

A Framework Document for Evidence-Based Programme Design on Reintegration

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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Claim	A statement about meaning, value or virtue.
Design (noun)	A specification for making or doing something.
Design/ing (verb)	To create designs.
Designer	Someone who makes designs.
Evidence	Information that is used in support or refutation of a hypothesis, theory or claim.
Information	Details or facts learned through study or experience.
Knowledge	An organized body of information, or the comprehension and understanding consequent on having acquired and organized a body of facts: e.g. "a knowledge of history".
Planning	The ordering of resources to achieve a goal.
Project document	A planning tool that aligns activities, resources and goals.
Prototype	A preliminary model, from which other forms may be built.
Strategy	A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end.
Strategic design	Design based on evidence and directed by a goal.
Theory	A set of principles on which the practice of an activity is based: "a theory of education"; "music theory"; "a theory of action".

PREFACE: A WORD ON “EVIDENCE”

The word evidence is often understood to be synonymous with “information”, sometimes even “proof” or “fact.” This perhaps explains the prevalence of adding the term “evidence-based” to many other terms, practices or activities that one could assume should have been based on information or fact in the first place. With this document we use the term “evidence-based design”. However, the word evidence is used here in a strict sense.

The terms information and evidence are related in important ways, but they are not interchangeable. We think of information as the facts and details learned about something, for example through study or experience. Evidence, however, is that information that can be used to either justify or deny a hypothesis or claim. While evidence is always made up of information, information on its own is not evidence. It only becomes evidence when applied in an evaluative and analytic process to confirm, verify or disprove a claim.

In the case of evidence-based design for reintegration, the claims made pertain to proposals for programming action and local engagement. The evidence referred to is information that is used to make a locally grounded case (either for or against) a proposed course of action, given what has been learned about that local context and situation. The requirement that evidence-based design places upon such proposals is that they be explicitly built from such evidence—from information that, applied as evidence, allows us to evaluate and demonstrate the value, feasibility and desirability of proposed actions for reaching desired strategic goals with communities, in locally effective ways.

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INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THIS FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

This is a Framework Document on evidence-based reintegration programme design, prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for the Inter-agency Working Group (IAWG) on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The purpose of this Framework Document is to develop and introduce a Conceptual Framework for working with evidence in the design of reintegration programmes to support efforts towards greater local impact at the field level. This is critical to achieving strategic goals at both the national and the international levels.

The general task of a Conceptual Framework is to lay out the central concern to be addressed, provide a way of thinking about that concern (in the sense of a theoretical orientation), and identify ways of treating, engaging or addressing that concern (in the sense of both practical and methodological requirements). A Conceptual Framework sets up the foundations for a shared vocabulary and orientation to complex phenomena and provides direction and focus to practices developed in response.

Taking direction from both the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and the IAWG's strategic priority areas as established for 2012–2014,¹ this framework is designed to support locally effective implementation of existing (and developing) policy on reintegration programming by directing attention to the operational needs of reintegration practitioners involved with programme design and strategic planning. As such, it is a highly pragmatic endeavour to advance the *means* by which policy is implemented.

Because these tasks inherently involve negotiating the complex space between local realities on the one hand, and the strategic objectives set out by high-level political actors on the other (such as national governments, existing peace treaties, United Nations Security Council resolutions, United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers etc.) the framework developed here treats evidence-based programme design as both a diagnostic and a design process.

It is a diagnostic process in that it is used for identifying and learning about local reintegration contexts, and that learning can directly contribute to crafting locally effective programming activities that serve strategic goals, but which are not always known a priori or are identified by predetermined assessments. It is a design process in that it facilitates both adaptation and innovation in programming through the use of evidence as a way of addressing problem-solving tasks.

The primary audience for this document is practitioners of the IAWG's member organizations. This is a diverse group of organizations and professionals. Therefore, the framework developed here is intended to provide broadly applicable and practical assistance relevant to tasks and requirements involved in programme design at various levels and junctures.

A secondary audience is the wider community of peace, security and development professionals concerned with how to better move knowledge to action in order to achieve greater success in their efforts.

A key objective in this Framework Document is to create an approach to evidence-based programme design that is responsive to the central challenge of negotiating field-level realities with strategic objectives (in the form of policies etc.) in a manner that is pragmatic, practical and productive.

¹ IAWG Joint Programme Strategy, 2012-2014: *Bridging Policy with Practice and Strengthening Capacity in Integrated DDR* (unpublished document).

In addressing this goal, the Framework Document focuses on two procedural steps central to evidence-based programme design, namely the *identification* of evidence, and the *application* of evidence to the design of activities that serve strategic goals in a local context.

I. FRAMING THE CHALLENGE: EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMME DESIGN ON REINTEGRATION

A. THE PROBLEM

The IAWG has determined that evidence-based programming is a strategic priority area for immediate development because reintegration programming is not as effective as it could or should be. This conclusion is shared by many national governments as well as the non-governmental organization (NGO) and academic communities.

The challenge is to improve the ability of programmes to address the problems, and effect the changes, targeted by reintegration policies and programming through better use of evidence.

Practitioners already make use of many different kinds of information from various sources, including United Nations assessments, commissioned research, and studies produced by governmental agencies, NGOs and other international and local actors. Important attention is given, by both researchers and practitioners alike, to the matter of making research accessible to policymakers and practitioners in order to inform and improve their plans and decisions.

The Overseas Development Institute has been running the Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) programme, for example, for almost a decade. As they explain it, “(RAPID) has been working to understand the relationship between research, policy and practice and promoting evidence-informed policy-making”.²

Difficulty still remains, however, in differentiating what is “nice to know” from that which we “need to know” in order to achieve practical goals. We remain limited in our collective capacity to identify which pieces, or kinds, of information are necessary (as opposed to merely relevant) for the practical achievement of strategic tasks and goals in a particular place.

Faced with a stack of research material, practitioners still must determine which pieces of information can be used as evidence for evaluating whether a proposed course of action may be a good one. So the questions remain: How should the material be evaluated? To what use is the collected information to be put, and how can it be used as evidence? And, once these questions are answered, how do we build the necessary systems to ensure that this takes place in our organizations?

These questions point to some of the needs that reintegration practitioners face—from headquarters to the field—in relation to working with evidence.

In the course of conducting research for this framework document, we developed three key insights that are helpful in addressing these questions:

Practitioners are problem solvers. Practitioners are interested in gathering and applying new information when, and often only when, it helps solve problems.

Different users, different uses. Practitioners working at the policy, programming and implementation levels have different problems to solve, and therefore different information needs.

Information does not apply itself. Even when information is widely available, and potentially applicable, it does not solve problems by itself. Information needs to be mobilized as a strategic asset in solving problems. This process is what turns information into evidence. It is not an

2 More information about the Overseas Development Institute’s work in this area can be found at <www.odi.org.uk/work/programmes/rapid/default.asp>.

obvious or automatic process, and it can easily be done incorrectly, inadvertently making matters worse rather than better. A conceptual framework is needed to guide this process.

In line with these insights, three core objectives emerge. An evidence-based approach to programme design must provide practitioners with assistance that supports their role as problem-solvers, is responsive to their different tasks and needs, and provides a way of applying information as an asset in solving problems.

B. A SOLUTION

To meet the challenges outlined above, any proposed solution must support the needs of practitioners while contributing to long-standing inter-organizational goals.

This document presents a framework for identifying and applying evidence in the design of reintegration programming that will have the following profile. The solution:

will contribute to the creation of more effective programming;

can facilitate results-based management processes for the benefit of greater accountability, transparency and effectiveness; and

may facilitate interagency cooperation on reintegration.

C. THE APPROACH

An Introduction to Evidence-based Programming

Many organizations, both within and outside the United Nations, have approached the problem of evidence-based programming. A great deal of attention is being paid to the matter in the public sector, including in such fields as transportation, education and especially public health.

This drive for evidence-based programming in the public sector comes from many sources, but one common feature is a widespread dissatisfaction with the levels of efficiency and effectiveness in high-cost activities, which creates pressures on those who need to justify expenditures and activities.³ Likewise, the general movement today across the public sector is towards greater accountability, transparency and effectiveness in major fields of public work. To improve these matters, governments, organizations and also private sector actors are working hard to “close the gap” between knowledge and action.

This tendency towards evidence-based policymaking, or programming, is newer than might be expected. David Bornstein explained that:

What we consider scientific evaluation today (i.e., treatment and control groups and random-assignments) is actually relatively new. The first randomized study of a medication, streptomycin, was published in 1948, and it was only in 1962, after birth defects caused by thalidomide, that the government began requiring pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate “substantial evidence of effectiveness” of drugs. Only in recent decades has evidence-based medicine emerged as an important movement in health care, challenging the idea that the doctor always knows best.⁴

3 The term efficiency refers to achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. In other words, the work being conducted is done in a competent and well-organized fashion. The term effective refers to being successful at achieving the desired results. It is worth noting that one can be extremely efficient in conducting activities that are entirely ineffective.

4 David Bornstein, “The Dawn of the Evidence-Based Budget”, *New York Times*, 30 May 2012.

Bornstein quotes Robert Gordon, executive associate director of the US Office of Management and Budget, who explained that “Because of overall budget constraints we are in a moment where everyone feels the imperative to do more with less. ... It has created a sense of urgency”.⁵

The British government has been advancing an agenda for the evidence-based policy approach since 1997. The *Modernising Government* white paper in 1999⁶ presented a new vision and strategy for the role and functioning of government in the United Kingdom. In the section on policymaking, the paper emphasizes the need to learn from experience, writing that:

Government should regard policy making as a continuous, learning process, not as a series of one-off initiatives. We will improve our use of evidence and research so that we understand better the problems we are trying to address. We must make more use of pilot schemes to encourage innovations and test whether they work. We will ensure that all policies and programmes are clearly specified and evaluated, and the lessons of success and failure are communicated and acted upon. Feedback from those who implement and deliver policies and services is essential too. We need to apply the disciplines of project management to the policy process.⁷

The United States has also cast a broad net over the need to use evidence in policymaking. A recent US Office of Management and Budget memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies concerned “The Use of Evidence and Evaluation in the 2014 Budget”. This four-page memo begins by explaining that:

Since taking office, the President has emphasized the need to use evidence and rigorous evaluation in budget, management, and policy decisions to make government work effectively. This need has only grown in the current fiscal environment. Where evidence is strong, we should act on it. Where evidence is suggestive, we should consider it. Where evidence is weak, we should build the knowledge to support better decisions in the future.⁸

As we direct our attention from the broad topic of governing itself to more thematic issues, we see the same problems noted. A recent tender provided by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, for example, states a problem that is widely shared by other governments and international organizations concerning development funding:

Billions of Norwegian Kroner are spent on development programmes. In 2011 alone spending amounted to 27, 7 billion Norwegian Kroner. To improve the efficiency of development spending, we need a better understanding of what works and how. A primary tool for acquiring understanding about effectiveness, relevance and impact of development cooperation programmes is evaluations, studies and other related research. While it is internationally recognized that there is a need to ensure that more development programmes are being evaluated, the value of these evaluations ultimately depends on their use. The challenge is to use these studies for better learning and decision-making.⁹

5 Ibid.

6 Available at <www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm43/4310/4310-00.htm>.

7 See item 6, <www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm43/4310/4310-02.htm>.

8 US office of Management and Budget, memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies, “Use of Evidence and Evaluation in the 2014 Budget”, 18 May 2012, <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-14.pdf>.

9 This quote is our translation of a passage from a request for tenders issued by Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, by email on 15 May 2012, for a study of evaluation use in the Norwegian development cooperation system. A link to a description of that call is available at <www.doffin.no/Search/Search_Switch.aspx?ID=258287>.

In 2009, our project at UNIDIR helped identify new approaches to addressing the knowledge-to-action nexus, which resulted in an official, joint statement by UNIDIR, the Conflict Research Unit at Clingendael, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Concluded from the workshop “Strategic Design in Public Policy: Revisiting the Knowledge-to-Action Nexus”, 23 November 2009, participants concluded that “There is a general state of dissatisfaction on the part of researchers and public policy practitioners about the way knowledge is used for action in public policy”, and that “Attention needs to be directed to the means by which knowledge is generated, and the ways in which it is used”.¹⁰

In response to this general concern about the use of knowledge in programming decisions for the public good, evidence-based programming (or policymaking, as some institutions call it) is broadly intended to better direct resources and processes towards results. It may be distinguished from experience-based or opinion-based programming (i.e. relying primarily or exclusively on one’s judgment), or negotiation-based programming (i.e. where options are created by, and selected through, political negotiation among actors in power or authority).

An evidence-based approach to programming is not a substitute for either of these alternatives. Experience is an essential element to effective programming and political processes are legitimate mechanisms of representative and responsive government. Consequently, evidence-based design neither negates the importance of experience, nor seizes the reigns of decision-making away from democratic processes. Rather it is meant to guard against error and better ensure that decisions are sufficiently informed by evidence relevant to the achievement of programming and policy goals.

Experience can often be misleading, and representative or cooperative decisions can often be wrong. It was once believed that the world was flat, that lead could be turned into gold, and that the Earth was the centre of the universe. Such errors—and the solutions to problems that were built from them—can only be replaced by a commitment to the scientific method working in cooperation with existing systems.

Evidence-based approaches create a new and cooperative grounds upon which to limit tendencies towards error, and in doing so, expand the range of possible actions, creating opportunities for new and more effective solutions.

The question, then, is how can we use evidence-based approaches for the benefit of improved designs for reintegration programmes? What are the approaches available, and how can they be utilized to achieve greater impact?

The assessment approach

In surveying a range of approaches to evidence-based programming, we have identified two that we believe are helpful in the present context. Each takes a different orientation to the identification and application of evidence in programme design. The first and more common approach is the Assessment Approach. The second is the Design Approach. This section and the next describe the approaches, discuss their relationship to one another, and explain their relevance for reintegration programme design specifically.

10 The Hague Conclusions from the Workshop on Strategic Design and Public Policy can be downloaded from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research at <www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf8-act337.pdf>. The follow-on event—The Glen Cove Conference on Strategic Design and Public Policy—was co-hosted by UNIDIR, the Center for Local Strategies Research at the University of Washington, and the Saïd Business School, University of Oxford. The background paper, conference agenda, participants list, Conference Report and several of the presentations can be found at <www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=535>.

The Assessment Approach is an evaluative approach. It is used to evaluate past or present conduct to produce evidence of effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) on the basis of rigorous criteria, systematically applied. Its goal is to show us what has worked and what has not so that we can make better decisions in the future. It is grounded by a dedication to scientific method.

The drive behind the Assessment Approach is a response to a long-standing desire on the part of policymakers (and others) to have a reasonable and demonstrable basis upon which to justify public expenditures and to take socially responsible actions. From this perspective, the goal of the Assessment Approach is twofold: first, to identify which past or current policies, programmes or practices have achieved the desired goals and effects; and second, to then systematically endorse or replicate these verified policies, programs, and practices.¹¹

An example of this approach is illustrated in the UK Department for International Development's research paper, "Scaling Up Nutrition: Unlocking puzzles to transform thinking and action" (September 2011). The paper declares:

We will be achieving our results in nutrition through scaling up programmes where there is evidence of fast and sustainable impact. And we will be working with others to make sure that we fill knowledge gaps and generate new research on what works and what does not in our drive for value.¹²

Notably, this approach orients the analysis not towards the particular, but rather towards making general claims that can form a basis for more universal conduct. The user it serves (i.e. the "consumer" of the evaluation itself) is the professional practitioner who has to make general decisions about conduct in a complex system.¹³

The Assessment Approach to evidence-based programming relies on scientific method to investigate programming impacts based on explicit evaluation criteria and explicit research designs. The specific criteria for evaluation will vary depending upon the study being conducted, but the commitment to scientific method remains.

This approach, when well executed, produces valid analysis that organizations can reliably use when making decisions about directing limited resources (e.g. time, money, human capital, political relationships etc.).¹⁴ Taken together, these evaluations lead to a base of evidence about the effectiveness of a programme or a programming approach. Hence, the term "evidence-based programming" in this sense refers to programming for which scientific evidence regarding impact has been produced. For matters of reintegration programming this approach is potentially valuable in improving our repertoire of programming options.

The design approach

The Design Approach is a problem-solving approach. The purpose of the Design Approach is to create value in programming by utilizing techniques for identifying and applying evidence in solving specific—or "situated"—problems.

11 Robert McCall, "Evidence-based programming in the context of practice and programming", *Social Policy Report*, vol. 23, no. 3, 2009, p. 4.

12 Available at <www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/scal-up-nutr-uk-pos-undernutr.pdf>.

13 That professional practitioner may very well elicit the assistance of advisors from the scientific community and others. However, the "end-user" is the decision-maker who must make decisions about the best allocation of resources to achieve some strategic end.

14 Some criteria that can be used in evaluating whether an Assessment Approach has been well executed include awareness of reasonable and valid assessment conditions (e.g. have the programmes to be assessed met the basic criteria for indicating readiness?), appropriate research design, appropriate implementation, and fidelity between findings and claims.

The Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon described design as the process of “[devising] courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones”.¹⁵

Programme design—be it on reintegration or other thematic areas—is a design task. The products of our designs are usually policies, programmes or practices. In order to create an evidence-based approach to design, we need to not only change existing situations into preferred ones, we need to do so in a manner that is systematic, grounded on evidence and oriented towards strategic goals.¹⁶

While the goal of the Assessment Approach is to demonstrate the effectiveness of programmes that have already been implemented, the goal of the design approach is to:

- make a grounded case for the local viability, feasibility and desirability of programmes that are being proposed for future action; and
- systematically apply the evidence used to make that case as a strategic asset in the design of action.

The role of evidence in this approach, then, is not to demonstrate the impact of past action. Rather, it is to create, evaluate and defend claims, either for or against, the relative value of proposed future actions with a view to creating effective programming for local contexts. In simpler language, it helps answer the question, “What makes us think this is a good idea?” While the language may be simple, the question is extremely serious.

A Design Approach is indicated in two kinds of situations:

- **When we need to adapt existing solutions to new situations.** Implementing existing programmes in new locations, including ones that have been subjected to evidence-based assessments, always requires a degree of adaptation. As explained in a report by the US Department of Health and Human Services, “there is a growing awareness and acceptance that often there must naturally be some level of ‘Adaptation’ that occurs when implementing an evidence-based program or practice. Adaptation must occur to some degree because the exact parameters of the true context in which the original program was implemented can never be recreated”.¹⁷ Determining the what and how of adaptation requires identifying evidence from the local context that can provide guidance on changes needed, as well as a process for using evidence in the design of strategic action.
- **When we need to do more than adapt.** We need to innovate. Implementing policy goals in local contexts that vary markedly from one another requires some alignment between general guidelines and particular contexts, in order to be locally effective. Sometimes achieving that alignment requires new approaches and new ideas. When we need to innovate around reintegration programming, a design approach provides a way of ensuring that new ideas are appropriate to, and grounded in, local realities.

The design approach is used to orient learning and analysis towards the particular, in order to improve impact and create value among a specific community, or demographic, or group of “users”. It has been used with positive effect in other sectors concerned with public service, such as public

15 Herbert Simon, *Models of Bounded Rationality*, 1982, p. 129.

16 New programme designs will always be subject to scrutiny by political processes. The design process, therefore, is not a challenge to political ones. Rather, design puts options on the table that political decision-making can consider and pick up. In the best scenarios, good designs compel good decisions.

17 US Department of Health and Human Services, *Implementation Resource Guide for Social Service Programs: An Introduction to Evidence-Based Programming*, 2010, p. 5.

healthcare (in Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom¹⁸), governance (Denmark, the United Kingdom¹⁹), transportation (United Kingdom²⁰) and even development.

This approach, when well-executed, produces locally grounded designs that bring value, engender uptake and address user needs effectively.

For matters of reintegration programming, this approach is potentially valuable in a number of areas. Specifically, it can provide us with a process for making direct use of local evidence in the design of programmes, improve our ability to adapt and innovate in more locally grounded ways, and it can provide guidance for problem-solving with evidence in new and changing contexts.

Choosing an approach

Each approach involves a set of tools and procedures for learning and action. Neither the Assessment Approach nor the Design Approach is an inherently better way of using evidence for programming than the other, any more than a hammer is inherently better than a saw for building a house. Rather, each effectively addresses certain kinds of challenges, situations and goals, and not others.

Because different aspects of reintegration programming can be usefully addressed by each of these approaches, we need a way of selecting which approach to use in the particular circumstances faced by field staff trying to design programming, and consequently, to determine which is the best option as the basis for the present framework.

Through interviews carried out with DDR trainers, practitioners and policy specialists, and reviews of academic, NGO and governmental literatures, two key sets of observations emerged as significant for making this determination:

- the first set pertains to the **alignment of the approach** to the practical needs of reintegration practitioners; and
- The second set pertains to the **amenability of the current state of affairs** of reintegration programming for development and integration of such an approach.

Alignment of the approach

As discussed above, the Assessment Approach is designed to rigorously evaluate and demonstrate the impact of past and on-going programmes and programming approaches. Through the application of scientific method, this approach generates a base of rigorous evidence about the effectiveness of programming. Such information can be valuable for the on-going development of programming practices by providing evidence about what has worked and what has not, both within, and ideally across, specific circumstances and cases. It can also facilitate programming processes by serving as a basis for tabling known programming options.

But, there are at least three kinds of situations commonly faced by staff working on reintegration that the Assessment Approach cannot be used to address. For the purposes of this discussion, the process of programme development can be broadly understood as beginning with a selection process. That is, it is the task of practitioners developing programmes to select what activities represent the best or most feasible way of achieving policy goals in a local context. The Assessment Approach can identify

18 In Norway, by the Norwegian Knowledge Center for Public Health. In Sweden, by the Public Healthcare Services Committee Administration of Stockholm County Council. In the United Kingdom, by the National Health System.

19 In Denmark, by the Ministry of Business and Growth, the Ministry of Taxation and the Ministry of Employment. In the United Kingdom, by the British Design Council.

20 By the West Sussex County Council Transport Division.

which programming options have been (demonstrably) effective in past cases, but it cannot help in the following circumstances, for which we offer examples and illustrations.²¹

- **When there are no evaluated options to choose from.** Reintegration programmes, thus far, have not been subjected to the same kind of rigorous and systematic evaluation processes that have been used in some other areas that depend upon an Assessment Approach to evidence-based programming (such as the nutrition example cited above). Though monitoring and evaluation is carried out in many cases, and efforts are being made to improve both evaluations themselves and their subsequent impact on new programmes, at present it cannot be said that either the compilation of lessons learned through evaluation processes, nor evaluation processes themselves, meet the same level of coherence (as a set) or rigor understood to form the basis of “evidence-based programming” in other fields (such as health, education and transportation).

Indeed, a review of DDR programmes published in 2010 by the Folke Bernadotte Academy found that “In most of the literature that we reviewed, we found little evidence of systematic assessments. Rather, most studies make sweeping statements based on limited and rather ambiguous evidence”.²² Therefore, at present, an evidence base in this sense does not yet exist on the effectiveness of reintegration programming—hence, there are no “evidence-based programmes” to choose from.²³

Illustration: Nita has arrived at her duty station in her posting as a Project Officer. She is in a regional office, far from the United Nations headquarters in the capital, with two national staff to assist her. She has been given a set of objectives to achieve in support of the reintegration programme being implemented by her agency, and now she must decide what activities will help her achieve this in the community where she is stationed. She sets about reviewing all the documents she can get access to that describe approaches taken in other DDR projects similar to her own. She comes across many evaluations (from DFID, GTZ, the World Bank, NGOs etc.) but most of the programmes she reviews have not yet been evaluated. Those evaluations that have been conducted have not used common evaluation criteria, have not been subjected to the same level of scientific rigor or review, or else they lack the specific project components (e.g. a gender component, a literacy programme, an employment programme etc.) that she is meant to design and implement locally. Nita must therefore make a selection from options that have not yet been assessed.

Since the role of the Assessment Approach is to identify effective programmes and approaches, it would ideally precede the juncture Nita faces, and produce the very list of programming options that she might consider.²⁴ However, in the situation she faces, which is choosing a course for future action, there is no role for the Assessment Approach.

21 These situations are illustrative and not intended to imply a complete classification system. They are drawn from real examples, learned through interviews, field-observations or personal communications. All names and other identifying details have been changed.

22 Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment*, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010, p. 4.

23 However, this also identifies an agenda to build that evidence base in order to explore the possibilities of its utility.

24 While evidence-based assessments might not exist for many reintegration programmes, monitoring and evaluation reports do. Often the findings from such reports result in “good practices” on reintegration programming, and these are often drawn from as preferred options.

- **When there are evaluated options to choose from, but no grounds upon which to make the choice.** The programming options produced by the Assessment Approach still need to be evaluated for their local applicability. It is widely recognized that no one solution is always applicable to different reintegration scenarios. Consequently, programme designers need a means of selecting among options for local implementation. “Lessons learned” or “good practice” reports are often used as a source of options, but, if criteria or guidance for selecting among options is not available, then the Assessment Approach reaches a procedural roadblock.

Illustration: Jack is on his third assignment in a DDR mission. In the past he has worked primarily in Asia, but now he finds himself in Africa. He is working with his colleagues to design the reintegration programme to be carried out in the volatile south-east region of the country. The team is fairly experienced overall, and they have been discussing programming approaches. Some team members are strongly in favour of taking an individual approach to reintegration, having had success with this in the past. Jack and another of colleague favour a communal approach based on their successes with it, and the team is presently in a deadlock over the matter. He recognizes that both options have been validated as legitimate programming options, but now wonders how they can determine which approach may be best suited, given the nature of the post-conflict conditions they face and the local culture, which many of the staff are just getting to know.

In this instance, despite the fact that Jack and his colleagues have what they consider to be a viable menu of programming options to consider, they still need a way of choosing from among them for the local context (and preferably a way that incorporates evidence along with experience and expertise). While the Assessment Approach can indicate what has been effective in other places at other times, it cannot guide decisions about future action, in new places. It can, in a sense, put options on the table, but it cannot help us decide which ones to take up.

- **When we reject the available options and need to come up with new ones.** The complexity of post-conflict scenarios will always open the possibility that programmes evaluated as having been effective in past contexts simply do not provide viable options for present ones. To be sure, existing evaluations are not to be ignored. They may help inform decisions, but they cannot in and of themselves provide a basis for determining whether activities should be put into practice. When we face situations in which, for different reasons, known or available options are rejected, then something new will need to be created.²⁵

25 New solutions do not suggest a rejection of the evidence base. Rather, the programme team will need to enter into an innovation process that will craft new solutions using a variety of methods and domains of knowledge.

Illustration: Mweni is an experienced Program Officer, and she is part of a well-organized and well-funded mission that has the support of the host government. Her team is fortunate because the assessment missions have yielded useful information to assist with programming. In addition, she has commissioned research on the cultural context to better inform her engagement with the local community. However, the research—strongly endorsed by the national team members—indicates that the programming solutions they were considering are actually ill-suited to the local context. A number of options from other missions are offered as alternatives, but for a variety of reasons (security context, political climate, nature of conflict, scope of host country agreement) none seem to offer a very good fit. Mweni is stuck. There is an evidence base of evaluated programming options to choose from, and there are criteria available to use for choosing among these existing solutions, but having rejected the available solutions the team needs to come up with alternatives.


While the Assessment Approach can provide us with programming options, there is no claim (nor expectation) that those options are definitive, or that they will or can be effective in all circumstances. In Mweni's case, the team's experience and expertise have led them away from the evidence-based (e.g. scientifically assessed) options before them. They now need an approach that can assist them in using that experience, expertise and information from local assessments to create a new solution.

Each of these illustrations represent a situation commonly faced by staff working on reintegration. These practitioners are faced with the task of either selecting a programming option for implementation, adapting a programming option for implementation, or innovating a new programming solution. But because the Assessment Approach is retrospective in nature (i.e. designed to evaluate the impact of past action) it is poorly aligned to tasks that are primarily about creating new or future action. This is why "using the studies for decision-making"—as for example the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation aspires to do—leaves unanswered how that divide is meant to be overcome.

In contrast, the Design Approach, as a problem-solving approach, is specifically developed to attend to situations and tasks such as these—in which new things must be learned, and applied in new ways—to solve "situated" problems. Such problems are specific (that is, they pertain to a particular set of actors, places, goals, conditions, resources and so on), and they may of course vary radically from place to place, and case to case.

An evidence-based Design Approach addresses such challenges with an emphasis on identifying evidence pertaining to the feasibility, viability and desirability of such action in a local context, and on building designs for future action on that basis.

The following diagram helps to illustrate the alignment between tasks (or circumstances) and approaches, and how a selection might be made:

Figure 1: Approaches and their Uses

- When a base of evidence exists concerning the effectiveness of programming approaches, and a selection system is in place for choosing approaches, it becomes possible (and often very helpful) to implement known solutions to familiar problems.
- When local variation and particularities make direct implementation of existing solutions questionable, adaptation is required. Hybrid solutions can be devised by taking direction from the evidence available, but tailoring the solution to local realities.
- When there is no base of evidence available concerning the effectiveness of programming approaches, or else existing solutions are rejected by programme designers as untenable, it becomes necessary to innovate and create new solutions. This places the programming task on the design end of the spectrum. At this end of the spectrum, evidence-based programme design is a creative process that is directed towards strategic goals, and that uses information to inform decisions so that they are accountable to the best available evidence whenever possible.

Because the Design Approach is best aligned with the tasks of adaptation and innovation, we can see a vital role for such an approach in reintegration programming. The IDDRS recognize adaptation as a standard aspect of developing reintegration programming, as explained in the following excerpt from the 2010 Operational Guide describing the need for context-specific approaches to reintegration:

The specific country contexts and characteristics of armed forces and groups, and programme participants may require a mix of the above reintegration approaches. A reintegration programme may therefore combine shortterm stabilization with excombatant-focused reintegration if the main objective is to deal with urgent threats to security. It may also combine excombatantfocused reintegration with an approach that deals with the priorities of the receiving communities, to increase their absorptive capacity.²⁶

Hence, the challenge of adaptation is a central and common one faced in reintegration programming. The circumstances and details requiring adaptation will vary, and solutions may therefore vary from case to case. The table referred to in the text provides some guidance for how to select among three general reintegration approaches for different contexts, but challenges for programme design still remain. An evidence-based Design Approach makes it possible to engage processes of adaptation with coherence, direction and with improved transparency. We believe that using such an approach

26 IDDRS Operational Guide, 2010, module 4.30, p. 159.

to guide these tasks will not constrain, but will rather liberate and encourage the ability to create context-specific solutions.

Amenability: The current state of affairs of reintegration programming

The second set of observations significant for selecting an approach to evidence-based programming at this juncture concerns the amenability of the current state of affairs in reintegration programming practices to the requirements involved in developing each approach, and the associated delivery-horizon for benefits.

In response to the first matter, the current state of affairs in reintegration programming practice indicates both an immediate need for programming support, and limited capacity and resources (including time, money and human resources) for conducting additional assessments and activities.

Developing an approach to evidence-based assessment for reintegration programming is a long-term, large-scale, expert-driven endeavour. Though the practice of conducting evaluations of reintegration programming goes back many years, these evaluations:

- have been conducted by a range of actors;
- have not been subjected to shared criteria or made using common methods;
- have produced results of uneven quality; and
- have not been conducted within a broader or coherent set of analytic goals enabling a set of cumulative findings and claims.

The 2006 edition of the IDDRS Operational Guide refers to this state of affairs in module 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes. The section summary notes that, “Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has been one of the weakest areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme management in the past, partly due to a lack of proper planning, a standardized M&E framework, and human and financial resources specifically dedicated to M&E”.²⁷

Consequently, as discussed above, no evidence base of “proven programmes” currently exists from which to choose reintegration programming solutions. At the present time, therefore, the initial challenge for an Assessment Approach to evidence-based reintegration programming is to either identify or develop an approach to evidence-based assessment for reintegration programming itself.²⁸

Likewise, though there are different approaches to rigorous assessment that are being practiced for the benefit of improved policy and practice in areas that fall under the broad category of development (such as health, finance, education, energy, governance and agriculture), it remains to be seen whether (and which of) these can be applied directly to the special concerns of reintegration programming, which are directed towards the broader goals of sustainable peacebuilding.

Once developed or selected, an evidence-based Assessment Approach can be implemented to assess programmes that have been or in some cases are being conducted. Such assessments will need to be proposed, funded, designed and conducted, and findings produced and shared. It is only at that juncture that reintegration practitioners can begin to have an evidence base upon which to draw in making programming choices.

²⁷ IDDRS Operational Guide, 2006, module 3.50, p. 1. A key and welcome feature of the 2010 Operational Guide is new guidance and standardization for M&E practices for DDR in module 3.50.

²⁸ At present, programming options are drawn from “good practices”. But the distinction between good practices as those that have been recommended on the basis of lessons learned, and “evidence-based” programs as those that have been evaluated through application of scientific method, should be underscored.

The value of this undertaking for improving reintegration programming is clear from a number of perspectives. But even with such evidence in hand, practitioners are still left with the need for guidance on adaptation and innovation.

By contrast, developing an approach to evidence-based design for reintegration programming addresses this need directly. In addition, it can be done comparatively quickly, can be developed through relatively small-scale processes, and can result in a broadly applicable tool or process that supports in-house expertise in working with the resources at hand, and in identifying additional resources for future improved practice.

The initial steps for development of an evidence-based Design Approach include:

- the identification of user (or practitioner) needs;
- the development of a conceptual framework for working with evidence to address those needs; and
- the development and testing of a prototype tool or process to facilitate evidence-based design practices, including techniques and mechanisms for generating evidence and putting it to work.

Additional steps would include:

- developing a network of research providers;
- developing tools and mechanisms for cooperation with research providers; and
- identifying funding mechanisms.

Once the prototype of such a tool or process is completed, it can be made available for use in current programme design and redesign activities, and it can be used by a wide range of practitioners, working at different levels. Though further development and refinement should be expected with use, and the utility of the approach should improve over time as it becomes integrated into practice and as the network of partners is established, it is possible for practitioners to start using and therefore yielding the benefit of the approach relatively quickly.

The value of this undertaking comes from at least three key features: its potential benefits are achievable in the near term, making it available for imminent reintegration programmes; the prototype can be produced by a small team of researchers and designers working cooperatively with country offices and practitioners; and, while expert involvement and support are the goal and will improve both the practice and the results of evidence-based design, the launch of the approach need not be expert-dependent. Taken together, this means that benefits can start to be seen with a smaller investment of resources than what is required for the development of an Assessment Approach.

Evidence-based design

As stated above, there is an important role for both evidence-based assessment and evidence-based design in improving reintegration programming. However, in comparing the Assessment Approach and the Design Approach, it is the Design Approach that emerges as the one best aligned with the immediate and practical needs of reintegration practitioners, and is most achievable in the current state of affairs. As such, it is more likely to yield short-term benefits while laying the foundations for long-term organizational development.

Work that is already underway can be used to support several of the steps listed above for developing a Design Approach:

- Identify user needs: Initial research into practitioners' needs was conducted in part during UNIDIR's Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) project, later in support of this document, and also as part of a recent project by the service design company live|work and The Policy Lab, working with the University of Tromsø (funded by the Norwegian Design Council).
- Develop a network of research providers: Research capacity for producing information on reintegration relevant to design needs is presently being produced by various universities and research centres, NGOs and so on. While such research still needs to be better adapted for use by practitioners²⁹ and for evidence-based design, existing research capacity can be made use of.³⁰
- Develop tools and mechanisms for cooperation with research providers: The project "Improving Reintegration Programming Through Evidence-based Research", conducted from February 2011 to February 2012, was an effort jointly funded by the IAWG and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, to investigate ways that the Center for Peace Studies can better serve reintegration policy and programming practices through its research.

In the following section we offer a model for conceptualizing evidence-based design for the benefit of practitioners tasked with designing reintegration programmes for specific locations, and the kinds of challenges faced there.

This model for strategic design, built on key findings from the previously mentioned SNAP project,³¹ provides a guide for how to identify evidence, and ways to apply it, in the achievement of strategic goals.

29 See *The Hague Conclusions from the Workshop on Strategic Design and Public Policy*, 2009, <www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf8-act337.pdf>; and *Conference Report: The Glenn Cove Conference on Strategic Design and Public Policy*, 2010, <www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf9-act337.pdf>.

30 Reintegration-specific, evidence-based assessment does not, as far as we know, exist at the present time. The approach and the capacity both need to be developed. Research is presently conducted from a wide range of perspectives into various aspects of reintegration. While there is certainly a degree of dissatisfaction expressed by practitioners as to the usefulness of some of the research produced, our assessment is that this is more a function of poor alignment of research to needs, rather than a lack of capacity.

31 Derek B. Miller and Lisa Rudnick, *The Security Needs Assessment Protocol: Improving Operational Effectiveness through Community Security*, UNIDIR, 2008.

II. THE STRATEGIC DESIGN MODEL AS A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMME DESIGN

Designing with evidence, as one writer explained, “is not just about gathering up data at the beginning of a project: it is about infusing design decisions with data-driven insights throughout the entire process”.³²

Evidence-based design for reintegration shares this orientation. The goal is to create a process whereby design decisions are made on the basis of local evidence, such that it is reflected in programming itself. This will require techniques, mechanisms and partners, for generating information that practitioners may use as evidence. It will also require a model that explains how to infuse design processes with evidence.

Programme design, at its core, is about creating or selecting activities for implementation. Using an evidence-based approach to programme design means building that process (of creating or selecting activities) on grounded claims about the value of acting certain ways in distinct circumstances (i.e. here and now, or then and there, or always and everywhere).

Therefore, the model we introduce proposes that the role of evidence in programme design is to make as rigorous, valid and sound a case as possible about the value of a course of action in and for a given context. The model therefore supports pragmatic action that will facilitate the achievement of strategic goals in locally viable ways.

For many practitioners this will already seem familiar, as it should, because sometimes this is done intuitively, or implicitly.³³ But, the critical move in evidence-based design—as opposed to experienced-based design, or negotiated design—is explicitly anchoring the proposed or selected set of activities in evidence, and aligning those activities to the strategic goals.

In this way, evidence-based design is especially helpful in adapting the “generic objectives” of a DDR programme to the “realities and needs of each context”, and in developing the “smaller objectives that clearly define expected outputs in each sector” (in this case, focusing specifically on reintegration).³⁴

32 David Gillis, “The Art and Science of Evidence-Based Design”, *UX Magazine*, 27 April 2010, <www.uxmag.com/articles/the-art-and-science-of-evidence-based-design>.

33 In addition, the process of planning and programme design laid out in the IDDRS Operational Guide features guidance on conducting detailed assessments, including an indication of assessment areas or themes, a list of methods of data collection, and a list of tools and techniques that can be used for analysing results produced by the assessments (IDDRS Operational Guide, 2006, module 3.20). But, beyond the explanation that, “The comprehensive DDR assessment will be the main source of data on which to draw when defining programme strategies, targets and so on” (ibid., p. 10) no guidance is provided on how to move from DDR assessment findings to programme design, beyond the description of key components in the Programme Document which such data is meant to support (ibid.). In the 2010 edition, the IDDRS Operational Guides anchors DDR programme design explicitly in the results-based management framework. The improvements are notable. For example, the text indicates that results based management provides the framework for achieving intended outcomes through activities and outputs (see Fig. 3.20.1, p.72, 2011). However, the notion of programme design is still equated more with using assessment findings to create key sections of the programme document, than with ways of using evidence to design courses of action to achieve intended outcomes. In terms of reintegration programme design specifically, Module 4.30, Social and Economic Reintegration, provides a set of Guiding Principles for “planning and implementation” (p. 4, 2006), and indicates key areas for pre-programme assessments along with suggested research questions for each. But, beyond identifying “key issues to consider when planning for reintegration,” (p. 11, 2006, and p. 167, 2011) the IDDRS does not yet provide guidance on how to make use of assessment findings in the design process itself.

34 IDDRS Operational Guide, 2006, module 3.20, p. 12.

We refer to this process of both anchoring design activities in evidence, and aligning them to strategic goals as Strategic Design.

In a strategic design process, we begin with a goal for action, and ask in a reflective and critical way, what needs to be known in order to achieve that goal locally. The essential question is, “What do we need to know, given what we want to do?”

Asking what needs to be known in order to successfully achieve programming goals is not a pedantic exercise. When posed reflectively and critically, the question of what needs to be known can lead us away from ticking boxes and missed opportunities, and towards genuine learning and new possibilities.

For example: The IDDRS specify a series of assessments to produce information that is deemed requisite for the design of a reintegration programme—and more specifically, the Programme Document. We know that we need information about the conflict and security context, about target groups or beneficiaries, about viable areas for return or resettlement, and for what purpose (as specified in both the general objectives of the DDR programme, and the sector-specific objectives, as mentioned above). However, if the goal is the durable reintegration of female ex-combatants in the Terai of Nepal, we might also need to know other things that do not figure on the list of assessments, to ensure the successful achievement of that goal in the local context. Such things might include information about the local model of gendered identity, how this is arranged in the local networks of care, how the different categories of community members are implicated in that model, how returning women and children are implicated, what the role of economic contribution to that model is, and what the local decision-making practices are and how these affect networks of care.

The answers to these questions and others can help shape core programming elements such as the processes that are created for accessing reintegration assistance, the options that are made available as reintegration packages, who are targeted as participants in programmes, what kind of programming approach is best suited to the local context and so on.

By starting with a clear action-oriented objective, a basis is provided from which to differentiate the “need to know” from the “nice to know.” This guides us towards identifying those forms of information and evidence most needed for achieving the goal in question.

This ability to prioritize among the many kinds of possibly relevant information can do much to help manage the current overload of reading material—such as reports, assessments and evaluations—and its insufficient application in programming, by providing programme designers with selection criteria to help them choose what to read, and also what to learn, when commissioning research. By starting with an action-oriented objective, the strategic design process focuses attention specifically on the kinds of evidence needed to achieve that objective. In doing so, strategic design can aid practitioners in scoping resources and goals with genuine and practical knowledge needs.

A useful and supportive approach to evidence-based reintegration programme design must therefore contain three elements:

- a framework for identifying evidence;
- a system for making use of evidence in a design process; and
- a system for evaluating the quality of the proposed design.

Each of the following three subsections explains one of these three elements. The three elements are then considered together as a coherent model for evidence-based reintegration programming. The model is called the Strategic Design Model.

Four key insights provide a platform from which to embark when building the model, and will be further explained in the relevant sections:

Information is not the same thing as evidence. Information becomes evidence when it is applied to a theory to help achieve a goal (from a programming perspective, this means the solving of a problem in support of a policy or higher-level strategy).

Evidence needs to be applied. Having evidence, either for or against a proposition, does not by default yield a course of action. Rather, evidence creates the grounds from which designs for action can be made.

Theories for action need to be built from evidence. For our purposes, a theory for action can be thought of as a set of assumptions about the meanings, values, causes and effects of an action or a course of action. Such assumptions can be derived from our own perspectives, experiences or cultural systems (in which case we refer to them as “folk theories”), or they can be derived through research and scholarship (as in Einsteins’ theory of relativity, in which case we refer to them as “formal theories”). It is essential that the theories for action used to inform reintegration programme design are grounded in evidence rather than conventional wisdom, political agreement or personal interpretation alone.

Evidence can be used to support or refute theories for action. Evidence can be used as a crucial check as the grounds upon which to evaluate whether some theory of action is reasonable in a given context. When built from evidence and sound method, theories for action can be used to animate and guide the design process, provide direction for future conduct, and provide a basis for the evaluation of designs, redesign and for accountability (among other uses).


A. FROM INFORMATION TO EVIDENCE

A first step in working with evidence is to define what it is.³⁵

Evidence is defined here as information that can be used either to justify or deny a hypothesis, theory or claim. Information itself is therefore not evidence.

Instead, information becomes evidence through analysis and evaluation by the researcher or designer. The analytic and evaluative move for transforming information into evidence consists of considering it in relationship to a goal in a systematic and principled manner.

Figure 2: The movement from information to evidence



That goal can be solving a mystery (i.e. the power goes out, but we do not know why), identifying the source of a problem (we check the generator, and find it out of petrol), or designing a solution (filling the generator is necessary, but may or may not be sufficient for a complete solution to the

³⁵ There are many ways to define the term “evidence”. Consequently, the approach taken here is not intended to be universal. Rather, it is intended to be productive and generative for the purposes of programme design generally and the matter of reintegration programme design specifically.

problem, in which case the information may not be evidence for the hypothesis that this is the source of the problem, or more evidence may be needed to understand the present problem).

In all three circumstances— solving mysteries, identifying the source(s) of problems, or designing effective solutions— evidence is mobilized to build a convincing argument about what the problem is, and what should be done about it.

In the case of programme design, evidence is most often used to build an argument that a proposed course of action will not solve a problem and should be dropped, a course of action will solve a problem and should be taken up, or a course of action is better than others and therefore should be chosen from among alternatives.

One useful way to illustrate the difference between information and evidence is by considering the difference between a database, and an evidence base.

A database can be thought of as a collection of information, while an evidence base is a set of arguments or testimonies. Information could be selected from a database, and—when evaluated in light of a particular question (mystery, problem, or solution)—it can be used as evidence for, or against, some position or argument. Does the bloody knife, for instance, support or falsify the claim that a murder has taken place? Likewise, do reports of community hostility towards female returnees support or refute the argument that an individual-based approach to reintegration should be favoured?

However, before a particular piece of information is analysed in this way, it is not possible to know whether it counts as evidence for a given case or not.³⁶ Recalling our detective and the analogy of a criminal investigation, some of the collected information from the crime scene may prove to be evidence in the case. But a large amount of that information is irrelevant to the case and cannot be used as evidence.

Therefore, the first step in identifying evidence is articulating a strategic goal. For the detective on the criminal case, the goal is solving the crime. For the programme designer, the goal is achieving the conditions indicated by policy objectives. What information helps me to make a case, either for or against, a given course of action in some context?

A goal-driven search for information (“what do we need to know, given what we want to do?”) directs attention towards those kinds of information that are potentially most applicable to the task at hand, out of the wide range available and potentially relevant.

Because reintegration is a complex process that takes place in difficult contexts, and at the macro, meso and micro levels, there are many tasks involved, requiring different kinds of information. Therefore, there can be no a priori claim about what kind of evidence is best suited or most needed for making decisions about reintegration writ large (e.g. political, economic, socio-cultural). However, as indicated in the IDDRS, there are three key areas for detailed assessments for reintegration programmes. These concern “participant profiles, likely areas of return and resettlement, and reintegration opportunities and services that are already available”.³⁷

36 The distinction is useful to make in considering the contexts in which people making programming decisions operate. Several practitioners have reported that, on the one hand, the sheer amount of information they must synthesize and make use of is overwhelming, but on the other, it is difficult to find information that is truly useful or directly relevant to conducting tasks or achieving goals. Having a framework that can help people identify the relevant pieces of evidence in the piles of information, or to recognize gaps in the information that is available, is helpful.

37 IDDRS Operational Guide, 2010, p. 160.

In addition, we also note that one broad area of information that is always applicable to the design of any meso- or micro-level engagement concerns what we refer to as local strategies research. At present, this type of research is not typically, systematically or explicitly used in programme design, nor indicated as an area of research in the IDDRS.³⁸

Local strategies are the “tactical processes for managing and improving social life that are developed in, and indigenous to, a given locale or community. [They] involve not only local tactics, enacted and articulated, but also local notions of the problematic and the possible in social life”.³⁹ Research into local strategies “illuminates the ways in which socio-cultural systems shape pragmatic action in the lives of communities”, and in so doing, brings some important information to light about how action is shaped and made sense of (whether conducted by community members or outsiders), about what is seen as problematic (or possible) and why, and therefore, what makes local sense to do about it.⁴⁰

This kind of information has an important role to play in an approach to evidence-based programme design. Similar to information about other aspects of local systems (like gender), local strategies research helps us to understand key assessment findings in more closely local ways, and is (or should be) used to evaluate proposals for action around such matters as access to land, resettlement schemes, training and employment, and process to support reconciliation, among others.

Key Points:

- Information is not the same thing as evidence.
- In programme design, we define evidence as information that can be used to build a case, either for or against, a proposed course of action (as one that is likely to be locally effective).
- The first step in identifying evidence is articulating a goal.
- Different kinds of evidence are required for different goals.
- One important source of evidence for evaluating proposals for communal engagement is local strategies research.

B. FROM EVIDENCE TO DESIGN

The IDDRS provide an overarching framework of what reintegration programming should attend to in order to support the transition of ex-combatants into civilian life, to promote peacebuilding and contribute to ongoing development and stability. Figuring out how to best implement these guidelines, in different local contexts, and towards these goals, requires a process—an evidence-based design process.

The above section discussed ways of identifying evidence. But this is not the same as applying it. Though some tools and guidelines may provide guidance about what kinds of information (not evidence) to generate in support of programme design, there is no systematic or explicit guidance


38 Derek B. Miller and Lisa Rudnick, *The Security Needs Assessment Protocol: Improving Operational Effectiveness through Community Security*, UNIDIR, 2008.

39 Gerry Philipsen, *Local Strategies Research: From Knowledge to Practice?*, (forthcoming); see also <<http://localstrategiesresearch.washington.edu/index.php/directors-page/directors-page-archive/>>

40 Derek B. Miller and Lisa Rudnick, “The Case for Situated Theory in Peacebuilding Practice”, *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, p. 65.

on how to make use of this in the design of programmes. At present, the task of application comes to rest on the person trying to solve a problem or design a solution. This means that application is largely idiosyncratic, and becomes dependent upon individual talent and skill. A framework is therefore needed to map out how we can use evidence in a design process in a more systematic way.

Figure 3: The movement from evidence to design propositions



Above we discussed the role of evidence in programme design as making a valid and sound case about the value of doing or not doing something, in some place. In this sense, evidence provides the basis for helping people to decide whether a proposed course of action is a good idea or not, in a given place and context.

If we think of programme design as a way of creating viable actions to achieve particular goals among people in a distinct socio-cultural system, then we need a theory for action *for* that system (what we call a “situated theory”). In other words, we need some informed basis that can guide our thinking about what kinds of actions are suited, not only to the tasks at hand (such as determining locally viable livelihood options, assisting ex-combatants in selecting reintegration packages suited to them, evaluating the resources for either individually or communally based programming options) but also to the beliefs and practices through which those actions will be received, interpreted and engaged by local participants. It is not enough to know “what” to do (e.g. create sustainable livelihoods for women), we must also understand “how” in order for solutions to be locally viable.

Too often, of course, evaluations note how internationally designed and implemented programmes fail the test of ownership by national and local actors. A situated theory for action would need to explicitly engage the question of why a course of action is expected to work. This is not only true for reintegration programmes, but in fact would be valuable for the full spectrum of international engagement (democratization, public health, education, livelihood assistance etc.)⁴¹

Situated theories for action are built from a variety of forms of information. As stated earlier, the kinds of information one needs is driven by the kinds of goals one is trying to achieve. However, one goal all local programming has in common is local impact. Consequently, situated theories for local action—independent of thematic goals—must attend to the more general matter of local beliefs and practices. For this reason, cultural research is essential because it makes it possible for us to see beyond our own assumptions about value and utility, learn about local systems, and then, through the use of strategic design, craft solutions informed by both.

Upon developing a situated theory for action, grounded on evidence and directed towards a strategic goal, we are in a new position to undertake the next two steps in the Strategic Design process:

- determine whether implementation is appropriate, or whether adaptation or innovation is required; and
- create, evaluate and, when possible, test design propositions.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64; see also Donal Carbaugh and Sally O. Hastings, “A Role for Communication Theory in Ethnography and Cultural Analysis”, *Communication Theory*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1992.

By drawing on new and emerging approaches to service design, interaction design and policy design, and adapting them to the special concerns of working in post-conflict contexts, we believe it is possible to develop an approach for reintegration programming that is cooperative and inclusive of stakeholders, in the same spirit as many approaches to participatory action research, but which holds the potential to be more effective in the achievement of practical and strategic goals. Design practices promise to contribute a great deal to effective local programming provided they are explicitly grounded in evidence, and employed by people who know how to design from situated theories for action, given the necessity to “do no harm”. Without a firm basis from which to understand the implications of our actions, to “do no harm” cannot be expected.⁴²

Key Points:


- Identifying evidence is not the same as applying it.
- The role of evidence in programme design is to provide the basis for evaluating whether a proposed course of action is or is not a good idea in a given context.
- Such evaluations must take in to account a proposal’s suitability to both practical needs for reaching strategic goals, as well as local systems of meaning and practice.
- Situated theories for action therefore provide an important part of that basis, and the foundations that guide adaptation and innovation.
- Service design and interaction design, among other approaches, offer techniques to use in this process when those processes are adequately grounded in evidence.

C. FROM DESIGN TO PROGRAMMES

Once programme designers have a situated theory for local action, which gives them some measure of confidence that a course of action is a good one (or least the best among alternatives), that design must be turned into a plan of action for people to carry out.

The move from design to programmes is the process of turning ideas into actions. Two key elements of that process are testing ideas through prototyping and strategic planning.

Figure 4: The movement from design propositions to tested prototypes



In the previous section, we explained that our situated theory for action now gives us grounds to choose among the alternatives of implementation, adaptation and innovation. One of the primary means by which we make this determination is through prototyping.

⁴² In investigating various design approaches for use in the context of SNAP, we found much promise and utility in service design and design thinking. While some of these approaches are starting to be applied in development contexts, we found them to be insufficiently developed with respect to concerns of conflict sensitivity to be viable for immediate application to community security in post-conflict situations. The same holds true for reintegration contexts.

A prototype is a preliminary model, from which other forms may be built. Because it is not always possible to know if a new design (whether for a process, service, computer, drug, etc.) will work, be used or be accepted by users in the way intended and imagined by designers, prototyping is an important element in effective design. Prototyping is the process of testing and refining design propositions (our ideas for solutions) prior to implementation.

Prototyping even on a very small scale can help bring to light problem areas that can only emerge when designs move from the page into practice, and help us reject weak ideas and identify better ones. In so doing, it can lead to better programmes, and better programming.


When we build prototypes, we test our ideas for our particular contexts, not for general use. In doing so, we learn whether, how and to what extent existing models for action can be implemented, or whether we they need to be adapted or replaced by new innovations.⁴³

The prototyping process is as follows:

1. Evidence is used to build a situated theory for action.
2. The situated theory for action is used to create design propositions.
3. Design propositions are turned into a prototype to be used in testing.
4. The results from the prototype testing are used to correct, adapt and refine the design proposition.
5. The refined design proposition becomes the programme design.

The feedback on prototypes created by this process is crucial for both effective design and strategic planning. Without it, we are advancing on assumptions of utility, but without evidence for it.

Figure 5: Results from prototype testing are used to create programme designs



Strategic planning is the process of building a course of action on the basis of a design. Specifically, this means aligning resources, methods and goals in order to craft that course of action. Prototyping helps with strategic planning because it provides us—ultimately—with a blueprint that we will use to build our strategic plan.

Reintegration programming generally aims to achieve near-term impacts while also advancing longer-term goals. With respect to long-term goals, reintegration programming “must be understood as a development process with an open-ended time frame”, which is “essentially determined by the economic situation of the country and by the extent of co-operation with other development programmes”.⁴⁴

43 We recognize that adaptation involves innovation, and that the two are not entirely distinct. However, we believe that an adaptation process is one that adjusts or modifies known solutions, whereas an innovation process is one that builds new solutions when adaptation is deemed insufficient.

44 Ian Douglas et al., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2004, p. 69.

The open-ended and long-term time frames inherent to many reintegration programmes create important opportunities for testing and adjusting programmes to better ensure that long-term goals are achieved.⁴⁵ Indeed, if “the term of reintegration programmes depends essentially on ... the efficiency of the programmes, and the degree of political will”, then there is a clear benefit to introducing techniques such as prototyping that may improve both elements.⁴⁶

It often happens that a plan might look great on paper, but fails to deliver when put into practice. This, of course, is not only true for reintegration programming. The chance to test out ideas before their implementation can therefore go a long way towards helping us avoid some of the pitfalls that may not be (or even cannot be) evident without doing so, even when we are careful to undertake risk assessments. A practical way of improving both efficiency and effectiveness of programming is knowing ahead of implementation what some of these challenges might be. This is why fields prototyping is a critical and common step for design and planning in a wide array of professions, including operations management, public health, transportation, urban planning and military science.

In addition to improving efficiency, prototyping can also help foster political will and, related to this, local buy-in and ownership. Prototyping can create new and inclusive forms of cooperation around programme design because the prototypes can often be created through inclusive processes with key stakeholders. In fact, some prototypes can only be created by learning from the beneficiaries and key stakeholders themselves.

Many techniques for prototyping exist, allowing practitioners to select an approach that is suited to the context at hand. Examples include modelling to gain a better understanding of complicated or complex systems, simulation to test out ideas, optimization to narrow down choices to the better options, and building risk management systems to maximize the potential value of a design while limiting risk to all participants—especially those most vulnerable—in order to “do no harm”.

Some techniques can be rigorous and involved, while others may be less so. However limited one’s time and resources, it is generally possible to find some way of testing ideas prior to implementation. Ensuring that prototyping is part of the strategic design process can assist field staff to adapt and innovate in the special circumstances of working in post-conflict contexts. Prototyping, because it is used to improve designs before implementation, can also prove helpful to practitioners when making a case for new programmes to donors, governments, communities and other stakeholders.

Today there is widespread use of prototyping in programme design processes in many other fields. Though to date this practice has not been made use of in peacebuilding generally, and reintegration programming specifically, adopting this process as part of an evidence-based design approach should help to achieve greater operational results.

The second key element to moving from design to programmes concerns strategic planning.

As discussed, engaging in a design process means using evidence, experience and expertise to develop activities that may best turn existing conditions into preferred ones. Having gone through an evidence-based design process, we now have a solid basis on which to suggest that some courses of action will be more effective (i.e. feasible, viable and desirable) than others. What we do not know yet is what activities we need to undertake—using what resources—to achieve these results.

45 This is not to claim that prototyping is impossible for near-term impact programs, only that the open-ended nature of long-term programming creates special opportunities.

46 Ibid.

Strategic planning, as mentioned above, is the process of aligning resources, methods and goals in order to properly craft a course of action. It generally involves identifying tasks, indicating sequences and allocating resources needed to implement a set of activities.

Project design is different from planning. If we think of a design as a blueprint for action, then planning is the process of determining who does what, when and how. Planning turns our recommended courses of action (i.e. the blueprint) into specific activities, outputs and expected outcomes in a results-based management framework.

Building a good plan requires knowing where to begin. In any results-based management approach, it is most helpful to start with the results one aims to achieve. These become our goals.

In order to achieve these goals, we must use our resources both efficiently and effectively. Resources may take many forms. They often include funds, staff, time, political capital and networks of support, for example.

These two terms—efficiency and effectiveness—are often confused because they so often appear together. As discussed, efficiency is about “doing things right”, i.e. optimizing resources so they yield the greatest return. An efficient car, for example, goes farther on the same fuel. An efficient team accomplishes more with fewer staff, less money and less time. And an efficient programme achieves more output with less input.

Effectiveness, however, means doing the right thing. Unless our theories are sound, and our designs are appropriate to the task, we might be driving an efficient car down the wrong road, our teams may be accomplishing more of the wrong tasks with less time and effort, and our outputs may require fewer inputs but just make things worse.

The strategic planning process is an iterative process of producing the right fit among resources (such as time, money, political will, relationships, etc.), methods (i.e. the specific activities one will take with those resources) and goals (or results).


The process of finding the right fit is called “abduction”. There are essentially two ways of proceeding:

Fixed resources. If the amount of money, staff or other resources is fixed, and there is no possibility of adding new resources, then the methods open to us are limited by the resources we have. That also means that we can only achieve goals that can be supported by our resources. If we want our limited resources to go farther, and give us more options, then we need to innovate, which means devising new methods that take better advantage of our resources.

Open resources. The extreme version of this is the “blank check” model, whereby we set our goals, and we choose our optimal methods, and all the resources are provided to achieve them. This is the dream scenario, and one that tends to make most practitioners chuckle. What is more common is that we may ask for more resources to top-up what we have based on some convincing argument about need.

The Strategy Triangle, below, illustrates how goals, resources, methods and theory fit together conceptually. The essential fact of the Strategy Triangle is that it is ideally an equilateral triangle. A good strategic plan is never skewed. There must be harmony in the relationship of goals, resources and methods, informed by our theory of success. When goals exceed the proper use of methods, we invite greater risk to our plans.

Figure 6: The Strategy Triangle



Key Points:

- Moving from design to programmes is the process of turning ideas into actions. Two key elements of that process are testing ideas through prototyping and strategic planning.
- Prototyping serves as a bridge between designs and programmes and can contribute to both efficiency and political will.
- Many techniques for prototyping exist, allowing practitioners to select an approach that is suited to the resources and context at hand.
- The application of design propositions to planning turns possible courses of action into specific and recommended activities, outputs and expected outcomes in a results-based management framework.
- The planning process is an iterative process of finding the right fit between available resources and methods in order to achieve strategic goals (or results).

III. NEXT STEPS: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION

Moving to an evidence-based approach to reintegration programming requires development in a number of areas. This document addressed the first step by developing a conceptual framework for working with evidence in reintegration programme design. Section One identified evidence-based design as the most suited approach to ground the framework for evidence-based programming for reintegration. Section Two developed such a framework for identifying and using evidence in a strategic design process.

Translating this framework into actual design practices that practitioners can use in conducting their work will require the development of a design tool, and the support of a properly resourced organizational system to support its use.

In Section Three, we propose a general framework, or “architecture”, for such a system and lay out next steps for the development of each element.

A system for evidence-based reintegration programming involves the following elements:

- a network for the supply of relevant and high-quality information from a range of providers;
- a mechanism for that information to be gathered, organized, and shared with reintegration practitioners; and
- an evidence-based design process or tool for reintegration practitioners to use for creating evidence-based reintegration programmes.

These three areas for development are presented in turn below.

A. CREATE A NETWORK OF INFORMATION PROVIDERS

Why:

An evidence-based design process should facilitate the work of practitioners tasked with programme design. It should not add to their research or assessment burdens, or create unnecessary steps. Consequently, a challenge emerges on how to bring relevant and quality information to programme designers in a manner that helps alleviate, rather than increases, their research burden. One response involves new partnerships of information providers.

Luckily, there are many potential partners to turn to who can conduct and supply much of the research needed to underpin an evidence-based programming system. Cooperation has long existed between United Nations agencies and a variety of individual researchers and consultants, NGOs, research centres, universities, think tanks and other entities that conduct research or assemble data.

But so far cooperation on the matter of reintegration has not been unified by a common set of practices or goals, and has largely been conducted on a case-by-case basis. Working without a shared framework has meant that there is often an unsatisfying alignment between the information provided and the uses to which practitioners must put it. It has also meant that ongoing research agendas that could be responsive to practitioner needs have not yet been built.

We believe that formalizing a network of providers will give structure to this cooperation as the foundation of an evidence-based system, will have a positive impact on capacity development, can allow for the development of cumulative learning, and will lead to advances in development of reintegration programming practices.

How:

The primary, long-term goal of establishing a network between providers of information and reintegration practitioners as the users of that information is to create a mode of cooperation that improves the usefulness and usability of the information provided to practitioners.

An example of such an initiative is an innovative effort by the Center for Peace Studies (CPS) at Tromsø University, which was jointly funded by the IAWG and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. This project conducted a series of three case studies that assessed reintegration programmes in three countries, and then worked closely with the IAWG Secretariat and members to learn how to make findings more useful and more useable for practitioner tasks.

In support of this agenda, CPS was also the recipient of a grant from the Norwegian Design Council to work with design partners live|work and The Policy Lab on creating a “service concept” for the Center. What does it mean, CPS had to ask itself, to re-imagine itself as a “service” to reintegration practitioners (working at both the policy and field levels)? What implications would that have across the spectrum of university work, and how would that result in a set of service offerings that aim at improving support to reintegration practitioners? These are important questions that can be asked by other universities as well, and under the umbrella of a shared programme of work.

An additional challenge, when creating a network of information providers, is ensuring the usefulness and usability of the information they provide to practitioners. It is important to recall that the audience for most academic studies—even on such a practical concern as reintegration— is the academic community.

In order for products (such as papers, lectures, podcasts etc.) to be useful and usable to end-users such as field staff, a common architecture (or, a structure that guides both demand and supply, and provides modes and forms of cooperation that link the two) will be needed to ensure that the inputs to the system are created and presented in support of output goals by the practitioners.

This common architecture should include at least the following elements:

- a common framework for understanding the uses to which information will be put;
- a mechanism for requesting and supplying information; and
- forms of institutional cooperation that enable ongoing collaboration between providers and implementing agencies.

The absence of this so far has meant that supply and demand often do not meet successfully the middle.

A first step would be to establish an integrated working group on evidence-based reintegration programming that would bring both potential providers and users (i.e. supply and demand) together to begin a dialogue to support ongoing cooperation.

The tasks involved in this next step would include:

1. Proposing the form, function and role of the integrated working group.
2. Establishing an initial expert roster of potential institutional providers (not individuals) such as universities, research centres, think tanks etc.
3. Hosting an initial meeting to develop a common agenda and lay the groundwork for cooperation needed to launch an evidence-based programming system for reintegration. Important topics to address in that first meeting would be ways of operationalizing the framework for cooperation and the forms of institutional arrangements needed to support

such cooperation (e.g. MoUs, institutional contracts, joint programmes of work, common funding platforms and proposals, the role of long-term research agendas etc.)

B. CREATE AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Why:

In order to work well with information, it needs to be easily located, applicable to the tasks at hand, and organized in a way that makes it easy to use. These concerns are central to knowledge management generally. It will be crucial to ensure that the needed systems are in place to facilitate the use of the information in design as a more comprehensive, systematic and targeted demand for information gets under way as part of an evidence-based approach to reintegration programming.

Today, a coherent system to serve this function for reintegration programming does not exist. All the elements may exist independently (researchers, libraries, archives, websites, databases, and even knowledge management systems in other areas etc.), but they do not exist as a system geared to supporting the practical requirements of reintegration programming specifically, for the benefit of IAWG members and field staff.

A properly functioning evidence-based programme design system would have solutions for the gathering, organizing and delivery of information to the reintegration programme design process. Over time, each element of such a system could be made more efficient and effective, both individually, and working together as a system.

How:

An agenda already exists within the IAWG to create a knowledge management system. Various platforms are already in use to serve other needs and goals.⁴⁷ Ensuring that the system supports evidence-based programming approaches will require some conscientious collaboration and development.

Once the evidence-based design tool prototype is finalized, collaboration should begin among relevant stakeholders to such a system, as well as expert collaborators capable of building it.

Once information has been generated, it must then be:

Gathered: Someone needs to bring existing knowledge together.

Organized: It needs to be packaged or sorted in some way to be useful.

Delivered: It needs to be made accessible to those who might need it. Matters that will need to be addressed (among many others) include how to receive inputs, criteria for acceptance or rejection, a system of classification, tagging and search; modes of access and sharing, hosting and maintenance, and funding.

C. CREATE A PROTOTYPE FOR AN EVIDENCE-BASED DESIGN TOOL

Why:

This document has advocated for using prototypes when moving from design to programming. In that same vein, there is merit in creating a prototype for a new evidence-based design tool that will guide practitioners through the process described in Section Two, and that will also form the foundation for cooperation between the network of providers and practitioners. The prototyping

47 See GRIPWEB at <www.gripweb.org/gripweb/>, and UN Teamworks at <www.unteamworks.org/login>.

process for an evidence-based design tool will provide new opportunities for both collaboration and expert assistance in creating this new approach for the IAWG.

How:

Phase II of UNIDIR's project "Research and Development on Evidence-Based Programme Design for Reintegration" will engage research staff, design partners and reintegration practitioners (both in Geneva and in selected country offices) to develop a design proposition and test a tool prototype.

UNIDIR will take a new approach to the development of this tool in order to ensure its usefulness and usability for practitioners as problem-solvers in complex contexts. The team will conduct user research and adopt a "user-centred approach" to tool development, by utilizing the framework from strategic design and the techniques of service design. We will use these cooperative approaches and expert partners to "co-create" the new prototype with stakeholders in an effort to facilitate the work of practitioners and support efforts to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation.

Phase II will proceed through five stages of development (see the Logical Framework in the annex for a description of each step):

1. Create user insights.
2. Conduct cooperative prototype development.
3. Conduct cooperative prototype testing.
4. Conduct prototype revision and refinement.
5. Submit action plan and roll-out of prototype.

This phase will be conducted over a 12-18 month period, once the project is initiated during the spring/summer of 2012. UNIDIR and the authors may be consulted directly for details.

The planned final phase of the project—Phase III—will be dedicated to pilot testing the new tool and developing capacity in its use among practitioners, pending funding. This would ideally begin during 2013 and conclude the research and development of the new tool for the IAWG.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Adopting an evidence-based approach to programme design is a foray into a new way of designing programmes, rather than a new way of reframing current practices. Whether an Assessment Approach is taken, or a Design Approach is taken, both represent an explicit use of evidence. This creates the need for not just a tool, but for a system that is guided by both a shared principle and a common architecture.

This document has focused on developing a conceptual framework that can support reintegration practitioners as problem-solvers who confront situations of adaptation and innovation on a regular basis in complex environments. The next steps for UNIDIR and its partners (notably live|work and The Policy Lab) will be to develop the evidence-based design tool prototype. Still, the value and benefit of the Assessment Approach for improving reintegration programming is clear, and this should also be pursued and integrated into a system of evidence-based programming on reintegration.

It is our view that developing such a system for reintegration is one of the best ways to foster continual improvement in the implementation of reintegration policy and programming alike. Lending focus and organization to the use of evidence creates feedback loops that can improve practice, advance learning and develop capacity at a number of levels.


We have discussed some of the ways in which a systematic use of evidence to ground programming designs can help create more effective programming. In addition, making the link between local evidence and design decisions explicit not only helps us make better programming decisions, it can help facilitate results-based management processes by showing the grounds for programming decisions, showing the path taken towards the strategic development of situated solutions, and including more locally relevant criteria for effectiveness. In addition, working with evidence explicitly may also facilitate interagency cooperation, by providing a shared basis for local action.

Time, resources and cooperation will be required to develop the system and build capacity, but we believe this is an investment that will pay off for communities and the United Nations alike.


ANNEX 1

STRATEGIC DESIGN: AN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE BASED DESIGN


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
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ANNEX 2

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROJECT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR AND EVIDENCE-BASED REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMING TOOL

Phase and Goal	Output	Outcome
<p>Phase 1: Framework Development</p> <p>Identify or create a framework for evidence-based reintegration programming</p> <p>August 2011–January 2012</p>	<p>A) A document for submission to the IAWG for review, feedback, and finalization.</p> <p>Working title is: <i>Reintegration Programming: A Best Process Approach to Evidence-Based Design and Planning</i></p>	<p>A) A conceptual framework for the systematic use of evidence in the design of reintegration programming is created which:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) provides a shared basis for IAWG members for working with evidence, and 2) allows the Partners to move into Phase 2 of the project and develop the Prototype.
<p>Phase 2: Prototype R&D</p> <p>Translate the framework from Phase 1 into a prototype reintegration programme design tool</p> <p>April 2012–March 2013</p>	<p>A) A prototype of the reintegration programming tool is submitted to the IAWG for formal consideration and later pilot-testing, refinement and implementation.</p>	<p>A) A tool prototype is ready for pilot-testing and capacity-building in relevant Head Quarters and country offices, as appropriate.</p> <p>B) New lessons have been learned about the work-practices and needs of country staff working on reintegration programming.</p> <p>C) Preliminary steps have been taken for learning about new ways that cooperation with research providers can best support use of the tool.</p>
<p>Phase 3: Pilot Testing and Capacity-building</p> <p>Test the prototype from Phase 2 in country offices, and build capacity in its use among staff.</p> <p>April 2013–March 2014*</p> <p><i>*The period of time of this phase will depend upon the number of pilot tests to be run, the conditions at field sites, and the nature of cooperation with annual DDR training courses.</i></p>	<p>A) Cooperation with IAWG members and other partner organizations to plan and implement the tool, as appropriate, in select field locations. (Site selection will be based on field office needs as well as political prioritization of DDR activities.)</p> <p>B) Cooperation with NORDEFIC and FBA to integrate project learning into the annual DDR Planning Course and develop training material as appropriate.</p>	<p>A) Field offices make use of an evidence-based approach to reintegration programming, thereby improving the quality of local programming, and increasing likelihood of sustainable peace in select post-conflict environments.</p> <p>B) NORDEFIC's and FBA's training programme on DDR is updated with the latest research and development from the UN, and remains at the forefront of DDR training.</p>

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ABBREVIATIONS

CPS	Center for Peace Studies at Tromsø University
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
IAWG	Inter-agency Working Group
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NGO	non-governmental organization
SNAP	Security Needs Assessment Protocol