Grammar with a "G"

[Rob Freeman]

Sydney M Lamb wrote:

> On Fri, 19 Mar 1999, Rob Freeman wrote:
> > ...
> > anything come up yet regarding 'emergent structure' from 'analogy based'
> > processing? ...  Basic idea is that grammar is just the observed
> > regularities of collections of examples, and analogies to them, which are what
> > really control our perceptions. You still get grammar, but because the basic
> > mechanism is analogy it has soft edges.
>
> The point I was trying to make takes off mainly from the assertion that
> this grammar that "you still get"  "is just the observed regularities ...
> and analogies to them ..."

Ah, there might be a misunderstanding there. When I say 'you still get grammar' I
mean it rather in the sense of a side-effect. In the same way as with a picture of a
clockwork you still 'get' a clockwork, but the 'reality' is all paint and canvas.

> The question is, as asked by one interested in what is in the mind and
> what is going on there: Are you distinguishing between (1) the mechanism
> being proposed for arriving at "grammar" (or some command of the language)
> and (2) that resulting "grammar" or command of the lg?

If I understand you then 'Yes'. And I would put 'command of the language' firmly
back on option '1).' I think command is pretty firmly rooted in the mechanism.
Except when you have to pass an English exam.

> Put in another way, are you proposing that the result consists just of
> remembered examples plus an ability to analogize?  Or are you proposing
> that the result of the analogical and other operations has some particular
> form other than that?

The 'examples and ability' one. The analogical operations can give you _lots_ of
forms, and I think that is an important operation at different times, but I think it
is important to realize that there is certainly no _particular_ form. The collection
of examples you get at any moment is task dependent, and there are infinitely many
of them, in fact.

I think _conception_ (not command) is the emergent form linked thing, and we all
know how many conceptual perspectives there are, an infinite number, just as we
would like - we've been thrashing the 'relative' reality thing all week.

> On Tue, 23 Mar 1999 12:47:57 +0800 Rob Freeman further writes:
>
> > ... In the theories I was referring to the 'real' mechanism is example
> > and analogy, Grammar is only the shadows it casts, real but unreal, with
> > fuzzy edges.
>
> To this I ask the same question, (ceteris paribus), plus this one:
> What/where is this "grammar" you refer to here?  Anywhere real?

Of course we have lots of 'observed regularity' grammars, but I perceive it's the
'meta-grammars' you want to get hold of. I hobbled together a lot of loose threads
and sent them to Esa the other day. Of what I regard as 'real' perhaps I can mention
the high spots here. I would say key current leads are: 'memory-based' work at
Tilburg in the Netherlands (Rens Bod's stuff I'm not sure of), Royal Skousen's work
from two or three years ago and, on a separate thread, the
phrasal/collocational/formulaic/lexical theory trend you see emerging in corpus
linguistic and second language acquisition circles in the last few years. I don't
think the cultures have met yet, but they should.

There's some good lexical category work which was done a few years ago by people
like Hinrich Shutze. That also merges into 'vector models' for text retrieval, and
genre categorization work using factor analysis or 'feature vectors' by people like
Douglas Biber, but this probably goes outside what people are interested in here.

Parallel Distributed Processing stuff goes without saying (mostly some interesting
experiments with finite word classes: English Past Tense etc.), but that carries
it's own psychological baggage around with it, and some limitations of method too
(the finite class bit), so I wouldn't want to emphasize it here.

Oh, and I would class all functionalism as closet 'analogy grammar' at heart. Isn't
systemic _contrast_ of form meant to underpin all meaning in functionalism, and
contrasts in meaning, in their turn, to specify form? Well 'contrasts in contrasts'
are similarities. Seems to me that if you decide contrast in (contrast defined)
meaning specifies form, then you are deciding similarity, or analogy, specifies
form. But I'm not trained in functionalism so I would not necessarily know. I just
started following it because of this perceived syllogism.

> > (BTW analogy is very naturally implemented using networks ;-).
>
> Yes, I agree. And my view (now expressed more fully in my new book)
> includes a warm spot for analogy (cf. Chap. 14); But it also includes the
> position that analogy is a mechanism and that what results from its
> operation is new network structure, which in effect incorporates
> generalizations that have resulted from the opn of analogy upon observed
> and remembered inputs.

A rose by another name? Funny, I would have said a _network_ is a mechanism, and
what results (very naturally, though not exclusively) from its operation is often
analogy! But there is probably room to describe analogical processes as 'abstract
networks' if you want to.

As for the rest, the 'relativeness' bit, all is agreement (...many perspectives,
many grammars - in fact in my theory multiple grammars and multiple cognitive spaces
are predicted to be the same thing, so the congruent 'manyness' is explained).
Though there might be a point on the relativeness of 'God's Truth' itself, to take
it to another level, that a philosopher would be more qualified to argue than me,
tree's falling unseen in forests, and all that... For me the 'reality' point is
resolved by what you can _do_ with the theories you get. Anyway, if we agree to
define the 'truth' as a theory we can do something with (wrt a given problem) we are
in agreement on the distinction between 'God's Truth' and 'Hocus Pocus' (wrt a given
problem).

Rob