Brian MacW/copy

[Colin James Harrison]

 A word in edgeways...

In response to Tom Givon's comments, I read there an implication,
probably not intentional, but nevertheless present, and one that in my
opinion leads to a lot of time wasted in discussions on this and other
topics, and that is what we might call "categorical thinking".

It is obvioulsy true that the level at which neurological functioning
becomes really interesting to linguists, psychologists etc. is an
organizationally high one, but to set up a distinction therefore between
modular function and the firing of individual neurons is to create a
category division where there isn't one.  The two levels of function are
the same phenomenon viewed at different levels of organisation, and
considering either is a good way to learn about both.

The danger in talking with such category distinctions is that it can lead
to the disjunction (in the minds of those who fail to consider it deeply
enough) of phenomena that are in fact inseperable, and the maintenance of
unrealistic notions such as we see reflected in the "box and arrow" type
models that have predominated in the literature for years.

A modular model will tell us nothing without some story about what goes
on inside the modules, just as a neuron-level connectionism will tell us
nothing about language, unless it acknowledges the emergent
characteristics of higher-level self-organisation, and has something
intelligent to say about that.

I'm not for a moment sugesting that Tom Givon is unaware of this, but I
have picked up on the faint suggestion of this I read in his posting to
make the point anyway, as it amazes me how often such binary thinking
clouds and distracts us from what would otherwise be really interesting
debates.

Colin Harrison
Rice University