From nh32 at soas.ac.uk  Thu Jun  2 08:45:03 2005
From: nh32 at soas.ac.uk (Najma Hussain)
Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2005 09:45:03 +0100
Subject: ELDP Grants Application Announcement
Message-ID: <THU.2.JUN.2005.094503.0100.NH32@SOAS.AC.UK>

The Endangered Languages Documentation Programme is a component of the
Hans Rausing Endangered Languages Project, administered by the School of
Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. It offers up
to £1million in grants each year for the documentation of endangered
languages in any location around the world. There are two main types of
grants:
    
1. Large grants - major documentation projects and post-doctoral
fellowships. Closing date 5th August 2005.
    
2. Small grants - pilot projects, PhD studentships, and fieldtrips.
Closing date 9th January 2006.
    
For further information and application forms visit
www.hrelp.org/grants/

We apologise if you have received this announcement multiple times


From nrude at Ballangrud.com  Mon Jun  6 15:32:10 2005
From: nrude at Ballangrud.com (Noel Rude)
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 08:32:10 -0700
Subject: Evolution
Message-ID: <MON.6.JUN.2005.083210.0700.NRUDE@BALLANGRUD.COM>

Howdy folks!

Steve Long makes some good points that no one has seconded--so here's my two
bits.  Though we smuggle in teleology and function via natural selection, we
should not forget that epistemological materialism demands that every last
miniscule step of the way from non-life to you and me is complete and utter
and total accident.  It's serendipity all the way.  Before any innovation
can be selected it's got to be there, and the choice can only be provided by
chance.  Selection cannot ultimately be responsible for that which is
selected.

Also I suggest we not forget that mathematical realism is the very
foundation of physics.  Biology is by nature more an empirical
investigation, a cataloguing from observation and dissection and the
electron microscope, and therefore biologists may find it hard to understand
the role of mathematics in physics.  Wild notions of cognitive adaptation
and metaphoric extension do not subtract from the fact that the contingent
laws of nature are written in the necessary language of mathematics.

Physicists find it profitable to study other possible worlds where the laws
of physics vary, all under the assumption that logic/math does not vary.
When you find physicists studying other possible worlds with a differently
evolved multicultural math, then you will know that they have acceded to
this rejection of mathematical realism and that postmodernism has finally
penetrated their domain.

Funknet cautions against extremism--be it rationalist or empircist.  Surely
there must be room in our field for both pragmatics and Plato.

Noel


----- Original Message -----
From: <Salinas17 at aol.com>
To: <FUNKNET at mailman.rice.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 4:38 PM
Subject: [FUNKNET] Evolution


In a message dated 5/31/05 5:31:39 PM, tgivon at uoregon.edu writes:
<< With all due respect, taking evolution, especially of social species, to
be a matter of purely accidents (random mutations) is not the most
sophisticated approach to evolution,... >>

Nevertheless, it is the only defensible model of natural selection and
biological evolution.  Up until humans are able to vary biological traits by
directly manipulating genetic material, the only source of biological
variation or
diversity is random mutation.  Bio-geneticists may accelerate or prune
variation, but the basic mechanism remains random mutation.

The structure of social animals may select "social traits" instead of
solitary ones.  But that structure is simply a piece of the selecting
environment.
The grist for the mill remains random mutation.

<<The late great Ernst Mayr said is best: "(adaptive) behavior is the
pace-maker of evolution". And adaptive behavior, a constant factor in
selection, is
not random, but rather purposive, thus in a clear way 'intentional' (if
mostly
non-conscious). There is a wonderful recent book by Boyd & Richerson on
cultural
evolution "Not by genes alone"... >>

No question here -- although Dawkins and Pinker paint a different picture.
But adaptive behavior is most certainly never the initial source of biology
diversity.  Genes are replicators.  If they had their way, we would all
still be
amoebas.  The basic source of variance in biological evolution is always
random mutation -- against the conservatism of the gene.  Viable adaptive
behavior
may advance the chance of survival where adaptive morphology would not
(i.e.,
learning might overcome a physical disadvantage.)  But that's down the line
in
the process.

The basic source of biological diversity is mutation.  What follows --
selection -- is a different story.

<<This 'continuum' position is the most standard one in EP today--that
culture is an extension of biological evolution, that it is just as adaptive
(tho
obviouly more complex), and that it is much older than humanity. By the same
token, biology didn't cease with human culture.>>

And some of us feel that is precisely what is severely wrong with
"evolutionary psychology."  Culture does NOT evolve in the same manner as
biological
species do.  Randomness gives way to intentionality.  The ruthlessness of
biological evolution is a model of enormous waste and mindless expansion of
forms.
Mayr didn't go far enough.  In fact, intentionality and learning are
adaptive in
a way is that is very different from random mutation and subsequent
adaptation or failure.

And -- going a step further -- human culture and language -- the ability to
store huge amounts of information over generations without storing it in
DNA --
broke the continuum just as sexuality (the mixing of two genotypes) broke
the
singular replication continuum in the passing of genetic information from
one
generation to the next.  There have been revolutions in evolution.

"Evolutionary psychology" is just plain using the wrong model.  Cultural
"evolution" is not Darwinian.  It is Lamarckian -- only Lamarck was applying
it to
the wrong set of data.  There are hints that bees and ants can pass on small
amounts of learned information from generation to generation.  There is
definite indication of this among non-human mammals.  But the quantitively
greater
information-load-carrying of human language and culture across generations
has
created something qualitatively different.  Human culture is
super-biological.

Regards,
Steve Long


From mark at polymathix.com  Mon Jun  6 16:01:58 2005
From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line)
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 11:01:58 -0500
Subject: Evolution
In-Reply-To: <002401c56aac$e85c2800$4f09a8c0@lang01>
Message-ID: <MON.6.JUN.2005.110158.0500.MARK@POLYMATHIX.COM>

Noel Rude said:
>
> Also I suggest we not forget that mathematical realism is the very
> foundation of physics.

Some philosophers of science would agree with you, and some (particularly
Bas van Fraassen) would disagree with you. I think most working physicists
would be too busy to care one way or the other, but would tend towards
some kind of vague notion of realism.

In any event, it's not uncontroversial to state that mathematical realism
is the very foundation of physics: what the foundation of physics is
remains a subject of debate (long predating postmodernism), and of course
it won't be resolved here.


> Biology is by nature more an empirical investigation, a cataloguing from
> observation and dissection and the electron microscope, and therefore
> biologists may find it hard to understand the role of mathematics in
> physics.

If I thought that physics enjoyed mathematical purity and Cartesian
vacuity in a way that biology does not, I'd say that physics was seriously
on the wrong track.


> Wild notions of cognitive adaptation and metaphoric extension do not
> subtract from the fact that the contingent laws of nature are written in
> the necessary language of mathematics.

This presupposes that there are laws of nature, contingent or otherwise.
That's another subject of debate (also long predating postmodernism) that
won't be resolved here.


> When you find physicists studying other possible worlds with a
> differently evolved multicultural math, then you will know that they have
> acceded to this rejection of mathematical realism and that postmodernism
> has finally penetrated their domain.

I don't think the question is between mathematical realism and
postmodernism. It's between realism and non-realism. The conduct and
progress of science do not necessitate any realist postulates, so it's
more rational to take a non-realist position rather than postulating
wildly about how Ultimate Truth Hath Been Calculated.

(And before anybody asks: I can't state or explain the non-realist
position any better than van Fraassen, so I'd rather defer to his writings
than engage in a mostly off-topic discussion here. I should just note that
nobody would be tempted to consider van Fraassen a postmodernist, or not a
mathematician.)


-- Mark

Mark P. Line
Polymathix
San Antonio, TX


From Salinas17 at aol.com  Mon Jun  6 19:51:57 2005
From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 15:51:57 EDT
Subject: Evolution (2)
Message-ID: <MON.6.JUN.2005.155157.EDT.>

In a message dated 6/6/05 12:02:27 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes:
<< If I thought that physics enjoyed mathematical purity and Cartesian
vacuity in a way that biology does not, I'd say that physics was seriously on the
wrong track. >>

Quick note -- I wouldn't worry too much about putting physics back on the
"right track."  That particular discipline doesn't seem particularly in need of
any desperate self-correction -- at least, as far as predictive power goes, it
seems to be very powerful.

What's very important to remember here is that science is not -- as a matter
of methodology -- out to "prove" mathematical realism.  What it is is an
assumption -- an umbrella hypothesis about the way the world works.  The
methodological imperative is not realism but proof.  If the day after tomorrow, the
assumption of realism collapses, then scientific methodology would be the first
one to know it.

Regarding the evolution of language, the same analysis looks in a mirror
right back at itself.  That form of language we call mathematics (or science) did
not take the shape it has arbitrarily.  It was the contingencies of our world
with us in it that shaped it.  If the rules were different, language would be
different, our brains would be different and we would be different.  This does
not mean that these laws rule everywhere and always.  But it does mean that
they are all we have at present to go by.

Regards,
Steve Long


From mark at polymathix.com  Mon Jun  6 20:31:46 2005
From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line)
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 15:31:46 -0500
Subject: Evolution (2)
In-Reply-To: <b7.59643799.2fd6035d@aol.com>
Message-ID: <MON.6.JUN.2005.153146.0500.MARK@POLYMATHIX.COM>

Salinas17 at aol.com said:
> In a message dated 6/6/05 12:02:27 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes:
> << If I thought that physics enjoyed mathematical purity and Cartesian
> vacuity in a way that biology does not, I'd say that physics was
> seriously on the wrong track. >>
>
> Quick note -- I wouldn't worry too much about putting physics back on the
> "right track."  That particular discipline doesn't seem particularly in
> need of any desperate self-correction -- at least, as far as predictive
> power goes, it seems to be very powerful.

Exactly. That's why I expressed myself contrafactually.


> What's very important to remember here is that science is not -- as a
> matter of methodology -- out to "prove" mathematical realism.  What it is
> is an assumption -- an umbrella hypothesis about the way the world works.

It's not an hypothesis unless it can be disproved. That's why I call it a
postulate and can entertain the notion that it's unnecessary.


> The methodological imperative is not realism but proof.  If the day after
> tomorrow, the assumption of realism collapses, then scientific
> methodology would be the first one to know it.

I don't think the assumption of realism can collapse, because I don't
think it can be disproved. It's a postulate that can be maintained or not,
neither more nor less natural -- and therefore neither more nor less
supernatural -- than any other postulate. Assumptions of realism belong in
metaphysics (along with scriptural mandates and creation myths), not in
physics.

The bottom line is that scientific results don't have to be true, under
any reasonable definition of 'true'. They only have to be useful. Any
amount of perfectly useful science can be done without maintaining any
realist postulates.


-- Mark

Mark P. Line
Polymathix
San Antonio, TX


From kibrik at comtv.ru  Wed Jun  8 20:07:24 2005
From: kibrik at comtv.ru (Andrej Kibrik)
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2005 00:07:24 +0400
Subject: conference announcement
Message-ID: <THU.9.JUN.2005.000724.0400.KIBRIK@COMTV.RU>

SECOND BIENNIAL RUSSIAN CONFERENCE ON COGNITIVE SCIENCE

June 9-13, 2006, St. Petersburg

First Call for Papers
The Russian Association for Cognitive Studies invites submissions for the 2nd Bi-Annual Russian Conference on Cognitive Science to be held on 9-13 June, 2006, in St. Petersburg. Our goal in organizing the conference is to continue the multidisciplinary dialog started  in  Kazan  in 2004 during the 1st Russian Conference on Cognitive Science. Topics of interest include cognition and its evolution, intellect, thinking, perception, consciousness, knowledge representation and acquisition, language as a means of cognition and communication, brain mechanisms of cognition, emotion and higher forms of behavior. Psychologists, linguists, neuroscientists, specialists in artificial intelligence and neuroinformatics, computer scientists, philosophers, anthropologists, as well as other researchers interested in interdisciplinary research, are invited to submit abstracts for oral and poster presentations. 

The working languages of the conference will be Russian and English. The conference program will include overview lectures by leading experts in cognitive science, round tables, oral papers, posters, and a special session for students and junior researchers. The invited speakers are Natalya Behtereva, Riitta Hari, Ray Jackendoff, Ronald W. Langacker, Dan Slobin, Vladimir Zinchenko and others.

 

SUBMISSIONS

 

DEADLINE: October 15, 2005

            

There are two categories for submission: 

PAPERS (20- or 30-minute spoken presentations) and POSTERS. 

Novel research papers are invited on any topic related to cognition. Submitted abstracts should be in Russian or English and no longer than 2 pages (single-spaced, Times New Roman, 12 type size), including illustrations and references. They will be evaluated through peer review with respect to several criteria, including originality, quality, and significance of research, relevance to a broad audience of cognitive science researchers, and clarity of presentation. One author cannot participate in more than two submitted papers (only once as a first author).

            Papers accepted for oral presentation will be presented at the conference as scheduled talks. Papers accepted for poster presentation will be presented at a poster session at the conference. All papers may present results from completed but original unpublished research as well as report on current research with an emphasis on novel approaches, methods, ideas, and perspectives.

            

ADDRESS FOR ELECTRONIC SUBMISSIONS:

cogsci06 at cs.msu.su 

 

FORMAT: MS Word file attached to an e-mail message. At the beginning of an abstract please indicate the following information:

  a.. the title of the paper
  b.. the author(s) information, including:
    a.. full name
    b.. affiliation
    c.. degree or educational status (undergraduate student, graduate student, Ph.D., etc.)
    d.. postal address
    e.. phone number
    f.. e-mail address
  c.. 5 to 7 keywords
 

Ensuring that each submission received solid reviews takes considerable time, and the Program Committee will inform the authors of its decisions on the acceptance by January 15, 2006. Abstracts of the papers accepted for publication will be published by the beginning of the conference. Authors of top-rated conference papers will be invited to prepare expanded versions of their papers for publication in a special volume.

 

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 

CHAIR:

Boris M. Velichkovsky (Dresden University of Technology and Moscow State University; applied cognitive research). 

CO-CHAIRS: 

Tatiana V. Chernigovskaya (St.-Petersburg State University; linguistics and neurobiology);

Yury I. Alexandrov (Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences; psychophysiology, neurosciences). 

SECRETARY: 

Denis N. Akhapkin (Institute of Linguistic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; linguistics).

 

CHAIR OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE: 

Tatiana V. Chernigovskaya (St.-Petersburg State University; linguistics and neurobiology). 

 

Additional information on the conference is available at  the web site of the Association for Cognitive Studies www.cogsci.ru/cogsci06/firstcallen.htm or by e-mail at: cogsci06 at cs.msu.su    


From twood at uwc.ac.za  Fri Jun 10 12:16:31 2005
From: twood at uwc.ac.za (Tahir Wood)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 14:16:31 +0200
Subject: Lakoff critique
Message-ID: <FRI.10.JUN.2005.141631.0200.TWOOD@UWC.AC.ZA>

The following essay is devoted to a short piece that Lakoff wrote around
the turn of the present year

Were the brief article that George Lakoff published in The Nation
(December 6, 2004) not so insidiously dangerous, it might be thought to
have met the highest standards of political farce and parody. That is
the way I would have taken it were I not simultaneously involved in
reading some of Lakoff's other panegyrics to the great "democratic",
"progressive" American citizenry, who, we are told, in the article cited
above, initially, "came together in this election, voted for Kerry and
rejected the Bush agenda".

Full:
http://www.counterpunch.org/lichtman05282005.html


From tgivon at uoregon.edu  Fri Jun 10 12:55:17 2005
From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 05:55:17 -0700
Subject: Lakoff critique
Message-ID: <FRI.10.JUN.2005.055517.0700.TGIVON@UOREGON.EDU>

Dear FUNK people,

With all due respect to Tahir, whose view I may even share, I would like to
suggest that FUNKNET be kept free of political discussion. If you need to
get at George (I have nothing against that, in principle), please do it in a
political forum. FUNKNET has, from the start, been a strictly professional
forum. Let's keep it this way.  Peace,

Tom Givon


========================

Tahir Wood wrote:

> The following essay is devoted to a short piece that Lakoff wrote around
> the turn of the present year
>
> Were the brief article that George Lakoff published in The Nation
> (December 6, 2004) not so insidiously dangerous, it might be thought to
> have met the highest standards of political farce and parody. That is
> the way I would have taken it were I not simultaneously involved in
> reading some of Lakoff's other panegyrics to the great "democratic",
> "progressive" American citizenry, who, we are told, in the article cited
> above, initially, "came together in this election, voted for Kerry and
> rejected the Bush agenda".
>
> Full:
> http://www.counterpunch.org/lichtman05282005.html


From twood at uwc.ac.za  Fri Jun 10 12:51:58 2005
From: twood at uwc.ac.za (Tahir Wood)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 14:51:58 +0200
Subject: Lakoff critique
Message-ID: <FRI.10.JUN.2005.145158.0200.TWOOD@UWC.AC.ZA>

>>> Tom Givon <tgivon at uoregon.edu> 6/10/2005 2:55:17 PM >>>

Dear FUNK people,

With all due respect to Tahir, whose view I may even share, I would
like to
suggest that FUNKNET be kept free of political discussion. If you need
to
get at George (I have nothing against that, in principle), please do it
in a
political forum. FUNKNET has, from the start, been a strictly
professional
forum. Let's keep it this way.  Peace,

Tom Givon

Sure, no problem. I just thought it might be of some interest. The
article does raise for me certain issues of cognition alongside the
political ones, but whatever ...
Tahir


From tgivon at uoregon.edu  Fri Jun 10 13:34:32 2005
From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 06:34:32 -0700
Subject: IN MEMORIAM:   Tom Shopen
Message-ID: <FRI.10.JUN.2005.063432.0700.TGIVON@UOREGON.EDU>

IN MEMORIAM:     TIM SHOPEN (1935-2005)


It is with great sadness that I report the passing of Tim Shopen, emeritus
professor of linguistics at Australian National Universitry (Canberra), June
8, 2005, after a long fight with cancer. Tim was a charter member of our
functionalist community, with many contribution, best known as editor of
several seminal collections on typology, socio-linguistics and language
preservation.

Tim and I went to grad school together at UCLA in the late 1960s, both of us
at the time as Africanists (sharing  Schachter as our dissertation
supervisor). I met Tim at Peter Ladofoged's phonetics-lab basement, where he
helped me launch my first experimental project in linguistics. And ex-PCV,
Tim was at the time a West Africa specialist, a well-supported area that
secured him his first two appointments, at Stanford and then Indiana. A
restless soul, Tim kept moving on, often in disappointment with the
prevailing academic order, eventually coming to roost at ANU. Every visit
there, beginning with 1976, became a tgreat reat because of Tim's presence
there.

Tim was a rare idealist, un homme vraiment engagE and a caring friend.
Everything he did, he put his heart and soul in it, often putting the rest
of us  to shame, leaving usfar behind in his furiuous pace. He was the most
relentless, exacting editor I had ever laboured under, often to my chagfrin
by always to my ultimate benefit.

Tim was an accomplished, enthusiastic musician, a banjo player and singer,
deeply into both American and Irish traditional music. I owe him a lifetime
of pleasure for having prevailed on me to take up the fiddle in 1976.
Playing on his radio program in Canberra in 1985, and with his Irish band
during the christening of his twin boys, will remain cherrished high points
of my life.

Our community has lost a faithful colleague and a loyal friend.

Requiescat in pace.

                        Tom Givon


From hopper at cmu.edu  Fri Jun 10 13:34:17 2005
From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 09:34:17 -0400
Subject: Lakoff critique
In-Reply-To: <s2a9a92b.090@Services-02.uwc.ac.za>
Message-ID: <FRI.10.JUN.2005.093417.0400.HOPPER@CMU.EDU>

Thanks, Tahir, for bringing this article to our attention. Richard Lichtman raises significant questions about Lakoff's approach to metaphor and cognition that seem to me to be quite within the bounds of discussion in FUNKnet. Lakoff himself certainly understands his political activities to be driven by language and linguistics.

The fact is that once we open up the study of language to 'functions', any attempt to impose limits according to some private definition of what is and what is not linguistic in nature is certain to be arbitrary (e.g., no one objected to the discussion of evolution over FUNKnet in recent weeks or 'suggested' that it be moved to a biological site).

I hope, Tahir, that you will continue to note relevant contributions from the intellectual community for us, and not be intimidated by 'suggestions' as to what does and does not fall within our purview. Let's keep FUNKnet open for input from any source that our members perceive as relevant.

Paul


>>>> Tom Givon <tgivon at uoregon.edu> 6/10/2005 2:55:17 PM >>>
>
> Dear FUNK people,
>
> With all due respect to Tahir, whose view I may even share, I would like
> to suggest that FUNKNET be kept free of political discussion. If you need
> to get at George (I have nothing against that, in principle), please do it
>  in a political forum. FUNKNET has, from the start, been a strictly
> professional forum. Let's keep it this way.  Peace,
>
> Tom Givon
>
> Sure, no problem. I just thought it might be of some interest. The article
> does raise for me certain issues of cognition alongside the political
> ones, but whatever ... Tahir
>
>


--
Paul J. Hopper
Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of the Humanities
Department of English
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15232, USA
Tel. 412-683-1109
Fax 412-268-7989


From hopper at cmu.edu  Sat Jun 11 00:29:04 2005
From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper)
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 20:29:04 -0400
Subject: [Fwd: Re: [FUNKNET] Lakoff critique]
Message-ID: <FRI.10.JUN.2005.202904.0400.HOPPER@CMU.EDU>

I'm forwarding this comment to FUNKNET readers because Ed Blansitt seems to have omitted the FUNKNET address.

I wonder if either Ed or Tom actually bothered to read the Richard Lichtman article that Tahir Wood drew our attention to, or whether you just picked up on the body of his message (which quoted the opening paragraph of Lichtman's essay, by the way--it was not a political comment by Tahir!) and categorised it off the cuff as +political, -linguistic, and therefore beyond the pale.

If you'd read the article, you'd have found a very pertinent comment on Lakoff's approach to metaphor and on cognitive linguistics. I for one find this at least as relevant to functional linguistics as the discussion of evolution that took place last week. (So, Ed, would your "narrower definition" of linguistic functions include, or not include, discussion of evolution? Please tell us, so that we can be informed for future reference what we may and what we may not discuss in this forum.)

As a founding member of the FUNKNET community, I find it troubling that a discussion group whose raison d'etre was liberation from the confines of structuralism should find itself subjected to the imposition of a new set of arbitrary theoretical constraints, cast, ironically, only a little bit further out than structuralism. But then, there's a word for what happens when revolutionaries come to positions of power: Politics.

Paul









---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Lakoff critique
From:    "Edward Blansitt" <cblansit at elp.rr.com>
Date:    Fri, June 10, 2005 7:54 pm
To:      "Paul Hopper" <hopper at cmu.edu>
         cogling at ucsd.edu
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

     As one who dropped out of LSA a few decades ago -- without ever
returning -- because it was tolerating a political discussion, I fully
understand and totally agree with Tom Givon's "suggestions".
     I am a functional structuralist, in the Martinet and Alarcos
traditions, and disagree, perhaps in a minor way, with some common
approaches to functionalism, including FG, SFG, and RRG; I feel rather close
to and united with these other functionalists, however, when autonomous
syntax is added to the mix.
     I must say, however, that I seem to have a much narrower definition of
linguistic "functions" than does Paul Hopper; I do agree that the boundary
between what is and what is not pertinent to linguistics is probably
indeterminable, but there are inside and outside fringes which clearly are
or are not within the domain of linguistics. If my understanding of
"functions" is due to my functional structuralism, perhaps some less
structuralist functionalists will call it to my attention.

Ed Blansitt



----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Hopper" <hopper at cmu.edu>
To: <cogling at ucsd.edu>
Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 11:24 AM
Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Lakoff critique


> Thanks, Tahir, for bringing this article to our attention. Richard
Lichtman raises significant questions about Lakoff's approach to metaphor
and cognition that seem to me to be quite within the bounds of discussion in
FUNKnet. Lakoff himself certainly understands his political activities to be
driven by language and linguistics.
>
> The fact is that once we open up the study of language to 'functions', any
attempt to impose limits according to some private definition of what is and
what is not linguistic in nature is certain to be arbitrary (e.g., no one
objected to the discussion of evolution over FUNKnet in recent weeks or
'suggested' that it be moved to a biological site).
>
> I hope, Tahir, that you will continue to note relevant contributions from
the intellectual community for us, and not be intimidated by 'suggestions'
as to what does and does not fall within our purview. Let's keep FUNKnet
open for input from any source that our members perceive as relevant.
>
> Paul
>
>
> >>>> Tom Givon <tgivon at uoregon.edu> 6/10/2005 2:55:17 PM >>>
> >
> > Dear FUNK people,
> >
> > With all due respect to Tahir, whose view I may even share, I would like
> > to suggest that FUNKNET be kept free of political discussion. If you
need
> > to get at George (I have nothing against that, in principle), please do
it
> >  in a political forum. FUNKNET has, from the start, been a strictly
> > professional forum. Let's keep it this way.  Peace,
> >
> > Tom Givon
> >
> > Sure, no problem. I just thought it might be of some interest. The
article
> > does raise for me certain issues of cognition alongside the political
> > ones, but whatever ... Tahir
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Paul J. Hopper
> Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of the Humanities
> Department of English
> Carnegie Mellon University
> Pittsburgh, PA 15232, USA
> Tel. 412-683-1109
> Fax 412-268-7989
>
>





--
Paul J. Hopper
Director of Graduate Studies
Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of the Humanities
Department of English
College of Humanities and Social Sciences
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15232, USA
Tel. 412-683-1109
Fax 412-268-7989


From daniel.everett at uol.com.br  Sat Jun 11 00:38:58 2005
From: daniel.everett at uol.com.br (Daniel Everett)
Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2005 01:38:58 +0100
Subject: [Fwd: Re: [FUNKNET] Lakoff critique]
In-Reply-To: <54785.151.201.42.106.1118449744.squirrel@151.201.42.106>
Message-ID: <SAT.11.JUN.2005.013858.0100.DANIEL.EVERETT@UOL.COM.BR>

I don't think that it is necessary to beat the horse so severely, Paul.

I think you and Tom are both right. On the one hand, I did read the
Lichtman article, and I didn't find it nearly so interesting in a
linguistic or cognitive sense as you seem to. I thought it was mainly
political. On the other hand, it did have a grain of
linguistic/cognitive interest.

In general, I think that a solid linguistically or cognitively based
discussion of political discourse/politics is relevant to Funknet or
Cogling. But I think Tom would likely agree. (Don't want to put words
in his mouth, though.)

What I think that we would all disagree with is making room on these
lists for  discussions that are principally political. (Discussions of
evolution also should be focussed on what insights might be provided
for linguistic or cognitive studies. ) On the other hand, I think all
of us would be happy to see discussions that connected linguistic or
cognitive issues directly to politics in some interesting way. I cannot
imagine that Tom would disagree.

So there is no reason, so far as I can see, to insinuate that Tom is
throwing his weight around inappropriately.

Dan


On 11 Jun 2005, at 01:29, Paul Hopper wrote:

> I'm forwarding this comment to FUNKNET readers because Ed Blansitt
> seems to have omitted the FUNKNET address.
>
> I wonder if either Ed or Tom actually bothered to read the Richard
> Lichtman article that Tahir Wood drew our attention to, or whether you
> just picked up on the body of his message (which quoted the opening
> paragraph of Lichtman's essay, by the way--it was not a political
> comment by Tahir!) and categorised it off the cuff as +political,
> -linguistic, and therefore beyond the pale.
>
> If you'd read the article, you'd have found a very pertinent comment
> on Lakoff's approach to metaphor and on cognitive linguistics. I for
> one find this at least as relevant to functional linguistics as the
> discussion of evolution that took place last week. (So, Ed, would your
> "narrower definition" of linguistic functions include, or not include,
> discussion of evolution? Please tell us, so that we can be informed
> for future reference what we may and what we may not discuss in this
> forum.)
>
> As a founding member of the FUNKNET community, I find it troubling
> that a discussion group whose raison d'etre was liberation from the
> confines of structuralism should find itself subjected to the
> imposition of a new set of arbitrary theoretical constraints, cast,
> ironically, only a little bit further out than structuralism. But
> then, there's a word for what happens when revolutionaries come to
> positions of power: Politics.
>
> Paul
>
>
>>
>
>
>
---------------------------------------------
Daniel L. Everett
Professor of Phonetics & Phonology
School of Languages, Linguistics, and Cultures
University of Manchester
Manchester M13 9PL UK
Fax: 44-161-275-3031
Phone: 44-161-275-3158
http://ling.man.ac.uk/info/staff/DE/DEHome.html


"It does not seem likely, therefore, that there is any direct relation
between the culture of a tribe and the language they speak, except in
so far as the form of the language will be moulded by the state of the
culture, but not in so far as a certain state of the culture is
conditioned by morphological traits of the language." Boas (1911,59ff)


From lamb at rice.edu  Mon Jun 20 14:47:30 2005
From: lamb at rice.edu (Sydney Lamb)
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 09:47:30 -0500
Subject: LACUS meeting August 2-6
Message-ID: <MON.20.JUN.2005.094730.0500.LAMB@RICE.EDU>

LACUS Meeting, Dartmouth College, 2-6 August 2005

The Linguistic Association of Canada and the U.S. is meeting
this summer at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, August 2-6.

The conference theme is "Networks", and there are sessions on
Computer Simulation of Network Operation, Neurolinguistics,
Science and Linguistics, Relational networks, and Social
Networks. Tutorials will be presented on (1) Neurolinguistics,
(2) Science and linguistics, (3) Evidence-Based Linguistics.

Featured speakers include Reka Albert, a leading authority on
general network theory (chief collaborator of Barabasi); Dick
Hudson (University College London) speaking on Semantic
Networks; and Alexander Gross, speaking on Evidence-Based
Linguistics.

Demos will be offered on (1) computerized network simulation,
(2) a new linguistically sophisticated software system for easy
input of characters from the world's languages (incl Chinese,
Japanese, all characters of all European languages, etc., etc.).

The complete program is posted on the LACUS website, at
www.lacus.org. Information on travel and accommodation is also
posted there. Preregistration is available at reduced fee until
July 1st -- see www.lacus.org/lacus32/reg32.html.


From tgivon at uoregon.edu  Mon Jun 20 20:28:12 2005
From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon)
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 13:28:12 -0700
Subject: help--re. Hartmut Burmeister
Message-ID: <MON.20.JUN.2005.132812.0700.TGIVON@UOREGON.EDU>

Dear FUNK people,

I am trying to locate an ex-colleage and good friend, Dr. Hartmut
Burmeister, PhD in applied ling. from the University of Kiel. The last
address I have for him was from Kiel, but apparently he has moved on. He
has taught applied linguistic at Oregon, then ESL in Korea, then back in
Kiel for a while, also in Hamburg. I'd appreciate tips about his current
mail address, either e-mail or any other kind. Thanks so much, Tom Givon


From language at sprynet.com  Tue Jun 21 18:25:20 2005
From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2)
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2005 14:25:20 -0400
Subject: LACUS meeting: Evidence Based Linguistics...
Message-ID: <TUE.21.JUN.2005.142520.0400.LANGUAGE@SPRYNET.COM>

Following up on the LACUS announcement, and also
following up on several discussions here, I'm pleased to tell
 you that I will be one of the invited speakers at their
conference this year.  This will take place at 4 PM on
Wednesday, August 3, when I will be speaking on the
topic "Is Evidence Based Linguistics the Solution?
Is Voodoo Linguistics the Problem?"

The abstract follows:

Is Evidence Based Linguistics the Solution?
Is Voodoo Linguistics the Problem?

A voluntary ten-question true-or-false self-test will be
distributed, enabling participants to silently experience
for themselves to what extent they may have been
practicing either of these two forms of Linguistics.  Of
these two terms, "evidence based linguistics" springs
from evidence based medicine (EBM),* a movement
that has recently made great strides among health-care
professionals to combat many arbitrary clinical pro-
cedures, unexamined assumptions, allegedly
authoritative rules, and institutional shibboleths,
along with advertising hyperbole and unproven claims
for impending cures or imminent progress, that have
begun to clutter the study of medicine.  "Voodoo
linguistics"** is simply an outgrowth from the book
title _Voodoo Science_, a term used by University
of Maryland physicist Robert L. Park to describe much
contemporary science, including widespread and often
government-supported superstitions concerning the
laws of thermodynamics, the causes of cancer, and
the space program.

Although the applicability of both terms to linguistics
may already be clear enough to many LACUS members,
the probable results of this test are likely to demonstrate
how deeply comparable voodoo elements, unsupported
by any defensible evidence, have crept into the study of
language. The first quarter hour will be devoted to
explaining the questions in the test, intended mainly as
a heuristic exercise which no one needs to sign or hand in.

A crucial section will explain how Guidelines for EBM
function in practice and attempt to set out a comparable
series of Guidelines for EBL, springing from the basic
principles and procedures of science—method, skepticism,
and replicability.   EBL Guidelines will clearly both resemble
and differ from those for EBM, requiring a review as to
how the former have been derived and are likely to be
applied in the future.

A final section will examine whether important evidence
about language, whether originated by linguists or rooted
in other sciences or springing from related areas, may
have been ignored or suppressed during the past
because of preconceptions related to these ten questions.
The sciences and fields of study discussed will
encompass—but not be limited to—cartography,
fractal forms in nature, translation studies, creating viable
laws and measuring units for language, neuro-
cognitive networks within language, and a complex
of physiological issues related to various language
processes.  The methodology of medical diagnosis will be
invoked in an attempt to describe the various stages and
degrees involved in language learning. It is hoped that
from these processes there may emerge a better grasp of
the full size and scope of language and a clearer notion
of what the desiderata might be for creating truly viable
and relatively complete theories in our field.

*Those wishing to learn more about EBM may find the
following search pages of use:
http://search.netscape.com/ns/search?fromPage=nsBrowserRoll&query=evidence+based+medicine
and:
http://www.cebm.net/ebm_links.asp

** Park, Robert L. 2000. Voodoo Science. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.  Professor Park also directs the DC center
of the American Physical Society and is a recognized media spokesman for his
profession.  He contributes a weekly
column on science issues to the APS website at:
http://www.aps.org/WN/

----------------------------

You can find out more about this conference, including the complete program,
at:

http://LACUS.org


From ksinnema at ling.helsinki.fi  Mon Jun 27 17:06:34 2005
From: ksinnema at ling.helsinki.fi (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kaius_Sinnem=E4ki?=)
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2005 20:06:34 +0300
Subject: Approaches to Complexity in Language (1st circular)
Message-ID: <MON.27.JUN.2005.200634.0300.KSINNEMA@LING.HELSINKI.FI>

(Apologies for cross-postings)


APPROACHES TO COMPLEXITY IN LANGUAGE
Symposium to be held in Helsinki, August 24-26, 2005

* * * First Circular, June 27, 2005 * * *

The Linguistic Association of Finland and the Department of General 
Linguistics University of Helsinki jointly organize the symposium 
"Approaches to complexity in language" August 24-26, 2005. The symposium 
will take place in Helsinki in The House of Sciences - or Tieteiden talo 
in Finnish (street address: Kirkkokatu 6).

Programme

The preliminary programme of the symposium as well as the abstracts for 
the section papers are now available at the Symposium web page 
http://www.ling.helsinki.fi/sky/tapahtumat/complexity/complexity.shtml. 
In addition to plenary lectures and section papers, the programme also 
includes the workshop "Consequences of informational complexity for 
human language processing," organized by Dr. Fermin Moscoso del Prado 
Martin (Medical Research Council - Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit 
Cambridge, UK). The workshop will run as a separate parallel session on 
Thursday August 25, 2005. More information - including the workshop 
abstract and the list of participants - is available at the symposium 
web page.

Registration

The deadline for registration is August 1, 2005. If you want to 
participate to the symposium, we kindly ask you to register by e-mail to 
the address of the organizing committee: complexity-organizers (at) 
ling.helsinki.fi.

Registration fees:
* general: EUR 50
* members of the association: EUR 25
* undergraduate students free
Participants from abroad are requested to pay in cash upon arrival. 
Participants from Finland may send the registration fee by giro account 
no 800013-1424850 to The Linguistic Association of Finland (SKY) / 
Symposium or pay in cash upon arrival. If you pay to the account of the 
association, please do remember to write the code COMPLEXITY, as well as 
your name, so that we will know exactly who has already paid.

Accommodation

The symposium web page also contains a link to the City of Helsinki 
Tourist Office, where, in addition to all kinds of useful information, 
you can find a link to the Hotel Booking Center. You can access the 
Hotel Booking Center directly from 
http://www.helsinkiexpert.fi/accommodation/varaa.html.

Looking forward to seeing you in August,
The organizers
(Marja Etelämäki, Pentti Haddington, Soili Hakulinen, Arja Hamari, Emmi 
Hynönen, Fred Karlsson, Seppo Kittilä, Matti Miestamo, Urpo Nikanne, 
Heli Pitkänen, Kaius Sinnemäki)


From Julia.Ulrich at degruyter.com  Wed Jun 29 11:15:09 2005
From: Julia.Ulrich at degruyter.com (Julia Ulrich)
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 13:15:09 +0200
Subject: Etsuyo Yuasa: Modularity in Language (2005)
Message-ID: <WED.29.JUN.2005.131509.0200.JULIA.ULRICH@DEGRUYTER.COM>

NEW FROM MOUTON DE GRUYTER

 

Etsuyo Yuasa

 

Modularity in Language

Constructional and Categorial Mismatch in Syntax and Semantics

 

2005. xii, 209 pages. Cloth. 

EUR 88.00 / sFr 141.00 / for USA, Canada, Mexico: US$ 123.20

ISBN 3-11-018309-9

(Trends in Linguistics. Studies and Monographs 159)

 

Date of publication: 06/2005

 

http://www.degruyter.de/rs/bookSingle.cfm?id=IS-3110183099-1&l=E

 

 

In Modularity in Language, Etsuyo Yuasa investigates exceptions and
idiosyncrasies in various complex clauses in Japanese and English within
the framework of multi-modular approaches to grammar. She proposes
original analyses of various complex clauses in Japanese and English,
which deviate from the norms of other complex clauses in the same
language or in other languages, and shows how these cases of
syntax-semantics mismatch justify the independence (or 'autonomy') of
different levels of grammatical structures. 

 

Yuasa's significant contribution is the incorporation of the notion of
'construction' from Construction Grammar into multi-modular approaches
to grammar. She claims that the idiosyncratic cases examined in this
study are instances of constructional and categorial mismatches where a
syntactic representation of a prototypical construction is paired with a
semantic representation of another prototypical construction. 

 

Modularity in Language is aimed at those interested in grammatical
theories in general, the parallel architecture of grammar (including
Lexical-Functional Gram-mar, Autolexical Grammar, Representational
Modularity), Constructional Grammar, syntax/semantics inter-face, and
Japanese linguistics.

 

Etsuyo Yuasa is Professor at the Department of East Asian Languages and
Literatures of The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA. 

 

Of interest to: Scholars Interested in Lexical-Functional Grammar,
Autolexical Grammar, Representational Modularity, Constructional Grammar
and in Grammatical Theories in General; Researchers Specializing in the
Syntax/Semantics Interface or Japanese Linguistics; Academic Institutes;
Libraries. 

 

 

TO ORDER, PLEASE CONTACT

 

SFG Servicecenter-Fachverlage

Postfach 4343

72774 Reutlingen, Germany

Fax: +49 (0)7071 - 93 53 - 33

E-mail: deGruyter at s-f-g.com 

 

 

For USA, Canada, Mexico: 

 

Walter de Gruyter, Inc.

PO Box 960

Herndon, VA 20172-0960

Tel.: +1 (703) 661 1589

Tel. Toll-free  +1 (800) 208 8144

Fax: +1 (703) 661 1501

e-mail: degruytermail at presswarehouse.com

 

Please visit our website for other publications by Mouton de Gruyter:
www.mouton-publishers.com
<file:///C:\Dokumente%20und%20Einstellungen\ulrich\Lokale%20Einstellunge
n\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\OLK464\www.mouton-publishers.com>  

 

For free demo versions of Mouton de Gruyter's multimedia products,
please visit www.mouton-online.com
<file:///C:\Dokumente%20und%20Einstellungen\ulrich\Lokale%20Einstellunge
n\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\OLK464\www.mouton-online.com> 



__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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From Julia.Ulrich at degruyter.com  Wed Jun 29 11:31:16 2005
From: Julia.Ulrich at degruyter.com (Julia Ulrich)
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 13:31:16 +0200
Subject: Kupferberg, Green: Troubled Talk
Message-ID: <WED.29.JUN.2005.133116.0200.JULIA.ULRICH@DEGRUYTER.COM>

NEW FROM MOUTON DE GRUYTER

 

Irit Kupferberg and David Green

 

Troubled Talk

Metaphorical Negotiation in Problem Discourse

 

2005. xiii, 221 pages. 

Cloth. EUR 84.00 / sFr 134.00 / for USA, Canada, Mexico: US$ 84.00

ISBN 3-11-018415-X

 

Paperback. EUR 32.95 / sFr 53.00 / *US$ 32.95

ISBN 3-11-018416-8

(Language, Power and Social Process 15)

 

Language of publication: English

Date of publication: 06/2005

 

http://www.degruyter.de/rs/bookSingle.cfm?id=IS-311018415X-1&l=E

 

How is meaning constructed discursively by participants in problem
discourse? To which discursive resources do they resort in order to
accomplish their complicated tasks of problem presentation and
negotiation of possible solutions? To what extent are these resources
related to the interactional and meaningful construction of problems and
solutions? 

 

Irit Kupferberg and David Green - a discourse analyst and a clinical
psychologist - have explored naturally-occurring media, hotline, and
cyber troubled discourse in a quest for answers. Inspired by a
constructivist-interpretive theoretical framework grounded in linguistic
anthropology, conversation analysis, narrative inquiry, and clinical
psychology as well as their professional experience, the authors put
forward three novel claims that are illustrated by 70 attention-holding
examples. First, sufferers often present their troubles through detailed
narrative discourse as well as succinct story-internal tropes such as
metaphors and similes - discursive resources that constitute two
interrelated versions of the troubled self. Particularly interesting are
the intriguing figurative constructions produced in acute emotional
states or at crucial discursive junctions. Second, such figurative
constructions often 'lubricate' the interactive negotiation of
solutions. Third, when the figurative and narrative resources of
self-construction are employed in the public arena they are used and
sometimes abused by the media representatives, depending on a plethora
of contextual resources identified in this book.

 

Irit Kupferberg is Associate Professor at Levinsky College, Tel Aviv,
Israel. David Green is Head of the Green Institute for Advanced
Psychology, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

 

Of interest to: Researchers, pre- and post-qualifying Practitioners, and
Students at the graduate and postgraduate Levels in the following
Domains: Linguistics (Cognitive and Functional), Discourse Analysis,
Communication, Psychology, Psychiatry, Social Work, Counseling, and
Education.

 

 

TO ORDER, PLEASE CONTACT

 

SFG Servicecenter-Fachverlage

Postfach 4343

72774 Reutlingen, Germany

Fax: +49 (0)7071 - 93 53 - 33

E-mail: deGruyter at s-f-g.com 

 

 

For USA, Canada, Mexico: 

 

Walter de Gruyter, Inc.

PO Box 960

Herndon, VA 20172-0960

Tel.: +1 (703) 661 1589

Tel. Toll-free  +1 (800) 208 8144

Fax: +1 (703) 661 1501

e-mail: degruytermail at presswarehouse.com

 

Please visit our website for other publications by Mouton de Gruyter:
www.mouton-publishers.com
<file:///C:\Dokumente%20und%20Einstellungen\ulrich\Lokale%20Einstellunge
n\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\OLK464\www.mouton-publishers.com>  

 

For free demo versions of Mouton de Gruyter's multimedia products,
please visit www.mouton-online.com
<file:///C:\Dokumente%20und%20Einstellungen\ulrich\Lokale%20Einstellunge
n\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\OLK464\www.mouton-online.com> 



__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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From jmori at wisc.edu  Thu Jun 30 01:01:43 2005
From: jmori at wisc.edu (Junko Mori)
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 20:01:43 -0500
Subject: The 15th Japanese Korean Linguistics Conference
Message-ID: <WED.29.JUN.2005.200143.0500.JMORI@WISC.EDU>

The information regarding the 15th Japanese Korean Linguistics Conference to
be held at University of Wisconsin-Madison from October 7-9, 2005 (program,
registration information, etc.) is now available at the following web site:

http://imp.lss.wisc.edu/jk15conference/JKindex.htm

We hope to see many of you here in Madison in October!

Junko Mori

-- 
Junko Mori
Associate Professor
Department of East Asian Languages and Literature
University of Wisconsin-Madison
1204 Van Hise Hall
1220 Linden Dr.
Madison, WI 53706
(608) 262-3871


From twood at uwc.ac.za  Thu Jun 30 07:32:30 2005
From: twood at uwc.ac.za (Tahir Wood)
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 09:32:30 +0200
Subject: Chomsky
Message-ID: <THU.30.JUN.2005.093230.0200.TWOOD@UWC.AC.ZA>

Another leftwing critique, this time of Chomsky and more substantial, very interesting on the relation of his linguistics to his anarchism. Sample:

The difference between the humanities and the sciences, for Chomsky, is that scientists must co-operate with one another across space and time and therefore be honest. In the humanities, by contrast * as in ordinary life * people are free to ignore one another and can claim whatever they please. In the humanities, scholars tend to feel threatened by science precisely because of its unrestrictedly co-operative nature. Equally, they feel threatened by ideas which are genuinely new. Such defects may also afflict disciplines within natural science. But at least 'the sciences do instil habits of honesty, creativity and co-operation', features considered 'dangerous from the point of view of society' (quoted in Rai 1995: 138). A student in a university physics department will hardly survive without being questioning; in the 'ideological disciplines', by contrast, originality is discouraged. Chomsky (1975: 219) complains that in the 'domain of social criticism the normal attitudes of the scientist are feared and deplored as a form of subversion or as dangerous radicalism'. For Chomsky, the culture of science is the real 'counter-culture' to the reigning ideology (Rai 1995: 138). 

Full:
http://homepages.uel.ac.uk/C.Knight/chomsky.htm 

Tahir


From pustetrm at yahoo.com  Thu Jun 30 12:02:06 2005
From: pustetrm at yahoo.com (REGINA PUSTET)
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 05:02:06 -0700
Subject: Chomsky
In-Reply-To: <s2c3bc33.089@Services-02.uwc.ac.za>
Message-ID: <THU.30.JUN.2005.050206.0700.PUSTETRM@YAHOO.COM>

Dear Funknetters,

 

The Knight quote is a nice bone of contention to throw to people, but before picking it up and slaughtering Chomsky – or maybe not – we should also consider the literature provided right after the quote in the Knight text, such as Kuhn 1970, because this indeed relatives the picture somewhat. In Kuhn 1970, the topic of paradigm shift in science is discussed at length, to the effect that there doesn’t seem to be any evidence for positing a difference between linguistics, or humanities in general, and natural science in this respect. Personally, as a linguist, I have never felt “threatened by science” or innovations, and neither do I feel that linguistics completely fails to “instill habits of honesty, creativity, and cooperation”. So arguing along Kuhnian lines, the fear of innovation, or lack thereof in individual cases, is as pronounced in natural sciences as it is in the humanities and other branches of science. This comes as no surprise because resistance to innovation is 
 a deeply
 human trait (probably evolutionarily based, if we want to discuss that).

 

In a way, however, I feel that there might be something to the statement that in the humanities, people are free to ignore each other and claim what they like. Here again, what I remember about Kuhn sheds some more light on the issue by saying that different disciplines are at different stages of maturity, in the sense that in classical and therefore older sciences like physics, mathemantics, and biology, people had more time to develop a consensus on what worthy objects of study are, on methods, terminology, and so on. The frameworks are so fixed that it is much harder to ignore others and claim what you like than in the humanities. Psychology, at least at Kuhn’s time, was not exactly in the category of mature sciences, and I’d say the same is definitely true of linguistics, even today. So the reason why linguists sometimes ignore each other and claim what they like might really be the fact that linguistics is a science that’s so young that it is still struggling with its
 foundations. Let’s be honest: there’s a whole bunch of different ways of doing linguistics. Some of you out there will probably dislike the idea of classifying linguistics as an less-than-mature science, but remember, everything’s relative, and we better keep the standards set by physics, biology, etc. in mind.

 

Regina Pustet


Tahir Wood <twood at uwc.ac.za> wrote:Another leftwing critique, this time of Chomsky and more substantial, very interesting on the relation of his linguistics to his anarchism. Sample:

The difference between the humanities and the sciences, for Chomsky, is that scientists must co-operate with one another across space and time and therefore be honest. In the humanities, by contrast * as in ordinary life * people are free to ignore one another and can claim whatever they please. In the humanities, scholars tend to feel threatened by science precisely because of its unrestrictedly co-operative nature. Equally, they feel threatened by ideas which are genuinely new. Such defects may also afflict disciplines within natural science. But at least 'the sciences do instil habits of honesty, creativity and co-operation', features considered 'dangerous from the point of view of society' (quoted in Rai 1995: 138). A student in a university physics department will hardly survive without being questioning; in the 'ideological disciplines', by contrast, originality is discouraged. Chomsky (1975: 219) complains that in the 'domain of social criticism the normal attitudes of
  the
 scientist are feared and deplored as a form of subversion or as dangerous radicalism'. For Chomsky, the culture of science is the real 'counter-culture' to the reigning ideology (Rai 1995: 138). 

Full:
http://homepages.uel.ac.uk/C.Knight/chomsky.htm 

Tahir



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