no-modularity-at-all

[Daniel L. Everett]

On Sun, 9 Feb 1997, Brian MacWhinney wrote:

> Dear FunkNet,
> ...

> At the best, connectionists
> (myself included) have presented a system for neural-like notation
> that allows one to believe that the problems of symbolic representation,
> language processing, and language acquisition might eventually be solved
> from an emergentist perspective.  The value of this demonstration is simply
> that it provides functional linguists (additional) license to dismiss
> claims regarding the psychological reality of generative grammar.

This is just whistling in the dark. Even if there were strong grounds for
optimism on connectionism generally, this would give no warrant for the
statement on psychological reality. That is a blatant non sequitur. (And I
am still waiting for a reply to Ted Gibson's criticism in Language (couple
of years back) of the Competition Model, since you cite your own work. If
there is such a reply, I would like to look at it, to better reevaluate
your own claims.)

> Givon chides connectionists for
> reductionism, but Nature herself is a reductionist.

No, Brian, Nature is not a reductionist. This is a category mistake.
Reductionism refers to the best way to explain things, not how 'they are',
which could conceivably remain a mystery throughout human history. At this
point, it is still the case that the best way to explain many aspects of
the mind/brain is in terms of the mental and 'higher levels/orders'. It
may be possible one day to restate these things in terms of the brain, but
it may, alternatively, never be possible to do so. There is a lot more to
learn about the brain before we will have any idea what the answer will
be. In fact, as Chomsky has noted, it might even turn out that
reductionism could lead in the other direction - the best statements
overall may be in terms of the mental rather than the cerebral. The
question is not one of ultimate substance, but the best explanations
available to us.

-- Dan