More on autonomy

Matthew S Dryer dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU
Sun Jan 12 13:11:17 UTC 1997


Although the discussion of "autonomy" has faded somewhat the past 24
hours, there is a serious terminological confusion that I think
remains unclarified.  The term "autonomy" has been used in two
different ways, and this has led to apparent disagreement when in
fact there has just been misunderstanding.  In an earlier message, I
distinguished three senses, but since innateness is not an issue in
the current discussion, let me narrow it down to the crucial two
senses:
(1) (strong) sense: One can explain syntactic facts in terms of
syntactic notions
(2) (weak) sense: Syntax/grammar exists.  Syntax has, at least to a
certain extent, a life of its own.

What makes me acutely aware of these two senses is that I sometimes
use the term "autonomy" one way, and sometimes the other way,
largely as a function of how the person I'm talking to uses it.  In
particular, in various discussions with Tom Givon in recent years,
I've used it the way he uses it, in the strong sense.  And, in
various discussions with Fritz Newmeyer in recent years, I've used
it the way he uses it, in the weak sense.  The real irony is that in
recent years, both Tom and Fritz have been giving arguments in print
for autonomy in the weak sense, except that Fritz calls it autonomy
and Tom doesn't.  But whatever you call it, it is clear when you
look closely at what they've each written about it, that they are
arguing for the same thing.  They're both arguing against those
functionalists who deny, or who seem to deny, that syntax/grammar
even exists.

Unfortunately, as I have pointed out to Fritz on occasion, he
sometimes strays back and forth between the two senses (presumably
because he believes in autonomy in both senses), and while what he
is usually arguing for is simply autonomy in the weak sense, he
sometimes either argues for autonomy in the strong sense (as in his
recent response to my message), or treats an argument for autonomy
in the weak sense as if it were an argument for autonomy in the
strong sense.  But this should not obscure the extent to which Fritz
and Tom have been arguing for the same thing.

Furthermore, since Fritz invoked Jack Hawkins, saying "Hawkins is
absolutely explicit that parsing explanations are compatible with
autonomy", it must be stressed that Hawkins (like Fritz) is using
"autonomy" in the WEAK sense, and, as far as I know from Hawkins'
writings and my own discussions with him, Hawkins does not believe
in autonomy in the strong sense.

The general moral is: let's not get hung up on the form (the
expression "autonomy of syntax") but let's look at the function
(i.e. meaning) to which this expression is being put.

Matthew



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