form and function

[Jon Aske]

I thank Edith for the very thorough and clear exposition which may help us
advance in our search for an understanding of form and function.  I am not
going to be able to give a thorough reply to all the points that Edith
mentions, although I hope that others will.  But I wanted to comment on
Edith's knife metaphor, which I find very interesting.

As my old teacher George Lakoff would argue, we depend on metaphors (as well
as prototypes, stereotypes, and other types) to understand such complex and
abstract issues, or to lead our thinking about them.  I am sure that we are
all using different metaphors to lead our thinking but, also, it seems that
when we use the same metaphor we are not necessarily drawing the same
conclusions.

Actually, I think the knife metaphor is much more apt than the one about the
coin when it comes to form and function in complex linguistic units (even
though it is faulty in many respects).  Let me explain.

Surely a life form very different from us could come across a knife left by
us in space by mistake and give a very thorough description of it, including
measurements, element composition, as well as devise theories of natural
knife formation inside volcanoes, or about their divine creation.

Still, I would find those descriptions, and explanations, to be rather
unsatisfying.  Knifes are the way they are because of the functions that
they were designed to fill and because of our technical and other
limitations, including the size and shape of our hands, the types of
materials that we know how to work at a particular time, etc.

Surely, you can use a knife for functions different from those for which it
was created, and we do it all the time, and that may even lead to
innovations in the construction of knives or similar implements (machetes,
swords, etc.).  In fact, there are many specialized types of knives,
depending on their specific function (a way in which the metaphor may cease
to be helpful).

Still, I believe that the information about function and the maker's
abilities (and the history of knife-making in a particular culture, etc.)
are all crucial in any description and "explanation" of particular knives.
Why we might want to keep that functional information out of an integral
description of knives escapes me, unless of course the information was not
available (the alien example).

Equally, to try to describe the form and distribution of reflexives without
making their function and their historical source and historical changes and
adaptations an integral part of that description, not an afterthought, is
incomprehensible to me.  (Unless, of course, we were space aliens of a
different sort and we were convinced a priori that reflexives were made by
some god for our amusement.)

That doesn't mean that we cannot (and should not) to some extent describe
the form (only) of the reflexive morphemes of a certain language or talk
about the reflexive function (only) in language in general.  Still, why stop
there?  Why leave the interesting stuff for somebody else?

Jon

PS. On the topic of our recent exchanges, I agree with John and not with
Johanna that this discussion is getting exciting and I hope that someone
won't try to stop it (as it has happened in the past) because it may lead to
dissension.  As long as we remain civil about it, I think we can continue.
I also realize, of course, that we are not likely to change anybody's views,
but I find these conversations to be stimulating since they lead us to
clarify our own thoughts, and perhaps come a bit closer together, or at
least to come to understand the other side(s) better.

In reply to Dick's comments, I am sorry if I offended you.  It was not my
intention to misrepresent your beliefs.  I really thought that that was what
you were saying with your definitions.  But, again, you may be right that I
was stereotyping you.  I will try very hard to avoid stereotyping (although,
as I said above, the use stereotypes is part of our way to make sense of the
world).  Still, if I stereotyped you, I would like to think that it wasn't
in order to "make [me] feel comfortable and morally superior."


> -----Original Message-----
> From: FUNKNET -- Discussion of issues in Functional Linguistics
> [mailto:FUNKNET at listserv.rice.edu]On Behalf Of Edith A Moravcsik
> Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2000 1:25 PM
> To: FUNKNET at listserv.rice.edu
> Subject: form and function
>
>
> In his message of Friday, February 25, Jon Aske wrote: "...you cannot
> separate form and function/meaning... The formal pole of any linguistic
> unit... does not exist without the functional pole. They are the two
> sides of the coin."
>
> There are two claims that emerge from this statement:
>
>   (1) Linguistic form and linguistic function cannot occur separately.
>   (2) Linguistic form and linguistic function cannot be described
>       separately.
>
> These are of course very important "foundational" issues and I am
> trying to think through them carefully.
>
> Let us first consider the two points in GENERAL terms - i.e., not
> specifically in relation to language.
>
>   (1) DISTRIBUTIONAL SEPARABILITY
>       What does it mean to say that two things occur separably or that
> they are occur inseparably? (In)separability claims are about the
> distribution of things. If two things are said to be separable in
> occurrence, that means each can occur without the other: they are not
> mutually cooccurrent (i.e., they are not mutually dependent on each other
> for occurrence). If, on the other hand, they are said to be inseparable in
> occurrence, that means neither can occur without the other: they are
> mutually coocurrent or mutually dependent on each other for occurrence.
>
>       For example, as Jon mentioned, the two sides of a coin are
> inseparable: one side cannot occur without the other.
> Similarly, a living head and its living body are inseparable. A man and
> his shadow are also inseparable because, under the same light conditions,
> neither can occur without the other. On the other hand, two different
> coins, somebody's body and someone else's head, and one person's body and
> somebody else's shadow are separable.
>
>      Inseparable occurrence thus rules out a one-to-zero relationship
> between the two things (i.e., one occurring without the other).
> It also rules out one-to-many relationships: if two things are
> inseparable, neither can vary without the other varying. Thus, each
> coin can only have ONE other side; each person can only have ONE shadow
> (given that light conditions remain the same and they involve a single
> light source); and bodies cannot have varying heads and vice versa.
>
>      Thus, inseparability of two objects means there is a constant
> one-to-one relation between the two. One-to-zero and one-to-many relations
> (where "many" means "many alternatives") are ruled out by
> inseparability.
>
>   (2) DESCRIPTIVE SEPARABILITY
>
>       What does it mean to say that two things are independently
> describable or that they are not describable independently? The
> independent describability of two objects would mean that one can describe
> one without describing the other. If two objects are not independently
> describable, that would mean one cannot describe one without describing
> the other.
>
>       Can one think of ANY two things that are not independently
> describable? Perhaps the only things that would meet this criterion
> would be things that are in a type-subtype (or type-token) relationship.
> For example, if I want to describe the concept "bird" and the concept
> "whooping crane", they are not independently describable because I cannot
> give a full description of the whooping crane without including the
> description of birds in general; and I cannot give a valid description
> of birds unless I know about all the different kinds of birds including
> whooping cranes.
>
>       If two things are independently describable, that does not mean that
> the two descriptions cannot jointly serve in statements, such as as terms
> in an explanatory argument. For example, a man and his shadow are
> independently describable but in order to EXPLAIN the shape of the shadow,
> one needs to make reference to properties of the man. Similarly, each side
> of a coin is independently describable but the shape of one side depends
> on the shape of the other side and thus explains it. Also, the size of a
> head and the size of its body may be mutually explanatory (e.g., an
> insect-size body could not support an elephant-size head).  But claiming
> an explanans-explanadum relationship between two things does not mean that
> they are not independently describable; in fact, it PRESUPPOSES that they
> are (Talmy Givo'n' point).
>
>      More generally, almost any statement ABOUT two objects - whether it
> is a statement of an explanatory relationship or simply a distributional
> relationship such as that they are separable or inseparable - presupposes
> that the two objects are independently describable. For example,
> when we say that the two sides of a coin are inseparable, what this means
> is that we operate in terms of the separate concepts of one side and
> the other side. Similarly, in order for the statement according to which
> the man and his shadow are inseparable to make sense, we need to have a
> separate concept (a separate description) of the man and of the shadow.
>
>      In sum:
>
>      (A) Re descriptive separability:
>          Two things are descriptively inseparable if neither can be
>          described without describing the other; they are descriptively
>          separable if either can be described without describing the
>          other. - Almost(?) any two things seem to be separately
>          describable.
>
>      (B) Re distributional separability:
>          Two things are distributionally inseparable if neither can
>          occur without the other; they are distributionally separable if
>          either can occur without the other. - Some things are
>          distributionally separable, other things are not.
>
>      (C) Re the relationship between descriptive and distributional
>          separability:
>          The statement of any distributional claim about two things,
>          whether saying that they are separable or that
>          they are inseparable, presupposes that the two are
>          separately describable.
>
> Let us now apply these points to FORM AND FUNCTION in LANGUAGE.
> The two questions to which we are looking for answers are these:
>
>      (1) Are form and function distributionally separable or
>          or descriptively inseparable?
>      (2) Are form and function descriptively separable or
>          descriptively inseparable?
>
> If the above general considerations are valid, then even just raising
> the first question about distributional separability implies that we are
> talking about two different things when we say "form" and "function"
> (Talmy Givo'n's point again) - that is, that the two are separately
> describable. Thus, if question (1) makes sense both to
> formalists and functionalist to the extent that both have it on their
> agenda to try to answer it, this necessarily implies that both
> formalists and functionalist subscribe to form and function as being
> descriptively separate concepts. Thus, the answer to question (2) about
> the DESCRIPTIVE independence of form and function would need to be in the
> affirmative for linguists of both persuasions.
>
> Acknowledging that form and function are descriptively
> independent leaves question (1) about their DISTRIBUTIONAL independence
> entirely open: the two may or may not be distributionally separable and
> in fact one could design languages where the two are separable and
> languages where they are inseparable. As suggested above, we can seek the
> answer to whether form and function are distributionally independent or
> not in actual languages by checking whether either can occur without the
> other (one-to-zero relationship) and whether forms can occur with
> alternative functions and functions can occur with alternative forms
> (one-to-many relationship). If any of these hold, then the relationship is
> that of separability rather than inseparability.
>
> The separability of form and function (or meaning) for functional objects
> in general can be easily demonstrated. A string of beads has a
> describable form regardless whether it has a meaning (such as when it is
> used as a rosary, with every bead standing for a prayer) or whether it has
> no meaning (such as when it is used as a necklace). Similarly, a function
> can occur without form in toolmaking; for example, the inventor of the
> knife must have had in mind the function before he found the right form to
> perform that function. Similarly, an object with the form of a knife
> can be used for different alternative purposes (to cut things, to pry
> something open, etc.); and each of these functions can be served by
> different alternative forms.
>
> What about language? Is there linguistic form without function? Is there
> function without linguistic form? Are there multiple alternative
> functions for a form? And are there multiple alternative forms for a
> function? It seems to me that the answer to at least three of these four
> questions is affirmative. Linguistic form without function is a string of
> words that do not make sense. The existence of meaning without linguistic
> form appears to be indicated by the "groping-for-words" phenomenon. And
> examples of ambiguity and synonym (IF it exists...) bear out the
> one-to-many relationship between form and meaning and thus the mutual
> detachability of the two. Thus, the answer to question (1) above is that
> form and meaning are not only descriptively but also distributionally
> separable.
>
> What is WRONG with this train of thought? (I am somewhat tentative
> about it since I feel I am treading on "dangerous" grounds - I
> shudder to think how a philosophically-trained person would evaluate it.)
> Exactly which are the assumptions or the logical steps that are false or
> at least questionable? Exactly WHERE would a CONTRARY argument part ways
> with the one above - an argument that would lead us to the opposite
> conclusions which I think Jon Aske and others hold true: that form and
> function are both descriptively and distributionally inseparable?
>
> Edith M.
>
>
>
> ************************************************************************
>                          Edith A. Moravcsik
>                          Department of Foreign Languages and Linguistics
>                          University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
>                          Milwaukee, WI 53201-0413
>                          USA
>
>                          E-mail: edith at uwm.edu
>                          Telephone: (414) 229-6794 /office/
>                                     (414) 332-0141 /home/
>                          Fax: (414) 229-2741
>
>
>
>
>
>