exemplars and prototypes

David_Tuggy at SIL.ORG David_Tuggy at SIL.ORG
Sat Oct 17 20:43:00 UTC 1998


     Must exemplars be "specific real-world instance[s], i.e. a particular
     dog or a particular candle."? Couldn't the non-particular,
     less-specific concept GERMAN SHEPHERD be one of the exemplars for a
     category such as DOG, or VOTIVE CANDLE IN A SMALL GLASS be an exemplar
     for CANDLE? I can't (at least consciously) recall any particular such
     candle, yet I would have said that kind of candle was, for me, an
     exemplar of the category. How would you tell for sure if a person in a
     psycholinguistic experiment was responding to the concept MY (GERMAN
     SHEPHERD) DOG DUCHESS or to DUCHESS AND DOGS LIKE HER? Couldn't a
     non-real-world, and generic, concept such as WOOKIE be an exemplar for
     ALIEN RACE?

     In a sense, even something as specific as MY DOG DUCHESS isn't fully
     specific, but is "a merger of the best or common features of the many
     exemplar[y]" experiences I had of Duchess.

     (Sorry--I'm trying to learn how these words are being used. But I
     suspect some others might have the same questions.)

     --David Tuggy


______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: exemplars and prototypes
Author:  macw at CMU.EDU at internet
Date:    10/16/98 12:39 PM


   Regarding David Kronenfeld's note on exemplars and prototypes and the
possibility of terminological slippage, let me say that the distinction is
fairly clear in the psychological literature.  An exemplar is a specific
real-world instance, i.e. a particular dog or a particular candle.  A
prototype is a merger of the best or common features of the many exemplars.
David is referring to the contrast in cognitive anthropology between
featural theory and prototype theory.  This contrast also exists in
psychology and many papers have been written arguing for one or the other,
but no one really challenges the potential relevance of exemplars during
the initial phases of induction.  The issue is whether the role of
exemplars in the final system is secondary and peripheral or major and
central.
  In any case, I don't sense any terminological slippage.  Instead, I think
there is a basic disagreement in both fields regarding (1) the relative
importance of exemplars and (2) the decision to opt for feature theory vs.
prototype theory.
  The range of my reading in cognitive anthropology is fairly restricted,
so I am happy to stand corrected on this.

--Brian MacWhinney



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