On nonobjects of syntactic study

[Dan Everett]

Good points. I will try to respond to them. My response in caps.

Dan

----- Original Message -----
From: "Sydney Lamb" <lamb at RICE.EDU>
To: <FUNKNET at listserv.rice.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 9:58 AM
Subject: Re: On nonobjects of syntactic study


> Dear Dan and all -
>
> It is good that you are trying to think this through with advice
> from others before going into print.

RISKY, THOUGH.


> > ...
> > The basic thesis is that in a Chomskyan/Cartesian linguistics there is
in
> > principle no object of study. Alternatively, there is in-principle no
> > way at getting at that object, however clear it may sound conceptually.
>
> Right. Or you could say that there is an object of study -- the
> ideal speaker-hearer, or the "internalized" grammar of same, or
> the competence of same -- but all of these objects are
> fictitious/imaginary/illusory.

THE IDEAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS AN ILLUSION TO BE SURE. AND BILL CROFT, IN HIS
BOOK _EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE_ OFFERS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ABSTRACTIONS
THE CONSTRAINT THAT OUR GENERALIZATIONS BE BASED ON THINGS WHICH ARE
'SPATIALLY-TEMPORALLY BOUNDED', WHICH I THINK IS A GREAT IDEA. ON THE OTHER
HAND, I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF WHAT WE STUDY IS IDEALIZED AND ILLUSORY. THE
QUESTION IS WHAT ILLUSIONS WE FIND USEFUL. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT SOME
VARIANTS OF GENERATIVE THEORY DO IS TO BUILD THE ILLUSION INTO THE ONTOLOGY
OF THE THEORY, NOT MERELY THE METHODOLOGY, AS I REPLIED TO TOM GIVON. WHEN
THE THEORY IS PREDICATED ON THE IDEA THAT THERE CAN BE A GOAL OF DISCOVERING
THE UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, I.E. TRUTH, THEN THAT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM BECAUSE IT
LEADS TO LACK OF USEFULNESS.

>
> > ...
> > a grammar is  necessarily a Cartesian construct based on assumptions
about
> > ...
>
> Yes, you could say 'Cartesian construct' as a euphemism for
> fiction/illusion.
>

YES, THAT IS TRUE. BUT MOST CONSTRUCTS ARE, TO ALLOW THE CRITICISM TO RANGE
A BIT MORE WIDELY.

> > ...
> >   How do we recognize which phenomena are grammar-only in this
> >  sense? We do not. We have not. We will not. We cannot.
> > ...
>
> I have trouble with the idea of 'grammar-only'. Why is it
> necessary to isolate smthg from all else in order to recognize
> it or study it? In the real world, Nothing is isolated from
> everything else. Everything is interconnected; but we can still
> study things.

YES, WE CAN. BUT WE MAY STUDY THEM 'AS IF THEY WERE ISOLATED' KNOWING THAT
WE ARE NOT AND KNOWING THAT TO BE A MAXIMALLY USEFUL STORY (IF THAT IS
USEFUL TO US) THE METHODOLOGICALLY ISOLATING BARRIERS WILL SOME DAY NEED TO
COME DOWN. IF WE STUDY THEM, HOWEVER, IN THE BELIEF THAT THE ISOLATING
BARRIERS ARE 'REAL' AND NEVER SHOULD COME DOWN (FOR EXAMPLE, THAT
INFORMATION STRUCTURE WILL NEVER BE A PART OF SENTENTIAL SYNTAX) THEN WE DO
OURSELVES A MISCHIEF.

>
> > ...
> >  Therefore, there is not, nor could there be, an object of study for an
> > Cartesian-Chomskyan research program.
> >...
>
> Well, sure. But it doesn't seem necessary to go through such an
> involved argument to arrive at this conclusion. Isn't it obvious
> that there is no such thing as an 'ideal speaker-hearer'? And
> that being the case, the 'competence' of such a fiction is
> equally illusory.

THE INVOLVED REASONING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE POINT IS BROADER. IT APPLIES
TO FUNCTIONALISM AND FORMALISM. HOWEVER, THE CRITICISM DOES NOT SEEM FATAL
FOR FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES BECAUSE THE RANGE OF ONTOLOGIES ALLOWABLE FOR
SUCH AN APPROACH IS WIDER THAN FOR CARTESIAN THEORIES.

>
> > ...  . What could syntacticians
> > study, then, if not a Cartesian or mental grammar?
> > That answer is easy: whatever we find useful to study. Ergo, the guiding
> > principles for linguistic
> >  theory are more likely to be found in Pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey,
CI
> > ...
>
> "Whatever is useful to study" is all right, but there is another
> way of looking at it: Beyond the usefulness we might have a
> concern with reality. It is not the case that linguistics has to
> treat fictitious/illusory objects. It is possible to do
> linguistics while also being realistic. Instead of imagining an
> 'ideal speaker-hearer' we can observe the Typical
> speaker-hearer, a real object. Our concern should be with the
> linguistic system(s) of such (a) person(s). Moreover, we know
> now, from 140 years of aphasiology, that that system is a real
> physical system residing the the cerebral cortex of that person.
> This does not mean that we have to become neuroscientists to do
> linguistics, for many of the ordinary time-honored methods of
> linguistic investigation are quite applicable to figuring out
> properties of that neurocognitive system. On the contrary, the
> awareness of what it is that we are actually investigating helps
> us to sort out which methods are likely to be useful and which
> are not. For example, as we know that people are actually able
> to use their linguistic systems for speaking and comprehending,
> we can cast doubt on any structural formulation that has no
> discernable means of being put into operation.

I AGREE WITH ALL OF THIS, EXCEPT THAT THE TYPICAL SPEAKER-HEARER IS ALSO AN
IDEALIZATION. THERE ARE ONLY SPEAKER-HEARERs - PLURAL - NOT SINGULAR. JUST
AS *LANGUAGE* IS AN IDEALIZATION. LANGUAGES ARE TOO, BUT PERHAPS LESS SO.
PERHAPS MORE USEFUL. ULTIMATELY PRAGMATISM LEADS, I BELIEVE, TO A RETURN TO
DESCRIPTIVISM AND THEORIES/STORIES CONCERNED WITH PLURALITIES, PEOPLE, WIDER
AND THICKER CONNECTIONS, WHERE DIFFERENCES AMONG LANGUAGES BECOME AGAIN AS
IMPORTANT AS SIMILARITIES.
>
> On the other hand aphasiology does provide useful clues that can
> be appreciated without specialized knowledge of neurology, such
> as the fact that our phonological systems include two
> distinguishable (but of course interconnected and mutually
> influencing) subsystems, one for phonological production, the
> other for phonological recognition. The long-standing habit of
> linguists of treating phonology just from the point of view of
> production is thus shown to be in error.

QUITE LIKELY YOU ARE CORRECT.
>
> Now what about syntax (since you mention it) and the problem of
> whether it could exist somehow apart from everything else? Well,
> as we now have a real object of study, we should investigate it
> without preconceptions and see what we find out: let the chips
> fall where they may. Observation will tell us whether or not, or
> to what extent, syntax is autonomous. We shouldn't care in
> advance what we find out. (My studies indicate that it is
> not.)

THIS IS USEFUL. I SUSPECT ALL WOULD AGREE. CHOMSKY CLAIMS THAT ASCRIBING TO
HIM THE VIEW THAT SYNTAX IS 'AUTONOMOUS' IS MYTHOLOGY.
>