form versus meaning

[Lise Menn, Linguistics, CU Boulder]

The way to treat concepts that are not directly accessible (e.g.
competence, nouniness, topic, empathy, foreground...) is as
'intermediate constructs'; one tests them by varying some factor(s) that
can be manipulated or measured (e.g.how do people rate the attractiveness or
humanness of the proposed empathic focus?) and looking at some measurable
outcome (e.g. how often do people make the proposed empathic focus the
first referent mentioned in a description of an event when that referent
is the undergoer?).  An intermediate construct gets validated if it helps
in making such predictions; it quietly vanishes away, like the
Boojum or ether or phlogiston, if it stops being useful. And concepts may
be useful for one purpose long after they have stopped being useful for
others.  I'm very skeptical about 'competence' existing apart from the
performances in which it is demonstrated, but it would be absurd to write
a reference grammar or a dictionary in terms of 'performance' alone.
        Lise Menn



On Sat, 11 Jan 1997, Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. wrote:

> At 11:10 AM 1/11/97 -1000, Elizabeth Bates wrote:
> > ... any research program that sets out
> >to describe competence "first" and deal with performance "later" is
> >going to run into trouble, because pure data that give us direct
> >insights into competence are simply not available.  That is precisely
> >why we are all still having this argument.
>
> There will never be any pure data that give direct insights into competence
> any more than there will ever be a tool by which we can measure nounness or
> verbness.  The nature of linguistics (except for phonology), like the nature
> of psychology (when it refers to the study of psyche--mental phenomena) is
> indirectly observable only.  This, however, does not mean we cannot do
> research on linguistics or make statements about competence.
>
> I realize I am begging the rather obvious comment that empirical science
> must deal with directly observable phenomena only and therefor the study of
> competence and most of syntax for that matter is not science.  But this is
> only if we follow the belief that the only relevant objects of scientific
> study are those which are directly observable and those of the indirectly
> observable variety, i.e. syntax and nounness, verbness, competence and so on
> are not science.  However, if we accept that any observable phenomenon is a
> proper object of empirical invesitigation, then competence, syntax, nounness
> and verbness are all back on the table in their full splendor and we are
> once again able do discuss competence without embarassment.
>
> These statements may seem somewhat barbarous in the light of current
> thinking, but it seems to me if we really want to throw out items that are
> only indirectly observable
> (such as competence and syntax and nounness and verbness) then we must also
> throw sceinces favorite tool of measurement, mathematics, because there is
> nothing in it that is directly observable.  So, whether or not there is
> direct evidence for competence, it is still a valid object of scientific
> investigation whether or not we
> deal with it first or later.
>
> Phil Bralich
>