From Malcolm.Ross at ANU.EDU.AU Thu Jul 5 02:22:36 2001 From: Malcolm.Ross at ANU.EDU.AU (Malcolm Ross) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2001 12:22:36 +1000 Subject: Pacific Linguistics: new publication Message-ID: PACIFIC LINGUISTICS is happy to announce the publication of David Rose The Western Desert Code: An Australian Cryptogrammar These works are described below. Prices are in Australian dollars (one Australian dollar is currently equivalent to about US$ 0,55.). _______________________________________________________________ David Rose The Western Desert Code: An Australian Cryptogrammar PL 513 This volume is a description of the language of Australia's Western Desert peoples, from the perspective of Western Desert culture, focusing on what M.A.K. Halliday has characterised as 'ways of meaning' in the culture. As a doctoral dissertation The Western Desert Code received exceptional praise from its examiners, C.M.I.M. Matthiessen (Macquarie University) called it 'an outstanding contribution to semiotic and linguistic scholarship in general and to the description and understanding of Australian Aboriginal languages in particular... the first contribution ever to give a comprehensive account of the semiotic complex of an Australian Aboriginal language-culture, using the resources of a powerful theory to map out this complex along a number of dimensions... a monumental, brilliant achievement in absolute terms... Rose thus clearly belongs to the class of once-in-a-blue-moon scholars that Whorf belonged to'. K. Davidse (University of Leeuven) writes: '... a tremendously inventive effort of interpretation... I know of no other work which has so consistently related to the relation between code, register, semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology as this Ph.D. thesis'. 2001 ISBN: 0 85883 437 5 xvi + 482 pp. AUS $59.40 International $54.00 _______________________________________________________________ Orders may be placed by mail, e-mail or telephone with: The Publications Administrator Pacific Linguistics Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 Australia Tel: +61 (0)2 6249 2742 Fax: +61 (0)2 6249 4896 mailto://jmanley at coombs.anu.edu.au Credit card orders are accepted. For our catalogue and other materials, see: http://pacling.anu.edu.au (under construction) -- _____________________________________ Dr Malcolm D. Ross Senior Fellow Department of Linguistics Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Australian National University CANBERRA ACT 0200 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Tue Jul 10 17:19:15 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 12:19:15 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: I hope that what follows below in this posting will provoke discussion on objects of study in linguistics. I am posting to both linguistlist and FUNKNET, so I apologize for multiple receptions of the letter. This is a very condensed form of a thesis I am currently developing in book form, so feedback would be personally useful, in addition to what I believe the benefits of such a discussion would be for linguists more generally. The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is in principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually. Here goes: Chomsky claims that the object of study in syntax is I-language or, to use an older term, speaker competence. What is this supposed to be? It is an internal *grammar* (not language - whether of the 'I-' or 'E-' variety - of any type widely accepted in Linguistics). Such a grammar is necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions about the mind, e.g. that there is a mind and that it is inside the head (instead of, for example, between members of a society). What could count as evidence for this Cartesian construct/grammar? All and only phenomena which have no nongrammatical explanation. What sorts of phenomena will have this property? Just those linguistic-like phenomena with no explanation in terms of history, function, sociolinguistics, phonetics, semantics, culture, sex, baldness, etc. (this list is ultimately 'everything but grammar'). How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot. And the problem of recognition here is not merely hard. It is in-principle impossible. This is because to know that this or that fact is 'pure grammar', uncontaminated by nongrammatical factors, would require knowledge of everything about that fact, i.e. just everything. Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an Cartesian-Chomskyan research program. There are only aspects of study (hence the appropriateness of the title of a certain syntax book from 1965). What could syntacticians study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar? That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding principles for linguistic theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey, CI Lewis, Rorty, Quine, Putnam, Wittgenstein), not in Cartesianism, especially as developed in Chomskyan linguistics. -- Dan Everett Department of Linguistics University of Manchester From dparvaz at UNM.EDU Tue Jul 10 17:50:31 2001 From: dparvaz at UNM.EDU (Dan Parvaz) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 11:50:31 -0600 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: <004401c10964$724fda60$3c04fea9@und.nodak.edu> Message-ID: > And the problem of recognition here is not merely hard. It is > in-principle impossible. This is because to know that this or that > fact is 'pure grammar', uncontaminated by nongrammatical factors, > would require knowledge of everything about that fact, i.e. just > everything. Removing 'grammar' from this statement, and replacing it with 'matter,' 'culture', or 'art,' seems to create an equally impossible epistemological standard for those areas of imquiry. So why necessarily pragmati(ci)sm? Cheers, Dan. ____________ ,,, . . D A N P A R V A Z -- Geek-in-Residence U University of New Mexico Linguistics Dept - dparvaz@{unm.edu,lanl.gov} 505.480.9638 From girod at STYBBA.NTC.NOKIA.COM Wed Jul 11 06:03:42 2001 From: girod at STYBBA.NTC.NOKIA.COM (Marc Girod) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 09:03:42 +0300 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: "Dan Everett"'s message of "Tue, 10 Jul 2001 12:19:15 -0500" Message-ID: >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics Dan> there is in principle no object of study. Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper layers to lower ones? I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl Popper. Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent limitations of layered models. I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but this is in an orthogonal dimension] -- Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Wed Jul 11 11:12:28 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 06:12:28 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: I think that is right. If the model depends on the purity of the data - free from contamination by other levels or other domains, e.g. Universal Grammar as a 'perfect biological system', then it is going to be subject to the complaints of pragmatism that it is using the wrong metaphors to tell its story by. Looking 'deeper and deeper' rather than 'wider and thicker', to paraphrase Rorty a bit. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Marc Girod" To: Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 1:03 AM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: > > Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics > Dan> there is in principle no object of study. > > Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built > upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper > layers to lower ones? > > I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", > which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl > Popper. > > Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the > problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent > limitations of layered models. > > I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and > semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones > (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. > > [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of > language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but > this is in an orthogonal dimension] > > -- > Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 > Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 > UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From lamb at RICE.EDU Wed Jul 11 14:58:56 2001 From: lamb at RICE.EDU (Sydney Lamb) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 09:58:56 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: <004401c10964$724fda60$3c04fea9@und.nodak.edu> Message-ID: Dear Dan and all - It is good that you are trying to think this through with advice from others before going into print. > ... > The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is in > principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no > way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually. Right. Or you could say that there is an object of study -- the ideal speaker-hearer, or the "internalized" grammar of same, or the competence of same -- but all of these objects are fictitious/imaginary/illusory. > ... > a grammar is necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions about > ... Yes, you could say 'Cartesian construct' as a euphemism for fiction/illusion. > ... > How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this > sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot. > ... I have trouble with the idea of 'grammar-only'. Why is it necessary to isolate smthg from all else in order to recognize it or study it? In the real world, Nothing is isolated from everything else. Everything is interconnected; but we can still study things. > ... > Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an > Cartesian-Chomskyan research program. >... Well, sure. But it doesn't seem necessary to go through such an involved argument to arrive at this conclusion. Isn't it obvious that there is no such thing as an 'ideal speaker-hearer'? And that being the case, the 'competence' of such a fiction is equally illusory. > ... . What could syntacticians > study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar? > That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding > principles for linguistic > theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey, CI > ... "Whatever is useful to study" is all right, but there is another way of looking at it: Beyond the usefulness we might have a concern with reality. It is not the case that linguistics has to treat fictitious/illusory objects. It is possible to do linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know now, from 140 years of aphasiology, that that system is a real physical system residing the the cerebral cortex of that person. This does not mean that we have to become neuroscientists to do linguistics, for many of the ordinary time-honored methods of linguistic investigation are quite applicable to figuring out properties of that neurocognitive system. On the contrary, the awareness of what it is that we are actually investigating helps us to sort out which methods are likely to be useful and which are not. For example, as we know that people are actually able to use their linguistic systems for speaking and comprehending, we can cast doubt on any structural formulation that has no discernable means of being put into operation. On the other hand aphasiology does provide useful clues that can be appreciated without specialized knowledge of neurology, such as the fact that our phonological systems include two distinguishable (but of course interconnected and mutually influencing) subsystems, one for phonological production, the other for phonological recognition. The long-standing habit of linguists of treating phonology just from the point of view of production is thus shown to be in error. Now what about syntax (since you mention it) and the problem of whether it could exist somehow apart from everything else? Well, as we now have a real object of study, we should investigate it without preconceptions and see what we find out: let the chips fall where they may. Observation will tell us whether or not, or to what extent, syntax is autonomous. We shouldn't care in advance what we find out. (My studies indicate that it is not.) Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From tgivon at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Thu Jul 12 03:35:30 2001 From: tgivon at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 20:35:30 -0700 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: "Perfect biological system" uncontaminated by any other lever, such as biology, cognition, neurology, culture, communication? Sounds like a perfect dream for a philosopher. But alas, science has always been heavily contaminated by 'other levels' (even physics is, once you off the Newtonian level in either a macro or micro direction...). So we'll just have to put up with the impurities. TG =========================== Dan Everett wrote: > > I think that is right. If the model depends on the purity of the data - > free from contamination by other levels or other domains, e.g. Universal > Grammar as a 'perfect biological system', then it is going to be subject to > the complaints of pragmatism that it is using the wrong metaphors to tell > its story by. Looking 'deeper and deeper' rather than 'wider and thicker', > to paraphrase Rorty a bit. > > Dan > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Marc Girod" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 1:03 AM > Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > > > >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: > > > > Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics > > Dan> there is in principle no object of study. > > > > Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built > > upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper > > layers to lower ones? > > > > I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", > > which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl > > Popper. > > > > Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the > > problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent > > limitations of layered models. > > > > I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and > > semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones > > (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. > > > > [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of > > language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but > > this is in an orthogonal dimension] > > > > -- > > Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 > > Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 > > UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Wed Jul 11 17:04:26 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 12:04:26 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: Tom, It is indeed the fact that we must put up with the purities. But we ought to avoid basing our theory on a philosophy built around the assumption that someday, somehow, we can overcome them. Idealization, a common heuristic device in most sciences, is fine in methodology. But it is seriously misguided in ontology. This is the force of the discussions of Pragmatism and why James offers a better story about how to think about the world than Descartes (or Popper, Carnap, Ayer, Russell, etc.) So we must put up with them at some level. But we must not put up with them in the quest for TRUTH, which is itself a rather unuseful construct in inquiry. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Tom Givon" To: "Dan Everett" Cc: Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 10:35 PM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > > "Perfect biological system" uncontaminated by any other lever, such as > biology, cognition, neurology, culture, communication? Sounds like a > perfect dream for a philosopher. But alas, science has always been > heavily contaminated by 'other levels' (even physics is, once you off > the Newtonian level in either a macro or micro direction...). So we'll > just have to put up with the impurities. TG > =========================== > > Dan Everett wrote: > > > > I think that is right. If the model depends on the purity of the data - > > free from contamination by other levels or other domains, e.g. Universal > > Grammar as a 'perfect biological system', then it is going to be subject to > > the complaints of pragmatism that it is using the wrong metaphors to tell > > its story by. Looking 'deeper and deeper' rather than 'wider and thicker', > > to paraphrase Rorty a bit. > > > > Dan > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Marc Girod" > > To: > > Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 1:03 AM > > Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > > > > > >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: > > > > > > Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics > > > Dan> there is in principle no object of study. > > > > > > Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built > > > upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper > > > layers to lower ones? > > > > > > I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", > > > which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl > > > Popper. > > > > > > Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the > > > problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent > > > limitations of layered models. > > > > > > I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and > > > semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones > > > (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. > > > > > > [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of > > > language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but > > > this is in an orthogonal dimension] > > > > > > -- > > > Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 > > > Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 > > > UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Wed Jul 11 17:18:49 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 12:18:49 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sydney Lamb" To: Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 9:58 AM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > Dear Dan and all - > > It is good that you are trying to think this through with advice > from others before going into print. RISKY, THOUGH. > > ... > > The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is in > > principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no > > way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually. > > Right. Or you could say that there is an object of study -- the > ideal speaker-hearer, or the "internalized" grammar of same, or > the competence of same -- but all of these objects are > fictitious/imaginary/illusory. THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE 'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. THE QUESTION IS WHAT ILLUSIONS WE FIND USEFUL. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT SOME VARIANTS OF GENERATIVE THEORY DO IS TO BUILD THE ILLUSION INTO THE ONTOLOGY OF THE THEORY, NOT MERELY THE METHODOLOGY, AS I REPLIED TO TOM GIVON. WHEN THE THEORY IS PREDICATED ON THE IDEA THAT THERE CAN BE A GOAL OF DISCOVERING THE UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, I.E. TRUTH, THEN THAT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM BECAUSE IT LEADS TO LACK OF USEFULNESS. > > > ... > > a grammar is necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions about > > ... > > Yes, you could say 'Cartesian construct' as a euphemism for > fiction/illusion. > YES, THAT IS TRUE. BUT MOST CONSTRUCTS ARE, TO ALLOW THE CRITICISM TO RANGE A BIT MORE WIDELY. > > ... > > How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this > > sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot. > > ... > > I have trouble with the idea of 'grammar-only'. Why is it > necessary to isolate smthg from all else in order to recognize > it or study it? In the real world, Nothing is isolated from > everything else. Everything is interconnected; but we can still > study things. YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS USEFUL TO US) THE METHODOLOGICALLY ISOLATING BARRIERS WILL SOME DAY NEED TO COME DOWN. IF WE STUDY THEM, HOWEVER, IN THE BELIEF THAT THE ISOLATING BARRIERS ARE 'REAL' AND NEVER SHOULD COME DOWN (FOR EXAMPLE, THAT INFORMATION STRUCTURE WILL NEVER BE A PART OF SENTENTIAL SYNTAX) THEN WE DO OURSELVES A MISCHIEF. > > > ... > > Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an > > Cartesian-Chomskyan research program. > >... > > Well, sure. But it doesn't seem necessary to go through such an > involved argument to arrive at this conclusion. Isn't it obvious > that there is no such thing as an 'ideal speaker-hearer'? And > that being the case, the 'competence' of such a fiction is > equally illusory. THE INVOLVED REASONING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE POINT IS BROADER. IT APPLIES TO FUNCTIONALISM AND FORMALISM. HOWEVER, THE CRITICISM DOES NOT SEEM FATAL FOR FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES BECAUSE THE RANGE OF ONTOLOGIES ALLOWABLE FOR SUCH AN APPROACH IS WIDER THAN FOR CARTESIAN THEORIES. > > > ... . What could syntacticians > > study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar? > > That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding > > principles for linguistic > > theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey, CI > > ... > > "Whatever is useful to study" is all right, but there is another > way of looking at it: Beyond the usefulness we might have a > concern with reality. It is not the case that linguistics has to > treat fictitious/illusory objects. It is possible to do > linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an > 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical > speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the > linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know > now, from 140 years of aphasiology, that that system is a real > physical system residing the the cerebral cortex of that person. > This does not mean that we have to become neuroscientists to do > linguistics, for many of the ordinary time-honored methods of > linguistic investigation are quite applicable to figuring out > properties of that neurocognitive system. On the contrary, the > awareness of what it is that we are actually investigating helps > us to sort out which methods are likely to be useful and which > are not. For example, as we know that people are actually able > to use their linguistic systems for speaking and comprehending, > we can cast doubt on any structural formulation that has no > discernable means of being put into operation. I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO. PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES. > > On the other hand aphasiology does provide useful clues that can > be appreciated without specialized knowledge of neurology, such > as the fact that our phonological systems include two > distinguishable (but of course interconnected and mutually > influencing) subsystems, one for phonological production, the > other for phonological recognition. The long-standing habit of > linguists of treating phonology just from the point of view of > production is thus shown to be in error. QUITE LIKELY YOU ARE CORRECT. > > Now what about syntax (since you mention it) and the problem of > whether it could exist somehow apart from everything else? Well, > as we now have a real object of study, we should investigate it > without preconceptions and see what we find out: let the chips > fall where they may. Observation will tell us whether or not, or > to what extent, syntax is autonomous. We shouldn't care in > advance what we find out. (My studies indicate that it is > not.) THIS IS USEFUL. I SUSPECT ALL WOULD AGREE. CHOMSKY CLAIMS THAT ASCRIBING TO HIM THE VIEW THAT SYNTAX IS 'AUTONOMOUS' IS MYTHOLOGY. > From paul at BENJAMINS.COM Wed Jul 11 17:59:22 2001 From: paul at BENJAMINS.COM (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 13:59:22 -0400 Subject: New Books: Nuyts; Fortescue Message-ID: John Benjamins Publishing has brought out two new books related to Functional Linguistics: Epistemic Modality, Language, and Conceptualization. A cognitive-pragmatic perspective. Jan NUYTS (University of Antwerp) Human Cognitive Processing 5 90 272 2357 2 / NLG 220.00 (Hardcover) 1 55619 983 X / USD 100.00 (Hardcover) The relationship between language and conceptualization remains one of the major puzzles in language research. This monograph addresses this issue by means of an in depth corpus based and experimental investigation of the major types of expressions of epistemic modality in Dutch, German and English. By adopting a systematic functional orientation, the book explains a whole range of peculiarities of epistemic expression forms (synchronically and diachronically), and it offers a clear perspective on which cognitive systems are needed to get from the concept of epistemic modality to its linguistic expression. On that basis the author postulates a sophisticated, layered view of human conceptualization. This book is of interest both to scholars working on modality and related semantic dimensions, and to the interdisciplinary field of researchers concerned with the cognitive systems involved in language use. * * * * * * * * Pattern and Process. A Whiteheadian perspective on linguistics. Michael Fortescue (University of Copenhagen) Human Cognitive Processing 6 US & Canada: 1 58811 058 3 USD 86.00 Rest of world: 90 272 2358 0 NLG 190.00/ Hardcover 2001. viii, 312 pp. The purpose of this book is to illustrate the relevance to linguistics today of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. Although largely ignored by linguists, Whitehead has in fact much to say as regards the cognitive processes underpinning language pattern. His theory of symbolism conceives of language as the 'systematization of expression', and relates meaning to feeling (in the broadest sense). The Whiteheadian perspective allows a synthesis of the psychological and the social approaches to language that does not fall into one or another fashionable form of reductionism. The volume represents a first application of Whitehead's thinking to a broad range of linguistic phenomena, ranging from speech act theory to the production and comprehension of texts, from language acquisition to historical change and the evolution of language. It is argued that Whitehead's holistic philosophy is uniquely suited to the view of language as an emergent phenomenon - regardless of whether one's approach to cognition is via the 'nativist' or the 'functionalist' route. John Benjamins Publishing Co. Offices: Philadelphia Amsterdam: Websites: http://www.benjamins.com http://www.benjamins.nl E-mail: service at benjamins.com customer.services at benjamins.nl Phone: +215 836-1200 +31 20 6304747 Fax: +215 836-1204 +31 20 6739773 From lamb at RICE.EDU Thu Jul 12 16:06:54 2001 From: lamb at RICE.EDU (Sydney Lamb) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 11:06:54 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: <001f01c10a2d$8cd10840$3c04fea9@und.nodak.edu> Message-ID: Dan - I have no quarrel with nuch of what you say in your message of Wed, 11 Jul 2001, > Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps. And I'll respond to a few of your caps responses in my lower-case: > THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS > BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS > THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE > 'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER > HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. > ... But we should try to get beyond the illusions and study reality. > ... > YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT > WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS > ... I don't understand how it helps to study them as if they were isolated. > > > ... > > linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an > > 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical > > speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the > > linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know > > ... > > I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN > IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST Evidently you misunderstand: What I am advocating as object of study is NOT some abstract 'typical speaker-hearer' but one or more actual speaker-hearers; hence, not an idealization. On thinking it over i see that it would have been better to say 'representative speaker-hearer'. For example, what I called my 'Northfork Mono Grammar' was actually -- and consciously and intentionally -- a description of the system of one representative speaker, my informant Lucy Kinsman. The title was perhaps misleading, but less so if (as I surmised and hoped) whe really was representative. > AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO. > PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO > DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER > AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS > IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES. Yes, right on. Except that languages are also too much of an idealization to be realisticalluy studied. The 'individual language' is a very abstract concept, so much so that it could be considered illusory. What is real, by contrast, is people speaking. And each person's system differs from that of every other person -- hence misunderstanding and imperfect understanding, which we observe going on all the time -- probably even now. So its not only differences among languages that are important, but differences among the linguistic systems of people who are (loosely) said to 'speak the same language'. We have to give up the idea that linguists should be studying languages, if we want to be realistic, for languages do not exist. Instead, linguists should be studying people speaking and comprehending, and figuring out what they can about the neurocognitive systems of those people. All the best, - Syd Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Thu Jul 12 17:03:40 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 12:03:40 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: Syd, I agree with everything you said, more or less. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sydney Lamb" To: Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2001 11:06 AM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > Dan - I have no quarrel with nuch of what you say in your > message of Wed, 11 Jul 2001, > > > Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps. > > And I'll respond to a few of your caps responses in my > lower-case: > > > THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS > > BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS > > THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE > > 'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER > > HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. > > ... > > But we should try to get beyond the illusions and study reality. > > > ... > > YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT > > WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS > > ... > > I don't understand how it helps to study them as if they were > isolated. > > > > > ... > > > linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an > > > 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical > > > speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the > > > linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know > > > ... > > > > I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN > > IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST > > Evidently you misunderstand: What I am advocating as object of > study is NOT some abstract 'typical speaker-hearer' but one or > more actual speaker-hearers; hence, not an idealization. On > thinking it over i see that it would have been better to > say 'representative speaker-hearer'. For example, what I called > my 'Northfork Mono Grammar' was actually -- and consciously and > intentionally -- a description of the system of one > representative speaker, my informant Lucy Kinsman. The title was > perhaps misleading, but less so if (as I surmised and hoped) whe > really was representative. > > > AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO. > > PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO > > DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER > > AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS > > IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES. > > Yes, right on. Except that languages are also too much of an > idealization to be realisticalluy studied. The 'individual > language' is a very abstract concept, so much so that it > could be considered illusory. What is real, by contrast, is > people speaking. And each person's system differs from that of > every other person -- hence misunderstanding and imperfect > understanding, which we observe going on all the time -- > probably even now. > > So its not only differences among languages that are important, > but differences among the linguistic systems of people who are > (loosely) said to 'speak the same language'. > > We have to give up the idea that linguists should be studying > languages, if we want to be realistic, for languages do not > exist. Instead, linguists should be studying people speaking and > comprehending, and figuring out what they can about the > neurocognitive systems of those people. > > All the best, - Syd > > Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ > Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences > Rice University, Houston, TX From paul at BENJAMINS.COM Fri Jul 13 18:39:15 2001 From: paul at BENJAMINS.COM (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2001 14:39:15 -0400 Subject: New Book in Functional Linguistics: Bybee/Hopper Message-ID: John Benjamins Publishing announces a new work in Functional Linguistics: Frequency and the Emergence of Linguistic Structure. Joan Bybee (University of New Mexico) and Paul Hopper (Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh) Typological Studies in Language 45 2001. vii, 492 pp US & Canada: HB:1 58811 027 3 USD 125.00 PB: 1 58811 028 1 USD 42.95 Rest of world: HB: 90 272 2947 3 NLG 275.00 PB: 90 272 2948 1 NLG 95.00/ . A mainstay of functional linguistics has been the claim that linguistic elements and patterns that are frequently used in discourse become conventionalized as grammar. This book addresses the two issues that are basic to this claim: first, the question of what types of elements are frequently used in discourse and second, the question of how frequency of use affects cognitive representations. Reporting on evidence from natural conversation, diachronic change, variability, child language acquisition and psycholinguistic experimentation the original articles in this book support two major principles. First, the content of people's interactions consists of a preponderance of subjective, evaluative statements, dominated by the use of pronouns, copulas and intransitive clauses. Second, the frequency with which certain items and strings of items are used has a profound influence on the way language is broken up into chunks in memory storage, the way such chunks are related to other stored material and the ease with which they are accessed to produce new utterances. Contributions by:Joan Bybee and Paul Hopper; Sandra A. Thompson and Paul J. Hopper; Joanne Scheibman; Naomi Hallan; Betty S. Phillips; Janet B. Pierrehumbert; Stefan Frisch, Nathan R. Large, Bushra Zawaydeh and David B. Pisoni; Mary L. Hare, Michael Ford and William D. Marslen-Wilson; Greville Corbett, Andrew Hippisley, Dunstan Brown and Paul Marriott; Daniel Jurafsky, Alan Bell, Michelle Gregory and William D. Raymond; Nathan Bush; Catie Berkenfield; Manfred G. Krug; Joan Bybee; K. Aaron Smith; Joyce Tang Boyland; Shana Poplack, Gertraud Fenk-Oczlon; Brian Macwhinney; Östen Dahl. John Benjamins Publishing Co. Offices: Philadelphia Amsterdam: Websites: http://www.benjamins.com http://www.benjamins.nl E-mail: service at benjamins.com customer.services at benjamins.nl Phone: +215 836-1200 +31 20 6304747 Fax: +215 836-1204 +31 20 6739773 From Malcolm.Ross at ANU.EDU.AU Thu Jul 5 02:22:36 2001 From: Malcolm.Ross at ANU.EDU.AU (Malcolm Ross) Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2001 12:22:36 +1000 Subject: Pacific Linguistics: new publication Message-ID: PACIFIC LINGUISTICS is happy to announce the publication of David Rose The Western Desert Code: An Australian Cryptogrammar These works are described below. Prices are in Australian dollars (one Australian dollar is currently equivalent to about US$ 0,55.). _______________________________________________________________ David Rose The Western Desert Code: An Australian Cryptogrammar PL 513 This volume is a description of the language of Australia's Western Desert peoples, from the perspective of Western Desert culture, focusing on what M.A.K. Halliday has characterised as 'ways of meaning' in the culture. As a doctoral dissertation The Western Desert Code received exceptional praise from its examiners, C.M.I.M. Matthiessen (Macquarie University) called it 'an outstanding contribution to semiotic and linguistic scholarship in general and to the description and understanding of Australian Aboriginal languages in particular... the first contribution ever to give a comprehensive account of the semiotic complex of an Australian Aboriginal language-culture, using the resources of a powerful theory to map out this complex along a number of dimensions... a monumental, brilliant achievement in absolute terms... Rose thus clearly belongs to the class of once-in-a-blue-moon scholars that Whorf belonged to'. K. Davidse (University of Leeuven) writes: '... a tremendously inventive effort of interpretation... I know of no other work which has so consistently related to the relation between code, register, semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology as this Ph.D. thesis'. 2001 ISBN: 0 85883 437 5 xvi + 482 pp. AUS $59.40 International $54.00 _______________________________________________________________ Orders may be placed by mail, e-mail or telephone with: The Publications Administrator Pacific Linguistics Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 Australia Tel: +61 (0)2 6249 2742 Fax: +61 (0)2 6249 4896 mailto://jmanley at coombs.anu.edu.au Credit card orders are accepted. For our catalogue and other materials, see: http://pacling.anu.edu.au (under construction) -- _____________________________________ Dr Malcolm D. Ross Senior Fellow Department of Linguistics Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Australian National University CANBERRA ACT 0200 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Tue Jul 10 17:19:15 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 12:19:15 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: I hope that what follows below in this posting will provoke discussion on objects of study in linguistics. I am posting to both linguistlist and FUNKNET, so I apologize for multiple receptions of the letter. This is a very condensed form of a thesis I am currently developing in book form, so feedback would be personally useful, in addition to what I believe the benefits of such a discussion would be for linguists more generally. The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is in principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually. Here goes: Chomsky claims that the object of study in syntax is I-language or, to use an older term, speaker competence. What is this supposed to be? It is an internal *grammar* (not language - whether of the 'I-' or 'E-' variety - of any type widely accepted in Linguistics). Such a grammar is necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions about the mind, e.g. that there is a mind and that it is inside the head (instead of, for example, between members of a society). What could count as evidence for this Cartesian construct/grammar? All and only phenomena which have no nongrammatical explanation. What sorts of phenomena will have this property? Just those linguistic-like phenomena with no explanation in terms of history, function, sociolinguistics, phonetics, semantics, culture, sex, baldness, etc. (this list is ultimately 'everything but grammar'). How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot. And the problem of recognition here is not merely hard. It is in-principle impossible. This is because to know that this or that fact is 'pure grammar', uncontaminated by nongrammatical factors, would require knowledge of everything about that fact, i.e. just everything. Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an Cartesian-Chomskyan research program. There are only aspects of study (hence the appropriateness of the title of a certain syntax book from 1965). What could syntacticians study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar? That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding principles for linguistic theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey, CI Lewis, Rorty, Quine, Putnam, Wittgenstein), not in Cartesianism, especially as developed in Chomskyan linguistics. -- Dan Everett Department of Linguistics University of Manchester From dparvaz at UNM.EDU Tue Jul 10 17:50:31 2001 From: dparvaz at UNM.EDU (Dan Parvaz) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 11:50:31 -0600 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: <004401c10964$724fda60$3c04fea9@und.nodak.edu> Message-ID: > And the problem of recognition here is not merely hard. It is > in-principle impossible. This is because to know that this or that > fact is 'pure grammar', uncontaminated by nongrammatical factors, > would require knowledge of everything about that fact, i.e. just > everything. Removing 'grammar' from this statement, and replacing it with 'matter,' 'culture', or 'art,' seems to create an equally impossible epistemological standard for those areas of imquiry. So why necessarily pragmati(ci)sm? Cheers, Dan. ____________ ,,, . . D A N P A R V A Z -- Geek-in-Residence U University of New Mexico Linguistics Dept - dparvaz@{unm.edu,lanl.gov} 505.480.9638 From girod at STYBBA.NTC.NOKIA.COM Wed Jul 11 06:03:42 2001 From: girod at STYBBA.NTC.NOKIA.COM (Marc Girod) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 09:03:42 +0300 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: "Dan Everett"'s message of "Tue, 10 Jul 2001 12:19:15 -0500" Message-ID: >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics Dan> there is in principle no object of study. Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper layers to lower ones? I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl Popper. Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent limitations of layered models. I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but this is in an orthogonal dimension] -- Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Wed Jul 11 11:12:28 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 06:12:28 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: I think that is right. If the model depends on the purity of the data - free from contamination by other levels or other domains, e.g. Universal Grammar as a 'perfect biological system', then it is going to be subject to the complaints of pragmatism that it is using the wrong metaphors to tell its story by. Looking 'deeper and deeper' rather than 'wider and thicker', to paraphrase Rorty a bit. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Marc Girod" To: Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 1:03 AM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: > > Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics > Dan> there is in principle no object of study. > > Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built > upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper > layers to lower ones? > > I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", > which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl > Popper. > > Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the > problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent > limitations of layered models. > > I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and > semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones > (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. > > [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of > language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but > this is in an orthogonal dimension] > > -- > Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 > Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 > UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From lamb at RICE.EDU Wed Jul 11 14:58:56 2001 From: lamb at RICE.EDU (Sydney Lamb) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 09:58:56 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: <004401c10964$724fda60$3c04fea9@und.nodak.edu> Message-ID: Dear Dan and all - It is good that you are trying to think this through with advice from others before going into print. > ... > The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is in > principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no > way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually. Right. Or you could say that there is an object of study -- the ideal speaker-hearer, or the "internalized" grammar of same, or the competence of same -- but all of these objects are fictitious/imaginary/illusory. > ... > a grammar is necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions about > ... Yes, you could say 'Cartesian construct' as a euphemism for fiction/illusion. > ... > How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this > sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot. > ... I have trouble with the idea of 'grammar-only'. Why is it necessary to isolate smthg from all else in order to recognize it or study it? In the real world, Nothing is isolated from everything else. Everything is interconnected; but we can still study things. > ... > Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an > Cartesian-Chomskyan research program. >... Well, sure. But it doesn't seem necessary to go through such an involved argument to arrive at this conclusion. Isn't it obvious that there is no such thing as an 'ideal speaker-hearer'? And that being the case, the 'competence' of such a fiction is equally illusory. > ... . What could syntacticians > study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar? > That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding > principles for linguistic > theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey, CI > ... "Whatever is useful to study" is all right, but there is another way of looking at it: Beyond the usefulness we might have a concern with reality. It is not the case that linguistics has to treat fictitious/illusory objects. It is possible to do linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know now, from 140 years of aphasiology, that that system is a real physical system residing the the cerebral cortex of that person. This does not mean that we have to become neuroscientists to do linguistics, for many of the ordinary time-honored methods of linguistic investigation are quite applicable to figuring out properties of that neurocognitive system. On the contrary, the awareness of what it is that we are actually investigating helps us to sort out which methods are likely to be useful and which are not. For example, as we know that people are actually able to use their linguistic systems for speaking and comprehending, we can cast doubt on any structural formulation that has no discernable means of being put into operation. On the other hand aphasiology does provide useful clues that can be appreciated without specialized knowledge of neurology, such as the fact that our phonological systems include two distinguishable (but of course interconnected and mutually influencing) subsystems, one for phonological production, the other for phonological recognition. The long-standing habit of linguists of treating phonology just from the point of view of production is thus shown to be in error. Now what about syntax (since you mention it) and the problem of whether it could exist somehow apart from everything else? Well, as we now have a real object of study, we should investigate it without preconceptions and see what we find out: let the chips fall where they may. Observation will tell us whether or not, or to what extent, syntax is autonomous. We shouldn't care in advance what we find out. (My studies indicate that it is not.) Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From tgivon at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU Thu Jul 12 03:35:30 2001 From: tgivon at OREGON.UOREGON.EDU (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 20:35:30 -0700 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: "Perfect biological system" uncontaminated by any other lever, such as biology, cognition, neurology, culture, communication? Sounds like a perfect dream for a philosopher. But alas, science has always been heavily contaminated by 'other levels' (even physics is, once you off the Newtonian level in either a macro or micro direction...). So we'll just have to put up with the impurities. TG =========================== Dan Everett wrote: > > I think that is right. If the model depends on the purity of the data - > free from contamination by other levels or other domains, e.g. Universal > Grammar as a 'perfect biological system', then it is going to be subject to > the complaints of pragmatism that it is using the wrong metaphors to tell > its story by. Looking 'deeper and deeper' rather than 'wider and thicker', > to paraphrase Rorty a bit. > > Dan > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Marc Girod" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 1:03 AM > Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > > > >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: > > > > Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics > > Dan> there is in principle no object of study. > > > > Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built > > upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper > > layers to lower ones? > > > > I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", > > which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl > > Popper. > > > > Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the > > problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent > > limitations of layered models. > > > > I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and > > semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones > > (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. > > > > [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of > > language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but > > this is in an orthogonal dimension] > > > > -- > > Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 > > Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 > > UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Wed Jul 11 17:04:26 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 12:04:26 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: Tom, It is indeed the fact that we must put up with the purities. But we ought to avoid basing our theory on a philosophy built around the assumption that someday, somehow, we can overcome them. Idealization, a common heuristic device in most sciences, is fine in methodology. But it is seriously misguided in ontology. This is the force of the discussions of Pragmatism and why James offers a better story about how to think about the world than Descartes (or Popper, Carnap, Ayer, Russell, etc.) So we must put up with them at some level. But we must not put up with them in the quest for TRUTH, which is itself a rather unuseful construct in inquiry. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Tom Givon" To: "Dan Everett" Cc: Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 10:35 PM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > > "Perfect biological system" uncontaminated by any other lever, such as > biology, cognition, neurology, culture, communication? Sounds like a > perfect dream for a philosopher. But alas, science has always been > heavily contaminated by 'other levels' (even physics is, once you off > the Newtonian level in either a macro or micro direction...). So we'll > just have to put up with the impurities. TG > =========================== > > Dan Everett wrote: > > > > I think that is right. If the model depends on the purity of the data - > > free from contamination by other levels or other domains, e.g. Universal > > Grammar as a 'perfect biological system', then it is going to be subject to > > the complaints of pragmatism that it is using the wrong metaphors to tell > > its story by. Looking 'deeper and deeper' rather than 'wider and thicker', > > to paraphrase Rorty a bit. > > > > Dan > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Marc Girod" > > To: > > Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 1:03 AM > > Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > > > > > >>>>> "Dan" == Dan Everett writes: > > > > > > Dan> The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics > > > Dan> there is in principle no object of study. > > > > > > Do you mean by "Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics" linguistics built > > > upon a layered model of language? With one-way dependencies from upper > > > layers to lower ones? > > > > > > I find this kind of a model in Carnap's "Introduction to Semantics", > > > which I am currently trying to read, following a quote from Karl > > > Popper. > > > > > > Anyway, I believe then (with Dan Parvaz, as I understand), that the > > > problem is then not specific to linguistics, but bound to inherent > > > limitations of layered models. > > > > > > I.e. if one wants to exclude from the lower layers (syntax, and > > > semantics meta-language) everything which depends on the upper ones > > > (semantics, pragmatics), there isn't anything left. > > > > > > [Popper also mentioned an other layered model for the functions of > > > language: expressive/ stimulative/ descriptive/ argumentative -- but > > > this is in an orthogonal dimension] > > > > > > -- > > > Marc Girod P.O. Box 310 Voice: +358-71 80 25581 > > > Nokia IM 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415 > > > UPS1 2/4 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 22227 From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Wed Jul 11 17:18:49 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 12:18:49 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sydney Lamb" To: Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 9:58 AM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > Dear Dan and all - > > It is good that you are trying to think this through with advice > from others before going into print. RISKY, THOUGH. > > ... > > The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is in > > principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no > > way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually. > > Right. Or you could say that there is an object of study -- the > ideal speaker-hearer, or the "internalized" grammar of same, or > the competence of same -- but all of these objects are > fictitious/imaginary/illusory. THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE 'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. THE QUESTION IS WHAT ILLUSIONS WE FIND USEFUL. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT SOME VARIANTS OF GENERATIVE THEORY DO IS TO BUILD THE ILLUSION INTO THE ONTOLOGY OF THE THEORY, NOT MERELY THE METHODOLOGY, AS I REPLIED TO TOM GIVON. WHEN THE THEORY IS PREDICATED ON THE IDEA THAT THERE CAN BE A GOAL OF DISCOVERING THE UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, I.E. TRUTH, THEN THAT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM BECAUSE IT LEADS TO LACK OF USEFULNESS. > > > ... > > a grammar is necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions about > > ... > > Yes, you could say 'Cartesian construct' as a euphemism for > fiction/illusion. > YES, THAT IS TRUE. BUT MOST CONSTRUCTS ARE, TO ALLOW THE CRITICISM TO RANGE A BIT MORE WIDELY. > > ... > > How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this > > sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot. > > ... > > I have trouble with the idea of 'grammar-only'. Why is it > necessary to isolate smthg from all else in order to recognize > it or study it? In the real world, Nothing is isolated from > everything else. Everything is interconnected; but we can still > study things. YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS USEFUL TO US) THE METHODOLOGICALLY ISOLATING BARRIERS WILL SOME DAY NEED TO COME DOWN. IF WE STUDY THEM, HOWEVER, IN THE BELIEF THAT THE ISOLATING BARRIERS ARE 'REAL' AND NEVER SHOULD COME DOWN (FOR EXAMPLE, THAT INFORMATION STRUCTURE WILL NEVER BE A PART OF SENTENTIAL SYNTAX) THEN WE DO OURSELVES A MISCHIEF. > > > ... > > Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an > > Cartesian-Chomskyan research program. > >... > > Well, sure. But it doesn't seem necessary to go through such an > involved argument to arrive at this conclusion. Isn't it obvious > that there is no such thing as an 'ideal speaker-hearer'? And > that being the case, the 'competence' of such a fiction is > equally illusory. THE INVOLVED REASONING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE POINT IS BROADER. IT APPLIES TO FUNCTIONALISM AND FORMALISM. HOWEVER, THE CRITICISM DOES NOT SEEM FATAL FOR FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES BECAUSE THE RANGE OF ONTOLOGIES ALLOWABLE FOR SUCH AN APPROACH IS WIDER THAN FOR CARTESIAN THEORIES. > > > ... . What could syntacticians > > study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar? > > That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding > > principles for linguistic > > theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey, CI > > ... > > "Whatever is useful to study" is all right, but there is another > way of looking at it: Beyond the usefulness we might have a > concern with reality. It is not the case that linguistics has to > treat fictitious/illusory objects. It is possible to do > linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an > 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical > speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the > linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know > now, from 140 years of aphasiology, that that system is a real > physical system residing the the cerebral cortex of that person. > This does not mean that we have to become neuroscientists to do > linguistics, for many of the ordinary time-honored methods of > linguistic investigation are quite applicable to figuring out > properties of that neurocognitive system. On the contrary, the > awareness of what it is that we are actually investigating helps > us to sort out which methods are likely to be useful and which > are not. For example, as we know that people are actually able > to use their linguistic systems for speaking and comprehending, > we can cast doubt on any structural formulation that has no > discernable means of being put into operation. I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO. PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES. > > On the other hand aphasiology does provide useful clues that can > be appreciated without specialized knowledge of neurology, such > as the fact that our phonological systems include two > distinguishable (but of course interconnected and mutually > influencing) subsystems, one for phonological production, the > other for phonological recognition. The long-standing habit of > linguists of treating phonology just from the point of view of > production is thus shown to be in error. QUITE LIKELY YOU ARE CORRECT. > > Now what about syntax (since you mention it) and the problem of > whether it could exist somehow apart from everything else? Well, > as we now have a real object of study, we should investigate it > without preconceptions and see what we find out: let the chips > fall where they may. Observation will tell us whether or not, or > to what extent, syntax is autonomous. We shouldn't care in > advance what we find out. (My studies indicate that it is > not.) THIS IS USEFUL. I SUSPECT ALL WOULD AGREE. CHOMSKY CLAIMS THAT ASCRIBING TO HIM THE VIEW THAT SYNTAX IS 'AUTONOMOUS' IS MYTHOLOGY. > From paul at BENJAMINS.COM Wed Jul 11 17:59:22 2001 From: paul at BENJAMINS.COM (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 13:59:22 -0400 Subject: New Books: Nuyts; Fortescue Message-ID: John Benjamins Publishing has brought out two new books related to Functional Linguistics: Epistemic Modality, Language, and Conceptualization. A cognitive-pragmatic perspective. Jan NUYTS (University of Antwerp) Human Cognitive Processing 5 90 272 2357 2 / NLG 220.00 (Hardcover) 1 55619 983 X / USD 100.00 (Hardcover) The relationship between language and conceptualization remains one of the major puzzles in language research. This monograph addresses this issue by means of an in depth corpus based and experimental investigation of the major types of expressions of epistemic modality in Dutch, German and English. By adopting a systematic functional orientation, the book explains a whole range of peculiarities of epistemic expression forms (synchronically and diachronically), and it offers a clear perspective on which cognitive systems are needed to get from the concept of epistemic modality to its linguistic expression. On that basis the author postulates a sophisticated, layered view of human conceptualization. This book is of interest both to scholars working on modality and related semantic dimensions, and to the interdisciplinary field of researchers concerned with the cognitive systems involved in language use. * * * * * * * * Pattern and Process. A Whiteheadian perspective on linguistics. Michael Fortescue (University of Copenhagen) Human Cognitive Processing 6 US & Canada: 1 58811 058 3 USD 86.00 Rest of world: 90 272 2358 0 NLG 190.00/ Hardcover 2001. viii, 312 pp. The purpose of this book is to illustrate the relevance to linguistics today of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. Although largely ignored by linguists, Whitehead has in fact much to say as regards the cognitive processes underpinning language pattern. His theory of symbolism conceives of language as the 'systematization of expression', and relates meaning to feeling (in the broadest sense). The Whiteheadian perspective allows a synthesis of the psychological and the social approaches to language that does not fall into one or another fashionable form of reductionism. The volume represents a first application of Whitehead's thinking to a broad range of linguistic phenomena, ranging from speech act theory to the production and comprehension of texts, from language acquisition to historical change and the evolution of language. It is argued that Whitehead's holistic philosophy is uniquely suited to the view of language as an emergent phenomenon - regardless of whether one's approach to cognition is via the 'nativist' or the 'functionalist' route. John Benjamins Publishing Co. Offices: Philadelphia Amsterdam: Websites: http://www.benjamins.com http://www.benjamins.nl E-mail: service at benjamins.com customer.services at benjamins.nl Phone: +215 836-1200 +31 20 6304747 Fax: +215 836-1204 +31 20 6739773 From lamb at RICE.EDU Thu Jul 12 16:06:54 2001 From: lamb at RICE.EDU (Sydney Lamb) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 11:06:54 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study In-Reply-To: <001f01c10a2d$8cd10840$3c04fea9@und.nodak.edu> Message-ID: Dan - I have no quarrel with nuch of what you say in your message of Wed, 11 Jul 2001, > Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps. And I'll respond to a few of your caps responses in my lower-case: > THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS > BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS > THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE > 'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER > HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. > ... But we should try to get beyond the illusions and study reality. > ... > YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT > WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS > ... I don't understand how it helps to study them as if they were isolated. > > > ... > > linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an > > 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical > > speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the > > linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know > > ... > > I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN > IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST Evidently you misunderstand: What I am advocating as object of study is NOT some abstract 'typical speaker-hearer' but one or more actual speaker-hearers; hence, not an idealization. On thinking it over i see that it would have been better to say 'representative speaker-hearer'. For example, what I called my 'Northfork Mono Grammar' was actually -- and consciously and intentionally -- a description of the system of one representative speaker, my informant Lucy Kinsman. The title was perhaps misleading, but less so if (as I surmised and hoped) whe really was representative. > AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO. > PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO > DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER > AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS > IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES. Yes, right on. Except that languages are also too much of an idealization to be realisticalluy studied. The 'individual language' is a very abstract concept, so much so that it could be considered illusory. What is real, by contrast, is people speaking. And each person's system differs from that of every other person -- hence misunderstanding and imperfect understanding, which we observe going on all the time -- probably even now. So its not only differences among languages that are important, but differences among the linguistic systems of people who are (loosely) said to 'speak the same language'. We have to give up the idea that linguists should be studying languages, if we want to be realistic, for languages do not exist. Instead, linguists should be studying people speaking and comprehending, and figuring out what they can about the neurocognitive systems of those people. All the best, - Syd Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK Thu Jul 12 17:03:40 2001 From: Dan.Everett at MAN.AC.UK (Dan Everett) Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 12:03:40 -0500 Subject: On nonobjects of syntactic study Message-ID: Syd, I agree with everything you said, more or less. Dan ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sydney Lamb" To: Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2001 11:06 AM Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study > Dan - I have no quarrel with nuch of what you say in your > message of Wed, 11 Jul 2001, > > > Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps. > > And I'll respond to a few of your caps responses in my > lower-case: > > > THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS > > BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS > > THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE > > 'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER > > HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. > > ... > > But we should try to get beyond the illusions and study reality. > > > ... > > YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT > > WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS > > ... > > I don't understand how it helps to study them as if they were > isolated. > > > > > ... > > > linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an > > > 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical > > > speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the > > > linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know > > > ... > > > > I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN > > IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST > > Evidently you misunderstand: What I am advocating as object of > study is NOT some abstract 'typical speaker-hearer' but one or > more actual speaker-hearers; hence, not an idealization. On > thinking it over i see that it would have been better to > say 'representative speaker-hearer'. For example, what I called > my 'Northfork Mono Grammar' was actually -- and consciously and > intentionally -- a description of the system of one > representative speaker, my informant Lucy Kinsman. The title was > perhaps misleading, but less so if (as I surmised and hoped) whe > really was representative. > > > AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO. > > PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO > > DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER > > AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS > > IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES. > > Yes, right on. Except that languages are also too much of an > idealization to be realisticalluy studied. The 'individual > language' is a very abstract concept, so much so that it > could be considered illusory. What is real, by contrast, is > people speaking. And each person's system differs from that of > every other person -- hence misunderstanding and imperfect > understanding, which we observe going on all the time -- > probably even now. > > So its not only differences among languages that are important, > but differences among the linguistic systems of people who are > (loosely) said to 'speak the same language'. > > We have to give up the idea that linguists should be studying > languages, if we want to be realistic, for languages do not > exist. Instead, linguists should be studying people speaking and > comprehending, and figuring out what they can about the > neurocognitive systems of those people. > > All the best, - Syd > > Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ > Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences > Rice University, Houston, TX From paul at BENJAMINS.COM Fri Jul 13 18:39:15 2001 From: paul at BENJAMINS.COM (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2001 14:39:15 -0400 Subject: New Book in Functional Linguistics: Bybee/Hopper Message-ID: John Benjamins Publishing announces a new work in Functional Linguistics: Frequency and the Emergence of Linguistic Structure. Joan Bybee (University of New Mexico) and Paul Hopper (Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh) Typological Studies in Language 45 2001. vii, 492 pp US & Canada: HB:1 58811 027 3 USD 125.00 PB: 1 58811 028 1 USD 42.95 Rest of world: HB: 90 272 2947 3 NLG 275.00 PB: 90 272 2948 1 NLG 95.00/ . A mainstay of functional linguistics has been the claim that linguistic elements and patterns that are frequently used in discourse become conventionalized as grammar. This book addresses the two issues that are basic to this claim: first, the question of what types of elements are frequently used in discourse and second, the question of how frequency of use affects cognitive representations. Reporting on evidence from natural conversation, diachronic change, variability, child language acquisition and psycholinguistic experimentation the original articles in this book support two major principles. First, the content of people's interactions consists of a preponderance of subjective, evaluative statements, dominated by the use of pronouns, copulas and intransitive clauses. Second, the frequency with which certain items and strings of items are used has a profound influence on the way language is broken up into chunks in memory storage, the way such chunks are related to other stored material and the ease with which they are accessed to produce new utterances. Contributions by:Joan Bybee and Paul Hopper; Sandra A. Thompson and Paul J. Hopper; Joanne Scheibman; Naomi Hallan; Betty S. Phillips; Janet B. Pierrehumbert; Stefan Frisch, Nathan R. Large, Bushra Zawaydeh and David B. Pisoni; Mary L. Hare, Michael Ford and William D. Marslen-Wilson; Greville Corbett, Andrew Hippisley, Dunstan Brown and Paul Marriott; Daniel Jurafsky, Alan Bell, Michelle Gregory and William D. Raymond; Nathan Bush; Catie Berkenfield; Manfred G. Krug; Joan Bybee; K. Aaron Smith; Joyce Tang Boyland; Shana Poplack, Gertraud Fenk-Oczlon; Brian Macwhinney; ?sten Dahl. John Benjamins Publishing Co. Offices: Philadelphia Amsterdam: Websites: http://www.benjamins.com http://www.benjamins.nl E-mail: service at benjamins.com customer.services at benjamins.nl Phone: +215 836-1200 +31 20 6304747 Fax: +215 836-1204 +31 20 6739773