Relativity versus Reality

[Salinas17 at aol.com]

In a message dated 6/11/04 7:52:38 PM, language at sprynet.com writes:
<< If this is even remotely true, then:

1. Why do we still find that the same image can be interpreted in two or more
different ways by different people even within the same culture?...
2.  Approaching this question from the opposite direction, why do we still
find that some of the simplest messages, i.e. traffic signs and road signs,
still take on remarkably different visual forms even in closely related Western
countries?  Here is a brief example of the first factor, dealing with a campaign
to prevent accidents in a South African mining area:

'The sixth poster was composed to illustrate the danger of standing beneath a
loaded crane sling.  The artist had drawn a box in a sling of four ropes with
one rope broken... >>

I'm sorry, but it is very difficult to understand what traffic signs and
factory safety signs could possibly say about "pre-linguistic" perceptions or
images.  If this is supposed to represent "the strong versions of Image Schema
Theory (with its highlighting of primitives)", then that position looks very much
like a straw dog.  Clearly, making such connections goes way beyond the
original sense of perceptual primitives.

There is nothing basic or perceptually "primitive" about attempting to
control complex and culturally-laden behavior like automobile traffic or warehouse
safety with pictorial symbols instead of words.

Remember that the original idea was that such fundamentals as "spatial
relations terms" in different languages can be reduced to common pre-linguistic
perceptions.

Near and far, up and down, forward and backwards are words that are loaded
with cultural nuances.  But at a raw, fundamental level they match up perfectly
with physiology that produces parallax vision and depth perception.  And at
that very BASIC level, they should be found in all languages.  To prove
relativity in this venue, one would need to find a natural human language where a
"near" object and a "far" object are synonymous -- reflecting a perception in its
speakers that would be diagnosed in modern society as severely dysfunctional
(except perhaps among a small number of quantum physicists.)

And of course this has nothing to do with the symbols on stop signs.  Driving
an automobile involves complex behavior with huge layers of cultural
pre-conditions.  Walk into a room full of people and shout nothing but "stop" and you
will be considered strange.  Interpretation demands cultural context and lots
of it.  What is the consequence of not observing a stop sign?  Is there
something innate about expecting a letter from the MVA cancelling your license?
Does a deer crossing sign mean that there is an opportunity ahead for
nature-watching or to use your car to put some venison on the table?  The consequences
implied in such simple communications always need prior understandings.

Primitive schema -- being primitive and being essentially private perceptions
-- do not carry complex behavioral messages easily, except where cultural
context fills in that message.  That was probably one good reason for early
humans to take the next step and develop language.  (Any reasonable interpretation
of the data tells us the first function of human language as we know it was
carrying messages.)

A better place to look for the pre-linguistic "schema" that would form the
underbed of language would be, not in traffic signs, but in Botticelli.
Calculated shadows that fool us into thinking that a mere circle is actually a
three-dimensional orb -- even when we know better.  When we create the illusion of
depth in a painting, we are using "primitive schema" -- i.e., universal cues
that we all use to ascertain spatial relationships, time and motion.

To expect more than this basic kind of cognition from "primitive image
schema" contradicts the assumption being tested.  Universal perceptions are not
going to include the implication of what we should do about raw physical facts.
History and context tells us that and these are not universals.

If we don't start by understanding the connection between language and
perception at this very basic level -- in terms of the fundamental physical
contingencies of humans in time and space -- we must get confused about where the line
between universals and relatives should run, given the the fundamental
findings of perceptual research.

If "primitive image schema" makes any sense, it needs to refer to underlying,
pre-linguistic rules that not only constrained but also organized the
earliest development of language -- so that everyone back then had some already
common ground for communicating. To assume that such building blocks did not exist
is to assume that, one fine day, language dropped out of the sky.

Somehow the term "Universal Grammar" has come to signify a severe complexity
instead of a severe simplicity.  Yet when children first learn "grammar," what
they learn about are nouns (objects), verbs (actions or processes) and
adjectives (attributes).  Nouns, verbs and adjectives match up very well with
fundamental perceptual processes -- depth, motion, time and edge perception -- and
are all at work most of the time "unconsciously."

Has a natural language ever been discovered that lacks any of these three
elements? (I've seen, for example, claims that Algonquin could be spoken entirely
using adjectives, but have never seen any verification.)  So at least here
there is enough evidence of a Universal Grammar that contradicts any kind of
radical relativity.

There IS a real world out there that shaped our perceptions.  And therefore
must have shaped our language right from the start.

(Disregarding pre-linguistic perception I believe underlies an error in the
work of Berlin and Kay on linguistic relativity color.  The Homeric Greeks had
only two Basic Color Terms (and by the way apparently no word for "color" in
our sense).  Is this supposed to mean that in this "pre-linguistic" color
state, the Homeric Greeks could not sense and therefore were not "cognizant" of the
difference between the wavelengths generated by a blue bird versus those of
red bird -- colors they did not have words for?  Was it only language that
later created the difference between them?  A look at late bronze age and archaic
period art will quickly confirm that these Greeks were quite adroit at
discriminating and manipulating pigments.  They were skillfully managing color
perceptions well before they gave "color" (as a noun) an abstract status in their
language.  The fact that they did not use words reconstructable by the
comparative method to some universal color word is of no practical consequence.)

If such ideas as primitives are overblown, it will be quite easy to overlook
what they represent and how they fit into the bigger picture.

In a message dated 6/11/04 6:15:58 PM, mg246 at cornell.edu writes:
<<...much the same as the old nature/nurture debate,... In terms of Image
Schemas, for example, it is highly likely that some form of innate
image-schematic primitives for representing events exist, but it is also highly likely that
they should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience
during development.  >>

A contrary position is that these universal "primitive" elements of
perception are similar to the letters of an alphabet.  They are essential to writing
words and sentences and producing libraries.  But by themselves these
perceptions represent only the universal basics in terms of overall human experience.
Whether they are "innate" or universally learned during early development is a
completely different question.

Regards,
Steve Long