image schemas and linguistic relativity

Alexander Gross language at sprynet.com
Fri Jun 11 23:52:03 UTC 2004


I was just about to post the following before Monica's latest message.  I
welcome her on-line statement distancing herself from support for the strong
version of image schema theory and also a similar private statement she sent
me a few weeks ago.  What follows is most definitely not aimed at her in any
way, though I fear it most definitely is aimed at proponents of strong image
schematics, is such there truly be.

------------------------------

Call me obtuse, but I am still having trouble accepting that:

"image schemas are pre-linguistic cognitive structures, arising from
universal aspects of how the human body interacts with its environment, both
physical and social, and existing
largely outside of conscious awareness. It follows that image schemas are
the same for everyone, regardless of the language a person speaks."

If this is even remotely true, then:

1. Why do we still find that the same image can be interpreted in two or
more different ways by different people even within the same culture?  To
say nothing of two people from different cultures?  A vast literature
spanning several decades of cognitive psychology can be invoked to prove
this, of which I have appended one brief excerpt below.

2.  Approaching this question from the opposite direction, why do we still
find that some of the simplest messages, i.e. traffic signs and road signs,
still take on remarkably different visual forms even in closely related
Western countries?  As the following websites make clear:

http://www.ugcs.caltech.edu/~jlin/signs/

http://www.intlsigns.com/world/traffic/2

http://www.travlang.com/signs/regulate.html

Here is a brief example of the first factor, dealing with a campaign to
prevent accidents in a South African mining area:

"The sixth poster was composed to illustrate the danger of standing beneath
a loaded crane sling.  The artist had drawn a box in a sling of four ropes
with one rope broken. Beneath was the figure of the worker with raised arms
petrified with horror, presumably as the box descended upon him.  The lower
half of the worker in the poster was not shown.  The artist had surrounded
the poster with a broad red oval border and had highlighted the man's face
with reddish brown.  This was unfortunate.  In the first place the box was
not seen as falling.   It was clear that three of the four ropes still held
it in place.  So the danger has to be seen elsewhere.  The colour red has
acquired a symbolic value for the black worker in South Africa.  In large
quantities it means fire.  In smaller amounts it signifies blood.  In the
case of this poster it was reported as fire.  The man was seen as being in a
fiery holocaust. This interpretation was heightened by the highlighting of
his features. The deciding factor was that the lower half of his body was
not visible.  It had obviously been consumed in the flames.  So the intended
message of the poster was lost due to misperceptions and misunderstandings
of custom and pictorial perception."

The source here is W. Hudson's "The Study of the Problem of Pictorial
Perception among Unacculturated Groups," first published in The
International Journal of Psychology, vol. 2 (1967), as reprinted in
"Cross-Cultural Studies," edited by D.R. Price-Williams, a 1969 book in the
series "Penguin modern psychology Readings."  This volume contains a fair
amount of comparable material and an impressive bibliography of related
books and papers based on observations from many different cultures around
the world, just in case the South African example is unacceptable to some
for political reasons.  The overall thesis of different interpretations
arising from the same visual stimulus has been proved and re-proved time and
time again.  I cannot see why this would be less true whether we call such a
stimulus an image, an image schema, a primitive, or an average.

The words "tests," "testing," "measuring," "comparability," "experiments,"
and "experimental" are frequently found in this work's over two hundred
listings, so it is fair to wonder if further "experimental approaches" are
required to prove the image schema notion of dubious merit. Granted, much of
this research springs from a racist era in comparing cultures, but does the
basic tenet--that two people are perfectly capable of interpreting the same
image quite differently, even if they come from the _same_ culture--truly
require any further proof?  It is also fair to wonder if the instigators of
this doctrine are prepared to assume responsability for the many lawsuits
arising from wrongful injuries and deaths that might occur if "universal"
image schemas were ever to be made the basis of a compulsory "universal"
design code for traffic signs and safety procedures imposed on all peoples,
nations, and cultures.

Have these seeming obstacles to universal image schemas been transcended in
some way I have not yet caught up with?  Will all pictorial symbols
henceforth be interpreted in exactly the same way by everyone everywhere?
And will all artists designing traffic signs henceforth come up with exactly
the same design for the meaning of each sign in every corner of the earth?
Or could we merely be dealing with some form of meme-mongering here?

very best to all!

alex


----- Original Message -----
From: "Monica Gonzalez-Marquez" <mg246 at cornell.edu>
To: <cogling at ucsd.edu>; <emcl-l at cornell.edu>; <funknet at mailman.rice.edu>
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2004 6:15 PM
Subject: [FUNKNET] image schemas and linguistic relativity

>
> Hello Everyone,
>
> I think a clarification of my position in this discussion is in
> order. I fear that the workshop announcement is being attributed be
> me as a position statement when in fact it is not. As the workshop
> announcement intimates, I do, in fact, believe that the strong
> versions of Image Schema Theory (with its highlighting of primitives)
> and of Linguistic Relativity (with its downplaying of primitives) are
> fundamentally at odds with one another. I feel that, much the same as
> the old nature/nurture debate, the evidence will show that the shape
> language takes for each individual speaker will result from how
> several different forces interact, and not from the isolated workings
> of one or the other. In terms of Image Schemas, for example, it is
> highly likely that some form of innate image-schematic primitives for
> representing events exist, but it is also highly likely that they
> should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience
> during development. This thinking is consistent with a view of
> embodiment in which no aspect of cognitive development occurs in
> isolation. If we believe this to be true of linguistic utterances,
> i.e. the end product of the language process, I don't see how it can
> be less true of the processes that are involved in the production of
> said utterances.
>
> That said, to my knowledge, nowhere near enough cross-linguistic,
> cross-cultural, or neurological empirical evidence has been collected
> to understand conclusively how image schemas and linguistic
> relativity impact language development. Cognitive Linguistics theory,
> as a theory, has shown its mettle. And like all good theories, it
> shows signs of holding up nicely to the scrutiny of the scientific
> method. Our workshop is intended to draw attention to a potential
> inconsistency so as to correct it with one of the soundest methods we
> know of.
>
> Monica



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