Relativity versus Reality

[Alexander Gross]

Steve, your assertions about both Homeric colors and Botticelli are
disputable, and I  certainly would have disputed them in detail back when I
started off majoring in Greek 50 years ago and during the four years I spent
in Florence during the 50s & 60s.  But I'll hold off for now, since there
are larger issues afoot.

I really think you're trying to pull far too much material together with far
too thin a thread.  And I'm a bit surprised at you, since i see you are a
fan, as am i, of the late Larry Trask, who not only trashed geneticists
writing about language but Chomsky writing about linguistics.

Can't you see that this whole "image schemas" folderol is simply the latest
installment in that infamous farrago including such other barbarisms as
poverty of stimulus, deep structure, and innate carburetors?  Just a few
years ago medical practitioners were forced to admit that there has never
been persuasive evidence for vast numbers of supposedly standard clinical
procedures and finally invented the field of "evidence based medicine."
Isn't it overdue for linguists to follow their lead with their own school of
"evidence based linguistics?"  Whenever they get around to doing so, they
will quickly discover there's no shortage of material to throw out.

Face it, over recent decades the practitioners of linguistics have resembled
not so much cautious scientists as so many fundamentalist zealots: mulling
mullahs, contentious cabalistic rabbis, bristling Mormon elders, desperately
calling forth miracles on the basis of their own home-grown magical
formulas, hoping that some budding hagiographer would immortalize them for
their soul-searching devotion, if not a Joseph Smith then at least a Randy
Allen Harris.

Let's take a closer look at these so-called "image schemas."  Precisely why
have they been called into being, how many of them supposedly exist, how do
we know that they are the only ones, how can we be certain of their
existence during the "pre-linguistic" period, and what on earth is the
nature of the problem their alleged existence is alleged to solve?  If we do
take a closer look, I think we'll discover image schematics is one of the
sloppier ideas to emerge from recent linguistics--amd that's already saying
a lot.

Yes, I'm aware of Lakoff, Calvin, Bickerton, et al., but isn't the whole
thrust of this idea simply another attempt to reject the sheer multiplicity
of language by once again favoring a simple-minded theory to explain that
multiplicity?  And precisely what would be gained if it were proved tomorrow
that "image schemas" do indeed play a major role in the creation of all
languages?  What would be either the theoretical or practical spin-offs of
such a conclusion (not that this is anywhere near actually being reached)?

I'm also wondering why this pre-conference workshop is being presented as
some sort of momentous conflict between truly clashing and equally powerful
paradigms, something like:

In the blue corner wearing blue trunks the reigning, somewhat weary, but
still (despite decades of baseless rumors) Undefeated Champion, let's hear
it for LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY!!!

And in the red corner wearing red trunks his far younger and sleeker
Challenger, the dashing MIT Consortium Champion and winner by knockout of
countless peer review encounters, will everybody please welcome IMAGE
SCHEMAS!!!

Sorry, I just don't buy it.  In my opinion even the weakest possible
formulation of Linguistic Relativity can beat even the strongest possible
formulation of Image Schemas by a first-round knockout.

Besides which, if these "primitives" were as powerful as claimed, one would
still expect to find them playing a far more prominent and unifying role in
the international design of trafffic signs and all kinds of notices than is
actually the case. Why does the literature make no reference to speeding-up
schemas, slowing down schemas, collision course schemas, pain avoidance
schemas, all of which were appropriate long before modern motor cars (or
even human beings) came along?

Come to think of it, since these schemas are supposedly to be found in
living organisms, why is so little attention paid to physical, biological,
and medical processes: why do we find no catching one's breath or finding
one's balance schema, much less thirst, hunger, fatigue, pain, or need for
excretion schemas?  And I'd be surprised if there weren't also a schema
dealing with sex and mating.

Wouldn't such physical, biological primitives be crucially necessary to
create the first linguistic utterances, which in their modest way were also
related to the way so many use autos today to drive down to the mall, since
they are likely to have included expressions of swift motion, colliding,
catching, eating, wearing, voicing satisfaction, mating, exulting, etc.?

Why do we find only conceptual formulations among these image schemas?  Does
anyone here suppose that the earliest language users spoke in balanced
Boolean propositions  according to the dictates of a rather precious theory
formulated thousands or millions of years later?

Precisely who chooses which pre-linguistic behavior patterns constitute
image schemas?  And why should we believe them?

Sure, the containment schema is universal as hell, as Ron Chen has pointed
out in a private message.  But not just among humans.  Even lady kangaroos
and squirrels of all sexes have it to account for the babies in their
pouches and the acorns stored in their cheeks.  And even a woodchuck has a
path and end-of-path schema amid its underground tunnels and probably a
cycle schema as well.  And hey, who are we to deny countless quintillions of
paramecia a containment schema for their contractile and food vacuoles?
Though last time I looked, kangaroos, squirrels, woodchucks, and paramecia
weren't busy creating what we call language (though even our own creation of
language may turn out to have been less spectacular than some imagine).

So what we're seeing in my opinion is merely yet another replay, using
slightly different terms, of the ancient Chomskyans-Bash-the-Whorfians
campaign.  Come to think of it, even calling this movement "linguistic
relativity" is most recently a form of propagandistic bashing indulged in by
Pinker.  The correct and more respectful name for this school that refuses
to die is of course the Whorf or Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, with roots in
Herder & Humboldt.

In conclusion, can't the field of linguistics find some new subjects to
study and some new perspectives to study them from?

Over time, on appropriate occasions, and with all due respect for my
colleagues, I'll be happy to suggest a few of these.

With very best wishes to all!

alex

PS--Oh well, just a wee bit about your misinterpetation of Botticellian
"universal" techniques;

> A better place to look for the pre-linguistic "schema" that would form the
> underbed of language would be, not in traffic signs, but in Botticelli.
> Calculated shadows that fool us into thinking that a mere circle is
actually a
> three-dimensional orb -- even when we know better.  When we create the
illusion of
> depth in a painting, we are using "primitive schema" -- i.e., universal
cues
> that we all use to ascertain spatial relationships, time and motion.

You're obviously not too well grounded in art history, or you would be
acquainted with the well-known case of the Dowager Empress of China
rejecting western-style portraits of her because the artists used similar
techniques, which she interpreted simply as blotches on her face making her
look ugly--and almost all Chinese of that time would have agreed with her.
Not very universal, is it?  You really ought to look up that 1969 Penguin
modern psschology Readings book I mentioned.

----- Original Message -----
From: <Salinas17 at aol.com>
To: <FUNKNET at LISTSERV.RICEof.EDU>
Sent: Monday, June 14, 2004 10:42 AM
Subject: [FUNKNET] Relativity versus Reality


> In a message dated 6/11/04 7:52:38 PM, language at sprynet.com writes:
> << If this is even remotely true, then:
>
> 1. Why do we still find that the same image can be interpreted in two or
more
> different ways by different people even within the same culture?...
> 2.  Approaching this question from the opposite direction, why do we still
> find that some of the simplest messages, i.e. traffic signs and road
signs,
> still take on remarkably different visual forms even in closely related
Western
> countries?  Here is a brief example of the first factor, dealing with a
campaign
> to prevent accidents in a South African mining area:
>
> 'The sixth poster was composed to illustrate the danger of standing
beneath a
> loaded crane sling.  The artist had drawn a box in a sling of four ropes
with
> one rope broken... >>
>
> I'm sorry, but it is very difficult to understand what traffic signs and
> factory safety signs could possibly say about "pre-linguistic" perceptions
or
> images.  If this is supposed to represent "the strong versions of Image
Schema
> Theory (with its highlighting of primitives)", then that position looks
very much
> like a straw dog.  Clearly, making such connections goes way beyond the
> original sense of perceptual primitives.
>
> There is nothing basic or perceptually "primitive" about attempting to
> control complex and culturally-laden behavior like automobile traffic or
warehouse
> safety with pictorial symbols instead of words.
>
> Remember that the original idea was that such fundamentals as "spatial
> relations terms" in different languages can be reduced to common
pre-linguistic
> perceptions.
>
> Near and far, up and down, forward and backwards are words that are loaded
> with cultural nuances.  But at a raw, fundamental level they match up
perfectly
> with physiology that produces parallax vision and depth perception.  And
at
> that very BASIC level, they should be found in all languages.  To prove
> relativity in this venue, one would need to find a natural human language
where a
> "near" object and a "far" object are synonymous -- reflecting a perception
in its
> speakers that would be diagnosed in modern society as severely
dysfunctional
> (except perhaps among a small number of quantum physicists.)
>
> And of course this has nothing to do with the symbols on stop signs.
Driving
> an automobile involves complex behavior with huge layers of cultural
> pre-conditions.  Walk into a room full of people and shout nothing but
"stop" and you
> will be considered strange.  Interpretation demands cultural context and
lots
> of it.  What is the consequence of not observing a stop sign?  Is there
> something innate about expecting a letter from the MVA cancelling your
license?
> Does a deer crossing sign mean that there is an opportunity ahead for
> nature-watching or to use your car to put some venison on the table?  The
consequences
> implied in such simple communications always need prior understandings.
>
> Primitive schema -- being primitive and being essentially private
perceptions
> -- do not carry complex behavioral messages easily, except where cultural
> context fills in that message.  That was probably one good reason for
early
> humans to take the next step and develop language.  (Any reasonable
interpretation
> of the data tells us the first function of human language as we know it
was
> carrying messages.)
>
> A better place to look for the pre-linguistic "schema" that would form the
> underbed of language would be, not in traffic signs, but in Botticelli.
> Calculated shadows that fool us into thinking that a mere circle is
actually a
> three-dimensional orb -- even when we know better.  When we create the
illusion of
> depth in a painting, we are using "primitive schema" -- i.e., universal
cues
> that we all use to ascertain spatial relationships, time and motion.
>
> To expect more than this basic kind of cognition from "primitive image
> schema" contradicts the assumption being tested.  Universal perceptions
are not
> going to include the implication of what we should do about raw physical
facts.
> History and context tells us that and these are not universals.
>
> If we don't start by understanding the connection between language and
> perception at this very basic level -- in terms of the fundamental
physical
> contingencies of humans in time and space -- we must get confused about
where the line
> between universals and relatives should run, given the the fundamental
> findings of perceptual research.
>
> If "primitive image schema" makes any sense, it needs to refer to
underlying,
> pre-linguistic rules that not only constrained but also organized the
> earliest development of language -- so that everyone back then had some
already
> common ground for communicating. To assume that such building blocks did
not exist
> is to assume that, one fine day, language dropped out of the sky.
>
> Somehow the term "Universal Grammar" has come to signify a severe
complexity
> instead of a severe simplicity.  Yet when children first learn "grammar,"
what
> they learn about are nouns (objects), verbs (actions or processes) and
> adjectives (attributes).  Nouns, verbs and adjectives match up very well
with
> fundamental perceptual processes -- depth, motion, time and edge
perception -- and
> are all at work most of the time "unconsciously."
>
> Has a natural language ever been discovered that lacks any of these three
> elements? (I've seen, for example, claims that Algonquin could be spoken
entirely
> using adjectives, but have never seen any verification.)  So at least here
> there is enough evidence of a Universal Grammar that contradicts any kind
of
> radical relativity.
>
> There IS a real world out there that shaped our perceptions.  And
therefore
> must have shaped our language right from the start.
>
> (Disregarding pre-linguistic perception I believe underlies an error in
the
> work of Berlin and Kay on linguistic relativity color.  The Homeric Greeks
had
> only two Basic Color Terms (and by the way apparently no word for "color"
in
> our sense).  Is this supposed to mean that in this "pre-linguistic" color

> state, the Homeric Greeks could not sense and therefore were not
"cognizant" of the
> difference between the wavelengths generated by a blue bird versus those
of
> red bird -- colors they did not have words for?  Was it only language that
> later created the difference between them?  A look at late bronze age and
archaic
> period art will quickly confirm that these Greeks were quite adroit at
> discriminating and manipulating pigments.  They were skillfully managing
color
> perceptions well before they gave "color" (as a noun) an abstract status
in their
> language.  The fact that they did not use words reconstructable by the
> comparative method to some universal color word is of no practical
consequence.)
>
> If such ideas as primitives are overblown, it will be quite easy to
overlook
> what they represent and how they fit into the bigger picture.
>
> In a message dated 6/11/04 6:15:58 PM, mg246 at cornell.edu writes:
> <<...much the same as the old nature/nurture debate,... In terms of Image
> Schemas, for example, it is highly likely that some form of innate
> image-schematic primitives for representing events exist, but it is also
highly likely that
> they should be substantially molded by linguistic and cultural experience
> during development.  >>
>
> A contrary position is that these universal "primitive" elements of
> perception are similar to the letters of an alphabet.  They are essential
to writing
> words and sentences and producing libraries.  But by themselves these
> perceptions represent only the universal basics in terms of overall human
experience.
> Whether they are "innate" or universally learned during early development
is a
> completely different question.
>
> Regards,
> Steve Long