defining generative grammar

[John Moore]

Jo Rubba writes:

>I think it is also clear that it has long been a
>goal of generativism to prove the existence of an innate,
>syntax-specific module, _physically_ distinct from other parts of the
>brain that process language (Chomsky's 'language organ'), to _explain_
>the facts of syntactic structure, and thus to minimize to zero if
>possible the involvement of semantics in the explanation of syntax. The
>description of this module's workings would then constitute an
>explanation of why syntax is the way it is.

This has been a long-standing point of contention here at UCSD, but it does
not take the form one might suspect.  Rather, those of us who are
identified as formalists are constantly hit over the head with this
autonomy thing from the members of the cognitive science community, who
tend to favor cognitive/functional approaches.  We, putative formalists, on
the other hand answer: "but we don't necessarily believe in the autonomy of
syntax - perhaps some do, but we don't."  Jo was a student here many years
ago, and must remember these exchanges.

I find it interesting that Jo uses quotes from cognitive/functional
linguists to bolster the idea that autonomy is a major tenet of formal
grammar.  I suspect that this is a position that is often attributed to
formal linguistics by others, and not an integral part of the paradigm.
During my graduate training in formal syntax at UCSC in the late 80s I
never heard anyone make the above claims.

Of course, it is true that perhaps a majority of formal syntacticians in
the GB/P&P tradition believe something along the lines of the autonomy
hypothesis.  It is also true that work in formal syntax tends to not make
reference to anything other than formal devices to account for syntactic
data.  However, this is clearly changing, and has been for some time (I'm
struck by a number of functionalist works that argue, in the 1980s and
1990s, against the generative tradition, and cite only _Aspects_).

We recently had a seminar on explanation here - it was interesting that the
psychological reality/autonomy of a generative grammar was never mentioned.
 As far as I remember, the closest any of the formalist participants came
to Jo's characterization of generative grammar were:

(i) the proposal that formal principles should be maintained as constants
and pushed to their limits in a deductive research strategy (papers by
Baker and Borer).

(ii) the claim that syntactic accounts are preferable because they are cast
in a well-understood algebra, whereas the nature of functional principles
invoke a less well-understood domain.

(iii) a similar point that generative (as some functional) accounts are of
particular value when they are explicit and make clear predictions.

I realize that these three points are controversial (and I don't fully
subscribe to i-ii); however, they are a far cry from the above
characterization of generative grammar.


>A favorite challenge of generativists is to name
>some favorite point of syntax (co-reference, for example) and ask 'How
>are you going to motivate _that_ semantically?'

I've heard (and expressed this) somewhat differently - generative research
has uncovered a lot of generalizations about language - the challenge for a
cognitive/functional approach is to either capture similar generalizations
or show that the generalizations are epiphenomenal.  Conversely, of course,
formal linguists need to take generalizations discovered by functionalists
seriously - this is what I understand Joan and Judith to be doing.

John Moore

P.S. Bach and Partee sketched a semantic account of some binding facts in a
CLS paper almost 20 years ago.  Aspects of their proposal have been very
influential in subsequent RG, LFG, HPSG works, as well as work by Will
imams and Reinhart and Reuland.

http://ling.ucsd.edu/~moore/