Language acquisition and functionalism

[Wolfgang Schulze]

Dear Brian and Funknetters,

the recent comments upon the Chomskyan program have rightly focused on the role
that language acquisition plays in this program. The chain of arguments saying
that (1) deep structure presupposes universal categories and universal mental
'operations' in terms of Universal Grammar, (2) UG presupposes a language
acquisition device (LAD), and (3) LAD presupposes its embedding in something like
the evolution of a 'Language of Thought' (LOT) yields at - if I understand it
correctly - the 'reconstruction' of UG to establish a 'meta-empiric' (or
meta-descriptive) domain of research. In this sense, however, the
'reconstruction' of the LAD represents an _intermediate_ step in a much larger
prospectus, namely the 'reconstruction' of LOT. It _may_ play the most important
part in the game just because language acquisition procedures seem to be
accessible to direct empirical observation, contrary to UG, LOT and LAD itself
that can only be indirectly accessed via  primary (UG) and secondary (LOT)
extrapolation.
    But why do 'functionalists' have to refer to language acquisition (or,
better, 'learning')? Is it just because the Chomskyan paradigm has opened a
perspective so far ignored by functionalists? In this case, the Chomskyan
paradigm would yet again represent the argumentative 'anchor' for 'deciding'
which explanatory and/or descriptive domains of research have to be accessed
within the paradigm of functionalism. In other words: Is it that we have to deal
with language acquisition just because Chomsky did so (since 1965)?
    The observable tendency, namely that functional argumentation is sometimes
(even often?) based on the 'reflex' to _react_ on Chomskyan hypotheses, to
accommodate these hypotheses to the program of functionalism, and - in a second
step - to declare the outcome as an intrinsic part of functionalism has
represented a salient aspect in the history of (younger) functionalism (say since
roughly 1961 (Dobbs Ferry)]. This is nothing new and it is self-evident if we
consider the 'private histories' a number of (now) functionalists. It is logical,
if we remember the fact that 'Standard Functionalism' (to use a cover term) is a
program that is younger than the MIT 'orthodoxy'. It is logical, too, if we bear
in mind that for the first time in the history of linguistics, two scientific
paradigms coexist (in a more or less friendly manor) for more than 40 years by
now. The scientific discourse between these two paradigms, however, is rather
unilateral, which means that functionalists tend to carefully watch the
activities of the East Pole (to quote R. Hudson) whereas the MIT orthodoxy
usually refers to the output of the West Pole in an rather unspoken manor (if
ever they do).
    Naturally, functionalists cannot deny the existence of the MIT paradigm. They
cannot start from zero. This would be both uneconomical and ahistorical. However,
what they can do is formulating a research program that would allow to tell
people _why_ functionalism has to deal with some of the major issues also
discussed by the MIT tradition. In other words, functionalism needs arguments
that are 'deduced from it own (unspoken) deductions'. Let me again address the
question "why functionalists should deal with language acquisition". Does
'functionalism' (what ever this means) have a program from which we can derive an
answer to this question saying 'yes!'? Brian is probably right saying that "if
functionalism wants to
achieve explanation, it cannot ignore learning". Obviously, 'explanation' forms a
major point in this program yet far from being fully formulated. But what can
'language acquisition' tell a functionalist with respect to the explanation of
linguistic data (or, communication etc.)? I for myself am sure that 'learning'
(as well as the accommodation of learning experience and maturation of brain
structures) represents a decisive point even in functional typology, just as for
language change and formal/functional diachrony (not to speak of language
contact: The linguistic interaction of children and parents etc. conform to many
aspects of language contact). However, is most cases functionalists seem to refer
to language acquisition only in case this explanatory domain is thought to be
adequate (and others fail). What we need (in my mind) is a more general (but
'polycentric') frame work for functionalism that explains _why_ domains like
language acquisition form a necessary part of the functional paradigm.

Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to all,

Wolfgang

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Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze
Institut fuer Allgemeine und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet München
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
D-80539 München
Tel.: +89-21805343 / Fax: +89-21805345
Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de
http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/
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