From harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK Mon Mar 1 08:57:43 1999 From: harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK (Peter Harder) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 02:57:43 -0600 Subject: maxims and universality Message-ID: Dear funknetters - Some weeks ago, when the issue was hot, I tried to send this message, which was twice rejected for reasons unclear to the funknet administration, who dis-and reconnected me in the hope of solving the problem. Excuse me for foisting a dated message on you, but I'd kind of like to know if I am now connected or not. --Peter > >It seems to me there are two issues involved in the discussion on Gricean maxims. One is the status of 'something like' Grice's maxims where most people, including myself, would agree with Ellen Prince that violations do not bring about their falsification or cultural relativization. The other issue, however, is the status of Grice's exact version, building on the co-operative principle. > >I think Grice hovers between two interpretations, one being the above, while the other is more like norms for efficient exchange of propositional information (cf. Lyons's discussion, 1977:593), i.e. something like norms for white, efficient males. To see the last interpretation, you need only conjure up the picture of a person who never communicates more or less than required for the purposes at hand, never says anything for which he lacks adequate evidence, never strays into irrelevance etc. The ideal business partner, but would you want your daughter to marry one? > >You can reject this by saying that nobody follows the norms all the time, and as long as it triggers extra inferences (sabotage, implicature or deficiency) when people deviate, the maxims are still valid. But as pointed out by several people it is simply not true that all deviations from Grice's maxims in their present shape do this. There are all sorts of genres and cultural contexts where purveying just the right amount of high-quality information is beside the point - and where it would be understood as sabotage, implicature or deficiency if people actually behaved in a Gricean manner. > >I think the genuinely universal core of Grice's theory is that part of it which is bound up with the degree of co-operation that is necessary to communicate, i.e. to get messages across. That core needs to be filtered out of the theory in its classic shape, in which it is assumed that there is necessarily a co-operative contract beyond communication itself ('the accepted purpose or direction of the talk'); here's where the Malagasy case is a counterexample. > >Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson) is one attempt to formulate what such a core could be, based on rigid cost-benefit assumptions about the nature of communication...and, ahem, I have tried to formulate an alternative where interactive success rather than informational optimization is basic (cf. Functional Semantics (1996:136). > > --Peter Harder, Copenhagen From ward at PG-13.LING.NWU.EDU Mon Mar 1 15:07:40 1999 From: ward at PG-13.LING.NWU.EDU (Gregory Ward) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 09:07:40 CST Subject: maxims and universality In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.16.19990301095008.33f73284@coco.ihi.ku.dk>; from "Peter Harder" at Mar 1, 99 2:57 am Message-ID: > I think Grice hovers between two interpretations, one being the above, > while the other is more like norms for efficient exchange of propositional > information (cf. Lyons's discussion, 1977:593), i.e. something like norms > for white, efficient males. To see the last interpretation, you need only > conjure up the picture of a person who never communicates more or less than > required for the purposes at hand, never says anything for which he lacks > adequate evidence, never strays into irrelevance etc. The ideal business > partner, but would you want your daughter to marry one? wait, the (norm for the) 'ideal business partner' is white (not to mention male)?? how does race figure into the discussion? gregory -- Gregory Ward Department of Linguistics Northwestern University 2016 Sheridan Road Evanston IL 60208-4090 e-mail: gw at nwu.edu tel: 847-491-8055 fax: 847-491-3770 www: http://www.ling.nwu.edu/~ward From harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK Mon Mar 1 15:54:02 1999 From: harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK (Peter Harder) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 09:54:02 -0600 Subject: maxims and universality Message-ID: Sorry about the racial implications. I was trying to speak in inverted brackets, invoking stereotypes that were floating around, as it were. I see they came across as my own. --Peter Harder >From: Gregory Ward >Subject: Re: maxims and universality >To: harder at coco.ihi.ku.dk >Date: Mon, 1 Mar 99 9:07:40 CST >Cc: FUNKNET at LISTSERV.RICE.EDU >Reply-to: gw at nwu.edu > >> I think Grice hovers between two interpretations, one being the above, >> while the other is more like norms for efficient exchange of propositional >> information (cf. Lyons's discussion, 1977:593), i.e. something like norms >> for white, efficient males. To see the last interpretation, you need only >> conjure up the picture of a person who never communicates more or less than >> required for the purposes at hand, never says anything for which he lacks >> adequate evidence, never strays into irrelevance etc. The ideal business >> partner, but would you want your daughter to marry one? > >wait, the (norm for the) 'ideal business partner' is white (not to >mention male)?? how does race figure into the discussion? > >gregory >-- > >Gregory Ward >Department of Linguistics >Northwestern University >2016 Sheridan Road >Evanston IL 60208-4090 > >e-mail: gw at nwu.edu >tel: 847-491-8055 >fax: 847-491-3770 >www: http://www.ling.nwu.edu/~ward > > From dparvaz at UNM.EDU Mon Mar 1 16:05:56 1999 From: dparvaz at UNM.EDU (Dan Parvaz) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 09:05:56 -0700 Subject: Book announcement--Newmeyer (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Given the little that I've seen of Newmeyer's book, the announcement's assessment can at best be termed "creative". Since I have not seen the entire book, can someone please tell me which aspects of functionalism does he not summarily trash? Cheers, Dan. From 320012714892-0001 at T-ONLINE.DE Tue Mar 2 07:05:05 1999 From: 320012714892-0001 at T-ONLINE.DE (Suzie & Peter Bartsch) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 08:05:05 +0100 Subject: Book announcement--Newmeyer (fwd); functionalism and formalism Message-ID: Dan Parvaz schrieb: > Given the little that I've seen of Newmeyer's book, the announcement's > assessment can at best be termed "creative". Since I have not seen the > entire book, can someone please tell me which aspects of functionalism > does he not summarily trash? > > Cheers, > > Dan. And I had thought after reading the announcement to write encouraging Newmeyer to tell us more about his book because: a) I'm always interested in syncretistic approaches: in quotidian life and in sciences in general, and in linguistics in particular; b) as for the specific case formalism (e.g. generativism) and functionalism, I'd like to know how - and if - contrary basic premisses are made compatible with each other, as for example the generative premiss of autonomy of syntax and Givon's functional premiss of iconicity of syntax; c) two months ago there was here an interesting discussion on functionalism vs generativism that however i.m.h.o. was not totally satisfactory, because a central difference between these two approaches was not clearly enough pronounced: the fact that generative "explanations" in form of principles and parameters are actually not explanations, but at best possible descriptions of structures, while functional approaches, basing on iconicity of syntactic structures, can be seen as adaquate and plausible explanations. d) and I had hoped that Newmeyer perhaps would have found a way to reconcile generative formal descriptions with functional explanations. Best regards Suzie -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Suzie Bartsch Student of German and French Linguistics Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin supeba at t-online.de From fjn at U.WASHINGTON.EDU Tue Mar 2 18:02:29 1999 From: fjn at U.WASHINGTON.EDU (Frederick Newmeyer) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 10:02:29 -0800 Subject: Book announcement--Newmeyer (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I feel more than a little uncomfortable defending my book in a bulletin board posting, but I really feel that I have to respond to Dan Parvaz's posting. My book 'trashes functionalism' only in the sense that it argues against particular analyses put forward by particular functionalists. In fact, the bulk of the generalizations about the effect of function upon form uncovered in decades of functionalist research are not only taken to be correct, but given an attempted explanation. These include the iconic motivation of grammatical structure, prototype effects, and the set of historical changes classified as 'grammaticalization'. In a nutshell, LANGUAGE FORM AND LANGUAGE FUNCTION argues that generative grammarians have been unable to deal with these phenomena in the past because 'modularity' was given only lip service. I argue that if we narrow the domain of explanation of formal grammar proper and study its interaction with semantic and pragmatic principles, many of the phenomena that functionalists have taken as 'refuting' the generativist approach have a natural explanation. I even present a functional explanation for why an autonomous grammar should exist at all! You are free to agree or disagree with my proposals (and I know that many readers of this list will disagree), but it really seems unfair to say that the book 'trashes functionalism' Fritz Newmeyer On Mon, 1 Mar 1999, Dan Parvaz wrote: > Given the little that I've seen of Newmeyer's book, the announcement's > assessment can at best be termed "creative". Since I have not seen the > entire book, can someone please tell me which aspects of functionalism > does he not summarily trash? > > Cheers, > > Dan. > From dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU Tue Mar 2 21:05:46 1999 From: dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU (Matthew S Dryer) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 16:05:46 -0500 Subject: Newmeyer's book Message-ID: Dan Parvaz asks which aspects of functionalism Newmeyer's recent book does not "summarily trash". The answer is none. While there are many particular functionalist claims that he argues against, these arguments are clearly based on extensive and careful reading of the functionalist literature. I believe that in general these arguments can be addressed, although in some cases it may require rejecting certain aspects of the functionalist analyses that I would characterize as nonessential to functionalist claims. But I do think that if functionalism is going to survive as more than a passing phase in the late 20th century, functionalists will have to be able to respond to arguments of the sort given by Newmeyer with the same level of careful reasoning. Matthew Dryer From lachler at UNM.EDU Tue Mar 2 22:15:10 1999 From: lachler at UNM.EDU (Jordan Lachler) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 15:15:10 -0700 Subject: New List: athlang-l Message-ID: NEW LIST Athlang-L is a new mailing list for the discussion of Athabaskan languages and linguistics. We invite everyone interested in Athabaskan to join, including native speakers and students of Athabaskan languages, linguists who specialize in Athabaskan, as well as others interested in discussing and learning about these languages. The webpage for Athlang-L can be found at: http://www.unm.edu/~lachler/athlang/ To Subscribe to Athlang-L -------------------------- Send a message to: majordomo at s-leodm.unm.edu Leave the Subject field blank. In the body of message, type (with no other text): subscribe athlang-l You should then receive further instructions within a few minutes. To Send a Message to Athlang-L ------------------------------- Once you're subscribed, all messages to the list should be sent to this address: athlang-l at s-leodm.unm.edu === Jordan Lachler lachler at unm.edu Co-Organizer, 1999 Athabaskan Language Conference athconf at s-leodm.unm.edu http://s-leodm.unm.edu/~athconf/ From dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU Tue Mar 2 22:06:56 1999 From: dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU (Matthew S Dryer) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 17:06:56 -0500 Subject: Newmeyer's book (CORRECTION) Message-ID: In a message I sent a short time ago, I got my negatives mixed up. When I said "Dan Parvaz asks which aspects of functionalism Newmeyer's recent book does not "summarily trash". The answer is none." I should have said "The answer is all", though just to be clear, what I am saying is that Newmeyer does not summarily trash any aspects of functionalism. Matthew Dryer From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Wed Mar 3 08:11:53 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 10:11:53 +0200 Subject: Modern Aramaic Message-ID: Does anyone out there know about published studies of Modern Aramaic (or at least the Aramaic of the last 1000 years), particularly the sociolinguistic situation of the language, or the names/email addresses of scholars specializing in or at least knowing something about Modern Aramaic? Thanks for any help. John Myhill From helasvuo at cc.helsinki.fi Wed Mar 3 09:35:44 1999 From: helasvuo at cc.helsinki.fi (Marja-Liisa Helasvuo) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 11:35:44 +0200 Subject: call for papers Message-ID: *** CALL FOR PAPERS *** The Linguistic Association of Finland is organizing a symposium on THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS IN THE ANALYSIS OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE to be held at the University of Helsinki, September 2-4, 1999. The symposium will bring together linguists interested in all aspects of language that relate to the relationship between syntax and semantics (such as argument structure, other types of constructions, linking, the role of context and lexical items, cognitive issues, idioms etc.). The aim of the symposium is to discuss the analysis of linguistic data as well as theoretical issues. The focus will be on linguistic phenomena rather than any particular descriptive formalism. Participants are strongly encouraged to give a paper on any aspect of the relation between syntax and semantics, as this is an excellent opportunity to get feedback from others working in this area. Invited speakers: Adele E. Goldberg (University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign) Urpo Nikanne (University of Oslo) Activities: * lectures by invited speakers * presentations by other participants (20 min + 10 min for discussion) Registration The deadline for submission of abstracts (in English; max 500 words) is April 30, 1999. Please submit your abstract by e-mail to the following address: syn-sem at ling.helsinki.fi E-mail submissions are strongly recommended. If, however, you send your abstract by ordinary mail, please provide an e-mail address as a contact address. Participants will be notified about acceptance by May 24, 1999. The deadline for registration and payment for all participants is June 15,1999. Register by e-mail to the e-mail address above. Registration fees: * general: FIM 200 * members of the association: FIM 100 * undergraduate and MA students free * send by giro account no 800013-1424850 to The Linguistic Association of Finland (SKY)/Symposium. In case of technical difficulty, payment in cash upon arrival is also accepted. Accommodation The organizers will provide a list of hotels later. For further information, please contact syn-sem at ling.helsinki.fi. Information can also be found at: http://www.ling.helsinki.fi/sky/synsem.html The organizing committee: Marja-Liisa Helasvuo Department of Finnish P.O. Box 3 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland e-mail: Marja-Liisa.Helasvuo at Helsinki.fi Ilona Herlin Department of Finnish P.O. Box 3 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland e-mail: Ilona.Herlin at Helsinki.fi Kirsi Hiltunen Portimopolku 5 A 15 FIN-00800 Helsinki Finland e-mail: Kirsihil at ling.helsinki.fi Meri Larjavaara Department of Romance Languages P.O. Box 4 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland e-mail: Meri.Larjavaara at Helsinki.fi Esa Penttilä Department of English University of Joensuu P.O.Box 111 FIN-80101 Joensuu Finland e-mail:Esa.Penttila at Joensuu.fi Marja Pälsi Vironkatu 8 B 33 FIN-00170 Helsinki Finland e-mail: Marja.Palsi at Helsinki.fi From johannes at compling.hu-berlin.de Wed Mar 3 12:15:56 1999 From: johannes at compling.hu-berlin.de (Johannes Heinecke) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 13:15:56 +0100 Subject: Modern Aramaic Message-ID: On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, John Myhill wrote: > Does anyone out there know about published studies of Modern Aramaic > (or at least the Aramaic of the last 1000 years), particularly the > sociolinguistic situation of the language, or the names/email addresses of > scholars specializing in or at least knowing something about Modern > Aramaic? Thanks for any help. > John Myhill Hi, several volumes describing phonology, morphology and syntax of aramaic varieties still spoken have been published in a series ``Semitica Viva'' edited by Otto Jastrow with Harrassowitz-Verlag. Jastrow himself wrote Jastrow, Otto: Der neuaramaeische Dialekt von Hertevin (Provinz Siirt). Semitica Viva ; 3. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1988. ISBN: 3-447-02767-3. Jastrow, Otto: Laut- und Formenlehre des neuaramaeischen Dialekts von Midin im .Tur `Abdin: Semitica Viva ; 9. Wiesbaden Harrassowitz (4edn) 1993. ISBN: 3-447-03334-7. As far as I know there are also descriptions of .Turoyo and Ma`lula available. Jastrow is professor for Semitic studies at Erlangen University. http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p2orient/ I do not know whether he's on e-mail. Best regards Johannes -- Johannes Heinecke heinecke at compling.hu-berlin.de Computerlinguistik or: h0203kfw at rz.hu-berlin.de Humboldt-Universit"at zu Berlin Tel: (030) 20192-553 10099 Berlin Fax: (030) 20196-729 From noonan at CSD.UWM.EDU Wed Mar 3 16:50:22 1999 From: noonan at CSD.UWM.EDU (Michael Noonan) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 10:50:22 -0600 Subject: Modern Aramaic In-Reply-To: <199903031215.NAA16595@zeus.compling.hu-berlin.de> Message-ID: In addition to works on Modern Aramaic Heinecke mentions, there is also: Georg Krotkoff: A Neo-Aramaic Dialect of Kurdistan. New Haven: American Oriental Society. 1982. Mickey Noonan Michael Noonan Professor of Linguistics Chair Office: 414-229-4539 Dept. of English Fax: 414-229-2643 University of Wisconsin Messages: 414-229-4511 Milwaukee, WI 53201 Webpage: http://www.uwm.edu/~noonan USA On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, Johannes Heinecke wrote: > On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, John Myhill wrote: > > > Does anyone out there know about published studies of Modern Aramaic > > (or at least the Aramaic of the last 1000 years), particularly the > > sociolinguistic situation of the language, or the names/email addresses of > > scholars specializing in or at least knowing something about Modern > > Aramaic? Thanks for any help. > > John Myhill > > > Hi, > > several volumes describing phonology, morphology and syntax of aramaic > varieties still spoken have been published in a series ``Semitica Viva'' > edited by Otto Jastrow with Harrassowitz-Verlag. Jastrow himself wrote > > Jastrow, Otto: Der neuaramaeische Dialekt von Hertevin > (Provinz Siirt). Semitica Viva ; 3. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1988. > ISBN: 3-447-02767-3. > > Jastrow, Otto: Laut- und Formenlehre des neuaramaeischen > Dialekts von Midin im .Tur `Abdin: Semitica Viva ; 9. Wiesbaden > Harrassowitz (4edn) 1993. ISBN: 3-447-03334-7. > > As far as I know there are also descriptions of > .Turoyo and Ma`lula available. > > Jastrow is professor for Semitic studies at Erlangen University. > http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p2orient/ > I do not know whether he's on e-mail. > > Best regards > Johannes > > -- > Johannes Heinecke heinecke at compling.hu-berlin.de > Computerlinguistik or: h0203kfw at rz.hu-berlin.de > Humboldt-Universit"at zu Berlin Tel: (030) 20192-553 > 10099 Berlin Fax: (030) 20196-729 > From kemmer at RUF.RICE.EDU Wed Mar 3 17:24:00 1999 From: kemmer at RUF.RICE.EDU (Suzanne E Kemmer) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 11:24:00 -0600 Subject: Aramaic Message-ID: Jo Rubba wrote an excellent dissertation on Aramaic called "Discontinuous Morphology in Modern Aramaic". It's not on the sociolinguistic situation, but on morphological structure tho. --Suzanne Kemmer From dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU Wed Mar 3 17:51:09 1999 From: dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU (Matthew S Dryer) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 12:51:09 -0500 Subject: Aramaic Message-ID: Another source on modern Aramaic is Garbell, Irene. 1965. The Jewish Neo-Aramaic Dialect of Persian Azerbayan. The Hague: Mouton. My understanding is that Chaldean is also an Aramaic language: Sara, Solomon I. 1974. A Description of Modern Chaldean. The Hague: Mouton. Matthew Dryer From eitkonen at UTU.FI Thu Mar 4 11:44:20 1999 From: eitkonen at UTU.FI (Esa Itkonen) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 13:44:20 +0200 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: Dear Funknetters In his (1994) grammar of Old Tamil Thomas Lehmann shows that in this language case endings can either just be dropped or exchanged without any semantic motivation. (The latter point is also made in Tolkaappiyam, the grammar written in and about Old Tamil.) This sounds surprising, at least to me. However, it recalls what S. Beyer (1991) has called the 'Telegram Principle': In written (and especially poetic?) language rules of grammar may be broken to achieve conciseness. How widespread is this phenomenon, and does it occur in spoken language too? (Presumably it occurred also in spoken Old Tamil.) I must confess that to me this is a rather new phenomenon. Esa Itkonen From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Thu Mar 4 14:11:44 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 16:11:44 +0200 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: I'm enormously suspicious of claims like this. Linguists typically make such claims when they can't figure out the motivation themselves. Whenever I've investigated a claim like this, it's turned out there is a difference which the linguist didn't notice for some reason. John Myhill >Dear Funknetters > In his (1994) grammar of Old Tamil Thomas Lehmann shows that in this >language case endings can either just be dropped or exchanged without any >semantic motivation. (The latter point is also made in Tolkaappiyam, the >grammar written in and about Old Tamil.) This sounds surprising, at least >to me. However, it recalls what S. Beyer (1991) has called the 'Telegram >Principle': In written (and especially poetic?) language rules of grammar >may be broken to achieve conciseness. How widespread is this phenomenon, >and does it occur in spoken language too? (Presumably it occurred also in >spoken Old Tamil.) I must confess that to me this is a rather new phenomenon. >Esa Itkonen From nrude at ucinet.com Thu Mar 4 14:51:18 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 06:51:18 -0800 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: Greetings, When languages die--at least I see this here--there is the tendancy to seize upon certain phonological and morphological features of the old system as markers of "Indianness". These languages have, for example, a k - q as well as plain - ejective distinction, but younger speakers often have only a k - k' distinction and will just arbitrarily throw in the ejective k' (in place of any of the four k-like sounds and even in place of tL and tL') for its cultural effect. I have seen the same thing with the ergative noun case, with -n at m arbitrarily thrown in (suffixed to any noun) just for its effect. Obviously this is not the same thing as is going on in the vibrantly alive language Tamil. Or is it? One wonders--where a case marking system is breaking down (as in some German dialects?)--do we see a similar tendancy? Where some speakers no longer control a system, might they try to exploit it for some other effect? Perhaps this way (over time) a structural feature could even change function, thus effecting a "crazy" historical change. Such might even wash back over speakers for whom the system was not breaking down. Noel From spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU Thu Mar 4 21:19:51 1999 From: spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU (Spike L Gildea) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 15:19:51 -0600 Subject: March LSA Bulletin Post (fwd) Message-ID: Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 10:09:24 -0500 From: LSA The March 1999 LSA Bulletin is now available on the LSA web site: http://www.lsadc.org From oesten at ling.su.se Fri Mar 5 08:46:40 1999 From: oesten at ling.su.se (=?iso-8859-1?B?1nN0ZW4gRGFobA==?=) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 09:46:40 +0100 Subject: Is grammar derivable? Message-ID: In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these characterizations. Östen Dahl From lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU Sat Mar 6 01:06:02 1999 From: lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU (George Lakoff) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 17:06:02 -0800 Subject: Is grammar derivable? In-Reply-To: <000001be66e4$b04151c0$50abed82@oesten.ling.su.se> Message-ID: At 9:46 AM +0100 3/5/99, Östen Dahl wrote: >In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that >generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal >grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on >(my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not >assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, >according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive >semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." > >It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these >characterizations. > > >Östen Dahl Dear Östen, That is, as I'm sure you know, a thoroughly inaccurate statement. A more accurate statement would be: Cognitive-functional grammar claims, on empirical grounds, that principles of grammar commonly make reference to, and are often motivated by, aspects of communicative function in context and embodied meaning in context (as characterized via embodied cognition). Here "motivated" is used as characterized in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Motivation is neither derivability nor arbritrariness. That oversimplified statement, of course, does not say a whole lot. Reading the literature of both fields is required to get a sophisticated idea of what all this is about. For example, in the Neural Theory of Language, a great deal of language makes use of neural mechanisms external to language and neural mechanisms in general. "As characterized via embodied cognition" makes reference to a huge literature on cognitive semantics -- image-schemas, metaphors, blends, force-dynamics, frames, X-schemas, radial categories, types of prototypes, and so on. For a discussion see Case study 3 in Women Fire and Chapter 22 in Philosophy in the Flesh, as well as Volume 1 of Langacker's Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. The statement you quoted is characteristic of the sort of innacurate things Chomskyans used to say about generative semantics. Best wishes, George From david_tuggy at SIL.ORG Fri Mar 5 20:18:28 1999 From: david_tuggy at SIL.ORG (david_tuggy at SIL.ORG) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 15:18:28 -0500 Subject: Is grammar derivable? Message-ID: What on earth would "derivable from" mean in such a statement? For what it's worth, I'd easily say that grammar is "established by" language use and "modified by" changes in usage, and that it "functions for the purpose of" systematically structuring meaning. I might even say it "consists of" systematic structurings of meaning-form combinations. But "derivable from"??? --David Tuggy ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: Is grammar derivable? Author: oesten at ling.su.se at internet Date: 3/5/99 3:46 AM In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these characterizations. Östen Dahl From david_tuggy at SIL.ORG Fri Mar 5 22:06:08 1999 From: david_tuggy at SIL.ORG (david_tuggy at SIL.ORG) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 17:06:08 -0500 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: Noel Rude wrote: **When languages die--at least I see this here--there is the tendancy to seize upon certain phonological and morphological features of the old system as markers of "Indianness". ... Obviously this is not the same thing as is going on in the vibrantly alive language Tamil. Or is it? One wonders--where a case marking system is breaking down (as in some German dialects?)--do we see a similar tendancy? Where some speakers no longer control a system, might they try to exploit it for some other effect? Perhaps this way (over time) a structural feature could even change function, thus effecting a "crazy" historical change. Such might even wash back over speakers for whom the system was not breaking down. ** Sounds right on to me. And one place we can see this sort of thing happening is in English. The language itself is of course far from moribund, but some parts of it are: e.g. the archaic thees & thous and the verb forms that used to go along with them, or the vestiges of nominative - accusative marking on pronouns. I keep running across "arbitrary" usages of some of these features, things like "unto thou who knoweth all things", or "he sayest", from the pens of people who should know better (e.g. in stuff that has made it past the editors of Time or Reader's Digest). Perhaps the most egregious, repeated ad nauseum (yes, that is another one) in the press this past year, is the misquotation "Let he who is without sin ..." "Let him ..." would probably, by now, grate on the ears of most Americans almost as badly as "Let he ..." does on mine. These usages break the rules that used to be conventional, and the motivation for breaking those rules would be difficult to identify with much certainty. Sometimes people seem to be attempting some ponderous sort of humor, but often as not they are probably just unconsciously demonstrating ignorance, sometimes pretentious ignorance. Perhaps the rule has changed for them to something like "sprinkle -eth's and -est's on non-1st-person verbs, and occasionally reverse the "nominative/accusative" markings on pronouns, in order to mark a (mock-) archaic or high-falutin' speech style." In any case, the usages would certainly look "arbitrary" to a linguist trained to classify under that rubric anything not fully systematic and predictable. As for "washing back", I have caught myself, purist though I be, starting to say "he and I" instead of "him and me" in answer to a question like "Who did they send it to?". And whom among us would invariably include the -m on the interrogative pronoun in that last question? --David Tuggy From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Sun Mar 7 09:32:20 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Sun, 7 Mar 1999 11:32:20 +0200 Subject: Thanks Message-ID: Thanks very much to all of you who sent me references and information on Modern Aramaic. I appreciate it very much. John From 6500frw0 at UCSBUXA.UCSB.EDU Mon Mar 8 16:20:20 1999 From: 6500frw0 at UCSBUXA.UCSB.EDU (Fiona Whalen) Date: Mon, 8 Mar 1999 08:20:20 -0800 Subject: 2nd call for papers (Workshop on American Indigenous Languages) Message-ID: SECOND CALL FOR PAPERS WORKSHOP ON AMERICAN INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES Santa Barbara, CA May 14-16, 1999 The linguistics department at the University of California, Santa Barbara announces its second annual Workshop on American Indigenous Languages (WAIL), a forum for the discussion of theoretical and descriptive linguistic studies of indigenous languages of the Americas. Invited Speaker: Sara Trechter Anonymous abstracts are invited for talks on any topic in Native American linguistics. Talks will be 20 minutes, followed by 10 minutes for discussion. Individuals may submit abstracts for one single and one co-authored paper. Abstracts should be 500 words or less and can be submitted by hard copy or e-mail. For hard copy submissions, please send five copies of your abstract and a 3x5 card with the following information: (1) name; (2) affiliation; (3) mailing address; (4) phone number; (5) e-mail address; (6) title of your paper. Send hard copy submissions to: Workshop on American Indigenous Languages Department of Linguistics University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106 E-mail submissions are encouraged. Include the information from the 3x5 card (above) in the body of the e-mail message, with the anonymous abstract as an attachment. Send e-mail submissions to: wail at humanitas.ucsb.edu DEADLINE FOR RECEIPT OF ABSTRACTS: March 19, 1999 Notification of acceptance will be by e-mail in late-March. Registration: $20 (checks payable to WAIL) For further information contact the conference coordinator at wail at humanitas.ucsb.edu or (805) 893-3776 or check out our web site at http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/wail/wail.html From Carl.Mills at UC.Edu Mon Mar 8 22:23:47 1999 From: Carl.Mills at UC.Edu (Carl Mills) Date: Mon, 8 Mar 1999 17:23:47 -0500 Subject: Forwarded: Re: Rejected posting to FUNKNET@LIS Message-ID: Regarding Professor Osten Dahl's query on the derivability of grammar, I am inclined to answer both yes and no. The question of Prof. Dahl poses depends on at least 2 presuppositions: (1) that language exist and (2) that the notion of 'grammar' (or 'a grammar' or 'grammars' or 'theory of grammar') is necessary or even useful. Frankly, I don't think there is any grammar, derivable or otherwise, and I don't think there is anything corresponding to "language" except as epiphenomenon. Yngve (1996) questions whether 'language' is the proper subject matter of linguistics. Except as a convenient shorthand for referring to humans' ability to produce and comprehend utterances, tell stories, and represent a portion of the outside world, 'language' appears less than useful. The brain appears to instantiate a ragbag collection of special-purposes devices that have been modified/distorted/drafted into the service of other purposes as the need developed. What we call language (and the 'grammar' subserving language) seems, I believe, to grow out of mental faculties originally serving perception, attention and arousal, and (especially) movement. Notice the interesting "Prologue" in the "Handbook of Neurolinguistics" on 'noun-deficits' vs 'verb-deficits' and the corresponding brain regions that are implicated in these phenomena. I doubt that there is a unified language faculty. Instead, we have brain modules devoted to the production and reception of utterances, which seem to have developed out of the brain structures, including some subcortical ones, especially with regard to what we might call syntax (if we must) that were adapted from their earlier functions. In addition, parts of the brain involved in planning and attending to the consequences (immediate, past, and future) of actions, including speech--chiefly the frontal lobes, I gather, are probably implicated in discourse planning and sociolinguistic aspects of language use. One could say with David Tuggy 'that grammar is "established by" language use and "modified by" changes in usage, and that it "functions for the purpose of" systematically structuring meaning' if one wanted to talk about grammar or language. Or one could say with George Lakoff 'that principles of grammar commonly make reference to, and are often motivated by, aspectsof communicative function in context and embodied meaning in context (ascharacterized via embodied cognition).' I would say that 'grammar' is a story made up by Gazzaniga's (1997) "interpreter" in one's left parietal lobe, which has as its main function the construction of narratives, little stories that help us make sense of our experience. One might say that that which we call 'grammar' is shaped by Lakoff's communication function in context and embodied meaning in context. But I suspect that current notions of 'communicative function' or 'language use' are too "coarse grained" to be of much theoretical use. Carl Mills > > ---=?iso-8859-1?B?1nN0ZW4gRGFobA==?= wrote: > > > > In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said > that > > generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal > > grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then > goes on > > (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that > do not > > assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, > > according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and > cognitive > > semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." > > > > It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree > with these > > characterizations. > > > > > > /sten Dahl > > > > > > _________________________________________________________ > DO YOU YAHOO!? > Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com > > _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com From Christer.Platzack at NORDLUND.LU.SE Tue Mar 9 09:05:07 1999 From: Christer.Platzack at NORDLUND.LU.SE (Christer Platzack) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 10:05:07 +0100 Subject: Is grammar derivable? Message-ID: In a posting to this list 3/5/99, Östen Dahl wrote: "In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these characterizations." The introduction mentioned is Christer Platzack Svenskans inre grammatik - det minimalistiska programmet. En introduktion till modern generativ grammatik (The internal grammar of Swedish - the minimalist program. An introduction to modern generative grammar) Studentlitteratur, Lund 1998 ISBN 91-44-00834-1 Being the author of this textbook, I like to comment on Dahl's question. What I had in mind, writing the lines cited by Dahl, was to condense statements like the following ones: "The chapter will argue that syntactic island constraints can be derived through an interaction of the Spatialization of Form Hypothesis with a general theory of attention". (Paul Deane, Grammar in Mind and Brain. Explorations in Cognitive Syntax. Mouton de Gruyter: Berlin, New York 1992, p. 4.) "What is controversial is whether these structures and abilities are unique to language, possibly constituting a separate modular package with special properties not reflective or derivative of others, more general cognitive functions." (Ronald Langacker, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1. Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1987, p. 13. "Functionalists maintain that the communicative situation motivates, constraints, explains, or otherwise determines grammatical structure, and that a structural or formal approach is not merely limited to an artificially restricted data base, but is inadequate even as a structural account." (Johanna Nichols, Functional theories of grammar. Annual Review of Antropology 13: 97-117; the quotation is found on page 97) "Crucial evidence for choosing a functionalist over a traditional Chomskian formalist approach would minimally be any language in which a rule-governed relationship exists between discourse/cognitive functions and linear order. Such languages clearly esist." (Doris Payne, What counts as explanation? A functionalist approach to word order. In Functionalism and Formalism in Linguistics, vol. 1. General Papers, ed. by Michael Darnell, Edith Moravcsik, Frederik J. Newmeyer, Michael Noonan, and Kathleen Weatley, 135-164. John Benjamins, Amsterdam 1998; the quotation is found on page 155). As is clear from these quotations, functionalists of various kinds do talk about the relation between function, semantics and grammar, and they even sometimes use the verb "derive" (see Deane and Langacker above), whereas others use words like "motivate", "constraint", "explain" "determine", "rule-governed relationship" and so on and so forth. Consider also David Tuggys response to Dahl's question (3/5/99): What on earth would "derivable from" mean in such a statement? For what it's worth, I'd easily say that grammar is "established by" language use and "modified by" changes in usage, and that it "functions for the purpose of" systematically structuring meaning. I might even say it "consists of" systematic structurings of meaning-form combinations. But "derivable from"??? It is obvious that Tuggy does not like the word "derive" (in my book I used the Swedish word 'haerleda' with roughly the same meaning). But what is the big issue? I included the lines under discussion in my book to inform the readers that there are other ways to look at grammar/language in addition to the generative view. In addition, in the final chapter, where I discuss the place of an internal grammar in relation to language as such, I suggest that such a formalist view of syntax may be fruitfully combined with cognitive approaches to semantics (Lakoff, Langacker). Christer Platzack From haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE Tue Mar 9 14:26:03 1999 From: haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 14:26:03 +0000 Subject: Is grammar derivable/motivated/explainable? Message-ID: I agree with Christer Platzack that the issue is not whether one uses the word "derive" or similar words such as "motivate" or "explain". Clearly, functionalists generally argue that grammatical structures can be motivated/explained on the basis of extra-grammatical factors. The real problem with the passage cited by Oesten Dahl from Christer Platzack's textbook is the passage immediately before, highlighted by me in the following: "There are other current theories of grammar that DO NOT ASSUME an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..." But of course, most functionalists do agree that there is an internal grammar, and that this is precisely what we need to explain. Platzack's statement is correct only if by "independent" he means "unexplainable". Martin -- Dr. Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Inselstr. 22 D-04103 Leipzig (Tel. (MPI) +49-341-9952 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616) From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Tue Mar 9 14:15:52 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 16:15:52 +0200 Subject: eye contact Message-ID: This isn't a mainstream linguistics question, but does anyone out there know about research on different patterns of eye contact in different cultures? I'm particularly interested in English- and Hebrew-speaking, but anything will be helpful. Thanks. John From bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU Tue Mar 9 15:35:16 1999 From: bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU (Elizabeth Bates) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 07:35:16 -0800 Subject: what does 'independent' mean Message-ID: It seems to me that the critical question here revolves around the term 'independent'. No one is denying that grammars exist. But how do they come about? Once again, the vexed issue of innateness rears its head. Are grammars the way they are because they represent the class of possible solutions to an extraordinarily rich communicative problem, with some reliable and knowable properties? Or are grammars the way they are (at least now in our species, post-evolution) because they are built into the mind/brain prior to birth? The strong (and in my view, more interesting) version of the functionalist approach as a causal theory is the former, i.e. that the properties of grammar *EMERGE* in response to a complex constraint-satisfaction problem (mapping a high-dimensional meaning space with some universal properties, determined by our social and cognitive make-up, onto a low-dimensional channel which also has some universal properties, determined by constraints on information processing -- memory, perception, articulation, etc.). Now, one might argue that we have begun to build that solution into the genome, so children don't have to start from scratch in every generation. That's certainly possible, and worth investigating -- but it shouldn't be established by fiat, as an article of faith, which is exactly how things are done in most child language work from a generativist perspective. Most of the generative folks cannot envision what it would mean for emergence to work as a developmental principle. They don't trust it, don't believe it, and hence they cite vague (invariably unspecified) notions of unlearnability, poverty of the stimulus, etc. This is precisely where the neural network simulations of bits of language learning have played an important role in the last few years: establishing by an existence proof that certain phenomena that were previously believed to be unlearnable are learnable after all. These are toy simulations, who knows if they will ever scale up to the level of a complex nervous system in a social world, but they *DO* help the functionalist enterprise by showing that emergence (as opposed to innateness, or its polar opposite, learning-by-copying) is a viable approach to language development, and that many of the conjectures (because that's all they ever were, there are no serious proofs) of the nativist learnability program need not concern us after all. Brian MacWhinney has a very interesting edited book coming out shortly (as in, in the next few days, I think) on "Emergence" in language development. Funknetters might find the volume useful in the framework of the general formalist/functionalist debate. -liz bates From W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE Tue Mar 9 15:39:44 1999 From: W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 16:39:44 +0100 Subject: Is grammar derivable/motivated/explainable? Message-ID: Martin Haspelmath schrieb: > The real problem with the passage cited by Oesten Dahl from Christer > Platzack's textbook is the passage immediately before, highlighted by me > in the following: > > "There are other current theories of grammar that DO NOT ASSUME an > independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to > which grammar is derivable from language use..." > > But of course, most functionalists do agree that there is an internal > grammar, and that this is precisely what we need to explain. Both Christer's and Martin's wordings demonstrate a basic problem of "functional" approaches, namely the use of a terminology that clearly belongs to another scientific paradigm. The term "internal grammar" is closely related to the MIT-Orthodoxy, but adopted by "functionalists" in a rather uncritical way. In fact the term seems to be rather desemantisized in the sense Martin uses it; it probably refers to some kind of "system internal structuring" or so. But such a kind of adaptation is dangerous and misleading: It also presupposes that "functionalists" have a well-formulated theory of what "internal grammar" is with respect to the frame work of "functionalism". If you (Martin) say that "there is an internal grammar" do you mean that there ALSO is an "external grammar"? Or is grammar always (per definitionem) "internal"? To which kind of "internality" do you refer? A cybernetic (self-determinated and self-regulating) system? If yes: Is this system "independent" (organ-like) or embedded in some extra-linguistic cognitive reality? Remember that the MIT-Orthodoxy also is based on some kind of "derivationism": LAD (if not a functional organ) is related to what once was called LOT (Language of Thought) or to other kinds of cognitive prerogatives. I think the basic problem is that functional approaches often argue on the basis of an unexplained multicausal derivationism which allows to introduce "extralinguistic" motivations for given linguistic structures ad hoc and rather randomly. The assumption of a "non-derived" (internal) layer reminds me of the way Neo-Grammarians approached their data: What we are looking for is the "system" (and "this is precisely what we need to explain"), the search for external motivation is left to Psycholinguistics etc. to which functionalism refers in case a system-"internal" motivation cannot be established. Obviously the question remains what "internal" means. If you use it in the MIT way then the term seems rather incompatible with "functionalism" in its traditional sense. If you claim that "internal" means some kind of reference to system-internal structures in the Saussurian sense then this usage may be compatible with businees-a-usual functionalism (or Neo-Grammar in Typology, if you want), but is is completely a-theoretical and fails to motivate whatever is "internal grammar". Though I call myself a "functionalist" (or "derivationalist"), I cannot subscribe to Martin's claim that "most functionalists do agree that there is an internal grammar". Before doing so, we have to explain (in terms of derivationalism, not in terms of the MIT-Orthodoxy) what is the "derivational" (or functional) basis for this so-called internal grammar [I tried to get closer to this in the lay-out of a "Grammar of Scenes and Scenarios" (see my home page for the "Person, Klasse, Kongruenz" volume (vol.1)[ http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/pkk_1abs.htm ] which tells you a little bit more about this)]. Without doing so terms like "internal grammar" are nothing but an a-theoretical but popular adaptation of main stream terminology or labels for a linguistic program that tacitly denies its own "functionalism". Wolfgang -- _____________________________________________________ | Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze | Institut fuer Allgemeine und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen | Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 | D-80539 Muenchen | Tel: +89-21802486 (secr.) | +89-21802485 (office) | Email: W.Schulze at mail.lrz-muenchen.de | http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/ _____________________________________________________ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: W.Schulze.vcf Type: text/x-vcard Size: 192 bytes Desc: Visitenkarte f�r Wolfgang Schulze URL: From dparvaz at UNM.EDU Tue Mar 9 16:22:25 1999 From: dparvaz at UNM.EDU (Danial A. Parvaz) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 09:22:25 -0700 Subject: eye contact In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Interesting. And since "Hebrew-speaking" culture is a relatively recent concoction, the differences between, say, the various flavors of Sephardi, Ashkenazi, and Israeli-Arab might be instructive. I have nothing to offer, but would love to hear what you end up with. Cheers, Dan. On Tue, 9 Mar 1999, John Myhill wrote: > This isn't a mainstream linguistics question, but does anyone out there know > about research on different patterns of eye contact in different cultures? > I'm particularly interested in English- and Hebrew-speaking, but anything > will be helpful. Thanks. > John > From macw at CMU.EDU Tue Mar 9 17:26:32 1999 From: macw at CMU.EDU (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 12:26:32 -0500 Subject: emergence and exaptation Message-ID: I am happy to second everything in Liz's message, except one minor point. Until last night, I would have agreed completely with her observation that "most of the generative folks cannot envision what it would mean for emergence to work as a developmental principle." Then I read a remarkable book on minimalism by Uriagereka titled "Rhyme and Reason". It is difficult to find a single adjective to describe this book. First, there is the adjective "heavy". It is almost as heavy as Gazzaniga's monster "The Cognitive Neurosciences". Second, there is the adjective "oblique". The whole book is written as a Platonic dialog between "L" (the linguist) and "O" (the other). It starts out with the same basic principles of emergentism that Liz and I share, discussing D'Arcy Thompson and packing constraints in nature. But then it starts to go in another direction, focusing on exaptation, rather than adaptation, claiming that there is a fundamental relation between minimalism and some crucial properties of nature as revealed through Fibonacci numbers. After all, the Fibonacci series can be generated by 0 -> 1 1 -> 0 1 applied recursively with some additional parallel read-off constraints. Somehow, Uriagereka believes that this shows that minimalism is emergent too. Not ontogenetically emergent, perhaps, but at least phylogenetically emergent, but only in the sense that spandrels (the areas under cupolas) are emergent. That is the first 180 pages of "Rhyme and Reason". About page 200, there is an admission that Optimality Theory might be a plausible alternative approach to phonology, although not to syntax. I found even that level of ecumenicality refreshing. After that, things take a more conservative turn with repetition of standard arguments about poverty of stimulus and ideas about how UG would reveal itself in tests with infants. Later, Uriagereka spends a page on cognitive grammar and dismisses it with sighs about "not coming down to earth". Somewhere around page 350, I started to tire of the dialog form of presentation and decided to skip to the chapter summaries and formal summary at the back of the book. Why am I discussing this book on FunkNet? The reason is that it demonstrates the "emergence" of a bit of common ground between functionalist and formalist approaches. If both approaches recognize the role of emergence, then maybe the disagreement is about adaptation vs. exaptation. However, I think we will want to be careful here too, since functionalists like Givon have been arguing for the importance of non-adaptive features in grammar. --Brian MacWhinney From TGIVON at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Tue Mar 9 20:11:26 1999 From: TGIVON at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Tom Givon) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 12:11:26 -0800 Subject: Whoa, Brian! Message-ID: Dear FUNK people, I was going to stay out of the recent traffic; till I saw Brian MacW.'s unfortunate interpretation of what I do or don't think about arbitrary grammatical structures. So, hopefully as briefly as I can: 1. In ch. 6 of "On Understanding Grammar" (1979) I observed that quite often, perhaps most often, synchronically-arbitrary morphosyntactic structures arise in the course of perefectly adaptive ('functionally motivated') grammaticalization. This is a fact of life one has to learn to live with. It does not mean that the *process* of grammaticalization, whethger diachronic, developmental or evolutionary, is 'unmotivated' or counter-adaptive. But only that in the emergence of complex structures, a certain level of arbitrariness comes with the terri- tory. Unless, of course, you want to throw a tantrum and ignore it, which I concede quite a few FUNKers seem to enjoy doing. 2. Subsequently, in a chapter on biological evolution in "Mind, Code & Context" (1989), I noted that a similar phenomenon has long been observed in biological evolution of complex organisms, going under the traditional name of "excess structure" (S.J. Gould's 'spandrels'). Again, many people with an anti-evolutionary philosophical bias have been citing such facts to suggest that bio-evolution is not adaptive (not 'function- guided'). Many Chomskyites have been embracing this as an anti-adaptive argument that would support 'autonomous/arbitrary syntax'. I think, as in the case of the diachronic 'spandrels', this attitude is rather unfortunate, and no serious evolutionary biologist--not even Steven J. himself--would espouse it (tho I have seen some people with PhD in Biology espouse it... I guess I don't count them as being serious.). 3. If, as I have been suggesting since 1977, grammar is a partially- automated speech-processing system, then one may as well note that the rise of automaticity--whether developmentally or phylo- genetically--always allows for *some degree* of rigidification, ritualization, symbolization, and thus seeming arbitrariness. These are some of the *consequences* of establishing rigid neuro-processing pathways. It is part of the cost the organism pays for the *substantial* benefits of automaticity: *higher processing speed *lower error rate *lesser dependence on context 4. One may also suggest that many features of culture are likewise ritualized, to the point where they seem--to the superficial observer--rather arbitrary. Again, many anthropologists, since Whorf, Boas and Bloomfield but also more recently (cultural relativism seems to have regained center-stage in anthropology...) take cultural diversity & ritualization as evidence of total arbitrariness, non-universality & non-adaptiveness of culture. Again, I see this as a cop-out, an escape from a serious empirical study of the great wonders of complexity of the human spirit. All in all, it seems to me that social scientiest would rather not tackle complexity seriously & empirically. Instead, they keep wanting to find some escape hatches, so that they could go on with *reductionist* interprertations of complex domains. In linguistics, this is obvious in the insistence that the system is either 100% 'emergent' or 100% 'innate', 100% 'motivated' or 100% 'arbitrary'. For as long as this kind of intellectual escapism prevails, I doubt it that the field would advance much farther beyond chasing its own tail; which is, in my most-humble opinion, what has been going on since Bloomfield/Skinner & Chomsky set up the terms of this sterile debate. Cheers, TG From gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA Wed Mar 10 10:30:19 1999 From: gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA (Greg Thomson) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 13:30:19 +0300 Subject: what does 'independent' mean In-Reply-To: <199903091535.HAA14330@crl.ucsd.edu> Message-ID: At 7:35 -0800 03-09-1999, Elizabeth Bates wrote: > No one is denying that grammars exist. But >how do they come about? Where do grammars exist? A child is born into an environment in which speech is going on. Gradually the child's brain learns to associate linguistic cues (phonetic, lexical, grammatical) with conceptual events (adding tokens to mental models, forming complex concepts out of more basic ones, etc.). Thus gradually conceptual processes come to be triggered by linguistic cues (and in such a way that individual "forms" may trigger multiple processes of various varieties). Under the influence of the developing comprehension system a production system also develops (and is maintained). It learns to produce the linguistic cues in such a way that they comply with the expectations of the comprehension system. Where is the grammar? Reflective humans may preserve records of linguistic events and reflect upon, and categorize, the "patterns" they find therein. "Grammars", in the old fashioned sense, framed in terms of "structural relationships" or whatever, are the result of such reflection and categorization. But wouldn't you imagine they have a rather distant and indirect (if not tenuous) relationship to the working linguistic systems inside of people. As far as the working language systems go, there may just be the solutions to the complex constraint-satisfaction problem you mention, which may include 1) cue-triggered instructions (a metaphor, of course) which create conceptual representations (comprehension), and 2) instructions triggered by conceptual representations which produce the cues that work for the comprehension system (production). If so, then where would the grammars be? Why must they emerge anywhere other than in our imaginations? And why is no one denying that they exist? Cordially, Greg XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Morning by morning new mercies I see XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Greg Thomson, Ph.D. Candidate (gthomson at gpu.srv.ualberta.ca) SIL/Thomson, Westpost P.O. Box 109, FIN 53101, Lappeenranta, FINLAND Phone: 7-812-246-35-48 (in St. Petersburg, Russia) From Carl.Mills at UC.Edu Wed Mar 10 13:46:57 1999 From: Carl.Mills at UC.Edu (Carl Mills) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 08:46:57 -0500 Subject: Really? Message-ID: Elizabeth Bates wrote: >No one is denying that grammars exist. But how do they come about? And Martin Haspelmath added: >But of course, most functionalists do agree that there is an internal grammar, and that this is precisely what we need to explain. Hi, everybody. No one here. Nice t'meet y'all. Technically, I suppose, both Profs. Bates and Haspelmath are correct. Of course, grammars exist--on the bookshelves of language teachers and in the minds of linguists. A more interesting question is "Should grammars exist?" Or more precisely, "Is the notion 'grammar' necessary or even useful in the language sciences?" Clearly, Vic Yngve thinks not, and I, from a slightly different perspective, agree. I don't want to put words into the post of Greg Thomson, and his opening remarks are a tad too empiricist for my taste, but I believe that his posting could be interpreted as supporting a non-grammatical approach to language science. For those of us concerned with developing a non-behaviorist/non-grammatical linguistics, Funknet is one of the few places where interesting discussion takes place. In the meantime, Uriagereka's book lies on the floor of my study while I pick my way through Lakoff & Johnson's even weightier tome (reading these books may improve your mind, but carrying them will sure improve your muscles), and I haven't even ordered Fritz Newmeyer's latest. Time to teach some classes and get back to re-inventing case(without the grammar). Kurasi, Carl From TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU Wed Mar 10 15:41:40 1999 From: TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU (Tony A. Wright) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 09:41:40 CST Subject: Really? Message-ID: Carl Mills wrote: >Technically, I suppose, both Profs. Bates and Haspelmath are correct. Of cou >bookshelves of language teachers and in the minds of linguists. A more inter >exist?" Or more precisely, "Is the notion 'grammar' necessary or even useful >Vic Yngve thinks not, and I, from a slightly different perspective, agree. I My mail reader chopped off the right hand side of this message, for some reason, but what I got from it raises a question in my mind. Don't we still have to account for things like subject - verb agreement, for example, or all the intricate vagaries of clitics in French and Italian, along with a whole host of other stuff we've been analyzing and calling 'grammar'? If we do, and decide to simply not call it 'grammar', what difference does it make? --Tony Wright From bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU Wed Mar 10 15:54:13 1999 From: bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU (Elizabeth Bates) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 07:54:13 -0800 Subject: what does 'independent' mean Message-ID: I think Greg Thomson's proposal is quite plausible, and when I say "no one is denying that grammars exist" I mean that in the sense that he proposes, i.e. that the child has developed a skill that correct maps between form and meaning. And that knowledge may not look even REMOTELY like the grammars proposed in many formal linguistic theories. We all agree that grammar (in the sense of structural facts) is a reality, but we are free to differ markedly in our characterization of the form that knowledge takes in a real live child. -liz bates From spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU Wed Mar 10 16:02:09 1999 From: spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU (Spike L Gildea) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 10:02:09 -0600 Subject: Job: Research post in Morphology/Typology (fwd) Message-ID: Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 08:34:37 +0000 From: Greville G. Corbett
University of Surrey SCHOOL OF LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE SURREY MORPHOLOGY GROUP
Starting salary up to 17,750 pounds per annum, depending on age and experience. Applications are invited for a three-year post on an ESRC-funded project "A Typology of Syncretism". The post will be in the Surrey Morphology Group, which specializes in typology, particularly the application of formal and statistical approaches to typology. The project will be directed by Professor Greville Corbett and Dr Dunstan Brown. Candidates should have wide-ranging interests within linguistics. A good post-graduate degree in linguistics is highly desirable. An interest in any of the following would be advantageous: typology, morphological theory, syntactic theory, Russian, other languages (especially from families relevant for investigating syncretism). The job will involve collecting and analysing cross-linguistic data, maintaining a database, compiling a bibliography and contributing to joint papers. Details of the Surrey Morphology Group can be found at: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/LIS/SMG/ Informal enquiries may be made to Dunstan Brown (d.brown at surrey.ac.uk) or to Greville Corbett (g.corbett at surrey.ac.uk). For an application pack, please telephone +1483 873846 or e-mail A.Bell at surrey.ac.uk or write to the Personnel Department (arb), University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 5XH. Please supply your postal address, where you saw the advertisement and the vacancy reference number 1668/arb. The closing date for written applications is Thursday 15th April 1999. Interviews will be held on Thursday 13th May 1999. Visit the University Web Site at http://www.surrey.ac.uk/ The University is committed to an Equal Opportunities Policy Greville G. Corbett Department of Linguistic and International Studies University of Surrey Guildford email: g.corbett at surrey.ac.uk Surrey, GU2 5XH FAX: +44 1483 259527 Great Britain phone: +44 1483 300800 ext 2849 From nrude at ucinet.com Wed Mar 10 19:21:25 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 11:21:25 -0800 Subject: Really? Message-ID: Hi to you too, Maybe the public perception is that language is just words--isn't that what nonlinguists think?--but shouldn't every class in linguistics emphasize that language is also structure? Information is by definition structured. And language structure is hierachical, and it exists on two levels. Semantics and discourse have their own structure, whether or not this has been automated in a grammar. And then when you look at all the closed classes and word order permutations, conjugations, declensions, etc., in a natural language, you see another level of structure--grammar--which the descriptivist cannot ignore. If structure necessarily exists on a semantic and discourse level, why should it not be reflected in the automated, routinized delivery system that Givon talks about? Noel From eitkonen at UTU.FI Thu Mar 11 14:10:15 1999 From: eitkonen at UTU.FI (Esa Itkonen) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 16:10:15 +0200 Subject: 'internal grammar' Message-ID: I have to agree with Wolfgang Schulze that, if we use words literally, it is not the 'internal grammar' that we have to explain, at least in the first place. Everybody has his/her own view of what the HYPOTHETICAL 'internal grammar' might be like. What has to be explained, first and foremost, is linguistic BEHAVIOR (which is known by direct observation). And the first, rather trivial but yet necessary, explanatory step is in terms of social RULES or conventions, which are known by (intersubjectively valid) linguistic intuition. We may then try to explain particular languages qua sets of rules by means of universally valid functional principles, and the 'internal grammars' (of particular languages) are (hypothetical) middle terms in this chain of explanations. Esa Itkonen From nrude at ucinet.com Thu Mar 11 15:10:03 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 07:10:03 -0800 Subject: 'internal grammar' Message-ID: Greetings, What has to be explained? Everything! Not just behavior. Not just biology. All of these, and also INFORMATION itself, as manifested in natural language, computer language, DNA, etc. Noel From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 03:11:58 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 22:11:58 -0500 Subject: The Myth of G Message-ID: Elizabeth Bates may already regret her (9 Mar 1999) remark that "No one is denying that grammars exist". Although Greg Thomson and Carl Mills (10 Mar 1999) have already responded to it insightfully and correctly, Tony Wright's retort, in which parts of speech and agreement and clitics prove the existence of a body of rules or other such propositional stores mediating between the analysis of input and the creation of output, makes me see that more is needed. For even when defined as "a skill that correct maps between form and meaning" (which Liz offers as a way to disassociate herself from the worst formalist excesses of the genre) or as "social RULES or conventions, which are known by (intersubjectively valid) linguistic intuition" (which Esa Itkonen offers as a necessary albeit "hypothetical" component of linguistic theory), the concept of a "grammar" as a component of language knowledge deserves to be laid to rest forever. The most recent of my litany of arguments in favor of this premise appears in the paper I presented at LACUS Forum XXV last July, to appear in the proceedings later this year under the title "Central Aphasia and the Myth of G: Toward a Grammar-Free Linguistics". In brief, a "dialectical-processual" view of language knowledge rejects any and all characterizations of language knowledge as rules, propositions, constraints, elements, nodes, or other such entities presumed to be neutral to, for example, the fundamental dichotomy between the primes of perceptual and motoric functioning. These and other arguments against a processually neutral view of language objects as "structural" abstractions may not make linguists' work any easier but they may succeed in making it less mystical than recent (read the last 50 years of) linguistic research have made it. Best. 'Bye. Steve From twright at INTERSATX.NET Fri Mar 12 04:45:52 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 22:45:52 -0600 Subject: The Myth of G In-Reply-To: <4.1.19990311211834.0099a260@mailbox.cc.binghamton.edu> Message-ID: At 10:11 PM 3/11/99 -0500, H Stephen Straight wrote: >Although Greg Thomson and Carl Mills (10 Mar >1999) have already responded to it insightfully and correctly, Tony Wright's >retort, in which parts of speech and agreement and clitics prove the existence >of a body of rules or other such propositional stores mediating between the >analysis of input and the creation of output, Whoa! I said all that? I didn't mean to. Also, I didn't intend my question to be a retort at all, nor did I intend to prove anything, but simply to ask an honest question. To me, the systematic relationships which have always been obvious between linguistic elements, or the predictable behavior of linguistic elements like clitics, etc., is real. I call it grammar. Whatever types of underlying factors are responsible for this (a specific language endowment or general cognitive capacities, or something else), I think that there are regular linguistic patterns that can be observed. Is this what is controversial, or just the practice of calling it grammar? Now I read people saying that we need to lay the notion of 'grammar' to rest. After reading this discussion, I'm still not sure what's wrong with calling it 'grammar,' or what people are proposing as an alternative that could not also be called 'grammar.' Isn't this rather like soap commercials on TV that tell you "Don't use soap, use (insert brand name soap)." --Tony Wright From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 05:46:48 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 00:46:48 -0500 Subject: Fwd: Re: The Myth of G Message-ID: > > Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 00:38:41 -0500 > To: Elizabeth Bates > From: H Stephen Straight > Subject: Re: The Myth of G > > Dear Liz - > At the risk of logic-chopping, I submit that the claim that "grammar > exists" differs significantly from the claim that "grammars exist", so that > reflection on the significance of your change of wording might make you > regret your earlier espousal of the latter claim. Moreover, the notion that > "a" grammar "maps between form and meaning" implies a non- or > ambi-directional view of the mapping relation, which is, IMnsHO, the root of > most of the formalist evils against which you and others have so impressively > battled over the years. Until we can wrest linguistic theory away from the > set-theoretic mentality implicit in the long-standing commitment to > "grammars", the functionalist-processualist alternative will remain > subservient to the regnant formalist-structuralist paradigm. > (You're not the only one of my favorite linguists that continue to > harbor the Myth of G, but you're arguably the one whose work I most admire. > Please consider your position carefully.) Best. 'Bye. Steve H Stephen Straight -- Anthro, Ling, & Langs Across the Curric (LxC) Office: 607.777.2824 - Home: 607.723.0157 - Fax: 607.777.2889/.2477 Spring 1999 Ofc Hrs, Sci 1 Rm 220: T 2-4, W 2-3:30 & by appointment From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 06:44:56 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 01:44:56 -0500 Subject: The Myth of G Message-ID: > > To: "Tony A. Wright" > > I'm sorry, Tony, if I put words in your mouth. What may have caused this > misunderstanding is the (grammatical!) distinction between "grammar" (mass > noun) versus "grammars" (count noun). There's lots of grammar out there, and > inside our heads, but the only grammars we know of are in books. To the > extent that what you said implied the existence of a body of implicit > knowledge that mediates or maps or otherwise exists independently of the > actual objects and processes of language comprehension, production, or > acquisition, then you were -- knowingly or not -- perpetuating the Myth of > G. But to the extent that you were merely defending the term grammar as a > cover term for the categories and relations that clearly exist among words > and phrases, then you are quite right to be contemptuous of anyone who would > deny the existence of such categories and relations or prohibit the use of > the term grammar to refer to them. I did not mean to be doing that, but if > that's what it sounded like, I apologize. Best. 'Bye. Steve From nrude at ucinet.com Fri Mar 12 14:08:23 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 06:08:23 -0800 Subject: Universals Message-ID: Howdy, Don't know exactly where you're coming from--linguistics, neuroscience--but I take it that what you're disputing is the existence of 'universals'. I appreciate the cock-sure attitude, but I wonder how I can really know that this matter has finally been laid to rest. Our school--as I understand it--defines universals as existing on the functional level, as also I believe that most of us would not deny the "existence" of propositional logic. Ours is a "communicative theory of language" and it is at this level that we define universals. How particular languages code them is another matter. Now I wonder--if we in the humanities or social sciences or neurosciences or whatever think we have finally laid to rest the millennia old debate between formalists and Platonists, then can we assume that our softer fields are about to usurp the prestige of the hard sciences and mathematics? Am just a naive by-stander here, but one always suspicious of the utterly sure. No offence intended. Cheers, Noel From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 14:40:45 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 09:40:45 -0500 Subject: Universals In-Reply-To: <36E91FD8.ADF@ucinet.com> Message-ID: To quote Tony Wright: "Whoa! I said all that? I didn't mean to." I'm a linguist in an anthropology department and have been reading and teaching and writing about psycholinguistic issues for a long time now. I don't have any doubt about the existence of universals and can't think why anyone would doubt their existence. More important, I don't see what I've said that would make you think that I have the slightest doubt of their existence, to say nothing of dismissing them as summarily as you imply. Please help me to better understand your apparent disagreement with my position. As for "the millennia old debate between formalists and Platonists," by which I think you meant to say "between idealists and realists" (with formalists and Platonists being examples of the former and functionalists and processualists examples of the latter) -- but maybe I don't get your point, I don't pretend to have laid this or any other such yin/yang dichotomy to rest. I do however think that humanists, social scientists, neuroscientists, and many others have provided hard empirical evidence and powerful conceptual tools for getting beyond the Myth of G whereby an essentially set-theoretic descriptive device (a grammar) becomes reified as a mental organ. I don't know whether to call it the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or just plain old equivocation and mystification, but I do think that locating grammars in the mind/brain makes about as much sense as locating physical equations (E=mc squared) in physical objects (atoms?). Best. 'Bye. Steve From meira at RUF.RICE.EDU Fri Mar 12 17:40:30 1999 From: meira at RUF.RICE.EDU (Sergio Meira S.C.O.) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 11:40:30 -0600 Subject: Myth of G In-Reply-To: <4.1.19990312091005.009b27e0@mailbox.cc.binghamton.edu> Message-ID: Just lurking-- but I couldn't help noticing that this 'Myth of G' discussion is getting interesting. Being interested in descriptive linguistics-- and actually wanting to make a career out of writting the 'grammars' that were so contemptuously alluded to-- I'd like to see the alternatives. In what way would the 'no-grammar' advocates describe understandably a given human language? Given the recurrent regularities, etc. that one finds when looking at an unknown language, is there a better way to talk about them than saying, 'here's a conjugation', 'here's a paradigm', 'here's a construction', regardless of what reality underlies these regularities? And can you guys give me references to it, in case there is? I'd certainly disagree with anyone who wanted to see a grammatical description as 'a map of the brain', 'a map of the internal knowledge of the speaker', etc., or who would want to locate it somewhere in the brain. I'm more of a hocus-pocus linguist; I tend to think grammars (in the plural) are convenient devices for us to catalog observed regularities. Would this vision of grammars still make them objectionable? --Sergio Meira Rice University meira at ruf.rice.edu From nrude at ucinet.com Fri Mar 12 19:07:19 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 11:07:19 -0800 Subject: Universals Message-ID: Greetings, Well I thought that "universals"--at least the kind that we've been used to--imply a grammar. Grammar thus lives on two levels. There is the semantic-discourse-pragmatic level which is pretty universal, and then there is its automated instantiation (dare "I" use such a word?) in individual grammars. As for the formalist vs. Platonist debate in mathematics and physics, what those folks over there are faced with is a seeming hierarchy to reality in which the laws of physics reside at a lower level than mathematics. Physicists, for example, study other possible worlds, for as they say, "even God cannot defy logic". The idea is that things that "could be no other way" are real--they somehow exist. Now I'm no committed Platonist, but I wonder--could some form of propositional logic "exist"--universally--in all possible worlds? Agreeing that the better metaphor for language is to be found in the elasticity of biology as opposed to the absolutism of the laws of physics. But this does not mean that we can learn nothing from the mathematicians and physicists. It doesn't mean that it is ALL pragmatics. Why canÕt we have both pragmatics and Plato? If it turns out that there is an awful lot of commonality in all information systems (natural language, mathematica, computer language, DNA), then maybe this is where we validate the notion of propositional sturcture. If itÕs not hardwired--but simply the only way to accomplish the task--then the neurologists just might miss it. But that wouldnÕt mean it wasn't "real". OK, I'm a heretic worthy of being impaled up-side-down. But what do I got to lose! Let's keep this interesting. Noel From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Sat Mar 13 04:10:07 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 23:10:07 -0500 Subject: Myth of G In-Reply-To: Message-ID: > I'm more of a hocus-pocus linguist; I tend to think >grammars (in the plural) are convenient devices for us to catalog observed >regularities. Would this vision of grammars still make them objectionable? My previous postings have voiced no objection to the use of grammars as descriptive devices. The Myth of G, as I've called it, lies not in the writing of grammars per se but rather in the claim that language users could have any use for them other than as interesting cultural artifacts in which linguists have cataloged and otherwise systematically described language objects in ways that correspond to people's judgments regarding the well-formedness, utility, similarity, contrast, and interrelatedness of various sample objects (whether recorded or invented). In particular, the Myth consists of the claim that to the extent that the description provided by a grammar is, as the saying used to go, "descriptively adequate" it is ipso facto a candidate for promotion as an "explanatorily adequate" account of a vital part of the mental/neural apparatus that actually underlies language comprehension, production, and acquisition. I'll admit that my personal preference is to do linguistics in such a way as to in fact arrive at such an explanatorily adequate account, which is why I feel abused when colleagues persist in pretending that grammars contribute to this goal. Myths often obstruct real understanding, and the Myth of G has obstructed explanatorily satisfying linguistics for too long. Best. 'Bye. Steve H Stephen Straight -- Anthro, Ling, & Langs Across the Curric (LxC) Office: 607.777.2824 - Home: 607.723.0157 - Fax: 607.777.2889/.2477 Spring 1999 Ofc Hrs, Sci 1 Rm 220: T 2-4, W 2-3:30 & by appointment From sburke at NETADVENTURE.NET Sat Mar 13 05:39:32 1999 From: sburke at NETADVENTURE.NET (Sean M. Burke) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 22:39:32 -0700 Subject: grammars Message-ID: H Stephen Straight wrote: >[...]I don't know whether to >call it the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or just plain old >equivocation and mystification, but I do think that locating grammars >in the mind/brain makes about as much sense as locating physical >equations (E=mc squared) in physical objects (atoms?). Similarly, I've been thinking of late about this question, that's also somewhat about "where's the rules?": Consider that there's two ways to implement a system that does something (in this case, that something is: understanding and producing language -- i.e., having a grammar): 1) a way where the operational elements of the system more or less match what patterns you'd observe in the output. Call this an "isomorphic" system. (I'm borrowing the term from some old object-oriented programming books I read, where it was used to mean the property of a program whose internal organization mirrors the organization of the problem being attacked, the situation being simulated, etc.) or: 2) a way where the basics of the program aren't isomorphic, but instead do fit together such that the thing (here, grammar) that you want is "emergent" -- and I use the word in /exactly/ the same sense as it's used in speaking of the patterns being emergent in Conway's Life, or Patternson's Worm(s), or [insert your favorite complex systems simulation here]. Call this an "emergence-based" system. Now suppose (in what is clearly now just a gedanken experiment) that I have two adult, lingual human brains (with the usual human bodies attached); and suppose that they both have effectively the same receptive and productive grammars of some or other language. But suppose that I know (somehow) that Brain A implements grammar using an "isomorphic" system, whereas Brain B implements grammar using an "emergence-based" system. Now: Is Brain B's grammar any less real than Brain A's? Or, taking somewhat of a different tack: If we all have brains like Brain B, are linguistic statements about our grammar any less interesting (whatever that means) or explanatory (whatever that means) than they would be if we all had brains like Brain A? -- Sean M. Burke sburke at netadventure.net http://www.netadventure.net/~sburke/ From dlpayne at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Mon Mar 15 17:38:23 1999 From: dlpayne at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Doris Payne) Date: Mon, 15 Mar 1999 09:38:23 -0800 Subject: Oregon: Visiting Assistant Professor Message-ID: Visiting Assistant Professor of Linguistics, University of Oregon. The Linguistics Department at the University of Oregon announces the opening of a non-tenure related Visiting Assistant Professor position for the 1999-2000 academic year, potentially renewable, depending on Departmental needs. The Linguistics Department of Oregon enjoys a long tradition of work within the functionalist tradition, concentrating in descriptive work and field work and in empirical work on language use, discourse, and language acquisition. We invite applications from qualified individuals who can contribute to the functional and typological orientation of the department. Since the openings fill teaching gaps for faculty on leave, the candidate must show evidence of considerable teaching skill, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. The successful applicant must be able to help cover our core curriculum, which includes phonetics, phonology, functional-typological morphosyntax, semantics, discourse, historical linguistics, and second language acquisition and teaching. In addition, the successful applicant must have an active research profile and must be able to direct graduate student research. Qualifications: Ph.D. in Linguistics Duties: Up to two courses per term of hire (we are on a quarter system) Mentor students in research projects, as needed Participate in department life, as appropriate Please submit a letter of application, vita, and names, addresses, phone numbers and e-mail addresses of three references to: 1999 VAP Search Committee, Department of Linguistics, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403. Applications must be received by April 16, 1999 to receive fullest consideration. Web Address: http://logos.uoregon.edu/uoling The University of Oregon is an EO/AA/ADA insitiution. From annes at HTDC.ORG Tue Mar 16 03:35:57 1999 From: annes at HTDC.ORG (Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D.) Date: Mon, 15 Mar 1999 17:35:57 -1000 Subject: Ergo's Patent Publishes Message-ID: The patent for the tools that create Ergo Linguistic Technologiess� software has just been published by the U.S. Patent Office. Copies of it can be obtained from them through the usual channels. Many have asked me to notify them when the patent is published. The patent description contains a theory of syntax that is far simpler and far more general than current theories, and more importantly, that makes software that individuals working with other theories can only dream of. For examples of the Ergo software go to http://www.ergo-ling.com. Probably the strongest recommendation for reading this patent and studying this theory is the software that it can create which can be seen at the Ergo web site. Those of you in industry may want to try and see if you can create similar tools and still beat the patent. We believe this is not possible, but we would encourage all to try in the spirit of good sportsmanship. In academia the very fact that we have a theory that produces better NLP tools than any other theory calls into question the status of all other theories of syntax. This is because every theoretical mechanism ever proposed for a theory of syntax (ours, Chomsky�s, or anyone else�s) can, in principle, be implemented in a programming language. Thus, the clearest judge of the best theory of syntax is the working software that can be produced from it. I have in the past even argued that until such time as other theories can do as well or better than we can in this area, that the Ergo parser should be declared the default standard for computational linguistics both in academia and in industry. (If anyone can demonstrate why this should not be the case, I would appreciate seeing the argument). The Ergo parser provides tools and a parser that can significantly improve navigation and control devices and question and answer dialoging software as well as other areas of NLP that require grammatical analysis. All the demos at the Ergo site are WIN95/8/NT compatible. Get them and compare them to the software made from other theories (if they are capable of producing any at all). Please do not take offense at these rather strongly worded statements. They are required because the soft sciences do not often have to deal with clear, incontrovertible evidence of the superiority of other theories or breakthroughs. In chemistry, for example, if someone creates a better and cheaper formula for a particular result (say the treatment of a disease), the new method is adopted and older ones are discarded until such time as evidence (e.g. the computer program in linguistics) demonstrates otherwise. For a discussion and description of standards for the evaluation of parsers and parsing systems go to http://www.vrml.org/WorkingGroups/NLP-ANIM. In addition, the Ergo web site provides examples and a parsing contest for those who would like to compare different parsing tools. Here�s an even greater challenge: Get the patent and the Ergo software and then write some papers that explain why working software is not a criteria for judging a theory of syntax. Or also why the theory of syntax cannot produce the software that we have. It might also be interesting to demonstrate why our theory of syntax is not to be preferred over others and why this theory of syntax is flawed (in spite of the unique software development it offers). Phil Bralich Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. President and CEO Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite 175 Honolulu, HI 96822 Tel: (808)539-3920 Fax: (808)539-3924 bralich at hawaii.edu http://www.ergo-ling.com Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite #175 Honolulu, HI 96822 fax: (808)539-3921 tel: (808)539-3924 From macw at CMU.EDU Tue Mar 16 15:15:13 1999 From: macw at CMU.EDU (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1999 10:15:13 -0500 Subject: Ergo's theory of syntax Message-ID: Dear Philip and Funknet, If you and Derek have developed a major breakthrough in our understanding of the theory of syntax, why don't you include something regarding the breakthrough in your posting to Funknet. You state that you now have a "theory of syntax that is far simpler and far more general than current theories, and more importantly, that makes software that individuals working with other theories can only dream of". A quick trip to your web site finds things like "clients", "demos", and "downloads", but no button labeled "theory". Would it be possible for you to either give an explicit link to the part of the web page that contains the theory or, better yet, summarize the theoretical advance in a few paragraphs? Many thanks. --Brian MacWhinney From annes at HTDC.ORG Tue Mar 16 19:28:13 1999 From: annes at HTDC.ORG (Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D.) Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1999 09:28:13 -1000 Subject: Corpora: Ergo's Patent Publishes Message-ID: At 08:28 PM 3/15/99 , you wrote: >On Mon, 15 Mar 1999, Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. wrote: >> The patent for the tools that create Ergo Linguistic Technologiess� >> software has just been published by the U.S. Patent Office. Copies > >This is my first post to this group. I hope this isn't out of line, but I >was too tempted by the claims of this post to resist checking the online >demo. I tested it with three different problems: Probably the most important thing I am trying to do with my posts and with the Ergo web site is to bring some degree of science and method to the comparison of parsers. As you note all parsers have some problems and anyone can find a list of sentences that will not parse. However, this really does little to provide a good comparison of parsers and theories of syntax. It also ignores the fact that a web site that is open to any sentence is not the same as a product that is targeted to a specific market. For instance, the parser we produce can provide an immediate and significant increase to the amounts of navigation and control that are handled by a speech rec system. This is a quantum leap forward for those products and should not be ingored in a situation where many jobs for linguists are waiting in the wings for more NLP tools to arrive on the market. Currently speech rec systems such as those from IBM, Microsoft, Learnout and Hauspie, Phillips, Dragon and Java are all neck and neck in a battle for shares of a very important market. In addition we can add significantly enhanced question and answer and messaging capabilities to those and other systems. One that any student in this area cannot ingore. Download Ergo's "MemoMaster" if you want to see what I mean by the improvement we offer. In addition we have recently completed a Department of Commerce grant to create a Web Browser based on NLP. This device provides significantly more Browser functionality for the naive user, for the blind and for others. In a multi-media conference in Japan in November, we beat out Nuance Communications (a spin off from Stanford Research Institute) and the U.S. Navy for the "Best Technical" award in NLP technology. These awards and the products we create are not accurately judged in the manner that is implied by typing in sentences arbitrarily. To really see what our parser can do and to really be able to compare our parser to others, it is necessary to look at parsers together and systematically. We provide a means for doing that on our web site in the section called "Parsing Contest" where we post our results for sentences in three practical NLP areas and ask other parsers to do the same. I suggest that the readers of this list abandon the habit of just arbtrarily pumping in sentences and start organizing sentences based on practical real world needs and on observable criteria that can be compared on several different theories. Try the http://www.ergo-ling.com web site and see what you think of our standards our contest and our results, but more importantly see if there is any parser ANYWHERE that can come even close to what we offer. And more importantly -- ask youself the question -- if any parser was indeed superior to the Ergo parser why don't they just post their results using our standards and our results and put us in our place definitively and finally. The reason of course is because no one can produce the results we can. Phil Bralich Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. President and CEO Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite 175 Honolulu, HI 96822 Tel: (808)539-3920 Fax: (808)539-3924 bralich at hawaii.edu http://www.ergo-ling.com Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite #175 Honolulu, HI 96822 fax: (808)539-3921 tel: (808)539-3924 From lmenn at PSYCH.COLORADO.EDU Tue Mar 16 22:04:57 1999 From: lmenn at PSYCH.COLORADO.EDU (Lise Menn) Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1999 15:04:57 -0700 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Steve Straight does us a service by reminding us that various language performances (speaking, hearing, judging grammaticality, judging whether something is a word) are neurolinguistically distinct; therefore a theory of grammar that is supposed to capture the individual's knowledge of language will be inadequate if it abstracts a single grammar that is uniform across types of use (comprehension outstrips production at all levels of language development; many of us use constructions that we would label ungrammatical; huge discrepancies across abilities within an individual can be observed in aphasia, etc.). However, the diversity of 'grammar(s)' in the brain does not mean that the different aspects of grammatical knowledge are totally disconnected. We do learn from hearing; we pick up styles and words from those around us, not to mention from reading - aren't you occasionally appalled to realize that you are 'talking like a book'? Priming (see Kay Bock's work) must account for how some word or construction we have just heard turns up in our conversations in places where it's not quite semantically what we really intended to say; and our sense of grammaticality changes too, though more slowly (haven't we all decreased in our *! reactions to English pronoun case violations as the case marking system becomes more surface-controlled?) Whether G has lost its usefulness as an abstraction, I would argue, depends on the level of detail at which one is working; if you are describing an underdocumented language, it would be most unreasonable to demand a separate account of what people 'know' in each of our currently available ways of assessing knowledge, but if you are modeling brain damage or language acquisition, then it is essential to attempt just that. But in doing so, the intense cross-talk and interaction between the different types of grammatical knowledge is a baby not to be discarded with the bathwater. Lise Menn Lise Menn Professor and Chair Linguistics Department - Box 295 University of Colorado Boulder CO 80309-0295 303-492-8042; fax 303-492-4416 BEWARE PROCRUSTES BEARING OCCAM'S RAZOR From gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA Thu Mar 18 18:04:08 1999 From: gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA (Greg Thomson) Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 21:04:08 +0300 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19990316150457.00ce060c@psych.colorado.edu> Message-ID: At 15:04 -0700 03-16-1999, Lise Menn wrote: >... the diversity of 'grammar(s)' >in the brain does not mean that the different aspects of grammatical >knowledge are totally disconnected. ... > Whether G has lost its usefulness as an abstraction, I would >argue, depends on the level of detail at which one is working; if you are >describing an underdocumented language, it would be most unreasonable to >demand a separate account of what people 'know' in each of our currently >available ways of assessing knowledge, but if you are modeling brain >damage or language acquisition, then it is essential to attempt just that. >But in doing so, the intense cross-talk and interaction between the >different types of grammatical knowledge is a baby not to be discarded >with the bathwater. I liked (sort of) Gerry Altmann's comparision of linguists' descriptions of grammars with the periodic table in Chemistry. Regarding the latter, it is interesting to see that substances combine in certain proportions, resulting in certain "regular" properties. But what is behind all of that? That is far more interesting. So also, descriptions of formal regularities in languages can be fun and fascinating, but then comes the "so what?" All those patterns in the spoken or written production would be there even if no linguist looked at them, and they aren't there just too look nice. "Grammar" is _doing_ something, and that's what's ultimately interesting. Leaving linguistics aside for a minute, we can consider a familiar illusion: the illusion of directly perceiving a speaker's thoughts. What I mean is, language users listening to speech are often (perhaps, typically) rather unaware of linguistic form as they subjectively "grasp" something else. How does linguistic (ultimately acoustic) form cause that to happen so well and so rapidly? And in what does that "happening" consist? Recall Givon's suggestion that we move on to "reinterpret grammar as mental processing instructions". How are concepts (let's say, those involved in a particular flow of narrative understanding) constructed and managed? Well, "grammars", including those of yet-to-be-documented languages, are an enormous source of evidence bearing on that more interesting question, to the extent that we use them for that purpose. Meanwhile, we still come back to the unlikeliness that a model of the external form of a language will turn out to be a useful model of anything inside the language user. Regards, Greg XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Morning by morning new mercies I see XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Greg Thomson, Ph.D. Candidate (gthomson at gpu.srv.ualberta.ca) SIL/Thomson, Westpost P.O. Box 109, FIN 53101, Lappeenranta, FINLAND Phone: 7-812-246-35-48 (in St. Petersburg, Russia) From Zylogy at AOL.COM Thu Mar 18 19:57:24 1999 From: Zylogy at AOL.COM (Jess Tauber) Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 14:57:24 EST Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Not everything linguistic is within Grammar- ideophones, at least as classically formulated, do not lie within clausal structure unless imported through auxiliation or other derivational processes. This is interesting since this type of ideophone is phonosemantically transparent, each shift of phonological feature shifting meaning in a predictable and geometrically symmetical way. In a way, one might even say there was only one ideophone, with many variants. That the most phonosemantically transparent items of vocabulary (I'll let you decide on your own whether ideophones are "in" the Lexicon) are the least integrated syntactically is probably no accident, as is the fact that the most worn down, historically changed material is the most syntactically integrated. Given that most vocabulary items likely have a phonosemantic origin ultimately, can we posit some sort of mechanism or mechanisms whereby we can get from the first state to the last? Is the ideophone like some sort of neutral molecule, with all the "valence" requirements satisfied by it's own internal parts? Once integrated into normal vocabulary, are some of these "valences" now directed outward, allowing syntactic combination? In doing so, is the stage set for historical change, in that there is decay in the structural coherence and integrity of the original ideophonic molecule? After all, what is the ultimate motivation for historical shifts of articulatory position and manner? Why do these changes seem to resemble matrix operations? (Note that real atomic orbitals used in molecular binding are analyzed in this fashion). Ideophones also are subject to typological phenomena- dependent-marking verb- final languages almost always have a separate word class containing these, verb-medial languages have some ambiguity between these and some other word class(es), and head-marking verb-initial languages mostly have "ideophones" (I'm not sure the name is applicable here) fully integrated into one word class (and verb-initial languages often have "precategorical" roots- word class is assigned with morphology, not before. Interestingly, all the usual ideophone-associated processes- robust reduplication, rhetorical lengthening, infixation, etc., are often present in this type of rootstock as derivational possibilities.) It is as if there is some sort of inversion of structure. It makes one wonder if such things might happen in the quantum world (for instance, could one have hydrophilic micelles floating in an oily environment?) It would be interesting if the various levels of reality (subatomic particles, atoms, DNA, language) which display tabularizable primitives and rules of combination were conceptually congruent. Is this a result of inherent structure, or are we simply viewing one possible interpretation of raw data through the constraining filters of our language-adapted minds? The properties of primitives and their rules of combination are not divorced from those of the environments they are part of- at any one level, each domain "licenses" the others, and all are born together. Thus there is the possibility of an equation describing all the available interactions, whether quantized or continuous. If language is like this, then only a holistic or integrative investigative/theoretic strategy which takes into account not only evolving formalistic structures but also the contexts of usage- all of them- will have any hope of generating enough of the points in the painting to give the big picture. Confirmational support will come from neurolinguistic work, but the kind of resolution one would need will be a long time developing. Jess Tauber zylogy at aol.com From david_tuggy at SIL.ORG Thu Mar 18 23:00:48 1999 From: david_tuggy at SIL.ORG (david_tuggy at SIL.ORG) Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 18:00:48 -0500 Subject: Jarno Raukko's whereabouts Message-ID: Is Jarno Raukko lurking out there somewhere? Or does anybody else who is know his email address? (and, lest Grice be insufficient, please send it to me if you do!) Thanks. David Tuggy From r.j.freeman at usa.net Fri Mar 19 03:14:47 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Fri, 19 Mar 1999 11:14:47 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: I've been kind of distantly following this discussion, but Greg's message came close enough to my beliefs to make me feel it might be worth posting. Has anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' processing? This has become a vigorous little sub-field of natural language processing research in recent years: 'example-based', 'memory-based', 'case-based' reasoning etc. Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. Rob Freeman rjfreeman at usa.net Greg Thomson wrote: > I liked (sort of) Gerry Altmann's comparision of linguists' descriptions of > grammars with the periodic table in Chemistry. Regarding the latter, it is > interesting to see that substances combine in certain proportions, > resulting in certain "regular" properties. But what is behind all of that? > That is far more interesting. So also, descriptions of formal regularities > in languages can be fun and fascinating, but then comes the "so what?" All > those patterns in the spoken or written production would be there even if > no linguist looked at them, and they aren't there just too look nice. > "Grammar" is _doing_ something, and that's what's ultimately interesting. > Leaving linguistics aside for a minute, we can consider a familiar > illusion: the illusion of directly perceiving a speaker's thoughts. What I > mean is, language users listening to speech are often (perhaps, typically) > rather unaware of linguistic form as they subjectively "grasp" something > else. How does linguistic (ultimately acoustic) form cause that to happen > so well and so rapidly? And in what does that "happening" consist? Recall > Givon's suggestion that we move on to "reinterpret grammar as mental > processing instructions". How are concepts (let's say, those involved in a > particular flow of narrative understanding) constructed and managed? Well, > "grammars", including those of yet-to-be-documented languages, are an > enormous source of evidence bearing on that more interesting question, to > the extent that we use them for that purpose. Meanwhile, we still come back > to the unlikeliness that a model of the external form of a language will > turn out to be a useful model of anything inside the language user. From nuyts at UIA.UA.AC.BE Mon Mar 22 14:33:45 1999 From: nuyts at UIA.UA.AC.BE (Jan.Nuyts) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 15:33:45 +0100 Subject: Cognitive Typology Message-ID: First announcement and call for papers INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 'COGNITIVE TYPOLOGY' April 12-14, 2000 University of Antwerp (UIA), Belgium Main Organisers: Jan Nuyts and Johan van der Auwera The purpose of this conference is to bring together researchers from the field of linguistic typology and from the domain of cognitive approaches to language (broadly defined) to reflect on how the typological and the cognitive enterprises in language research interrelate, what they have to offer each other, and/or how they can join forces in view of their shared goal of achieving an explanatory account of language. Abstracts are invited for 30-minute presentations (plus 10 minutes discussion time) on any topic contributing to this overall purpose. Deadline for receiving abstracts: ** November 1, 1999 ** Abstracts should be no longer than 400 words. Please add a full correspondence address and an indication of any special equipment you may need. Send your submission (in plain ASCII format or in RTF format) either (preferentially) via email or (both in hard copy and on an IBM-readable floppy) via regular mail, to the following address: 'Cognitive Typology Conference' p/a Jan Nuyts University of Antwerp Linguistics (GER) Universiteitsplein 1 B-2610 Wilrijk Belgium fax: 0032/3/820.27.62 email: nuyts at uia.ua.ac.be You will be notified of whether your submission has been accepted by December 1, 1999. A selection of the papers presented at the conference will be published by the organizers. Information regarding the venue of the conference, accommodation, social events (conference dinner on Thursday evening, April 13), and the conference fee and ways of paying it, will be provided in later circulars. If you are intending to participate or are interested in receiving further information, please return the pre-registration form below asap. ******************************************* Pre-registration form INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 'COGNITIVE TYPOLOGY' April 12-14, 2000 - University of Antwerp (UIA), Belgium Name: Address: Phone/Fax: Email: I intend to particpate: yes/no I intend to present a paper: yes/no ******************************************* ***** Jan Nuyts phone: 32/3/820.27.73 University of Antwerp fax: 32/3/820.27.62 Linguistics email: nuyts at uia.ua.ac.be Universiteitsplein 1 B-2610 Wilrijk - Belgium From lamb at RUF.RICE.EDU Mon Mar 22 15:43:26 1999 From: lamb at RUF.RICE.EDU (Sydney M Lamb) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 09:43:26 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36F1C126.828B96B0@usa.net> Message-ID: On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > I've been kind of distantly following this discussion, but Greg's message came > close enough to my beliefs to make me feel it might be worth posting. Has > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > processing? This has become a vigorous little sub-field of natural language > processing research in recent years: 'example-based', 'memory-based', > 'case-based' reasoning etc. Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. This is a start, but it leaves more questions unanswered than answered: "You still get grammar..." WHO gets grammar? The linguist doing an ex post facto analysis? Or who? "...emergent structure..." WHERE does the structure emerge? In the minds of linguists analyzing linguistic productions? Or in the minds of speakers? If the latter then this view is no different from that which has always been held by everyone except 'innatists', a recently encountered group most of whom are not functionalists. If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are talking about. And again we have to ask if anything new is being proposed, since we have observed over the decades that different schools of grammar come up with different formulations of grammar, suggesting that grammar is just the product of the minds of the grammarians. So we can conclude that it has (or ought to have been) generally accepted all along that "grammar is just the observed regularities..." Back in the fifties and sixties people used to call it 'hocus-pocus linguistics'. Cheers, Syd Lamb From macw at CMU.EDU Mon Mar 22 17:00:49 1999 From: macw at CMU.EDU (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 12:00:49 -0500 Subject: hocus-pocus, God's Truth, and grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Syd and FunkNet, It is my impression that the earlier contrast between hocus-pocus and God's Truth theories had to do with whether the theorist actually believed in the reality of the constructs of the theory. God's Truth people had the chutzpah to belief in the stuff they stipulated. Hocus-pocus people were more realistic. The current contrast between emergentism and stipulationism is somewhat different. Emergentists with their self-organizing models are like biologists playing around with the building blocks of life. In both cases, the results are seldom fully known at the outset and researchers are forced to stand back and watch what the models can do. If the models end up acquiring grammar, it was not by specific stipulation of the outcome representations. So, we might say that emergentists believe in the God's Truth of hocus-pocus. --Brian MacWhinney From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 23 04:47:57 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Something new? There is a new approach to structure in it, ignore the rest. Think of the difference between a clockwork and the picture of a clockwork, that's it. They look the same, but what they are is different. My point (like Greg's?) is not who is looking at the clockwork of language, it is the suggestion that the perceived structure is not the 'real' structure. In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with fuzzy edges. That's the point I wanted to make. Beyond that I don't care what you make of grammar, who's looking at the shadows: me see, you see, we all see... Anyway, I was just drawing attention to this 'analogy-based' work (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-). I wasn't sure if it had come up. If y'all are familiar with it then that's OK. Rob Freeman Sydney M Lamb wrote: > On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > > > I've been kind of distantly following this discussion, but Greg's message came > > close enough to my beliefs to make me feel it might be worth posting. Has > > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > > processing? This has become a vigorous little sub-field of natural language > > processing research in recent years: 'example-based', 'memory-based', > > 'case-based' reasoning etc. Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. > > This is a start, but it leaves more questions unanswered than answered: > "You still get grammar..." WHO gets grammar? The linguist > doing an ex post facto analysis? Or who? > > "...emergent structure..." WHERE does the structure emerge? > In the minds of linguists analyzing linguistic > productions? Or in the minds of speakers? If the latter > then this view is no different from that which has always > been held by everyone except 'innatists', a recently > encountered group most of whom are not functionalists. > > If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" > then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are > talking about. And again we have to ask if anything new is being > proposed... From twright at INTERSATX.NET Tue Mar 23 05:36:17 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 23:36:17 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 09:43 AM 3/22/99 -0600, Sydney M Lamb wrote: >If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" >then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are >talking about. If I give the mechanic an account of my car's behavior, namely that it dies out any time I let my foot off the gas, which I formalize using the following rule: dies / [- accelerator] __________ (dies immediately following an environment negatively-specified for accelerator pressure). is my account of my car's behavior really only about me, and not about the car in any sense? I could formalize my car's behavior in many ways. All of these would certainly say much about me and my penchant for branching nodes, arrows, brackets, etc. But at the core, these formalisms would all equate to "dies when I let off the gas," which let's suppose is exactly, for whatever reason, what the car does, with not a single counter-example. True, my account is merely observationally adequate, lacking as I do any understanding of what is going on (or what ever goes on) under the hood of a car. The car is really largely a black box to me, I can assure you. Does this mean that my account, either the formal or informal version, says nothing about the car and only reflects my methodology and formalism of car-problem analysis? I note that my mechanic insists on my observationally-adequate account of my car's behavior before he will even begin looking at it. --Tony Wright From lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK Tue Mar 23 10:47:36 1999 From: lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK (Liu Xiaohu) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 18:47:36 +0800 Subject: Second Call For Papers Message-ID: Second Call For Papers (EMNLP/VLC-99) JOINT SIGDAT CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND VERY LARGE CORPORA Sponsored by SIGDAT (ACL's Special Interest Group for Linguistic Data and Corpus-based Approaches to NLP) June 21-22, 1999 University of Maryland In conjunction with ACL'99: the 37th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics This SIGDAT-sponsored joint conference will continue to provide a forum for new research in corpus-based and/or empirical methods in NLP. In addition to providing a general forum, the theme for this year is "Corpus-based and/or Empirical Methods in NLP for Speech, MT, IR, and other Applied Systems" A large number of systems in automatic speech recognition(ASR) and synthesis, machine translation(MT), information retrieval(IR), optical character recognition(OCR) and handwriting recognition have become commercially available in the last decade. Many of these systems use NLP technologies as an important component. Corpus-based and empirical methods in NLP have been a major trend in recent years. How useful are these techniques when applied to real systems, especially when compared to rule-based methods? Are there any new techniques to be developed in EMNLP and from VLC in order to improve the state-of-the-art of ASR, MT, IR, OCR, and other applied systems? Are there new ways to combine corpus-based and empirical methods with rule-based systems? This two-day conference aims to bring together academic researchers and industrial practitioners to discuss the above issues, through technical paper sessions, invited talks, and panel discussions. The goal of the conference is to raise an awareness of what kind of new EMNLP techniques need to be developed in order to bring about the next breakthrough in speech recognition and synthesis, machine translation, information retrieval and other applied systems. Scope The conference solicits paper submissions in (and not limited to) the following areas: 1) Original work in one of the following technologies and its relevance to speech, MT, or IR: (a) word sense disambiguation (b) word and term segmentation and extraction (c) alignment (d) bilingual lexicon extraction (e) POS tagging (f) statistical parsing (g) dialog models (h) others (please specify) 2) Proposals of new EMNLP technologies for speech, MT, IR, OCR, or other applied systems (please specify). 3) Comparetive evaluation of the performance of EMNLP technologies in one of the areas in (1) and that of its rule-based or knowledge-based counterpart in a speech, MT, IR, OCR or other applied system. Submission Requirements Submissions should be limited to original, evaluated work. All papers should include background survey and/or reference to previous work. The authors should provide explicit explanation when there is no evaluation in their work. We encourage paper submissions related to the conference theme. In particular, we encourage the authors to include in their papers, proposals and discussions of the relevance of their work to the theme. However, there will be a special session in the conference to include corpus-based and/or empirical work in all areas of natural language processing. Submission Format Only hard-copy submissions will be accepted. Reviewing of papers will not be blind. The submission format and word limit are the same as those for ACL this year. We strongly recommend the use of ACL-standard LaTeX (plus bibstyle and trivial example) or Word style files for the preparation of submissions. Six opies of full-length paper (not to exceed 3200 words exclusive of references) should be received at the following address before or on March 31, 1999. EMNLP/VLC-99 Program Committee c/o Pascale Fung Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Important Dates March 31 Submission of full-length paper April 30 Acceptance notice May 20 Camera-ready paper due June 21-22 Conference date Program Chair Pascale Fung Human Language Technology Center Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Tel: (+852) 2358 8537 Fax: (+852) 2358 1485 Email: pascale at ee.ust.hk Program Co-Chair Joe Zhou LEXIS-NEXIS, a Division of Reed Elsevier 9555 Springboro Pike Dayton, OH 45342 USA Email: joez at lexis-nexis.com Program Committee (partial list) Jiang-Shin Chang (Behavior Design Corp.) Ken Church (AT&T Labs--Research) Ido Dagan (Bar-Ilan University) Marti Hearst (UC-Berkeley) Huang, Changning (Tsinghua University) Pierre Isabelle (Xerox Research Europe) Lillian Lee (Cornell University) David Lewis (AT&T Research) Dan Melamed (West Group) Masaaki Nagata (NTT) Steve Richardson (Microsoft Research) Richard Sproat (AT&T Labs--Research) Andreas Stolcke (SRI) Ralph Weischedel (BBN) Dekai Wu (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology) David Yarowsky (Johns Hopkins University) From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 23 12:46:10 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 20:46:10 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Tony A. Wright wrote: > At 09:43 AM 3/22/99 -0600, Sydney M Lamb wrote: > > >If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" > >then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are > >talking about. > > If I give the mechanic an account of my car's behavior, namely that it dies > out any time I let my foot off the gas, which I formalize using the > following rule: > > dies / [- accelerator] __________ (dies immediately following an > environment negatively-specified for > accelerator pressure). > > (snip)... > > Does this mean that my account, either the formal or informal version, says > nothing about the car and only reflects my methodology and formalism of > car-problem analysis? I note that my mechanic insists on my > observationally-adequate account of my car's behavior before he will even > begin looking at it. I would probably have to agree with Syd on this bit. We all work within a frame of reference, not much use in arguing otherwise, that's not new. Point is, what can we do with it? I think the distinction to be made is that rules like this are not much use for making cars. Your mechanic might appreciate your subjective observations about the car, but he needs knowledge of something more 'real' before he can fix it. We expect a mechanic to know what lies under the hood, as linguists we might be expected to know what lies under grammar, however useful subjective knowledge of grammar is in itself. I was just trying to point to a useful reality (which I think analogy-based models for what underlies grammar are) not argue that subjective reality was a new idea. Rob From twright at INTERSATX.NET Tue Mar 23 13:30:24 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 07:30:24 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36F78D12.4D7A48BE@usa.net> Message-ID: At 08:46 PM 3/23/99 +0800, Rob Freeman wrote: >I would probably have to agree with Syd on this bit. We all work within a frame of >reference, not much use in arguing otherwise, that's not new. Point is, what can we do >with it? I think the distinction to be made is that rules like this are not much use >for making cars. I don't see the comparison. Linguists "make" languages? > Your mechanic might appreciate your subjective observations about the >car, but he needs knowledge of something more 'real' before he can fix it. He doesn't just appreciate it, he insists on it. His only alternative is to check every component of the car, from the pistons to the turn signal to see what's not functioning correctly. One might object that he could simply drive the car and see what's wrong himself. Of course, this merely means that he will first have to gather data about the car's behavior and formulate a rule-based account of it--just like I did-- before he gets under the hood. BTW, what's subjective about it? My mode of exposition may have a subjective component, but the facts about my car are something anyone would have to agree with. --Tony Wright From eitkonen at UTU.FI Tue Mar 23 16:15:53 1999 From: eitkonen at UTU.FI (Esa Itkonen) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 18:15:53 +0200 Subject: hocus-pocus, God's truth Message-ID: This terminological distinction which was coined (and accepted) by the US structuralists of the classical era is valid even under somewhat changed circumstances. The 'hocus-pocus' view (without any negative connotations) has been and is (and will be) represented by those who just want to present the facts of a given language (N.B. seldom the facts of several languages at the same time) in a maximally simple and general way. Most of the time, this way has or is meant to have NO psychological or biological reality. Example: Panini, whom many (including myself) consider the best grammarian ever, did not care about psychological reality. (This was agreed on - LA, June 1982 - by Paul Kiparsky and myself, of whom the former knows Panini better than the latter.) The 'God's truth' position (without any either positive or negative connotations) is represented by those who do not merely wish to capture the psychological and/or biological reality, but who actually succeed in doing so, at least to some extent. Both approaches are equally legitimate, as long as one knows what one is doing (which is seldom the case). Rob Freeman's case for ANALOGY is most welcome, given that even functionalists and cognitivists still seem to some extent intimidated by Chomsky's long-standing hostility towards analogy; but this will certainly change; maybe it has changed already. Esa Itkonen From wilcox at UNM.EDU Tue Mar 23 16:05:34 1999 From: wilcox at UNM.EDU (Sherman Wilcox) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 09:05:34 -0700 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.16.19990323072907.3b27a59c@mail.intersatx.net> Message-ID: On 3/23/99 Tony Wright wrote: > Linguists "make" languages? Maybe not languages, but grammars. In one way, at least. I was having a good discussion with some linguist friends after a Sonny Rollins jazz concert last night (which was awesome, by the way). One mentioned that the musicologist Gunther Schuller once published a transcription and analysis of a Rollins tune, "Blue 7" (an odd tune, recorded in 1956). He found some interesting structural stuff going on. Apparently Rollins read this analysis and wrote back something to the effect, "take your analysis and shove it. My music can't be analyzed this way." Well, what do we make of this. Is Schuller wrong? Is that structure not there? Rollins apparently didn't think it showed anything useful, and he was the creator, the speaker, to so speak. Or, maybe musicologists, like linguists, know more about the products of creativity than the creators do. Another question, as my other linguist friend pointed out, is not whether structure can be found -- is "there" -- but whether *that* is what accounted for Rollins' production of his improvisation in the first place. My simple-minded way of thinking of the difference is that maybe Schuller's analysis *worked*, but it wasn't *right*. Maybe linguists' grammars work -- that doesn't make them right. And, of course, there is one more problem (thanks again to Larry Gorbet, one the linguist friends, for pointing this out): the difference between saying "that structure was *there*" and "*that* structure was there" (that one, and no other). Sure, maybe Schuller found a structure, and if we accept that he's not hallucinating (this is jazz, after all) and knows his musicology business, then apparently that structure is there. But another, equally sharp jazz-loving musicologist might find a different structure. Are they both wrong (I bet I know what Sonny would say)? Is only one wrong? Or are they both correct? I guess I think they were both correct. But none of it means a damn for Sonny, who created "Blue 7". And to that extent, then, I also think they're both wrong. If linguists are like jazz critics or art critics, then the best among them are, I guess, finding stuff that's *there*, and they're all correct. The beauty of creative works is that they are "multiply sanctioned" -- to use a cognitive linguist term. The best are massively multiply sanctioned. That's why, like "Blue 7", they are ageless and inspire so many, over and over again. We hear something new in "Blue 7" or see something new in a Jackson Pollack painting each time we experience them. I, for one, though, would like to figure out how the hell Sonny Rollins created "Blue 7" and all the other brilliant improvisations that he does. And as a linguist, I'd like to figure out why and how and what people do what they do when they create utterances. When it comes to language, we are all improvisational geniuses. "Blue 7" just finished on my stereo. I'll shut up now. -- Sherman From lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK Wed Mar 24 06:52:51 1999 From: lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK (Liu Xiaohu) Date: Wed, 24 Mar 1999 14:52:51 +0800 Subject: Final Call For Papers Message-ID: Final Call For Papers (EMNLP/VLC-99) JOINT SIGDAT CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND VERY LARGE CORPORA Sponsored by SIGDAT (ACL's Special Interest Group for Linguistic Data and Corpus-based Approaches to NLP) June 21-22, 1999 University of Maryland In conjunction with ACL'99: the 37th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics This SIGDAT-sponsored joint conference will continue to provide a forum for new research in corpus-based and/or empirical methods in NLP. In addition to providing a general forum, the theme for this year is "Corpus-based and/or Empirical Methods in NLP for Speech, MT, IR, and other Applied Systems" A large number of systems in automatic speech recognition(ASR) and synthesis, machine translation(MT), information retrieval(IR), optical character recognition(OCR) and handwriting recognition have become commercially available in the last decade. Many of these systems use NLP technologies as an important component. Corpus-based and empirical methods in NLP have been a major trend in recent years. How useful are these techniques when applied to real systems, especially when compared to rule-based methods? Are there any new techniques to be developed in EMNLP and from VLC in order to improve the state-of-the-art of ASR, MT, IR, OCR, and other applied systems? Are there new ways to combine corpus-based and empirical methods with rule-based systems? This two-day conference aims to bring together academic researchers and industrial practitioners to discuss the above issues, through technical paper sessions, invited talks, and panel discussions. The goal of the conference is to raise an awareness of what kind of new EMNLP techniques need to be developed in order to bring about the next breakthrough in speech recognition and synthesis, machine translation, information retrieval and other applied systems. Scope The conference solicits paper submissions in (and not limited to) the following areas: 1) Original work in one of the following technologies and its relevance to speech, MT, or IR: (a) word sense disambiguation (b) word and term segmentation and extraction (c) alignment (d) bilingual lexicon extraction (e) POS tagging (f) statistical parsing (g) dialog models (h) others (please specify) 2) Proposals of new EMNLP technologies for speech, MT, IR, OCR, or other applied systems (please specify). 3) Comparetive evaluation of the performance of EMNLP technologies in one of the areas in (1) and that of its rule-based or knowledge-based counterpart in a speech, MT, IR, OCR or other applied system. Submission Requirements Submissions should be limited to original, evaluated work. All papers should include background survey and/or reference to previous work. The authors should provide explicit explanation when there is no evaluation in their work. We encourage paper submissions related to the conference theme. In particular, we encourage the authors to include in their papers, proposals and discussions of the relevance of their work to the theme. However, there will be a special session in the conference to include corpus-based and/or empirical work in all areas of natural language processing. Submission Format Only hard-copy submissions will be accepted. Reviewing of papers will not be blind. The submission format and word limit are the same as those for ACL this year. We strongly recommend the use of ACL-standard LaTeX (plus bibstyle and trivial example) or Word style files for the preparation of submissions. Paper ID is not required. Please leave it blank. Six opies of full-length paper (not to exceed 3200 words exclusive of references) should be received at the following address before or on March 31, 1999. EMNLP/VLC-99 Program Committee c/o Pascale Fung Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Important Dates March 31 Submission of full-length paper April 30 Acceptance notice May 20 Camera-ready paper due June 21-22 Conference date Program Chair Pascale Fung Human Language Technology Center Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Tel: (+852) 2358 8537 Fax: (+852) 2358 1485 Email: pascale at ee.ust.hk Program Co-Chair Joe Zhou LEXIS-NEXIS, a Division of Reed Elsevier 9555 Springboro Pike Dayton, OH 45342 USA Email: joez at lexis-nexis.com Program Committee Jiang-Shin Chang (Behavior Design Corp.) Ken Church (AT&T Labs--Research) Ido Dagan (Bar-Ilan University) Marti Hearst (UC-Berkeley) Huang, Changning (Tsinghua University) Pierre Isabelle (Xerox Research Europe) Lillian Lee (Cornell University) David Lewis (AT&T Research) Dan Melamed (West Group) Mehryar Mohri (AT&T Labs--Research) Masaaki Nagata (NTT) Richard Sproat (AT&T Labs--Research) Andreas Stolcke (SRI) Ralph Weischedel (BBN) Dekai Wu (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology) David Yarowsky (Johns Hopkins University) From haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE Thu Mar 25 09:41:47 1999 From: haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:41:47 +0000 Subject: functional phonology at GLOW Message-ID: I wanted to ask if others share my impression that research in mainstream phonology is getting more and more functionally oriented. Is phonology again one step ahead of the dominant paradigm in syntax? Consider the following description of a GLOW ("Generative Linguistics in the Old World") workshop on phonology, to be held next week at the University of Potsdam: "The workshop is broadly concerned with the relevance of articulatory and perceptual facts for phonological theory. More specifically, it intends to focus on such questions as the extent to which functional factors determine phonological grammars, the status of the distinction between phonological representation and phonetic implementation, the issue of multiple (articulation-based as well as perception-based) phonological representations, and the universality and 'groundedness' of phonological constraints." More on the workshop (including the abstracts of papers) can be found at www.ling.uni-potsdam.de/ik/phon.html Since I am not a phonologist, I find it difficult to judge whether we are really witnessing a gradual paradigm shift here. And if so, why should phonology be so different from syntax? Martin Haspelmath -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Inselstr. 22 D-04103 Leipzig (Tel. (MPI) +49-341-9952 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616) From jan at LING.SU.SE Thu Mar 25 10:21:04 1999 From: jan at LING.SU.SE (Jan Anward) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 11:21:04 +0100 Subject: functional phonology at GLOW In-Reply-To: <36FA04D4.83DD24FD@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Isn't it is just an empiricist-physicalist feature of the American structuralist tradition, a Bloomfield heritage, if you like, that whereas it is all right to bring phonetic facts to bear on phonology, these facts being 'material' and 'real', it has never been all right to bring semantic or pragmatic facts to bear on syntax? Jan Anward ________________________________________________________________________ Jan Anward Department of Linguistics e-mail: jan at ling.su.se Stockholm University tel: +46 8 16 23 43 S-106 91 Stockholm fax +46 8 15 53 89 Sweden URL: http://www.ling.su.se/staff/jan Office: Room C 351, Södra huset, Frescati From r.j.freeman at usa.net Thu Mar 25 12:08:39 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 20:08:39 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Sorry to be away for a day. Tony A. Wright wrote: > At 08:46 PM 3/23/99 +0800, Rob Freeman wrote: > > >I would probably have to agree with Syd on this bit. We all work within a > frame of > >reference, not much use in arguing otherwise, that's not new. Point is, > what can we do > >with it? I think the distinction to be made is that rules like this are > not much use > >for making cars. > > I don't see the comparison. Linguists "make" languages? Wouldn't you like to be able to? I would. Why does the auto-lady in my tele-banking service sound like a clockwork mouse? Why do you have to punch all those buttons instead of just telling her what to do? Why do you need a pointing 'mouse' to open a file on your computer? Because nobody can 'make' language, that's why. You can call these the problems of other fields and avoid them that way, but somebody has got to claim them, nobody can solve them, and they seem to have a lot to do with language to me. > > Your mechanic might appreciate your subjective observations about the > >car, but he needs knowledge of something more 'real' before he can fix it. > > He doesn't just appreciate it, he insists on it. His only alternative is > to check every component of the car, from the pistons to the turn signal to > see what's not functioning correctly. > > One might object that he could simply drive the car and see what's wrong > himself. Of course, this merely means that he will first have to gather > data about the car's behavior and formulate a rule-based account of > it--just like I did-- before he gets under the hood. I have no objection to any consistent system of description for talking about a problem. They can all be 'true'. There are different 'truths' - that's the subjectivity. If I ask you to describe a language to me I am happy if you tell me it is verb final, or ergative, that it identifies a 'patient' slot, or whatever, depending on my purpose (or I might want you to tell me it is beautiful, or that it sounds like a machine gun). Hearing it is verb final does not tell me what a verb _is_, however, even if I can analogize your use of the word 'verb' to my own experience and apply the knowledge to many purposes. But what a 'verb' _is_ (in sufficient detail that my tele-banking auto-lady can use one) is the elusive (subjective) reality that I am interested in at this time, what is 'under' grammar. Call it meta-grammar if you like. BTW with reference to Esa Itkonen's message, can anyone summarize Chomsky's dismissal of analogy as mechanism of language succinctly for me? I don't know if this is the right forum, but these things bear re-airing, from time to time IMHO. Rob From darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU Thu Mar 25 12:32:01 1999 From: darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU (Michael Darnell) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 06:32:01 -0600 Subject: functional phonology Message-ID: Hi to all, While I can't comment directly on GLOW, it is true, I think, that folks in phonology who have worked in the generative/formalist tradition are taking a hard look at phonetic data and language use data and using it to inform their approaches. For example, Mike Hammond has been looking at frequency effects and stress patterns. As a former student of his, I can tell you that his original approach was clearly generative/formalist. (Hi, Mike, if you're out there.) Mike Darnell From geoffn at SIU.EDU Thu Mar 25 15:01:17 1999 From: geoffn at SIU.EDU (Geoffrey S. Nathan) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:01:17 -0600 Subject: Functional (generative) phonology Message-ID: I think that people's assessment that 'generative' phonology is becoming more 'functional' (all scare quotes deliberate) is quite correct. I am, as some of you know, a died-in-the-wool functional phonologist (in the American, rather than the European sense), a student of David Stampe, and I have been trying to integrate the principles of Natural Phonology with the concepts of Cognitive Grammar. But I continue to follow the paradigm in what has evolved out of Generative Phonology. While some practitioners continue to ignore phonetic considerations, others, especially many at the leading edge of Optimality Theory development, are attempting to build articulatory and (occasionally) acoustic considerations into the grammar. I should point out, in addition, that not all functional considerations are purely 'phonetic'. Bruce Hayes, for example, has done some very nice work on the nature of rhythm and how human rhythmic behavior contributes to the nature of stress systems in the world's languages. And, of course, in my work I have argued that phonemes are categories, and consequently such categorization principles as prototypicality and image schema transformations apply to relate members of categories--again, these are 'functional' considerations which go beyond the issue of the plumbing used in producing sounds. For what it's worth, when there was a conference held two years ago in Milwaukee on formalism/functionalism, the phonologists among us (Hayes, Hammond, Bybee, me) had far more to say to each other than the syntacticians and semanticists. The convergence is greater at the phonological level than at higher ones. Volume one of that conference will be out from Benjamins in a month or so, incidentally. Geoff Geoffrey S. Nathan Department of Linguistics Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, 62901 USA Phone: +618 453-3421 (Office) FAX +618 453-6527 +618 549-0106 (Home) From geoffn at SIU.EDU Thu Mar 25 15:04:38 1999 From: geoffn at SIU.EDU (Geoffrey S. Nathan) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:04:38 -0600 Subject: Functional (generative) phonology Message-ID: begin 644 Happy99.exe M35I0``(````$``\`__\``+@`````````0``:```````````````````````` M``````````````````````$``+H0``X?M`G-(;@!3,TAD)!4:&ES('!R;V=R M86T@;75S="!B92!R=6X@=6YD97(@5VEN,S(-"B0W```````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M`````````````````````````````````````````%!%``!,`00`GR77C@`` M````````X`". at 0L!`AD`"@```!8```````````$````!`````@```$`````! 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M-(U[S7\-0(-Y\WJC>R-\DWSS?:-^DW!C at -.!4X'C at R M.#\X=CA\.(LXFSBG.*XXM#BZ.,`XQCC,.-(XV#C>..0XZCCP./8X_#@".0 at Y M#CD4.1HY(#DF.2PY,CDX.3XY1#E*.5`Y5CE<.6(Y:#EN.0`````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` *```````````````` ` end From kaboyates at SPRINTMAIL.COM Thu Mar 25 15:51:03 1999 From: kaboyates at SPRINTMAIL.COM (Bob Yates) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:51:03 -0600 Subject: Virus warning: happy99.exe!!! Message-ID: Attached to Geoffrey Nathan's last message was an attachment entitled happy99.exe! Do not under any circumstances execute this program. Go here for information about it: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2195075,00.html Bob Yates, Central Missouri State University From dkp at U.ARIZONA.EDU Thu Mar 25 16:18:32 1999 From: dkp at U.ARIZONA.EDU (Dianne K. Patterson) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:18:32 -0700 Subject: Functional (generative) phonology In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990325090117.00832860@saluki-mail.siu.edu> Message-ID: Two points: 1) Geoffrey Nathan has sent a letter referencing Happy99.exe, a well known and nasty little virus. What is all that about? 2) I've just spent the last 6 years of my life trying to understand the sound categories used by a parrot (Alex) who has referential use of English words. He does have minimal pairs of words (for ex., "tea" "key") and the acoustic and articulatory characteristics of these sound categories /t/ vs /k/ etc. are quite different. Now, I have to be careful and call these "phoneme-like" categories...because, of course, he may not have the perceptual trading relations that humans have for these categories etc. etc. but I think that the existence of these categories is evidence of an intriguing class of problems about the human/language specificity of the "phoneme". Interestingly, Alex also engages in word play in which he drops the onset off of a word and sticks on a new onset to create word-like items that he's never heard before. This word play seems to conform to certain restrictions that are natural-class like (that is, he might take /k/ off of "key" and put on "ch" in its place, but he'd never stick a vowel in its place. At any rate, I thought you all might be interested in the "Alex" phenomenon. Dianne Patterson U of A On Thu, 25 Mar 1999, Geoffrey S. Nathan wrote: > I think that people's assessment that 'generative' phonology is becoming > more 'functional' (all scare quotes deliberate) is quite correct. > I am, as some of you know, a died-in-the-wool functional phonologist (in > the American, rather than the European sense), a student of David Stampe, > and I have been trying to integrate the principles of Natural Phonology > with the concepts of Cognitive Grammar. But I continue to follow the > paradigm in what has evolved out of Generative Phonology. While some > practitioners continue to ignore phonetic considerations, others, > especially many at the leading edge of Optimality Theory development, are > attempting to build articulatory and (occasionally) acoustic considerations > into the grammar. I should point out, in addition, that not all functional > considerations are purely 'phonetic'. Bruce Hayes, for example, has done > some very nice work on the nature of rhythm and how human rhythmic behavior > contributes to the nature of stress systems in the world's languages. And, > of course, in my work I have argued that phonemes are categories, and > consequently such categorization principles as prototypicality and image > schema transformations apply to relate members of categories--again, these > are 'functional' considerations which go beyond the issue of the plumbing > used in producing sounds. > For what it's worth, when there was a conference held two years ago in > Milwaukee on formalism/functionalism, the phonologists among us (Hayes, > Hammond, Bybee, me) had far more to say to each other than the > syntacticians and semanticists. The convergence is greater at the > phonological level than at higher ones. on>Volume one of that conference will be out from Benjamins in a month or > so, incidentally. > > Geoff > > > Geoffrey S. Nathan > Department of Linguistics > Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, > Carbondale, IL, 62901 USA > Phone: +618 453-3421 (Office) FAX +618 453-6527 > +618 549-0106 (Home) > From faucon at COGSCI.UCSD.EDU Thu Mar 25 18:30:27 1999 From: faucon at COGSCI.UCSD.EDU (Gilles Fauconnier) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 10:30:27 -0800 Subject: dismissal of analogy Message-ID: The importance of analogy in all matters linguistic has of course been recognized for centuries. In early generative grammar, you'll find quite a few disparaging references to analogy. This was due to a confusion between the cognitive operation of analogy and the folk-theoretic notion of 'analogy' as a non-scientific, vague and unconstrained way of trying to explain things. The same mistake would probably not be made today, because of the impressive amount of work done in the 80's and 90's in cognitive science on analogy, metaphor, frame-projections, conceptual blending, etc. You ask about Chomsky, who always looms large in the preoccupations of linguists! On a personal note, I had occasion some years ago to tell him about the explanatory value of analogical mapping in semantics. I have to say that he showed no aptitude at all for this way of thinking (and little curiosity for the empirical data that motivate it)! [BTW, the prejudice against analogy remains strong in so-called formal semantics and in analytic philosophy] Gilles Fauconnier Department of Cognitive Science University of California San Diego La Jolla CA 92093 Phone 619 534 69 58 Fax 619 822-0599 E-mail gfauconnier at ucsd.edu From lamb at ruf.rice.edu Fri Mar 26 17:32:36 1999 From: lamb at ruf.rice.edu (Sydney M Lamb) Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1999 11:32:36 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36F1C126.828B96B0@usa.net> Message-ID: Rob, Tony, Sherman, Esa, Steve, Brian, and bystanders: Hi, I'm back! I'd like to try to clarify a bit, adding to y'all's already interesting efforts. On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > ... > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > processing? ... Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. The point I was trying to make takes off mainly from the assertion that this grammar that "you still get" "is just the observed regularities ... and analogies to them ..." The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language) and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg? Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of remembered examples plus an ability to analogize? Or are you proposing that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular form other than that? On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Rob Freeman further writes: > ... In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example > and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with > fuzzy edges. To this I ask the same question, (ceteris paribus), plus this one: What/where is this "grammar" you refer to here? Anywhere real? > ... Anyway, I was just drawing attention to this 'analogy-based' work Right - I appreciate this point, but I still ask my question. > (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-). Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed and remembered inputs. On Mon, 22 Mar, Tony A. Wright asks > If I give the mechanic an account of my car's behavior, namely that it > dies out any time I let my foot off the gas, which I formalize using the > following rule: > dies / [- accelerator] __________ (dies immediately following an > environment negatively-specified for > accelerator pressure). > is my account of my car's behavior really only about me, and not about > the car in any sense? The facts are about the car, the means of stating them are about you. Those who take an interest in "God's Truth" (which we can reformulate for modern times as taking an interest in what is in the mind and/or brain) have to be concerned with the means of stating the facts. If one is not concerned with the means but only with getting the fact accurate -- for language this means providing an accurate account of some aspects of the linguistic productions of people -- then one is doing (what I at least was calling) hocus pocus linguistics -- a practise to which I have no objection at all, by the way. But I do insist on the distinction between the two kinds of aim. Both are valid, both have useful applications. > ... All of these would certainly say much about me and my penchant for > branching nodes, arrows, brackets, etc. Exactly my point. > But at the core, these formalisms would all equate to "dies when I let > off the gas," which let's suppose is exactly, for whatever reason, what > the car does, with not a single counter-example. And this is a good example of the usefulness of the "hocus-pocus" approach to data. (On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 20:46:10 +0800 Rob Freeman already conveyed approx the equiv message) On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 09:05:34 -0700 Sherman Wilcox adds: > ... > Maybe linguists' grammars work -- that doesn't make them right. ... And I wholedheartedly agree, with a qualification: they can be more or less right in a hocus-pocus sense, but that doesn't in any way make them right in a neurocognitive sense. As Sherman further says, evidently motivated by cognitive considerations: > ... I'd like to figure out why and how and what people do what they do when they create utterances. When it comes to language, we are all improvisational geniuses. Since I was using the terms "God's Truth" and "hocus-pocus" in a more clearly defined way than those mid-century structuralists, maybe I could communicate more clearly by using, instead of these terms, the following: Analytical Linguistics -- This is the familar kind. In this mode one is mainly concerned with accurately describing linguistic productions (without concern for the process of production or that of comprehension or the system that makes those processes possible). Neurocognitive Linguistics -- The aim here is to understand that system and those processes. I use the term 'neurocognitive' rather than just 'cognitive' since many people nowadays who use the term 'cognitive' are using it to label concerns which are mainly those of analytical lx. (See the article by Bert Peeters in WORD, August 98). Esa Itkonen adds, and I wholeheartedly agree: > ... Both approaches are equally legitimate ... Thanx for 'listening', -Syd From keith_slater at SIL.ORG Fri Mar 26 21:22:21 1999 From: keith_slater at SIL.ORG (Keith Slater) Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1999 16:22:21 -0500 Subject: functional phonology Message-ID: I think there's a good reason why generative phonology seems more functional than does generative syntax. >From the outset, the generative program in phonology seems to have tried to account for the same sorts of facts that had been described in historical phonology. Underlying representations were (more or less) based on internal reconstruction, and the goals of the theory thus had to include the modelling of the sorts of phonological and phonetic changes that actually occur in human language. Unfortunately, generative syntax had no such historical model to base its approach on. One can only wonder what generative syntax would look like today, if there had been (for example) a well-developed approach to grammaticization before Chomsky came along. Perhaps we'd see a more "functional" program in syntax, too. Keith From r.j.freeman at usa.net Sat Mar 27 05:03:06 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Sat, 27 Mar 1999 13:03:06 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Sydney M Lamb wrote: > On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > > ... > > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > > processing? ... Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. > > The point I was trying to make takes off mainly from the assertion that > this grammar that "you still get" "is just the observed regularities ... > and analogies to them ..." Ah, there might be a misunderstanding there. When I say 'you still get grammar' I mean it rather in the sense of a side-effect. In the same way as with a picture of a clockwork you still 'get' a clockwork, but the 'reality' is all paint and canvas. > The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and > what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism > being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language) > and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg? If I understand you then 'Yes'. And I would put 'command of the language' firmly back on option '1).' I think command is pretty firmly rooted in the mechanism. Except when you have to pass an English exam. > Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of > remembered examples plus an ability to analogize? Or are you proposing > that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular > form other than that? The 'examples and ability' one. The analogical operations can give you _lots_ of forms, and I think that is an important operation at different times, but I think it is important to realize that there is certainly no _particular_ form. The collection of examples you get at any moment is task dependent, and there are infinitely many of them, in fact. I think _conception_ (not command) is the emergent form linked thing, and we all know how many conceptual perspectives there are, an infinite number, just as we would like - we've been thrashing the 'relative' reality thing all week. > On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Rob Freeman further writes: > > > ... In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example > > and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with > > fuzzy edges. > > To this I ask the same question, (ceteris paribus), plus this one: > What/where is this "grammar" you refer to here? Anywhere real? Of course we have lots of 'observed regularity' grammars, but I perceive it's the 'meta-grammars' you want to get hold of. I hobbled together a lot of loose threads and sent them to Esa the other day. Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention the high spots here. I would say key current leads are: 'memory-based' work at Tilburg in the Netherlands (Rens Bod's stuff I'm not sure of), Royal Skousen's work from two or three years ago and, on a separate thread, the phrasal/collocational/formulaic/lexical theory trend you see emerging in corpus linguistic and second language acquisition circles in the last few years. I don't think the cultures have met yet, but they should. There's some good lexical category work which was done a few years ago by people like Hinrich Shutze. That also merges into 'vector models' for text retrieval, and genre categorization work using factor analysis or 'feature vectors' by people like Douglas Biber, but this probably goes outside what people are interested in here. Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without saying (mostly some interesting experiments with finite word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries it's own psychological baggage around with it, and some limitations of method too (the finite class bit), so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here. Oh, and I would class all functionalism as closet 'analogy grammar' at heart. Isn't systemic _contrast_ of form meant to underpin all meaning in functionalism, and contrasts in meaning, in their turn, to specify form? Well 'contrasts in contrasts' are similarities. Seems to me that if you decide contrast in (contrast defined) meaning specifies form, then you are deciding similarity, or analogy, specifies form. But I'm not trained in functionalism so I would not necessarily know. I just started following it because of this perceived syllogism. > > (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-). > > Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) > includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the > position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its > operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates > generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed > and remembered inputs. A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a _network_ is a mechanism, and what results (very naturally, though not exclusively) from its operation is often analogy! But there is probably room to describe analogical processes as 'abstract networks' if you want to. As for the rest, the 'relativeness' bit, all is agreement (...many perspectives, many grammars - in fact in my theory multiple grammars and multiple cognitive spaces are predicted to be the same thing, so the congruent 'manyness' is explained). Though there might be a point on the relativeness of 'God's Truth' itself, to take it to another level, that a philosopher would be more qualified to argue than me, tree's falling unseen in forests, and all that... For me the 'reality' point is resolved by what you can _do_ with the theories you get. Anyway, if we agree to define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something with (wrt a given problem) we are in agreement on the distinction between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given problem). Rob From Ziv at HUM.HUJI.AC.IL Sun Mar 28 02:30:00 1999 From: Ziv at HUM.HUJI.AC.IL (Ziv Yael) Date: Sat, 27 Mar 1999 18:30:00 PST Subject: New e-mail address Message-ID: Shalom everybody, Following is my new e-mail address : mszivy at mscc.huji.ac.il Thanks for updading your records. Regards, Yael Ziv Dept of English The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus Israel 91905 Fax: 972-2-5322545 (University) Tel: 972-2-5883973 (W) 972-2-6782059 (H) From delancey at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Sun Mar 28 19:50:01 1999 From: delancey at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Scott Delancey) Date: Sun, 28 Mar 1999 11:50:01 -0800 Subject: functional phonology at GLOW In-Reply-To: <36FA04D4.83DD24FD@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: On Thu, 25 Mar 1999, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Since I am not a phonologist, I find it difficult to judge whether we > are really witnessing a gradual paradigm shift here. And if so, why > should phonology be so different from syntax? Yes, I think there's definitely a lot about contemporary phonology that could properly be called "functionalist". (I'd date the beginnings of it to the introduction of Autosegmental Phonology in the '70's, though people didn't start seriously seeing the implications of AS for a while after that). One reason, I think, is that generative phonology has always been much more cross-linguistically, typologically oriented than syntax. While _Aspects of *the Theory of Syntax*_ deals exclusively with English data, _The Sound Pattern of *English*_ uses data from over 70 languages in building and justifying the theoretical framework for the analysis of English. As we all know, the more willing you are to look closely at data from a range of languages, the easier it is to avoid some of the intellectual pitfalls that generative syntax has spent a generation lost in. Scott DeLancey From spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU Mon Mar 29 02:01:33 1999 From: spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU (Spike L Gildea) Date: Sun, 28 Mar 1999 20:01:33 -0600 Subject: for FUNKNET (fwd) Message-ID: from: T. Givon RE: FUNCTIONALIST PHONOLOGY I think Scott Dleancey's historical comment was very perceptive. But perhaps something else could be added: Phonology has always been much more adaptively transparent. To begin with, two of its coding processes (speech perception, articulation) are relatively concrete, & their adaptive value is rather transparent. But even the third, more abstract functional dimention of phonology ("phonology proper")--the neurological coding of conceptual meaning-- has been implicit in much of the traditional (pre-Chomsky) work on **minimal pairs**, **phonemic contrasts**, **complementary distribution** etc. So much so that even the grand abstract edifice of ordered rules (that deft abduction of diachrony into synchrony...) and other gratuitous abstractions could not quite succeed in obliterating the manifest adaptive dimentions of phonetics/phonology. The bane of syntax/grammar has been, of course, that (i) the adaptive ('functional') dimentions associated with it are much less transparent, in as much as they are not easily discoverable by the traditional clause-level, (reflective, conscious, speculative) methodology. And (ii), the code itself is so much more abstract. This latter fact has tended to yield two curious results: **Among formalists, the genuine abstraction of the grammatical code has licensed unmotivated, excessive abstract descriptions ('generaliza- tions'), constrained primarily by (a species of) formal economy rather than by the data. **Among functionalists, there is an unfortunate tendency to ignore the genuine, manifest abstract dimensions of grammar. What we do then, is either focus solely on grammar's more concrete dimentions (morphology, word-order, intonation); or, worse, we deny the reality of grammar altogether (often denying the relevance of the notion "code" to grammar). Much of the recent discussion on "Grammar with G" seems to have fallen prey to some version of these attitudes. Which is, leastwise from where I stand, rather unfortunate. Grammar is the most complex domain of human language. On the functional side, it ranges over (i.e. 'interacts with') a big chunk of lexical semantics, particularly of verbs (event frames, argument structuree); over all of propositional (combinatorial) semantics; and over most of **systematically coded** discourse pragmatics (here excepting gesturally-, intonationally- & facially-coded pragmatics). It has massive interaction with both episodic memory & working memory (thus attention). It is thus hardly surprising that the coding instrument itself is complex and (partially) abstract. Complexity & abstraction are siamese twins in systems design. The thing that worries me most, in science in general & but in linguistics in particular, is how prone we all are--again & again--to seek simple models ('solutions') to complex domains ('problems'). This intellectual scourge is called **reductionism**, and it is killing our science just as conspicuously as its twin scourge--**ideological nationalism**--is killing people. If our preoccupation with iconicity should have taught us anything at all, it is that reductionism, anywhere except perhaps in logic, is a very dubious methodological maneuver (Occam's Razor notwithstanding). Y'all be good, y'hear. TG From geoffn at SIU.EDU Mon Mar 29 14:38:40 1999 From: geoffn at SIU.EDU (Geoffrey S. Nathan) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 08:38:40 -0600 Subject: Apologies Message-ID: Let me apologize for unleashing the 'happy99.exe' worm. I had never heard of it before some of you alerted me. I received it from someone I infrequently correspond with, and thought he had sent me a belated New Year's 'gift'. I believe I have disinfected all the computers it came in contact with. If anyone needs instructions, feel free to contact me. Nobody ever commented on my original message--I assume people were distracted by the worm, but I must say I've been enjoying the discussion. Geoff Remember--just delete the attachment 'happy99.exe'--don't run it. Geoffrey S. Nathan Department of Linguistics Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, 62901 USA Phone: +618 453-3421 (Office) FAX +618 453-6527 +618 549-0106 (Home) From lamb at ruf.rice.edu Mon Mar 29 17:01:12 1999 From: lamb at ruf.rice.edu (Sydney M Lamb) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 11:01:12 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36FC668A.B62409EF@usa.net> Message-ID: On Sat, 27 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > Sydney M Lamb wrote: > > > The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and > > what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism > > being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language) > > and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg? > > If I understand you then 'Yes'. And I would put 'command of the language' firmly > back on option '1).' I think command is pretty firmly rooted in the mechanism. > Except when you have to pass an English exam. If you really want to put command of the language "firmly back on option '1)'" then you seem not to be distinguishing between (a) the learning mechanism and (b) what results from the learning process. Is that really your position? or am I misunderstanding? > > Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of > > remembered examples plus an ability to analogize? Or are you proposing > > that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular > > form other than that? > > The 'examples and ability' one. Ah, then, it seems that I have not misunderstood and that you really are claiming that the brain only remembers examples and has the ability to analogize, but that it doesn't generalize from the examples nor from its analogizing. > The analogical operations can give you _lots_ of > forms, and I think that is an important operation at different times... Yes, indeed they can -- but do you really want to claim that the brain goes back to square one each time and just starts from the examples plus the ability to analogize, and doesn't remember the results of such processing performed earlier, and doesn't build generalizations? > ... . Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention > the high spots here. ... > Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without saying (mostly some interesting > experiments with finite word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries > it's own psychological baggage around with it, and some limitations of method too > (the finite class bit), so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here. Oops!! I now have to ask, what kind of reality you have in mind. The PDP stuff has practically zero neurological plausibility, hence can hardly be regarded as able to come up with anything realistic. (At least, I'm happy to observe that you "wouldn't want to emphasize it here.") > ... > > Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) > > includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the > > position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its > > operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates > > generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed > > and remembered inputs. > > A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a _network_ is a mechanism, and > what results (very naturally, though not exclusively) from its operation is often analogy! I come very close to agreeing with this. To clarify we would have to move to the next higher level of precision, where we could say that what we have is a network system and that it can indeed be thought of as a mechanism; but I would prefer to say (at the risk of sounding obscure) that some of its operations produce results that _could be described_ as analogical. It is a subtle distinction, but what I am trying to say is that the term 'analogy' doesn't Directly characterize either an operation of the system or the results of such operation; rather it describes (and quite well) what the system Seems to be doing -- but it doesn't Direcly describe what it is Actually doing to give that appearance. In other words, the operation of the network system Accounts for our observations that there seems to be some kind of analogical process involved. OK, I admit it. This Does Indeed sound pretty obscure. But there is an example which can clarify, on pp. 212-213 of 'Pathways of the Brain'. It proposes a simple process of building new connections in the developing system of a typical child, just in the most directly available way to the system at that point, which results in the child's producing 'brang' as the past tense of 'bring'. > But there is probably room to describe analogical processes as 'abstract > networks' if you want to. No, I wouldn't want to do that. > As for the rest, the 'relativeness' bit, all is agreement (...many perspectives, > ... For me the 'reality' point is > resolved by what you can _do_ with the theories you get. Anyway, if we agree to > define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something with (wrt a given problem) we are > in agreement on the distinction between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given > problem). Too bad: we are Not in agreement. If you allow many theories which can come up with similar products then you are talking hocus-pocus wrt the actual mechanism (in our case, brain structures). These multiple theories are saying, in effect, "It's AS IF the brain were operating in such and such a way". So, for example, linguists might construct many diff grammars of many diff forms, all of which would account for certain sentences of a lg. If they do so correctly, that would apparently be good enough to satisfy you -- along with many others. Fine, may you and they be blessed. But: For a person interested in God's Truth, that isn't good enough -- such a person wants to know, to at least some extent, what is Actually There. Best, -Syd From amnfn at WELL.COM Mon Mar 29 20:41:30 1999 From: amnfn at WELL.COM (A. Katz) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 12:41:30 -0800 Subject: No subject Message-ID: I don't know about reductionism, but I would tend to agree with Givon on the issue of abstraction. Those who speak out against grammar with a capital G seem to be throwing out the benefits of generalization in favor of isolated examples. Likewise, the rejection of anything that does not relate directly to brain morphology or neurological facts of language processing implies a concrete-bound approach. Language would not work if not for generalization. Abstraction is at the very heart of the phenomenon whose study our discipline undertakes. I would prefer to distinguish the concrete language-processing entity from the `language' that it processes. Wasn't it Chomsky who introduced the idea that language and the little black box that supposedly produces it are inseparable? As functionalists, do we buy into that? Brain configurations vary. Persons with severe brain damage in early childhood are often capable of normal language processing and production, even though the connections in their brains are very different from the norm. What if we found that even in normal, undamaged brains, there is an immense variety of ways in which the same item can be stored and processed by native speakers of the same language? If we concentrated on the biological entity that produces it, we'd lose the generalization involved in the communicative function of language. Speakers don't know how their interlocutors' brains are configured. Communication is based on the abstract system of contrasts set up in the language. We react to electronically programmed simulations of human speech just as we would to those produced by actual people, if it's close enough. We read manuscripts written thousands of years ago, and the information is communicated, even though the brain that produced it has long ago been consumed by worms. That's the magic of language. The concretes don't matter. --Aya Katz From TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU Mon Mar 29 22:36:20 1999 From: TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU (Tony A. Wright) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 16:36:20 CST Subject: Grammar with a G Message-ID: > Speakers don't know how their interlocutors' brains are configured. > Communication is based on the abstract system of contrasts set up in > the language. We react to electronically programmed simulations of > human speech just as we would to those produced by actual people, if > it's close enough. We read manuscripts written thousands of > years ago, and the information is communicated, even though the brain > that produced it has long ago been consumed by worms. > > That's the magic of language. The concretes don't matter. Hear hear! What you have written is--I think--the first sane and actually meaningful thing to appear on FUNKNET in ages. I think everything you have said is implicit in the way linguists actually work. Some are willing to admit that they use of abstraction, and some aren't. And then there are those who want to be neurologists. Frankly, while I'm sure neurology is fascinating, abstract linguistic analysis is no less so, to me anyway. I can't believe people want to give up linguistics for bean counting (neuron-counting). --Tony Wright From twright at INTERSATX.NET Mon Mar 29 23:40:22 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 17:40:22 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a G: My apologies Message-ID: I would like to apologize to everyone for my tacky and uncalled-for remarks just now under the subject heading "Grammar with a G". I really do value the perspective of neurolinguistics and other functionally-oriented approaches, and I plead (temporary) insanity for saying things that would indicate otherwise. --Tony Wright From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 30 04:15:35 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 12:15:35 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Sydney M Lamb wrote: > ...do you really want to claim that the brain > goes back to square one each time and just starts from the examples plus > the ability to analogize, and doesn't remember the results of such > processing performed earlier, and doesn't build generalizations? Yes, I do. Well, rather, I think those generalizations are the same things as concepts, so every time you need a new concept you need to build a new generalization. > > ... . Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention > > the high spots here. ... > > Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without > > saying (mostly some interesting experiments with finite > > word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries > > it's own psychological baggage around with it, and > > some limitations of method too (the finite class bit), > > so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here. > > Oops!! I now have to ask, what kind of reality you have in mind. The PDP > stuff has practically zero neurological plausibility, hence can hardly be > regarded as able to come up with anything realistic. (At least, I'm happy > to observe that you "wouldn't want to emphasize it here.") I agree, they have flaws. > > > ...my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) > > > includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the > > > position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its > > > operation is new network structure... > > > > A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a > > _network_ is a mechanism, and what results (very naturally, though > > not exclusively) from its operation is often analogy! > > I come very close to agreeing with this... > > ...But there is > an example which can clarify, on pp. 212-213 of 'Pathways of the > Brain'. It proposes a simple process of building new connections in the > developing system of a typical child, just in the most directly available > way to the system at that point, which results in the child's producing > 'brang' as the past tense of 'bring'. I would suspect the action of analogy, or at least similarity, least-squares, or some such thing, in the nature of 'the most directly available way'. > > ...if we agree to define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something > > with (wrt a given problem) we are in agreement on the distinction > > between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given > > problem). > > ...For a person interested in God's Truth, that isn't good enough -- > such a person wants to know, to at least some extent, what is Actually > There. Then you will need the 'eye of God', because you will only ever see it filtered through your education and your brain, and you too, like me and everybody else, will be seeing mostly both. Personally I'm happy to resign myself to debating useful abstractions, with the emphasis on _useful_. Rob From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 30 04:15:44 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 12:15:44 +0800 Subject: No subject Message-ID: A. Katz wrote: > ...I would prefer to distinguish the concrete language-processing > entity > from the `language' that it processes. Wasn't it Chomsky who > introduced the idea that language and the little black box that > supposedly produces it are inseparable? As functionalists, do we buy > into that? I think he might have been arguing that concretes don't matter, actually. Hence the _black_ box. > ...Speakers don't know how their interlocutors' brains are configured. > Communication is based on the abstract system of contrasts set up in > the language. Am I wrong in thinking that syntactic form is specified by systemic contrasts of meaning in functionalism? That is what I am arguing, for myself. I don't know where all this talk of neurons came from. Rob From amnfn at WELL.COM Tue Mar 30 07:21:47 1999 From: amnfn at WELL.COM (A. Katz) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 23:21:47 -0800 Subject: No subject Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote (in re Chomsky's black box): >I think he might have been arguing that concretes don't matter, actually. >Hence the _black_ box. The black box is vague, but it isn't all that abstract. As I understand it, humans are supposed to come equipped with a device that has specific syntactic settings. The range available is very limited, it is given in advance, and it is physically hard-wired. We may not know or care exactly how, but it's a physical property. This is not too different from asserting that all humans come equipped with an organ of veneration, whose exact location in the brain is not currently known. That's kind of vague, but it is entirely too concrete. --Aya Katz From Carl.Mills at UC.Edu Tue Mar 30 17:50:45 1999 From: Carl.Mills at UC.Edu (Carl Mills) Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 12:50:45 -0500 Subject: A defense of beans and counting them Message-ID: Aya Katz wrote (in part): >> >> That's the magic of language. The concretes don't matter. And Tony Wright seconded: > >Hear hear! What you have written is--I think--the first sane and actually >meaningful thing to appear on FUNKNET in ages. I think everything you have >said is implicit in the way linguists actually work. Some are >willing to admit that they use of abstraction, and some aren't. And then there >are those who want to be neurologists. Frankly, while I'm sure neurology is >fascinating, abstract linguistic analysis is no less so, to me anyway. > >I can't believe people want to give up linguistics for >bean counting (neuron-counting). > >--Tony Wright > As a confirmed counter (of beans and everything else (see the character Cameron in Richard Brautigan's The Hawkline Monster)) and a determined lover of things concrete, I want to reply to the recent posts by Aya and Tony. (And yes, I did read Tony's apology, but I think other points of view need to be represented.) First, magic is fine, but not all of us are interested in magic. And for some of us the concretes do matter very much--at least, in science, as a means of keeping score. And while linguistics is certainly not neurology, there are other ways of looking at the relationship between neuroscience and linguistics. Vic Yngve, Syd Lamb, and George Lakoff have, in different ways, explored some aspects of this relationship. Personally, I would like to see linguistics become a science, and that means looking at the relation between concrete structures and specific functions, on one hand, and abstract theory, on the other. More, it means that linguistics would finally have to pay a long-overdue promissory note to neuroscience (That's ok: there has not been much "there" there in neuroscience to receive payment until quite recently.). Linguistics needs to become physically realistic. This does not have to result in the sort of nothing-but reductionism that has been labeled "greedy reductionism" (Whom am I quoting here? Is it Pat Churchland?). But it does mean that linguistics has to be "responsible to" a neurocognitive substrate--just as chemistry has to accord with the laws of physics, biology has to frame its explanatory theories in terms of chemistry, and psychology has to ground its theories in the brain. It is not, however, a matter of counting neurons. As I, an observer hoping to learn something useful, of neuroscience and neurocognitive approaches to things human, understand it, connections--vertical as well as horizontal, subcortical as well as cortical--among populations of neurons are what we need to look at (and neurochemistry, too, for that matter). Linguists do not have to be neuroscientists, but unless we give our discipline a firm grounding in what folks are discovering about the brain, it will never become a science. Instead, linguistics will be condemned to drift forever between the sciences and the humanities (sic). However, there is more to grounding than mere neuroscience. We also need to ground out abstract theories in evolutionary biology. In The Mind's Past, Gazzaniga says that the first (and last ) question we must ask is "What is X for?" As an outside and sympathetic (I think) observer of functionalists who hopes to learn something from y'all, I believe that functionalists have been asking Gazzaniga's question for a long time. I just don't think that "grammar" or "Grammar" or "communication" are sufficiently concrete, sufficiently fine-grained, sufficiently biological to build a useful abstract theory on. I have no quarrel with "grammar(s)" as summaries or parsimonious descriptions of observed regularities in attested languages (with an 's' at the end). I just see such "grammars" as data to be explained, not as explanations. As for big-G Grammar (or UG, if you will) or "Grammars" in the formal sense, I do not see how they offer anything but a series of dead ends, an endless asking of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I should leave such big issues to Lakoff and Yngve and others who are more capable of dealing with them. Reductionistically yours, Carl From r.j.freeman at usa.net Wed Mar 31 04:23:55 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:23:55 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a G Message-ID: I was hoping some more debate might come up on the (abstract) merits of analogy, and how it relates to functionalism and systemic contrast (whether or not faced with observations at a neural level). But as none seems forthcoming just a final comment on 'reductionism'. I don't see basing examples on syntactic abstractions (the usual idea of G-grammar) as inherently less reductionistic than basing syntactic abstractions on examples (which is analogy). Even where 'reductionism' might be thought of as bad, which is by no means always, grounding in examples is simply not more reductionist, if anything it is less. Remember what we are discussing here. Essentially they are systems. Linguists have traditionally been rather weak on systems. Chomsky bought some mathematical machinery over to formalize a traditional one (combination?), the functional tradition has revered (though dare I say largely ignored) another (contrast?). I believe Helmslev and others(?) proposed some other pretty esoteric ones (also along the lines of contrast?). But they are all systems. One might seem more 'concrete' than another, but that is simply another aspect of evidence in favour or against. One might seem to over simplify, but all systems, thank goodness, simplify. Let's not all get so caught up in the artifacts or our art that we forget we are all proposing systems. It's not system or not, it's one or another. Remember that under all of your understanding lies an assumption of system, and I think the gulfs between us will narrow. Rob From W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE Wed Mar 31 14:42:59 1999 From: W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 16:42:59 +0200 Subject: Grammar and System Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote: > Let's not all get so caught up in the artifacts or our art that we forget we > are all proposing systems. It's not system or not, it's one or another. Let me briefly ask you: Which kind of system to you talk about? Do you refer to the cognitive reality "linguistic knowledge 'system'" or to some kind of artefact that is established by the systematization of what is produced by this knowledge 'system'? At least since Husserl's phenomenology is has become clear that "systematic thinking" is a problematic kind of scientificism that often aims at the creation of "systems" in order to construe realities instead of understanding them. Hence I would sharply distinguish between metalinguistic "grammars" that construe a linguistic reality in order to make it interpretable or usefull in some sense or another from the linguistic knowledge bases that generate this reality. On the metalinguistic level, we can apply any kind of cybernetic assumptions, mathematical calculations and formalization, system logics etc. But if linguistics concentrate on such grammars then it may well be that we create nothing but metalinguistic theories or theories of metagrammars. However, it would be good to know more about the organization of linguistic knowledge itself. The intentional or pragmatic use of this knowledge already creates a interpretative "distance" between an indiviual and his/her language which allows him/her to look at this knowledge as a "system". The less this knowledge is articulate, the less it is systematized by a "user", the more it is part of the overall communicative and cognitive behavior of this indiviual, i.e. the cumulation of synergetic activities of a polycentric knowledge cluster. In this respect, real (or tacit) "grammar" is much less systematic than generally thought. Wolfgang -- _____________________________________________________ | Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze | Institut fuer Allgemeine und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen | Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 | D-80539 Muenchen | Tel: +89-21802486 (secr.) | +89-21802485 (office) | Email: W.Schulze at mail.lrz-muenchen.de | http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/ _____________________________________________________ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: W.Schulze.vcf Type: text/x-vcard Size: 192 bytes Desc: Visitenkarte f�r Wolfgang Schulze URL: From harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK Mon Mar 1 08:57:43 1999 From: harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK (Peter Harder) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 02:57:43 -0600 Subject: maxims and universality Message-ID: Dear funknetters - Some weeks ago, when the issue was hot, I tried to send this message, which was twice rejected for reasons unclear to the funknet administration, who dis-and reconnected me in the hope of solving the problem. Excuse me for foisting a dated message on you, but I'd kind of like to know if I am now connected or not. --Peter > >It seems to me there are two issues involved in the discussion on Gricean maxims. One is the status of 'something like' Grice's maxims where most people, including myself, would agree with Ellen Prince that violations do not bring about their falsification or cultural relativization. The other issue, however, is the status of Grice's exact version, building on the co-operative principle. > >I think Grice hovers between two interpretations, one being the above, while the other is more like norms for efficient exchange of propositional information (cf. Lyons's discussion, 1977:593), i.e. something like norms for white, efficient males. To see the last interpretation, you need only conjure up the picture of a person who never communicates more or less than required for the purposes at hand, never says anything for which he lacks adequate evidence, never strays into irrelevance etc. The ideal business partner, but would you want your daughter to marry one? > >You can reject this by saying that nobody follows the norms all the time, and as long as it triggers extra inferences (sabotage, implicature or deficiency) when people deviate, the maxims are still valid. But as pointed out by several people it is simply not true that all deviations from Grice's maxims in their present shape do this. There are all sorts of genres and cultural contexts where purveying just the right amount of high-quality information is beside the point - and where it would be understood as sabotage, implicature or deficiency if people actually behaved in a Gricean manner. > >I think the genuinely universal core of Grice's theory is that part of it which is bound up with the degree of co-operation that is necessary to communicate, i.e. to get messages across. That core needs to be filtered out of the theory in its classic shape, in which it is assumed that there is necessarily a co-operative contract beyond communication itself ('the accepted purpose or direction of the talk'); here's where the Malagasy case is a counterexample. > >Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson) is one attempt to formulate what such a core could be, based on rigid cost-benefit assumptions about the nature of communication...and, ahem, I have tried to formulate an alternative where interactive success rather than informational optimization is basic (cf. Functional Semantics (1996:136). > > --Peter Harder, Copenhagen From ward at PG-13.LING.NWU.EDU Mon Mar 1 15:07:40 1999 From: ward at PG-13.LING.NWU.EDU (Gregory Ward) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 09:07:40 CST Subject: maxims and universality In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.16.19990301095008.33f73284@coco.ihi.ku.dk>; from "Peter Harder" at Mar 1, 99 2:57 am Message-ID: > I think Grice hovers between two interpretations, one being the above, > while the other is more like norms for efficient exchange of propositional > information (cf. Lyons's discussion, 1977:593), i.e. something like norms > for white, efficient males. To see the last interpretation, you need only > conjure up the picture of a person who never communicates more or less than > required for the purposes at hand, never says anything for which he lacks > adequate evidence, never strays into irrelevance etc. The ideal business > partner, but would you want your daughter to marry one? wait, the (norm for the) 'ideal business partner' is white (not to mention male)?? how does race figure into the discussion? gregory -- Gregory Ward Department of Linguistics Northwestern University 2016 Sheridan Road Evanston IL 60208-4090 e-mail: gw at nwu.edu tel: 847-491-8055 fax: 847-491-3770 www: http://www.ling.nwu.edu/~ward From harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK Mon Mar 1 15:54:02 1999 From: harder at COCO.IHI.KU.DK (Peter Harder) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 09:54:02 -0600 Subject: maxims and universality Message-ID: Sorry about the racial implications. I was trying to speak in inverted brackets, invoking stereotypes that were floating around, as it were. I see they came across as my own. --Peter Harder >From: Gregory Ward >Subject: Re: maxims and universality >To: harder at coco.ihi.ku.dk >Date: Mon, 1 Mar 99 9:07:40 CST >Cc: FUNKNET at LISTSERV.RICE.EDU >Reply-to: gw at nwu.edu > >> I think Grice hovers between two interpretations, one being the above, >> while the other is more like norms for efficient exchange of propositional >> information (cf. Lyons's discussion, 1977:593), i.e. something like norms >> for white, efficient males. To see the last interpretation, you need only >> conjure up the picture of a person who never communicates more or less than >> required for the purposes at hand, never says anything for which he lacks >> adequate evidence, never strays into irrelevance etc. The ideal business >> partner, but would you want your daughter to marry one? > >wait, the (norm for the) 'ideal business partner' is white (not to >mention male)?? how does race figure into the discussion? > >gregory >-- > >Gregory Ward >Department of Linguistics >Northwestern University >2016 Sheridan Road >Evanston IL 60208-4090 > >e-mail: gw at nwu.edu >tel: 847-491-8055 >fax: 847-491-3770 >www: http://www.ling.nwu.edu/~ward > > From dparvaz at UNM.EDU Mon Mar 1 16:05:56 1999 From: dparvaz at UNM.EDU (Dan Parvaz) Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1999 09:05:56 -0700 Subject: Book announcement--Newmeyer (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Given the little that I've seen of Newmeyer's book, the announcement's assessment can at best be termed "creative". Since I have not seen the entire book, can someone please tell me which aspects of functionalism does he not summarily trash? Cheers, Dan. From 320012714892-0001 at T-ONLINE.DE Tue Mar 2 07:05:05 1999 From: 320012714892-0001 at T-ONLINE.DE (Suzie & Peter Bartsch) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 08:05:05 +0100 Subject: Book announcement--Newmeyer (fwd); functionalism and formalism Message-ID: Dan Parvaz schrieb: > Given the little that I've seen of Newmeyer's book, the announcement's > assessment can at best be termed "creative". Since I have not seen the > entire book, can someone please tell me which aspects of functionalism > does he not summarily trash? > > Cheers, > > Dan. And I had thought after reading the announcement to write encouraging Newmeyer to tell us more about his book because: a) I'm always interested in syncretistic approaches: in quotidian life and in sciences in general, and in linguistics in particular; b) as for the specific case formalism (e.g. generativism) and functionalism, I'd like to know how - and if - contrary basic premisses are made compatible with each other, as for example the generative premiss of autonomy of syntax and Givon's functional premiss of iconicity of syntax; c) two months ago there was here an interesting discussion on functionalism vs generativism that however i.m.h.o. was not totally satisfactory, because a central difference between these two approaches was not clearly enough pronounced: the fact that generative "explanations" in form of principles and parameters are actually not explanations, but at best possible descriptions of structures, while functional approaches, basing on iconicity of syntactic structures, can be seen as adaquate and plausible explanations. d) and I had hoped that Newmeyer perhaps would have found a way to reconcile generative formal descriptions with functional explanations. Best regards Suzie -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Suzie Bartsch Student of German and French Linguistics Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin supeba at t-online.de From fjn at U.WASHINGTON.EDU Tue Mar 2 18:02:29 1999 From: fjn at U.WASHINGTON.EDU (Frederick Newmeyer) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 10:02:29 -0800 Subject: Book announcement--Newmeyer (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I feel more than a little uncomfortable defending my book in a bulletin board posting, but I really feel that I have to respond to Dan Parvaz's posting. My book 'trashes functionalism' only in the sense that it argues against particular analyses put forward by particular functionalists. In fact, the bulk of the generalizations about the effect of function upon form uncovered in decades of functionalist research are not only taken to be correct, but given an attempted explanation. These include the iconic motivation of grammatical structure, prototype effects, and the set of historical changes classified as 'grammaticalization'. In a nutshell, LANGUAGE FORM AND LANGUAGE FUNCTION argues that generative grammarians have been unable to deal with these phenomena in the past because 'modularity' was given only lip service. I argue that if we narrow the domain of explanation of formal grammar proper and study its interaction with semantic and pragmatic principles, many of the phenomena that functionalists have taken as 'refuting' the generativist approach have a natural explanation. I even present a functional explanation for why an autonomous grammar should exist at all! You are free to agree or disagree with my proposals (and I know that many readers of this list will disagree), but it really seems unfair to say that the book 'trashes functionalism' Fritz Newmeyer On Mon, 1 Mar 1999, Dan Parvaz wrote: > Given the little that I've seen of Newmeyer's book, the announcement's > assessment can at best be termed "creative". Since I have not seen the > entire book, can someone please tell me which aspects of functionalism > does he not summarily trash? > > Cheers, > > Dan. > From dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU Tue Mar 2 21:05:46 1999 From: dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU (Matthew S Dryer) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 16:05:46 -0500 Subject: Newmeyer's book Message-ID: Dan Parvaz asks which aspects of functionalism Newmeyer's recent book does not "summarily trash". The answer is none. While there are many particular functionalist claims that he argues against, these arguments are clearly based on extensive and careful reading of the functionalist literature. I believe that in general these arguments can be addressed, although in some cases it may require rejecting certain aspects of the functionalist analyses that I would characterize as nonessential to functionalist claims. But I do think that if functionalism is going to survive as more than a passing phase in the late 20th century, functionalists will have to be able to respond to arguments of the sort given by Newmeyer with the same level of careful reasoning. Matthew Dryer From lachler at UNM.EDU Tue Mar 2 22:15:10 1999 From: lachler at UNM.EDU (Jordan Lachler) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 15:15:10 -0700 Subject: New List: athlang-l Message-ID: NEW LIST Athlang-L is a new mailing list for the discussion of Athabaskan languages and linguistics. We invite everyone interested in Athabaskan to join, including native speakers and students of Athabaskan languages, linguists who specialize in Athabaskan, as well as others interested in discussing and learning about these languages. The webpage for Athlang-L can be found at: http://www.unm.edu/~lachler/athlang/ To Subscribe to Athlang-L -------------------------- Send a message to: majordomo at s-leodm.unm.edu Leave the Subject field blank. In the body of message, type (with no other text): subscribe athlang-l You should then receive further instructions within a few minutes. To Send a Message to Athlang-L ------------------------------- Once you're subscribed, all messages to the list should be sent to this address: athlang-l at s-leodm.unm.edu === Jordan Lachler lachler at unm.edu Co-Organizer, 1999 Athabaskan Language Conference athconf at s-leodm.unm.edu http://s-leodm.unm.edu/~athconf/ From dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU Tue Mar 2 22:06:56 1999 From: dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU (Matthew S Dryer) Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1999 17:06:56 -0500 Subject: Newmeyer's book (CORRECTION) Message-ID: In a message I sent a short time ago, I got my negatives mixed up. When I said "Dan Parvaz asks which aspects of functionalism Newmeyer's recent book does not "summarily trash". The answer is none." I should have said "The answer is all", though just to be clear, what I am saying is that Newmeyer does not summarily trash any aspects of functionalism. Matthew Dryer From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Wed Mar 3 08:11:53 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 10:11:53 +0200 Subject: Modern Aramaic Message-ID: Does anyone out there know about published studies of Modern Aramaic (or at least the Aramaic of the last 1000 years), particularly the sociolinguistic situation of the language, or the names/email addresses of scholars specializing in or at least knowing something about Modern Aramaic? Thanks for any help. John Myhill From helasvuo at cc.helsinki.fi Wed Mar 3 09:35:44 1999 From: helasvuo at cc.helsinki.fi (Marja-Liisa Helasvuo) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 11:35:44 +0200 Subject: call for papers Message-ID: *** CALL FOR PAPERS *** The Linguistic Association of Finland is organizing a symposium on THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS IN THE ANALYSIS OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE to be held at the University of Helsinki, September 2-4, 1999. The symposium will bring together linguists interested in all aspects of language that relate to the relationship between syntax and semantics (such as argument structure, other types of constructions, linking, the role of context and lexical items, cognitive issues, idioms etc.). The aim of the symposium is to discuss the analysis of linguistic data as well as theoretical issues. The focus will be on linguistic phenomena rather than any particular descriptive formalism. Participants are strongly encouraged to give a paper on any aspect of the relation between syntax and semantics, as this is an excellent opportunity to get feedback from others working in this area. Invited speakers: Adele E. Goldberg (University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign) Urpo Nikanne (University of Oslo) Activities: * lectures by invited speakers * presentations by other participants (20 min + 10 min for discussion) Registration The deadline for submission of abstracts (in English; max 500 words) is April 30, 1999. Please submit your abstract by e-mail to the following address: syn-sem at ling.helsinki.fi E-mail submissions are strongly recommended. If, however, you send your abstract by ordinary mail, please provide an e-mail address as a contact address. Participants will be notified about acceptance by May 24, 1999. The deadline for registration and payment for all participants is June 15,1999. Register by e-mail to the e-mail address above. Registration fees: * general: FIM 200 * members of the association: FIM 100 * undergraduate and MA students free * send by giro account no 800013-1424850 to The Linguistic Association of Finland (SKY)/Symposium. In case of technical difficulty, payment in cash upon arrival is also accepted. Accommodation The organizers will provide a list of hotels later. For further information, please contact syn-sem at ling.helsinki.fi. Information can also be found at: http://www.ling.helsinki.fi/sky/synsem.html The organizing committee: Marja-Liisa Helasvuo Department of Finnish P.O. Box 3 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland e-mail: Marja-Liisa.Helasvuo at Helsinki.fi Ilona Herlin Department of Finnish P.O. Box 3 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland e-mail: Ilona.Herlin at Helsinki.fi Kirsi Hiltunen Portimopolku 5 A 15 FIN-00800 Helsinki Finland e-mail: Kirsihil at ling.helsinki.fi Meri Larjavaara Department of Romance Languages P.O. Box 4 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland e-mail: Meri.Larjavaara at Helsinki.fi Esa Penttil? Department of English University of Joensuu P.O.Box 111 FIN-80101 Joensuu Finland e-mail:Esa.Penttila at Joensuu.fi Marja P?lsi Vironkatu 8 B 33 FIN-00170 Helsinki Finland e-mail: Marja.Palsi at Helsinki.fi From johannes at compling.hu-berlin.de Wed Mar 3 12:15:56 1999 From: johannes at compling.hu-berlin.de (Johannes Heinecke) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 13:15:56 +0100 Subject: Modern Aramaic Message-ID: On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, John Myhill wrote: > Does anyone out there know about published studies of Modern Aramaic > (or at least the Aramaic of the last 1000 years), particularly the > sociolinguistic situation of the language, or the names/email addresses of > scholars specializing in or at least knowing something about Modern > Aramaic? Thanks for any help. > John Myhill Hi, several volumes describing phonology, morphology and syntax of aramaic varieties still spoken have been published in a series ``Semitica Viva'' edited by Otto Jastrow with Harrassowitz-Verlag. Jastrow himself wrote Jastrow, Otto: Der neuaramaeische Dialekt von Hertevin (Provinz Siirt). Semitica Viva ; 3. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1988. ISBN: 3-447-02767-3. Jastrow, Otto: Laut- und Formenlehre des neuaramaeischen Dialekts von Midin im .Tur `Abdin: Semitica Viva ; 9. Wiesbaden Harrassowitz (4edn) 1993. ISBN: 3-447-03334-7. As far as I know there are also descriptions of .Turoyo and Ma`lula available. Jastrow is professor for Semitic studies at Erlangen University. http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p2orient/ I do not know whether he's on e-mail. Best regards Johannes -- Johannes Heinecke heinecke at compling.hu-berlin.de Computerlinguistik or: h0203kfw at rz.hu-berlin.de Humboldt-Universit"at zu Berlin Tel: (030) 20192-553 10099 Berlin Fax: (030) 20196-729 From noonan at CSD.UWM.EDU Wed Mar 3 16:50:22 1999 From: noonan at CSD.UWM.EDU (Michael Noonan) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 10:50:22 -0600 Subject: Modern Aramaic In-Reply-To: <199903031215.NAA16595@zeus.compling.hu-berlin.de> Message-ID: In addition to works on Modern Aramaic Heinecke mentions, there is also: Georg Krotkoff: A Neo-Aramaic Dialect of Kurdistan. New Haven: American Oriental Society. 1982. Mickey Noonan Michael Noonan Professor of Linguistics Chair Office: 414-229-4539 Dept. of English Fax: 414-229-2643 University of Wisconsin Messages: 414-229-4511 Milwaukee, WI 53201 Webpage: http://www.uwm.edu/~noonan USA On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, Johannes Heinecke wrote: > On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, John Myhill wrote: > > > Does anyone out there know about published studies of Modern Aramaic > > (or at least the Aramaic of the last 1000 years), particularly the > > sociolinguistic situation of the language, or the names/email addresses of > > scholars specializing in or at least knowing something about Modern > > Aramaic? Thanks for any help. > > John Myhill > > > Hi, > > several volumes describing phonology, morphology and syntax of aramaic > varieties still spoken have been published in a series ``Semitica Viva'' > edited by Otto Jastrow with Harrassowitz-Verlag. Jastrow himself wrote > > Jastrow, Otto: Der neuaramaeische Dialekt von Hertevin > (Provinz Siirt). Semitica Viva ; 3. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1988. > ISBN: 3-447-02767-3. > > Jastrow, Otto: Laut- und Formenlehre des neuaramaeischen > Dialekts von Midin im .Tur `Abdin: Semitica Viva ; 9. Wiesbaden > Harrassowitz (4edn) 1993. ISBN: 3-447-03334-7. > > As far as I know there are also descriptions of > .Turoyo and Ma`lula available. > > Jastrow is professor for Semitic studies at Erlangen University. > http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p2orient/ > I do not know whether he's on e-mail. > > Best regards > Johannes > > -- > Johannes Heinecke heinecke at compling.hu-berlin.de > Computerlinguistik or: h0203kfw at rz.hu-berlin.de > Humboldt-Universit"at zu Berlin Tel: (030) 20192-553 > 10099 Berlin Fax: (030) 20196-729 > From kemmer at RUF.RICE.EDU Wed Mar 3 17:24:00 1999 From: kemmer at RUF.RICE.EDU (Suzanne E Kemmer) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 11:24:00 -0600 Subject: Aramaic Message-ID: Jo Rubba wrote an excellent dissertation on Aramaic called "Discontinuous Morphology in Modern Aramaic". It's not on the sociolinguistic situation, but on morphological structure tho. --Suzanne Kemmer From dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU Wed Mar 3 17:51:09 1999 From: dryer at ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU (Matthew S Dryer) Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 12:51:09 -0500 Subject: Aramaic Message-ID: Another source on modern Aramaic is Garbell, Irene. 1965. The Jewish Neo-Aramaic Dialect of Persian Azerbayan. The Hague: Mouton. My understanding is that Chaldean is also an Aramaic language: Sara, Solomon I. 1974. A Description of Modern Chaldean. The Hague: Mouton. Matthew Dryer From eitkonen at UTU.FI Thu Mar 4 11:44:20 1999 From: eitkonen at UTU.FI (Esa Itkonen) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 13:44:20 +0200 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: Dear Funknetters In his (1994) grammar of Old Tamil Thomas Lehmann shows that in this language case endings can either just be dropped or exchanged without any semantic motivation. (The latter point is also made in Tolkaappiyam, the grammar written in and about Old Tamil.) This sounds surprising, at least to me. However, it recalls what S. Beyer (1991) has called the 'Telegram Principle': In written (and especially poetic?) language rules of grammar may be broken to achieve conciseness. How widespread is this phenomenon, and does it occur in spoken language too? (Presumably it occurred also in spoken Old Tamil.) I must confess that to me this is a rather new phenomenon. Esa Itkonen From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Thu Mar 4 14:11:44 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 16:11:44 +0200 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: I'm enormously suspicious of claims like this. Linguists typically make such claims when they can't figure out the motivation themselves. Whenever I've investigated a claim like this, it's turned out there is a difference which the linguist didn't notice for some reason. John Myhill >Dear Funknetters > In his (1994) grammar of Old Tamil Thomas Lehmann shows that in this >language case endings can either just be dropped or exchanged without any >semantic motivation. (The latter point is also made in Tolkaappiyam, the >grammar written in and about Old Tamil.) This sounds surprising, at least >to me. However, it recalls what S. Beyer (1991) has called the 'Telegram >Principle': In written (and especially poetic?) language rules of grammar >may be broken to achieve conciseness. How widespread is this phenomenon, >and does it occur in spoken language too? (Presumably it occurred also in >spoken Old Tamil.) I must confess that to me this is a rather new phenomenon. >Esa Itkonen From nrude at ucinet.com Thu Mar 4 14:51:18 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 06:51:18 -0800 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: Greetings, When languages die--at least I see this here--there is the tendancy to seize upon certain phonological and morphological features of the old system as markers of "Indianness". These languages have, for example, a k - q as well as plain - ejective distinction, but younger speakers often have only a k - k' distinction and will just arbitrarily throw in the ejective k' (in place of any of the four k-like sounds and even in place of tL and tL') for its cultural effect. I have seen the same thing with the ergative noun case, with -n at m arbitrarily thrown in (suffixed to any noun) just for its effect. Obviously this is not the same thing as is going on in the vibrantly alive language Tamil. Or is it? One wonders--where a case marking system is breaking down (as in some German dialects?)--do we see a similar tendancy? Where some speakers no longer control a system, might they try to exploit it for some other effect? Perhaps this way (over time) a structural feature could even change function, thus effecting a "crazy" historical change. Such might even wash back over speakers for whom the system was not breaking down. Noel From spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU Thu Mar 4 21:19:51 1999 From: spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU (Spike L Gildea) Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 15:19:51 -0600 Subject: March LSA Bulletin Post (fwd) Message-ID: Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1999 10:09:24 -0500 From: LSA The March 1999 LSA Bulletin is now available on the LSA web site: http://www.lsadc.org From oesten at ling.su.se Fri Mar 5 08:46:40 1999 From: oesten at ling.su.se (=?iso-8859-1?B?1nN0ZW4gRGFobA==?=) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 09:46:40 +0100 Subject: Is grammar derivable? Message-ID: In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these characterizations. ?sten Dahl From lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU Sat Mar 6 01:06:02 1999 From: lakoff at COGSCI.BERKELEY.EDU (George Lakoff) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 17:06:02 -0800 Subject: Is grammar derivable? In-Reply-To: <000001be66e4$b04151c0$50abed82@oesten.ling.su.se> Message-ID: At 9:46 AM +0100 3/5/99, ?sten Dahl wrote: >In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that >generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal >grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on >(my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not >assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, >according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive >semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." > >It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these >characterizations. > > >?sten Dahl Dear ?sten, That is, as I'm sure you know, a thoroughly inaccurate statement. A more accurate statement would be: Cognitive-functional grammar claims, on empirical grounds, that principles of grammar commonly make reference to, and are often motivated by, aspects of communicative function in context and embodied meaning in context (as characterized via embodied cognition). Here "motivated" is used as characterized in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Motivation is neither derivability nor arbritrariness. That oversimplified statement, of course, does not say a whole lot. Reading the literature of both fields is required to get a sophisticated idea of what all this is about. For example, in the Neural Theory of Language, a great deal of language makes use of neural mechanisms external to language and neural mechanisms in general. "As characterized via embodied cognition" makes reference to a huge literature on cognitive semantics -- image-schemas, metaphors, blends, force-dynamics, frames, X-schemas, radial categories, types of prototypes, and so on. For a discussion see Case study 3 in Women Fire and Chapter 22 in Philosophy in the Flesh, as well as Volume 1 of Langacker's Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. The statement you quoted is characteristic of the sort of innacurate things Chomskyans used to say about generative semantics. Best wishes, George From david_tuggy at SIL.ORG Fri Mar 5 20:18:28 1999 From: david_tuggy at SIL.ORG (david_tuggy at SIL.ORG) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 15:18:28 -0500 Subject: Is grammar derivable? Message-ID: What on earth would "derivable from" mean in such a statement? For what it's worth, I'd easily say that grammar is "established by" language use and "modified by" changes in usage, and that it "functions for the purpose of" systematically structuring meaning. I might even say it "consists of" systematic structurings of meaning-form combinations. But "derivable from"??? --David Tuggy ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: Is grammar derivable? Author: oesten at ling.su.se at internet Date: 3/5/99 3:46 AM In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these characterizations. ?sten Dahl From david_tuggy at SIL.ORG Fri Mar 5 22:06:08 1999 From: david_tuggy at SIL.ORG (david_tuggy at SIL.ORG) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 1999 17:06:08 -0500 Subject: arbitrary case-marking? Message-ID: Noel Rude wrote: **When languages die--at least I see this here--there is the tendancy to seize upon certain phonological and morphological features of the old system as markers of "Indianness". ... Obviously this is not the same thing as is going on in the vibrantly alive language Tamil. Or is it? One wonders--where a case marking system is breaking down (as in some German dialects?)--do we see a similar tendancy? Where some speakers no longer control a system, might they try to exploit it for some other effect? Perhaps this way (over time) a structural feature could even change function, thus effecting a "crazy" historical change. Such might even wash back over speakers for whom the system was not breaking down. ** Sounds right on to me. And one place we can see this sort of thing happening is in English. The language itself is of course far from moribund, but some parts of it are: e.g. the archaic thees & thous and the verb forms that used to go along with them, or the vestiges of nominative - accusative marking on pronouns. I keep running across "arbitrary" usages of some of these features, things like "unto thou who knoweth all things", or "he sayest", from the pens of people who should know better (e.g. in stuff that has made it past the editors of Time or Reader's Digest). Perhaps the most egregious, repeated ad nauseum (yes, that is another one) in the press this past year, is the misquotation "Let he who is without sin ..." "Let him ..." would probably, by now, grate on the ears of most Americans almost as badly as "Let he ..." does on mine. These usages break the rules that used to be conventional, and the motivation for breaking those rules would be difficult to identify with much certainty. Sometimes people seem to be attempting some ponderous sort of humor, but often as not they are probably just unconsciously demonstrating ignorance, sometimes pretentious ignorance. Perhaps the rule has changed for them to something like "sprinkle -eth's and -est's on non-1st-person verbs, and occasionally reverse the "nominative/accusative" markings on pronouns, in order to mark a (mock-) archaic or high-falutin' speech style." In any case, the usages would certainly look "arbitrary" to a linguist trained to classify under that rubric anything not fully systematic and predictable. As for "washing back", I have caught myself, purist though I be, starting to say "he and I" instead of "him and me" in answer to a question like "Who did they send it to?". And whom among us would invariably include the -m on the interrogative pronoun in that last question? --David Tuggy From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Sun Mar 7 09:32:20 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Sun, 7 Mar 1999 11:32:20 +0200 Subject: Thanks Message-ID: Thanks very much to all of you who sent me references and information on Modern Aramaic. I appreciate it very much. John From 6500frw0 at UCSBUXA.UCSB.EDU Mon Mar 8 16:20:20 1999 From: 6500frw0 at UCSBUXA.UCSB.EDU (Fiona Whalen) Date: Mon, 8 Mar 1999 08:20:20 -0800 Subject: 2nd call for papers (Workshop on American Indigenous Languages) Message-ID: SECOND CALL FOR PAPERS WORKSHOP ON AMERICAN INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES Santa Barbara, CA May 14-16, 1999 The linguistics department at the University of California, Santa Barbara announces its second annual Workshop on American Indigenous Languages (WAIL), a forum for the discussion of theoretical and descriptive linguistic studies of indigenous languages of the Americas. Invited Speaker: Sara Trechter Anonymous abstracts are invited for talks on any topic in Native American linguistics. Talks will be 20 minutes, followed by 10 minutes for discussion. Individuals may submit abstracts for one single and one co-authored paper. Abstracts should be 500 words or less and can be submitted by hard copy or e-mail. For hard copy submissions, please send five copies of your abstract and a 3x5 card with the following information: (1) name; (2) affiliation; (3) mailing address; (4) phone number; (5) e-mail address; (6) title of your paper. Send hard copy submissions to: Workshop on American Indigenous Languages Department of Linguistics University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106 E-mail submissions are encouraged. Include the information from the 3x5 card (above) in the body of the e-mail message, with the anonymous abstract as an attachment. Send e-mail submissions to: wail at humanitas.ucsb.edu DEADLINE FOR RECEIPT OF ABSTRACTS: March 19, 1999 Notification of acceptance will be by e-mail in late-March. Registration: $20 (checks payable to WAIL) For further information contact the conference coordinator at wail at humanitas.ucsb.edu or (805) 893-3776 or check out our web site at http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/wail/wail.html From Carl.Mills at UC.Edu Mon Mar 8 22:23:47 1999 From: Carl.Mills at UC.Edu (Carl Mills) Date: Mon, 8 Mar 1999 17:23:47 -0500 Subject: Forwarded: Re: Rejected posting to FUNKNET@LIS Message-ID: Regarding Professor Osten Dahl's query on the derivability of grammar, I am inclined to answer both yes and no. The question of Prof. Dahl poses depends on at least 2 presuppositions: (1) that language exist and (2) that the notion of 'grammar' (or 'a grammar' or 'grammars' or 'theory of grammar') is necessary or even useful. Frankly, I don't think there is any grammar, derivable or otherwise, and I don't think there is anything corresponding to "language" except as epiphenomenon. Yngve (1996) questions whether 'language' is the proper subject matter of linguistics. Except as a convenient shorthand for referring to humans' ability to produce and comprehend utterances, tell stories, and represent a portion of the outside world, 'language' appears less than useful. The brain appears to instantiate a ragbag collection of special-purposes devices that have been modified/distorted/drafted into the service of other purposes as the need developed. What we call language (and the 'grammar' subserving language) seems, I believe, to grow out of mental faculties originally serving perception, attention and arousal, and (especially) movement. Notice the interesting "Prologue" in the "Handbook of Neurolinguistics" on 'noun-deficits' vs 'verb-deficits' and the corresponding brain regions that are implicated in these phenomena. I doubt that there is a unified language faculty. Instead, we have brain modules devoted to the production and reception of utterances, which seem to have developed out of the brain structures, including some subcortical ones, especially with regard to what we might call syntax (if we must) that were adapted from their earlier functions. In addition, parts of the brain involved in planning and attending to the consequences (immediate, past, and future) of actions, including speech--chiefly the frontal lobes, I gather, are probably implicated in discourse planning and sociolinguistic aspects of language use. One could say with David Tuggy 'that grammar is "established by" language use and "modified by" changes in usage, and that it "functions for the purpose of" systematically structuring meaning' if one wanted to talk about grammar or language. Or one could say with George Lakoff 'that principles of grammar commonly make reference to, and are often motivated by, aspectsof communicative function in context and embodied meaning in context (ascharacterized via embodied cognition).' I would say that 'grammar' is a story made up by Gazzaniga's (1997) "interpreter" in one's left parietal lobe, which has as its main function the construction of narratives, little stories that help us make sense of our experience. One might say that that which we call 'grammar' is shaped by Lakoff's communication function in context and embodied meaning in context. But I suspect that current notions of 'communicative function' or 'language use' are too "coarse grained" to be of much theoretical use. Carl Mills > > ---=?iso-8859-1?B?1nN0ZW4gRGFobA==?= wrote: > > > > In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said > that > > generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal > > grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then > goes on > > (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that > do not > > assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, > > according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and > cognitive > > semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." > > > > It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree > with these > > characterizations. > > > > > > /sten Dahl > > > > > > _________________________________________________________ > DO YOU YAHOO!? > Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com > > _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com From Christer.Platzack at NORDLUND.LU.SE Tue Mar 9 09:05:07 1999 From: Christer.Platzack at NORDLUND.LU.SE (Christer Platzack) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 10:05:07 +0100 Subject: Is grammar derivable? Message-ID: In a posting to this list 3/5/99, ?sten Dahl wrote: "In a recent Swedish introduction to generative grammar, it is said that generative grammar, in the miminalist version, postulates an "internal grammar", acting as an independent cognitive module. The author then goes on (my translation): "There are other current theories of grammar that do not assume an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..., and cognitive semantics, according to which grammar is derivable from meaning...." It would be interesting to know whether FUNKNET subscribers agree with these characterizations." The introduction mentioned is Christer Platzack Svenskans inre grammatik - det minimalistiska programmet. En introduktion till modern generativ grammatik (The internal grammar of Swedish - the minimalist program. An introduction to modern generative grammar) Studentlitteratur, Lund 1998 ISBN 91-44-00834-1 Being the author of this textbook, I like to comment on Dahl's question. What I had in mind, writing the lines cited by Dahl, was to condense statements like the following ones: "The chapter will argue that syntactic island constraints can be derived through an interaction of the Spatialization of Form Hypothesis with a general theory of attention". (Paul Deane, Grammar in Mind and Brain. Explorations in Cognitive Syntax. Mouton de Gruyter: Berlin, New York 1992, p. 4.) "What is controversial is whether these structures and abilities are unique to language, possibly constituting a separate modular package with special properties not reflective or derivative of others, more general cognitive functions." (Ronald Langacker, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1. Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1987, p. 13. "Functionalists maintain that the communicative situation motivates, constraints, explains, or otherwise determines grammatical structure, and that a structural or formal approach is not merely limited to an artificially restricted data base, but is inadequate even as a structural account." (Johanna Nichols, Functional theories of grammar. Annual Review of Antropology 13: 97-117; the quotation is found on page 97) "Crucial evidence for choosing a functionalist over a traditional Chomskian formalist approach would minimally be any language in which a rule-governed relationship exists between discourse/cognitive functions and linear order. Such languages clearly esist." (Doris Payne, What counts as explanation? A functionalist approach to word order. In Functionalism and Formalism in Linguistics, vol. 1. General Papers, ed. by Michael Darnell, Edith Moravcsik, Frederik J. Newmeyer, Michael Noonan, and Kathleen Weatley, 135-164. John Benjamins, Amsterdam 1998; the quotation is found on page 155). As is clear from these quotations, functionalists of various kinds do talk about the relation between function, semantics and grammar, and they even sometimes use the verb "derive" (see Deane and Langacker above), whereas others use words like "motivate", "constraint", "explain" "determine", "rule-governed relationship" and so on and so forth. Consider also David Tuggys response to Dahl's question (3/5/99): What on earth would "derivable from" mean in such a statement? For what it's worth, I'd easily say that grammar is "established by" language use and "modified by" changes in usage, and that it "functions for the purpose of" systematically structuring meaning. I might even say it "consists of" systematic structurings of meaning-form combinations. But "derivable from"??? It is obvious that Tuggy does not like the word "derive" (in my book I used the Swedish word 'haerleda' with roughly the same meaning). But what is the big issue? I included the lines under discussion in my book to inform the readers that there are other ways to look at grammar/language in addition to the generative view. In addition, in the final chapter, where I discuss the place of an internal grammar in relation to language as such, I suggest that such a formalist view of syntax may be fruitfully combined with cognitive approaches to semantics (Lakoff, Langacker). Christer Platzack From haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE Tue Mar 9 14:26:03 1999 From: haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 14:26:03 +0000 Subject: Is grammar derivable/motivated/explainable? Message-ID: I agree with Christer Platzack that the issue is not whether one uses the word "derive" or similar words such as "motivate" or "explain". Clearly, functionalists generally argue that grammatical structures can be motivated/explained on the basis of extra-grammatical factors. The real problem with the passage cited by Oesten Dahl from Christer Platzack's textbook is the passage immediately before, highlighted by me in the following: "There are other current theories of grammar that DO NOT ASSUME an independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to which grammar is derivable from language use..." But of course, most functionalists do agree that there is an internal grammar, and that this is precisely what we need to explain. Platzack's statement is correct only if by "independent" he means "unexplainable". Martin -- Dr. Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Inselstr. 22 D-04103 Leipzig (Tel. (MPI) +49-341-9952 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616) From john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL Tue Mar 9 14:15:52 1999 From: john at RESEARCH.HAIFA.AC.IL (John Myhill) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 16:15:52 +0200 Subject: eye contact Message-ID: This isn't a mainstream linguistics question, but does anyone out there know about research on different patterns of eye contact in different cultures? I'm particularly interested in English- and Hebrew-speaking, but anything will be helpful. Thanks. John From bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU Tue Mar 9 15:35:16 1999 From: bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU (Elizabeth Bates) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 07:35:16 -0800 Subject: what does 'independent' mean Message-ID: It seems to me that the critical question here revolves around the term 'independent'. No one is denying that grammars exist. But how do they come about? Once again, the vexed issue of innateness rears its head. Are grammars the way they are because they represent the class of possible solutions to an extraordinarily rich communicative problem, with some reliable and knowable properties? Or are grammars the way they are (at least now in our species, post-evolution) because they are built into the mind/brain prior to birth? The strong (and in my view, more interesting) version of the functionalist approach as a causal theory is the former, i.e. that the properties of grammar *EMERGE* in response to a complex constraint-satisfaction problem (mapping a high-dimensional meaning space with some universal properties, determined by our social and cognitive make-up, onto a low-dimensional channel which also has some universal properties, determined by constraints on information processing -- memory, perception, articulation, etc.). Now, one might argue that we have begun to build that solution into the genome, so children don't have to start from scratch in every generation. That's certainly possible, and worth investigating -- but it shouldn't be established by fiat, as an article of faith, which is exactly how things are done in most child language work from a generativist perspective. Most of the generative folks cannot envision what it would mean for emergence to work as a developmental principle. They don't trust it, don't believe it, and hence they cite vague (invariably unspecified) notions of unlearnability, poverty of the stimulus, etc. This is precisely where the neural network simulations of bits of language learning have played an important role in the last few years: establishing by an existence proof that certain phenomena that were previously believed to be unlearnable are learnable after all. These are toy simulations, who knows if they will ever scale up to the level of a complex nervous system in a social world, but they *DO* help the functionalist enterprise by showing that emergence (as opposed to innateness, or its polar opposite, learning-by-copying) is a viable approach to language development, and that many of the conjectures (because that's all they ever were, there are no serious proofs) of the nativist learnability program need not concern us after all. Brian MacWhinney has a very interesting edited book coming out shortly (as in, in the next few days, I think) on "Emergence" in language development. Funknetters might find the volume useful in the framework of the general formalist/functionalist debate. -liz bates From W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE Tue Mar 9 15:39:44 1999 From: W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 16:39:44 +0100 Subject: Is grammar derivable/motivated/explainable? Message-ID: Martin Haspelmath schrieb: > The real problem with the passage cited by Oesten Dahl from Christer > Platzack's textbook is the passage immediately before, highlighted by me > in the following: > > "There are other current theories of grammar that DO NOT ASSUME an > independent internal grammar, such as functional grammar, according to > which grammar is derivable from language use..." > > But of course, most functionalists do agree that there is an internal > grammar, and that this is precisely what we need to explain. Both Christer's and Martin's wordings demonstrate a basic problem of "functional" approaches, namely the use of a terminology that clearly belongs to another scientific paradigm. The term "internal grammar" is closely related to the MIT-Orthodoxy, but adopted by "functionalists" in a rather uncritical way. In fact the term seems to be rather desemantisized in the sense Martin uses it; it probably refers to some kind of "system internal structuring" or so. But such a kind of adaptation is dangerous and misleading: It also presupposes that "functionalists" have a well-formulated theory of what "internal grammar" is with respect to the frame work of "functionalism". If you (Martin) say that "there is an internal grammar" do you mean that there ALSO is an "external grammar"? Or is grammar always (per definitionem) "internal"? To which kind of "internality" do you refer? A cybernetic (self-determinated and self-regulating) system? If yes: Is this system "independent" (organ-like) or embedded in some extra-linguistic cognitive reality? Remember that the MIT-Orthodoxy also is based on some kind of "derivationism": LAD (if not a functional organ) is related to what once was called LOT (Language of Thought) or to other kinds of cognitive prerogatives. I think the basic problem is that functional approaches often argue on the basis of an unexplained multicausal derivationism which allows to introduce "extralinguistic" motivations for given linguistic structures ad hoc and rather randomly. The assumption of a "non-derived" (internal) layer reminds me of the way Neo-Grammarians approached their data: What we are looking for is the "system" (and "this is precisely what we need to explain"), the search for external motivation is left to Psycholinguistics etc. to which functionalism refers in case a system-"internal" motivation cannot be established. Obviously the question remains what "internal" means. If you use it in the MIT way then the term seems rather incompatible with "functionalism" in its traditional sense. If you claim that "internal" means some kind of reference to system-internal structures in the Saussurian sense then this usage may be compatible with businees-a-usual functionalism (or Neo-Grammar in Typology, if you want), but is is completely a-theoretical and fails to motivate whatever is "internal grammar". Though I call myself a "functionalist" (or "derivationalist"), I cannot subscribe to Martin's claim that "most functionalists do agree that there is an internal grammar". Before doing so, we have to explain (in terms of derivationalism, not in terms of the MIT-Orthodoxy) what is the "derivational" (or functional) basis for this so-called internal grammar [I tried to get closer to this in the lay-out of a "Grammar of Scenes and Scenarios" (see my home page for the "Person, Klasse, Kongruenz" volume (vol.1)[ http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/pkk_1abs.htm ] which tells you a little bit more about this)]. Without doing so terms like "internal grammar" are nothing but an a-theoretical but popular adaptation of main stream terminology or labels for a linguistic program that tacitly denies its own "functionalism". Wolfgang -- _____________________________________________________ | Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze | Institut fuer Allgemeine und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen | Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 | D-80539 Muenchen | Tel: +89-21802486 (secr.) | +89-21802485 (office) | Email: W.Schulze at mail.lrz-muenchen.de | http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/ _____________________________________________________ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: W.Schulze.vcf Type: text/x-vcard Size: 192 bytes Desc: Visitenkarte f?r Wolfgang Schulze URL: From dparvaz at UNM.EDU Tue Mar 9 16:22:25 1999 From: dparvaz at UNM.EDU (Danial A. Parvaz) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 09:22:25 -0700 Subject: eye contact In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Interesting. And since "Hebrew-speaking" culture is a relatively recent concoction, the differences between, say, the various flavors of Sephardi, Ashkenazi, and Israeli-Arab might be instructive. I have nothing to offer, but would love to hear what you end up with. Cheers, Dan. On Tue, 9 Mar 1999, John Myhill wrote: > This isn't a mainstream linguistics question, but does anyone out there know > about research on different patterns of eye contact in different cultures? > I'm particularly interested in English- and Hebrew-speaking, but anything > will be helpful. Thanks. > John > From macw at CMU.EDU Tue Mar 9 17:26:32 1999 From: macw at CMU.EDU (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 12:26:32 -0500 Subject: emergence and exaptation Message-ID: I am happy to second everything in Liz's message, except one minor point. Until last night, I would have agreed completely with her observation that "most of the generative folks cannot envision what it would mean for emergence to work as a developmental principle." Then I read a remarkable book on minimalism by Uriagereka titled "Rhyme and Reason". It is difficult to find a single adjective to describe this book. First, there is the adjective "heavy". It is almost as heavy as Gazzaniga's monster "The Cognitive Neurosciences". Second, there is the adjective "oblique". The whole book is written as a Platonic dialog between "L" (the linguist) and "O" (the other). It starts out with the same basic principles of emergentism that Liz and I share, discussing D'Arcy Thompson and packing constraints in nature. But then it starts to go in another direction, focusing on exaptation, rather than adaptation, claiming that there is a fundamental relation between minimalism and some crucial properties of nature as revealed through Fibonacci numbers. After all, the Fibonacci series can be generated by 0 -> 1 1 -> 0 1 applied recursively with some additional parallel read-off constraints. Somehow, Uriagereka believes that this shows that minimalism is emergent too. Not ontogenetically emergent, perhaps, but at least phylogenetically emergent, but only in the sense that spandrels (the areas under cupolas) are emergent. That is the first 180 pages of "Rhyme and Reason". About page 200, there is an admission that Optimality Theory might be a plausible alternative approach to phonology, although not to syntax. I found even that level of ecumenicality refreshing. After that, things take a more conservative turn with repetition of standard arguments about poverty of stimulus and ideas about how UG would reveal itself in tests with infants. Later, Uriagereka spends a page on cognitive grammar and dismisses it with sighs about "not coming down to earth". Somewhere around page 350, I started to tire of the dialog form of presentation and decided to skip to the chapter summaries and formal summary at the back of the book. Why am I discussing this book on FunkNet? The reason is that it demonstrates the "emergence" of a bit of common ground between functionalist and formalist approaches. If both approaches recognize the role of emergence, then maybe the disagreement is about adaptation vs. exaptation. However, I think we will want to be careful here too, since functionalists like Givon have been arguing for the importance of non-adaptive features in grammar. --Brian MacWhinney From TGIVON at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Tue Mar 9 20:11:26 1999 From: TGIVON at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Tom Givon) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 1999 12:11:26 -0800 Subject: Whoa, Brian! Message-ID: Dear FUNK people, I was going to stay out of the recent traffic; till I saw Brian MacW.'s unfortunate interpretation of what I do or don't think about arbitrary grammatical structures. So, hopefully as briefly as I can: 1. In ch. 6 of "On Understanding Grammar" (1979) I observed that quite often, perhaps most often, synchronically-arbitrary morphosyntactic structures arise in the course of perefectly adaptive ('functionally motivated') grammaticalization. This is a fact of life one has to learn to live with. It does not mean that the *process* of grammaticalization, whethger diachronic, developmental or evolutionary, is 'unmotivated' or counter-adaptive. But only that in the emergence of complex structures, a certain level of arbitrariness comes with the terri- tory. Unless, of course, you want to throw a tantrum and ignore it, which I concede quite a few FUNKers seem to enjoy doing. 2. Subsequently, in a chapter on biological evolution in "Mind, Code & Context" (1989), I noted that a similar phenomenon has long been observed in biological evolution of complex organisms, going under the traditional name of "excess structure" (S.J. Gould's 'spandrels'). Again, many people with an anti-evolutionary philosophical bias have been citing such facts to suggest that bio-evolution is not adaptive (not 'function- guided'). Many Chomskyites have been embracing this as an anti-adaptive argument that would support 'autonomous/arbitrary syntax'. I think, as in the case of the diachronic 'spandrels', this attitude is rather unfortunate, and no serious evolutionary biologist--not even Steven J. himself--would espouse it (tho I have seen some people with PhD in Biology espouse it... I guess I don't count them as being serious.). 3. If, as I have been suggesting since 1977, grammar is a partially- automated speech-processing system, then one may as well note that the rise of automaticity--whether developmentally or phylo- genetically--always allows for *some degree* of rigidification, ritualization, symbolization, and thus seeming arbitrariness. These are some of the *consequences* of establishing rigid neuro-processing pathways. It is part of the cost the organism pays for the *substantial* benefits of automaticity: *higher processing speed *lower error rate *lesser dependence on context 4. One may also suggest that many features of culture are likewise ritualized, to the point where they seem--to the superficial observer--rather arbitrary. Again, many anthropologists, since Whorf, Boas and Bloomfield but also more recently (cultural relativism seems to have regained center-stage in anthropology...) take cultural diversity & ritualization as evidence of total arbitrariness, non-universality & non-adaptiveness of culture. Again, I see this as a cop-out, an escape from a serious empirical study of the great wonders of complexity of the human spirit. All in all, it seems to me that social scientiest would rather not tackle complexity seriously & empirically. Instead, they keep wanting to find some escape hatches, so that they could go on with *reductionist* interprertations of complex domains. In linguistics, this is obvious in the insistence that the system is either 100% 'emergent' or 100% 'innate', 100% 'motivated' or 100% 'arbitrary'. For as long as this kind of intellectual escapism prevails, I doubt it that the field would advance much farther beyond chasing its own tail; which is, in my most-humble opinion, what has been going on since Bloomfield/Skinner & Chomsky set up the terms of this sterile debate. Cheers, TG From gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA Wed Mar 10 10:30:19 1999 From: gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA (Greg Thomson) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 13:30:19 +0300 Subject: what does 'independent' mean In-Reply-To: <199903091535.HAA14330@crl.ucsd.edu> Message-ID: At 7:35 -0800 03-09-1999, Elizabeth Bates wrote: > No one is denying that grammars exist. But >how do they come about? Where do grammars exist? A child is born into an environment in which speech is going on. Gradually the child's brain learns to associate linguistic cues (phonetic, lexical, grammatical) with conceptual events (adding tokens to mental models, forming complex concepts out of more basic ones, etc.). Thus gradually conceptual processes come to be triggered by linguistic cues (and in such a way that individual "forms" may trigger multiple processes of various varieties). Under the influence of the developing comprehension system a production system also develops (and is maintained). It learns to produce the linguistic cues in such a way that they comply with the expectations of the comprehension system. Where is the grammar? Reflective humans may preserve records of linguistic events and reflect upon, and categorize, the "patterns" they find therein. "Grammars", in the old fashioned sense, framed in terms of "structural relationships" or whatever, are the result of such reflection and categorization. But wouldn't you imagine they have a rather distant and indirect (if not tenuous) relationship to the working linguistic systems inside of people. As far as the working language systems go, there may just be the solutions to the complex constraint-satisfaction problem you mention, which may include 1) cue-triggered instructions (a metaphor, of course) which create conceptual representations (comprehension), and 2) instructions triggered by conceptual representations which produce the cues that work for the comprehension system (production). If so, then where would the grammars be? Why must they emerge anywhere other than in our imaginations? And why is no one denying that they exist? Cordially, Greg XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Morning by morning new mercies I see XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Greg Thomson, Ph.D. Candidate (gthomson at gpu.srv.ualberta.ca) SIL/Thomson, Westpost P.O. Box 109, FIN 53101, Lappeenranta, FINLAND Phone: 7-812-246-35-48 (in St. Petersburg, Russia) From Carl.Mills at UC.Edu Wed Mar 10 13:46:57 1999 From: Carl.Mills at UC.Edu (Carl Mills) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 08:46:57 -0500 Subject: Really? Message-ID: Elizabeth Bates wrote: >No one is denying that grammars exist. But how do they come about? And Martin Haspelmath added: >But of course, most functionalists do agree that there is an internal grammar, and that this is precisely what we need to explain. Hi, everybody. No one here. Nice t'meet y'all. Technically, I suppose, both Profs. Bates and Haspelmath are correct. Of course, grammars exist--on the bookshelves of language teachers and in the minds of linguists. A more interesting question is "Should grammars exist?" Or more precisely, "Is the notion 'grammar' necessary or even useful in the language sciences?" Clearly, Vic Yngve thinks not, and I, from a slightly different perspective, agree. I don't want to put words into the post of Greg Thomson, and his opening remarks are a tad too empiricist for my taste, but I believe that his posting could be interpreted as supporting a non-grammatical approach to language science. For those of us concerned with developing a non-behaviorist/non-grammatical linguistics, Funknet is one of the few places where interesting discussion takes place. In the meantime, Uriagereka's book lies on the floor of my study while I pick my way through Lakoff & Johnson's even weightier tome (reading these books may improve your mind, but carrying them will sure improve your muscles), and I haven't even ordered Fritz Newmeyer's latest. Time to teach some classes and get back to re-inventing case(without the grammar). Kurasi, Carl From TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU Wed Mar 10 15:41:40 1999 From: TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU (Tony A. Wright) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 09:41:40 CST Subject: Really? Message-ID: Carl Mills wrote: >Technically, I suppose, both Profs. Bates and Haspelmath are correct. Of cou >bookshelves of language teachers and in the minds of linguists. A more inter >exist?" Or more precisely, "Is the notion 'grammar' necessary or even useful >Vic Yngve thinks not, and I, from a slightly different perspective, agree. I My mail reader chopped off the right hand side of this message, for some reason, but what I got from it raises a question in my mind. Don't we still have to account for things like subject - verb agreement, for example, or all the intricate vagaries of clitics in French and Italian, along with a whole host of other stuff we've been analyzing and calling 'grammar'? If we do, and decide to simply not call it 'grammar', what difference does it make? --Tony Wright From bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU Wed Mar 10 15:54:13 1999 From: bates at CRL.UCSD.EDU (Elizabeth Bates) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 07:54:13 -0800 Subject: what does 'independent' mean Message-ID: I think Greg Thomson's proposal is quite plausible, and when I say "no one is denying that grammars exist" I mean that in the sense that he proposes, i.e. that the child has developed a skill that correct maps between form and meaning. And that knowledge may not look even REMOTELY like the grammars proposed in many formal linguistic theories. We all agree that grammar (in the sense of structural facts) is a reality, but we are free to differ markedly in our characterization of the form that knowledge takes in a real live child. -liz bates From spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU Wed Mar 10 16:02:09 1999 From: spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU (Spike L Gildea) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 10:02:09 -0600 Subject: Job: Research post in Morphology/Typology (fwd) Message-ID: Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 08:34:37 +0000 From: Greville G. Corbett
University of Surrey SCHOOL OF LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE SURREY MORPHOLOGY GROUP
Starting salary up to 17,750 pounds per annum, depending on age and experience. Applications are invited for a three-year post on an ESRC-funded project "A Typology of Syncretism". The post will be in the Surrey Morphology Group, which specializes in typology, particularly the application of formal and statistical approaches to typology. The project will be directed by Professor Greville Corbett and Dr Dunstan Brown. Candidates should have wide-ranging interests within linguistics. A good post-graduate degree in linguistics is highly desirable. An interest in any of the following would be advantageous: typology, morphological theory, syntactic theory, Russian, other languages (especially from families relevant for investigating syncretism). The job will involve collecting and analysing cross-linguistic data, maintaining a database, compiling a bibliography and contributing to joint papers. Details of the Surrey Morphology Group can be found at: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/LIS/SMG/ Informal enquiries may be made to Dunstan Brown (d.brown at surrey.ac.uk) or to Greville Corbett (g.corbett at surrey.ac.uk). For an application pack, please telephone +1483 873846 or e-mail A.Bell at surrey.ac.uk or write to the Personnel Department (arb), University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 5XH. Please supply your postal address, where you saw the advertisement and the vacancy reference number 1668/arb. The closing date for written applications is Thursday 15th April 1999. Interviews will be held on Thursday 13th May 1999. Visit the University Web Site at http://www.surrey.ac.uk/ The University is committed to an Equal Opportunities Policy Greville G. Corbett Department of Linguistic and International Studies University of Surrey Guildford email: g.corbett at surrey.ac.uk Surrey, GU2 5XH FAX: +44 1483 259527 Great Britain phone: +44 1483 300800 ext 2849 From nrude at ucinet.com Wed Mar 10 19:21:25 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Wed, 10 Mar 1999 11:21:25 -0800 Subject: Really? Message-ID: Hi to you too, Maybe the public perception is that language is just words--isn't that what nonlinguists think?--but shouldn't every class in linguistics emphasize that language is also structure? Information is by definition structured. And language structure is hierachical, and it exists on two levels. Semantics and discourse have their own structure, whether or not this has been automated in a grammar. And then when you look at all the closed classes and word order permutations, conjugations, declensions, etc., in a natural language, you see another level of structure--grammar--which the descriptivist cannot ignore. If structure necessarily exists on a semantic and discourse level, why should it not be reflected in the automated, routinized delivery system that Givon talks about? Noel From eitkonen at UTU.FI Thu Mar 11 14:10:15 1999 From: eitkonen at UTU.FI (Esa Itkonen) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 16:10:15 +0200 Subject: 'internal grammar' Message-ID: I have to agree with Wolfgang Schulze that, if we use words literally, it is not the 'internal grammar' that we have to explain, at least in the first place. Everybody has his/her own view of what the HYPOTHETICAL 'internal grammar' might be like. What has to be explained, first and foremost, is linguistic BEHAVIOR (which is known by direct observation). And the first, rather trivial but yet necessary, explanatory step is in terms of social RULES or conventions, which are known by (intersubjectively valid) linguistic intuition. We may then try to explain particular languages qua sets of rules by means of universally valid functional principles, and the 'internal grammars' (of particular languages) are (hypothetical) middle terms in this chain of explanations. Esa Itkonen From nrude at ucinet.com Thu Mar 11 15:10:03 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 07:10:03 -0800 Subject: 'internal grammar' Message-ID: Greetings, What has to be explained? Everything! Not just behavior. Not just biology. All of these, and also INFORMATION itself, as manifested in natural language, computer language, DNA, etc. Noel From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 03:11:58 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 22:11:58 -0500 Subject: The Myth of G Message-ID: Elizabeth Bates may already regret her (9 Mar 1999) remark that "No one is denying that grammars exist". Although Greg Thomson and Carl Mills (10 Mar 1999) have already responded to it insightfully and correctly, Tony Wright's retort, in which parts of speech and agreement and clitics prove the existence of a body of rules or other such propositional stores mediating between the analysis of input and the creation of output, makes me see that more is needed. For even when defined as "a skill that correct maps between form and meaning" (which Liz offers as a way to disassociate herself from the worst formalist excesses of the genre) or as "social RULES or conventions, which are known by (intersubjectively valid) linguistic intuition" (which Esa Itkonen offers as a necessary albeit "hypothetical" component of linguistic theory), the concept of a "grammar" as a component of language knowledge deserves to be laid to rest forever. The most recent of my litany of arguments in favor of this premise appears in the paper I presented at LACUS Forum XXV last July, to appear in the proceedings later this year under the title "Central Aphasia and the Myth of G: Toward a Grammar-Free Linguistics". In brief, a "dialectical-processual" view of language knowledge rejects any and all characterizations of language knowledge as rules, propositions, constraints, elements, nodes, or other such entities presumed to be neutral to, for example, the fundamental dichotomy between the primes of perceptual and motoric functioning. These and other arguments against a processually neutral view of language objects as "structural" abstractions may not make linguists' work any easier but they may succeed in making it less mystical than recent (read the last 50 years of) linguistic research have made it. Best. 'Bye. Steve From twright at INTERSATX.NET Fri Mar 12 04:45:52 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1999 22:45:52 -0600 Subject: The Myth of G In-Reply-To: <4.1.19990311211834.0099a260@mailbox.cc.binghamton.edu> Message-ID: At 10:11 PM 3/11/99 -0500, H Stephen Straight wrote: >Although Greg Thomson and Carl Mills (10 Mar >1999) have already responded to it insightfully and correctly, Tony Wright's >retort, in which parts of speech and agreement and clitics prove the existence >of a body of rules or other such propositional stores mediating between the >analysis of input and the creation of output, Whoa! I said all that? I didn't mean to. Also, I didn't intend my question to be a retort at all, nor did I intend to prove anything, but simply to ask an honest question. To me, the systematic relationships which have always been obvious between linguistic elements, or the predictable behavior of linguistic elements like clitics, etc., is real. I call it grammar. Whatever types of underlying factors are responsible for this (a specific language endowment or general cognitive capacities, or something else), I think that there are regular linguistic patterns that can be observed. Is this what is controversial, or just the practice of calling it grammar? Now I read people saying that we need to lay the notion of 'grammar' to rest. After reading this discussion, I'm still not sure what's wrong with calling it 'grammar,' or what people are proposing as an alternative that could not also be called 'grammar.' Isn't this rather like soap commercials on TV that tell you "Don't use soap, use (insert brand name soap)." --Tony Wright From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 05:46:48 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 00:46:48 -0500 Subject: Fwd: Re: The Myth of G Message-ID: > > Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 00:38:41 -0500 > To: Elizabeth Bates > From: H Stephen Straight > Subject: Re: The Myth of G > > Dear Liz - > At the risk of logic-chopping, I submit that the claim that "grammar > exists" differs significantly from the claim that "grammars exist", so that > reflection on the significance of your change of wording might make you > regret your earlier espousal of the latter claim. Moreover, the notion that > "a" grammar "maps between form and meaning" implies a non- or > ambi-directional view of the mapping relation, which is, IMnsHO, the root of > most of the formalist evils against which you and others have so impressively > battled over the years. Until we can wrest linguistic theory away from the > set-theoretic mentality implicit in the long-standing commitment to > "grammars", the functionalist-processualist alternative will remain > subservient to the regnant formalist-structuralist paradigm. > (You're not the only one of my favorite linguists that continue to > harbor the Myth of G, but you're arguably the one whose work I most admire. > Please consider your position carefully.) Best. 'Bye. Steve H Stephen Straight -- Anthro, Ling, & Langs Across the Curric (LxC) Office: 607.777.2824 - Home: 607.723.0157 - Fax: 607.777.2889/.2477 Spring 1999 Ofc Hrs, Sci 1 Rm 220: T 2-4, W 2-3:30 & by appointment From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 06:44:56 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 01:44:56 -0500 Subject: The Myth of G Message-ID: > > To: "Tony A. Wright" > > I'm sorry, Tony, if I put words in your mouth. What may have caused this > misunderstanding is the (grammatical!) distinction between "grammar" (mass > noun) versus "grammars" (count noun). There's lots of grammar out there, and > inside our heads, but the only grammars we know of are in books. To the > extent that what you said implied the existence of a body of implicit > knowledge that mediates or maps or otherwise exists independently of the > actual objects and processes of language comprehension, production, or > acquisition, then you were -- knowingly or not -- perpetuating the Myth of > G. But to the extent that you were merely defending the term grammar as a > cover term for the categories and relations that clearly exist among words > and phrases, then you are quite right to be contemptuous of anyone who would > deny the existence of such categories and relations or prohibit the use of > the term grammar to refer to them. I did not mean to be doing that, but if > that's what it sounded like, I apologize. Best. 'Bye. Steve From nrude at ucinet.com Fri Mar 12 14:08:23 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 06:08:23 -0800 Subject: Universals Message-ID: Howdy, Don't know exactly where you're coming from--linguistics, neuroscience--but I take it that what you're disputing is the existence of 'universals'. I appreciate the cock-sure attitude, but I wonder how I can really know that this matter has finally been laid to rest. Our school--as I understand it--defines universals as existing on the functional level, as also I believe that most of us would not deny the "existence" of propositional logic. Ours is a "communicative theory of language" and it is at this level that we define universals. How particular languages code them is another matter. Now I wonder--if we in the humanities or social sciences or neurosciences or whatever think we have finally laid to rest the millennia old debate between formalists and Platonists, then can we assume that our softer fields are about to usurp the prestige of the hard sciences and mathematics? Am just a naive by-stander here, but one always suspicious of the utterly sure. No offence intended. Cheers, Noel From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Fri Mar 12 14:40:45 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 09:40:45 -0500 Subject: Universals In-Reply-To: <36E91FD8.ADF@ucinet.com> Message-ID: To quote Tony Wright: "Whoa! I said all that? I didn't mean to." I'm a linguist in an anthropology department and have been reading and teaching and writing about psycholinguistic issues for a long time now. I don't have any doubt about the existence of universals and can't think why anyone would doubt their existence. More important, I don't see what I've said that would make you think that I have the slightest doubt of their existence, to say nothing of dismissing them as summarily as you imply. Please help me to better understand your apparent disagreement with my position. As for "the millennia old debate between formalists and Platonists," by which I think you meant to say "between idealists and realists" (with formalists and Platonists being examples of the former and functionalists and processualists examples of the latter) -- but maybe I don't get your point, I don't pretend to have laid this or any other such yin/yang dichotomy to rest. I do however think that humanists, social scientists, neuroscientists, and many others have provided hard empirical evidence and powerful conceptual tools for getting beyond the Myth of G whereby an essentially set-theoretic descriptive device (a grammar) becomes reified as a mental organ. I don't know whether to call it the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or just plain old equivocation and mystification, but I do think that locating grammars in the mind/brain makes about as much sense as locating physical equations (E=mc squared) in physical objects (atoms?). Best. 'Bye. Steve From meira at RUF.RICE.EDU Fri Mar 12 17:40:30 1999 From: meira at RUF.RICE.EDU (Sergio Meira S.C.O.) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 11:40:30 -0600 Subject: Myth of G In-Reply-To: <4.1.19990312091005.009b27e0@mailbox.cc.binghamton.edu> Message-ID: Just lurking-- but I couldn't help noticing that this 'Myth of G' discussion is getting interesting. Being interested in descriptive linguistics-- and actually wanting to make a career out of writting the 'grammars' that were so contemptuously alluded to-- I'd like to see the alternatives. In what way would the 'no-grammar' advocates describe understandably a given human language? Given the recurrent regularities, etc. that one finds when looking at an unknown language, is there a better way to talk about them than saying, 'here's a conjugation', 'here's a paradigm', 'here's a construction', regardless of what reality underlies these regularities? And can you guys give me references to it, in case there is? I'd certainly disagree with anyone who wanted to see a grammatical description as 'a map of the brain', 'a map of the internal knowledge of the speaker', etc., or who would want to locate it somewhere in the brain. I'm more of a hocus-pocus linguist; I tend to think grammars (in the plural) are convenient devices for us to catalog observed regularities. Would this vision of grammars still make them objectionable? --Sergio Meira Rice University meira at ruf.rice.edu From nrude at ucinet.com Fri Mar 12 19:07:19 1999 From: nrude at ucinet.com (Noel Rude) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 11:07:19 -0800 Subject: Universals Message-ID: Greetings, Well I thought that "universals"--at least the kind that we've been used to--imply a grammar. Grammar thus lives on two levels. There is the semantic-discourse-pragmatic level which is pretty universal, and then there is its automated instantiation (dare "I" use such a word?) in individual grammars. As for the formalist vs. Platonist debate in mathematics and physics, what those folks over there are faced with is a seeming hierarchy to reality in which the laws of physics reside at a lower level than mathematics. Physicists, for example, study other possible worlds, for as they say, "even God cannot defy logic". The idea is that things that "could be no other way" are real--they somehow exist. Now I'm no committed Platonist, but I wonder--could some form of propositional logic "exist"--universally--in all possible worlds? Agreeing that the better metaphor for language is to be found in the elasticity of biology as opposed to the absolutism of the laws of physics. But this does not mean that we can learn nothing from the mathematicians and physicists. It doesn't mean that it is ALL pragmatics. Why can?t we have both pragmatics and Plato? If it turns out that there is an awful lot of commonality in all information systems (natural language, mathematica, computer language, DNA), then maybe this is where we validate the notion of propositional sturcture. If it?s not hardwired--but simply the only way to accomplish the task--then the neurologists just might miss it. But that wouldn?t mean it wasn't "real". OK, I'm a heretic worthy of being impaled up-side-down. But what do I got to lose! Let's keep this interesting. Noel From sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU Sat Mar 13 04:10:07 1999 From: sstraigh at BINGHAMTON.EDU (H Stephen Straight) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 23:10:07 -0500 Subject: Myth of G In-Reply-To: Message-ID: > I'm more of a hocus-pocus linguist; I tend to think >grammars (in the plural) are convenient devices for us to catalog observed >regularities. Would this vision of grammars still make them objectionable? My previous postings have voiced no objection to the use of grammars as descriptive devices. The Myth of G, as I've called it, lies not in the writing of grammars per se but rather in the claim that language users could have any use for them other than as interesting cultural artifacts in which linguists have cataloged and otherwise systematically described language objects in ways that correspond to people's judgments regarding the well-formedness, utility, similarity, contrast, and interrelatedness of various sample objects (whether recorded or invented). In particular, the Myth consists of the claim that to the extent that the description provided by a grammar is, as the saying used to go, "descriptively adequate" it is ipso facto a candidate for promotion as an "explanatorily adequate" account of a vital part of the mental/neural apparatus that actually underlies language comprehension, production, and acquisition. I'll admit that my personal preference is to do linguistics in such a way as to in fact arrive at such an explanatorily adequate account, which is why I feel abused when colleagues persist in pretending that grammars contribute to this goal. Myths often obstruct real understanding, and the Myth of G has obstructed explanatorily satisfying linguistics for too long. Best. 'Bye. Steve H Stephen Straight -- Anthro, Ling, & Langs Across the Curric (LxC) Office: 607.777.2824 - Home: 607.723.0157 - Fax: 607.777.2889/.2477 Spring 1999 Ofc Hrs, Sci 1 Rm 220: T 2-4, W 2-3:30 & by appointment From sburke at NETADVENTURE.NET Sat Mar 13 05:39:32 1999 From: sburke at NETADVENTURE.NET (Sean M. Burke) Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1999 22:39:32 -0700 Subject: grammars Message-ID: H Stephen Straight wrote: >[...]I don't know whether to >call it the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or just plain old >equivocation and mystification, but I do think that locating grammars >in the mind/brain makes about as much sense as locating physical >equations (E=mc squared) in physical objects (atoms?). Similarly, I've been thinking of late about this question, that's also somewhat about "where's the rules?": Consider that there's two ways to implement a system that does something (in this case, that something is: understanding and producing language -- i.e., having a grammar): 1) a way where the operational elements of the system more or less match what patterns you'd observe in the output. Call this an "isomorphic" system. (I'm borrowing the term from some old object-oriented programming books I read, where it was used to mean the property of a program whose internal organization mirrors the organization of the problem being attacked, the situation being simulated, etc.) or: 2) a way where the basics of the program aren't isomorphic, but instead do fit together such that the thing (here, grammar) that you want is "emergent" -- and I use the word in /exactly/ the same sense as it's used in speaking of the patterns being emergent in Conway's Life, or Patternson's Worm(s), or [insert your favorite complex systems simulation here]. Call this an "emergence-based" system. Now suppose (in what is clearly now just a gedanken experiment) that I have two adult, lingual human brains (with the usual human bodies attached); and suppose that they both have effectively the same receptive and productive grammars of some or other language. But suppose that I know (somehow) that Brain A implements grammar using an "isomorphic" system, whereas Brain B implements grammar using an "emergence-based" system. Now: Is Brain B's grammar any less real than Brain A's? Or, taking somewhat of a different tack: If we all have brains like Brain B, are linguistic statements about our grammar any less interesting (whatever that means) or explanatory (whatever that means) than they would be if we all had brains like Brain A? -- Sean M. Burke sburke at netadventure.net http://www.netadventure.net/~sburke/ From dlpayne at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Mon Mar 15 17:38:23 1999 From: dlpayne at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Doris Payne) Date: Mon, 15 Mar 1999 09:38:23 -0800 Subject: Oregon: Visiting Assistant Professor Message-ID: Visiting Assistant Professor of Linguistics, University of Oregon. The Linguistics Department at the University of Oregon announces the opening of a non-tenure related Visiting Assistant Professor position for the 1999-2000 academic year, potentially renewable, depending on Departmental needs. The Linguistics Department of Oregon enjoys a long tradition of work within the functionalist tradition, concentrating in descriptive work and field work and in empirical work on language use, discourse, and language acquisition. We invite applications from qualified individuals who can contribute to the functional and typological orientation of the department. Since the openings fill teaching gaps for faculty on leave, the candidate must show evidence of considerable teaching skill, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. The successful applicant must be able to help cover our core curriculum, which includes phonetics, phonology, functional-typological morphosyntax, semantics, discourse, historical linguistics, and second language acquisition and teaching. In addition, the successful applicant must have an active research profile and must be able to direct graduate student research. Qualifications: Ph.D. in Linguistics Duties: Up to two courses per term of hire (we are on a quarter system) Mentor students in research projects, as needed Participate in department life, as appropriate Please submit a letter of application, vita, and names, addresses, phone numbers and e-mail addresses of three references to: 1999 VAP Search Committee, Department of Linguistics, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403. Applications must be received by April 16, 1999 to receive fullest consideration. Web Address: http://logos.uoregon.edu/uoling The University of Oregon is an EO/AA/ADA insitiution. From annes at HTDC.ORG Tue Mar 16 03:35:57 1999 From: annes at HTDC.ORG (Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D.) Date: Mon, 15 Mar 1999 17:35:57 -1000 Subject: Ergo's Patent Publishes Message-ID: The patent for the tools that create Ergo Linguistic Technologiess? software has just been published by the U.S. Patent Office. Copies of it can be obtained from them through the usual channels. Many have asked me to notify them when the patent is published. The patent description contains a theory of syntax that is far simpler and far more general than current theories, and more importantly, that makes software that individuals working with other theories can only dream of. For examples of the Ergo software go to http://www.ergo-ling.com. Probably the strongest recommendation for reading this patent and studying this theory is the software that it can create which can be seen at the Ergo web site. Those of you in industry may want to try and see if you can create similar tools and still beat the patent. We believe this is not possible, but we would encourage all to try in the spirit of good sportsmanship. In academia the very fact that we have a theory that produces better NLP tools than any other theory calls into question the status of all other theories of syntax. This is because every theoretical mechanism ever proposed for a theory of syntax (ours, Chomsky?s, or anyone else?s) can, in principle, be implemented in a programming language. Thus, the clearest judge of the best theory of syntax is the working software that can be produced from it. I have in the past even argued that until such time as other theories can do as well or better than we can in this area, that the Ergo parser should be declared the default standard for computational linguistics both in academia and in industry. (If anyone can demonstrate why this should not be the case, I would appreciate seeing the argument). The Ergo parser provides tools and a parser that can significantly improve navigation and control devices and question and answer dialoging software as well as other areas of NLP that require grammatical analysis. All the demos at the Ergo site are WIN95/8/NT compatible. Get them and compare them to the software made from other theories (if they are capable of producing any at all). Please do not take offense at these rather strongly worded statements. They are required because the soft sciences do not often have to deal with clear, incontrovertible evidence of the superiority of other theories or breakthroughs. In chemistry, for example, if someone creates a better and cheaper formula for a particular result (say the treatment of a disease), the new method is adopted and older ones are discarded until such time as evidence (e.g. the computer program in linguistics) demonstrates otherwise. For a discussion and description of standards for the evaluation of parsers and parsing systems go to http://www.vrml.org/WorkingGroups/NLP-ANIM. In addition, the Ergo web site provides examples and a parsing contest for those who would like to compare different parsing tools. Here?s an even greater challenge: Get the patent and the Ergo software and then write some papers that explain why working software is not a criteria for judging a theory of syntax. Or also why the theory of syntax cannot produce the software that we have. It might also be interesting to demonstrate why our theory of syntax is not to be preferred over others and why this theory of syntax is flawed (in spite of the unique software development it offers). Phil Bralich Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. President and CEO Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite 175 Honolulu, HI 96822 Tel: (808)539-3920 Fax: (808)539-3924 bralich at hawaii.edu http://www.ergo-ling.com Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite #175 Honolulu, HI 96822 fax: (808)539-3921 tel: (808)539-3924 From macw at CMU.EDU Tue Mar 16 15:15:13 1999 From: macw at CMU.EDU (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1999 10:15:13 -0500 Subject: Ergo's theory of syntax Message-ID: Dear Philip and Funknet, If you and Derek have developed a major breakthrough in our understanding of the theory of syntax, why don't you include something regarding the breakthrough in your posting to Funknet. You state that you now have a "theory of syntax that is far simpler and far more general than current theories, and more importantly, that makes software that individuals working with other theories can only dream of". A quick trip to your web site finds things like "clients", "demos", and "downloads", but no button labeled "theory". Would it be possible for you to either give an explicit link to the part of the web page that contains the theory or, better yet, summarize the theoretical advance in a few paragraphs? Many thanks. --Brian MacWhinney From annes at HTDC.ORG Tue Mar 16 19:28:13 1999 From: annes at HTDC.ORG (Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D.) Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1999 09:28:13 -1000 Subject: Corpora: Ergo's Patent Publishes Message-ID: At 08:28 PM 3/15/99 , you wrote: >On Mon, 15 Mar 1999, Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. wrote: >> The patent for the tools that create Ergo Linguistic Technologiess? >> software has just been published by the U.S. Patent Office. Copies > >This is my first post to this group. I hope this isn't out of line, but I >was too tempted by the claims of this post to resist checking the online >demo. I tested it with three different problems: Probably the most important thing I am trying to do with my posts and with the Ergo web site is to bring some degree of science and method to the comparison of parsers. As you note all parsers have some problems and anyone can find a list of sentences that will not parse. However, this really does little to provide a good comparison of parsers and theories of syntax. It also ignores the fact that a web site that is open to any sentence is not the same as a product that is targeted to a specific market. For instance, the parser we produce can provide an immediate and significant increase to the amounts of navigation and control that are handled by a speech rec system. This is a quantum leap forward for those products and should not be ingored in a situation where many jobs for linguists are waiting in the wings for more NLP tools to arrive on the market. Currently speech rec systems such as those from IBM, Microsoft, Learnout and Hauspie, Phillips, Dragon and Java are all neck and neck in a battle for shares of a very important market. In addition we can add significantly enhanced question and answer and messaging capabilities to those and other systems. One that any student in this area cannot ingore. Download Ergo's "MemoMaster" if you want to see what I mean by the improvement we offer. In addition we have recently completed a Department of Commerce grant to create a Web Browser based on NLP. This device provides significantly more Browser functionality for the naive user, for the blind and for others. In a multi-media conference in Japan in November, we beat out Nuance Communications (a spin off from Stanford Research Institute) and the U.S. Navy for the "Best Technical" award in NLP technology. These awards and the products we create are not accurately judged in the manner that is implied by typing in sentences arbitrarily. To really see what our parser can do and to really be able to compare our parser to others, it is necessary to look at parsers together and systematically. We provide a means for doing that on our web site in the section called "Parsing Contest" where we post our results for sentences in three practical NLP areas and ask other parsers to do the same. I suggest that the readers of this list abandon the habit of just arbtrarily pumping in sentences and start organizing sentences based on practical real world needs and on observable criteria that can be compared on several different theories. Try the http://www.ergo-ling.com web site and see what you think of our standards our contest and our results, but more importantly see if there is any parser ANYWHERE that can come even close to what we offer. And more importantly -- ask youself the question -- if any parser was indeed superior to the Ergo parser why don't they just post their results using our standards and our results and put us in our place definitively and finally. The reason of course is because no one can produce the results we can. Phil Bralich Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. President and CEO Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite 175 Honolulu, HI 96822 Tel: (808)539-3920 Fax: (808)539-3924 bralich at hawaii.edu http://www.ergo-ling.com Philip A. Bralich, Ph.D. Ergo Linguistic Technologies 2800 Woodlawn Drive, Suite #175 Honolulu, HI 96822 fax: (808)539-3921 tel: (808)539-3924 From lmenn at PSYCH.COLORADO.EDU Tue Mar 16 22:04:57 1999 From: lmenn at PSYCH.COLORADO.EDU (Lise Menn) Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1999 15:04:57 -0700 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Steve Straight does us a service by reminding us that various language performances (speaking, hearing, judging grammaticality, judging whether something is a word) are neurolinguistically distinct; therefore a theory of grammar that is supposed to capture the individual's knowledge of language will be inadequate if it abstracts a single grammar that is uniform across types of use (comprehension outstrips production at all levels of language development; many of us use constructions that we would label ungrammatical; huge discrepancies across abilities within an individual can be observed in aphasia, etc.). However, the diversity of 'grammar(s)' in the brain does not mean that the different aspects of grammatical knowledge are totally disconnected. We do learn from hearing; we pick up styles and words from those around us, not to mention from reading - aren't you occasionally appalled to realize that you are 'talking like a book'? Priming (see Kay Bock's work) must account for how some word or construction we have just heard turns up in our conversations in places where it's not quite semantically what we really intended to say; and our sense of grammaticality changes too, though more slowly (haven't we all decreased in our *! reactions to English pronoun case violations as the case marking system becomes more surface-controlled?) Whether G has lost its usefulness as an abstraction, I would argue, depends on the level of detail at which one is working; if you are describing an underdocumented language, it would be most unreasonable to demand a separate account of what people 'know' in each of our currently available ways of assessing knowledge, but if you are modeling brain damage or language acquisition, then it is essential to attempt just that. But in doing so, the intense cross-talk and interaction between the different types of grammatical knowledge is a baby not to be discarded with the bathwater. Lise Menn Lise Menn Professor and Chair Linguistics Department - Box 295 University of Colorado Boulder CO 80309-0295 303-492-8042; fax 303-492-4416 BEWARE PROCRUSTES BEARING OCCAM'S RAZOR From gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA Thu Mar 18 18:04:08 1999 From: gthomson at GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA (Greg Thomson) Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 21:04:08 +0300 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19990316150457.00ce060c@psych.colorado.edu> Message-ID: At 15:04 -0700 03-16-1999, Lise Menn wrote: >... the diversity of 'grammar(s)' >in the brain does not mean that the different aspects of grammatical >knowledge are totally disconnected. ... > Whether G has lost its usefulness as an abstraction, I would >argue, depends on the level of detail at which one is working; if you are >describing an underdocumented language, it would be most unreasonable to >demand a separate account of what people 'know' in each of our currently >available ways of assessing knowledge, but if you are modeling brain >damage or language acquisition, then it is essential to attempt just that. >But in doing so, the intense cross-talk and interaction between the >different types of grammatical knowledge is a baby not to be discarded >with the bathwater. I liked (sort of) Gerry Altmann's comparision of linguists' descriptions of grammars with the periodic table in Chemistry. Regarding the latter, it is interesting to see that substances combine in certain proportions, resulting in certain "regular" properties. But what is behind all of that? That is far more interesting. So also, descriptions of formal regularities in languages can be fun and fascinating, but then comes the "so what?" All those patterns in the spoken or written production would be there even if no linguist looked at them, and they aren't there just too look nice. "Grammar" is _doing_ something, and that's what's ultimately interesting. Leaving linguistics aside for a minute, we can consider a familiar illusion: the illusion of directly perceiving a speaker's thoughts. What I mean is, language users listening to speech are often (perhaps, typically) rather unaware of linguistic form as they subjectively "grasp" something else. How does linguistic (ultimately acoustic) form cause that to happen so well and so rapidly? And in what does that "happening" consist? Recall Givon's suggestion that we move on to "reinterpret grammar as mental processing instructions". How are concepts (let's say, those involved in a particular flow of narrative understanding) constructed and managed? Well, "grammars", including those of yet-to-be-documented languages, are an enormous source of evidence bearing on that more interesting question, to the extent that we use them for that purpose. Meanwhile, we still come back to the unlikeliness that a model of the external form of a language will turn out to be a useful model of anything inside the language user. Regards, Greg XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Morning by morning new mercies I see XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Greg Thomson, Ph.D. Candidate (gthomson at gpu.srv.ualberta.ca) SIL/Thomson, Westpost P.O. Box 109, FIN 53101, Lappeenranta, FINLAND Phone: 7-812-246-35-48 (in St. Petersburg, Russia) From Zylogy at AOL.COM Thu Mar 18 19:57:24 1999 From: Zylogy at AOL.COM (Jess Tauber) Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 14:57:24 EST Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Not everything linguistic is within Grammar- ideophones, at least as classically formulated, do not lie within clausal structure unless imported through auxiliation or other derivational processes. This is interesting since this type of ideophone is phonosemantically transparent, each shift of phonological feature shifting meaning in a predictable and geometrically symmetical way. In a way, one might even say there was only one ideophone, with many variants. That the most phonosemantically transparent items of vocabulary (I'll let you decide on your own whether ideophones are "in" the Lexicon) are the least integrated syntactically is probably no accident, as is the fact that the most worn down, historically changed material is the most syntactically integrated. Given that most vocabulary items likely have a phonosemantic origin ultimately, can we posit some sort of mechanism or mechanisms whereby we can get from the first state to the last? Is the ideophone like some sort of neutral molecule, with all the "valence" requirements satisfied by it's own internal parts? Once integrated into normal vocabulary, are some of these "valences" now directed outward, allowing syntactic combination? In doing so, is the stage set for historical change, in that there is decay in the structural coherence and integrity of the original ideophonic molecule? After all, what is the ultimate motivation for historical shifts of articulatory position and manner? Why do these changes seem to resemble matrix operations? (Note that real atomic orbitals used in molecular binding are analyzed in this fashion). Ideophones also are subject to typological phenomena- dependent-marking verb- final languages almost always have a separate word class containing these, verb-medial languages have some ambiguity between these and some other word class(es), and head-marking verb-initial languages mostly have "ideophones" (I'm not sure the name is applicable here) fully integrated into one word class (and verb-initial languages often have "precategorical" roots- word class is assigned with morphology, not before. Interestingly, all the usual ideophone-associated processes- robust reduplication, rhetorical lengthening, infixation, etc., are often present in this type of rootstock as derivational possibilities.) It is as if there is some sort of inversion of structure. It makes one wonder if such things might happen in the quantum world (for instance, could one have hydrophilic micelles floating in an oily environment?) It would be interesting if the various levels of reality (subatomic particles, atoms, DNA, language) which display tabularizable primitives and rules of combination were conceptually congruent. Is this a result of inherent structure, or are we simply viewing one possible interpretation of raw data through the constraining filters of our language-adapted minds? The properties of primitives and their rules of combination are not divorced from those of the environments they are part of- at any one level, each domain "licenses" the others, and all are born together. Thus there is the possibility of an equation describing all the available interactions, whether quantized or continuous. If language is like this, then only a holistic or integrative investigative/theoretic strategy which takes into account not only evolving formalistic structures but also the contexts of usage- all of them- will have any hope of generating enough of the points in the painting to give the big picture. Confirmational support will come from neurolinguistic work, but the kind of resolution one would need will be a long time developing. Jess Tauber zylogy at aol.com From david_tuggy at SIL.ORG Thu Mar 18 23:00:48 1999 From: david_tuggy at SIL.ORG (david_tuggy at SIL.ORG) Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 18:00:48 -0500 Subject: Jarno Raukko's whereabouts Message-ID: Is Jarno Raukko lurking out there somewhere? Or does anybody else who is know his email address? (and, lest Grice be insufficient, please send it to me if you do!) Thanks. David Tuggy From r.j.freeman at usa.net Fri Mar 19 03:14:47 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Fri, 19 Mar 1999 11:14:47 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: I've been kind of distantly following this discussion, but Greg's message came close enough to my beliefs to make me feel it might be worth posting. Has anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' processing? This has become a vigorous little sub-field of natural language processing research in recent years: 'example-based', 'memory-based', 'case-based' reasoning etc. Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. Rob Freeman rjfreeman at usa.net Greg Thomson wrote: > I liked (sort of) Gerry Altmann's comparision of linguists' descriptions of > grammars with the periodic table in Chemistry. Regarding the latter, it is > interesting to see that substances combine in certain proportions, > resulting in certain "regular" properties. But what is behind all of that? > That is far more interesting. So also, descriptions of formal regularities > in languages can be fun and fascinating, but then comes the "so what?" All > those patterns in the spoken or written production would be there even if > no linguist looked at them, and they aren't there just too look nice. > "Grammar" is _doing_ something, and that's what's ultimately interesting. > Leaving linguistics aside for a minute, we can consider a familiar > illusion: the illusion of directly perceiving a speaker's thoughts. What I > mean is, language users listening to speech are often (perhaps, typically) > rather unaware of linguistic form as they subjectively "grasp" something > else. How does linguistic (ultimately acoustic) form cause that to happen > so well and so rapidly? And in what does that "happening" consist? Recall > Givon's suggestion that we move on to "reinterpret grammar as mental > processing instructions". How are concepts (let's say, those involved in a > particular flow of narrative understanding) constructed and managed? Well, > "grammars", including those of yet-to-be-documented languages, are an > enormous source of evidence bearing on that more interesting question, to > the extent that we use them for that purpose. Meanwhile, we still come back > to the unlikeliness that a model of the external form of a language will > turn out to be a useful model of anything inside the language user. From nuyts at UIA.UA.AC.BE Mon Mar 22 14:33:45 1999 From: nuyts at UIA.UA.AC.BE (Jan.Nuyts) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 15:33:45 +0100 Subject: Cognitive Typology Message-ID: First announcement and call for papers INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 'COGNITIVE TYPOLOGY' April 12-14, 2000 University of Antwerp (UIA), Belgium Main Organisers: Jan Nuyts and Johan van der Auwera The purpose of this conference is to bring together researchers from the field of linguistic typology and from the domain of cognitive approaches to language (broadly defined) to reflect on how the typological and the cognitive enterprises in language research interrelate, what they have to offer each other, and/or how they can join forces in view of their shared goal of achieving an explanatory account of language. Abstracts are invited for 30-minute presentations (plus 10 minutes discussion time) on any topic contributing to this overall purpose. Deadline for receiving abstracts: ** November 1, 1999 ** Abstracts should be no longer than 400 words. Please add a full correspondence address and an indication of any special equipment you may need. Send your submission (in plain ASCII format or in RTF format) either (preferentially) via email or (both in hard copy and on an IBM-readable floppy) via regular mail, to the following address: 'Cognitive Typology Conference' p/a Jan Nuyts University of Antwerp Linguistics (GER) Universiteitsplein 1 B-2610 Wilrijk Belgium fax: 0032/3/820.27.62 email: nuyts at uia.ua.ac.be You will be notified of whether your submission has been accepted by December 1, 1999. A selection of the papers presented at the conference will be published by the organizers. Information regarding the venue of the conference, accommodation, social events (conference dinner on Thursday evening, April 13), and the conference fee and ways of paying it, will be provided in later circulars. If you are intending to participate or are interested in receiving further information, please return the pre-registration form below asap. ******************************************* Pre-registration form INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 'COGNITIVE TYPOLOGY' April 12-14, 2000 - University of Antwerp (UIA), Belgium Name: Address: Phone/Fax: Email: I intend to particpate: yes/no I intend to present a paper: yes/no ******************************************* ***** Jan Nuyts phone: 32/3/820.27.73 University of Antwerp fax: 32/3/820.27.62 Linguistics email: nuyts at uia.ua.ac.be Universiteitsplein 1 B-2610 Wilrijk - Belgium From lamb at RUF.RICE.EDU Mon Mar 22 15:43:26 1999 From: lamb at RUF.RICE.EDU (Sydney M Lamb) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 09:43:26 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36F1C126.828B96B0@usa.net> Message-ID: On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > I've been kind of distantly following this discussion, but Greg's message came > close enough to my beliefs to make me feel it might be worth posting. Has > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > processing? This has become a vigorous little sub-field of natural language > processing research in recent years: 'example-based', 'memory-based', > 'case-based' reasoning etc. Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. This is a start, but it leaves more questions unanswered than answered: "You still get grammar..." WHO gets grammar? The linguist doing an ex post facto analysis? Or who? "...emergent structure..." WHERE does the structure emerge? In the minds of linguists analyzing linguistic productions? Or in the minds of speakers? If the latter then this view is no different from that which has always been held by everyone except 'innatists', a recently encountered group most of whom are not functionalists. If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are talking about. And again we have to ask if anything new is being proposed, since we have observed over the decades that different schools of grammar come up with different formulations of grammar, suggesting that grammar is just the product of the minds of the grammarians. So we can conclude that it has (or ought to have been) generally accepted all along that "grammar is just the observed regularities..." Back in the fifties and sixties people used to call it 'hocus-pocus linguistics'. Cheers, Syd Lamb From macw at CMU.EDU Mon Mar 22 17:00:49 1999 From: macw at CMU.EDU (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 12:00:49 -0500 Subject: hocus-pocus, God's Truth, and grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Syd and FunkNet, It is my impression that the earlier contrast between hocus-pocus and God's Truth theories had to do with whether the theorist actually believed in the reality of the constructs of the theory. God's Truth people had the chutzpah to belief in the stuff they stipulated. Hocus-pocus people were more realistic. The current contrast between emergentism and stipulationism is somewhat different. Emergentists with their self-organizing models are like biologists playing around with the building blocks of life. In both cases, the results are seldom fully known at the outset and researchers are forced to stand back and watch what the models can do. If the models end up acquiring grammar, it was not by specific stipulation of the outcome representations. So, we might say that emergentists believe in the God's Truth of hocus-pocus. --Brian MacWhinney From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 23 04:47:57 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Something new? There is a new approach to structure in it, ignore the rest. Think of the difference between a clockwork and the picture of a clockwork, that's it. They look the same, but what they are is different. My point (like Greg's?) is not who is looking at the clockwork of language, it is the suggestion that the perceived structure is not the 'real' structure. In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with fuzzy edges. That's the point I wanted to make. Beyond that I don't care what you make of grammar, who's looking at the shadows: me see, you see, we all see... Anyway, I was just drawing attention to this 'analogy-based' work (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-). I wasn't sure if it had come up. If y'all are familiar with it then that's OK. Rob Freeman Sydney M Lamb wrote: > On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > > > I've been kind of distantly following this discussion, but Greg's message came > > close enough to my beliefs to make me feel it might be worth posting. Has > > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > > processing? This has become a vigorous little sub-field of natural language > > processing research in recent years: 'example-based', 'memory-based', > > 'case-based' reasoning etc. Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. > > This is a start, but it leaves more questions unanswered than answered: > "You still get grammar..." WHO gets grammar? The linguist > doing an ex post facto analysis? Or who? > > "...emergent structure..." WHERE does the structure emerge? > In the minds of linguists analyzing linguistic > productions? Or in the minds of speakers? If the latter > then this view is no different from that which has always > been held by everyone except 'innatists', a recently > encountered group most of whom are not functionalists. > > If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" > then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are > talking about. And again we have to ask if anything new is being > proposed... From twright at INTERSATX.NET Tue Mar 23 05:36:17 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1999 23:36:17 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 09:43 AM 3/22/99 -0600, Sydney M Lamb wrote: >If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" >then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are >talking about. If I give the mechanic an account of my car's behavior, namely that it dies out any time I let my foot off the gas, which I formalize using the following rule: dies / [- accelerator] __________ (dies immediately following an environment negatively-specified for accelerator pressure). is my account of my car's behavior really only about me, and not about the car in any sense? I could formalize my car's behavior in many ways. All of these would certainly say much about me and my penchant for branching nodes, arrows, brackets, etc. But at the core, these formalisms would all equate to "dies when I let off the gas," which let's suppose is exactly, for whatever reason, what the car does, with not a single counter-example. True, my account is merely observationally adequate, lacking as I do any understanding of what is going on (or what ever goes on) under the hood of a car. The car is really largely a black box to me, I can assure you. Does this mean that my account, either the formal or informal version, says nothing about the car and only reflects my methodology and formalism of car-problem analysis? I note that my mechanic insists on my observationally-adequate account of my car's behavior before he will even begin looking at it. --Tony Wright From lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK Tue Mar 23 10:47:36 1999 From: lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK (Liu Xiaohu) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 18:47:36 +0800 Subject: Second Call For Papers Message-ID: Second Call For Papers (EMNLP/VLC-99) JOINT SIGDAT CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND VERY LARGE CORPORA Sponsored by SIGDAT (ACL's Special Interest Group for Linguistic Data and Corpus-based Approaches to NLP) June 21-22, 1999 University of Maryland In conjunction with ACL'99: the 37th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics This SIGDAT-sponsored joint conference will continue to provide a forum for new research in corpus-based and/or empirical methods in NLP. In addition to providing a general forum, the theme for this year is "Corpus-based and/or Empirical Methods in NLP for Speech, MT, IR, and other Applied Systems" A large number of systems in automatic speech recognition(ASR) and synthesis, machine translation(MT), information retrieval(IR), optical character recognition(OCR) and handwriting recognition have become commercially available in the last decade. Many of these systems use NLP technologies as an important component. Corpus-based and empirical methods in NLP have been a major trend in recent years. How useful are these techniques when applied to real systems, especially when compared to rule-based methods? Are there any new techniques to be developed in EMNLP and from VLC in order to improve the state-of-the-art of ASR, MT, IR, OCR, and other applied systems? Are there new ways to combine corpus-based and empirical methods with rule-based systems? This two-day conference aims to bring together academic researchers and industrial practitioners to discuss the above issues, through technical paper sessions, invited talks, and panel discussions. The goal of the conference is to raise an awareness of what kind of new EMNLP techniques need to be developed in order to bring about the next breakthrough in speech recognition and synthesis, machine translation, information retrieval and other applied systems. Scope The conference solicits paper submissions in (and not limited to) the following areas: 1) Original work in one of the following technologies and its relevance to speech, MT, or IR: (a) word sense disambiguation (b) word and term segmentation and extraction (c) alignment (d) bilingual lexicon extraction (e) POS tagging (f) statistical parsing (g) dialog models (h) others (please specify) 2) Proposals of new EMNLP technologies for speech, MT, IR, OCR, or other applied systems (please specify). 3) Comparetive evaluation of the performance of EMNLP technologies in one of the areas in (1) and that of its rule-based or knowledge-based counterpart in a speech, MT, IR, OCR or other applied system. Submission Requirements Submissions should be limited to original, evaluated work. All papers should include background survey and/or reference to previous work. The authors should provide explicit explanation when there is no evaluation in their work. We encourage paper submissions related to the conference theme. In particular, we encourage the authors to include in their papers, proposals and discussions of the relevance of their work to the theme. However, there will be a special session in the conference to include corpus-based and/or empirical work in all areas of natural language processing. Submission Format Only hard-copy submissions will be accepted. Reviewing of papers will not be blind. The submission format and word limit are the same as those for ACL this year. We strongly recommend the use of ACL-standard LaTeX (plus bibstyle and trivial example) or Word style files for the preparation of submissions. Six opies of full-length paper (not to exceed 3200 words exclusive of references) should be received at the following address before or on March 31, 1999. EMNLP/VLC-99 Program Committee c/o Pascale Fung Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Important Dates March 31 Submission of full-length paper April 30 Acceptance notice May 20 Camera-ready paper due June 21-22 Conference date Program Chair Pascale Fung Human Language Technology Center Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Tel: (+852) 2358 8537 Fax: (+852) 2358 1485 Email: pascale at ee.ust.hk Program Co-Chair Joe Zhou LEXIS-NEXIS, a Division of Reed Elsevier 9555 Springboro Pike Dayton, OH 45342 USA Email: joez at lexis-nexis.com Program Committee (partial list) Jiang-Shin Chang (Behavior Design Corp.) Ken Church (AT&T Labs--Research) Ido Dagan (Bar-Ilan University) Marti Hearst (UC-Berkeley) Huang, Changning (Tsinghua University) Pierre Isabelle (Xerox Research Europe) Lillian Lee (Cornell University) David Lewis (AT&T Research) Dan Melamed (West Group) Masaaki Nagata (NTT) Steve Richardson (Microsoft Research) Richard Sproat (AT&T Labs--Research) Andreas Stolcke (SRI) Ralph Weischedel (BBN) Dekai Wu (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology) David Yarowsky (Johns Hopkins University) From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 23 12:46:10 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 20:46:10 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Tony A. Wright wrote: > At 09:43 AM 3/22/99 -0600, Sydney M Lamb wrote: > > >If grammar "is just the observed regularities of collections of examples" > >then it is the grammarian and not the speaker of the language that you are > >talking about. > > If I give the mechanic an account of my car's behavior, namely that it dies > out any time I let my foot off the gas, which I formalize using the > following rule: > > dies / [- accelerator] __________ (dies immediately following an > environment negatively-specified for > accelerator pressure). > > (snip)... > > Does this mean that my account, either the formal or informal version, says > nothing about the car and only reflects my methodology and formalism of > car-problem analysis? I note that my mechanic insists on my > observationally-adequate account of my car's behavior before he will even > begin looking at it. I would probably have to agree with Syd on this bit. We all work within a frame of reference, not much use in arguing otherwise, that's not new. Point is, what can we do with it? I think the distinction to be made is that rules like this are not much use for making cars. Your mechanic might appreciate your subjective observations about the car, but he needs knowledge of something more 'real' before he can fix it. We expect a mechanic to know what lies under the hood, as linguists we might be expected to know what lies under grammar, however useful subjective knowledge of grammar is in itself. I was just trying to point to a useful reality (which I think analogy-based models for what underlies grammar are) not argue that subjective reality was a new idea. Rob From twright at INTERSATX.NET Tue Mar 23 13:30:24 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 07:30:24 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36F78D12.4D7A48BE@usa.net> Message-ID: At 08:46 PM 3/23/99 +0800, Rob Freeman wrote: >I would probably have to agree with Syd on this bit. We all work within a frame of >reference, not much use in arguing otherwise, that's not new. Point is, what can we do >with it? I think the distinction to be made is that rules like this are not much use >for making cars. I don't see the comparison. Linguists "make" languages? > Your mechanic might appreciate your subjective observations about the >car, but he needs knowledge of something more 'real' before he can fix it. He doesn't just appreciate it, he insists on it. His only alternative is to check every component of the car, from the pistons to the turn signal to see what's not functioning correctly. One might object that he could simply drive the car and see what's wrong himself. Of course, this merely means that he will first have to gather data about the car's behavior and formulate a rule-based account of it--just like I did-- before he gets under the hood. BTW, what's subjective about it? My mode of exposition may have a subjective component, but the facts about my car are something anyone would have to agree with. --Tony Wright From eitkonen at UTU.FI Tue Mar 23 16:15:53 1999 From: eitkonen at UTU.FI (Esa Itkonen) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 18:15:53 +0200 Subject: hocus-pocus, God's truth Message-ID: This terminological distinction which was coined (and accepted) by the US structuralists of the classical era is valid even under somewhat changed circumstances. The 'hocus-pocus' view (without any negative connotations) has been and is (and will be) represented by those who just want to present the facts of a given language (N.B. seldom the facts of several languages at the same time) in a maximally simple and general way. Most of the time, this way has or is meant to have NO psychological or biological reality. Example: Panini, whom many (including myself) consider the best grammarian ever, did not care about psychological reality. (This was agreed on - LA, June 1982 - by Paul Kiparsky and myself, of whom the former knows Panini better than the latter.) The 'God's truth' position (without any either positive or negative connotations) is represented by those who do not merely wish to capture the psychological and/or biological reality, but who actually succeed in doing so, at least to some extent. Both approaches are equally legitimate, as long as one knows what one is doing (which is seldom the case). Rob Freeman's case for ANALOGY is most welcome, given that even functionalists and cognitivists still seem to some extent intimidated by Chomsky's long-standing hostility towards analogy; but this will certainly change; maybe it has changed already. Esa Itkonen From wilcox at UNM.EDU Tue Mar 23 16:05:34 1999 From: wilcox at UNM.EDU (Sherman Wilcox) Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1999 09:05:34 -0700 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.16.19990323072907.3b27a59c@mail.intersatx.net> Message-ID: On 3/23/99 Tony Wright wrote: > Linguists "make" languages? Maybe not languages, but grammars. In one way, at least. I was having a good discussion with some linguist friends after a Sonny Rollins jazz concert last night (which was awesome, by the way). One mentioned that the musicologist Gunther Schuller once published a transcription and analysis of a Rollins tune, "Blue 7" (an odd tune, recorded in 1956). He found some interesting structural stuff going on. Apparently Rollins read this analysis and wrote back something to the effect, "take your analysis and shove it. My music can't be analyzed this way." Well, what do we make of this. Is Schuller wrong? Is that structure not there? Rollins apparently didn't think it showed anything useful, and he was the creator, the speaker, to so speak. Or, maybe musicologists, like linguists, know more about the products of creativity than the creators do. Another question, as my other linguist friend pointed out, is not whether structure can be found -- is "there" -- but whether *that* is what accounted for Rollins' production of his improvisation in the first place. My simple-minded way of thinking of the difference is that maybe Schuller's analysis *worked*, but it wasn't *right*. Maybe linguists' grammars work -- that doesn't make them right. And, of course, there is one more problem (thanks again to Larry Gorbet, one the linguist friends, for pointing this out): the difference between saying "that structure was *there*" and "*that* structure was there" (that one, and no other). Sure, maybe Schuller found a structure, and if we accept that he's not hallucinating (this is jazz, after all) and knows his musicology business, then apparently that structure is there. But another, equally sharp jazz-loving musicologist might find a different structure. Are they both wrong (I bet I know what Sonny would say)? Is only one wrong? Or are they both correct? I guess I think they were both correct. But none of it means a damn for Sonny, who created "Blue 7". And to that extent, then, I also think they're both wrong. If linguists are like jazz critics or art critics, then the best among them are, I guess, finding stuff that's *there*, and they're all correct. The beauty of creative works is that they are "multiply sanctioned" -- to use a cognitive linguist term. The best are massively multiply sanctioned. That's why, like "Blue 7", they are ageless and inspire so many, over and over again. We hear something new in "Blue 7" or see something new in a Jackson Pollack painting each time we experience them. I, for one, though, would like to figure out how the hell Sonny Rollins created "Blue 7" and all the other brilliant improvisations that he does. And as a linguist, I'd like to figure out why and how and what people do what they do when they create utterances. When it comes to language, we are all improvisational geniuses. "Blue 7" just finished on my stereo. I'll shut up now. -- Sherman From lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK Wed Mar 24 06:52:51 1999 From: lxiaohu at CS.UST.HK (Liu Xiaohu) Date: Wed, 24 Mar 1999 14:52:51 +0800 Subject: Final Call For Papers Message-ID: Final Call For Papers (EMNLP/VLC-99) JOINT SIGDAT CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND VERY LARGE CORPORA Sponsored by SIGDAT (ACL's Special Interest Group for Linguistic Data and Corpus-based Approaches to NLP) June 21-22, 1999 University of Maryland In conjunction with ACL'99: the 37th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics This SIGDAT-sponsored joint conference will continue to provide a forum for new research in corpus-based and/or empirical methods in NLP. In addition to providing a general forum, the theme for this year is "Corpus-based and/or Empirical Methods in NLP for Speech, MT, IR, and other Applied Systems" A large number of systems in automatic speech recognition(ASR) and synthesis, machine translation(MT), information retrieval(IR), optical character recognition(OCR) and handwriting recognition have become commercially available in the last decade. Many of these systems use NLP technologies as an important component. Corpus-based and empirical methods in NLP have been a major trend in recent years. How useful are these techniques when applied to real systems, especially when compared to rule-based methods? Are there any new techniques to be developed in EMNLP and from VLC in order to improve the state-of-the-art of ASR, MT, IR, OCR, and other applied systems? Are there new ways to combine corpus-based and empirical methods with rule-based systems? This two-day conference aims to bring together academic researchers and industrial practitioners to discuss the above issues, through technical paper sessions, invited talks, and panel discussions. The goal of the conference is to raise an awareness of what kind of new EMNLP techniques need to be developed in order to bring about the next breakthrough in speech recognition and synthesis, machine translation, information retrieval and other applied systems. Scope The conference solicits paper submissions in (and not limited to) the following areas: 1) Original work in one of the following technologies and its relevance to speech, MT, or IR: (a) word sense disambiguation (b) word and term segmentation and extraction (c) alignment (d) bilingual lexicon extraction (e) POS tagging (f) statistical parsing (g) dialog models (h) others (please specify) 2) Proposals of new EMNLP technologies for speech, MT, IR, OCR, or other applied systems (please specify). 3) Comparetive evaluation of the performance of EMNLP technologies in one of the areas in (1) and that of its rule-based or knowledge-based counterpart in a speech, MT, IR, OCR or other applied system. Submission Requirements Submissions should be limited to original, evaluated work. All papers should include background survey and/or reference to previous work. The authors should provide explicit explanation when there is no evaluation in their work. We encourage paper submissions related to the conference theme. In particular, we encourage the authors to include in their papers, proposals and discussions of the relevance of their work to the theme. However, there will be a special session in the conference to include corpus-based and/or empirical work in all areas of natural language processing. Submission Format Only hard-copy submissions will be accepted. Reviewing of papers will not be blind. The submission format and word limit are the same as those for ACL this year. We strongly recommend the use of ACL-standard LaTeX (plus bibstyle and trivial example) or Word style files for the preparation of submissions. Paper ID is not required. Please leave it blank. Six opies of full-length paper (not to exceed 3200 words exclusive of references) should be received at the following address before or on March 31, 1999. EMNLP/VLC-99 Program Committee c/o Pascale Fung Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Important Dates March 31 Submission of full-length paper April 30 Acceptance notice May 20 Camera-ready paper due June 21-22 Conference date Program Chair Pascale Fung Human Language Technology Center Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering University of Science and Tehnology (HKUST) Clear Water Bay, Kowloon Hong Kong Tel: (+852) 2358 8537 Fax: (+852) 2358 1485 Email: pascale at ee.ust.hk Program Co-Chair Joe Zhou LEXIS-NEXIS, a Division of Reed Elsevier 9555 Springboro Pike Dayton, OH 45342 USA Email: joez at lexis-nexis.com Program Committee Jiang-Shin Chang (Behavior Design Corp.) Ken Church (AT&T Labs--Research) Ido Dagan (Bar-Ilan University) Marti Hearst (UC-Berkeley) Huang, Changning (Tsinghua University) Pierre Isabelle (Xerox Research Europe) Lillian Lee (Cornell University) David Lewis (AT&T Research) Dan Melamed (West Group) Mehryar Mohri (AT&T Labs--Research) Masaaki Nagata (NTT) Richard Sproat (AT&T Labs--Research) Andreas Stolcke (SRI) Ralph Weischedel (BBN) Dekai Wu (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology) David Yarowsky (Johns Hopkins University) From haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE Thu Mar 25 09:41:47 1999 From: haspelmath at EVA.MPG.DE (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:41:47 +0000 Subject: functional phonology at GLOW Message-ID: I wanted to ask if others share my impression that research in mainstream phonology is getting more and more functionally oriented. Is phonology again one step ahead of the dominant paradigm in syntax? Consider the following description of a GLOW ("Generative Linguistics in the Old World") workshop on phonology, to be held next week at the University of Potsdam: "The workshop is broadly concerned with the relevance of articulatory and perceptual facts for phonological theory. More specifically, it intends to focus on such questions as the extent to which functional factors determine phonological grammars, the status of the distinction between phonological representation and phonetic implementation, the issue of multiple (articulation-based as well as perception-based) phonological representations, and the universality and 'groundedness' of phonological constraints." More on the workshop (including the abstracts of papers) can be found at www.ling.uni-potsdam.de/ik/phon.html Since I am not a phonologist, I find it difficult to judge whether we are really witnessing a gradual paradigm shift here. And if so, why should phonology be so different from syntax? Martin Haspelmath -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Inselstr. 22 D-04103 Leipzig (Tel. (MPI) +49-341-9952 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616) From jan at LING.SU.SE Thu Mar 25 10:21:04 1999 From: jan at LING.SU.SE (Jan Anward) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 11:21:04 +0100 Subject: functional phonology at GLOW In-Reply-To: <36FA04D4.83DD24FD@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Isn't it is just an empiricist-physicalist feature of the American structuralist tradition, a Bloomfield heritage, if you like, that whereas it is all right to bring phonetic facts to bear on phonology, these facts being 'material' and 'real', it has never been all right to bring semantic or pragmatic facts to bear on syntax? Jan Anward ________________________________________________________________________ Jan Anward Department of Linguistics e-mail: jan at ling.su.se Stockholm University tel: +46 8 16 23 43 S-106 91 Stockholm fax +46 8 15 53 89 Sweden URL: http://www.ling.su.se/staff/jan Office: Room C 351, S?dra huset, Frescati From r.j.freeman at usa.net Thu Mar 25 12:08:39 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 20:08:39 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Sorry to be away for a day. Tony A. Wright wrote: > At 08:46 PM 3/23/99 +0800, Rob Freeman wrote: > > >I would probably have to agree with Syd on this bit. We all work within a > frame of > >reference, not much use in arguing otherwise, that's not new. Point is, > what can we do > >with it? I think the distinction to be made is that rules like this are > not much use > >for making cars. > > I don't see the comparison. Linguists "make" languages? Wouldn't you like to be able to? I would. Why does the auto-lady in my tele-banking service sound like a clockwork mouse? Why do you have to punch all those buttons instead of just telling her what to do? Why do you need a pointing 'mouse' to open a file on your computer? Because nobody can 'make' language, that's why. You can call these the problems of other fields and avoid them that way, but somebody has got to claim them, nobody can solve them, and they seem to have a lot to do with language to me. > > Your mechanic might appreciate your subjective observations about the > >car, but he needs knowledge of something more 'real' before he can fix it. > > He doesn't just appreciate it, he insists on it. His only alternative is > to check every component of the car, from the pistons to the turn signal to > see what's not functioning correctly. > > One might object that he could simply drive the car and see what's wrong > himself. Of course, this merely means that he will first have to gather > data about the car's behavior and formulate a rule-based account of > it--just like I did-- before he gets under the hood. I have no objection to any consistent system of description for talking about a problem. They can all be 'true'. There are different 'truths' - that's the subjectivity. If I ask you to describe a language to me I am happy if you tell me it is verb final, or ergative, that it identifies a 'patient' slot, or whatever, depending on my purpose (or I might want you to tell me it is beautiful, or that it sounds like a machine gun). Hearing it is verb final does not tell me what a verb _is_, however, even if I can analogize your use of the word 'verb' to my own experience and apply the knowledge to many purposes. But what a 'verb' _is_ (in sufficient detail that my tele-banking auto-lady can use one) is the elusive (subjective) reality that I am interested in at this time, what is 'under' grammar. Call it meta-grammar if you like. BTW with reference to Esa Itkonen's message, can anyone summarize Chomsky's dismissal of analogy as mechanism of language succinctly for me? I don't know if this is the right forum, but these things bear re-airing, from time to time IMHO. Rob From darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU Thu Mar 25 12:32:01 1999 From: darnell at CSD.UWM.EDU (Michael Darnell) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 06:32:01 -0600 Subject: functional phonology Message-ID: Hi to all, While I can't comment directly on GLOW, it is true, I think, that folks in phonology who have worked in the generative/formalist tradition are taking a hard look at phonetic data and language use data and using it to inform their approaches. For example, Mike Hammond has been looking at frequency effects and stress patterns. As a former student of his, I can tell you that his original approach was clearly generative/formalist. (Hi, Mike, if you're out there.) Mike Darnell From geoffn at SIU.EDU Thu Mar 25 15:01:17 1999 From: geoffn at SIU.EDU (Geoffrey S. Nathan) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:01:17 -0600 Subject: Functional (generative) phonology Message-ID: I think that people's assessment that 'generative' phonology is becoming more 'functional' (all scare quotes deliberate) is quite correct. I am, as some of you know, a died-in-the-wool functional phonologist (in the American, rather than the European sense), a student of David Stampe, and I have been trying to integrate the principles of Natural Phonology with the concepts of Cognitive Grammar. But I continue to follow the paradigm in what has evolved out of Generative Phonology. While some practitioners continue to ignore phonetic considerations, others, especially many at the leading edge of Optimality Theory development, are attempting to build articulatory and (occasionally) acoustic considerations into the grammar. I should point out, in addition, that not all functional considerations are purely 'phonetic'. Bruce Hayes, for example, has done some very nice work on the nature of rhythm and how human rhythmic behavior contributes to the nature of stress systems in the world's languages. And, of course, in my work I have argued that phonemes are categories, and consequently such categorization principles as prototypicality and image schema transformations apply to relate members of categories--again, these are 'functional' considerations which go beyond the issue of the plumbing used in producing sounds. For what it's worth, when there was a conference held two years ago in Milwaukee on formalism/functionalism, the phonologists among us (Hayes, Hammond, Bybee, me) had far more to say to each other than the syntacticians and semanticists. The convergence is greater at the phonological level than at higher ones. Volume one of that conference will be out from Benjamins in a month or so, incidentally. Geoff Geoffrey S. Nathan Department of Linguistics Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, 62901 USA Phone: +618 453-3421 (Office) FAX +618 453-6527 +618 549-0106 (Home) From geoffn at SIU.EDU Thu Mar 25 15:04:38 1999 From: geoffn at SIU.EDU (Geoffrey S. Nathan) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:04:38 -0600 Subject: Functional (generative) phonology Message-ID: begin 644 Happy99.exe M35I0``(````$``\`__\``+@`````````0``:```````````````````````` M``````````````````````$``+H0``X?M`G-(;@!3,TAD)!4:&ES('!R;V=R M86T@;75S="!B92!R=6X@=6YD97(@5VEN,S(-"B0W```````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M`````````````````````````````````````````%!%``!,`00`GR77C@`` M````````X`". at 0L!`AD`"@```!8```````````$````!`````@```$`````! 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M-(U[S7\-0(-Y\WJC>R-\DWSS?:-^DW!C at -.!4X'C at R M.#\X=CA\.(LXFSBG.*XXM#BZ.,`XQCC,.-(XV#C>..0XZCCP./8X_#@".0 at Y M#CD4.1HY(#DF.2PY,CDX.3XY1#E*.5`Y5CE<.6(Y:#EN.0`````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` *```````````````` ` end From kaboyates at SPRINTMAIL.COM Thu Mar 25 15:51:03 1999 From: kaboyates at SPRINTMAIL.COM (Bob Yates) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:51:03 -0600 Subject: Virus warning: happy99.exe!!! Message-ID: Attached to Geoffrey Nathan's last message was an attachment entitled happy99.exe! Do not under any circumstances execute this program. Go here for information about it: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2195075,00.html Bob Yates, Central Missouri State University From dkp at U.ARIZONA.EDU Thu Mar 25 16:18:32 1999 From: dkp at U.ARIZONA.EDU (Dianne K. Patterson) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 09:18:32 -0700 Subject: Functional (generative) phonology In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19990325090117.00832860@saluki-mail.siu.edu> Message-ID: Two points: 1) Geoffrey Nathan has sent a letter referencing Happy99.exe, a well known and nasty little virus. What is all that about? 2) I've just spent the last 6 years of my life trying to understand the sound categories used by a parrot (Alex) who has referential use of English words. He does have minimal pairs of words (for ex., "tea" "key") and the acoustic and articulatory characteristics of these sound categories /t/ vs /k/ etc. are quite different. Now, I have to be careful and call these "phoneme-like" categories...because, of course, he may not have the perceptual trading relations that humans have for these categories etc. etc. but I think that the existence of these categories is evidence of an intriguing class of problems about the human/language specificity of the "phoneme". Interestingly, Alex also engages in word play in which he drops the onset off of a word and sticks on a new onset to create word-like items that he's never heard before. This word play seems to conform to certain restrictions that are natural-class like (that is, he might take /k/ off of "key" and put on "ch" in its place, but he'd never stick a vowel in its place. At any rate, I thought you all might be interested in the "Alex" phenomenon. Dianne Patterson U of A On Thu, 25 Mar 1999, Geoffrey S. Nathan wrote: > I think that people's assessment that 'generative' phonology is becoming > more 'functional' (all scare quotes deliberate) is quite correct. > I am, as some of you know, a died-in-the-wool functional phonologist (in > the American, rather than the European sense), a student of David Stampe, > and I have been trying to integrate the principles of Natural Phonology > with the concepts of Cognitive Grammar. But I continue to follow the > paradigm in what has evolved out of Generative Phonology. While some > practitioners continue to ignore phonetic considerations, others, > especially many at the leading edge of Optimality Theory development, are > attempting to build articulatory and (occasionally) acoustic considerations > into the grammar. I should point out, in addition, that not all functional > considerations are purely 'phonetic'. Bruce Hayes, for example, has done > some very nice work on the nature of rhythm and how human rhythmic behavior > contributes to the nature of stress systems in the world's languages. And, > of course, in my work I have argued that phonemes are categories, and > consequently such categorization principles as prototypicality and image > schema transformations apply to relate members of categories--again, these > are 'functional' considerations which go beyond the issue of the plumbing > used in producing sounds. > For what it's worth, when there was a conference held two years ago in > Milwaukee on formalism/functionalism, the phonologists among us (Hayes, > Hammond, Bybee, me) had far more to say to each other than the > syntacticians and semanticists. The convergence is greater at the > phonological level than at higher ones. on>Volume one of that conference will be out from Benjamins in a month or > so, incidentally. > > Geoff > > > Geoffrey S. Nathan > Department of Linguistics > Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, > Carbondale, IL, 62901 USA > Phone: +618 453-3421 (Office) FAX +618 453-6527 > +618 549-0106 (Home) > From faucon at COGSCI.UCSD.EDU Thu Mar 25 18:30:27 1999 From: faucon at COGSCI.UCSD.EDU (Gilles Fauconnier) Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 10:30:27 -0800 Subject: dismissal of analogy Message-ID: The importance of analogy in all matters linguistic has of course been recognized for centuries. In early generative grammar, you'll find quite a few disparaging references to analogy. This was due to a confusion between the cognitive operation of analogy and the folk-theoretic notion of 'analogy' as a non-scientific, vague and unconstrained way of trying to explain things. The same mistake would probably not be made today, because of the impressive amount of work done in the 80's and 90's in cognitive science on analogy, metaphor, frame-projections, conceptual blending, etc. You ask about Chomsky, who always looms large in the preoccupations of linguists! On a personal note, I had occasion some years ago to tell him about the explanatory value of analogical mapping in semantics. I have to say that he showed no aptitude at all for this way of thinking (and little curiosity for the empirical data that motivate it)! [BTW, the prejudice against analogy remains strong in so-called formal semantics and in analytic philosophy] Gilles Fauconnier Department of Cognitive Science University of California San Diego La Jolla CA 92093 Phone 619 534 69 58 Fax 619 822-0599 E-mail gfauconnier at ucsd.edu From lamb at ruf.rice.edu Fri Mar 26 17:32:36 1999 From: lamb at ruf.rice.edu (Sydney M Lamb) Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1999 11:32:36 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36F1C126.828B96B0@usa.net> Message-ID: Rob, Tony, Sherman, Esa, Steve, Brian, and bystanders: Hi, I'm back! I'd like to try to clarify a bit, adding to y'all's already interesting efforts. On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > ... > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > processing? ... Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. The point I was trying to make takes off mainly from the assertion that this grammar that "you still get" "is just the observed regularities ... and analogies to them ..." The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language) and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg? Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of remembered examples plus an ability to analogize? Or are you proposing that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular form other than that? On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Rob Freeman further writes: > ... In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example > and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with > fuzzy edges. To this I ask the same question, (ceteris paribus), plus this one: What/where is this "grammar" you refer to here? Anywhere real? > ... Anyway, I was just drawing attention to this 'analogy-based' work Right - I appreciate this point, but I still ask my question. > (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-). Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed and remembered inputs. On Mon, 22 Mar, Tony A. Wright asks > If I give the mechanic an account of my car's behavior, namely that it > dies out any time I let my foot off the gas, which I formalize using the > following rule: > dies / [- accelerator] __________ (dies immediately following an > environment negatively-specified for > accelerator pressure). > is my account of my car's behavior really only about me, and not about > the car in any sense? The facts are about the car, the means of stating them are about you. Those who take an interest in "God's Truth" (which we can reformulate for modern times as taking an interest in what is in the mind and/or brain) have to be concerned with the means of stating the facts. If one is not concerned with the means but only with getting the fact accurate -- for language this means providing an accurate account of some aspects of the linguistic productions of people -- then one is doing (what I at least was calling) hocus pocus linguistics -- a practise to which I have no objection at all, by the way. But I do insist on the distinction between the two kinds of aim. Both are valid, both have useful applications. > ... All of these would certainly say much about me and my penchant for > branching nodes, arrows, brackets, etc. Exactly my point. > But at the core, these formalisms would all equate to "dies when I let > off the gas," which let's suppose is exactly, for whatever reason, what > the car does, with not a single counter-example. And this is a good example of the usefulness of the "hocus-pocus" approach to data. (On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 20:46:10 +0800 Rob Freeman already conveyed approx the equiv message) On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 09:05:34 -0700 Sherman Wilcox adds: > ... > Maybe linguists' grammars work -- that doesn't make them right. ... And I wholedheartedly agree, with a qualification: they can be more or less right in a hocus-pocus sense, but that doesn't in any way make them right in a neurocognitive sense. As Sherman further says, evidently motivated by cognitive considerations: > ... I'd like to figure out why and how and what people do what they do when they create utterances. When it comes to language, we are all improvisational geniuses. Since I was using the terms "God's Truth" and "hocus-pocus" in a more clearly defined way than those mid-century structuralists, maybe I could communicate more clearly by using, instead of these terms, the following: Analytical Linguistics -- This is the familar kind. In this mode one is mainly concerned with accurately describing linguistic productions (without concern for the process of production or that of comprehension or the system that makes those processes possible). Neurocognitive Linguistics -- The aim here is to understand that system and those processes. I use the term 'neurocognitive' rather than just 'cognitive' since many people nowadays who use the term 'cognitive' are using it to label concerns which are mainly those of analytical lx. (See the article by Bert Peeters in WORD, August 98). Esa Itkonen adds, and I wholeheartedly agree: > ... Both approaches are equally legitimate ... Thanx for 'listening', -Syd From keith_slater at SIL.ORG Fri Mar 26 21:22:21 1999 From: keith_slater at SIL.ORG (Keith Slater) Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1999 16:22:21 -0500 Subject: functional phonology Message-ID: I think there's a good reason why generative phonology seems more functional than does generative syntax. >From the outset, the generative program in phonology seems to have tried to account for the same sorts of facts that had been described in historical phonology. Underlying representations were (more or less) based on internal reconstruction, and the goals of the theory thus had to include the modelling of the sorts of phonological and phonetic changes that actually occur in human language. Unfortunately, generative syntax had no such historical model to base its approach on. One can only wonder what generative syntax would look like today, if there had been (for example) a well-developed approach to grammaticization before Chomsky came along. Perhaps we'd see a more "functional" program in syntax, too. Keith From r.j.freeman at usa.net Sat Mar 27 05:03:06 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Sat, 27 Mar 1999 13:03:06 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Sydney M Lamb wrote: > On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > > ... > > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based' > > processing? ... Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed > > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what > > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic > > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges. > > The point I was trying to make takes off mainly from the assertion that > this grammar that "you still get" "is just the observed regularities ... > and analogies to them ..." Ah, there might be a misunderstanding there. When I say 'you still get grammar' I mean it rather in the sense of a side-effect. In the same way as with a picture of a clockwork you still 'get' a clockwork, but the 'reality' is all paint and canvas. > The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and > what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism > being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language) > and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg? If I understand you then 'Yes'. And I would put 'command of the language' firmly back on option '1).' I think command is pretty firmly rooted in the mechanism. Except when you have to pass an English exam. > Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of > remembered examples plus an ability to analogize? Or are you proposing > that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular > form other than that? The 'examples and ability' one. The analogical operations can give you _lots_ of forms, and I think that is an important operation at different times, but I think it is important to realize that there is certainly no _particular_ form. The collection of examples you get at any moment is task dependent, and there are infinitely many of them, in fact. I think _conception_ (not command) is the emergent form linked thing, and we all know how many conceptual perspectives there are, an infinite number, just as we would like - we've been thrashing the 'relative' reality thing all week. > On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Rob Freeman further writes: > > > ... In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example > > and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with > > fuzzy edges. > > To this I ask the same question, (ceteris paribus), plus this one: > What/where is this "grammar" you refer to here? Anywhere real? Of course we have lots of 'observed regularity' grammars, but I perceive it's the 'meta-grammars' you want to get hold of. I hobbled together a lot of loose threads and sent them to Esa the other day. Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention the high spots here. I would say key current leads are: 'memory-based' work at Tilburg in the Netherlands (Rens Bod's stuff I'm not sure of), Royal Skousen's work from two or three years ago and, on a separate thread, the phrasal/collocational/formulaic/lexical theory trend you see emerging in corpus linguistic and second language acquisition circles in the last few years. I don't think the cultures have met yet, but they should. There's some good lexical category work which was done a few years ago by people like Hinrich Shutze. That also merges into 'vector models' for text retrieval, and genre categorization work using factor analysis or 'feature vectors' by people like Douglas Biber, but this probably goes outside what people are interested in here. Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without saying (mostly some interesting experiments with finite word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries it's own psychological baggage around with it, and some limitations of method too (the finite class bit), so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here. Oh, and I would class all functionalism as closet 'analogy grammar' at heart. Isn't systemic _contrast_ of form meant to underpin all meaning in functionalism, and contrasts in meaning, in their turn, to specify form? Well 'contrasts in contrasts' are similarities. Seems to me that if you decide contrast in (contrast defined) meaning specifies form, then you are deciding similarity, or analogy, specifies form. But I'm not trained in functionalism so I would not necessarily know. I just started following it because of this perceived syllogism. > > (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-). > > Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) > includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the > position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its > operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates > generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed > and remembered inputs. A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a _network_ is a mechanism, and what results (very naturally, though not exclusively) from its operation is often analogy! But there is probably room to describe analogical processes as 'abstract networks' if you want to. As for the rest, the 'relativeness' bit, all is agreement (...many perspectives, many grammars - in fact in my theory multiple grammars and multiple cognitive spaces are predicted to be the same thing, so the congruent 'manyness' is explained). Though there might be a point on the relativeness of 'God's Truth' itself, to take it to another level, that a philosopher would be more qualified to argue than me, tree's falling unseen in forests, and all that... For me the 'reality' point is resolved by what you can _do_ with the theories you get. Anyway, if we agree to define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something with (wrt a given problem) we are in agreement on the distinction between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given problem). Rob From Ziv at HUM.HUJI.AC.IL Sun Mar 28 02:30:00 1999 From: Ziv at HUM.HUJI.AC.IL (Ziv Yael) Date: Sat, 27 Mar 1999 18:30:00 PST Subject: New e-mail address Message-ID: Shalom everybody, Following is my new e-mail address : mszivy at mscc.huji.ac.il Thanks for updading your records. Regards, Yael Ziv Dept of English The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus Israel 91905 Fax: 972-2-5322545 (University) Tel: 972-2-5883973 (W) 972-2-6782059 (H) From delancey at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Sun Mar 28 19:50:01 1999 From: delancey at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Scott Delancey) Date: Sun, 28 Mar 1999 11:50:01 -0800 Subject: functional phonology at GLOW In-Reply-To: <36FA04D4.83DD24FD@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: On Thu, 25 Mar 1999, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Since I am not a phonologist, I find it difficult to judge whether we > are really witnessing a gradual paradigm shift here. And if so, why > should phonology be so different from syntax? Yes, I think there's definitely a lot about contemporary phonology that could properly be called "functionalist". (I'd date the beginnings of it to the introduction of Autosegmental Phonology in the '70's, though people didn't start seriously seeing the implications of AS for a while after that). One reason, I think, is that generative phonology has always been much more cross-linguistically, typologically oriented than syntax. While _Aspects of *the Theory of Syntax*_ deals exclusively with English data, _The Sound Pattern of *English*_ uses data from over 70 languages in building and justifying the theoretical framework for the analysis of English. As we all know, the more willing you are to look closely at data from a range of languages, the easier it is to avoid some of the intellectual pitfalls that generative syntax has spent a generation lost in. Scott DeLancey From spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU Mon Mar 29 02:01:33 1999 From: spikeg at OWLNET.RICE.EDU (Spike L Gildea) Date: Sun, 28 Mar 1999 20:01:33 -0600 Subject: for FUNKNET (fwd) Message-ID: from: T. Givon RE: FUNCTIONALIST PHONOLOGY I think Scott Dleancey's historical comment was very perceptive. But perhaps something else could be added: Phonology has always been much more adaptively transparent. To begin with, two of its coding processes (speech perception, articulation) are relatively concrete, & their adaptive value is rather transparent. But even the third, more abstract functional dimention of phonology ("phonology proper")--the neurological coding of conceptual meaning-- has been implicit in much of the traditional (pre-Chomsky) work on **minimal pairs**, **phonemic contrasts**, **complementary distribution** etc. So much so that even the grand abstract edifice of ordered rules (that deft abduction of diachrony into synchrony...) and other gratuitous abstractions could not quite succeed in obliterating the manifest adaptive dimentions of phonetics/phonology. The bane of syntax/grammar has been, of course, that (i) the adaptive ('functional') dimentions associated with it are much less transparent, in as much as they are not easily discoverable by the traditional clause-level, (reflective, conscious, speculative) methodology. And (ii), the code itself is so much more abstract. This latter fact has tended to yield two curious results: **Among formalists, the genuine abstraction of the grammatical code has licensed unmotivated, excessive abstract descriptions ('generaliza- tions'), constrained primarily by (a species of) formal economy rather than by the data. **Among functionalists, there is an unfortunate tendency to ignore the genuine, manifest abstract dimensions of grammar. What we do then, is either focus solely on grammar's more concrete dimentions (morphology, word-order, intonation); or, worse, we deny the reality of grammar altogether (often denying the relevance of the notion "code" to grammar). Much of the recent discussion on "Grammar with G" seems to have fallen prey to some version of these attitudes. Which is, leastwise from where I stand, rather unfortunate. Grammar is the most complex domain of human language. On the functional side, it ranges over (i.e. 'interacts with') a big chunk of lexical semantics, particularly of verbs (event frames, argument structuree); over all of propositional (combinatorial) semantics; and over most of **systematically coded** discourse pragmatics (here excepting gesturally-, intonationally- & facially-coded pragmatics). It has massive interaction with both episodic memory & working memory (thus attention). It is thus hardly surprising that the coding instrument itself is complex and (partially) abstract. Complexity & abstraction are siamese twins in systems design. The thing that worries me most, in science in general & but in linguistics in particular, is how prone we all are--again & again--to seek simple models ('solutions') to complex domains ('problems'). This intellectual scourge is called **reductionism**, and it is killing our science just as conspicuously as its twin scourge--**ideological nationalism**--is killing people. If our preoccupation with iconicity should have taught us anything at all, it is that reductionism, anywhere except perhaps in logic, is a very dubious methodological maneuver (Occam's Razor notwithstanding). Y'all be good, y'hear. TG From geoffn at SIU.EDU Mon Mar 29 14:38:40 1999 From: geoffn at SIU.EDU (Geoffrey S. Nathan) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 08:38:40 -0600 Subject: Apologies Message-ID: Let me apologize for unleashing the 'happy99.exe' worm. I had never heard of it before some of you alerted me. I received it from someone I infrequently correspond with, and thought he had sent me a belated New Year's 'gift'. I believe I have disinfected all the computers it came in contact with. If anyone needs instructions, feel free to contact me. Nobody ever commented on my original message--I assume people were distracted by the worm, but I must say I've been enjoying the discussion. Geoff Remember--just delete the attachment 'happy99.exe'--don't run it. Geoffrey S. Nathan Department of Linguistics Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, 62901 USA Phone: +618 453-3421 (Office) FAX +618 453-6527 +618 549-0106 (Home) From lamb at ruf.rice.edu Mon Mar 29 17:01:12 1999 From: lamb at ruf.rice.edu (Sydney M Lamb) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 11:01:12 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a "G" In-Reply-To: <36FC668A.B62409EF@usa.net> Message-ID: On Sat, 27 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote: > Sydney M Lamb wrote: > > > The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and > > what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism > > being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language) > > and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg? > > If I understand you then 'Yes'. And I would put 'command of the language' firmly > back on option '1).' I think command is pretty firmly rooted in the mechanism. > Except when you have to pass an English exam. If you really want to put command of the language "firmly back on option '1)'" then you seem not to be distinguishing between (a) the learning mechanism and (b) what results from the learning process. Is that really your position? or am I misunderstanding? > > Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of > > remembered examples plus an ability to analogize? Or are you proposing > > that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular > > form other than that? > > The 'examples and ability' one. Ah, then, it seems that I have not misunderstood and that you really are claiming that the brain only remembers examples and has the ability to analogize, but that it doesn't generalize from the examples nor from its analogizing. > The analogical operations can give you _lots_ of > forms, and I think that is an important operation at different times... Yes, indeed they can -- but do you really want to claim that the brain goes back to square one each time and just starts from the examples plus the ability to analogize, and doesn't remember the results of such processing performed earlier, and doesn't build generalizations? > ... . Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention > the high spots here. ... > Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without saying (mostly some interesting > experiments with finite word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries > it's own psychological baggage around with it, and some limitations of method too > (the finite class bit), so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here. Oops!! I now have to ask, what kind of reality you have in mind. The PDP stuff has practically zero neurological plausibility, hence can hardly be regarded as able to come up with anything realistic. (At least, I'm happy to observe that you "wouldn't want to emphasize it here.") > ... > > Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) > > includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the > > position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its > > operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates > > generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed > > and remembered inputs. > > A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a _network_ is a mechanism, and > what results (very naturally, though not exclusively) from its operation is often analogy! I come very close to agreeing with this. To clarify we would have to move to the next higher level of precision, where we could say that what we have is a network system and that it can indeed be thought of as a mechanism; but I would prefer to say (at the risk of sounding obscure) that some of its operations produce results that _could be described_ as analogical. It is a subtle distinction, but what I am trying to say is that the term 'analogy' doesn't Directly characterize either an operation of the system or the results of such operation; rather it describes (and quite well) what the system Seems to be doing -- but it doesn't Direcly describe what it is Actually doing to give that appearance. In other words, the operation of the network system Accounts for our observations that there seems to be some kind of analogical process involved. OK, I admit it. This Does Indeed sound pretty obscure. But there is an example which can clarify, on pp. 212-213 of 'Pathways of the Brain'. It proposes a simple process of building new connections in the developing system of a typical child, just in the most directly available way to the system at that point, which results in the child's producing 'brang' as the past tense of 'bring'. > But there is probably room to describe analogical processes as 'abstract > networks' if you want to. No, I wouldn't want to do that. > As for the rest, the 'relativeness' bit, all is agreement (...many perspectives, > ... For me the 'reality' point is > resolved by what you can _do_ with the theories you get. Anyway, if we agree to > define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something with (wrt a given problem) we are > in agreement on the distinction between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given > problem). Too bad: we are Not in agreement. If you allow many theories which can come up with similar products then you are talking hocus-pocus wrt the actual mechanism (in our case, brain structures). These multiple theories are saying, in effect, "It's AS IF the brain were operating in such and such a way". So, for example, linguists might construct many diff grammars of many diff forms, all of which would account for certain sentences of a lg. If they do so correctly, that would apparently be good enough to satisfy you -- along with many others. Fine, may you and they be blessed. But: For a person interested in God's Truth, that isn't good enough -- such a person wants to know, to at least some extent, what is Actually There. Best, -Syd From amnfn at WELL.COM Mon Mar 29 20:41:30 1999 From: amnfn at WELL.COM (A. Katz) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 12:41:30 -0800 Subject: No subject Message-ID: I don't know about reductionism, but I would tend to agree with Givon on the issue of abstraction. Those who speak out against grammar with a capital G seem to be throwing out the benefits of generalization in favor of isolated examples. Likewise, the rejection of anything that does not relate directly to brain morphology or neurological facts of language processing implies a concrete-bound approach. Language would not work if not for generalization. Abstraction is at the very heart of the phenomenon whose study our discipline undertakes. I would prefer to distinguish the concrete language-processing entity from the `language' that it processes. Wasn't it Chomsky who introduced the idea that language and the little black box that supposedly produces it are inseparable? As functionalists, do we buy into that? Brain configurations vary. Persons with severe brain damage in early childhood are often capable of normal language processing and production, even though the connections in their brains are very different from the norm. What if we found that even in normal, undamaged brains, there is an immense variety of ways in which the same item can be stored and processed by native speakers of the same language? If we concentrated on the biological entity that produces it, we'd lose the generalization involved in the communicative function of language. Speakers don't know how their interlocutors' brains are configured. Communication is based on the abstract system of contrasts set up in the language. We react to electronically programmed simulations of human speech just as we would to those produced by actual people, if it's close enough. We read manuscripts written thousands of years ago, and the information is communicated, even though the brain that produced it has long ago been consumed by worms. That's the magic of language. The concretes don't matter. --Aya Katz From TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU Mon Mar 29 22:36:20 1999 From: TWRIGHT at ACCDVM.ACCD.EDU (Tony A. Wright) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 16:36:20 CST Subject: Grammar with a G Message-ID: > Speakers don't know how their interlocutors' brains are configured. > Communication is based on the abstract system of contrasts set up in > the language. We react to electronically programmed simulations of > human speech just as we would to those produced by actual people, if > it's close enough. We read manuscripts written thousands of > years ago, and the information is communicated, even though the brain > that produced it has long ago been consumed by worms. > > That's the magic of language. The concretes don't matter. Hear hear! What you have written is--I think--the first sane and actually meaningful thing to appear on FUNKNET in ages. I think everything you have said is implicit in the way linguists actually work. Some are willing to admit that they use of abstraction, and some aren't. And then there are those who want to be neurologists. Frankly, while I'm sure neurology is fascinating, abstract linguistic analysis is no less so, to me anyway. I can't believe people want to give up linguistics for bean counting (neuron-counting). --Tony Wright From twright at INTERSATX.NET Mon Mar 29 23:40:22 1999 From: twright at INTERSATX.NET (Tony A. Wright) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 17:40:22 -0600 Subject: Grammar with a G: My apologies Message-ID: I would like to apologize to everyone for my tacky and uncalled-for remarks just now under the subject heading "Grammar with a G". I really do value the perspective of neurolinguistics and other functionally-oriented approaches, and I plead (temporary) insanity for saying things that would indicate otherwise. --Tony Wright From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 30 04:15:35 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 12:15:35 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a "G" Message-ID: Sydney M Lamb wrote: > ...do you really want to claim that the brain > goes back to square one each time and just starts from the examples plus > the ability to analogize, and doesn't remember the results of such > processing performed earlier, and doesn't build generalizations? Yes, I do. Well, rather, I think those generalizations are the same things as concepts, so every time you need a new concept you need to build a new generalization. > > ... . Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention > > the high spots here. ... > > Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without > > saying (mostly some interesting experiments with finite > > word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries > > it's own psychological baggage around with it, and > > some limitations of method too (the finite class bit), > > so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here. > > Oops!! I now have to ask, what kind of reality you have in mind. The PDP > stuff has practically zero neurological plausibility, hence can hardly be > regarded as able to come up with anything realistic. (At least, I'm happy > to observe that you "wouldn't want to emphasize it here.") I agree, they have flaws. > > > ...my view (now expressed more fully in my new book) > > > includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the > > > position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its > > > operation is new network structure... > > > > A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a > > _network_ is a mechanism, and what results (very naturally, though > > not exclusively) from its operation is often analogy! > > I come very close to agreeing with this... > > ...But there is > an example which can clarify, on pp. 212-213 of 'Pathways of the > Brain'. It proposes a simple process of building new connections in the > developing system of a typical child, just in the most directly available > way to the system at that point, which results in the child's producing > 'brang' as the past tense of 'bring'. I would suspect the action of analogy, or at least similarity, least-squares, or some such thing, in the nature of 'the most directly available way'. > > ...if we agree to define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something > > with (wrt a given problem) we are in agreement on the distinction > > between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given > > problem). > > ...For a person interested in God's Truth, that isn't good enough -- > such a person wants to know, to at least some extent, what is Actually > There. Then you will need the 'eye of God', because you will only ever see it filtered through your education and your brain, and you too, like me and everybody else, will be seeing mostly both. Personally I'm happy to resign myself to debating useful abstractions, with the emphasis on _useful_. Rob From r.j.freeman at usa.net Tue Mar 30 04:15:44 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 12:15:44 +0800 Subject: No subject Message-ID: A. Katz wrote: > ...I would prefer to distinguish the concrete language-processing > entity > from the `language' that it processes. Wasn't it Chomsky who > introduced the idea that language and the little black box that > supposedly produces it are inseparable? As functionalists, do we buy > into that? I think he might have been arguing that concretes don't matter, actually. Hence the _black_ box. > ...Speakers don't know how their interlocutors' brains are configured. > Communication is based on the abstract system of contrasts set up in > the language. Am I wrong in thinking that syntactic form is specified by systemic contrasts of meaning in functionalism? That is what I am arguing, for myself. I don't know where all this talk of neurons came from. Rob From amnfn at WELL.COM Tue Mar 30 07:21:47 1999 From: amnfn at WELL.COM (A. Katz) Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 23:21:47 -0800 Subject: No subject Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote (in re Chomsky's black box): >I think he might have been arguing that concretes don't matter, actually. >Hence the _black_ box. The black box is vague, but it isn't all that abstract. As I understand it, humans are supposed to come equipped with a device that has specific syntactic settings. The range available is very limited, it is given in advance, and it is physically hard-wired. We may not know or care exactly how, but it's a physical property. This is not too different from asserting that all humans come equipped with an organ of veneration, whose exact location in the brain is not currently known. That's kind of vague, but it is entirely too concrete. --Aya Katz From Carl.Mills at UC.Edu Tue Mar 30 17:50:45 1999 From: Carl.Mills at UC.Edu (Carl Mills) Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 12:50:45 -0500 Subject: A defense of beans and counting them Message-ID: Aya Katz wrote (in part): >> >> That's the magic of language. The concretes don't matter. And Tony Wright seconded: > >Hear hear! What you have written is--I think--the first sane and actually >meaningful thing to appear on FUNKNET in ages. I think everything you have >said is implicit in the way linguists actually work. Some are >willing to admit that they use of abstraction, and some aren't. And then there >are those who want to be neurologists. Frankly, while I'm sure neurology is >fascinating, abstract linguistic analysis is no less so, to me anyway. > >I can't believe people want to give up linguistics for >bean counting (neuron-counting). > >--Tony Wright > As a confirmed counter (of beans and everything else (see the character Cameron in Richard Brautigan's The Hawkline Monster)) and a determined lover of things concrete, I want to reply to the recent posts by Aya and Tony. (And yes, I did read Tony's apology, but I think other points of view need to be represented.) First, magic is fine, but not all of us are interested in magic. And for some of us the concretes do matter very much--at least, in science, as a means of keeping score. And while linguistics is certainly not neurology, there are other ways of looking at the relationship between neuroscience and linguistics. Vic Yngve, Syd Lamb, and George Lakoff have, in different ways, explored some aspects of this relationship. Personally, I would like to see linguistics become a science, and that means looking at the relation between concrete structures and specific functions, on one hand, and abstract theory, on the other. More, it means that linguistics would finally have to pay a long-overdue promissory note to neuroscience (That's ok: there has not been much "there" there in neuroscience to receive payment until quite recently.). Linguistics needs to become physically realistic. This does not have to result in the sort of nothing-but reductionism that has been labeled "greedy reductionism" (Whom am I quoting here? Is it Pat Churchland?). But it does mean that linguistics has to be "responsible to" a neurocognitive substrate--just as chemistry has to accord with the laws of physics, biology has to frame its explanatory theories in terms of chemistry, and psychology has to ground its theories in the brain. It is not, however, a matter of counting neurons. As I, an observer hoping to learn something useful, of neuroscience and neurocognitive approaches to things human, understand it, connections--vertical as well as horizontal, subcortical as well as cortical--among populations of neurons are what we need to look at (and neurochemistry, too, for that matter). Linguists do not have to be neuroscientists, but unless we give our discipline a firm grounding in what folks are discovering about the brain, it will never become a science. Instead, linguistics will be condemned to drift forever between the sciences and the humanities (sic). However, there is more to grounding than mere neuroscience. We also need to ground out abstract theories in evolutionary biology. In The Mind's Past, Gazzaniga says that the first (and last ) question we must ask is "What is X for?" As an outside and sympathetic (I think) observer of functionalists who hopes to learn something from y'all, I believe that functionalists have been asking Gazzaniga's question for a long time. I just don't think that "grammar" or "Grammar" or "communication" are sufficiently concrete, sufficiently fine-grained, sufficiently biological to build a useful abstract theory on. I have no quarrel with "grammar(s)" as summaries or parsimonious descriptions of observed regularities in attested languages (with an 's' at the end). I just see such "grammars" as data to be explained, not as explanations. As for big-G Grammar (or UG, if you will) or "Grammars" in the formal sense, I do not see how they offer anything but a series of dead ends, an endless asking of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I should leave such big issues to Lakoff and Yngve and others who are more capable of dealing with them. Reductionistically yours, Carl From r.j.freeman at usa.net Wed Mar 31 04:23:55 1999 From: r.j.freeman at usa.net (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:23:55 +0800 Subject: Grammar with a G Message-ID: I was hoping some more debate might come up on the (abstract) merits of analogy, and how it relates to functionalism and systemic contrast (whether or not faced with observations at a neural level). But as none seems forthcoming just a final comment on 'reductionism'. I don't see basing examples on syntactic abstractions (the usual idea of G-grammar) as inherently less reductionistic than basing syntactic abstractions on examples (which is analogy). Even where 'reductionism' might be thought of as bad, which is by no means always, grounding in examples is simply not more reductionist, if anything it is less. Remember what we are discussing here. Essentially they are systems. Linguists have traditionally been rather weak on systems. Chomsky bought some mathematical machinery over to formalize a traditional one (combination?), the functional tradition has revered (though dare I say largely ignored) another (contrast?). I believe Helmslev and others(?) proposed some other pretty esoteric ones (also along the lines of contrast?). But they are all systems. One might seem more 'concrete' than another, but that is simply another aspect of evidence in favour or against. One might seem to over simplify, but all systems, thank goodness, simplify. Let's not all get so caught up in the artifacts or our art that we forget we are all proposing systems. It's not system or not, it's one or another. Remember that under all of your understanding lies an assumption of system, and I think the gulfs between us will narrow. Rob From W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE Wed Mar 31 14:42:59 1999 From: W.Schulze at LRZ.UNI-MUENCHEN.DE (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 16:42:59 +0200 Subject: Grammar and System Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote: > Let's not all get so caught up in the artifacts or our art that we forget we > are all proposing systems. It's not system or not, it's one or another. Let me briefly ask you: Which kind of system to you talk about? Do you refer to the cognitive reality "linguistic knowledge 'system'" or to some kind of artefact that is established by the systematization of what is produced by this knowledge 'system'? At least since Husserl's phenomenology is has become clear that "systematic thinking" is a problematic kind of scientificism that often aims at the creation of "systems" in order to construe realities instead of understanding them. Hence I would sharply distinguish between metalinguistic "grammars" that construe a linguistic reality in order to make it interpretable or usefull in some sense or another from the linguistic knowledge bases that generate this reality. On the metalinguistic level, we can apply any kind of cybernetic assumptions, mathematical calculations and formalization, system logics etc. But if linguistics concentrate on such grammars then it may well be that we create nothing but metalinguistic theories or theories of metagrammars. However, it would be good to know more about the organization of linguistic knowledge itself. The intentional or pragmatic use of this knowledge already creates a interpretative "distance" between an indiviual and his/her language which allows him/her to look at this knowledge as a "system". The less this knowledge is articulate, the less it is systematized by a "user", the more it is part of the overall communicative and cognitive behavior of this indiviual, i.e. the cumulation of synergetic activities of a polycentric knowledge cluster. In this respect, real (or tacit) "grammar" is much less systematic than generally thought. Wolfgang -- _____________________________________________________ | Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze | Institut fuer Allgemeine und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen | Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 | D-80539 Muenchen | Tel: +89-21802486 (secr.) | +89-21802485 (office) | Email: W.Schulze at mail.lrz-muenchen.de | http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/ _____________________________________________________ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: W.Schulze.vcf Type: text/x-vcard Size: 192 bytes Desc: Visitenkarte f?r Wolfgang Schulze URL: