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Cognitive sociology has not had -- so far -- the success of the study of
social cognition in for instance social psychology (well, at least in the
USA and in work on social representations in Europe, but not in for instance
"discursive psychology") -- after the early, but unfortunately not very influential
book of Aaron Cicourel on cognitive sociology 30 years ago. It was mostly
the other side of "qualititative" or "phenomenological" sociology, namely
ethnomethodology, that became very popular, for instance in conversation
analysis, and its success in the general study of discourse, also in discursive
psychology. <br>
<br>
It is a pity that precisely one of the interesting aspects of this phenomenological
sociology (of Afred Schütz, etc), namely the study of "implicit 'folk' methods"
people use in conducting their everyday lives, was limited in practice by
the ethnomethodologists to the realm of action, interaction and hence conversation.
Ironically, in that sense they are closer to the interest in "action" as
a basis of sociology of their generally despised master Talcott Parsons than
they might be willing to concede. <br>
<br>
Aaron Cicourel -- and some others -- not only took up the conversational
side of phenomenological sociology, but also the cognitive side, and at the
University of California at San Diego in La Jolla (where I spent a sabbatical
in 1985 -- working on racism and discourse) he has been connected to work
on cognition for many years. <br>
<br>
Indeed, in my view, the other half part of the "program" of Schütz and others
has never been carried out -- namely the study not only the social expressions
of implicit ´methods' in terms of action, interaction or conversation, but
of the 'methods' themselves. <br>
<br>
Of course, there are still old and neo behaviorists who claim that these
cannot be studied because these are not "observable" (and who think that
an action is something more "real" and "observable" than, say, beliefs).
<br>
<br>
But it seems to me that limiting oneself to the study of action, interaction
and discourse, without going beyond that, in terms of "underlying" cognitions
(or broader societal functions, but that is another topic), is doing only
half of the job. It is like doing linguistics without doing semantics --
with the argument that "meanings" are not "observable" -- as already Bloomfield
claimed in the 1930s. Or grammar without thinking about its cognitive basis.<br>
<br>
Crucial, then, is to design a research program that does of course NOT reduce
interaction, conversation or discourse to a mere study of cognition and hence
to cognitive psychology or cognitive science as we know it today. A cognitive
sociology of course can and should contribute things that are different from
cognitive or social psychology. <br>
<br>
Many ideas of Schütz and others, about 'methods', could be developed in terms
of a modern cognitive sociology that examines in detail the mental representations
shared by (members of) groups and institutions. These shared beliefs are
as "social" as anything else studied in sociology. <br>
<br>
Beyond what is being studied in cognitive and social psychology about beliefs,
such a cognitive sociology might and should study the social conditions and
consequences of (various kinds of) shared beliefs, social representations,
attitudes or ideologies. <br>
<br>
For instance in my work on ideology, I became fascinated by the question
whether and how some social groups develop ideologies and others do not --
indeed, what are the precise social conditions why groups "need" an ideology,
and how do these social conditions influence the contents, structures, and
processes of such ideologies. <br>
<br>
The same is true, of course, for the notion of knowledge, which is also fundamentally
social and not only cognitive. A new sociology of knowledge can and should
therefore be developed also within such a framework, and not limited to the
current types of sociology of knowledge (or science) that ignores cognition.<br>
<br>
Important though is NOT to <i>reduce</i>, but to expand and to interrelate.
Not to reduce the study of discourse or cognition to the study of "observable"
discourse or action, nor vice versa, abuse of the cognitive foundations of
discourse or action and hence reduce everything to a cognitive approach.
A cognitive sociology must study the social nature of cognition, and do so
of course (also) in the theoretical terms and categories of sociology. <br>
<br>
There is a vast field to explore here.<br>
<br>
Unfortunately, much of this cannot be found in the little recent book by
Zerubavel. There is much more to be done -- across disciplines -- connecting
a non reductionist social psychology with a new cognitive sociology. <br>
<br>
And relevant for this list: I would develop these relationships in a critical
perspective, namely precisely in order to be able to explain how socially
shared cognitions (like knowledge or prejudices or idoelogies) may be used
and abused in the (discursive) reproduction of domination.<br>
<br>
<br>
Teun A. van Dijk<br>
Universitat Pompeu Fabra<br>
Dept. de Traducció i Filologia<br>
Rambla 30<br>
08002 Barcelona, Spain<br>
<br>
E-mail: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:teun@discourse-in-society.org">teun@discourse-in-society.org</a><br>
Web-site: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.discourse-in-society.org">http://www.discourse-in-society.org</a><br>
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