From prashantpardeshi at yahoo.com Tue Jun 1 07:36:37 2004 From: prashantpardeshi at yahoo.com (Prashant Pardeshi) Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2004 00:36:37 -0700 Subject: The Third International Forum on Language, Brain, and Cognition Message-ID: (Apologies for multiple postings) The Third International Forum on Language, Brain, and Cognition Organized by: Tohoku University 21st Century Program in Humanities Strategic Research and Education Center for an Integrated Approach to Language, Brain, and Cognition (http://www.lbc21.jp/) Workshop on Linguistic Science at Interdisciplinary Crossroads (http://www.lbc21.jp/TEMP/InfoForum03.htm) Date: June 11 (Friday), 9am-17pm Venue: The Cass Centre(http://www.thecasscentre.co.uk/location.htm), Cambridge, UK *Pre-registration kindly requested (via COE Program Secretariat: office at lbc21.jp) Speakers: Ina Bornkessel, Max Planck Institute for Neuroscience, Leipzig �@�@"Neurotypology: Towards a cross-linguistic framework for language comprehension" Hiroto Hoshi, SOAS, University of London "Functional categories, structure building and theta marking" Naho Ikuta, Jungho Kim, and Masatoshi Koizumi, The COE Program in Humanities, Tohoku University "Brain activities related to the processing of Japanese canonical and scrambled sentences " Sotaro Kita, Dept. of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol "Thinking-for-speaking in motion event descriptions as revealed by speech-accompanying gestures" Kichun Nam, Dept., of Psychology, Korea University, and Sunbeom Pyun, College of Medicine, University of Ulsan "Behavioral neuropsychological assessment and brain activation in an acquired dyslexia: An fMRI study" Prashant Pardeshi, Kaoru Horie and Shigeru Sato, The COE Program in Humanities, Tohoku University "Where grammar and socio-cultural cognition meet: A case of ego (speaker) as a goal" Ian Roberts, Dept. of linguistics, University of Cambridge "Parametric comparison: Can we measure the syntactic distance between languages?" Yuko Sassa, Hyeonjeong Jeong, Hideyuki Okamoto, Ryuta Kawashima, The COE Program in Humanities, Tohoku University "Functional organization of the human inferior frontal cortex involved in language processing" Contact: Secretariat, COE Program in Humanities, Graduate School of International Cultural Studies, Kawauchi, Aoba-ku, Sendai, 980-8576 Japan Tel. +81-22-217-7550, Fax. +81-22-217-7850, E-mail: office at lbc21.jp __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Friends. Fun. Try the all-new Yahoo! Messenger. http://messenger.yahoo.com/ From mg246 at cornell.edu Thu Jun 3 07:03:09 2004 From: mg246 at cornell.edu (Monica Gonzalez-Marquez) Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2004 03:03:09 -0400 Subject: Workshop Announcement Message-ID: *****Apologies for crosspostings***** EMCL*: A Workshop on Image-Schemas and Linguistic Relativity July 17, 2004 University of Portsmouth, UK http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/psychology/lcmconference2004/ To precede the Language, Culture, and Mind conference (July 18-20) In cognitive linguistics, image schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive structures, arising from universal aspects of how the human body interacts with its environment, both physical and social, and existing largely outside of conscious awareness. It follows that image schemas are the same for everyone, regardless of the language a person speaks. In contrast, the idea of linguistic relativity maintains that language influences thought. The goal of the workshop is to scrutinize assumptions surrounding image-schemas and linguistic relativity in an attempt to elucidate (and resolve) the conflict between the two research areas. Speakers: Stephanie Pourcel, University of Durham Studying Linguistic Relativity Empirically: Scope and Issues Monica Gonzalez-Marquez, Cornell University An Overview of Image Schemas in the Literature Stanka Fitneva, Queen's University On Possible Conflicts between Image Schemas and Linguistic Relativity Joerg Zinken, University of Portsmouth Linguistic Fieldwork Roslyn Frank, University of Iowa (Title to be announced) Jordan Zlatev, Lund University; Caroline David, University of Poitiers Do Swedes and Frenchmen View Motion Differently? Margarita Correa-Beningfield, C. Vandeloise, Gitte Kristiansen, Universidad Complutense de Madrid Image Schema and Empirical Data from Second Language Acquisition of English by Spanish speakers Ting Ting Avis Chan, University of Hawaii Writing Direction and the Universality of Image Schemas Dominik Lukes, Collegium Hieronymi Pragensis Image Schemas in Second Language Learning and Instruction: A Case for a Multidisciplinary Approach Asifa Majid, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics; Miriam van Staden, University of Amsterdam; Nick Enfield, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics The Image Schema and Cross-Linguistic Differences in Body-Part Terms Organizing Committee: Monica Gonzalez-Marquez, Cornell University, US Stanka Fitneva, Queens University, CA Stephanie Pourcel, University of Durham, UK Joerg Zinken, University of Portsmouth, UK Information: mg246 at cornell.edu From mg246 at cornell.edu Sat Jun 5 03:45:09 2004 From: mg246 at cornell.edu (Monica Gonzalez-Marquez) Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2004 23:45:09 -0400 Subject: Updated info: Image Schemas and Linguistic Relativity Message-ID: Hello All, Two speakers have been added to the workshop: Ben Bergen, University of Hawaii, Manoa and Chris Sinha, University of Portsmouth Also, a website is now available: http://cerebro.psych.cornell.edu/emcl/islr/index.htm best, Monica From rjfreeman at email.com Wed Jun 9 05:41:27 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 13:41:27 +0800 Subject: primitive image-schemas In-Reply-To: <200406081619.JAA05464@mail.ucsd.edu> Message-ID: George and the list(s), (Which list are we on? Anyone not getting Funknet and Cogling is only getting half this thread.) I apologize to Monica for singling her out in my original post. I had no idea it was central to the definition of image-schemas that they be primitives. It seems she was merely stating the accepted position in Cognitive Linguistics. If such primitives are posited I agree with Monica that there is a conflict to be resolved. If language is subjective, and language reflects cognition, why should there be universal cognitive primitives (you can make it so by adding complexity to the theory, but why _should_ it be so?) It starts to sound like a confusion between "primitive" and "average". Are the primitives we see really primitives, or are they the average of a lot of subjective conceptions of the same thing? I suppose it is inevitable that on some level the topology of the brain will kick in and you will have a true primitive ("Cogs"!! I like it :-) I would be surprised if the topology of the brain restricted us to a concept of "containment" or such, however. -Rob Freeman On Wednesday 09 June 2004 00:19, you wrote: > Hi, > > Sorry to be out of touch for so long, but I've > been working at applying cogling to politics and > helping to establish the Rockridge Institute > (www.rockridgeinstitute.org). > > As the person who (so far as I know) introduced > the term "image-schema" into cognitive > linguistics, I hope I can help clarify the > discussion so far. > > As is natural in science, ideas go through > various stages as better and better > understandings of the subject matter are > achieved. Here are some of the stages in the use > of "image-schema." > > Stage 1: I first used the term "image-schema" to > refer to the primitive "images" that both Talmy > and Langacker were discussing in the mid-to-late > 1970's, and which remarkable researchers like > Casad, Lindner and Brugman expanded on. > > Talmy's original discussion (in a talk at > Berkeley, summer 1975) made the observation that, > although spatial relations terms seem to have > quite different meanings in the languages of the > world, those meanings can be decomposed into > primitive "images" that recur across languages. > Talmy surmised that there was a set of such > primitives that was universal. His examples > included containment, source-path-goal, contact, > encirclement, etc. His idea was that the > closed-class spatial relations terms (like > prepositions in English, cases in Finnish, > postpositions in Japanese) were complex concepts > made up of such primitives. > > Talmy further analyzed the primitives into > conceptual types: topological, orientational, and > force-dynamic. I used the term "image-schema" for > each such primitive in Women, Fire, and Dangerous > Things, case study 2. > > Langacker, starting around the same time, had a > similar idea about the existence of such spatial > primitives. He, together with Casad, Lindner, and > Brugman, have provided extremely rich > image-schema analyses, breaking down the meanings > of spatial terms into primitives. These studies > are among the most sophisticated within cognitive > linguistics. They are, however, not > uncontroversial, as alternative decompositions > into primitives have been proposed. The > controversy has been about which decompositions > are cognitively correct, not about whether > image-schema analysis is right. > > Stage 2: Mark Johnson (1987) enriched that idea > of image-schemas with his discussion of > phenomenological embodiment -- intuitive > embodiment subject to introspection. Johnson took > the idea out of linguistics per se and set it in > the context of phenomenological introspection: We > understand our bodies as containers, with an > inside, a boundary, and an outside. We understand > every movement we make as having a source, a > path, and a goal. And so on. For Johnson, > image-schemas were recurrent patterns of bodily > experience. > > Johnson was right, but provided no biological mechanism. > > Stage 3: Terry Regier (1995) proposed that image > schemas were consequences of brain structure and > that they worked via the mechanism of neural > computation. The container schema, for example, > is a constellation of topographic maps that > jointly compute the schema roles - interior, > boundary, exterior - given shape input and using > such mechanisms as outside-to-inside spreading > (Ramanujan). He argued that orientational schemas > could be learned on the basis of orientational > sensitive cells. Regier also showed how the > learning of the meanings of complex terms could > be done without negative input. In short, under > the Regier proposal, image-schemas are primitive > cognitive/imagistics structures computed by brain > structures, at least some of which are innate in > all human beingsd and therefore universal (e.g., > Container, Contact.) > However , the words and morphemes that express > spatial concepts are complex - made up of > multiple schemas bound together. > > Regier's book was an oversimplification > done to get the computations to work most simply. > His model also was not designed to account for > image-schematic inferences (e,g., if you're in a > container, you're not out of it).. > > Stage 4: Srini Narayanan (1997) proposed that (a) > the aspectual schemas are neural structures in > the premotor cortex, that (b) aspectual > understanding is a matter of simulation, that (c) > aspectual inferences were arrived at by neural > computation over those neural structures, that > (d) metaphorical mappings are neural circuits > linking different ("source" and "target") brain > areas, and that (e) metaphorical inference arises > from the computational combination of source and > target neural computations via the brain > circuitry that constitutes metaphor. > > Narayanan added aspectual schemas and > showed how they could do inferences via neural > computation. Narayanan's model was made to fit > the theory of neural simulation, based on > findings that the imagination of perception and > action uses the same neural substrate as > perception and actions themselves. > > Though there is no running computational > model of Regier's and Narayanan's systems work > together, one can imagine various ways of > combining their systems to produce inferences for > primitive image-schemas. > > Stage 5: The Cog Theory of Image-schemas. In the > course of writing The Brain's Concept's" with > Vittorio Gallese, I noted that Srini's aspectual > schemas are (a) located in "secondary" brain > structures (cf. Gallese and Lakoff, submitted to > Cognitive Neurospyschology and present in 2003 at > ICL ) with (b) neural connections to more > "primary" brain areas (closer to effectors and > sensors); and that (c) they compute the semantics > of grammatical elements. I applied the term "cog" > to all such cases. I then observed that, > thinking in Regier's terms, all image-schemas > could be understood as cogs. > > Under the cog theory, (1) image-schemas are > computed specific neural circuits used in > sensory-motor operations, (2) those sensory-motor > operations are multi-modal (cf. Lakoff and > Gallese), (3) image-schemas are multi-modal and > not located in any one module, (4) different > image-schemas are computed by circuitry in > different parts of the brain, and (5) the > circuitry operates over neural clusters, not > individual neurons. > > This theory explains why image-schemas are > examples of what Talmy calls "ception" - neutral > between perception and action, common to both, > yet used for conception. > > The Cog Theory of image-schemas is vague, and necessarily so. > > It is informed by what we have learned from > Regier and Naryanan about the kinds of neural > structures that could carry out the necessary > computations. But it makes no claims about the > exact neural circuits that do the job, because > not enough is known. But, it is only by via the > Cog Hypothesis that neuroscientists could even > imagine looking for circuits of the right kind. > > Stage 6: ECG: Embodied Construction Grammar. ECG > uses a notation motivated by brain studies and > neural computation that can be used for > characterizing linguistic structures precisely. > ECG elements reduce to neural clusters and to > circuitry that can do the appropriate > computation. In ECG, only the parameter structure > of image-schemas is notated - the topological, > orientational, and force-dynamic structure is > factored out and reduced to a formalism that can > be used in language understanding systems. The > formalism, though lacking the imagistic and > force-dynamic content, has the utility of > permitting precise accounts of image-schemas. > > =46or linguists, the big advantage of the cog > theory is that we can go ahead using ECG > formalism with a reasonable guess as to how the > formalism will eventually be fleshed out, but > with out having to know about the neuroscience > details. > > Given the rapid development of the theory of > image-schemas, it is understandable that there > should be conflicting understandings. > > Given this as background, some comments are in order. > > Here's what Monica's conference announcement said: > > In cognitive linguistics, image schemas are > pre-linguistic cognitive structures, arising from > universal aspects of how the human body interacts > with its environment, both physical and social, > and existing largely outside of conscious > awareness. It follows that image schemas are the > same for everyone, regardless of the language a > person speaks. In contrast, the idea of > linguistic relativity maintains that language > influences thought. The goal of the workshop is > to scrutinize assumptions surrounding > image-schemas and linguistic relativity in an > attempt to elucidate (and resolve) the conflict > between the two research areas. > > =85 The fragment "In cognitive linguistics, image > schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive structures," > fits all stages. > > =85 The sentence, "In cognitive linguistics, > image schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive > structures, arising from universal aspects of how > the human body interacts with its environment, > both physical and social, and existing largely > outside of conscious awareness," fits Johnson's > 1987 characterization, but doesn't mention the > more recent neurally-based accounts (though it is > consistent with them). > > =85 The sentence, "It follows that image schemas > are the same for everyone, regardless of the > language a person speaks," fits all stages. > > =85 The sentence, "In contrast, the idea of > linguistic relativity maintains that language > influences thought" contains two mistakes. > > The most relevant mistake is contained in the > phrase "in contrast." Every version of the theory > of image schemas is consistent with the idea that > language influences thought. The reason is this: > Image-schemas are conceptual in nature, part of > the sensory-motor system (see Gallese & Lakoff). > They are part of the semantic pole in Langacker's > sense. Language requires a linking of the > phonological pole with the semantic pole. A > spatial relations term is phonological in nature. > The term (morpheme, word, or phrase) when paired > with its meaning is part of language. > > Now each spatial relations term, in general, is > paired not with one meaning but with a radial > category of meanings (see Women, Fire and > Dangerous Things, case study 2) and the writings > of Langacker, Casad, Lindner, Brugman, and > others). Such radial categories differ from > language to language, and each language form a > different system of how spatial relations terms > are related to their categories of meanings. > > (a) Since this system of pairs of forms with > meaning-categories is language particular, > (b) since it works unconsciously, > (c) since the elements of the meanings include > complex image-schemas (complexes of primitive > image-schemas used automatically as complexes in > thinking), and > (d) since image-schemas are embodied conceptual > universals, it follows that both > (e) "language infuences thought" and > (f) image-schemas are universal. > > Not only does the universality of image-schemas > not conflict with the idea of linguistic > relativity, these two ideas have consistently > been discuss together in the cognitive linguistic > literature: See chapter 18 of Women, Fire, and > Dangerous Things. In that chapter, I discussed > the second mistake in Monica's sentence beginning > "in contrast," namely that linguistic relativity > is the idea that language influences thought. > That is only one small part of Whorf's idea. For > the rest, see the long discussion of Whorf in > Women, Fire. > > I hope that this false dichotomy does not persist. > > =46or example, Wally Chafe, in this discussion has > written "thought involves imagery and emotions." > He is of course correct. But that has no bearing > on whether image-schemas are universal and > computed by brain structures that are pretty much > the same (computationally equivalent) for > everyone. If anyone is aware of the complexities > of word meanings and the differences in thought > across languages, Wally is. But that again has no > bearing on the question. > > I hope this helps. > > George From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Jun 9 15:18:41 2004 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 11:18:41 EDT Subject: primitive image-schemas 2 Message-ID: In a message dated 6/9/04 1:45:49 AM, rjfreeman at email.com writes: << If such primitives are posited I agree with Monica that there is a conflict to be resolved. If language is subjective, and language reflects cognition, why should there be universal cognitive primitives (you can make it so by adding complexity to the theory, but why _should_ it be so?) It starts to sound like a confusion between "primitive" and "average". Are the primitives we see really primitives, or are they the average of a lot of subjective conceptions of the same thing? >> Just an observation. It's not like we are talking about purely "subjective" matters when we talk about things like spatial relationships. There is a concrete and rather complex physical world out there that does demand a certain conformity between what is subjective and what is objective. If image-schemas are at all helpful in getting us to and opening the refrigerator door (or helping us tell someone how to do that), then we can expect a fundamental conformity to physical laws in the way these "cognitive" organs have evolved and therefore operate. Likewise, the pain nerves in my toe tell me that my toe is part of "me", despite any subjective schema that attempts to leave it out of what is "me". One might call it a biological dictate. In asking whether such commonality of observation and effect is either "primitive" or "average", we are fundamentally asking what these image-schemas would be like in a human (or other organism) in a world where spatial relationships are different than the world in which we live. Otherwise, we might expect primitive and average to be pretty much one and the same -- whether it is learning the world or biological evolution that shaped them. Fundamentally inaccurate image-schemas on a basic level are not going to get very far in terms of simple survival value. And that is why we expect them -- on a basic level -- to be universal. Steve Long From wilcox at unm.edu Wed Jun 9 15:27:07 2004 From: wilcox at unm.edu (Sherman Wilcox) Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 09:27:07 -0600 Subject: primitive image-schemas 2 In-Reply-To: <7e.5068a867.2df88451@aol.com> Message-ID: On 6/9/04 9:18 AM, "Salinas17 at aol.com" wrote: > If image-schemas are at all helpful in getting us to and opening the > refrigerator door (or helping us tell someone how to do that), then we can > expect a fundamental conformity to physical laws in the way these "cognitive" > organs have evolved and therefore operate. Likewise, the pain nerves in my > toe tell me that my toe is part of "me", despite any subjective schema that > attempts to leave it out of what is "me". One might call it a biological > dictate. Peter Gärdenfors has an illuminating discussion of a related matter (the origin of quality dimensions in conceptual spaces) on pages 26-30 of his book "Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought" (2000, MIT Press). -- Sherman Wilcox Associate Professor and Chair Department of Linguistics University of New Mexico From tgivon at uoregon.edu Wed Jun 9 16:52:00 2004 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 09:52:00 -0700 Subject: primitive image-schemas Message-ID: Dear friends, Perhaps one needs to be reminded that "language is subjective" is itself a relative ("subjective") proposition. It is no doubt true in principle, and for the deductive philosopher this may be enough. But not for the empirical scientist. For science is not (only) about what is true in principle, but also what is more likely, or more frequent in fact. In physics and inorganic chemistry, this truism is sometimes obscured; but it is a fact of life in all complex biologically-based systems. Most of our "Greenbergian" universals are very much like many universals in biology and cognitive psychology. They admit a certain range of variation ("deviation") without being automatically falsified by them. Indeed, in biology, cognition and language, exceptions are a vital part of the adaptive system; they provide for adaptation, learning & change. Sine qua non. This is so because we deal here with multiple adaptive pressures ("functional principles") that often come into conflict, and evantually arrive at some adaptive compromise (MacWhinney & Bates' "competition model"). In such complex domains, more than one adaptive compromise is viable, though in the main they all tend to fall within a rather confined ballpark. (Why do we have so few languages with thirty phonemic vowels? Why do we have only 7-8 main types of doing the work of passive voice?). This is, after all, what typology and variation is all about--there's more than one way of skinning the "..." (in deference to those resent traditional image schemata). But the range of variants is highly constrained by the adaptive parameter that drive the system. Event-and-object cognition, the rightful name of "image scemata", is an ancient adaptation, not linguistic, not human, but harkening back to mammals and their vertebrate precoursors. They are about survival in a world of physical obstacles, potential foods and poisons, dangerous predators and edible/tangible preys. They are about finding a faithful mate, raising healthy young, and banding together for mutual support, defence and (yes!) transcendence. The human neurology that supports event cognition is, in its main features, the same for us as it is for simians and canines. The various "schemata" abducted and tested through this system are neither capricious nor wide-open. They are strongly constrained by adaptive factors. For they have been selected over muillions of years in a very ruthless fashion: The DNA of the organisms who thought that this rock (or tree, or rive, or tiger, or hawk, or snake, or ricinus plant) were just relativistic figments of the subjective imagination is not with us anymore. For the philosophically- oriented individuals who held extreme relativistic views about Ultimate Reality--bless their dear pre-Kantian hearts--did not live to tell the tale. Nor did they produce offsprings who would perpetuate their extreme relativist DNA. Brutal, perhaps, but supremely efficent. And sweet. Like love. Have a good summer, TG ============================= Rob Freeman wrote: > George and the list(s), > > (Which list are we on? Anyone not getting Funknet and Cogling is only getting > half this thread.) > > I apologize to Monica for singling her out in my original post. I had no idea > it was central to the definition of image-schemas that they be primitives. It > seems she was merely stating the accepted position in Cognitive Linguistics. > > If such primitives are posited I agree with Monica that there is a conflict to > be resolved. If language is subjective, and language reflects cognition, why > should there be universal cognitive primitives (you can make it so by adding > complexity to the theory, but why _should_ it be so?) > > It starts to sound like a confusion between "primitive" and "average". Are the > primitives we see really primitives, or are they the average of a lot of > subjective conceptions of the same thing? > > I suppose it is inevitable that on some level the topology of the brain will > kick in and you will have a true primitive ("Cogs"!! I like it :-) I would be > surprised if the topology of the brain restricted us to a concept of > "containment" or such, however. > > -Rob Freeman > > On Wednesday 09 June 2004 00:19, you wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Sorry to be out of touch for so long, but I've > > been working at applying cogling to politics and > > helping to establish the Rockridge Institute > > (www.rockridgeinstitute.org). > > > > As the person who (so far as I know) introduced > > the term "image-schema" into cognitive > > linguistics, I hope I can help clarify the > > discussion so far. > > > > As is natural in science, ideas go through > > various stages as better and better > > understandings of the subject matter are > > achieved. Here are some of the stages in the use > > of "image-schema." > > > > Stage 1: I first used the term "image-schema" to > > refer to the primitive "images" that both Talmy > > and Langacker were discussing in the mid-to-late > > 1970's, and which remarkable researchers like > > Casad, Lindner and Brugman expanded on. > > > > Talmy's original discussion (in a talk at > > Berkeley, summer 1975) made the observation that, > > although spatial relations terms seem to have > > quite different meanings in the languages of the > > world, those meanings can be decomposed into > > primitive "images" that recur across languages. > > Talmy surmised that there was a set of such > > primitives that was universal. His examples > > included containment, source-path-goal, contact, > > encirclement, etc. His idea was that the > > closed-class spatial relations terms (like > > prepositions in English, cases in Finnish, > > postpositions in Japanese) were complex concepts > > made up of such primitives. > > > > Talmy further analyzed the primitives into > > conceptual types: topological, orientational, and > > force-dynamic. I used the term "image-schema" for > > each such primitive in Women, Fire, and Dangerous > > Things, case study 2. > > > > Langacker, starting around the same time, had a > > similar idea about the existence of such spatial > > primitives. He, together with Casad, Lindner, and > > Brugman, have provided extremely rich > > image-schema analyses, breaking down the meanings > > of spatial terms into primitives. These studies > > are among the most sophisticated within cognitive > > linguistics. They are, however, not > > uncontroversial, as alternative decompositions > > into primitives have been proposed. The > > controversy has been about which decompositions > > are cognitively correct, not about whether > > image-schema analysis is right. > > > > Stage 2: Mark Johnson (1987) enriched that idea > > of image-schemas with his discussion of > > phenomenological embodiment -- intuitive > > embodiment subject to introspection. Johnson took > > the idea out of linguistics per se and set it in > > the context of phenomenological introspection: We > > understand our bodies as containers, with an > > inside, a boundary, and an outside. We understand > > every movement we make as having a source, a > > path, and a goal. And so on. For Johnson, > > image-schemas were recurrent patterns of bodily > > experience. > > > > Johnson was right, but provided no biological mechanism. > > > > Stage 3: Terry Regier (1995) proposed that image > > schemas were consequences of brain structure and > > that they worked via the mechanism of neural > > computation. The container schema, for example, > > is a constellation of topographic maps that > > jointly compute the schema roles - interior, > > boundary, exterior - given shape input and using > > such mechanisms as outside-to-inside spreading > > (Ramanujan). He argued that orientational schemas > > could be learned on the basis of orientational > > sensitive cells. Regier also showed how the > > learning of the meanings of complex terms could > > be done without negative input. In short, under > > the Regier proposal, image-schemas are primitive > > cognitive/imagistics structures computed by brain > > structures, at least some of which are innate in > > all human beingsd and therefore universal (e.g., > > Container, Contact.) > > However , the words and morphemes that express > > spatial concepts are complex - made up of > > multiple schemas bound together. > > > > Regier's book was an oversimplification > > done to get the computations to work most simply. > > His model also was not designed to account for > > image-schematic inferences (e,g., if you're in a > > container, you're not out of it).. > > > > Stage 4: Srini Narayanan (1997) proposed that (a) > > the aspectual schemas are neural structures in > > the premotor cortex, that (b) aspectual > > understanding is a matter of simulation, that (c) > > aspectual inferences were arrived at by neural > > computation over those neural structures, that > > (d) metaphorical mappings are neural circuits > > linking different ("source" and "target") brain > > areas, and that (e) metaphorical inference arises > > from the computational combination of source and > > target neural computations via the brain > > circuitry that constitutes metaphor. > > > > Narayanan added aspectual schemas and > > showed how they could do inferences via neural > > computation. Narayanan's model was made to fit > > the theory of neural simulation, based on > > findings that the imagination of perception and > > action uses the same neural substrate as > > perception and actions themselves. > > > > Though there is no running computational > > model of Regier's and Narayanan's systems work > > together, one can imagine various ways of > > combining their systems to produce inferences for > > primitive image-schemas. > > > > Stage 5: The Cog Theory of Image-schemas. In the > > course of writing The Brain's Concept's" with > > Vittorio Gallese, I noted that Srini's aspectual > > schemas are (a) located in "secondary" brain > > structures (cf. Gallese and Lakoff, submitted to > > Cognitive Neurospyschology and present in 2003 at > > ICL ) with (b) neural connections to more > > "primary" brain areas (closer to effectors and > > sensors); and that (c) they compute the semantics > > of grammatical elements. I applied the term "cog" > > to all such cases. I then observed that, > > thinking in Regier's terms, all image-schemas > > could be understood as cogs. > > > > Under the cog theory, (1) image-schemas are > > computed specific neural circuits used in > > sensory-motor operations, (2) those sensory-motor > > operations are multi-modal (cf. Lakoff and > > Gallese), (3) image-schemas are multi-modal and > > not located in any one module, (4) different > > image-schemas are computed by circuitry in > > different parts of the brain, and (5) the > > circuitry operates over neural clusters, not > > individual neurons. > > > > This theory explains why image-schemas are > > examples of what Talmy calls "ception" - neutral > > between perception and action, common to both, > > yet used for conception. > > > > The Cog Theory of image-schemas is vague, and necessarily so. > > > > It is informed by what we have learned from > > Regier and Naryanan about the kinds of neural > > structures that could carry out the necessary > > computations. But it makes no claims about the > > exact neural circuits that do the job, because > > not enough is known. But, it is only by via the > > Cog Hypothesis that neuroscientists could even > > imagine looking for circuits of the right kind. > > > > Stage 6: ECG: Embodied Construction Grammar. ECG > > uses a notation motivated by brain studies and > > neural computation that can be used for > > characterizing linguistic structures precisely. > > ECG elements reduce to neural clusters and to > > circuitry that can do the appropriate > > computation. In ECG, only the parameter structure > > of image-schemas is notated - the topological, > > orientational, and force-dynamic structure is > > factored out and reduced to a formalism that can > > be used in language understanding systems. The > > formalism, though lacking the imagistic and > > force-dynamic content, has the utility of > > permitting precise accounts of image-schemas. > > > > =46or linguists, the big advantage of the cog > > theory is that we can go ahead using ECG > > formalism with a reasonable guess as to how the > > formalism will eventually be fleshed out, but > > with out having to know about the neuroscience > > details. > > > > Given the rapid development of the theory of > > image-schemas, it is understandable that there > > should be conflicting understandings. > > > > Given this as background, some comments are in order. > > > > Here's what Monica's conference announcement said: > > > > In cognitive linguistics, image schemas are > > pre-linguistic cognitive structures, arising from > > universal aspects of how the human body interacts > > with its environment, both physical and social, > > and existing largely outside of conscious > > awareness. It follows that image schemas are the > > same for everyone, regardless of the language a > > person speaks. In contrast, the idea of > > linguistic relativity maintains that language > > influences thought. The goal of the workshop is > > to scrutinize assumptions surrounding > > image-schemas and linguistic relativity in an > > attempt to elucidate (and resolve) the conflict > > between the two research areas. > > > > =85 The fragment "In cognitive linguistics, image > > schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive structures," > > fits all stages. > > > > =85 The sentence, "In cognitive linguistics, > > image schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive > > structures, arising from universal aspects of how > > the human body interacts with its environment, > > both physical and social, and existing largely > > outside of conscious awareness," fits Johnson's > > 1987 characterization, but doesn't mention the > > more recent neurally-based accounts (though it is > > consistent with them). > > > > =85 The sentence, "It follows that image schemas > > are the same for everyone, regardless of the > > language a person speaks," fits all stages. > > > > =85 The sentence, "In contrast, the idea of > > linguistic relativity maintains that language > > influences thought" contains two mistakes. > > > > The most relevant mistake is contained in the > > phrase "in contrast." Every version of the theory > > of image schemas is consistent with the idea that > > language influences thought. The reason is this: > > Image-schemas are conceptual in nature, part of > > the sensory-motor system (see Gallese & Lakoff). > > They are part of the semantic pole in Langacker's > > sense. Language requires a linking of the > > phonological pole with the semantic pole. A > > spatial relations term is phonological in nature. > > The term (morpheme, word, or phrase) when paired > > with its meaning is part of language. > > > > Now each spatial relations term, in general, is > > paired not with one meaning but with a radial > > category of meanings (see Women, Fire and > > Dangerous Things, case study 2) and the writings > > of Langacker, Casad, Lindner, Brugman, and > > others). Such radial categories differ from > > language to language, and each language form a > > different system of how spatial relations terms > > are related to their categories of meanings. > > > > (a) Since this system of pairs of forms with > > meaning-categories is language particular, > > (b) since it works unconsciously, > > (c) since the elements of the meanings include > > complex image-schemas (complexes of primitive > > image-schemas used automatically as complexes in > > thinking), and > > (d) since image-schemas are embodied conceptual > > universals, it follows that both > > (e) "language infuences thought" and > > (f) image-schemas are universal. > > > > Not only does the universality of image-schemas > > not conflict with the idea of linguistic > > relativity, these two ideas have consistently > > been discuss together in the cognitive linguistic > > literature: See chapter 18 of Women, Fire, and > > Dangerous Things. In that chapter, I discussed > > the second mistake in Monica's sentence beginning > > "in contrast," namely that linguistic relativity > > is the idea that language influences thought. > > That is only one small part of Whorf's idea. For > > the rest, see the long discussion of Whorf in > > Women, Fire. > > > > I hope that this false dichotomy does not persist. > > > > =46or example, Wally Chafe, in this discussion has > > written "thought involves imagery and emotions." > > He is of course correct. But that has no bearing > > on whether image-schemas are universal and > > computed by brain structures that are pretty much > > the same (computationally equivalent) for > > everyone. If anyone is aware of the complexities > > of word meanings and the differences in thought > > across languages, Wally is. But that again has no > > bearing on the question. > > > > I hope this helps. > > > > George From rjfreeman at email.com Thu Jun 10 10:22:08 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2004 18:22:08 +0800 Subject: primitive image-schemas In-Reply-To: <40C74030.F988B6FA@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Steve: I think what you are saying I covered when I said all languages are constrained to refer to the "same thing". Tom: I think you are saying language is not (totally) subjective and therefore we can expect cognitive universals. If cognitive universals can be posited on the basis of linguistic universals I guess that would be good evidence. The search for linguistic universals has a long history. Good luck. Personally I believe there are linguistic universals, a kind of Universal Grammar even, but I don't think it goes much beyond an identification of contrast with category. -Rob From ono at U.Arizona.EDU Thu Jun 10 17:16:36 2004 From: ono at U.Arizona.EDU (Tsuyoshi Ono) Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2004 10:16:36 -0700 Subject: JK14 (fwd) Message-ID: > From: Tim Vance [mailto:vancet at u.arizona.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2004 11:58 AM > To: JK Referees > Cc: Hajime Hoji; Shoichi Iwasaki; Paul Lyddon > Subject: Please Forward > > > *****J/K14 DEADLINE EXTENSION***** > > The deadline for submitting an abstract for the 14th Japanese/Korean > Linguistics Conference has been extended to June 25, 2004. > > Please see the conference website for details: > > http://www.coh.arizona.edu/jk14 > > ****************************** > Timothy J. Vance > University of Arizona > Department of East Asian Studies > P.O. Box 210105 > Tucson, AZ 85721-0105 > > (520) 621-5534 [phone] > (520) 621-1149 [fax] > > Learning Services Building 104 > ****************************** > From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Jun 11 01:25:48 2004 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2004 21:25:48 EDT Subject: primitive image-schemas 3 Message-ID: In a message dated 6/10/04 6:32:26 AM, rjfreeman at email.com writes: << Steve: I think what you are saying I covered when I said all languages are constrained to refer to the "same thing". >> What you wrote was: "It starts to sound like a confusion between "primitive" and "average". Are the primitives we see really primitives, or are they the average of a lot of subjective conceptions of the same thing?" The confusion may be caused by your assumption that "primitives" are in some way opposite to an average of subjective perceptions. They are apples and oranges. The word "primitives" in the original post appears to refer to this statement: "Talmy's original discussion (in a talk at Berkeley, summer 1975) made the observation that, although spatial relations terms seem to have quite different meanings in the languages of the world, those meanings can be decomposed into primitive 'images' that recur across languages. Talmy surmised that there was a set of such primitives that was universal." Logically, if we are talking about reducing diverse spatial relations terms to common "primitive images," we are no longer talking about language per se. One can certainly perceive spatial facts as basic as depth -- in either a visual scene or a "subjective" memory of that scene -- without having words to describe that perception. Infants and non-human animals certainly perceive a 3-dimensional world, even if they cannot describe it. (And because these non-language users will be fooled by optical illusions of depth, it appears that they are responding to the same visual cues of depth that we humans do. The problem is, of course, without language we have no self-reports from these subjects.) As Tom pointed out -- "primitive" spatial perceptions might be expected to have some standard variance. But what makes these primitives "average" is that they are primitive, i.e., fundamental, basic. An organism that does not have depth perception or a language that cannot express depth perception, for example, represent a fundamentally different reality than we consistently experience. So there's no real point in asking whether these "subjective" perceptions are really primitive or just averages. Primitives in this sense must overwhelmingly be the average, since not having them would promise severe operational problems. There's an important point here. And it is that this has nothing to do with whether these primitives are pre-wired or learned. Such critical, basic attributes of the world would shape either learning or pre-wiring in exactly the same way. For example, even if humans are plastic enough to perceive a non-3-dimensional physical space, the environment we live in offers little room for that amount of variance in our perceptions. And that would be why it would show up in all languages, in any case. Steve Long From faucon at Cogsci.ucsd.edu Fri Jun 11 15:49:05 2004 From: faucon at Cogsci.ucsd.edu (Gilles Fauconnier) Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 08:49:05 -0700 Subject: The foundations of mind Message-ID: Especially relevant to the ongoing discussion about image-schemas, and to many other aspects of thought with or without language is Jean Mandler's fascinating book, just out at Oxford University Press: The Foundations of Mind Origins of Conceptual Thought -- Gilles Fauconnier Department of Cognitive Science University of California San Diego La Jolla CA 92093 Fax 858 259 6124 E-mail gfauconnier at ucsd.edu http://cogsci.ucsd.edu/~faucon/ From mg246 at cornell.edu Fri Jun 11 22:15:38 2004 From: mg246 at cornell.edu (Monica Gonzalez-Marquez) Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 18:15:38 -0400 Subject: image schemas and linguistic relativity Message-ID: Hello Everyone, I think a clarification of my position in this discussion is in order. I fear that the workshop announcement is being attributed be me as a position statement when in fact it is not. As the workshop announcement intimates, I do, in fact, believe that the strong versions of Image Schema Theory (with its highlighting of primitives) and of Linguistic Relativity (with its downplaying of primitives) are fundamentally at odds with one another. I feel that, much the same as the old nature/nurture debate, the evidence will show that the shape language takes for each individual speaker will result from how several different forces interact, and not from the isolated workings of one or the other. In terms of Image Schemas, for example, it is highly likely that some form of innate image-schematic primitives for representing events exist, but it is also highly likely that they should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience during development. This thinking is consistent with a view of embodiment in which no aspect of cognitive development occurs in isolation. If we believe this to be true of linguistic utterances, i.e. the end product of the language process, I don't see how it can be less true of the processes that are involved in the production of said utterances. That said, to my knowledge, nowhere near enough cross-linguistic, cross-cultural, or neurological empirical evidence has been collected to understand conclusively how image schemas and linguistic relativity impact language development. Cognitive Linguistics theory, as a theory, has shown its mettle. And like all good theories, it shows signs of holding up nicely to the scrutiny of the scientific method. Our workshop is intended to draw attention to a potential inconsistency so as to correct it with one of the soundest methods we know of. Monica From language at sprynet.com Fri Jun 11 23:52:03 2004 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross) Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 19:52:03 -0400 Subject: image schemas and linguistic relativity Message-ID: I was just about to post the following before Monica's latest message. I welcome her on-line statement distancing herself from support for the strong version of image schema theory and also a similar private statement she sent me a few weeks ago. What follows is most definitely not aimed at her in any way, though I fear it most definitely is aimed at proponents of strong image schematics, is such there truly be. ------------------------------ Call me obtuse, but I am still having trouble accepting that: "image schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive structures, arising from universal aspects of how the human body interacts with its environment, both physical and social, and existing largely outside of conscious awareness. It follows that image schemas are the same for everyone, regardless of the language a person speaks." If this is even remotely true, then: 1. Why do we still find that the same image can be interpreted in two or more different ways by different people even within the same culture? To say nothing of two people from different cultures? A vast literature spanning several decades of cognitive psychology can be invoked to prove this, of which I have appended one brief excerpt below. 2. Approaching this question from the opposite direction, why do we still find that some of the simplest messages, i.e. traffic signs and road signs, still take on remarkably different visual forms even in closely related Western countries? As the following websites make clear: http://www.ugcs.caltech.edu/~jlin/signs/ http://www.intlsigns.com/world/traffic/2 http://www.travlang.com/signs/regulate.html Here is a brief example of the first factor, dealing with a campaign to prevent accidents in a South African mining area: "The sixth poster was composed to illustrate the danger of standing beneath a loaded crane sling. The artist had drawn a box in a sling of four ropes with one rope broken. Beneath was the figure of the worker with raised arms petrified with horror, presumably as the box descended upon him. The lower half of the worker in the poster was not shown. The artist had surrounded the poster with a broad red oval border and had highlighted the man's face with reddish brown. This was unfortunate. In the first place the box was not seen as falling. It was clear that three of the four ropes still held it in place. So the danger has to be seen elsewhere. The colour red has acquired a symbolic value for the black worker in South Africa. In large quantities it means fire. In smaller amounts it signifies blood. In the case of this poster it was reported as fire. The man was seen as being in a fiery holocaust. This interpretation was heightened by the highlighting of his features. The deciding factor was that the lower half of his body was not visible. It had obviously been consumed in the flames. So the intended message of the poster was lost due to misperceptions and misunderstandings of custom and pictorial perception." The source here is W. Hudson's "The Study of the Problem of Pictorial Perception among Unacculturated Groups," first published in The International Journal of Psychology, vol. 2 (1967), as reprinted in "Cross-Cultural Studies," edited by D.R. Price-Williams, a 1969 book in the series "Penguin modern psychology Readings." This volume contains a fair amount of comparable material and an impressive bibliography of related books and papers based on observations from many different cultures around the world, just in case the South African example is unacceptable to some for political reasons. The overall thesis of different interpretations arising from the same visual stimulus has been proved and re-proved time and time again. I cannot see why this would be less true whether we call such a stimulus an image, an image schema, a primitive, or an average. The words "tests," "testing," "measuring," "comparability," "experiments," and "experimental" are frequently found in this work's over two hundred listings, so it is fair to wonder if further "experimental approaches" are required to prove the image schema notion of dubious merit. Granted, much of this research springs from a racist era in comparing cultures, but does the basic tenet--that two people are perfectly capable of interpreting the same image quite differently, even if they come from the _same_ culture--truly require any further proof? It is also fair to wonder if the instigators of this doctrine are prepared to assume responsability for the many lawsuits arising from wrongful injuries and deaths that might occur if "universal" image schemas were ever to be made the basis of a compulsory "universal" design code for traffic signs and safety procedures imposed on all peoples, nations, and cultures. Have these seeming obstacles to universal image schemas been transcended in some way I have not yet caught up with? Will all pictorial symbols henceforth be interpreted in exactly the same way by everyone everywhere? And will all artists designing traffic signs henceforth come up with exactly the same design for the meaning of each sign in every corner of the earth? Or could we merely be dealing with some form of meme-mongering here? very best to all! alex ----- Original Message ----- From: "Monica Gonzalez-Marquez" To: ; ; Sent: Friday, June 11, 2004 6:15 PM Subject: [FUNKNET] image schemas and linguistic relativity > > Hello Everyone, > > I think a clarification of my position in this discussion is in > order. I fear that the workshop announcement is being attributed be > me as a position statement when in fact it is not. As the workshop > announcement intimates, I do, in fact, believe that the strong > versions of Image Schema Theory (with its highlighting of primitives) > and of Linguistic Relativity (with its downplaying of primitives) are > fundamentally at odds with one another. I feel that, much the same as > the old nature/nurture debate, the evidence will show that the shape > language takes for each individual speaker will result from how > several different forces interact, and not from the isolated workings > of one or the other. In terms of Image Schemas, for example, it is > highly likely that some form of innate image-schematic primitives for > representing events exist, but it is also highly likely that they > should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience > during development. This thinking is consistent with a view of > embodiment in which no aspect of cognitive development occurs in > isolation. If we believe this to be true of linguistic utterances, > i.e. the end product of the language process, I don't see how it can > be less true of the processes that are involved in the production of > said utterances. > > That said, to my knowledge, nowhere near enough cross-linguistic, > cross-cultural, or neurological empirical evidence has been collected > to understand conclusively how image schemas and linguistic > relativity impact language development. Cognitive Linguistics theory, > as a theory, has shown its mettle. And like all good theories, it > shows signs of holding up nicely to the scrutiny of the scientific > method. Our workshop is intended to draw attention to a potential > inconsistency so as to correct it with one of the soundest methods we > know of. > > Monica From rjfreeman at email.com Sat Jun 12 11:47:33 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2004 19:47:33 +0800 Subject: primitive image-schemas 3 In-Reply-To: <129.4398b010.2dfa641c@aol.com> Message-ID: Steve, If there were only one way of generalizing experiences what you say might be true. This suggests a question which has interested me recently. It puts the focus of discussion back on language, but I think the point is quite general. What were Chomsky's reasons for dismissing the discovery methods of the "post-Bloomsfieldian" structuralists (Pike, Harris, Trager-Smith?) I mean apart from lack of generativity. I understand Harris had 'a "synthesis" procedure, which could be understood as generative grammar', but still Chomsky felt it could not work. Does anyone know the exact reason Chomsky felt it could not work? My understanding is that this was because these discovery procedures resulted in "incoherent or inconsistent" representations. I would like to know if this was the reason, or the only reason. -Rob Freeman On Friday 11 June 2004 09:25, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 6/10/04 6:32:26 AM, rjfreeman at email.com writes: > << Steve: I think what you are saying I covered when I said all languages > are constrained to refer to the "same thing". >> > > What you wrote was: > "It starts to sound like a confusion between "primitive" and "average". > Are the primitives we see really primitives, or are they the average of a > lot of subjective conceptions of the same thing?" > > The confusion may be caused by your assumption that "primitives" are in > some way opposite to an average of subjective perceptions. They are apples > and oranges. > > The word "primitives" in the original post appears to refer to this > statement: "Talmy's original discussion (in a talk at Berkeley, summer > 1975) made the observation that, although spatial relations terms seem to > have quite different meanings in the languages of the world, those > meanings can be decomposed into primitive 'images' that recur across > languages. Talmy surmised that there was a set of such primitives that was > universal." > > Logically, if we are talking about reducing diverse spatial relations terms > to common "primitive images," we are no longer talking about language per > se. One can certainly perceive spatial facts as basic as depth -- in either > a visual scene or a "subjective" memory of that scene -- without having > words to describe that perception. Infants and non-human animals certainly > perceive a 3-dimensional world, even if they cannot describe it. (And > because these non-language users will be fooled by optical illusions of > depth, it appears that they are responding to the same visual cues of depth > that we humans do. The problem is, of course, without language we have no > self-reports from these subjects.) > > As Tom pointed out -- "primitive" spatial perceptions might be expected to > have some standard variance. But what makes these primitives "average" is > that they are primitive, i.e., fundamental, basic. An organism that does > not have depth perception or a language that cannot express depth > perception, for example, represent a fundamentally different reality than > we consistently experience. > > So there's no real point in asking whether these "subjective" perceptions > are really primitive or just averages. Primitives in this sense must > overwhelmingly be the average, since not having them would promise severe > operational problems. > > There's an important point here. And it is that this has nothing to do > with whether these primitives are pre-wired or learned. Such critical, > basic attributes of the world would shape either learning or pre-wiring in > exactly the same way. For example, even if humans are plastic enough to > perceive a non-3-dimensional physical space, the environment we live in > offers little room for that amount of variance in our perceptions. > > And that would be why it would show up in all languages, in any case. > > Steve Long From mariel at post.tau.ac.il Sun Jun 13 10:38:13 2004 From: mariel at post.tau.ac.il (Mira Ariel) Date: Sun, 13 Jun 2004 12:38:13 +0200 Subject: Job announcement Message-ID: Pending funding, the Linguistics Department at Tel Aviv University seeks to hire a specialist in one or more of the following: psycholinguistics/neurolinguistics, language acquisition, computational linguistics. Should the appointment go through, it will be tenure-track, beginning or intermediate rank, effective October 2005. The candidate may not have held a regular position at an Israeli university for more than one year before the application. Courses at Tel Aviv University may be taught in English, but the candidate is expected to learn Hebrew within 3 years. A PhD with specialization in linguistics is required by the time of the formal application to be made by the Department of Linguistics (December 2004). Applicants should submit hard copy of curriculum vitae, statement of research interests, indicating how they may interact with members of the department, 2 samples of published work, and full contact information for three academic references (from more than one institution), whom they have asked to write letters of recommendation on their behalf to the Search Committee, Linguistics Dept. Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel. For further information, contact Prof. Mira Ariel, mariel at post.tau.ac.il. Deadline for application: September 15, 2004. From mg246 at cornell.edu Mon Jun 14 14:07:21 2004 From: mg246 at cornell.edu (Monica Gonzalez-Marquez) Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2004 10:07:21 -0400 Subject: headcount for image schemas and linguistic relativity Message-ID: Hello Everyone, The workshop on the issues is scheduled for July 17, 2004 at Portsmouth, England. This the day before the Conference on Language, Culture and Mind. Would you please let me know if you will be joining us so that we can make adequate space arrangements? We will reserve a space based on how many people respond to this email. If you have already sent me an email saying that you would like to join the discussion, there is no need to send a second. Though we are still working on the final schedule, the workshop will likely begin at 9:am with a series of short introductory talks to the issues to be given by the organizers. This will be followed by the "meat' of the workshop, ie. the series of 7 accepted talks, which will be short so as to allow as much time as possible for discussion. We expect to end at about 6 or so. We look forward to hearing from you! cheers! Monica From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Jun 14 14:42:29 2004 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2004 10:42:29 EDT Subject: Relativity versus Reality Message-ID: In a message dated 6/11/04 7:52:38 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << If this is even remotely true, then: 1. Why do we still find that the same image can be interpreted in two or more different ways by different people even within the same culture?... 2. Approaching this question from the opposite direction, why do we still find that some of the simplest messages, i.e. traffic signs and road signs, still take on remarkably different visual forms even in closely related Western countries? Here is a brief example of the first factor, dealing with a campaign to prevent accidents in a South African mining area: 'The sixth poster was composed to illustrate the danger of standing beneath a loaded crane sling. The artist had drawn a box in a sling of four ropes with one rope broken... >> I'm sorry, but it is very difficult to understand what traffic signs and factory safety signs could possibly say about "pre-linguistic" perceptions or images. If this is supposed to represent "the strong versions of Image Schema Theory (with its highlighting of primitives)", then that position looks very much like a straw dog. Clearly, making such connections goes way beyond the original sense of perceptual primitives. There is nothing basic or perceptually "primitive" about attempting to control complex and culturally-laden behavior like automobile traffic or warehouse safety with pictorial symbols instead of words. Remember that the original idea was that such fundamentals as "spatial relations terms" in different languages can be reduced to common pre-linguistic perceptions. Near and far, up and down, forward and backwards are words that are loaded with cultural nuances. But at a raw, fundamental level they match up perfectly with physiology that produces parallax vision and depth perception. And at that very BASIC level, they should be found in all languages. To prove relativity in this venue, one would need to find a natural human language where a "near" object and a "far" object are synonymous -- reflecting a perception in its speakers that would be diagnosed in modern society as severely dysfunctional (except perhaps among a small number of quantum physicists.) And of course this has nothing to do with the symbols on stop signs. Driving an automobile involves complex behavior with huge layers of cultural pre-conditions. Walk into a room full of people and shout nothing but "stop" and you will be considered strange. Interpretation demands cultural context and lots of it. What is the consequence of not observing a stop sign? Is there something innate about expecting a letter from the MVA cancelling your license? Does a deer crossing sign mean that there is an opportunity ahead for nature-watching or to use your car to put some venison on the table? The consequences implied in such simple communications always need prior understandings. Primitive schema -- being primitive and being essentially private perceptions -- do not carry complex behavioral messages easily, except where cultural context fills in that message. That was probably one good reason for early humans to take the next step and develop language. (Any reasonable interpretation of the data tells us the first function of human language as we know it was carrying messages.) A better place to look for the pre-linguistic "schema" that would form the underbed of language would be, not in traffic signs, but in Botticelli. Calculated shadows that fool us into thinking that a mere circle is actually a three-dimensional orb -- even when we know better. When we create the illusion of depth in a painting, we are using "primitive schema" -- i.e., universal cues that we all use to ascertain spatial relationships, time and motion. To expect more than this basic kind of cognition from "primitive image schema" contradicts the assumption being tested. Universal perceptions are not going to include the implication of what we should do about raw physical facts. History and context tells us that and these are not universals. If we don't start by understanding the connection between language and perception at this very basic level -- in terms of the fundamental physical contingencies of humans in time and space -- we must get confused about where the line between universals and relatives should run, given the the fundamental findings of perceptual research. If "primitive image schema" makes any sense, it needs to refer to underlying, pre-linguistic rules that not only constrained but also organized the earliest development of language -- so that everyone back then had some already common ground for communicating. To assume that such building blocks did not exist is to assume that, one fine day, language dropped out of the sky. Somehow the term "Universal Grammar" has come to signify a severe complexity instead of a severe simplicity. Yet when children first learn "grammar," what they learn about are nouns (objects), verbs (actions or processes) and adjectives (attributes). Nouns, verbs and adjectives match up very well with fundamental perceptual processes -- depth, motion, time and edge perception -- and are all at work most of the time "unconsciously." Has a natural language ever been discovered that lacks any of these three elements? (I've seen, for example, claims that Algonquin could be spoken entirely using adjectives, but have never seen any verification.) So at least here there is enough evidence of a Universal Grammar that contradicts any kind of radical relativity. There IS a real world out there that shaped our perceptions. And therefore must have shaped our language right from the start. (Disregarding pre-linguistic perception I believe underlies an error in the work of Berlin and Kay on linguistic relativity color. The Homeric Greeks had only two Basic Color Terms (and by the way apparently no word for "color" in our sense). Is this supposed to mean that in this "pre-linguistic" color state, the Homeric Greeks could not sense and therefore were not "cognizant" of the difference between the wavelengths generated by a blue bird versus those of red bird -- colors they did not have words for? Was it only language that later created the difference between them? A look at late bronze age and archaic period art will quickly confirm that these Greeks were quite adroit at discriminating and manipulating pigments. They were skillfully managing color perceptions well before they gave "color" (as a noun) an abstract status in their language. The fact that they did not use words reconstructable by the comparative method to some universal color word is of no practical consequence.) If such ideas as primitives are overblown, it will be quite easy to overlook what they represent and how they fit into the bigger picture. In a message dated 6/11/04 6:15:58 PM, mg246 at cornell.edu writes: <<...much the same as the old nature/nurture debate,... In terms of Image Schemas, for example, it is highly likely that some form of innate image-schematic primitives for representing events exist, but it is also highly likely that they should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience during development. >> A contrary position is that these universal "primitive" elements of perception are similar to the letters of an alphabet. They are essential to writing words and sentences and producing libraries. But by themselves these perceptions represent only the universal basics in terms of overall human experience. Whether they are "innate" or universally learned during early development is a completely different question. Regards, Steve Long From rjfreeman at email.com Wed Jun 16 09:33:57 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2004 17:33:57 +0800 Subject: Relativity versus Reality In-Reply-To: <195.2af9377b.2dff1355@aol.com> Message-ID: On Monday 14 June 2004 22:42, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > ... > A contrary position is that these universal "primitive" elements of > perception are similar to the letters of an alphabet. They are essential > to writing words and sentences and producing libraries. But by themselves > these perceptions represent only the universal basics in terms of overall > human experience. Whether they are "innate" or universally learned during > early development is a completely different question. Steve, Do we really have a choice between '"innate" or universally learned'? Your arguments about relative relativity are fair. Everyone must accept there is broad consensus out there, getting us to and from the fridge. We just want to know why the detail is so elusive. Equally you don't seem adverse to the idea of subjectivity in the details. Your "line between universals and relatives". But can the system be "universally learned"? What are the implications of learned categories? I think the analogy to phonemes is good, from the broad consensus to the elusive detail. That means we can talk about language again. Which is why I asked the question about Chomsky. My understanding is that Chomsky was forced to propose UG exactly because he found it was _not_ possible for language to be "universally learned", phonemes and all. In fact he demonstrated that not only was it not possible for language structure to be universally learned, it was not possible to learn even a single, language specific, universal structure (the "incoherent or inconsistent representation" thing). Essentially he was saying either language is innate or it is subjective. So a "universally learned" language system is not an option, and you don't need to take my word for it, take Chomsky's. What you might want to take my word for is the best conclusion to draw from this observation. Because subjectivity was unacceptable to Chomsky he felt this was a knock down argument for innateness. But the world has moved on since then and subjectivity in language has proven robust. Where Chomsky got rid of it in his rules by positing innateness it has crept back, largely through the lexicon. How to reconcile this subjective, lexical, character, with the assumed innate universality of Chomsky's rules has become the central "dilemma" of modern linguistics. Some dilemma! Wouldn't the world be a simpler place if we went back to the central learnability issue and accepted subjectivity, synchronic "incoherent or inconsistent" regularities and all, in the first place? Otherwise aren't we are in the incongruous position of trying to bolt a fine grain subjectivity onto a system which is supposed to be innate, exactly because it was considered unreasonable that it be subjective! That is what I understand of the ability of language to be "universally learned", and its implications. I'm sure I'm making all kinds of errors of fact. I would be happy to hear more about the exact reasons Chomsky rejected rules based on the techniques of the old "post-Bloomsfieldian" structuralists etc. from anyone familiar with what the arguments were at the time. -Rob Freeman From language at sprynet.com Wed Jun 16 18:26:41 2004 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross) Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2004 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: Relativity versus Reality Message-ID: Steve, your assertions about both Homeric colors and Botticelli are disputable, and I certainly would have disputed them in detail back when I started off majoring in Greek 50 years ago and during the four years I spent in Florence during the 50s & 60s. But I'll hold off for now, since there are larger issues afoot. I really think you're trying to pull far too much material together with far too thin a thread. And I'm a bit surprised at you, since i see you are a fan, as am i, of the late Larry Trask, who not only trashed geneticists writing about language but Chomsky writing about linguistics. Can't you see that this whole "image schemas" folderol is simply the latest installment in that infamous farrago including such other barbarisms as poverty of stimulus, deep structure, and innate carburetors? Just a few years ago medical practitioners were forced to admit that there has never been persuasive evidence for vast numbers of supposedly standard clinical procedures and finally invented the field of "evidence based medicine." Isn't it overdue for linguists to follow their lead with their own school of "evidence based linguistics?" Whenever they get around to doing so, they will quickly discover there's no shortage of material to throw out. Face it, over recent decades the practitioners of linguistics have resembled not so much cautious scientists as so many fundamentalist zealots: mulling mullahs, contentious cabalistic rabbis, bristling Mormon elders, desperately calling forth miracles on the basis of their own home-grown magical formulas, hoping that some budding hagiographer would immortalize them for their soul-searching devotion, if not a Joseph Smith then at least a Randy Allen Harris. Let's take a closer look at these so-called "image schemas." Precisely why have they been called into being, how many of them supposedly exist, how do we know that they are the only ones, how can we be certain of their existence during the "pre-linguistic" period, and what on earth is the nature of the problem their alleged existence is alleged to solve? If we do take a closer look, I think we'll discover image schematics is one of the sloppier ideas to emerge from recent linguistics--amd that's already saying a lot. Yes, I'm aware of Lakoff, Calvin, Bickerton, et al., but isn't the whole thrust of this idea simply another attempt to reject the sheer multiplicity of language by once again favoring a simple-minded theory to explain that multiplicity? And precisely what would be gained if it were proved tomorrow that "image schemas" do indeed play a major role in the creation of all languages? What would be either the theoretical or practical spin-offs of such a conclusion (not that this is anywhere near actually being reached)? I'm also wondering why this pre-conference workshop is being presented as some sort of momentous conflict between truly clashing and equally powerful paradigms, something like: In the blue corner wearing blue trunks the reigning, somewhat weary, but still (despite decades of baseless rumors) Undefeated Champion, let's hear it for LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY!!! And in the red corner wearing red trunks his far younger and sleeker Challenger, the dashing MIT Consortium Champion and winner by knockout of countless peer review encounters, will everybody please welcome IMAGE SCHEMAS!!! Sorry, I just don't buy it. In my opinion even the weakest possible formulation of Linguistic Relativity can beat even the strongest possible formulation of Image Schemas by a first-round knockout. Besides which, if these "primitives" were as powerful as claimed, one would still expect to find them playing a far more prominent and unifying role in the international design of trafffic signs and all kinds of notices than is actually the case. Why does the literature make no reference to speeding-up schemas, slowing down schemas, collision course schemas, pain avoidance schemas, all of which were appropriate long before modern motor cars (or even human beings) came along? Come to think of it, since these schemas are supposedly to be found in living organisms, why is so little attention paid to physical, biological, and medical processes: why do we find no catching one's breath or finding one's balance schema, much less thirst, hunger, fatigue, pain, or need for excretion schemas? And I'd be surprised if there weren't also a schema dealing with sex and mating. Wouldn't such physical, biological primitives be crucially necessary to create the first linguistic utterances, which in their modest way were also related to the way so many use autos today to drive down to the mall, since they are likely to have included expressions of swift motion, colliding, catching, eating, wearing, voicing satisfaction, mating, exulting, etc.? Why do we find only conceptual formulations among these image schemas? Does anyone here suppose that the earliest language users spoke in balanced Boolean propositions according to the dictates of a rather precious theory formulated thousands or millions of years later? Precisely who chooses which pre-linguistic behavior patterns constitute image schemas? And why should we believe them? Sure, the containment schema is universal as hell, as Ron Chen has pointed out in a private message. But not just among humans. Even lady kangaroos and squirrels of all sexes have it to account for the babies in their pouches and the acorns stored in their cheeks. And even a woodchuck has a path and end-of-path schema amid its underground tunnels and probably a cycle schema as well. And hey, who are we to deny countless quintillions of paramecia a containment schema for their contractile and food vacuoles? Though last time I looked, kangaroos, squirrels, woodchucks, and paramecia weren't busy creating what we call language (though even our own creation of language may turn out to have been less spectacular than some imagine). So what we're seeing in my opinion is merely yet another replay, using slightly different terms, of the ancient Chomskyans-Bash-the-Whorfians campaign. Come to think of it, even calling this movement "linguistic relativity" is most recently a form of propagandistic bashing indulged in by Pinker. The correct and more respectful name for this school that refuses to die is of course the Whorf or Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, with roots in Herder & Humboldt. In conclusion, can't the field of linguistics find some new subjects to study and some new perspectives to study them from? Over time, on appropriate occasions, and with all due respect for my colleagues, I'll be happy to suggest a few of these. With very best wishes to all! alex PS--Oh well, just a wee bit about your misinterpetation of Botticellian "universal" techniques; > A better place to look for the pre-linguistic "schema" that would form the > underbed of language would be, not in traffic signs, but in Botticelli. > Calculated shadows that fool us into thinking that a mere circle is actually a > three-dimensional orb -- even when we know better. When we create the illusion of > depth in a painting, we are using "primitive schema" -- i.e., universal cues > that we all use to ascertain spatial relationships, time and motion. You're obviously not too well grounded in art history, or you would be acquainted with the well-known case of the Dowager Empress of China rejecting western-style portraits of her because the artists used similar techniques, which she interpreted simply as blotches on her face making her look ugly--and almost all Chinese of that time would have agreed with her. Not very universal, is it? You really ought to look up that 1969 Penguin modern psschology Readings book I mentioned. ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Monday, June 14, 2004 10:42 AM Subject: [FUNKNET] Relativity versus Reality > In a message dated 6/11/04 7:52:38 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: > << If this is even remotely true, then: > > 1. Why do we still find that the same image can be interpreted in two or more > different ways by different people even within the same culture?... > 2. Approaching this question from the opposite direction, why do we still > find that some of the simplest messages, i.e. traffic signs and road signs, > still take on remarkably different visual forms even in closely related Western > countries? Here is a brief example of the first factor, dealing with a campaign > to prevent accidents in a South African mining area: > > 'The sixth poster was composed to illustrate the danger of standing beneath a > loaded crane sling. The artist had drawn a box in a sling of four ropes with > one rope broken... >> > > I'm sorry, but it is very difficult to understand what traffic signs and > factory safety signs could possibly say about "pre-linguistic" perceptions or > images. If this is supposed to represent "the strong versions of Image Schema > Theory (with its highlighting of primitives)", then that position looks very much > like a straw dog. Clearly, making such connections goes way beyond the > original sense of perceptual primitives. > > There is nothing basic or perceptually "primitive" about attempting to > control complex and culturally-laden behavior like automobile traffic or warehouse > safety with pictorial symbols instead of words. > > Remember that the original idea was that such fundamentals as "spatial > relations terms" in different languages can be reduced to common pre-linguistic > perceptions. > > Near and far, up and down, forward and backwards are words that are loaded > with cultural nuances. But at a raw, fundamental level they match up perfectly > with physiology that produces parallax vision and depth perception. And at > that very BASIC level, they should be found in all languages. To prove > relativity in this venue, one would need to find a natural human language where a > "near" object and a "far" object are synonymous -- reflecting a perception in its > speakers that would be diagnosed in modern society as severely dysfunctional > (except perhaps among a small number of quantum physicists.) > > And of course this has nothing to do with the symbols on stop signs. Driving > an automobile involves complex behavior with huge layers of cultural > pre-conditions. Walk into a room full of people and shout nothing but "stop" and you > will be considered strange. Interpretation demands cultural context and lots > of it. What is the consequence of not observing a stop sign? Is there > something innate about expecting a letter from the MVA cancelling your license? > Does a deer crossing sign mean that there is an opportunity ahead for > nature-watching or to use your car to put some venison on the table? The consequences > implied in such simple communications always need prior understandings. > > Primitive schema -- being primitive and being essentially private perceptions > -- do not carry complex behavioral messages easily, except where cultural > context fills in that message. That was probably one good reason for early > humans to take the next step and develop language. (Any reasonable interpretation > of the data tells us the first function of human language as we know it was > carrying messages.) > > A better place to look for the pre-linguistic "schema" that would form the > underbed of language would be, not in traffic signs, but in Botticelli. > Calculated shadows that fool us into thinking that a mere circle is actually a > three-dimensional orb -- even when we know better. When we create the illusion of > depth in a painting, we are using "primitive schema" -- i.e., universal cues > that we all use to ascertain spatial relationships, time and motion. > > To expect more than this basic kind of cognition from "primitive image > schema" contradicts the assumption being tested. Universal perceptions are not > going to include the implication of what we should do about raw physical facts. > History and context tells us that and these are not universals. > > If we don't start by understanding the connection between language and > perception at this very basic level -- in terms of the fundamental physical > contingencies of humans in time and space -- we must get confused about where the line > between universals and relatives should run, given the the fundamental > findings of perceptual research. > > If "primitive image schema" makes any sense, it needs to refer to underlying, > pre-linguistic rules that not only constrained but also organized the > earliest development of language -- so that everyone back then had some already > common ground for communicating. To assume that such building blocks did not exist > is to assume that, one fine day, language dropped out of the sky. > > Somehow the term "Universal Grammar" has come to signify a severe complexity > instead of a severe simplicity. Yet when children first learn "grammar," what > they learn about are nouns (objects), verbs (actions or processes) and > adjectives (attributes). Nouns, verbs and adjectives match up very well with > fundamental perceptual processes -- depth, motion, time and edge perception -- and > are all at work most of the time "unconsciously." > > Has a natural language ever been discovered that lacks any of these three > elements? (I've seen, for example, claims that Algonquin could be spoken entirely > using adjectives, but have never seen any verification.) So at least here > there is enough evidence of a Universal Grammar that contradicts any kind of > radical relativity. > > There IS a real world out there that shaped our perceptions. And therefore > must have shaped our language right from the start. > > (Disregarding pre-linguistic perception I believe underlies an error in the > work of Berlin and Kay on linguistic relativity color. The Homeric Greeks had > only two Basic Color Terms (and by the way apparently no word for "color" in > our sense). Is this supposed to mean that in this "pre-linguistic" color > state, the Homeric Greeks could not sense and therefore were not "cognizant" of the > difference between the wavelengths generated by a blue bird versus those of > red bird -- colors they did not have words for? Was it only language that > later created the difference between them? A look at late bronze age and archaic > period art will quickly confirm that these Greeks were quite adroit at > discriminating and manipulating pigments. They were skillfully managing color > perceptions well before they gave "color" (as a noun) an abstract status in their > language. The fact that they did not use words reconstructable by the > comparative method to some universal color word is of no practical consequence.) > > If such ideas as primitives are overblown, it will be quite easy to overlook > what they represent and how they fit into the bigger picture. > > In a message dated 6/11/04 6:15:58 PM, mg246 at cornell.edu writes: > <<...much the same as the old nature/nurture debate,... In terms of Image > Schemas, for example, it is highly likely that some form of innate > image-schematic primitives for representing events exist, but it is also highly likely that > they should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience > during development. >> > > A contrary position is that these universal "primitive" elements of > perception are similar to the letters of an alphabet. They are essential to writing > words and sentences and producing libraries. But by themselves these > perceptions represent only the universal basics in terms of overall human experience. > Whether they are "innate" or universally learned during early development is a > completely different question. > > Regards, > Steve Long From Salinas17 at aol.com Thu Jun 17 18:07:08 2004 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 14:07:08 EDT Subject: Relativity versus Reality 2 Message-ID: In a message dated 6/16/04 6:40:52 AM, rjfreeman at email.com writes: << My understanding is that Chomsky was forced to propose UG exactly because he found it was _not_ possible for language to be "universally learned", phonemes and all... Essentially he was saying either language is innate or it is subjective. >> How did we get into that rather odd box? Innate versus subjective? What kind of alternatives are those? Here's something that should be emerging as an idea from the historical track that we humans have been on for a long time -- innateness and learning both solve the same general problems. If flying in a bird called "innate," then what is it when I fly to NY on Delta Airlines? If nest-building in a bird is innate, then what is renting a condo in Miami Beach? Here Chomsky in an 1999 interview on the Language Acquisition Device: "The existence of such LAD is sometimes regarded as controversial, or even as having been disproven. If terms are being used in their technical sense, these conclusions amount to saying that there is no dedicated 'language module,' in which case it remains a mystery why my granddaughter's pet kitten (or chimpanzee, or whatever) doesn't acquire a particular language just as she does, given essentially the same experience...." Think about this. Can the mystery of why that pet kitten does not have a cell phone, wear designer clothes or eventually manufacture a nuclear bomb also only be resolved by postulating an innate Cell Phone Acquistion Device, etc -- given essentially the same experience? Or is it that the products of human technology is not "an open and infinite set" like the endless string of sentences a human language can produce? Obviously, our biology plays a significant role in our ability to make cell phones, but obviously cell phones were not implicit in our biology. Why do we see language as somehow different than airplanes or cellphones -- other things that cats and chimps don't do? Clothes-wearing is almost as unique and universally human as language. Why don't we postulate a Clothes Acquistion Device? Strict mentalism creates an artificial distinction between language and other unique human activities. It deceives us into thinking that our internal system of symbols would be there if there were no outside world. It is essentially neo-platonism all over again. Universal learning of the basic rules of the world we live in is a perfectly logical evolutionary alternative to an innate compliance with those rules. Both do the same job and roughly satisfy the same requirments of survival value. Where you don't have one, you are going to have the other -- or you won't have survival. It may be there is some kind of LAD, but it's output might probably be indistinguishable from early universal human learning. The solution would be the same in either case. What I'd like to see is someone come up with an alternative "Universal Grammar" that universal learners could use and innates could not. Without such an alternative, there is no hypotheses to test. If Universal Grammar is the only path to language by the local laws of the universe, then universal learning or an innate device will end up in the same place. I suspect that in the end we are going to find that the difference between animal communications and human communication is quantitive and not qualitative, and that awareness of mental states is simply a by-product of a quantitatively larger system of communication. That is the assumption of continuity that a naturalistic, scientific approach to this subject is bound to make. So, as to whether "language is innate or subjective", it is probably neither of the two. There is a fascinating paper by Martin Neef ("The Reader's View: Sharpening in German" in The Relation of Writing to Spoken Language (2002)) that is a kernel of an idea that I think will point these things in the right direction. In that paper, Neef concludes that "writing systems aim at being consistent not for the writer but for the reader." What a change of perspective that also is on the rules of language. Once we see language as a communal event masquarading as an internal process, we go back to the common sense idea that we must have something in common in order for language to make any sense among us -- and is the real a priori for it to make sense to us individually, subjectively. Whether that commonality is universal on one level or local on a later, more complex level, the odd question of innateness versus subjectivity (how did they become opposites?) falls away. <> Perhaps the bolting was originally done in the opposite direction? Perhaps the lexical character of language was the original material and Chomsky's rules were the way they had to be organized. You can only put planks together in a very limited number of ways to build a house or a bridge. That's a dictate of the laws of physics. Perhaps the basic laws of organization dictate the same kind of constraints on the structure of language? Again, has anyone developed a working, communicative non-Chomskyian Universal Grammar? Or is this just a case of "if you are going to build a bridge, you'd better build it so it does what bridges do?" Regards, Steve Long From rjfreeman at email.com Fri Jun 18 10:39:25 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2004 18:39:25 +0800 Subject: Relativity versus Reality 2 In-Reply-To: <54.2c3b9746.2e0337cc@aol.com> Message-ID: On Friday 18 June 2004 02:07, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > ... > Think about this. Can the mystery of why that pet kitten does not have a > cell phone, wear designer clothes or eventually manufacture a nuclear bomb > also only be resolved by postulating an innate Cell Phone Acquistion > Device, etc -- given essentially the same experience? Or is it that the > products of human technology is not "an open and infinite set" like the > endless string of sentences a human language can produce? Obviously, our > biology plays a significant role in our ability to make cell phones, but > obviously cell phones were not implicit in our biology. > > Why do we see language as somehow different than airplanes or cellphones -- > other things that cats and chimps don't do? Clothes-wearing is almost as > unique and universally human as language. Why don't we postulate a Clothes > Acquistion Device? :-) Steve, I agree with just about everything you write. I don't think there is a Language Acquisition Device much beyond what we use to learn fashion either. But I also don't believe that language (and cognition, and quite a few other systems which are fundamentally a product of generalizations and don't have a single, central, motivating logic) can be "universally learned". I don't agree with Chomsky's conclusions, but I am willing to believe he made some powerful observations. In particular I'm interested in this nexus between "learning by structural generalizations based on contrasts" (i.e. the "post-Bloomsfieldian structuralists"), and the "selection from observed regularity according to innate principles" (Universal Grammar) he was moved to propose in its place. I'm interested in it not because I'm convinced we need an innate device to select universally applicable rules (it seems like it was such an article of faith on Chomsky's part that such a single, central, motivating logic should be there, that when he didn't see it he felt we had to hypothesize it, but at least he realized he couldn't see it!) I'm interested because in the absence of an innate device he concluded universally applicable rules for language could not be learned. This is relevant just because people are still trying to learn such rules. The silly thing is that they seem to be coming up against the same facts without drawing many conclusions at all. Machine learning theory is quite active now that the work can all be automated. Lots of learning experiments have been carried out. What I hear is they have no trouble learning grammars from observed regularities in texts. The "problem" is not so much that they cannot learn grammar from texts, it's that they can learn too many, for every language! Machine Learning theorists seem to conclude from this that they "haven't got it right yet", but isn't it more likely that Chomsky saw the issues more clearly 50 years ago. He at least outlined the problem clearly, even if he drew the wrong conclusion. Maybe the correct conclusion is that such a single "universal" grammar can't be learned because the requisite single, central, motivating logic is not there (and mark, we're talking about the structure of language now, Steve, not its function which _is_ central and motivating and logical...) Maybe the Machine Learning guys have "got it right" they just haven't asked the right question! Like "is there a single relevant set of regularities, and if not how do we find any given regularity we need, when we need it"? In the face of contrary evidence why do we stick to this absolutist conviction that there can only be one best way of describing everything? Do we argue whether populations of people are most fundamentally characterized according to their height or their intellectual ability? No, we realize that one characterization or another can be most relevant, depending on the issue at hand. It is not possible to find a single generalization (a single ranking, for instance) which simultaneously captures both regularities (in general ordering with respect to one completely mixes with respect to the other). Couldn't the same be true for language? More importantly is the evidence that the same might be true for language? (That sometimes one way of regularizing the sequence of tokens is more important, and sometimes another, and that in general regularizing one way completely mixes the data with respect to the other -- or at least "completely" mixes it to within parameter of agreement consistent with the function of getting to the fridge and back"...) That's why I'd like to hear more about what the arguments were when Chomsky decided language could not be universally learned. Exactly why was it he decided it could not be universally learned? Is my information right that it was (at least partially) because such learning resulted in "inconsistent or incoherent representations"? Do any currently working Machine Learning people have a comment? Do they tend to find single regularities or multiple, contradictory regularities which wash out and create impoverished "wannabe universal" representations? Is there a conflict between any single generality and clusters of particular detail which is difficult to explain? Anybody from the Memory-based Learning fraternity (which advocates making decisions by ad-hoc generalization over raw data for certain systems) listening who would care to make a comment? We know such systems exist: we know there are systems based on generalizations over collections of facts (like the generalizations we make about human populations) which fundamentally cannot be described in a single universally correct way, cannot be "universally learned". Why should that not be the case for language (and cognition in general)? Best, Rob From mg246 at cornell.edu Tue Jun 22 16:49:31 2004 From: mg246 at cornell.edu (Monica Gonzalez-Marquez) Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2004 12:49:31 -0400 Subject: last call for image schemas/ling relativity workshop Message-ID: Hello again everyone, I need to know by this Friday, June 22 if you do plan to attend our workshop on July 17 in Portsmouth. There is no fee for the workshop itself though we do need to know how large a space to reserve. If you're worried about accommodations, they can be arranged at the same place as the conference accommodations. cheers! Monica From tgivon at uoregon.edu Tue Jun 22 21:23:43 2004 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2004 14:23:43 -0700 Subject: universals, innateness & Chomsky Message-ID: Dear FUNK people, I keep changing my mind whether it would be useful to respond to Alexander Gross' recent epistle. It was surely a spirited missive, certainly most enjoyable. But how could one respond to a Credo ? (Except by reciting a counter- Credo , which I am loathe to do). Perhaps rather than responding directly, I will pick what seem to me the most salient issues. 1. Reductionism: One of the least fortunate legacies of 20th Centrury linguistics is the stark, either-or reductionism used to frame theoretical (and factual...) issues. For the record, Chomsky was not the first culprit. Bloomfield (1922, 1933), in his capacity as a flaming behaviorist/empiricist, was quite adamant about making a forced choice between Hermann Paul's "mentalism" and know-no-mind empiricism; or between Paul's (and Humbold's) universalism and 100% linguistic relativity; or between (implicitly here) Platonic innateness and true-blue Watsonian behaviorism. Chomsky (1959, 1966) of course reversed directions, but was just as adamant about there being no middle grounds between Skinner & Descartes. The facts of language learning, language use and diachronic change, however, together with theoretical considerations that go back to (at least) Kant, strongly suggest that language is a typical biologically-based hybrid system; one that accommodates both extremes as competing principles within a complex system. As long as it keeps oscilating between the two reductive extremes, linguistics is doomed to recapitulate the 23 centuries' pendulum swings of post-Socrating epistemology. Which, for my money, would be a bloomin' shame. 2. Universals, innateness and evolution: So far as I can tell, there has been only two serious traditional explanation proposed for universals, not only of language but also of mind and, indeed, of biological design: (i) The Divine; (ii) Evolution. For the peculiar band of non-religious relativists that sprang in academic linguistics and anthropology one could concede a third one: (iii) Randomness. But, you surely agree, this is not much of an explanation. So, if you are not inclined to invoked either the Deity (i) or Randomess (iii) as serious scientific explanations, and if you recognize at least some universals of language, you have no choice but to concede some innatenes, neurological specialization, genetic encoding--and evolution. You simply can't buy one without buying the others. They come together, package deal. Tho of course, you are entitled to quibble about (or let repeated cycles of empirical investrigation settle, as I vastly prefer) matters of degree & fine details. 3. Evolution of mind: What split the two co-discovered of adaptive-selected evolution, Darwin and Wallace, from each other was the ancient question of where to draw the line. Wallace argued that the body evolved but the mind did not; essentially a dusted-up Platonic/Cartesian dualist position. Darwin insisted that what's good for the body is also good for the mind/soul; a position in line with Aristotelian monism in biology. One of the most puzzling things about Chomsky's approach to language is that in spite of being an avowed innatist and an atheist, he resists viewing language as the product of adaptive-selected evolution. In a recent joint article (with Hauser and Fitch, in Science), this paradox is maintained by invoking a (familiar?) distinction between the general cognition that supports language (including semantics and preagmatics!), which did evolve selectively-adaptively, and the presumably non-adaptive, unique core-principle of human language--recursivity-- which cannot be explained adaptively. The supportive argument is cited directly from Chomsky 1965--yes, you guessed it-- Performance ("general cognition") vs. Competence ("the unique core-principle")! So Chomsky has gone a considerable distance past Wallace, recognizing the evolution of mind but not of language. 4. Linguistic relativism: The kind of linguistic/cultural relativism that Alexander Gross waxes so nostalgically about is rather familiar in the social science (and the humanities), and is indeed the direct intellectual descendant of Wallace's denial of the evolution of mind. It is fully tantamount to saying that the brain evolved but the mind didn't. Perhaps with one exception, tho--this position is advocated by non-religious academics. But otherwise, it is part and parcel of the old tradition of drawing a sharp line between the biological (corporeal, profane, mundane; or subject to adaptive-selected evolution), and the mental/cultural (divinely given or free-chosen and fancy free). And it is Decartes' dualism thinly disguised, dusted up and refitted in fancy (post-modern) lingo. But otherwise still recognoizable. 5. Chomsky as a convenient Devil: I come last to a peculiar obsession of functionalist of whatever sect (or stripe), one they apparently--in a way peculiarly remiscent of old-time religion--cannot do without. For apparently we need a Devil; our very own Daemon to cast out; the Scapegoat to lead to the altar. And Chomsky surely makes such a splendid "Tailed One" (Kwasi-gyat , in Ute), being so obviously the font of all intellectual evil. So, at the risk of heresy and excommunication, I would like to suggest that in spite of all the profound and well documented differences and disagreements, we owe poor Noam an awful lot. For he had put many important issues back on the table that were ruled out or obscured by the Bloomfieldians. And, above all, that we really don't need a devil, be it Noam or anybody else. For we can learn even from what we take to be his missteps, and then move on, unencumbered by self-righteousness. Hey guys, let's do science. Let's unearth interesting facts and look for systematic tho tentative but (hopefully) progressively better explanations. Have fun. Best, TG From language at sprynet.com Wed Jun 23 03:20:00 2004 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross) Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2004 23:20:00 -0400 Subject: universals, innateness & Chomsky Message-ID: I'm delighted that Tom Givon felt sufficiently provoked to dash off his small critique. And I'd be even more delighted to reply in detail, but I am on the very eve of departure for a conference in Philadelphia, followed by a brief holiday with my wife, and will have no opportunity to respond for at least a week. On the whole it all sounds fairly familiar, the supposition by a Credo supporter that any critic must simply be supporting another Credo, along with the repetition of the expected canticles from the catechism: Universals, innateness and evolution, Darwin and Wallace, Performance vs. Competence. All the comforting catchwords from the past as a mantram against noticing that almost fifty years of linguistic work have gone astray. I notice also no mention at all of image schemas. Could it just be that the argument against their existence is so overwhelming that Tom has been forced to the wall and felt the need to defend all so-called universals generically? But if universals are truly central to language, why would there be any perceived need to defend them? Hey, guys, I agree, let's do science: in the plural, lots of sciences and not just the appointed, annointed ones, with a real breakout into medicine, cartography, fractal geometry, true neurocognitive connections along with others, and not just the plastic ones that claim Botticelli's use of perspective as a false universal. Let's get outside the box and stop murmuring all the inside-the-box phrases whenever the existence of a life beyond its bounds is suggested. I'm really afraid I've heard most of this before. Since I won't be here for a while, those of you who might care to see how I have responded to similar critiques in the past might want to look at: http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&selm=8ebm3f%24c6q%241%40slb1.atl.mindspring.net&rnum=1 or: http://language.home.sprynet.com/lingdex/bigbird.htm#totop or perhaps even my view of what it really takes to "do linguistics" at: http://language.home.sprynet.com/lingdex/minimum.htm#totop all the best to everyone! alex ----- Original Message ----- From: "Tom Givon" To: Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 5:23 PM Subject: [FUNKNET] universals, innateness & Chomsky > > Dear FUNK people, > > I keep changing my mind whether it would be useful to respond to > Alexander Gross' recent epistle. It was surely a spirited missive, > certainly most enjoyable. But how could one respond to a Credo ? (Except > by reciting a counter- Credo , which I am loathe to do). Perhaps rather > than responding directly, I will pick what seem to me the most salient > issues. > > 1. Reductionism: One of the least fortunate legacies of 20th Centrury > linguistics is the stark, either-or reductionism used to frame > theoretical (and factual...) issues. For the record, Chomsky was not the > first culprit. Bloomfield (1922, 1933), in his capacity as a flaming > behaviorist/empiricist, was quite adamant about making a forced choice > between Hermann Paul's "mentalism" and know-no-mind empiricism; or > between Paul's (and Humbold's) universalism and 100% linguistic > relativity; or between (implicitly here) Platonic innateness and > true-blue Watsonian behaviorism. Chomsky (1959, 1966) of course reversed > directions, but was just as adamant about there being no middle grounds > between Skinner & Descartes. The facts of language learning, language > use and diachronic change, however, together with theoretical > considerations that go back to (at least) Kant, strongly suggest that > language is a typical biologically-based hybrid system; one that > accommodates both extremes as competing principles within a complex > system. As long as it keeps oscilating between the two reductive > extremes, linguistics is doomed to recapitulate the 23 centuries' > pendulum swings of post-Socrating epistemology. Which, for my money, > would be a bloomin' shame. > > 2. Universals, innateness and evolution: So far as I can tell, there has > been only two serious traditional explanation proposed for universals, > not only of language but also of mind and, indeed, of biological design: > (i) The Divine; (ii) Evolution. For the peculiar band of non-religious > relativists that sprang in academic linguistics and anthropology one > could concede a third one: (iii) Randomness. But, you surely agree, this > is not much of an explanation. So, if you are not inclined to invoked > either the Deity (i) or Randomess (iii) as serious scientific > explanations, and if you recognize at least some universals of > language, you have no choice but to concede some innatenes, > neurological specialization, genetic encoding--and evolution. You simply > can't buy one without buying the others. They come together, package > deal. Tho of course, you are entitled to quibble about (or let repeated > cycles of empirical investrigation settle, as I vastly prefer) matters > of degree & fine details. > > 3. Evolution of mind: What split the two co-discovered of > adaptive-selected evolution, Darwin and Wallace, from each other was the > ancient question of where to draw the line. Wallace argued that the body > evolved but the mind did not; essentially a dusted-up Platonic/Cartesian > dualist position. Darwin insisted that what's good for the body is also > good for the mind/soul; a position in line with Aristotelian monism in > biology. > > One of the most puzzling things about Chomsky's approach to language is > that in spite of being an avowed innatist and an atheist, he resists > viewing language as the product of adaptive-selected evolution. In a > recent joint article (with Hauser and Fitch, in Science), this paradox > is maintained by invoking a (familiar?) distinction between the general > cognition that supports language (including semantics and preagmatics!), > which did evolve selectively-adaptively, and the presumably > non-adaptive, unique core-principle of human language--recursivity-- > which cannot be explained adaptively. The supportive argument is cited > directly from Chomsky 1965--yes, you guessed it-- Performance ("general > cognition") vs. Competence ("the unique core-principle")! So Chomsky has > gone a considerable distance past Wallace, recognizing the evolution of > mind but not of language. > > 4. Linguistic relativism: The kind of linguistic/cultural relativism > that Alexander Gross waxes so nostalgically about is rather familiar in > the social science (and the humanities), and is indeed the direct > intellectual descendant of Wallace's denial of the evolution of mind. It > is fully tantamount to saying that the brain evolved but the mind > didn't. Perhaps with one exception, tho--this position is advocated by > non-religious academics. But otherwise, it is part and parcel of the old > tradition of drawing a sharp line between the biological (corporeal, > profane, mundane; or subject to adaptive-selected evolution), and the > mental/cultural (divinely given or free-chosen and fancy free). And it > is Decartes' dualism thinly disguised, dusted up and refitted in fancy > (post-modern) lingo. But otherwise still recognoizable. > > 5. Chomsky as a convenient Devil: I come last to a peculiar obsession of > functionalist of whatever sect (or stripe), one they apparently--in a > way peculiarly remiscent of old-time religion--cannot do without. For > apparently we need a Devil; our very own Daemon to cast out; the > Scapegoat to lead to the altar. And Chomsky surely makes such a splendid > "Tailed One" (Kwasi-gyat , in Ute), being so obviously the font of all > intellectual evil. So, at the risk of heresy and excommunication, I > would like to suggest that in spite of all the profound and well > documented differences and disagreements, we owe poor Noam an awful lot. > For he had put many important issues back on the table that were ruled > out or obscured by the Bloomfieldians. And, above all, that we really > don't need a devil, be it Noam or anybody else. For we can learn even > from what we take to be his missteps, and then move on, unencumbered by > self-righteousness. Hey guys, let's do science. Let's unearth > interesting facts and look for systematic tho tentative but (hopefully) > progressively better explanations. > > Have fun. Best, TG > > From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 23 04:01:01 2004 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2004 21:01:01 -0700 Subject: universals, innateness & Chomsky In-Reply-To: <40D8A35F.D32AFEAA@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: On June 22, 2004 Tom Givon wrote: >2. Universals, innateness and evolution: So far as I can tell, there has >been only two serious traditional explanation proposed for universals, >not only of language but also of mind and, indeed, of biological design: >(i) The Divine; (ii) Evolution. For the peculiar band of non-religious >relativists that sprang in academic linguistics and anthropology one >could concede a third one: (iii) Randomness. But, you surely agree, this >is not much of an explanation. So, if you are not inclined to invoked >either the Deity (i) or Randomess (iii) as serious scientific >explanations, and if you recognize at least some universals of >language, you have no choice but to concede some innatenes, >neurological specialization, genetic encoding--and evolution. You simply >can't buy one without buying the others. They come together, package >deal. Actually, if we distinguish the emergence of language from the evolution of the anatomy of those who use language, there is a fourth explanation: some language universals may be dictated by the nature of the universe: there are physical rules regarding the organization and transmission of information. Those rules apply whether the information is being transmitted by a biological entity, like a human, or a mechanical device, such as a computer, or even by lower level entities such as the chemical subunits of genetic code. Once we take the universal origin of some universals into account, their presence makes the argument in favor of biological innateness far weaker. Whether the languages we use are hard-wired, partially or totally, or learned and even to some extent designed by the contributions of individual speakers is not deducible from those features of language that any code for the transmission of information must have. That indeterminately complex messages may be composed from a small number of subunits and a limited set of patterns for their configuration is true of human language, computer code, and DNA code, for instance. By the way, not all design is of divine origin, so that the dichotomy of the Deity versus Evolution is a false forced choice. When we examine computer code, we don't have to choose between the theory of its divine origin and the idea that it evolved naturally. Best, --Aya Katz ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ http://www.well.com/user/amnfn ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ From ep21 at soas.ac.uk Wed Jun 23 09:07:47 2004 From: ep21 at soas.ac.uk (Ellen Potts) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 10:07:47 +0100 Subject: Endangered Languages Documentation Programme (ELDP) - 2004 Call for applications Message-ID: **Apologies for any cross-posting** The ELDP is now inviting applications for its third funding round. Full details of the application procedure are on the website at: http://www.hrelp.org. Deadlines, according to application type, are as follows: Major Documentation Projects & Individual Postdoctoral Fellowships: Preliminary applications - 7th August, 2004; Full applications (on invitation) - 5th November, 2004 Individual Graduate Studentships & Pilot Projects: Full applications - 7th January, 2005 Field Trip Grants (projects starting between 1st April 2005 & 31st March 2006): Full applications - 7th January 2005 Field Trip Grants (projects starting between 1st June 2005 & 31st May 2006): Full applications - 28th March 2005 Please address queries to: ep21 at soas.ac.uk From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Jun 23 13:56:47 2004 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 09:56:47 EDT Subject: Botticelli/Getting to the Hotel Room Message-ID: In a message dated 6/22/04 11:20:45 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << and not just the plastic ones that claim Botticelli's use of perspective as a false universal. >> I also have not had a moment to reply to Alex's original post, but this extra little jab motivated me. "Perspective" is just a reference to an artist's reproduction of the cues of depth in a 3-dimensional world. Unless Alex is a flat-worlder, he lives like all (or most) of us in a real 3-dimensional world. What is universal is not Botticelli (although some lovers of the period might disagree with me). What is universal -- beyond just human perception -- is that 3-dimensional world. Is there a natural human language that does not recognize 3-dimensions lexically? You'd have to show me before I'd believe it. Wishing Alex a good trip to Philly, and hoping he will there make full use of those universal spatial perceptions, without which he will not be able to go "up" to his room or experience the marvels of Philadelphia's "downtown"... Steve Long PS - In a message dated 6/16/04 2:27:07 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << You're obviously not too well grounded in art history, or you would be acquainted with the well-known case of the Dowager Empress of China rejecting western-style portraits of her because the artists used similar techniques, which she interpreted simply as blotches on her face making her look ugly--and almost all Chinese of that time would have agreed with her. Not very universal, is it? >> Actually all too universal! Nobody said 3-D had to be pretty. The Dowager's warts, for example, would have been ever so much more prominent if they were made "life-like", i.e., given depth. I wonder how she felt about mirrors. But what you seem to be saying here is that the Dowager did not respond to the cues of depth perception -- which is possible, I suppose. (Royal inter-breeding might do funny things to human organs. One of the many down-sides of eugenics.) A much better explanation is probably that her artist did not have the skill to pull it off. The reason I brought up Botticelli was because of your reference to road signs, which are also pretty poor in terms of representing depth. My bet is that the Dowager would have loved what Sandro Botticelli or Rapheal Sanzio would have done with her -- so long as they air-brushed out those "protruding" 3-dimensional warts. From rjfreeman at email.com Wed Jun 23 14:50:26 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 22:50:26 +0800 Subject: universals, innateness & Chomsky In-Reply-To: <40D8A35F.D32AFEAA@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: On Wednesday 23 June 2004 05:23, Tom Givon wrote: > ...Hey guys, let's do science. Let's unearth > interesting facts and look for systematic tho tentative but (hopefully) > progressively better explanations. Tom, Unearthing the interesting facts and looking for progressively better explanations sounds good. Do we agree there is at least a possibility multiple (partially contradictory?) regularities are to be found in any body of language usage, and that no one set of rules, even with variations, can capture them all? It shouldn't be too hard to prove one way or the other, once we admit the possibility. Best, Rob From geoffnathan at wayne.edu Wed Jun 23 16:02:34 2004 From: geoffnathan at wayne.edu (Geoff Nathan) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 12:02:34 -0400 Subject: Relativity versus Reality 2 Message-ID: At 06:39 AM 6/18/2004, Rob Freeman wrote: >That's why I'd like to hear more about what the arguments were when Chomsky >decided language could not be universally learned. Exactly why was it he >decided it could not be universally learned? Is my information right that it >was (at least partially) because such learning resulted in "inconsistent or >incoherent representations"? Perhaps it's because I'm very old, or perhaps because I had a very eclectic linguistic education (having been born an American Structuralist, raised a generative semanticist and converted to some kind of Cognitive Grammar in my old age) but it seems that nobody remembers what Chomsky originally said (and continues to say). There are things about language that relatively young children know, and certainly adult speakers know, that they could not have acquired through exposure to the speech of those around them. Many of these things are about what you cannot do under certain circumstances that you can do under others. The classic example, of course, is a series of constraints on movement (or whatever current metaphor you prefer). For example, you can form a WH-question in English (and most languages) by placing the WH-word at the front and leaving a gap in the sentence where it is understood (to use a traditional grammar term): What did Mary say John was looking at ___? but if the embedded clause is an indirect question the result is ungrammatical in English and in virtually all other languages (although not absolutely all): *What did Mary ask whether John was looking at ___? This sentence is crashingly bad, in fact almost incomprehensible, despite the fact that a sentence with all the same ingredients is just fine if the WH-word is left in place: Mary asked whether John was looking at WHAT? Chomsky's point was that he could imagine no way that this restriction on how questions are constructed could be learned from positive data (i.e. from the real sentences produced around the child), since he believed that children do not get negative data (i.e. sentences are not pronounced with asterisks intact, and the kinds of corrections children experience from their interlocutors deal with content, not form, or with a few prescriptive shibboleths). Now since then there have been proposals for non-linguistically-specific sources for 'movement' constraints, and I suspect they are correct, but we do need to recognize that this is a hard question, and Chomsky was not just blowing smoke here. I suspect he would ask at this point, for example, what aspect of our perceptual system, or of our interaction with objects around us leads to this constraint. Although I am not a 'Chomskyan' I still think it's a good question. Geoff Geoffrey S. Nathan Faculty Liaison, Computing and Information Technology, and Associate Professor of English Linguistics Program Phone Numbers Department of English Computing and Information Technology: (313) 577-1259 Wayne State University Linguistics (English): (313) 577-8621 Detroit, MI, 48202 C&IT Fax: (313) 577-1338 From macw at cmu.edu Wed Jun 23 17:29:27 2004 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:29:27 -0400 Subject: language learning Message-ID: Dear Funknet, Thanks to Geoff Nathan for picking up the ball on Rob Freeman's question about the logical problem of language acquisition. Although Chomsky floated some ideas in "Syntactic Structures" and "Aspects" about language being unlearnable because of degenerate input, that idea was abandoned when Newport, Gleitman, and Gleitman showed that input to children was, if anything, even more grammatically well-formed than adult conversation. Attention then turned to a particular version of "Plato's Problem" couched in terms of question formation in English, just as Geoff has noted. In the most publicized version of this discussion (from Piatelli-Palmarini, 1970), Chomsky discussed the unacceptability of questions like Is the boy who __ standing in line is tall? as opposed to Is the boy who is standing in line tall? The ungrammaticality of these is said to hinge on the Structural Dependency condition. This issue is discussed in great and clarifying detail by Geoff Pullum and Barbara Scholz in a target article in The Linguistic Review 1o from 2002. The whole issue is devoted to commentary on the Pullum-Scholz analysis. I have also been working on this topic, hoping to use the CHILDES database as a way of testing Chomsky's claims empirically. The results of my analysis will be coming out in the next issue of The Journal of Child Language, along with 12 additional commentaries. It would not be easy to summarize all of these discussions here. However, perhaps the most important outcome of my analysis, stimulated in many ways by the Pullum-Scholz analysis, is that there is good positive data available to the child for the learning of the Structural Dependency condition. In the end, I find myself agreeing with Chomsky on one basic point. This is the fact that children have a basic capacity to associate words into conceptual clusters that then can be treated as "chunked" wholes. This operation is enough to allow for the emergence of structure. There is no reason to believe that this type of structural dependency is exclusively linguistic, but I think it is reasonable to imagine that the evolution of language allowed our species to develop this ability beyond that of our closest biological relatives. The particular examples that Geoff Nathan cites involve a somewhat different constraint on raising. For this constraint, an account based not just on the availability of positive evidence, but also on the conservative nature of the learning of wh-question patterns seems more appropriate. Data providing evidence for this conservatism this comes from: Kuczaj, S., & Brannick, N. (1979). Children's use of the Wh question modal auxiliary placement rule. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 28, 43-67. --Brian MacWhinney From dan.everett at man.ac.uk Wed Jun 23 18:06:36 2004 From: dan.everett at man.ac.uk (Daniel L.Everett) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 19:06:36 +0100 Subject: language learning In-Reply-To: <53309.128.2.62.74.1088011767.squirrel@webmail.andrew.cmu.edu> Message-ID: I also have a recent paper to appear on poverty of stimulus. The paper is currently on my website. It is a review article on Givon's Biolinguistics and Lightfoot and Anderson's The Language Organ, contrasting those two approaches. Among other things I point out, the generative literature on acquisition largely assumes that language is learned from the written form, i.e. devoid of intonation, among other things. Intonation alone is enough to handle the famous Chomsky example that Brian mentions below. I also have another article on my website "Cultural Constraints on Grammar in Piraha", currently under review, in which I argue that the Piraha language not only forces a reconsideration of Hockett's 'design features' of language, but that it strongly indicates that Piraha speakers must learn cultural values before or along with grammar. This is the reverse of the Whorf hypothesis (rather than language --> thought --> culture, I argue that the Piraha case argues for both culture --> language and language <--> culture). There can be no content attributed to notions like 'poverty of stimulus' or 'language organs' without consideration of intonation's role (in conjunction with information structure) in the data, which almost no one has done, but certainly not in the Chomskyan tradition. Dan P.S. I also point out in the review that some of Givon's experiments fail to do the work he wants them to do because the math used to support the conclusions is wrong. On Wednesday, Jun 23, 2004, at 18:29 Europe/London, Brian MacWhinney wrote: > Dear Funknet, > > Thanks to Geoff Nathan for picking up the ball on Rob Freeman's > question about the logical problem of language acquisition. Although > Chomsky floated some ideas in "Syntactic Structures" and "Aspects" > about > language being unlearnable because of degenerate input, that idea was > abandoned when Newport, Gleitman, and Gleitman showed that input to > children > was, if anything, even more grammatically well-formed than adult > conversation. > Attention then turned to a particular version of "Plato's Problem" > couched > in terms of question formation in English, just as Geoff has noted. In > the > most publicized version of this discussion (from Piatelli-Palmarini, > 1970), Chomsky discussed the unacceptability of questions like > > Is the boy who __ standing in line is tall? > > as opposed to > > Is the boy who is standing in line tall? > > The ungrammaticality of these is said to hinge on the Structural > Dependency > condition. > > This issue is discussed in great and clarifying detail by Geoff Pullum > and > Barbara Scholz in a target article in The Linguistic Review 1o from > 2002. > The whole issue is devoted to commentary on the Pullum-Scholz analysis. > > I have also been working on this topic, hoping to use the CHILDES > database > as a way of testing Chomsky's claims empirically. The results of my > analysis will be coming out in the next issue of The Journal of Child > Language, along with 12 additional commentaries. > > It would not be easy to summarize all of these discussions here. > However, > perhaps the most important outcome of my analysis, stimulated in many > ways > by the Pullum-Scholz analysis, is that there is good positive data > available to the child for the learning of the Structural Dependency > condition. > > In the end, I find myself agreeing with Chomsky on one basic point. > This > is the fact that children have a basic capacity to associate words into > conceptual clusters that then can be treated as "chunked" wholes. This > operation is enough to allow for the emergence of structure. There is > no > reason to believe that this type of structural dependency is > exclusively > linguistic, but I think it is reasonable to imagine that the evolution > of > language allowed our species to develop this ability beyond that of our > closest biological relatives. > > The particular examples that Geoff Nathan cites involve a somewhat > different constraint on raising. For this constraint, an account based > not just on > the availability of positive evidence, but also on the conservative > nature > of the learning of wh-question patterns seems more appropriate. Data > providing evidence for this conservatism this comes from: > > Kuczaj, S., & Brannick, N. (1979). Children's use of the Wh question > modal > auxiliary placement rule. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 28, > 43-67. > > --Brian MacWhinney > > ------------------------------------------ Daniel L. Everett Professor of Phonetics & Phonology Postgraduate Programme Director Department of Linguistics The University of Manchester Oxford Road Manchester, UK M13 9PL Fax/Office Phone: 44-161-275-3187 http://ling.man.ac.uk/info/staff/DE/DEHome.html From dick at linguistics.ucl.ac.uk Wed Jun 23 18:16:15 2004 From: dick at linguistics.ucl.ac.uk (Richard Hudson) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 19:16:15 +0100 Subject: language learning and structural dependency In-Reply-To: <53309.128.2.62.74.1088011767.squirrel@webmail.andrew.cmu.e du> Message-ID: Thanks to Brian and Geoff for their nice summaries of these issues. Personally I've never understand why structure-dependency has been taken so seriously. It certainly seems (to me at least) to be a property of language - but so far as I can see, it's a property of all cognition, so it proves nothing about the genetic foundations of language. Can anyone give me an example of an activity or a kind of thinking which isn't structure-dependent? Dick Hudson At 18:29 23/06/2004, you wrote: >Dear Funknet, > > Thanks to Geoff Nathan for picking up the ball on Rob Freeman's >question about the logical problem of language acquisition. Although >Chomsky floated some ideas in "Syntactic Structures" and "Aspects" about >language being unlearnable because of degenerate input, that idea was >abandoned when Newport, Gleitman, and Gleitman showed that input to children >was, if anything, even more grammatically well-formed than adult >conversation. > Attention then turned to a particular version of "Plato's Problem" couched >in terms of question formation in English, just as Geoff has noted. In the >most publicized version of this discussion (from Piatelli-Palmarini, >1970), Chomsky discussed the unacceptability of questions like > >Is the boy who __ standing in line is tall? > >as opposed to > >Is the boy who is standing in line tall? > >The ungrammaticality of these is said to hinge on the Structural Dependency >condition. > >This issue is discussed in great and clarifying detail by Geoff Pullum and >Barbara Scholz in a target article in The Linguistic Review 1o from 2002. >The whole issue is devoted to commentary on the Pullum-Scholz analysis. > >I have also been working on this topic, hoping to use the CHILDES database >as a way of testing Chomsky's claims empirically. The results of my >analysis will be coming out in the next issue of The Journal of Child >Language, along with 12 additional commentaries. > >It would not be easy to summarize all of these discussions here. However, >perhaps the most important outcome of my analysis, stimulated in many ways >by the Pullum-Scholz analysis, is that there is good positive data >available to the child for the learning of the Structural Dependency >condition. > >In the end, I find myself agreeing with Chomsky on one basic point. This >is the fact that children have a basic capacity to associate words into >conceptual clusters that then can be treated as "chunked" wholes. This >operation is enough to allow for the emergence of structure. There is no >reason to believe that this type of structural dependency is exclusively >linguistic, but I think it is reasonable to imagine that the evolution of >language allowed our species to develop this ability beyond that of our >closest biological relatives. > >The particular examples that Geoff Nathan cites involve a somewhat >different constraint on raising. For this constraint, an account based >not just on >the availability of positive evidence, but also on the conservative nature >of the learning of wh-question patterns seems more appropriate. Data >providing evidence for this conservatism this comes from: > >Kuczaj, S., & Brannick, N. (1979). Children's use of the Wh question modal >auxiliary placement rule. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 28, >43-67. > >--Brian MacWhinney Dick (Richard) Hudson, FBA Dept of Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 020 7679 3152; fax 020 7383 4108; www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/dick/home.htm From ocls at madisoncounty.net Wed Jun 23 19:48:04 2004 From: ocls at madisoncounty.net (Suzette Haden Elgin) Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2004 14:48:04 -0500 Subject: the current FunkNet discussion Message-ID: June 23, 2004 Dear Professor Nathan, In your recent FunkNet posting you wrote that it was grammatical in English to say "What did Mary say John was looking at ___?" and continued... "but if the embedded clause is an indirect question the result is ungrammatical in English and in virtually all other languages (although not absolutely all): *What did Mary ask whether John was looking at ___? This sentence is crashingly bad, in fact almost incomprehensible..." It happens that that sentence "What did Mary ask whether John was looking at?" is entirely grammatical and acceptable in my own Ozark English dialect, and is a structure no more uncommon than "What did Mary say John was looking at?" It's copying rather than chopping -- forgive me for being quaint -- but it's absolutely a grammatical sentence. Sincerely, Suzette Haden Elgin From rjfreeman at email.com Thu Jun 24 15:01:51 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2004 23:01:51 +0800 Subject: language learning In-Reply-To: <53309.128.2.62.74.1088011767.squirrel@webmail.andrew.cmu.edu> Message-ID: On Thursday 24 June 2004 01:29, Brian MacWhinney wrote: > Dear Funknet, > > Thanks to Geoff Nathan for picking up the ball on Rob Freeman's > question about the logical problem of language acquisition. Although > Chomsky floated some ideas in "Syntactic Structures" and "Aspects" about > language being unlearnable because of degenerate input, that idea was > abandoned when Newport, Gleitman, and Gleitman showed that input to > children was, if anything, even more grammatically well-formed than adult > conversation. > Attention then turned to a particular version of "Plato's Problem" > couched in terms of question formation in English, just as Geoff has noted. > ... Thanks to Geoff and others. Degenerate input is closer to what I was thinking of, but it wasn't the innateness issue itself I wanted to concentrate on, but some of the early evidence which was garnered to the cause. In short evidence of subjectivity. The particular analysis which interests me is one I found in a historical retrospective by Fritz Newmeyer and others "Chomsky's 1962 programme for linguistics" (in Newmeyer's "Generative Linguistics -- A Historical Perspective", Routledge, 1996, and apparently also published in "Proc. of the XVth International Congress of Linguists".) Newmeyer is talking mostly about Chomsky's "Logical basis of linguistic theory" paper (presented at the Ninth Int. Congress of Linguists?) Chomsky's argument as he presents it focused largely on phonology, and was controversial because it attacked what was at the time "considered a fundamental scientific insight: the centrality of the contrastive function of linguistic elements." This interests me because I also believe in the "centrality of the contrastive function of linguistic elements" (as do all Functionalists?) But what was Chomsky's objection? According to Newmeyer "part of the discussion of phonology in 'LBLT' is directed towards showing that the conditions that were supposed to define a phonemic representation (including complementary distribution, locally determined biuniqueness, linearity, etc.) were inconsistent or incoherent in some cases and led to (or at least allowed) absurd analyses in others." Most importantly the interposition of such a "phonemic level ... led to a loss of generality in the formulation of the rule-governed regularities of the language." It is this "loss of generality" as an argument which I find most relevant. Evidence of a "loss of generality" could be seen as negative for learnability if you assume what is to be learned must apply universally, which seems to be the way Chomsky took it, but it is positive evidence if you imagine once that language structure might be elusive only because it is fundamentally subjective (the multiple contradictory orderings thing). Has there been any debate on this issue: the fact that such "loss of generality" does not so much support innateness as it supports (functional centrality and) structural subjectivity? -Rob From amnfn at well.com Thu Jun 24 16:02:56 2004 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2004 09:02:56 -0700 Subject: language learning In-Reply-To: <200406242258.43152.rob@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote: >Has there been any debate on this issue: the fact that such "loss of >generality" does not so much support innateness as it supports >(functional centrality and) structural subjectivity? In our book CYCLES IN LANGUAGE, co-author June Sun and I stress the contrastive function of language, and show that on both the phonological and morphological level, the degree of opacity associated with the subcomponents of linguistic units is directly related to the overall systematicity of the morphological or phonological organization of such units in the language as a whole. Our current draft of the manuscript is available in pdf files for those who are interested. Best, --Aya Katz +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ httP://www.well.com +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ From lamb at rice.edu Thu Jun 24 16:56:41 2004 From: lamb at rice.edu (Sydney Lamb) Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2004 11:56:41 -0500 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: <200406242258.43152.rob@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: On Thu, 24 Jun 2004, Rob Freeman wrote: > ... > The particular analysis which interests me is one I found in a historical > retrospective by Fritz Newmeyer and others "Chomsky's 1962 programme for > linguistics" (in Newmeyer's "Generative Linguistics -- A Historical > Perspective", Routledge, 1996, and apparently also published in "Proc. of the > XVth International Congress of Linguists".) > > Newmeyer is talking mostly about Chomsky's "Logical basis of linguistic > theory" paper (presented at the Ninth Int. Congress of Linguists?) Chomsky's > argument as he presents it focused largely on phonology, and was > controversial because it attacked what was at the time "considered a > fundamental scientific insight: the centrality of the contrastive function of > linguistic elements." > > This interests me because I also believe in the "centrality of the contrastive > function of linguistic elements" (as do all Functionalists?) I certainly can't answer for others, but I do. > > But what was Chomsky's objection? According to Newmeyer "part of the > discussion of phonology in 'LBLT' is directed towards showing that the > conditions that were supposed to define a phonemic representation (including > complementary distribution, locally determined biuniqueness, linearity, etc.) > were inconsistent or incoherent in some cases and led to (or at least > allowed) absurd analyses in others." Most importantly the interposition of > such a "phonemic level ... led to a loss of generality in the formulation of > the rule-governed regularities of the language." > ... > ... Chomsky was correct in pointing out that some of the criteria in use at that time for defining phonemic representations were less than airtight, but his alternative phonological proposals were even more faulty. I analyzed every one of his arguments against the "classical phonemic level" (e.g. the Russian obstruents, the English vowel length difference before voiced vs. voiceless syllable-final consonants) and found flaws in every one, some of them rather eqregious. Conclusion: His arguments about "loss of generality" are wrong -- every one of them. For example, perhaps his most celebrated argument concerns the Russian obstruents. He correctly pointed out that the usual solution incorporates a loss of generality, but he misdiagosed the problem. The problem was the criterion of linearity. He stubbornly holds on to this criterion, although it really is faulty, and comes up with a solution for the Russian obstruents that obscures the phonological structure. I showed (in accounts cited below) that by relaxing the linearity requirement we get an elegant solution while preserving "centrality of contrastive function of linguistic elements". The errors in Chomsky's arguments (together with defense of "centrality of contrastive function of linguistic elements") have been pointed out it a number of publications, including: Lamb, review of Chomsky .... American Anthropologist 69.411-415 (1967). Lamb, Prolegomena to a theory of phonology. Language 42.536-573 (1966) (includes analysis of the Russian obstruents question, as well as a more reasonable critique of the criteria of classical phonemics). Lamb and Vanderslice, On thrashing classical phonemics. LACUS Forum 2.154-163 (1976). See also the discussion in Lamb, Linguistics to the beat of a different drummer. First Person Singular III. Benjamins, 1998 (reprinted in Language and Reality, Continuum, 2004). All the best, - Syd Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From rjfreeman at email.com Fri Jun 25 11:00:15 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2004 19:00:15 +0800 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Friday 25 June 2004 00:56, Sydney Lamb wrote: > On Thu, 24 Jun 2004, Rob Freeman wrote: > > ... > > But what was Chomsky's objection? According to Newmeyer "part of the > > discussion of phonology in 'LBLT' is directed towards showing that the > > conditions that were supposed to define a phonemic representation > > (including complementary distribution, locally determined biuniqueness, > > linearity, etc.) were inconsistent or incoherent in some cases and led to > > (or at least allowed) absurd analyses in others." Most importantly the > > interposition of such a "phonemic level ... led to a loss of generality > > in the formulation of the rule-governed regularities of the language." > > ... > > Chomsky ... correctly pointed out that the usual > solution incorporates a loss of generality, but he misdiagosed > the problem. The problem was the criterion of linearity. He > stubbornly holds on to this criterion, although it really is > faulty, and comes up with a solution for the Russian obstruents > that obscures the phonological structure. I showed (in accounts > cited below) that by relaxing the linearity requirement we get > an elegant solution while preserving "centrality of contrastive > function of linguistic elements". Syd, I think I am with you on this one. Am I right in understanding that "relaxing the linearity requirement" means the phonetic value of a sequence of phonemes is no longer taken to be the sequence of phonetic values of isolated phonemes? In short that the phonetic value of a phoneme is no longer taken to be independent of its context? If so, I'm happy with that. What I am looking for is evidence of subjectivity. If you swap a claim about the generality of rules for a claim about the (contextual) subjectivity of elements, I don't mind at all. I think your analysis is just the kind of confirmation I was looking for. I'm not so interested in the conclusions Chomsky drew. I'm just looking for evidence of subjectivity. Reading Newmeyer's analysis it struck me that Chomsky's evidence (which I think we can give him credit for observing clearly) was not so much of innateness, or that the fundamental focus of the structuralists of the time on "contrastive function" was wrong. Rather it looks to me to be evidence that a focus on the "centrality of the contrastive function of linguistic elements" (which is also the foundation of Functionalism) implies structural subjectivity in language. If we ever knew this we seem to have forgotten it, otherwise we would not be arguing about it on Funknet. That is the thread I want to explore. I think you are supportive of the same basic issues. Am I wrong? Do you believe language structure is universal and capable of being objectively codified? -Rob From lamb at rice.edu Fri Jun 25 16:17:25 2004 From: lamb at rice.edu (Sydney Lamb) Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2004 11:17:25 -0500 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: <200406251900.16565.rjfreeman@email.com> Message-ID: Hi Rob! You wrote: > On Friday 25 June 2004 00:56, Sydney Lamb wrote: > > ... > > Chomsky ... correctly pointed out that the usual > > solution incorporates a loss of generality, but he misdiagosed > > the problem. The problem was the criterion of linearity. He > > stubbornly holds on to this criterion, although it really is > > faulty, and comes up with a solution for the Russian obstruents > > that obscures the phonological structure. I showed (in accounts > > cited below) that by relaxing the linearity requirement we get > > an elegant solution while preserving "centrality of contrastive > > function of linguistic elements". > > Syd, > > I think I am with you on this one. > > Am I right in understanding that "relaxing the linearity requirement" means > the phonetic value of a sequence of phonemes is no longer taken to be the > sequence of phonetic values of isolated phonemes? In short that the phonetic > value of a phoneme is no longer taken to be independent of its context? Yes, that is exactly right. In Russian (as in English and most languages with obstruent clusters), voicing or lack of it applies to the whole cluster. Therefore a description loses generality if it assigns voicing or lack of voicing to each individual segment of the cluster. In English the voicing of the whole cluster is determined by the first element; in Russian, by the last element (even if it is part of the following word). Thus you could say that voicing of the other obstruents is determined by their context. (And therefore it is not distinctive -- has no contrastive function.) > ... > I'm not so interested in the conclusions Chomsky drew. I'm just looking for > evidence of subjectivity. Reading Newmeyer's analysis it struck me that > Chomsky's evidence (which I think we can give him credit for observing > clearly) was not so much of innateness, or that the fundamental focus of the > structuralists of the time on "contrastive function" was wrong. I agree. These phonological arguments of Chomsky have nothing to do with innateness. (Quite aside from the fact that they are erroneous.) And the structuralists were right to focus on contrastive function. > ... Rather it > looks to me to be evidence that a focus on the "centrality of the contrastive > function of linguistic elements" (which is also the foundation of > Functionalism) implies structural subjectivity in language. I'm sorry to say that I don't see this connection. I'm not disagreeing (necessarily) -- just don't get the implication. What am I missing? > ... > I think you are supportive of the same basic issues. Am I wrong? Do you > believe language structure is universal and capable of being objectively > codified? There surely are universal properties of language structure, and there certainly are subjective properties as well. As to "objectively codified", if you really want my opinion I'd need a better idea of what you mean by this phrase. All best, - Syd Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From rjfreeman at email.com Mon Jun 28 07:15:42 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2004 15:15:42 +0800 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Saturday 26 June 2004 00:17, Sydney Lamb wrote: > > > ...Reading Newmeyer's analysis it struck me > > that Chomsky's evidence ... was not so much of innateness, or > > that the fundamental focus of the structuralists of the time on > > "contrastive function" was wrong. > > > ... Rather it > > looks to me to be evidence that a focus on the "centrality of the > > contrastive function of linguistic elements" (which is also the > > foundation of Functionalism) implies structural subjectivity in language. > > I'm sorry to say that I don't see this connection. I'm not > disagreeing (necessarily) -- just don't get the implication. > What am I missing? One way of seeing the connection is to equate "relaxing the linearity requirement" with structural subjectivity. This seems natural to me. They both imply you need to look at the whole utterance to know the elements. If there were only one way of describing language elements (or if they were invariable primitives) it is hard to see how their combination would not be linear. If each context dynamically selects different generalizations to characterize as elements, however, it follows naturally that their combination will not be linear. Another way of looking at it -- if you allow combinations of linguistic elements to be non-linear, your results will be indistinguishable from strings formed by "linear" combinations of subjective elements. I think "relaxing the linearity condition" and "subjective elements" are saying very much the same thing. Unless we can think of some other mechanism explaining how non-linear combination might occur. Can you think of anything which might distinguish the two? Thanks for letting me know how the debate developed all those years ago. I was curious to know what happened to Chomsky's (and Halle's?) observation after reading an account of it recently in Newmeyer's book. I prefer your interpretation. Perhaps there is more evidence of this sort lying around undiscussed. What is the evidence? Is it that language has a single, universal structure, or that structure is generalized, subjectively, on the spot, parameterized only by meaningful contrasts? What was the subsequent theoretical and practical impact of your observation that there was a need for "relaxing the linearity requirement" over combinations of phonemes? Has this been taken on board by people trying to model phonemes for speech recognition, for example? Best, Rob From lamb at rice.edu Mon Jun 28 16:24:42 2004 From: lamb at rice.edu (Sydney Lamb) Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2004 11:24:42 -0500 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: <200406281515.42675.rjfreeman@email.com> Message-ID: On Mon, 28 Jun 2004, Rob Freeman wrote: > > > ... Rather it > > > looks to me to be evidence that a focus on the "centrality of the > > > contrastive function of linguistic elements" (which is also the > > > foundation of Functionalism) implies structural subjectivity in language. > > > > I'm sorry to say that I don't see this connection. I'm not > > disagreeing (necessarily) -- just don't get the implication. > > What am I missing? > > One way of seeing the connection is to equate "relaxing the linearity > requirement" with structural subjectivity. This seems natural to me. They > both imply you need to look at the whole utterance to know the elements. > ... It could be that the problem I am (still) having is related to your definition of subjectivity. To me, subjectivity implies that each individual forms and uses his/her own individual representation of linguistic structure. This surely has to be so, imho. Objectivity means that there is some common linguistic structure shared across different individuals. To some extent, the different individual (subjective) structures share enough with respect to linguistic expressions and their correlations to make communication possible (to some extent, though always limited). To the extent that such sharing occurs one could speak (with some danger of being misunderstood) about objectivity of structure. More meaningfully, perhaps, we may speak of objectivity at the level of the neural substrate, as all people use the same general neural mechanisms in substantially the same way for developing their (subjective) representations of linguistic structure. But all this has nothing to do (as far as I can see) with whether or not we recognize non-linear features in phonology. One could have either subjective or (hypothetically) across-the-board objective representations of phonological structure with some non-linear features. > ... > Another way of looking at it -- if you allow combinations of linguistic > elements to be non-linear, your results will be indistinguishable from > strings formed by "linear" combinations of subjective elements. I don't follow this at all. Are you sure you want to say this? > I think "relaxing the linearity condition" and "subjective elements" are > saying very much the same thing. Unless we can think of some other mechanism > explaining how non-linear combination might occur. The mechanism can be explained on an objective basis in terms of ease of articulation (applicable for everyone, hence objective). In the case of obstruent clusters -- of Russian or English or what-have-you -- it would be very difficult to produce clusters in which voice could be turned on and/or off in the middle of the cluster -- much easier if the whole thing is either voiced or voiceless. We therefore posit the feature of voicing or unvoicing as extending for the length of the cluster -- it's what Harris called a long component. Rather than having it repeat for each segment. It is for this reason that the linearity requirement (as stated by Chomsky) has to be abandoned (although it was mistakenly retained by Chomsky and Halle). > ... > What is the evidence? Is it that language has a single, universal structure, > or that structure is generalized, subjectively, on the spot, parameterized > only by meaningful contrasts? I go with the latter view, although there are universal properties, because of shared biological and environmental features. > ... > What was the subsequent theoretical and practical impact of your observation > that there was a need for "relaxing the linearity requirement" over > combinations of phonemes? Has this been taken on board by people trying to > model phonemes for speech recognition, for example? What happened was weird. Chomsky responded to my published account (e.g. Prolegomena to a theory of phonology, Language 1966) by saying that (approx quote) "Lamb's attempt at refutation amounts to accepting my solution in toto with a change of notation". (!!) This despite that fact that Chomsky's solution retains linearity while rejecting biuniqueness (contrastive function), while mine rejects linearity while preserving biuniqueness. The whole story (there is more) is related in Lamb and Vanderslice, On thrashing classical phonemics, LACUS Forum 2, 1975). How did others (besides Chomsky) react? As far as I can tell, by simply ignoring these published refutations of mine, with their alternative solutions. It came to be generally accepted that the notion of a contrastive phoneme (Chomsky's "biuniqueness") had been thrown out by Chomsky. The phoneme was dead for the next two or three decades. Nobody (other than my students) was even aware of my refutation of his argument. In those days, Chomsky was the sole source of truth, and it was not considered necessary to pay attention to opposing views. All best, - Syd Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Jun 28 16:48:25 2004 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2004 09:48:25 -0700 Subject: FWD: Dwight Bolinger's Web site Message-ID: From rjfreeman at email.com Tue Jun 29 11:32:15 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2004 19:32:15 +0800 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Tuesday 29 June 2004 00:24, Sydney Lamb wrote: > On Mon, 28 Jun 2004, Rob Freeman wrote: > > > > ... Rather it > > > > looks to me to be evidence that a focus on the "centrality of the > > > > contrastive function of linguistic elements" (which is also the > > > > foundation of Functionalism) implies structural subjectivity in > > > > language. > > > > > > I'm sorry to say that I don't see this connection. I'm not > > > disagreeing (necessarily) -- just don't get the implication. > > > What am I missing? > > > > One way of seeing the connection is to equate "relaxing the linearity > > requirement" with structural subjectivity. This seems natural to me. They > > both imply you need to look at the whole utterance to know the elements. > > ... > > It could be that the problem I am (still) having is related to > your definition of subjectivity. To me, subjectivity implies > that each individual forms and uses his/her own individual > representation of linguistic structure. This surely has to be > so, imho. Yes, that could be where we are at cross-purposes. I'm talking about subjectivity from utterance to utterance not just from language to language, or even individual to individual. I believe that not only does each individual form a slightly different representation of linguistic structure, but that same individual forms a different representation of linguistic structure (to an extent limited by the functional contrasts required by the message only) from utterance to utterance. That means you can explain non-linearity as a redefinition of each phoneme (e.g. voiced or un-voiced) by the same individual from context to context. Does my equation of non-linearity with subjectivity make more sense if you think of a phoneme as subjective on its context within an utterance? > But all this has nothing to do (as far as I can see) with > whether or not we recognize non-linear features in phonology. > One could have either subjective or (hypothetically) > across-the-board objective representations of phonological > structure with some non-linear features. Well, we _could_ have objective phonological structure with non-linear combination, but how would we implement it? Even if we entertain the possibility, consider the complexity. The value associated with every element in a combination of phonemes would have to have an extra +x (not only adding, but swapping values completely, as from voiced to voiceless) from every other phoneme in the combination. Who could tell what the "real" phoneme might be under all that. No wonder Chomsky thought a true (universal?) representation could not be learned. In fact I really don't think you can keep non-linear combination of _objective_ phonemes (as opposed to combinations which are non-linear because the phonemes are subjective) and keep biuniqueness as a fundamental defining principle of structure, Syd. If you want to propose there is something objective under all those +x's you have to accept you can never learn it. Biuniqueness will only give you the sum of a particular non-linear combination operation. We are slipping into the abyss. Isn't it much better to accept that the idealized, objective, phoneme does not exist at all (for it to need to change), that the idea of an idealized phoneme is just an average of contrasts (subjective, because the contrasts needed differ from word to word) needed to make meaningful distinctions (only those consistent with getting the message across) each time. Perhaps that's not a proof, but can you think of another mechanism which would produce non-linear combinations of phonemes? In particular one which maintains biuniqueness as a fundamental parameter? Producing the phoneme anew each time as an average of only the necessary contrasts would do it. > > ... > > Another way of looking at it -- if you allow combinations of linguistic > > elements to be non-linear, your results will be indistinguishable from > > strings formed by "linear" combinations of subjective elements. > > I don't follow this at all. Are you sure you want to say this? I'll stick with it. If subjective elements are thought of as subjective on the context of an utterance I think it is true. Can you think of anything which might distinguish the them? > > I think "relaxing the linearity condition" and "subjective elements" are > > saying very much the same thing. Unless we can think of some other > > mechanism explaining how non-linear combination might occur. > > The mechanism can be explained on an objective basis in terms of > ease of articulation... Well that's a motivation, but what about a mechanism? In real life practical constraints push us to do all kinds of things, but what actually happens is limited by what the system will allow. Our vocal tract is telling us we want to produce the least contrast we have to, but what is the smallest contrast the system allows us? If the system were a linear concatenation of objective phonemes then the option of producing voiceless versions would not be available, not from the point of view of the system itself. We could take the "hard" non-linear case and have each phoneme in a combination of multiple "objective" phonemes. Or we could take Chomsky's view. We could try to explain the omission of the voiced/voiceless contrast as a performance limitation acting on a structurally invariant ideal. But in either case there is no way of knowing what the real system is, because there is no way of knowing what the objective phonemes are like! We are back searching for Universal Grammar. Biuniqueness only tells us what the observables are. It is no longer a fundamental principle. > > ... > > What is the evidence? Is it that language has a single, universal > > structure, or that structure is generalized, subjectively, on the spot, > > parameterized only by meaningful contrasts? > > I go with the latter view, although there are universal > properties, because of shared biological and environmental > features. Yes, I don't think the universal nature of language exists much beyond a mechanism for identifying and associating (contrasting) repeated segments in sequences. That combined with the common functional motivation of the "real" world. A system to produce language must have these common (and common biological) capabilities, which, as I'm sure you know, all indications (e.g. speed of parallel search, flexibility, robustness...) tell us would be supremely suited to some kind of network implementation. I don't mind if someone wants to call that Universal Grammar. > > ... > > What was the subsequent theoretical and practical impact of your > > observation that there was a need for "relaxing the linearity > > requirement" over combinations of phonemes? Has this been taken on board > > by people trying to model phonemes for speech recognition, for example? > > What happened was weird. Chomsky responded to my published > account (e.g. Prolegomena to a theory of phonology, Language > 1966) by saying that (approx quote) "Lamb's attempt at > refutation amounts to accepting my solution in toto with > a change of notation". (!!) This despite that fact that > Chomsky's solution retains linearity while rejecting > biuniqueness (contrastive function), while mine rejects > linearity while preserving biuniqueness. Well, I don't find it too surprising... I guess Chomsky found non-linear rules to be quite as untenable as a rules which exhibited a "loss of generality". I do see them as rather the same thing -- subjective combinations of elements (or combinations of subjective elements, or both). What it comes down to in the end is whether you accept the subjective (non-linear, non-general) combinations, or if you reject the biuniqueness which produces them. Chomsky was probably happy you agreed with the basic observation that a phoneme consistent with a definition in terms of biuniqueness is not consistent in combination, but didn't see a non-linear rule as a credible solution (not as system, anyway). So he felt we were forced to return to his solution -- that the contrastive patterns we see in the data are not the true patterns at all (competence) but only corruptions of those patterns (performance). > How did others (besides Chomsky) react? As far as I can tell, by > simply ignoring these published refutations of mine, with their > alternative solutions. It came to be generally accepted that the > notion of a contrastive phoneme (Chomsky's "biuniqueness") had > been thrown out by Chomsky. The phoneme was dead for the next > two or three decades. Nobody (other than my students) was even > aware of my refutation of his argument. It's a pity. I think this observation, whether you characterize it as "loss of generality" or "relaxing the linearity condition", is nice evidence that language strings are produced by top down, ad-hoc, generalization according to minimum contrasts. Accepting the implications of non-linearity as a positive statement about the nature of phonemes ("loss of generality"/non-linearity/subjectivity), rather than a negative statement about the significance of functional contrast (biuniqueness), could have forced us to seek ways to systematically generate non-linear sequences of phonemes, viz. constant subjective generalization of phonemes within each utterance parameterized only by the functional contrasts demanded by the context. How did Functionalism treat this? Surely Functionalism did not reject a fundamental role for functional contrast? Or did Functionalists stop thinking about structure altogether? -Rob From lamb at rice.edu Tue Jun 29 16:29:07 2004 From: lamb at rice.edu (Sydney Lamb) Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2004 11:29:07 -0500 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: <200406291931.04449.rjfreeman@email.com> Message-ID: On Tue, 29 Jun 2004, Rob Freeman wrote: > ... > Yes, that could be where we are at cross-purposes. I'm talking about > subjectivity from utterance to utterance not just from language to language, > or even individual to individual. I believe that not only does each > individual form a slightly different representation of linguistic structure, > but that same individual forms a different representation of linguistic > structure (to an extent limited by the functional contrasts required by the > message only) from utterance to utterance. Why call this sujectivity? > That means you can explain non-linearity as a redefinition of each phoneme > (e.g. voiced or un-voiced) by the same individual from context to context. No. That would be RETAINING linearity. The whole point of rejecting a linearity requirement is to make it unnecessary to do this. > Does my equation of non-linearity with subjectivity make more sense if you > think of a phoneme as subjective on its context within an utterance? No. Lamb: > > But all this has nothing to do (as far as I can see) with > > whether or not we recognize non-linear features in phonology. > > One could have either subjective or (hypothetically) > > across-the-board objective representations of phonological > > structure with some non-linear features. > > Well, we _could_ have objective phonological structure with non-linear > combination, but how would we implement it? > > Even if we entertain the possibility, consider the complexity. The value > associated with every element in a combination of phonemes would have to have > an extra +x (not only adding, but swapping values completely, as from voiced > to voiceless) from every other phoneme in the combination. Who could tell > ... No. That is the problem you would get if you RETAIN linearity. > In fact I really don't think you can keep non-linear combination of > _objective_ phonemes (as opposed to combinations which are non-linear because > the phonemes are subjective) and keep biuniqueness as a fundamental defining > principle of structure, Syd. If you want to propose there is something > objective under all those +x's you have to accept you can never learn it. > Biuniqueness will only give you the sum of a particular non-linear > combination operation. Not at all. > > We are slipping into the abyss. Isn't it much better to accept that the > idealized, objective, phoneme does not exist at all (for it to need to > change), Change? Are we now suddenly adding diachronic considerations? > Perhaps that's not a proof, but can you think of another mechanism which would > produce non-linear combinations of phonemes? In particular one which > maintains biuniqueness as a fundamental parameter? There is really no problem. Your mention of production prompts me to bring up an additional consideration that is usually neglected (and was neglected during the whole period of classical phonemics, as well as during the period of Chomsky-Halle phonology: we have to distinguish production phonology from receptive phonology -- their structures are not the same. They are even processed in entirely different (though interconnected) parts of the cortex. From the point of view of production phonology, the linearity condition is actually retained w.r.t. voicing of obstruent clusters. At the beginning of the cluster the voice is turned off or on (as the case may be), and it just remains that way -- no add'l voicing operation needed -- till the end of the cluster. > ... > Our vocal tract is telling us we want to produce the least contrast we have > to, but what is the smallest contrast the system allows us? If the system > were a linear concatenation of objective phonemes then the option of > producing voiceless versions would not be available, not from the point of > view of the system itself. > I don't see this at all. > We could take the "hard" non-linear case and have each phoneme in a > combination of multiple "objective" phonemes. Nor this. > Or we could take Chomsky's view. We could try to explain the omission of the > voiced/voiceless contrast as a performance limitation acting on a > structurally invariant ideal. This is NOT what Chomsky proposed. (Your additional discussion is not repeated here, as it depends on the same misunderstanding of what is meant by relaxing the linearity requirement. If we can straighten out the above points, then it will be unnecessary to dwell further on the rest.) > > > ... > > > What was the subsequent theoretical and practical impact of your > > > observation that there was a need for "relaxing the linearity > > > requirement" over combinations of phonemes? Has this been taken on board > > > by people trying to model phonemes for speech recognition, for example? > > > > What happened was weird. Chomsky responded to my published > > account (e.g. Prolegomena to a theory of phonology, Language > > 1966) by saying that (approx quote) "Lamb's attempt at > > refutation amounts to accepting my solution in toto with > > a change of notation". (!!) This despite that fact that > > Chomsky's solution retains linearity while rejecting > > biuniqueness (contrastive function), while mine rejects > > linearity while preserving biuniqueness. > > Well, I don't find it too surprising... I guess Chomsky found non-linear rules > to be quite as untenable as a rules which exhibited a "loss of generality". I think the problem was not this; rather that the possibility of abandoning the linearity requirement didn't even occur to him. (Although once one considers it a little, it becomes obvious that it is just a troublesome excrescence handed down from tradition, influenced by alphabetic writing.) > ... > It's a pity. I think this observation, whether you characterize it as "loss of > generality" or "relaxing the linearity condition", No -- these are two quite different things. What I had shown was that by relaxing the linearity condition we can handle the obstruent clusters without loss of generality. - Syd Sydney M. Lamb http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lamb/ Linguistics and Cognitive Sciences Rice University, Houston, TX From Julia.Ulrich at degruyter.com Wed Jun 30 11:53:31 2004 From: Julia.Ulrich at degruyter.com (Julia Ulrich) Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2004 13:53:31 +0200 Subject: =?iso-8859-1?q?A_New_Architecture_for_Functional_Gramm?= =?iso-8859-1?q?ar=2C_edited_by_J=2E_Lachlan_Mackenzie_and_Mari=E1_?= =?iso-8859-1?q?de_los_=C1ngeles_G=F3mez_Gonz=E1lez?= Message-ID: Available in Paperback! A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR Edited by J. Lachlan Mackenzie and María de los Ángeles Gómez-González July 2004. xiv, 394 pages. Paperback. EUR 39.95 / sFr 64.00 / approx. US$ 48.00 ISBN 3-11-017356-5 (Functional Grammar Series 24) This volume, which represents a major advance on Simon Dik's final statement of the theory (1997), lays the foundation for the future evolution of FG towards a Functional Discourse Grammar. It rises to the double challenge of specifying the interface between discourse and grammar and of detailing the expression rules that link semantic representation and morphosyntactic form. The opening chapter, by Kees Hengeveld, sets out in programmatic form a new architecture for FG which both preserves the best of the traditional model and offers a place for numerous recent insights. The remaining chapters are devoted to refining and developing the programme laid down by Hengeveld, bringing in data from a range of languages as well as theoretical insights inspired by adjoining frameworks. Of special interest are an account by Matthew Anstey of how current proposals arise from the history of FG and various chapters in which the model is brought much closer to an account of real-time language production, notably including the first ever detailed account of the workings of expression rules, by Dik Bakker and Anna Siewierska. The final chapter, also by Hengeveld, draws together the findings of the various chapters, culminating in an elaborated model that represents the most sophisticated statement of Functional Grammar currently available. The volume thus gives a coherent account of FG as a theory which combines formal explicitness with a broad account of language functions. J. Lachlan Mackenzie is Professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Mariá de los Ángeles Gómez González is Senior Lecturer at Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Spain. FROM THE CONTENTS: The Architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar KEES HENGEVELD Functional Grammar from its inception MATTHEW P. ANSTEY Behind the scenes: Cognition and Functional Discourse Grammar CARLOS INCHAURRALDE The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar JOHN CONNOLLY Focus of attention in discourse FRANCIS CORNISH The complementarity of the process and pattern interpretations of Functional Grammar MICHAEL FORTESCUE Functional Discourse Grammar and language production J. LACHLAN MACKENZIE Comment clauses, Functional Discourse Grammar and the grammar-discourse interface PETER HARDER Functional Grammar and the dynamics of Discourse MARÍA DE LOS ÁNGELES GÓMEZ-GONZÁLEZ The problem of subjective modality in the Functional Grammar model JEAN-CHRISTOPHE VERSTRAETE Remarks on layering in a cognitive-functional language production model JAN NUYTS Discourse structure, the Generalized Parallelism Hypothesis and the architecture of Functional Grammar AHMED MOUTAOUAKIL Towards a speaker model of Functional Grammar DIK BAKKER AND ANNA SIEWIERSKA Epilogue KEES HENGEVELD SIGN UP FOR OUR FREE ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER AT WWW.DEGRUYTER.DE/NEWSLETTER. To order, please contact SFG-Servicecenter-Fachverlage Postfach 4343 72774 Reutlingen, Germany Fax: +49 (0)7071 - 93 53 - 33 E-mail: deGruyter at s-f-g.com For USA, Canada and Mexico: Walter de Gruyter, Inc. 200 Saw Mill River Road Hawthorne, NY 10532, USA Fax: +1 (914) 747-1326 E-mail: cs at degruyterny.com Please visit our website for other publications by Mouton de Gruyter: http://www.mouton-publishers.com __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Diese E-Mail und ihre Dateianhaenge ist fuer den angegeben Empfaenger und/oder die Empfaengergruppe bestimmt. Wenn Sie diese E-Mail versehentlich trotzdem erhalten haben, setzen Sie sich bitte mit dem Absender oder Ihrem Systembetreuer in Verbindung. Diese Fusszeile bestaetigt ausserdem, dass die E-Mail auf zum Pruefzeitpunkt bekannte Viren ueberprueft wurde. This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the sender or the system manager. This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept for the presence of computer viruses. From rjfreeman at email.com Wed Jun 30 14:32:08 2004 From: rjfreeman at email.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2004 22:32:08 +0800 Subject: "loss of generality" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Wednesday 30 June 2004 00:29, Sydney Lamb wrote: > On Tue, 29 Jun 2004, Rob Freeman wrote: > > ... > > Yes, that could be where we are at cross-purposes. I'm talking about > > subjectivity from utterance to utterance not just from language to > > language, or even individual to individual. I believe that not only does > > each individual form a slightly different representation of linguistic > > structure, but that same individual forms a different representation of > > linguistic structure (to an extent limited by the functional contrasts > > required by the message only) from utterance to utterance. > > Why call this sujectivity? The value of a phoneme is construed subjectively depending on its context. > > That means you can explain non-linearity as a redefinition of each > > phoneme (e.g. voiced or un-voiced) by the same individual from context to > > context. > > No. That would be RETAINING linearity. The whole point of > rejecting a linearity requirement is to make it unnecessary to > do this. It would be a linear combination of elements which were subjective on context. As I've asked a couple of times, can you think of anything which might distinguish the two? > > > > ... > > > > What was the subsequent theoretical and practical impact of your > > > > observation that there was a need for "relaxing the linearity > > > > requirement" over combinations of phonemes? > > > > > > What happened was weird. Chomsky responded to my published > > > account (e.g. Prolegomena to a theory of phonology, Language > > > 1966) by saying that (approx quote) "Lamb's attempt at > > > refutation amounts to accepting my solution in toto with > > > a change of notation". (!!) > > > > Well, I don't find it too surprising... I guess Chomsky found non-linear > > rules to be quite as untenable as a rules which exhibited a "loss of > > generality". > > ...these are two quite different things. I kind of have to hold with Chomsky on this. I see non-linearity and "loss of generality" of rules as much the same thing: a statement that structural elements in language are not "consistent in combination". I don't mind because your conclusions were the same as mine: that the centrality of functional contrast should be retained, but that it should be regarded as an unavoidable consequence of this that phonemes can no longer be considered to be "consistent in combination". -Rob