From eng_shh at SHSU.EDU Tue Jul 1 19:28:12 1997 From: eng_shh at SHSU.EDU (Helena Halmari) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 1997 14:28:12 EST Subject: 1998 AAAL GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL GRANT/ADDRESS CORRECTION Message-ID: The recently posted AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant contained a mistake in the address where the applications should be sent. The following message contains the current address of the AAAL Business Office. 1998 AAAL GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL GRANT Purpose: To help support travel (and some expenses) of a graduate student member of AAAL to the 1998 annual meeting. Eligibility: Applicants must be current members of AAAL (at time of application) who are in a university Master's or Ph.D. program in applied linguistics or related field. Amount: One award of $500.00 (US) will be made for the 1998 conference. Selection Criteria: (a) Present scholarship and future promise (b) Demonstrated need (c) Involvement in applied linguistics and commitment to the field Application procedure: 1. Send four copies of a letter of introduction in which you state: (a) institution and program of study (b) current contributions to the field of applied linguistics (c) career plans after completion of degree program (d) current financial situation, including your university's contribution to conference travel (e) how conference attendance will benefit you and others (f) a biographical statement of no longer than 50 words, suitable for publication (g) contact information (address, telephone, fax, and e-mail)* 2. Send a sealed letter of recommendation from a professor in your graduate program who is familiar with your work. The letter should state your professor's estimation of: (a) your academic work and promise in the field of applied linguistics (b) personal attributes relevant to a career in applied linguistics (c) your level of need for financial assistance as provided for by this grant.* *Each of the categories listed must be addressed since evaluation is keyed to individual categories (not including 1(a), (f), (g)). Deadline for receipt of application: December 1, 1997 Send all materials to: 1998 AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant AAAL Business Office P.O. Box 21686 Eagan, MN 55121-0686 Any questions about this grant may be addressed to the Co-chair of the Awards Committee: Helena Halmari, Dept. of English, Sam Houston State University Huntsville, Texas 77341 e-mail: eng_shh at shsu.edu tel: 409-294-1990 From dp11 at CORNELL.EDU Wed Jul 2 13:59:32 1997 From: dp11 at CORNELL.EDU (David Parkinson) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 1997 09:59:32 -0400 Subject: Question about functional approaches Message-ID: Hello FUNKNET members: Myself and some grad student colleagues who have an informal discussion group here at Cornell have a question or two that we thought could be answered on this list. As I understand it, the functionalist <--> formalist dimension is orthogonal to the innate (language-specific) knowledge <--> non-innate (general cognitive) knowledge dimension. Presumably one could have: (1) highly functional syntax as well as innate language-specific learning principles; (2) highly functional syntax and no language-specific learning principles; (3) "dysfunctional" syntax as well as innate language-specific learning principles; (4) "dysfunctional" syntax and no language-specific learning principles; This is pretty sketchy, I admit, but the idea, I hope, is clear. My feeling is that generativists tend towards (3) and many functionalists towards (2). For obvious reasons, (1) and (4) seem to be out on limbs of their own, but they are logically possible positions to hold; just hard to adduce evidence for, perhaps. Clearly, it is strange to talk about "functionality" vs. "dysfunctionality" as though it were as cut-and-dried as the issue of whether or not there are language-specific learning mechanisms; functionality inheres in parts of a system to varying degrees, whereas innateness defines the nature of a system from the outside, as it were. As befits our East Polar status, weare trained here in generative grammatical theory, but some of us have been trying to learn more about functional approaches, especially to syntax, since syntax so readily leads to debates about innateness of linguistic knowledge. There is a whole standard set of problems in generative syntax, whose ultimate explanation points towards innateness claims, via poverty of the stimulus, etc. Some of these include that-trace effects, subjacency violations, ECP effects, wh-islands, what used to be the SSC and NIC, the Head Movement Constraint, and so on. Can anyone out there suggest places we could look to see how a functionalist approach would answer questions of this type? Do functionalist theories of syntax have as a goal this sort of investigation? Having been trained in formalist and nativist theories of syntax, we are curious to see whether there is any cross-talk between these two areas. Do functionalists consider the questions that formalists ask worth answering? Is there an entirely different approach and entirelyt different issues and questions to be answered that leave aside the traditional concerns of generative theories? If anyone out there can suggest places we can start looking for some ways in which similar linguistic data can be viewed through the lenses of both theoretical appraoches, we would be happy. If there are really no or very few problems common to both approaches, this is interesting (and distressing). If I have gone of the rails here, please let me know where and how (why, too, if you feel combative!). If anyone has a response to these or related questions, I am happy to take responses by personal e-mail, and provide a summary. Your anonymity will be respected if you ask me to do so. Thanks in advance, David Parkinson dp11 at cornell.edu From lmenn at CLIPR.COLORADO.EDU Wed Jul 2 20:08:58 1997 From: lmenn at CLIPR.COLORADO.EDU (Lise Menn, Linguistics, CU Boulder) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 1997 13:08:58 -0700 Subject: Question about functional approaches In-Reply-To: Message-ID: There's another factor to consider, or maybe just another way to phrase what you've said: innateness vs. the ability to learn and to abstract patterns. The functionalist approach by itself doesn't deal with whether/how patterns are acquired; just because something is motivated by or fulfills a function doesn't mean that it's learnable. Some functionalists aren't terribly interested in this issue; others of us definitely are. YOu might like to to look at the papers on the innateness issue in BLS 22, which has just come out. On Wed, 2 Jul 1997, David Parkinson wrote: > Hello FUNKNET members: > Myself and some grad student colleagues who have an informal > discussion group here at Cornell have a question or two that we thought > could be answered on this list. > As I understand it, the functionalist <--> formalist dimension is > orthogonal to the innate (language-specific) knowledge <--> non-innate > (general cognitive) knowledge dimension. Presumably one could have: > > (1) highly functional syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; > (2) highly functional syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; > (3) "dysfunctional" syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; > (4) "dysfunctional" syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; > > This is pretty sketchy, I admit, but the idea, I hope, is clear. My feeling > is that generativists tend towards (3) and many functionalists towards (2). > For obvious reasons, (1) and (4) seem to be out on limbs of their own, but > they are logically possible positions to hold; just hard to adduce evidence > for, perhaps. Clearly, it is strange to talk about "functionality" vs. > "dysfunctionality" as though it were as cut-and-dried as the issue of > whether or not there are language-specific learning mechanisms; > functionality inheres in parts of a system to varying degrees, whereas > innateness defines the nature of a system from the outside, as it were. > As befits our East Polar status, weare trained here in generative > grammatical theory, but some of us have been trying to learn more about > functional approaches, especially to syntax, since syntax so readily leads > to debates about innateness of linguistic knowledge. There is a whole > standard set of problems in generative syntax, whose ultimate explanation > points towards innateness claims, via poverty of the stimulus, etc. Some of > these include that-trace effects, subjacency violations, ECP effects, > wh-islands, what used to be the SSC and NIC, the Head Movement Constraint, > and so on. Can anyone out there suggest places we could look to see how a > functionalist approach would answer questions of this type? Do > functionalist theories of syntax have as a goal this sort of investigation? > Having been trained in formalist and nativist theories of syntax, > we are curious to see whether there is any cross-talk between these two > areas. Do functionalists consider the questions that formalists ask worth > answering? Is there an entirely different approach and entirelyt different > issues and questions to be answered that leave aside the traditional > concerns of generative theories? > If anyone out there can suggest places we can start looking for > some ways in which similar linguistic data can be viewed through the lenses > of both theoretical appraoches, we would be happy. If there are really no > or very few problems common to both approaches, this is interesting (and > distressing). > If I have gone of the rails here, please let me know where and how > (why, too, if you feel combative!). If anyone has a response to these or > related questions, I am happy to take responses by personal e-mail, and > provide a summary. Your anonymity will be respected if you ask me to do so. > > Thanks in advance, > David Parkinson > dp11 at cornell.edu > From eng_shh at SHSU.EDU Wed Jul 2 21:40:13 1997 From: eng_shh at SHSU.EDU (Helena Halmari) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 1997 16:40:13 EST Subject: Correction to AAAL Travel Grant announcement Message-ID: The address given for the AAAL Business office in the recently posted AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant announcement was incorrect. The following message contains the current, correct address of the AAAL Business Office. 1998 AAAL GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL GRANT Purpose: To help support travel (and some expenses) of a graduate student member of AAAL to the 1998 annual meeting. Eligibility: Applicants must be current members of AAAL (at time of application) who are in a university Master's or Ph.D. program in applied linguistics or related field. Amount: One award of $500.00 (US) will be made for the 1998 conference. Selection Criteria: (a) Present scholarship and future promise (b) Demonstrated need (c) Involvement in applied linguistics and commitment to the field Application procedure: 1. Send four copies of a letter of introduction in which you state: (a) institution and program of study (b) current contributions to the field of applied linguistics (c) career plans after completion of degree program (d) current financial situation, including your university's contribution to conference travel (e) how conference attendance will benefit you and others (f) a biographical statement of no longer than 50 words, suitable for publication (g) contact information (address, telephone, fax, and e-mail)* 2. Send a sealed letter of recommendation from a professor in your graduate program who is familiar with your work. The letter should state your professor's estimation of: (a) your academic work and promise in the field of applied linguistics (b) personal attributes relevant to a career in applied linguistics (c) your level of need for financial assistance as provided for by this grant.* *Each of the categories listed must be addressed since evaluation is keyed to individual categories (not including 1(a), (f), (g)). Deadline for receipt of application: December 1, 1997 Send all materials to: 1998 AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant AAAL Business Office P.O. Box 21686 Eagan, MN 55121-0686 Any questions about this grant may be addressed to the Co-chair of the Awards Committee: Helena Halmari, Dept. of English, Sam Houston State University Huntsville, Texas 77341 e-mail: eng_shh at shsu.edu tel: 409-294-1990 From lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU Thu Jul 3 09:17:14 1997 From: lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU (George Lakoff) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 02:17:14 -0700 Subject: Question about functional approaches Message-ID: Hi, As a cognitivist who shares many functionalist goals, my answer will be different than functionalists who are not cognitivists. > As I understand it, the functionalist <--> formalist dimension is >orthogonal to the innate (language-specific) knowledge <--> non-innate >(general cognitive) knowledge dimension. Presumably one could have: > >(1) highly functional syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; >(2) highly functional syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; >(3) "dysfunctional" syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; >(4) "dysfunctional" syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; The cognitive response is NONE OF THE ABOVE. The reason is that in the rapidly evolving Neural Theory of Language, much of syntax uses semantics and much of linguistic semantics uses embodied structures from the sensory-motor system. All innateness issues get blurred here, since the sensory-motor/linguistics boundary no longer exists and since it is impossible to disentangle exactly what is and is not there in the sensory-motor system at birth, in the womb, and as a result of genetics (which underdetermines neural structure). From a neural/cognitive persopactive, all these issues look different. Things to read: Terry Regier's book THE HUMAN SEMANTIC POTENTIAL (MIT Press, 1996), and the papers, reports and dissertations on the website at icsi.berkeley.edu/Lzero. In this tradition, the poverty of the stimulus is replaced by the richness of the substrate. > As befits our East Polar status, weare trained here in generative >grammatical theory, but some of us have been trying to learn more about >functional approaches, especially to syntax, since syntax so readily leads >to debates about innateness of linguistic knowledge. There is a whole >standard set of problems in generative syntax, whose ultimate explanation >points towards innateness claims, via poverty of the stimulus, etc. Some of >these include that-trace effects, subjacency violations, ECP effects, >wh-islands, what used to be the SSC and NIC, the Head Movement Constraint, >and so on. Can anyone out there suggest places we could look to see how a >functionalist approach would answer questions of this type? Do >functionalist theories of syntax have as a goal this sort of investigation? Two obvious places to look: For a Langacker-tradition approach to anaphora, try Karen Van Hoek's thesis (soon to be published by Chicago) and her Language article. For a NTL approach to syntactic constraints using Shastri's theory of temporal binding for structured connectionist model, look at Jamie Henderson's thesis from Penn a few years back. > Having been trained in formalist and nativist theories of syntax, >we are curious to see whether there is any cross-talk between these two >areas. Do functionalists consider the questions that formalists ask worth >answering? Cognitive-finctionalists do not find the questions at all interesting, since they make assumptions contrary to the evidence from cognitive science and neurosceince. Is there an entirely different approach and entirelyt different >issues and questions to be answered that leave aside the traditional >concerns of generative theories? Yes. There is very extensive literature. The whole field of cognitive linguistics as well as the functionalist literature. > If anyone out there can suggest places we can start looking for >some ways in which similar linguistic data can be viewed through the lenses >of both theoretical appraoches, we would be happy. If there are really no >or very few problems common to both approaches, this is interesting (and >distressing). There does not seem to be much overlap. > If I have gone of the rails here, please let me know where and how >(why, too, if you feel combative!). If anyone has a response to these or >related questions, I am happy to take responses by personal e-mail, and >provide a summary. Your anonymity will be respected if you ask me to do so. > >Thanks in advance, >David Parkinson >dp11 at cornell.edu I'm glad you're interested. There's a whole universe of great linguistics outside of generative linguistics. It's developing in an incredibly exciting way. Best wishes, George Lakoff From M.Durie at LINGUISTICS.UNIMELB.EDU.AU Thu Jul 3 11:05:07 1997 From: M.Durie at LINGUISTICS.UNIMELB.EDU.AU (Mark Durie) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 22:05:07 +1100 Subject: Question about functional approaches In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear David, some comments on your Funknet posting: I think the notion of 'functional' vs 'dysfunctional' is confusing and needs clarification for your distinctions to be meaningful. I think we need to make a distinction between adequate functioning within the time-frame of use, and attributions of function as part of causal explanations. Working with the former sense, one might conclude that a structural property such as wh-islands contributes to adequate functioning, hinders functions, or is afunctional, making no difference to linguistic functionality. This is thus a 3-way distinction: your two-way distinction is not enough. Indeed things might be more complex: a structure might both help and hinder functioning, but in different ways, at the same time. Clearly this sense of function as process is orthogonal to the innateness question. Some innate things are functional (e.g. legs), some are dysfunctional (e.g. appendices), some are neutral (e.g. -I suppose- the two little ridges joining the nostils and the lips), and many if not most exhibit a mixture of functionality, afunctionality and dysfunctionality. The second sense of function as causal explanation is the critical one for the formal-functional contention. This is the idea that something is the way it is because of how it functions (in the first sense above). An example would be a claim that cars have their structure because of what they are used for. When Chomsky has argued that the function of the heart in no way offers an explanation for its structure, he is rejecting a causal functional explanation, not the idea that the heart is 'functional' in the first sense that it functions adequately to pump blood. Clearly these two senses of functional are related in complex ways: a particular causal function may have played a role in determining the evolution of an organ--sense 2--but no longer play a part in its contemporary functioning--sense 1--(an obsolete function), or an actual functioning role of something may have made no contribution to its evolution (an appropriated function). The term 'dysfunctional' as you use it as an opposite for 'functional' is misleading. 'Dysfunctional' is only used, as far as I know, in the first sense, of inadequate functioning, not for lack of a causal explanation. I.e. it is not an explanatory term. One would not what to report Chomsky's discussion of hearts as a claim that they are 'dysfunctional'. As I understand it, some generativists' position on syntax is anti-functional in both senses: not only is the attempt at functional (sense 2) explanation regarded as misguided, but syntax is actually claimed to be significantly dysfunctional (or perhaps afunctional) in the first sense. This is the idea that language is like a Rube Goldberg device, stuck on a stick and used for a sundial. (Taken from an anecdote in Daniel Dennett's 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea'). Of course any causal explanation, to avoid teleology, must refer an account in terms of a temporal sequence of cause-and-effect, so functional explanations, if they have any scientific substance, are inevitably diachronic or phylogenic. They are indeed Darwinian explanations of one kind or another, for Darwin's achievement was to take the teleology out of evolutionary theory. Keeping this in mind, I believe most functionalists would regard syntax as only partly optimized for function, due to the constant nature of linguistic change, and the existence of competing functional constraints. They would thus acknowledge the omnipresence of dysfunction in varying degrees. Indeed the very existence of dysfunctionality is essential the functional theory of competing motivations. Or to put it another way, adaptation involves functional compromise. So I don't think it is quite right to say that functionalists are really of the 'everything is functional' camp. With regard to the learnability issue, I would prefer to remain almost silent. I will say however that any purely formal explanation begs the why question - the question of the ontology of form. The innatenes hypothesis is one approach to addressing the ontology problem. One advantage of the this hypothesis, from a formal perspective, is that it has allowed linguists to maintain a maximal autonomy for formal structuresm especally if one isolates these innate principles from the effects of Darwinian selection, by assuming that the evolution of language in humans was a freakish accident, a bolt from the blue, as some generativists have suggested. A more plausible intermediate position is that the innate capacity for learning language involves selected (i.e. functional) aspects, as well as perhaps some features that are due to accidents of phylogeny. The fundamental issue is not innate vs. 'functional', but what is the contribution of adapative selection (through diachrony and phylogeny) in accounting for the nature of language, versus the role of accidents of evolution (either diachronic or phylogenetic). Has language evolved, or has it just stumbled, or been coopted, into existence? And likewise for individual languages. With regard to syntactic issues - functionalists have indeed paid much less attention to the kinds of structural syntactic properties you refer to. R. D. Van Valin might be a good person to contact as he has been doing work on functional approaches to wh-islands. There are some syntactic issues where interaction have taken place. For example in functionalist research on binding, and work on linear precedence constraints. Of course the issue of whether there are 'language-specific' learning principles begs the question of what 'language' is that these principles would be specific to it. Here there are major disagreements about where to draw the lines. My impression of some streams of generative syntax is that what is seriously 'in' syntax is only taken to be that to which the poverty of the stimulus argument can be applied. I.e. syntax is quintessentially UG. In parallel fashion, funtionalist grammarians have tended to focus on syntactic properties which are more amenable to functional explanations, especially diachronic ones, and these may tend to appear more peripheral from the perspective of some generativists. So, as you suggest, grammarians of the two families tend to focus on quite different structural properties. I am hopeful that more interaction will come in time. After all, there was a period when the current rich interactions between formal and functional work in phonology/phonetics may have seemed beyond our horizon. Your group might find Dennett's 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' useful. Mark Durie ------------------------------------ From: Mark Durie Department of Linguistics and Applied Linguistics University of Melbourne Parkville 3052 Hm (03) 9380-5247 Wk (03) 9344-5191 Fax (03) 9349-4326 M.Durie at linguistics.unimelb.edu.au http://www.arts.unimelb.edu.au/Dept/LALX/staff/durie.html From bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU Fri Jul 4 00:42:45 1997 From: bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU (Liz Bates) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 17:42:45 -0700 Subject: Question about functional approaches In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I agree with the other respondents that the issues of innateness and functionality are orthogonal (at least in principle), although I would phrase it more in terms of innateness vs. domain-specificity (i.e. the extent to which language in general and grammar in particular are based on idiosyncratic principles and mechanisms, free-standing, independent of the principles and mechanisms at work in non-linguistic domains). As we all know, the supposed autonomy/peculiarity/domain-specificity of grammar plays an important role in arguments about its innateness: if grammar is entirely idiosyncratic in its structure and operations, then (so the argument goes) it cannot be acquired by "bottom up" mechanisms that transcend language (e.g. distributional analysis, statistical induction, pattern extraction) nor can it be inferred, constructed, constrained or assimilated by "top down" structures or mechanisms that transcend language (e.g. the kind of body-based cognition that George Lakoff wrote about as a basis for cognitive grammar, or the kinds of information processing constraints (perception, memory, motor constraints, attention) that some functionalists have proposed). In the absence of a case for bottom-up or top-down learning mechanisms, grammar must be innate. The structure of this argument makes it clear why any claim that language is "caused" by cognition (or grammar is "caused" by meaning) is viewed with such suspicion in the nativist camp. In this regard, Brian MacWhinney and I found it useful back in our 1989 book ("The cross-linguistic study of sentence processing") to distinguish between four levels of functional causation of grammar, ordered from the weakest to the strongest, in the sense that the higher levels presupposed the lower ones. By "functional causation" we are referring both to message constraints (the cognitive content that underlies those semantic structures that are mapped onto grammar) and to information processing constraints (perceptual, memory, motor output, etc.). The four levels refer to the ways in which these constraints could operate to affect the nature and shape of grammar. In a nutshell: Level 1 functionalism refers to claims that grammars are the way they are because of functional constraints on evolution, i.e. the process by which grammars appeared in the first place. Note that, at this level, no claims are made about cause-and-effect relations in today's speaker-listeners, nor about the effect of functional constraints on language acquisition, nor about the need to include functional categories and operations within our characterization of the grammar (i.e. in competence models). In other words, Level 1 functionalism does not preclude strong, domain-specific nativist beliefs. I interpret the well-known Pinker & Bloom paper on Natural Language and Natural Selection to reflect a kind of Level 1 functionalism. Level 2 functionalism presupposes Level 1, with an additional claim: specifically, that the same functional constraints that brought grammar into the world continue to operate synchronically, maintaining grammars in their current form and (perhaps) bringing about continuing change (i.e. historical language change following inter-language contact, gradual erosion of morphological markers, and so on). Note that one can embrace Level 2 functionalism without assuming that the cause-and-effect relations that operate in adult discourse are available to small children as an aid in language learning (indeed, many of these facts may be completely inaccessible to children, of no use at all in learning). Hence one can still be a nativist, assuming that grammars are unlearnable without substantial a priori knowledge. Nor is it necessary for a Level 2 functionalist to build non-linguistic constraints directly into his/her characterization of the grammar (i.e. one can maintain a modular architecture, with an autonomous grammar). Level 3 functionalism presupposes Levels 1 and 2, with a further claim: that children can exploit the form-function correlations used by adults, rediscovering in each successive generation the reasons why grammars look the way they do. In other words, the functional constraints described at Levels 1 and 2 also operate causally within the learning/discovery process. Although this approach eats away at strong nativism (because less grammar-specific innate knowledge is required), it is still possible to maintain some kind of modular architecture in which grammar eventually "decouples" from the rest of cognition. Level 4 functionalism presupposes Levels 1 - 3, with the additional claim that grammar cannot be adequately described without reference to the functional constraints (structures and operations) that play a causal role in its evolutionary history, current use by adults, and acquisition by children. In other words, modular accounts must be abandoned in favor of accounts of linguistic knowledge that are "functionalist all the way down." This is, I take it, where most functionalist and cognitivist grammarians take their stand. In our 1989 proposal, Brian and I suggested that each of these four levels requires different kinds of empirical evidence. Lower forms of evidence (in the logical sense outlined above) are required for the higher levels, but are not sufficient to establish claims at the higher levels. We hoped back in 1989 that this taxonomy might prove useful. It seemed to work for us. Maybe it will be useful to some of you in the current discussion. -liz bates From iclc97 at LET.VU.NL Sat Jul 5 22:55:44 1997 From: iclc97 at LET.VU.NL (ICLC'97 Local Organizers) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 1997 00:55:44 +0200 Subject: Cognitive Linguistics Conference Message-ID: ********************************************************************* We have now completed the final update of the www-site for the ************************************************** 5th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, July 14 - 19 ************************************************** The site now includes not only the abstracts of all plenary lectures and theme sessions and an alphabetical list of all papers and posters, but also travel information, a day-by-day overview of the conference program, and the abstracts for the Student Session. Our URL: http://www.vu.nl/ICLC97/ All conference participants are cordially invited to come to the Welcome Reception at the Park Hotel (Amsterdam, Stadhouderskade 25) on Sunday, July 13, from 16:00 (4 pm) to 20:00 (8 pm). The scientific program will begin on Monday, July 14, at 8:45 with opening remarks by Theo Janssen and a plenary lecture by George Lakoff, and will end on Saturday, July 19, with a featured lecture by Douglas Hofstadter. Theo Janssen & Gisela Redeker Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Organizers of ICLC'97 iclc97 at let.vu.nl fax: +31-20-4446500 ********************************************************************* From jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU Mon Jul 7 21:56:12 1997 From: jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU (Johanna Rubba) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 1997 14:56:12 -0700 Subject: Query: discontinuous morphology Message-ID: I am preparing an article for a forthcoming typology handbook on 'introflection', a.k.a. 'discontinuous' or 'nonconcatenative' morphology. I have a few questions that I am researching via databases, but would appreciate any tips that would shorten my search time while helping me achieve good coverage for a handbook of this type. The questions are: (a) Is very thoroughgoing discontinuous morphology** found in language families _other_ than the Semitic? If so, which languages/families? (b) Among currently living Semitic languages/dialects, which use discontinuous morphology in the verb and/or noun-pluralization systems most productively, and which use it least productively? (c) Is anyone in Optimality Theory (and/or other recent 'hot' morphological theories) working on discontinuous morphology in Semitic or other language families? [I have been out of this loop since finishing my dissertation, on Modern Aramaic, in 1993] ** By this I don't mean the occasional construction in which noncontiguous morphs recur with similar meanings, but rather whole (or nearly whole) systems which employ discontinous morphemes/morphemes consisting of noncontiguous morphs/phonemes. If there is interest, I will post a summary to the list. In any case, I will acknowledge helpful sources in my article. Thanks! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Johanna Rubba Assistant Professor, Linguistics ~ English Department, California Polytechnic State University ~ San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 ~ Tel. (805)-756-2184 E-mail: jrubba at oboe.aix.calpoly.edu ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From tony at BENJAMINS.COM Fri Jul 11 15:24:15 1997 From: tony at BENJAMINS.COM (Tony Schiavo) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 1997 11:24:15 -0400 Subject: New Books: Functional Linguistics Message-ID: John Benjamins Publishing would like to call your attention to the following new titles in the field of Functional Linguistics: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE FUNCTION AND LANGUAGE TYPE DEDICATED TO T. GIVÓN Joan Bybee, John Haiman & Sandra A. Thompson (eds.) 1997 vi, 480 pp. US/Canada: Cloth: 1 55619 522 2 Price: US$99.00 Rest of the world: Cloth: 90 272 2168 5 Price: Hfl. 195,-- John Benjamins Publishing web site: http://www.benjamins.com For further information via e-mail: service at benjamins.com In their subject matter and in their theoretical orientation all the papers in this volume reflect the powerful influence of T. Givón. Most of them deal with questions of morphosyntactic typology, pragmatics, and grammaticalization theory. Many of them are directly based on extensive fieldwork on local languages of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Others are based on statistical analyses of extensive written and spoken corpora of texts. CONVERSATION COGNITIVE, COMMUNICATIVE AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES T. Givón (ed.) 1997 viii, 302 pp. Typological Studies in Language, 34 US/Canada: Cloth: 1 55619 643 1 Price: $89.00 Paper: 1 55619 644 X Price: $29.95 Rest of the world: Cloth: 90 272 2929 5 Price: Hfl. 150,-- Paper: 90 272 2930 9 Price: Hfl. 60,-- John Benjamins Publishing web site: http://www.benjamins.com For further information via e-mail: service at benjamins.com The papers in this volume were originally presented at the Symposium on Conversation, held at the University of New Mexico in July 1995. The symposium brought together scholars who work on face-to-face communication from a variety of perspectives: social, cultural, cognitive and communicative. The aim for both the symposium and this volume has been to challenge some of the prevailing dichotomies in discourse studies: First, the cleavage between the study of information flow and the study of social interaction. Second, the theoretical division between speech-situation models and cognitive models. Third, the methodological split between the study of spontaneous conversation in natural context and the study of speech production and comprehension under controlled experimental conditions. And fourth, the rigid genre distinction between narrative and conversational discourse. All four dichotomies have been useful either methodologically or historically. But important as they may have been in the past, the time has perhaps come to work toward an integrated approach to the study of human communication, one that will be less dependent on narrow reductions. Both the ontological primacy and the methodological challenge of natural face-to-face communication are self evident. Human language has evolved, is acquired, and is practiced most commonly in the context of face-to-face communication. Most past theory-building in either linguistics or psychology has not benefited from the study of face-to-face communication, a fact that is regrettable and demands rectification. Contributors to the volume include: A. Anderson, A. Robertson, K. Kilborn, S. Beek and E. Dean (Glasgow), W. Chafe (Santa Barbara), J. Coates (Roehampton), C. Dickinson and T. Givon (Oregon), S. Ervin-Tripp and A. Kuntay (Berkeley), P. Linell and N. Korolija (Linkoping), L. Moxey and A. Sanford (Glasgow), N. Stein, R. Bernas and D. Calicchia (Chicago), T. Trabasso and A. Ozyurek (Chicago). -------------------------------------------------------------- Anthony P. Schiavo Jr Tel: (215) 836-1200 Publicity/Marketing Fax: (215) 836-1204 John Benjamins North America e-mail: tony at benjamins.com PO Box 27519 Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 Check out the John Benjamins web site: http://www.benjamins.com From AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR Sat Jul 12 04:38:47 1997 From: AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR (Ramin Akbari) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 1997 08:08:47 +330 Subject: Cognition and Intelligence Message-ID: I am preparing an article investigating the relationship between language acquisition(first and second), intelligence, and cognition.However,cognitive psychology does specify the nature of the relationship between cognition and intelligence.How are these two concepts related?Is intelligence part of cognition or is it the opposite? I would be grateful to receive tips and comments related to this problem.All helpful suggestions would be acknowledged in the article. ***************************************************************************** Ramin Akbari,English Department,Tarbiat Modaress University,Tehran,Iran e-mail:AKBARI_R at NET1cs.modares.ac.ir From tpc1 at RA.MSSTATE.EDU Mon Jul 14 20:36:19 1997 From: tpc1 at RA.MSSTATE.EDU (Thomas Price Caldwell Jr.) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 1997 15:36:19 -0500 Subject: niceness Message-ID: At 8:46 AM 9/19/98, Brian MacWhinney wrote: >Jane, > Good point. However, my claim was a bit more narrow. I was not >suggesting that English is in any way "nice", only that it avoids this >particular verbal show of pleasure in other's suffering. English accepts >the notion of "sadism", but only as a foreign import. English is rich, of >course, in terms describing moral violations like greed, sloth, cowardice >(the basic sins of Pilgrim's Progress). It is also definitely OK to talk >openly about vindictiveness and revenge (witness Timothy McVeigh on the >subject of revenge for the Waco FBI attack). These emotional terms are >justified by their grounding in righteousness. But it is exactly this that >forces us to shift (almost at the last moment?) from feeling >"Schadenfreude" to concluding that someone "got his just desserts". In >fact, what happens is that the wrath (vindictiveness, vengefulness) of the >Almighty ends up descending onto an appropriate target without us having to >develop a personal relation grounded on the joy of seeing someone else >suffer. Tricky stuff. > Does Lakoff have anything on issues like this? English has lots of >stuff like "writhing in agony" and "twisting in the wind." Are there >metaphors and similes in Schadenfreude languages grounded on "delight in >watching someone twist in the wind?" > Alternatively, perhaps there is some universal of metaphor that >excludes emotions about others' emotions. Maybe such terms are just too >cognitively complex according to some version of "theory of mind." What >about Akio Kamio's analyses that claim that Japanese limits the speaker's >ability to make statements about the hearer's feelings and emotions >(speaker's territory of knowledge)? Perhaps we could argue that English is >constrained in a similar way. I realize that this is not the original >account that I offered, but it is also an interesting possibility. > >-- Brian Price Caldwell English Department Mississippi State University Miss. State, MS 39762 From darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU Mon Jul 14 21:26:27 1997 From: darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU (Michael Darnell) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 1997 16:26:27 -0500 Subject: conference announcement Message-ID: CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT CHANGE OF DATE 24th University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Linguistics Symposium: Discourse Across Languages and Cultures. Our 24th symposium has been rescheduled. The symposium will be held SEPTEMBER 10-12, 1998. We apologize any inconvenience this rescheduling may create, and for any multiple postings. Contact person: Mike Darnell darnell at csd.uwm.edu From jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK Fri Jul 18 08:46:02 1997 From: jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK (Jean Hudson) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 09:46:02 +0100 Subject: fixedness Message-ID: Dear funknetters It's quite a few years since Paul Hopper wrote (in Traugott & Heine 1991): "The occurrence of certain lexical items in frequent collocations (for example when the word 'foot' repeatedly occurs in phrases like 'at the foot of the hill', etc) may be prima facie evidence of incipient grammaticalization." My primary interest is the notion of 'fixedness' and I've been trying (in vain) to find references to work related to this citation. Note that it is not the grammaticalization of the phrase that concerns me but the propensity of words that seem to be undergoing grammaticalization to become part of fixed expressions. Any references to related work or contacts with interested researchers would be most welcome. Jean Hudson From AAGHBAR at GROVE.IUP.EDU Fri Jul 18 15:17:01 1997 From: AAGHBAR at GROVE.IUP.EDU (Ali Aghbar) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 10:17:01 -0500 Subject: Fixedness Message-ID: Jean, Below you will find a home page for a dissertation written by Christina Gitsaki. She has an impressive list of references on collocations. (I know that Gitsaki now has a new e-mail address although I do not have a handy record of it at the moment.) Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 19:23:44 +1000 From: Christina Gitsaki Subject: Ph.D. Thesis on Collocations Dear Colleagues, I would like to announce that my Ph.D. Thesis on the Development of ESL Collocational Knowledge is now available on WWW. Here's the URL: http://www.cltr.uq.oz.au:8000/users/christina.gitsaki/ Any comments will be greatly appreciated. Regards, Christina Gitsaki Copyright 1996 by Christina Gitsaki I am also interested in the study of collocations and fixedness, so I would appreciate receiving a summary of what you find. Ali Aghbar, Dept. of English, Indiana U. of Pennsylvania, Indiana, PA 15705 aaghbar at grove.iup.edu Phone: (412) 357 4937 http://www.iup.edu/~aaghbar From AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR Sat Jul 19 05:14:38 1997 From: AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR (Ramin Akbari) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1997 08:44:38 +330 Subject: Proficiency Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I am investigating the relationship between language proficiency as it is defined in the measurement literature and cognitive variables.One of the cognitive variables which has kicked up a lot of controversy is intelligence.Some people claim that intelligence is the same as language proficiency, while some others believe that language proficiency has got nothing to do with intelligence.A big problem here is that no one is completely clear on the meaning of the term intelligence.Worse still is the nature of the relationship between cognition and intelligence:How are these two related?Which one is a subpart of the other? I would be grateful to receive comments related to the nature of language proficiency,intelligence, and cognition. Thanks! Ramin Akbari,English Department, Tarbait Modarss University,Tehran,Iran. email:AKBARI_R at NET1cs.modares.ac.ir From AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR Sun Jul 20 05:38:18 1997 From: AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR (Ramin Akbari) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 1997 09:08:18 +330 Subject: More on Language Proficiency Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, Thanks a lot for your helpful comments.It seems that I have not clearly stated my problem.My real purpose in investigating the relationship between intelligence and language proficiency is to learn more about the structure of the latter.In second/foreign language testing literature,we use factor analysis for testing the psychological reality (construct validity) of the components we believe to be part of language proficiency.However,studies making use of this statistical technique have lead to often contradictory results.Some of the findings say that we have one single language ability which is not divisible into smaller components.Some others claim that language proficiency can easiliy be broken down into smaller sections,such as listening comprehension,reading comprehension,and knowledge of grammar. Still other studies have found that the structure of language proficiency is sensitive to the proficiency level of the learners;i.e.,language proficiency is divisible in beginners and unifactorial in advanced learners.It is my hunch that cognitive variables such as intelligence have a role in determining the nature (or the structure) of second language proficiency. The first problem is obtaining a real estimate of the learners intelligence.The second problem is determining the exact relationship between intelligince and what cognitive psychologists call cognitive structure or cognition.How are these two related? I would be grateful if you send me your useful comments. Sincerely, Ramin Akbari,English Department, Tarbiat Modaress University,Tehran,Iran. email:AKBARI_R at NET1cs.modares.ac.ir From jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK Mon Jul 21 10:45:10 1997 From: jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK (Jean Hudson) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 11:45:10 +0100 Subject: fixedness Message-ID: Thankyou for responses on fixedness, and some further clarification. I am familiar with the Firthian concepts and also much of what has been written about idioms (esp more recent psycholinguistic work demonstrating the relationship between reduced salience via certain types of metaphor, and fixedness (ie, syntactic, semantic, collocational constraints). My question concerned only the situation where there seems to be incipient grammaticalization of a 'full lexical item' and a concomitant propensity for that item to enter into fixed expressions (together with all the other symptoms of gramm:n - decategoriality etc). I don't think there is a great deal of interest in this particular question, and don't want to take too much space on this discussion list, but if anyone out there is interested in further discussion of this very specific aspect of fixedness, please get in touch. Jean Hudson From ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU Mon Jul 21 12:48:03 1997 From: ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Paul J Hopper) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 08:48:03 -0400 Subject: Fixedness Message-ID: Jean Hudson brings our attention to an interesting issue. Usually by the time we are sufficently aware of the grammatical status of a form or a construction, it is already clearly grammatical. What about the preceding stages? The earlier history not only raises the question of how fixed a form has to be before it is said to be fixed, but it also tests our conception of 'grammatical' and 'grammar', both of which are prerequisites to 'grammaticalization', in relation to specific kinds of discourse context, genres, and other messy issues. Some recent discussion that comes to mind (there's lots more; perhaps others can eke this out, and I apologize if I've left out something obvious): Several papers in the Traugott/Heine volumes deal with the discourse contexts and genres of incipient grammaticalization (e.g., Chr. Lehmann, Nichols/Timberlake, Herring, Hopper), see also Carey's and Slobin's papers on the perfect in the Pagliuca volume. I discuss this very question in my paper for the volume Anna Giacalone and I are editing on 'The Limits of Grammaticalization'. - Paul Hopper From satoshi at INSC.TOHOKU.AC.JP Mon Jul 21 13:55:31 1997 From: satoshi at INSC.TOHOKU.AC.JP (Satoshi Uehara) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 22:55:31 +0900 Subject: journal subscription info Message-ID: Hi Could anyone kindly e-mail me the institutional subscription info of the following journals (publishers, ISSNs, annual dues): Studies in Language Functions of Language I'd like to add the above two to the journals that my institution subscribes to, and need the info immediately. If you know other functional-linguistically oriented journals, I appreciate your suggestions. Please send your message to my e-mail address below, not to the list: uehara at intcul.tohoku.ac.jp Thank you in advance. Satoshi Uehara, Ph.D. International Student Center Tohoku University From jtang at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU Mon Jul 21 16:09:13 1997 From: jtang at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU (Joyce Tang Boyland) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 09:09:13 -0700 Subject: fixedness Message-ID: Hello, My dissertation deals with this issue (fixedness), using as a case study the modal+have ("would've") construction. A copy and related papers are available at http://act.psy.cmu.edu/act/people/joyce/joyce.html If you would like a paper copy please send me e-mail (if you have already requested one and are still waiting, I'll be sending them out in a few weeks when I'll be back in Berkeley where photocopying is cheaper than it is here in Pittsburgh). Joyce Tang Boyland jtang at andrew.cmu.edu or jtang at cogsci.berkeley.edu From DPAT at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU Tue Jul 22 03:47:27 1997 From: DPAT at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU (DPAT at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 20:47:27 -0700 Subject: tenure a thing of the past? Message-ID: From: IN%"RTROIKE at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU" "Rudy Troike" 21-JUL-1997 10:47 To: IN%"LINGUA at LISTSERV.ARIZONA.EDU" CC: Subj: FYI re AIC Return-path: Received: from listserv.arizona.edu by CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU (PMDF V5.1-7 #24133) with ESMTP id <01ILHUYG9V008ZDXCW at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU>; Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:47:03 MST Received: from LISTSERV (listserv.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.14]) by listserv.arizona.edu (AIX4.2/UCB 8.7/8.7) with ESMTP id KAA30040; Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:46:57 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:46:53 -0700 From: Rudy Troike Subject: FYI re AIC Sender: Linguistics at the University of Arizona To: LINGUA at LISTSERV.ARIZONA.EDU Reply-to: Rudy Troike Message-id: <199707211746.KAA30040 at listserv.arizona.edu> X-Envelope-to: ALEXLAB, AZSLAT, CKSUHLIN, CVERES, DOHALA, DPAT, HIKAWA Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:10:00 -0700 From: Tenney Nathanson For those of you who don't know Kali, she came to AIC this past year with a critical book (from Cambridge)already in print and as the publisher of a widely-respected journal and small press. I'm out of town now so I haven't seen the Tucson Weekly piece, but I bet it's a good read!. Tenney ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 20 Jul 97 13:53:26 +0100 From: Kali Tal Subject: Fire-at-Will University Dear Friends, This is a copy of the letter I've sent to the Delegates list of the Modern Language Association. I'd very much appreciate it if you could forward it to appropriate discussion lists, and bring it to the attention of academic organizations to which you belong. I'm interested in getting as much public attention as possible directed at Arizona International Campus of the Univ. of AZ, and in making the profession aware of the ways in which the University of Arizona system is supporting the denial of faculty rights, academic freedom, and due process. Thank you, Kali Tal ___________________________________________________________ Dear Colleagues, Arizona International Campus is a new campus in the University of Arizona system. It's a small liberal arts college, and it was advertised last year as a non-tenure-granting institution that would develop other means to guarantee academic freedom and due process for its faculty. Five new professors were hired and moved, from different parts of the country, to open its doors for the 1996-97 school year as its "Founding Faculty" members. We were asked to make a long-term commitment to the institution, and told that we'd take part in the development of this new non-tenure system. We were also assured that the one-year contracts given in our first year were "just a formality" because the Arizona Board of Regents had not yet approved multi-year contracts for AIC faculty. On the promise of the Provost of AIC, Celestino Fernandez, that multi-year contracts would certainly be offered the following year and that we had nothing to fear in terms of nonrenewal, we relocated to Tucson and began our work. The distressing turn which AIC has taken is described extremely well in this week's issue of the _Tucson Weekly_. You can find it on the Web at: http://www.weeklywire.com/tw/07-17-97/feat.htm The 3800+ word article was written by Margaret Regan, who has received two awards for her previous coverage of AIC's development. The bottom line is that there is no due process and no protection of academic freedom at AIC. All faculty members again received one-year contracts. My own contract was not renewed, and the Provost refused to give an explanation for his decision, though I believe that he did not renew me because of my tendency to speak my mind, and to question his commitment to the principles of the institution--particularly his commitment to due process. Faculty evaluations were highly irregular. This may be hard to believe, but faculty were evaluated with *the same one-page form* that was used to evaluate secretarial staff, and there was no process for evaluating teaching, service work or scholarship. No faculty member took part in looking over the dossiers of other faculty members; the decision was solely administrative and in the hands of one man, the Provost. Finally, even though our letters of offer stated that we were to serve under the terms and conditions of employment under development at AIC, my letter of nonrenewal stated that I was no more than a year-to-year appointee, with no rights under the tenure system in place at our parent campus, the University of Arizona. The push to eliminate tenure is very strong now, all over the country. Some of us have even supported the development of alternatives to tenure--I thought, when I took the job at AIC, that I was helping to create a new kind of system which would have the advantages of tenure, but none of its drawbacks. Unfortunately, I discovered that those with the greatest enthusiasm for eliminating tenure want most to eliminate its protections for faculty. AIC has been touted as "the future" of the academy. If it *is* the future, then our future will be made of academic sweat shops and a growing class of intellectual migrant laborers. I hope that you will take the time to read the _Tucson Weekly_ article, and to pass it on to your colleagues. At a time when tenure lines are going unfilled for lack of funding, and part-time and year-to-year employment among academics is growing by leaps and bounds, we need to pay careful attention to the ugly and ill-constructed foundations upon which the "non-tenure revolution" in the academy rests. I'd appreciate responses, either on the list or privately, as well as any suggestions about how to publicize the situation at AIC. Collegially, Kali Tal Until recently a Professor at Arizona International Campus, Tucson. Now a woman without an institution. Kali Tal kali at kalital.com http://www.kalital.com New Word Order Web Development http://www.new-word.com "Web Sites for Academics and Other Smart People" From ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU Wed Jul 23 00:50:24 1997 From: ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Paul J Hopper) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1997 20:50:24 -0400 Subject: Fwd: Paul Benedict Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Return-path: X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 0;andrew.cmu.edu;Network-Mail Received: from po5.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail ID ; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 19:15:15 -0400 (EDT) Received: from VM.SC.EDU (vm.sc.edu [129.252.41.4]) by po5.andrew.cmu.edu (8.8.5/8.8.2) with SMTP id TAA10509 for ; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 19:15:13 -0400 (EDT) Received: from VM.SC.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with BSMTP id 2110; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:11:59 EDT Received: from VM.SC.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8245; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:57 -0400 Received: from VM.SC.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (LISTSERV-TCP/IP release 1.8c) with spool id 9412 for HISTLING at VM.SC.EDU; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:55 -0400 Received: from UNIVSCVM (NJE origin DISTERH at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8227; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:55 -0400 Received: from UNIVSCVM (NJE origin SMTP at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8119; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:15 -0400 Received: from VM.SC.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with BSMTP id 2050; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:08:15 EDT Received: from VM.SC.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8115; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:15 -0400 Received: from UNIVSCVM (NJE origin SMTP at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8113; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:15 -0400 Received: from CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with TCP; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:08:14 EDT Received: from CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU by CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 9502; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:08:56 EDT Received: from cms.cc.wayne.edu (NJE origin MRATLIF at WAYNEST1) by CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 3461; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:56 -0400 Approved-By: Dorothy Disterheft Message-ID: Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:51 EDT Reply-To: Martha Ratliff Sender: HISTLING -- Historical Linguistics Mailing List From: Martha Ratliff Subject: Paul Benedict To: HISTLING at VM.SC.EDU ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear colleagues, It is with a heavy heart that I make the following announcement -- Paul Benedict was killed in a car accident in Florida yesterday. I talked with his wife today, and she told me that he died quickly, without suffering. I had just seen him at a meeting of Southeast Asianists in May, where he was as active and happy as always, and full of ideas for new projects. If any of you knew Paul and care to write to his wife, the address is as follows: Marilyn Benedict 104 River Lane Ormond Beach, Florida 32176 In memory of good times now past, Martha Ratliff From jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU Wed Jul 23 17:46:02 1997 From: jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU (Johanna Rubba) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 1997 10:46:02 -0700 Subject: Book search Message-ID: I am trying to get my hands on a copy of a textbook that was published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in 1985 and is now out of print and permanently out of stock, acc. to HBJ's phone rep. It's called _Writing Step by Step_ and is by Robert de Beaugrande. Some of you may be familiar with his 1984 article that sets out a little bit of a methodology for teaching grammar concepts and analysis skills using the English competence of the students, "Forward to the basics: Getting down to grammar" fom 1984's CCC journal. The book's ISBN # is 0155982583. I have not found it in any of the U of CA online library catalogs, nor the Cal State libraries that I can access online, nor the Library of Congress (though I may have botched that search!) If anyone knows of a source of this book, or has a spare copy they could send me (I will take very good care of it!), please get in touch. Thanks! Johanna ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Johanna Rubba Assistant Professor, Linguistics ~ English Department, California Polytechnic State University ~ San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 ~ Tel. (805)-756-2184 E-mail: jrubba at polymail.calpoly.edu ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From eng_shh at SHSU.EDU Tue Jul 1 19:28:12 1997 From: eng_shh at SHSU.EDU (Helena Halmari) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 1997 14:28:12 EST Subject: 1998 AAAL GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL GRANT/ADDRESS CORRECTION Message-ID: The recently posted AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant contained a mistake in the address where the applications should be sent. The following message contains the current address of the AAAL Business Office. 1998 AAAL GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL GRANT Purpose: To help support travel (and some expenses) of a graduate student member of AAAL to the 1998 annual meeting. Eligibility: Applicants must be current members of AAAL (at time of application) who are in a university Master's or Ph.D. program in applied linguistics or related field. Amount: One award of $500.00 (US) will be made for the 1998 conference. Selection Criteria: (a) Present scholarship and future promise (b) Demonstrated need (c) Involvement in applied linguistics and commitment to the field Application procedure: 1. Send four copies of a letter of introduction in which you state: (a) institution and program of study (b) current contributions to the field of applied linguistics (c) career plans after completion of degree program (d) current financial situation, including your university's contribution to conference travel (e) how conference attendance will benefit you and others (f) a biographical statement of no longer than 50 words, suitable for publication (g) contact information (address, telephone, fax, and e-mail)* 2. Send a sealed letter of recommendation from a professor in your graduate program who is familiar with your work. The letter should state your professor's estimation of: (a) your academic work and promise in the field of applied linguistics (b) personal attributes relevant to a career in applied linguistics (c) your level of need for financial assistance as provided for by this grant.* *Each of the categories listed must be addressed since evaluation is keyed to individual categories (not including 1(a), (f), (g)). Deadline for receipt of application: December 1, 1997 Send all materials to: 1998 AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant AAAL Business Office P.O. Box 21686 Eagan, MN 55121-0686 Any questions about this grant may be addressed to the Co-chair of the Awards Committee: Helena Halmari, Dept. of English, Sam Houston State University Huntsville, Texas 77341 e-mail: eng_shh at shsu.edu tel: 409-294-1990 From dp11 at CORNELL.EDU Wed Jul 2 13:59:32 1997 From: dp11 at CORNELL.EDU (David Parkinson) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 1997 09:59:32 -0400 Subject: Question about functional approaches Message-ID: Hello FUNKNET members: Myself and some grad student colleagues who have an informal discussion group here at Cornell have a question or two that we thought could be answered on this list. As I understand it, the functionalist <--> formalist dimension is orthogonal to the innate (language-specific) knowledge <--> non-innate (general cognitive) knowledge dimension. Presumably one could have: (1) highly functional syntax as well as innate language-specific learning principles; (2) highly functional syntax and no language-specific learning principles; (3) "dysfunctional" syntax as well as innate language-specific learning principles; (4) "dysfunctional" syntax and no language-specific learning principles; This is pretty sketchy, I admit, but the idea, I hope, is clear. My feeling is that generativists tend towards (3) and many functionalists towards (2). For obvious reasons, (1) and (4) seem to be out on limbs of their own, but they are logically possible positions to hold; just hard to adduce evidence for, perhaps. Clearly, it is strange to talk about "functionality" vs. "dysfunctionality" as though it were as cut-and-dried as the issue of whether or not there are language-specific learning mechanisms; functionality inheres in parts of a system to varying degrees, whereas innateness defines the nature of a system from the outside, as it were. As befits our East Polar status, weare trained here in generative grammatical theory, but some of us have been trying to learn more about functional approaches, especially to syntax, since syntax so readily leads to debates about innateness of linguistic knowledge. There is a whole standard set of problems in generative syntax, whose ultimate explanation points towards innateness claims, via poverty of the stimulus, etc. Some of these include that-trace effects, subjacency violations, ECP effects, wh-islands, what used to be the SSC and NIC, the Head Movement Constraint, and so on. Can anyone out there suggest places we could look to see how a functionalist approach would answer questions of this type? Do functionalist theories of syntax have as a goal this sort of investigation? Having been trained in formalist and nativist theories of syntax, we are curious to see whether there is any cross-talk between these two areas. Do functionalists consider the questions that formalists ask worth answering? Is there an entirely different approach and entirelyt different issues and questions to be answered that leave aside the traditional concerns of generative theories? If anyone out there can suggest places we can start looking for some ways in which similar linguistic data can be viewed through the lenses of both theoretical appraoches, we would be happy. If there are really no or very few problems common to both approaches, this is interesting (and distressing). If I have gone of the rails here, please let me know where and how (why, too, if you feel combative!). If anyone has a response to these or related questions, I am happy to take responses by personal e-mail, and provide a summary. Your anonymity will be respected if you ask me to do so. Thanks in advance, David Parkinson dp11 at cornell.edu From lmenn at CLIPR.COLORADO.EDU Wed Jul 2 20:08:58 1997 From: lmenn at CLIPR.COLORADO.EDU (Lise Menn, Linguistics, CU Boulder) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 1997 13:08:58 -0700 Subject: Question about functional approaches In-Reply-To: Message-ID: There's another factor to consider, or maybe just another way to phrase what you've said: innateness vs. the ability to learn and to abstract patterns. The functionalist approach by itself doesn't deal with whether/how patterns are acquired; just because something is motivated by or fulfills a function doesn't mean that it's learnable. Some functionalists aren't terribly interested in this issue; others of us definitely are. YOu might like to to look at the papers on the innateness issue in BLS 22, which has just come out. On Wed, 2 Jul 1997, David Parkinson wrote: > Hello FUNKNET members: > Myself and some grad student colleagues who have an informal > discussion group here at Cornell have a question or two that we thought > could be answered on this list. > As I understand it, the functionalist <--> formalist dimension is > orthogonal to the innate (language-specific) knowledge <--> non-innate > (general cognitive) knowledge dimension. Presumably one could have: > > (1) highly functional syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; > (2) highly functional syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; > (3) "dysfunctional" syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; > (4) "dysfunctional" syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; > > This is pretty sketchy, I admit, but the idea, I hope, is clear. My feeling > is that generativists tend towards (3) and many functionalists towards (2). > For obvious reasons, (1) and (4) seem to be out on limbs of their own, but > they are logically possible positions to hold; just hard to adduce evidence > for, perhaps. Clearly, it is strange to talk about "functionality" vs. > "dysfunctionality" as though it were as cut-and-dried as the issue of > whether or not there are language-specific learning mechanisms; > functionality inheres in parts of a system to varying degrees, whereas > innateness defines the nature of a system from the outside, as it were. > As befits our East Polar status, weare trained here in generative > grammatical theory, but some of us have been trying to learn more about > functional approaches, especially to syntax, since syntax so readily leads > to debates about innateness of linguistic knowledge. There is a whole > standard set of problems in generative syntax, whose ultimate explanation > points towards innateness claims, via poverty of the stimulus, etc. Some of > these include that-trace effects, subjacency violations, ECP effects, > wh-islands, what used to be the SSC and NIC, the Head Movement Constraint, > and so on. Can anyone out there suggest places we could look to see how a > functionalist approach would answer questions of this type? Do > functionalist theories of syntax have as a goal this sort of investigation? > Having been trained in formalist and nativist theories of syntax, > we are curious to see whether there is any cross-talk between these two > areas. Do functionalists consider the questions that formalists ask worth > answering? Is there an entirely different approach and entirelyt different > issues and questions to be answered that leave aside the traditional > concerns of generative theories? > If anyone out there can suggest places we can start looking for > some ways in which similar linguistic data can be viewed through the lenses > of both theoretical appraoches, we would be happy. If there are really no > or very few problems common to both approaches, this is interesting (and > distressing). > If I have gone of the rails here, please let me know where and how > (why, too, if you feel combative!). If anyone has a response to these or > related questions, I am happy to take responses by personal e-mail, and > provide a summary. Your anonymity will be respected if you ask me to do so. > > Thanks in advance, > David Parkinson > dp11 at cornell.edu > From eng_shh at SHSU.EDU Wed Jul 2 21:40:13 1997 From: eng_shh at SHSU.EDU (Helena Halmari) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 1997 16:40:13 EST Subject: Correction to AAAL Travel Grant announcement Message-ID: The address given for the AAAL Business office in the recently posted AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant announcement was incorrect. The following message contains the current, correct address of the AAAL Business Office. 1998 AAAL GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL GRANT Purpose: To help support travel (and some expenses) of a graduate student member of AAAL to the 1998 annual meeting. Eligibility: Applicants must be current members of AAAL (at time of application) who are in a university Master's or Ph.D. program in applied linguistics or related field. Amount: One award of $500.00 (US) will be made for the 1998 conference. Selection Criteria: (a) Present scholarship and future promise (b) Demonstrated need (c) Involvement in applied linguistics and commitment to the field Application procedure: 1. Send four copies of a letter of introduction in which you state: (a) institution and program of study (b) current contributions to the field of applied linguistics (c) career plans after completion of degree program (d) current financial situation, including your university's contribution to conference travel (e) how conference attendance will benefit you and others (f) a biographical statement of no longer than 50 words, suitable for publication (g) contact information (address, telephone, fax, and e-mail)* 2. Send a sealed letter of recommendation from a professor in your graduate program who is familiar with your work. The letter should state your professor's estimation of: (a) your academic work and promise in the field of applied linguistics (b) personal attributes relevant to a career in applied linguistics (c) your level of need for financial assistance as provided for by this grant.* *Each of the categories listed must be addressed since evaluation is keyed to individual categories (not including 1(a), (f), (g)). Deadline for receipt of application: December 1, 1997 Send all materials to: 1998 AAAL Graduate Student Travel Grant AAAL Business Office P.O. Box 21686 Eagan, MN 55121-0686 Any questions about this grant may be addressed to the Co-chair of the Awards Committee: Helena Halmari, Dept. of English, Sam Houston State University Huntsville, Texas 77341 e-mail: eng_shh at shsu.edu tel: 409-294-1990 From lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU Thu Jul 3 09:17:14 1997 From: lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU (George Lakoff) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 02:17:14 -0700 Subject: Question about functional approaches Message-ID: Hi, As a cognitivist who shares many functionalist goals, my answer will be different than functionalists who are not cognitivists. > As I understand it, the functionalist <--> formalist dimension is >orthogonal to the innate (language-specific) knowledge <--> non-innate >(general cognitive) knowledge dimension. Presumably one could have: > >(1) highly functional syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; >(2) highly functional syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; >(3) "dysfunctional" syntax as well as innate language-specific > learning principles; >(4) "dysfunctional" syntax and no language-specific learning > principles; The cognitive response is NONE OF THE ABOVE. The reason is that in the rapidly evolving Neural Theory of Language, much of syntax uses semantics and much of linguistic semantics uses embodied structures from the sensory-motor system. All innateness issues get blurred here, since the sensory-motor/linguistics boundary no longer exists and since it is impossible to disentangle exactly what is and is not there in the sensory-motor system at birth, in the womb, and as a result of genetics (which underdetermines neural structure). From a neural/cognitive persopactive, all these issues look different. Things to read: Terry Regier's book THE HUMAN SEMANTIC POTENTIAL (MIT Press, 1996), and the papers, reports and dissertations on the website at icsi.berkeley.edu/Lzero. In this tradition, the poverty of the stimulus is replaced by the richness of the substrate. > As befits our East Polar status, weare trained here in generative >grammatical theory, but some of us have been trying to learn more about >functional approaches, especially to syntax, since syntax so readily leads >to debates about innateness of linguistic knowledge. There is a whole >standard set of problems in generative syntax, whose ultimate explanation >points towards innateness claims, via poverty of the stimulus, etc. Some of >these include that-trace effects, subjacency violations, ECP effects, >wh-islands, what used to be the SSC and NIC, the Head Movement Constraint, >and so on. Can anyone out there suggest places we could look to see how a >functionalist approach would answer questions of this type? Do >functionalist theories of syntax have as a goal this sort of investigation? Two obvious places to look: For a Langacker-tradition approach to anaphora, try Karen Van Hoek's thesis (soon to be published by Chicago) and her Language article. For a NTL approach to syntactic constraints using Shastri's theory of temporal binding for structured connectionist model, look at Jamie Henderson's thesis from Penn a few years back. > Having been trained in formalist and nativist theories of syntax, >we are curious to see whether there is any cross-talk between these two >areas. Do functionalists consider the questions that formalists ask worth >answering? Cognitive-finctionalists do not find the questions at all interesting, since they make assumptions contrary to the evidence from cognitive science and neurosceince. Is there an entirely different approach and entirelyt different >issues and questions to be answered that leave aside the traditional >concerns of generative theories? Yes. There is very extensive literature. The whole field of cognitive linguistics as well as the functionalist literature. > If anyone out there can suggest places we can start looking for >some ways in which similar linguistic data can be viewed through the lenses >of both theoretical appraoches, we would be happy. If there are really no >or very few problems common to both approaches, this is interesting (and >distressing). There does not seem to be much overlap. > If I have gone of the rails here, please let me know where and how >(why, too, if you feel combative!). If anyone has a response to these or >related questions, I am happy to take responses by personal e-mail, and >provide a summary. Your anonymity will be respected if you ask me to do so. > >Thanks in advance, >David Parkinson >dp11 at cornell.edu I'm glad you're interested. There's a whole universe of great linguistics outside of generative linguistics. It's developing in an incredibly exciting way. Best wishes, George Lakoff From M.Durie at LINGUISTICS.UNIMELB.EDU.AU Thu Jul 3 11:05:07 1997 From: M.Durie at LINGUISTICS.UNIMELB.EDU.AU (Mark Durie) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 22:05:07 +1100 Subject: Question about functional approaches In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear David, some comments on your Funknet posting: I think the notion of 'functional' vs 'dysfunctional' is confusing and needs clarification for your distinctions to be meaningful. I think we need to make a distinction between adequate functioning within the time-frame of use, and attributions of function as part of causal explanations. Working with the former sense, one might conclude that a structural property such as wh-islands contributes to adequate functioning, hinders functions, or is afunctional, making no difference to linguistic functionality. This is thus a 3-way distinction: your two-way distinction is not enough. Indeed things might be more complex: a structure might both help and hinder functioning, but in different ways, at the same time. Clearly this sense of function as process is orthogonal to the innateness question. Some innate things are functional (e.g. legs), some are dysfunctional (e.g. appendices), some are neutral (e.g. -I suppose- the two little ridges joining the nostils and the lips), and many if not most exhibit a mixture of functionality, afunctionality and dysfunctionality. The second sense of function as causal explanation is the critical one for the formal-functional contention. This is the idea that something is the way it is because of how it functions (in the first sense above). An example would be a claim that cars have their structure because of what they are used for. When Chomsky has argued that the function of the heart in no way offers an explanation for its structure, he is rejecting a causal functional explanation, not the idea that the heart is 'functional' in the first sense that it functions adequately to pump blood. Clearly these two senses of functional are related in complex ways: a particular causal function may have played a role in determining the evolution of an organ--sense 2--but no longer play a part in its contemporary functioning--sense 1--(an obsolete function), or an actual functioning role of something may have made no contribution to its evolution (an appropriated function). The term 'dysfunctional' as you use it as an opposite for 'functional' is misleading. 'Dysfunctional' is only used, as far as I know, in the first sense, of inadequate functioning, not for lack of a causal explanation. I.e. it is not an explanatory term. One would not what to report Chomsky's discussion of hearts as a claim that they are 'dysfunctional'. As I understand it, some generativists' position on syntax is anti-functional in both senses: not only is the attempt at functional (sense 2) explanation regarded as misguided, but syntax is actually claimed to be significantly dysfunctional (or perhaps afunctional) in the first sense. This is the idea that language is like a Rube Goldberg device, stuck on a stick and used for a sundial. (Taken from an anecdote in Daniel Dennett's 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea'). Of course any causal explanation, to avoid teleology, must refer an account in terms of a temporal sequence of cause-and-effect, so functional explanations, if they have any scientific substance, are inevitably diachronic or phylogenic. They are indeed Darwinian explanations of one kind or another, for Darwin's achievement was to take the teleology out of evolutionary theory. Keeping this in mind, I believe most functionalists would regard syntax as only partly optimized for function, due to the constant nature of linguistic change, and the existence of competing functional constraints. They would thus acknowledge the omnipresence of dysfunction in varying degrees. Indeed the very existence of dysfunctionality is essential the functional theory of competing motivations. Or to put it another way, adaptation involves functional compromise. So I don't think it is quite right to say that functionalists are really of the 'everything is functional' camp. With regard to the learnability issue, I would prefer to remain almost silent. I will say however that any purely formal explanation begs the why question - the question of the ontology of form. The innatenes hypothesis is one approach to addressing the ontology problem. One advantage of the this hypothesis, from a formal perspective, is that it has allowed linguists to maintain a maximal autonomy for formal structuresm especally if one isolates these innate principles from the effects of Darwinian selection, by assuming that the evolution of language in humans was a freakish accident, a bolt from the blue, as some generativists have suggested. A more plausible intermediate position is that the innate capacity for learning language involves selected (i.e. functional) aspects, as well as perhaps some features that are due to accidents of phylogeny. The fundamental issue is not innate vs. 'functional', but what is the contribution of adapative selection (through diachrony and phylogeny) in accounting for the nature of language, versus the role of accidents of evolution (either diachronic or phylogenetic). Has language evolved, or has it just stumbled, or been coopted, into existence? And likewise for individual languages. With regard to syntactic issues - functionalists have indeed paid much less attention to the kinds of structural syntactic properties you refer to. R. D. Van Valin might be a good person to contact as he has been doing work on functional approaches to wh-islands. There are some syntactic issues where interaction have taken place. For example in functionalist research on binding, and work on linear precedence constraints. Of course the issue of whether there are 'language-specific' learning principles begs the question of what 'language' is that these principles would be specific to it. Here there are major disagreements about where to draw the lines. My impression of some streams of generative syntax is that what is seriously 'in' syntax is only taken to be that to which the poverty of the stimulus argument can be applied. I.e. syntax is quintessentially UG. In parallel fashion, funtionalist grammarians have tended to focus on syntactic properties which are more amenable to functional explanations, especially diachronic ones, and these may tend to appear more peripheral from the perspective of some generativists. So, as you suggest, grammarians of the two families tend to focus on quite different structural properties. I am hopeful that more interaction will come in time. After all, there was a period when the current rich interactions between formal and functional work in phonology/phonetics may have seemed beyond our horizon. Your group might find Dennett's 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' useful. Mark Durie ------------------------------------ From: Mark Durie Department of Linguistics and Applied Linguistics University of Melbourne Parkville 3052 Hm (03) 9380-5247 Wk (03) 9344-5191 Fax (03) 9349-4326 M.Durie at linguistics.unimelb.edu.au http://www.arts.unimelb.edu.au/Dept/LALX/staff/durie.html From bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU Fri Jul 4 00:42:45 1997 From: bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU (Liz Bates) Date: Thu, 3 Jul 1997 17:42:45 -0700 Subject: Question about functional approaches In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I agree with the other respondents that the issues of innateness and functionality are orthogonal (at least in principle), although I would phrase it more in terms of innateness vs. domain-specificity (i.e. the extent to which language in general and grammar in particular are based on idiosyncratic principles and mechanisms, free-standing, independent of the principles and mechanisms at work in non-linguistic domains). As we all know, the supposed autonomy/peculiarity/domain-specificity of grammar plays an important role in arguments about its innateness: if grammar is entirely idiosyncratic in its structure and operations, then (so the argument goes) it cannot be acquired by "bottom up" mechanisms that transcend language (e.g. distributional analysis, statistical induction, pattern extraction) nor can it be inferred, constructed, constrained or assimilated by "top down" structures or mechanisms that transcend language (e.g. the kind of body-based cognition that George Lakoff wrote about as a basis for cognitive grammar, or the kinds of information processing constraints (perception, memory, motor constraints, attention) that some functionalists have proposed). In the absence of a case for bottom-up or top-down learning mechanisms, grammar must be innate. The structure of this argument makes it clear why any claim that language is "caused" by cognition (or grammar is "caused" by meaning) is viewed with such suspicion in the nativist camp. In this regard, Brian MacWhinney and I found it useful back in our 1989 book ("The cross-linguistic study of sentence processing") to distinguish between four levels of functional causation of grammar, ordered from the weakest to the strongest, in the sense that the higher levels presupposed the lower ones. By "functional causation" we are referring both to message constraints (the cognitive content that underlies those semantic structures that are mapped onto grammar) and to information processing constraints (perceptual, memory, motor output, etc.). The four levels refer to the ways in which these constraints could operate to affect the nature and shape of grammar. In a nutshell: Level 1 functionalism refers to claims that grammars are the way they are because of functional constraints on evolution, i.e. the process by which grammars appeared in the first place. Note that, at this level, no claims are made about cause-and-effect relations in today's speaker-listeners, nor about the effect of functional constraints on language acquisition, nor about the need to include functional categories and operations within our characterization of the grammar (i.e. in competence models). In other words, Level 1 functionalism does not preclude strong, domain-specific nativist beliefs. I interpret the well-known Pinker & Bloom paper on Natural Language and Natural Selection to reflect a kind of Level 1 functionalism. Level 2 functionalism presupposes Level 1, with an additional claim: specifically, that the same functional constraints that brought grammar into the world continue to operate synchronically, maintaining grammars in their current form and (perhaps) bringing about continuing change (i.e. historical language change following inter-language contact, gradual erosion of morphological markers, and so on). Note that one can embrace Level 2 functionalism without assuming that the cause-and-effect relations that operate in adult discourse are available to small children as an aid in language learning (indeed, many of these facts may be completely inaccessible to children, of no use at all in learning). Hence one can still be a nativist, assuming that grammars are unlearnable without substantial a priori knowledge. Nor is it necessary for a Level 2 functionalist to build non-linguistic constraints directly into his/her characterization of the grammar (i.e. one can maintain a modular architecture, with an autonomous grammar). Level 3 functionalism presupposes Levels 1 and 2, with a further claim: that children can exploit the form-function correlations used by adults, rediscovering in each successive generation the reasons why grammars look the way they do. In other words, the functional constraints described at Levels 1 and 2 also operate causally within the learning/discovery process. Although this approach eats away at strong nativism (because less grammar-specific innate knowledge is required), it is still possible to maintain some kind of modular architecture in which grammar eventually "decouples" from the rest of cognition. Level 4 functionalism presupposes Levels 1 - 3, with the additional claim that grammar cannot be adequately described without reference to the functional constraints (structures and operations) that play a causal role in its evolutionary history, current use by adults, and acquisition by children. In other words, modular accounts must be abandoned in favor of accounts of linguistic knowledge that are "functionalist all the way down." This is, I take it, where most functionalist and cognitivist grammarians take their stand. In our 1989 proposal, Brian and I suggested that each of these four levels requires different kinds of empirical evidence. Lower forms of evidence (in the logical sense outlined above) are required for the higher levels, but are not sufficient to establish claims at the higher levels. We hoped back in 1989 that this taxonomy might prove useful. It seemed to work for us. Maybe it will be useful to some of you in the current discussion. -liz bates From iclc97 at LET.VU.NL Sat Jul 5 22:55:44 1997 From: iclc97 at LET.VU.NL (ICLC'97 Local Organizers) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 1997 00:55:44 +0200 Subject: Cognitive Linguistics Conference Message-ID: ********************************************************************* We have now completed the final update of the www-site for the ************************************************** 5th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, July 14 - 19 ************************************************** The site now includes not only the abstracts of all plenary lectures and theme sessions and an alphabetical list of all papers and posters, but also travel information, a day-by-day overview of the conference program, and the abstracts for the Student Session. Our URL: http://www.vu.nl/ICLC97/ All conference participants are cordially invited to come to the Welcome Reception at the Park Hotel (Amsterdam, Stadhouderskade 25) on Sunday, July 13, from 16:00 (4 pm) to 20:00 (8 pm). The scientific program will begin on Monday, July 14, at 8:45 with opening remarks by Theo Janssen and a plenary lecture by George Lakoff, and will end on Saturday, July 19, with a featured lecture by Douglas Hofstadter. Theo Janssen & Gisela Redeker Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Organizers of ICLC'97 iclc97 at let.vu.nl fax: +31-20-4446500 ********************************************************************* From jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU Mon Jul 7 21:56:12 1997 From: jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU (Johanna Rubba) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 1997 14:56:12 -0700 Subject: Query: discontinuous morphology Message-ID: I am preparing an article for a forthcoming typology handbook on 'introflection', a.k.a. 'discontinuous' or 'nonconcatenative' morphology. I have a few questions that I am researching via databases, but would appreciate any tips that would shorten my search time while helping me achieve good coverage for a handbook of this type. The questions are: (a) Is very thoroughgoing discontinuous morphology** found in language families _other_ than the Semitic? If so, which languages/families? (b) Among currently living Semitic languages/dialects, which use discontinuous morphology in the verb and/or noun-pluralization systems most productively, and which use it least productively? (c) Is anyone in Optimality Theory (and/or other recent 'hot' morphological theories) working on discontinuous morphology in Semitic or other language families? [I have been out of this loop since finishing my dissertation, on Modern Aramaic, in 1993] ** By this I don't mean the occasional construction in which noncontiguous morphs recur with similar meanings, but rather whole (or nearly whole) systems which employ discontinous morphemes/morphemes consisting of noncontiguous morphs/phonemes. If there is interest, I will post a summary to the list. In any case, I will acknowledge helpful sources in my article. Thanks! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Johanna Rubba Assistant Professor, Linguistics ~ English Department, California Polytechnic State University ~ San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 ~ Tel. (805)-756-2184 E-mail: jrubba at oboe.aix.calpoly.edu ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From tony at BENJAMINS.COM Fri Jul 11 15:24:15 1997 From: tony at BENJAMINS.COM (Tony Schiavo) Date: Fri, 11 Jul 1997 11:24:15 -0400 Subject: New Books: Functional Linguistics Message-ID: John Benjamins Publishing would like to call your attention to the following new titles in the field of Functional Linguistics: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE FUNCTION AND LANGUAGE TYPE DEDICATED TO T. GIV?N Joan Bybee, John Haiman & Sandra A. Thompson (eds.) 1997 vi, 480 pp. US/Canada: Cloth: 1 55619 522 2 Price: US$99.00 Rest of the world: Cloth: 90 272 2168 5 Price: Hfl. 195,-- John Benjamins Publishing web site: http://www.benjamins.com For further information via e-mail: service at benjamins.com In their subject matter and in their theoretical orientation all the papers in this volume reflect the powerful influence of T. Giv?n. Most of them deal with questions of morphosyntactic typology, pragmatics, and grammaticalization theory. Many of them are directly based on extensive fieldwork on local languages of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Others are based on statistical analyses of extensive written and spoken corpora of texts. CONVERSATION COGNITIVE, COMMUNICATIVE AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES T. Giv?n (ed.) 1997 viii, 302 pp. Typological Studies in Language, 34 US/Canada: Cloth: 1 55619 643 1 Price: $89.00 Paper: 1 55619 644 X Price: $29.95 Rest of the world: Cloth: 90 272 2929 5 Price: Hfl. 150,-- Paper: 90 272 2930 9 Price: Hfl. 60,-- John Benjamins Publishing web site: http://www.benjamins.com For further information via e-mail: service at benjamins.com The papers in this volume were originally presented at the Symposium on Conversation, held at the University of New Mexico in July 1995. The symposium brought together scholars who work on face-to-face communication from a variety of perspectives: social, cultural, cognitive and communicative. The aim for both the symposium and this volume has been to challenge some of the prevailing dichotomies in discourse studies: First, the cleavage between the study of information flow and the study of social interaction. Second, the theoretical division between speech-situation models and cognitive models. Third, the methodological split between the study of spontaneous conversation in natural context and the study of speech production and comprehension under controlled experimental conditions. And fourth, the rigid genre distinction between narrative and conversational discourse. All four dichotomies have been useful either methodologically or historically. But important as they may have been in the past, the time has perhaps come to work toward an integrated approach to the study of human communication, one that will be less dependent on narrow reductions. Both the ontological primacy and the methodological challenge of natural face-to-face communication are self evident. Human language has evolved, is acquired, and is practiced most commonly in the context of face-to-face communication. Most past theory-building in either linguistics or psychology has not benefited from the study of face-to-face communication, a fact that is regrettable and demands rectification. Contributors to the volume include: A. Anderson, A. Robertson, K. Kilborn, S. Beek and E. Dean (Glasgow), W. Chafe (Santa Barbara), J. Coates (Roehampton), C. Dickinson and T. Givon (Oregon), S. Ervin-Tripp and A. Kuntay (Berkeley), P. Linell and N. Korolija (Linkoping), L. Moxey and A. Sanford (Glasgow), N. Stein, R. Bernas and D. Calicchia (Chicago), T. Trabasso and A. Ozyurek (Chicago). -------------------------------------------------------------- Anthony P. Schiavo Jr Tel: (215) 836-1200 Publicity/Marketing Fax: (215) 836-1204 John Benjamins North America e-mail: tony at benjamins.com PO Box 27519 Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 Check out the John Benjamins web site: http://www.benjamins.com From AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR Sat Jul 12 04:38:47 1997 From: AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR (Ramin Akbari) Date: Sat, 12 Jul 1997 08:08:47 +330 Subject: Cognition and Intelligence Message-ID: I am preparing an article investigating the relationship between language acquisition(first and second), intelligence, and cognition.However,cognitive psychology does specify the nature of the relationship between cognition and intelligence.How are these two concepts related?Is intelligence part of cognition or is it the opposite? I would be grateful to receive tips and comments related to this problem.All helpful suggestions would be acknowledged in the article. ***************************************************************************** Ramin Akbari,English Department,Tarbiat Modaress University,Tehran,Iran e-mail:AKBARI_R at NET1cs.modares.ac.ir From tpc1 at RA.MSSTATE.EDU Mon Jul 14 20:36:19 1997 From: tpc1 at RA.MSSTATE.EDU (Thomas Price Caldwell Jr.) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 1997 15:36:19 -0500 Subject: niceness Message-ID: At 8:46 AM 9/19/98, Brian MacWhinney wrote: >Jane, > Good point. However, my claim was a bit more narrow. I was not >suggesting that English is in any way "nice", only that it avoids this >particular verbal show of pleasure in other's suffering. English accepts >the notion of "sadism", but only as a foreign import. English is rich, of >course, in terms describing moral violations like greed, sloth, cowardice >(the basic sins of Pilgrim's Progress). It is also definitely OK to talk >openly about vindictiveness and revenge (witness Timothy McVeigh on the >subject of revenge for the Waco FBI attack). These emotional terms are >justified by their grounding in righteousness. But it is exactly this that >forces us to shift (almost at the last moment?) from feeling >"Schadenfreude" to concluding that someone "got his just desserts". In >fact, what happens is that the wrath (vindictiveness, vengefulness) of the >Almighty ends up descending onto an appropriate target without us having to >develop a personal relation grounded on the joy of seeing someone else >suffer. Tricky stuff. > Does Lakoff have anything on issues like this? English has lots of >stuff like "writhing in agony" and "twisting in the wind." Are there >metaphors and similes in Schadenfreude languages grounded on "delight in >watching someone twist in the wind?" > Alternatively, perhaps there is some universal of metaphor that >excludes emotions about others' emotions. Maybe such terms are just too >cognitively complex according to some version of "theory of mind." What >about Akio Kamio's analyses that claim that Japanese limits the speaker's >ability to make statements about the hearer's feelings and emotions >(speaker's territory of knowledge)? Perhaps we could argue that English is >constrained in a similar way. I realize that this is not the original >account that I offered, but it is also an interesting possibility. > >-- Brian Price Caldwell English Department Mississippi State University Miss. State, MS 39762 From darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU Mon Jul 14 21:26:27 1997 From: darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU (Michael Darnell) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 1997 16:26:27 -0500 Subject: conference announcement Message-ID: CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT CHANGE OF DATE 24th University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Linguistics Symposium: Discourse Across Languages and Cultures. Our 24th symposium has been rescheduled. The symposium will be held SEPTEMBER 10-12, 1998. We apologize any inconvenience this rescheduling may create, and for any multiple postings. Contact person: Mike Darnell darnell at csd.uwm.edu From jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK Fri Jul 18 08:46:02 1997 From: jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK (Jean Hudson) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 09:46:02 +0100 Subject: fixedness Message-ID: Dear funknetters It's quite a few years since Paul Hopper wrote (in Traugott & Heine 1991): "The occurrence of certain lexical items in frequent collocations (for example when the word 'foot' repeatedly occurs in phrases like 'at the foot of the hill', etc) may be prima facie evidence of incipient grammaticalization." My primary interest is the notion of 'fixedness' and I've been trying (in vain) to find references to work related to this citation. Note that it is not the grammaticalization of the phrase that concerns me but the propensity of words that seem to be undergoing grammaticalization to become part of fixed expressions. Any references to related work or contacts with interested researchers would be most welcome. Jean Hudson From AAGHBAR at GROVE.IUP.EDU Fri Jul 18 15:17:01 1997 From: AAGHBAR at GROVE.IUP.EDU (Ali Aghbar) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 10:17:01 -0500 Subject: Fixedness Message-ID: Jean, Below you will find a home page for a dissertation written by Christina Gitsaki. She has an impressive list of references on collocations. (I know that Gitsaki now has a new e-mail address although I do not have a handy record of it at the moment.) Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 19:23:44 +1000 From: Christina Gitsaki Subject: Ph.D. Thesis on Collocations Dear Colleagues, I would like to announce that my Ph.D. Thesis on the Development of ESL Collocational Knowledge is now available on WWW. Here's the URL: http://www.cltr.uq.oz.au:8000/users/christina.gitsaki/ Any comments will be greatly appreciated. Regards, Christina Gitsaki Copyright 1996 by Christina Gitsaki I am also interested in the study of collocations and fixedness, so I would appreciate receiving a summary of what you find. Ali Aghbar, Dept. of English, Indiana U. of Pennsylvania, Indiana, PA 15705 aaghbar at grove.iup.edu Phone: (412) 357 4937 http://www.iup.edu/~aaghbar From AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR Sat Jul 19 05:14:38 1997 From: AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR (Ramin Akbari) Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1997 08:44:38 +330 Subject: Proficiency Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I am investigating the relationship between language proficiency as it is defined in the measurement literature and cognitive variables.One of the cognitive variables which has kicked up a lot of controversy is intelligence.Some people claim that intelligence is the same as language proficiency, while some others believe that language proficiency has got nothing to do with intelligence.A big problem here is that no one is completely clear on the meaning of the term intelligence.Worse still is the nature of the relationship between cognition and intelligence:How are these two related?Which one is a subpart of the other? I would be grateful to receive comments related to the nature of language proficiency,intelligence, and cognition. Thanks! Ramin Akbari,English Department, Tarbait Modarss University,Tehran,Iran. email:AKBARI_R at NET1cs.modares.ac.ir From AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR Sun Jul 20 05:38:18 1997 From: AKBARI_R at NET1CS.MODARES.AC.IR (Ramin Akbari) Date: Sun, 20 Jul 1997 09:08:18 +330 Subject: More on Language Proficiency Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, Thanks a lot for your helpful comments.It seems that I have not clearly stated my problem.My real purpose in investigating the relationship between intelligence and language proficiency is to learn more about the structure of the latter.In second/foreign language testing literature,we use factor analysis for testing the psychological reality (construct validity) of the components we believe to be part of language proficiency.However,studies making use of this statistical technique have lead to often contradictory results.Some of the findings say that we have one single language ability which is not divisible into smaller components.Some others claim that language proficiency can easiliy be broken down into smaller sections,such as listening comprehension,reading comprehension,and knowledge of grammar. Still other studies have found that the structure of language proficiency is sensitive to the proficiency level of the learners;i.e.,language proficiency is divisible in beginners and unifactorial in advanced learners.It is my hunch that cognitive variables such as intelligence have a role in determining the nature (or the structure) of second language proficiency. The first problem is obtaining a real estimate of the learners intelligence.The second problem is determining the exact relationship between intelligince and what cognitive psychologists call cognitive structure or cognition.How are these two related? I would be grateful if you send me your useful comments. Sincerely, Ramin Akbari,English Department, Tarbiat Modaress University,Tehran,Iran. email:AKBARI_R at NET1cs.modares.ac.ir From jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK Mon Jul 21 10:45:10 1997 From: jhudson at CUP.CAM.AC.UK (Jean Hudson) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 11:45:10 +0100 Subject: fixedness Message-ID: Thankyou for responses on fixedness, and some further clarification. I am familiar with the Firthian concepts and also much of what has been written about idioms (esp more recent psycholinguistic work demonstrating the relationship between reduced salience via certain types of metaphor, and fixedness (ie, syntactic, semantic, collocational constraints). My question concerned only the situation where there seems to be incipient grammaticalization of a 'full lexical item' and a concomitant propensity for that item to enter into fixed expressions (together with all the other symptoms of gramm:n - decategoriality etc). I don't think there is a great deal of interest in this particular question, and don't want to take too much space on this discussion list, but if anyone out there is interested in further discussion of this very specific aspect of fixedness, please get in touch. Jean Hudson From ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU Mon Jul 21 12:48:03 1997 From: ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Paul J Hopper) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 08:48:03 -0400 Subject: Fixedness Message-ID: Jean Hudson brings our attention to an interesting issue. Usually by the time we are sufficently aware of the grammatical status of a form or a construction, it is already clearly grammatical. What about the preceding stages? The earlier history not only raises the question of how fixed a form has to be before it is said to be fixed, but it also tests our conception of 'grammatical' and 'grammar', both of which are prerequisites to 'grammaticalization', in relation to specific kinds of discourse context, genres, and other messy issues. Some recent discussion that comes to mind (there's lots more; perhaps others can eke this out, and I apologize if I've left out something obvious): Several papers in the Traugott/Heine volumes deal with the discourse contexts and genres of incipient grammaticalization (e.g., Chr. Lehmann, Nichols/Timberlake, Herring, Hopper), see also Carey's and Slobin's papers on the perfect in the Pagliuca volume. I discuss this very question in my paper for the volume Anna Giacalone and I are editing on 'The Limits of Grammaticalization'. - Paul Hopper From satoshi at INSC.TOHOKU.AC.JP Mon Jul 21 13:55:31 1997 From: satoshi at INSC.TOHOKU.AC.JP (Satoshi Uehara) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 22:55:31 +0900 Subject: journal subscription info Message-ID: Hi Could anyone kindly e-mail me the institutional subscription info of the following journals (publishers, ISSNs, annual dues): Studies in Language Functions of Language I'd like to add the above two to the journals that my institution subscribes to, and need the info immediately. If you know other functional-linguistically oriented journals, I appreciate your suggestions. Please send your message to my e-mail address below, not to the list: uehara at intcul.tohoku.ac.jp Thank you in advance. Satoshi Uehara, Ph.D. International Student Center Tohoku University From jtang at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU Mon Jul 21 16:09:13 1997 From: jtang at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU (Joyce Tang Boyland) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 09:09:13 -0700 Subject: fixedness Message-ID: Hello, My dissertation deals with this issue (fixedness), using as a case study the modal+have ("would've") construction. A copy and related papers are available at http://act.psy.cmu.edu/act/people/joyce/joyce.html If you would like a paper copy please send me e-mail (if you have already requested one and are still waiting, I'll be sending them out in a few weeks when I'll be back in Berkeley where photocopying is cheaper than it is here in Pittsburgh). Joyce Tang Boyland jtang at andrew.cmu.edu or jtang at cogsci.berkeley.edu From DPAT at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU Tue Jul 22 03:47:27 1997 From: DPAT at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU (DPAT at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 20:47:27 -0700 Subject: tenure a thing of the past? Message-ID: From: IN%"RTROIKE at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU" "Rudy Troike" 21-JUL-1997 10:47 To: IN%"LINGUA at LISTSERV.ARIZONA.EDU" CC: Subj: FYI re AIC Return-path: Received: from listserv.arizona.edu by CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU (PMDF V5.1-7 #24133) with ESMTP id <01ILHUYG9V008ZDXCW at CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU>; Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:47:03 MST Received: from LISTSERV (listserv.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.14]) by listserv.arizona.edu (AIX4.2/UCB 8.7/8.7) with ESMTP id KAA30040; Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:46:57 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:46:53 -0700 From: Rudy Troike Subject: FYI re AIC Sender: Linguistics at the University of Arizona To: LINGUA at LISTSERV.ARIZONA.EDU Reply-to: Rudy Troike Message-id: <199707211746.KAA30040 at listserv.arizona.edu> X-Envelope-to: ALEXLAB, AZSLAT, CKSUHLIN, CVERES, DOHALA, DPAT, HIKAWA Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1997 10:10:00 -0700 From: Tenney Nathanson For those of you who don't know Kali, she came to AIC this past year with a critical book (from Cambridge)already in print and as the publisher of a widely-respected journal and small press. I'm out of town now so I haven't seen the Tucson Weekly piece, but I bet it's a good read!. Tenney ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 20 Jul 97 13:53:26 +0100 From: Kali Tal Subject: Fire-at-Will University Dear Friends, This is a copy of the letter I've sent to the Delegates list of the Modern Language Association. I'd very much appreciate it if you could forward it to appropriate discussion lists, and bring it to the attention of academic organizations to which you belong. I'm interested in getting as much public attention as possible directed at Arizona International Campus of the Univ. of AZ, and in making the profession aware of the ways in which the University of Arizona system is supporting the denial of faculty rights, academic freedom, and due process. Thank you, Kali Tal ___________________________________________________________ Dear Colleagues, Arizona International Campus is a new campus in the University of Arizona system. It's a small liberal arts college, and it was advertised last year as a non-tenure-granting institution that would develop other means to guarantee academic freedom and due process for its faculty. Five new professors were hired and moved, from different parts of the country, to open its doors for the 1996-97 school year as its "Founding Faculty" members. We were asked to make a long-term commitment to the institution, and told that we'd take part in the development of this new non-tenure system. We were also assured that the one-year contracts given in our first year were "just a formality" because the Arizona Board of Regents had not yet approved multi-year contracts for AIC faculty. On the promise of the Provost of AIC, Celestino Fernandez, that multi-year contracts would certainly be offered the following year and that we had nothing to fear in terms of nonrenewal, we relocated to Tucson and began our work. The distressing turn which AIC has taken is described extremely well in this week's issue of the _Tucson Weekly_. You can find it on the Web at: http://www.weeklywire.com/tw/07-17-97/feat.htm The 3800+ word article was written by Margaret Regan, who has received two awards for her previous coverage of AIC's development. The bottom line is that there is no due process and no protection of academic freedom at AIC. All faculty members again received one-year contracts. My own contract was not renewed, and the Provost refused to give an explanation for his decision, though I believe that he did not renew me because of my tendency to speak my mind, and to question his commitment to the principles of the institution--particularly his commitment to due process. Faculty evaluations were highly irregular. This may be hard to believe, but faculty were evaluated with *the same one-page form* that was used to evaluate secretarial staff, and there was no process for evaluating teaching, service work or scholarship. No faculty member took part in looking over the dossiers of other faculty members; the decision was solely administrative and in the hands of one man, the Provost. Finally, even though our letters of offer stated that we were to serve under the terms and conditions of employment under development at AIC, my letter of nonrenewal stated that I was no more than a year-to-year appointee, with no rights under the tenure system in place at our parent campus, the University of Arizona. The push to eliminate tenure is very strong now, all over the country. Some of us have even supported the development of alternatives to tenure--I thought, when I took the job at AIC, that I was helping to create a new kind of system which would have the advantages of tenure, but none of its drawbacks. Unfortunately, I discovered that those with the greatest enthusiasm for eliminating tenure want most to eliminate its protections for faculty. AIC has been touted as "the future" of the academy. If it *is* the future, then our future will be made of academic sweat shops and a growing class of intellectual migrant laborers. I hope that you will take the time to read the _Tucson Weekly_ article, and to pass it on to your colleagues. At a time when tenure lines are going unfilled for lack of funding, and part-time and year-to-year employment among academics is growing by leaps and bounds, we need to pay careful attention to the ugly and ill-constructed foundations upon which the "non-tenure revolution" in the academy rests. I'd appreciate responses, either on the list or privately, as well as any suggestions about how to publicize the situation at AIC. Collegially, Kali Tal Until recently a Professor at Arizona International Campus, Tucson. Now a woman without an institution. Kali Tal kali at kalital.com http://www.kalital.com New Word Order Web Development http://www.new-word.com "Web Sites for Academics and Other Smart People" From ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU Wed Jul 23 00:50:24 1997 From: ph1u+ at ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Paul J Hopper) Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1997 20:50:24 -0400 Subject: Fwd: Paul Benedict Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Return-path: X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 0;andrew.cmu.edu;Network-Mail Received: from po5.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail ID ; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 19:15:15 -0400 (EDT) Received: from VM.SC.EDU (vm.sc.edu [129.252.41.4]) by po5.andrew.cmu.edu (8.8.5/8.8.2) with SMTP id TAA10509 for ; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 19:15:13 -0400 (EDT) Received: from VM.SC.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with BSMTP id 2110; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:11:59 EDT Received: from VM.SC.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8245; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:57 -0400 Received: from VM.SC.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (LISTSERV-TCP/IP release 1.8c) with spool id 9412 for HISTLING at VM.SC.EDU; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:55 -0400 Received: from UNIVSCVM (NJE origin DISTERH at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8227; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:55 -0400 Received: from UNIVSCVM (NJE origin SMTP at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8119; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:15 -0400 Received: from VM.SC.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with BSMTP id 2050; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:08:15 EDT Received: from VM.SC.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8115; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:15 -0400 Received: from UNIVSCVM (NJE origin SMTP at UNIVSCVM) by VM.SC.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 8113; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:15 -0400 Received: from CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU by VM.SC.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with TCP; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:08:14 EDT Received: from CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU by CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 9502; Tue, 22 Jul 97 18:08:56 EDT Received: from cms.cc.wayne.edu (NJE origin MRATLIF at WAYNEST1) by CMS.CC.WAYNE.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 3461; Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:08:56 -0400 Approved-By: Dorothy Disterheft Message-ID: Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:11:51 EDT Reply-To: Martha Ratliff Sender: HISTLING -- Historical Linguistics Mailing List From: Martha Ratliff Subject: Paul Benedict To: HISTLING at VM.SC.EDU ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Dear colleagues, It is with a heavy heart that I make the following announcement -- Paul Benedict was killed in a car accident in Florida yesterday. I talked with his wife today, and she told me that he died quickly, without suffering. I had just seen him at a meeting of Southeast Asianists in May, where he was as active and happy as always, and full of ideas for new projects. If any of you knew Paul and care to write to his wife, the address is as follows: Marilyn Benedict 104 River Lane Ormond Beach, Florida 32176 In memory of good times now past, Martha Ratliff From jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU Wed Jul 23 17:46:02 1997 From: jrubba at POLYMAIL.CPUNIX.CALPOLY.EDU (Johanna Rubba) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 1997 10:46:02 -0700 Subject: Book search Message-ID: I am trying to get my hands on a copy of a textbook that was published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in 1985 and is now out of print and permanently out of stock, acc. to HBJ's phone rep. It's called _Writing Step by Step_ and is by Robert de Beaugrande. Some of you may be familiar with his 1984 article that sets out a little bit of a methodology for teaching grammar concepts and analysis skills using the English competence of the students, "Forward to the basics: Getting down to grammar" fom 1984's CCC journal. The book's ISBN # is 0155982583. I have not found it in any of the U of CA online library catalogs, nor the Cal State libraries that I can access online, nor the Library of Congress (though I may have botched that search!) If anyone knows of a source of this book, or has a spare copy they could send me (I will take very good care of it!), please get in touch. Thanks! Johanna ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Johanna Rubba Assistant Professor, Linguistics ~ English Department, California Polytechnic State University ~ San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 ~ Tel. (805)-756-2184 E-mail: jrubba at polymail.calpoly.edu ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~