From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Wed Mar 1 01:01:42 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 14:01:42 +1300 Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization In-Reply-To: <10500620.1141156127363.JavaMail.oesten@ling.su.se> Message-ID: Hi Östen, On Wednesday 01 March 2006 08:48, Östen Dahl wrote: > ... > (The two meanings are "a nonfunctional property or byproduct" and "an > effect which by itself has no effects in the physical world whatever".) I don't think we need be surprised, all words have different and even contradictory meanings. If they do it is probably because we need them all. In particular it is not unusual for causes and effects to get mixed up. To me it is your first meaning of "byproduct", in the sense of "not being a direct effect", or "having no direct causes" which is the most interesting and relevant for epiphenomena in the context of language. Of course an epiphenomenal model of language does not mean there are no causes, only that the causes are not direct. We would still have grammar, it is just identification as an epiphenomenon would mean we would not seek to directly describe the grammar in terms of rules. What rules we have would only describe indirect causes, like ways of generalizing usage. > The term "emergence", by the way, is arguably even more ambiguously used by > linguists and others. I discuss the two terms "emergence" and > "epiphenomena" in my book "The growth and maintenance of linguistic > complexity", Benjamins 2004. Can you outline the main issues for us? I would like to hear what you have to say about "emergence" (especially in the epiphenomenal sense of "having no direct causes" rather than the evolutionary sense of gradual change!!) -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Mar 1 01:55:41 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 20:55:41 EST Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization (2) Message-ID: In a message dated 2/28/06 1:19:35 PM, phonosemantics at earthlink.net writes: << Things aren't as random as all that- each new generation takes its cue from the prior one, however imperfectly. This means there is already a 'memory' of prior selection. >> Of course, new generations take biological "cues" from prior ones - that's exactly what genetics is. And of course there's a memory of prior selection -- that's exactly what genes are. But non-mutating genes could not produce the diversity of evolution. We'd all be unicellular if it wasn't for mutation. Yes, from all the evidence we have, things ARE THAT random in biological evolution -- unless you are talking about something non-naturalistic like intelligent design. Even organism that appear to induce mutations (those that "have evolved to evolve") are not using any other means than accelerated random mutation. In contrast, the larva may turn into a butterfly without randomly mutating, but that controlled morphological change is not evolution, but a product of evolution. All the examples you give, as far as I can tell, go to complexity. Traits held in reserve reflect nothing more than the evolution of organisms that hold traits in reserve. None of this contradicts randomness as the generating engine of diversity. The choice is basic. Either there is randomness or there is some intentionality intervening that generates variations. The only way to make raw biological evolution and language evolution congruent is to say that either language changes are all randomly generated or that the expansion of biological diversity on this planet was somehow intentional. This brings us back to "unidirectionality" and functionalism. If changes in language are fundamentally driven by the intentions of individual humans, wherefrom the uni- in unidirectionality? The answer is the common objectives of those intentions -- what humans have in common to SPEAK ABOUT, i.e., communication. We probably should assume that the rules of effective information exchange are at least as rigid as putting up a barn. There is not a lot of wiggle room. And "growth" in grammar was probably driven by the same intentionality that morphed neolithic wagons into Ferraris, or megaphones into cellphones. But, of course, where local objectives in language might diverge, we'd expect to see Dan's Pirahas, or Homer mysteriously calling a blue Aegean sea, "wine-dark." We technically should not call any of this "evolution." Regards, Steve Long From anggarrgoon at gmail.com Wed Mar 1 02:26:35 2006 From: anggarrgoon at gmail.com (Anggarrgoon) Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 20:26:35 -0600 Subject: criticisms of grammaticalization In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I'd like to return to Martin's first point, and Joan's comment: > > 1. Unidirectionality, if it exists, is an even greater problem for > functionalism than if it turns out to be false. Developments that span > centuries would have to be explained independently of speakers, who only > have access to three generations of other speakers. (I attribute this one to > Janda 2001.) > Point 1 is only a problem if you assume that language change takes place > in language acquisition. If you assume that grammaticization is driven > by processes that occur as language is used, by everyone all the time, > then unidirectionality is what you would expect. > I don't think it's necessarily problematic for acquisition-based theories. If I wanted to construct an argument about unidirectionality within a acquisition-based/Minimalist framework of language change I would argue that certain operations are privileged (Move over Merge, for example), so there's a "built-in" bias for kids to prefer one potential Grammar over another. I think Elly van Gelderen has done some work on developing this line of argument, and privileging certain operations is already part of Minimalism, as is a more general idea of economy. I would further note that there are a number of one-way processes in language change other than grammaticalization. For example, nasal-stop assimilation is always anticipatory. For example, the sequence [*anpa] becomes [ampa] but never [anda] (that is, the nasal assimilates to the p.o.a. of the stop, not vice versa). *k > ? (glottal stop) is common, while the reverse isn't. Whether you model such change as the result of misacquisition of the 'correct' target or as a change in the speech of adults (or both) is irrelevant to issues of directionality, as far as I can see. It's shaped by a combination of perceptual and articulatory factors. Kids acquiring language are still subject to those factors. Claire From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 1 04:30:58 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 23:30:58 -0500 Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization (2) Message-ID: First apologies for how far off linguistics this will be getting... Again, things ain't that random. Free or bound. Black or white. Tastes great or less filling. What happened to intermediate states, all the nice gray areas and fuzzy boundaries? I have this sort of argument with a Chomskyoid friend of mine all the time. OK- if things were completely random then anything could mutate into anything. But that's not what we see. There are limits. There is relative freedom between the limits when that's what's been selected for. Take for example conserved parts of genes, which code for important functional molecular groups in proteins. Conservation implies some sort of form/function fit which living organisms literally cannot live without. Histone proteins, which bind DNA into chromatin for compact storage and now also apparently for periodic organization as in my previous post, are hardly variable across all eukaryotic organisms. Sure they can mutate beyond these limits, but then its bye-bye baby! Other proteins, such as serum albumins, vary wildly in their particular 3-D conformation and most of their individual peptide identities. Except for the ones that bind molecules and ions that need to be carted around the bloodstream. The shape of the molecule is just not that important, so selection allows a great latitude here. Most proteins are somewhere in between- they have the structure they need to function (the business ends, regulatory sites, docking sites for attachments to various pieces of architecture or other parts of more complex multi-protein machines), or to fold into their proper shapes (with the oil-loving side chains in the center, and the water-loving ones on the periphery), and so on. Shapes and charges are often complementary- both within-unit and between. Parts of larger protein complexes have to interact- therefore if one part changes its conformation due to a mutation, another in its partner unit may undo the significance of the original one. And so on, across the board of the 'proteome' as its now being called. In spirit rather like a gigantic multidimensional and dynamic jigsaw puzzle, whose pieces' borders shift around a bit, but complementarily. Even so, the flexibility of the system is rather large. My growth hormone will work in a fruit fly in a pinch, thank you very much. The vast majority of such point mutations either kill the organism outright, make its reproductive success less likely, or are simply neutral. Sometimes mutations are simply out of the control of the cell- radiation, chemical damage, a kink in the DNA at the wrong place and time, etc. At other times these (and other types of) mutation(s) seem to be facilitated by the organism. This isn't 'intelligent design', its regulation of repair and reproductive genetic shuffling. In other words, the organism actually has some (unconscious but based on tried and true 'memory') control over where and when mutations take place. The repair of DNA can be scaled up or down in accuracy or rate. This often seems to happen in reaction to outside events having to do with size of populations, resource availability, moving to new environments, etc. It adapts. The events of meiosis are also very interesting in terms of error correction. Although nobody has looked yet, I'm betting the system has an internal model of itself- whether it is centralized or distributed who can say? First the existance of such a thing would have to be demonstrated. But most point mutations have little to do with evolution at the level most biologists are interested in. From a systems point of view a hydra is little different from a hamster. Sure the hamster has more bells and whistles, and a bigger staff cellwise, but this comes far more from regulation changes than from the particulars of individual protein structure generated by DNA point mutations. In the jigsaw analogy I'm making, one can make and break links between pieces, change the nature and degree, spacing and timing of interactions. The basic parts- the mortar and bricks- are still essentially the same. In eukaryotic DNA, much of the regulation comes from the 'junk' DNA that comes in between actual protein-translated genes. And the 'junk' makes up the vast majority of the DNA (think of it as 'dark matter'). Most of the 'junk' (interesting how easily one can dismiss what one isn't currently examining, isn't it?) is made of repeated patterns of DNA, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter. Far from random. If your random mutation hypothesis were correct, then one would expect to find the 'junk' cumulating mutations. But this is not so. It appears that such mutations (though they MUST occur) are weeded out, either by death, failure to reproduce successfully, or by repair mechanism in cell. Since as I said the bulk of interesting evolution comes from changes in such DNA (changes in the population sizes of the repeat variants, their placements, their N-mer number), that doesn't leave much room for randomness, at least from the point mutation POV. Perhaps you meant the outcome of the struggle to occupy space on the DNA wasn't predictable (these repeats may be originally viral in origin, by the way- remember what I said about integration of structurally reduced parasites into the host? Other larger parasites are now regularly being found to modify the behaviors of their hosts to increase their own reproductive fitness- maybe this is the origin of split genes and junk DNA in the first place, as eukaryotes were cobbled together by otherwise mindless ancient viruses for their own use). External context, though, may end up canalizing such changes in regular ways- something perhaps similar in spirit to grammaticalization, by the way. Neither complete randomness nor complete predictability. Now, are all cell-induced mutations or other modifications (such as methylation of nucleotide bases and similar marks added or subtracted from proteins, polysaccharides, lipids etc., all of which also play very important large roles I've ignored here- for instance a new theory that polysaccharides form a system of mailing addresses that direct proteins and other molecules to the right places at the right times) always random? NO. Because the DNA itself can be opened and closed up in controlled fashion, and because there are proteins and other molecules which can recognize sequences, plain or tagged, the cell actually can pick and choose to a certain degree what its modificational targets will be at any given time. I'm not implying intention here- its all automatic- but a sufficiently complex multilevel hierarchical dynamical system optimized to dam holes in the dyke may start to seem like it has intention. If you want to invoke the butterfly effect (which isn't what you were getting at but I couldn't resist- and if Laura Dern would lend me her hand now I'd be most gratified!) maybe that might start to resemble randomness because we have no access either to initial conditions or a God-like overarching perspective (but watch out for quantum and relativistic effects). That supernova over there in Orion a couple of thousand years ago may turn your grandchildren blue as the cosmic rays reach their mark- but it is not likely to turn them into bats. Now it may be (trying to give this post some FUNKNET-relevant linguistic content) that similar-flavor system regulatory effects happen historically intergenerationally as well as during the lifetime of a language user. Such things as regular sound changes, some of which act together (chain effects, series effects, such as in Tai-Kadai tones, etc.) come to mind. Some sort of matrix like thing going on, kinda sorta? What about at higher levels hierarchically? H/D order harmonies, for instance, or prosody? Never 100%, but interesting nonetheless. And often competitive to boot. I read years ago that over phylogenetic time different groups/populations of nerve cells have vied for physical hierarchical position and concomitant resources/connectivity in the nervous system- akin to what gets recapitulated in ontogeny. Something like this go on in language acquisition/processing? Now your added bonus feature: The genetic code itself has evolved to minimize the impact of point mutations while at the same time giving enough variety of translation products- it is 'degenerate'. Because of this some mutations give the same peptide unit But it goes further- the entire system of 'cubies' in the 4x4x4 matrix is arranged such that even when the coding shift doesn't give the same unit, it often gives a near equivalent (in terms of relevant side chain chemical/physical or torsional properties). Ok so I don't have oranges today- here's a tangerine... It also turns out (unpublished work) that when you slightly (and motivatedly..) rearrange the order of nucleotides on the matrix axes the system becomes even more balanced and geometrically clean- with the cube center-crossing diagonals representing opposing properties such as positive or negative charge, shapes and sizes of side chains, etc. All the known code variants (in archaea, for instance) seem to take advantage of this design, as do the stop/start signals. Oops, did I call it a design? Pattern, how's that? In a purely arbitrary system one would not see such well-balanced patterning. Was this system designed? Do I think so? Not hardly! But given the bits and pieces available and reproducible at the time, and the larger physical context of early earth, this is the optimal coding system currently surviving life hit upon- there may have been others. I guess in the end it really all boils down to issues of generativity/production versus filtering/selection, and how much the various levels of System have over each- where, when, how much, fidelity, etc. I say biological systems have far more control than you think they do- that we are NOT merely kluges. Whether we have control over overall directions of change ('drift') is an open question. From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Mar 1 05:03:49 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 00:03:49 EST Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization (3) Message-ID: In a message dated 2/28/06 2:49:19 PM, oesten at ling.su.se writes: << I recommend reading Daniel Dennett's discussion in "Consciousness explained"... As will be clear from the following quote, it's not only in linguistics that the term is problematic. "The term "epiphenomena" ... is used with *entirely* different meanings... although I have pointed this out time and again, no one seems to care." Perhaps Dennett has made the same unappreciated observations about inconsistencies with regard to such terms as "cognition" or "language" or "evolution"? He certainly has a lot of opportunity to do a lot more pointing out that someone might care about. <> I'd suggest that the multiple meanings reflect different theoretical positions. And that would also be true with terms like "cognition" and such. The trouble is that this word has a history that doesn't reflect either meaning given above. Without the benefit of Östen Dahl's discussions in his book -- "epiphenomenon" simply meant symptom in its original modern usages, which were in medicine. e.g., "Fever is always secondary to some specific disease or other of which it is a mere epiphenomenon or symptom." (1876) The notion obviously was that phenomenon itself was the disease and that the symptom -- epiphenomenon -- was peripheral. Here it is a diagnostic term - a manner of characterizing evidence. But a symptom is a valuable thing in diagnostics -- it's not useless or meaningless. In physics, it has been used to mean nothing more than "irrelevance to the matters being observed," i.e, data gathered in an experiment but peripheral to variables being measured. In this sense, it was an "operational" definition -- a way of distinguishing types of raw data -- impacts appearing on an x-ray plate that were not on the principal particle's path. Given these senses, it's hard to see how it applies to the original poster's statement --"Grammaticalization should really be decomposed into its independently existing component processes. There's no point in granting explanatory power to an epiphenomenon." In this sense, epiphenomenon seems to be used to indicate an ineffective or unnecessary concept -- not data or symptoms -- which are observations. A concept is not really an epiphenomenon. Occam's Razor would provide better phrasing. Emergence is something different. In one sense, "emergence" did mean a incidental effect, but it's original use in a psychological sense was by George Henry Lewes in the late 1800's, who defined the term as "an effect produced by a combination of causes, but not capable of being regarded as the sum of their individual effects." This was in reference to a gestalt kind of approach to mind and body. The whole ending up being greater than the sum of its parts. Emergent in that sense is an excellent word to use if one is talking about sodium and chloride, two poisons, coming together to make table salt. And it is probably useful in describing how human language evolved out of whatever pre-language traits preceded it. It goes to unpredictability of effects based on a prior examination of causes. Thus, the use of a phrase like "emergent epiphenomenon" -- in these original senses -- is admittedly a little difficult to picture. But no more so than much terminology in a cognitive field that reflects many different theoretical approaches and accompanying shades of wording. If one wants to complain about multiple meanings, there's plenty to complain about in other approaches as well -- including evolutionary psychology. Regards, Steve Long From oesten at ling.su.se Wed Mar 1 09:52:37 2006 From: oesten at ling.su.se (=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D6sten_Dahl?=) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 10:52:37 +0100 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena Message-ID: In my previous posting, I said: > The term "emergence", by the way, is arguably even more ambiguously used by > linguists and others. I discuss the two terms "emergence" and > "epiphenomena" in my book "The growth and maintenance of linguistic > complexity", Benjamins 2004. Rob Freeman says: >Can you outline the main issues for us? I would like to hear what you have to >say about "emergence" (especially in the epiphenomenal sense of "having no >direct causes" rather than the evolutionary sense of gradual change!!) Actually, the gist of the argument can be found by digging into the FUNKNET archive. On July 30, 1999, I had a posting with the title “What is emergence anyway?” (http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9907&L=FUNKNET&P=R349&I=- 3), with quite a few comments from other people, which can be read on the Linguist List website. I quote the concluding part of my own posting (which, as can be seen, hooks onto the original definition of “emergence” quoted by Steve Long): “In the older tradition, "emergence" stands for new and interesting higher-order structures that are not reducible to the lower-order ones. MacWhinney and Hopper, on the contrary, seem to use the same term precisely for the opposite: seemingly complex systems that are in fact derivable from -- "epiphenomenal by-products" of -- other simpler systems. One may ask how such a radical shift in meaning may have occurred. It seems that we can find the seed of the conflict in the original notion of emergence. On one hand, the target has new and interesting properties that cannot be described in terms of the source, on the other, there is presumably some kind of causal chain that leads from the source to the target. The essence of the notion of a self-organizing system seems to be precisely the fact that unexpected things happen as it were by themselves. Depending on whether one is more fascinated by the novel or the predictable component in this process, one may come to see different and seemingly contradictory aspects of "emergence" as criterial. Hopefully, we will eventually be able to see both sides of the phenomena at the same time. ” Steve Long writes: >Perhaps Dennett has made the same unappreciated observations about >inconsistencies with regard to such terms as "cognition" or "language" or >"evolution"? >He certainly has a lot of opportunity to do a lot more pointing out that >someone might care about. It seems to me that Dennett has in fact made quite a few observations about troublesome concepts of this kind (after all, that’s what he’s paid for, being a philosophy professor), but to say that they have been “unappreciated” would certainly be rather misleading. We have to live with ambiguous terms, but the trouble starts when people think they mean the same thing, although they don’t, or when terms are used as convenient labels to sweep things away. In my book, I point out that although “emergence” was originally used in an anti-reductionist spirit, later uses in linguistics of “emergence” and “epiphenomenon” reveal a reductionist attitude. I conclude with the following which I think is essentially in the same spirit as Suzanne Kemmer’s comments: “There seems to be a reductionist hiding in all of us, although many tend to claim otherwise. It may well be that the readiness of the “other side” to define away the notions that we ourselves find useful should make us wary of reductionist tactics.” - Östen From jordan.zlatev at ling.lu.se Wed Mar 1 11:26:53 2006 From: jordan.zlatev at ling.lu.se (Jordan Zlatev) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:26:53 +0100 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena In-Reply-To: <20060301095240.4605E3C0CC@smtp3.su.se> Message-ID: And if the referenences that Östen mentions are not enough - the latest number of Journal of Consciousness Studies (vol 13/1-2) (which I have yet not read...) is entirely devoted to "Epiphenomenalism"... I admit that I have not made up my mind on these issues, but one thing is clear: even epiphenomena are phenomena (that need to be described and eventually explained). Best, Jordan 2006-03-01 kl. 10.52 skrev Östen Dahl: > In my previous posting, I said: > >> The term "emergence", by the way, is arguably even more ambiguously >> used > by >> linguists and others. I discuss the two terms "emergence" and >> "epiphenomena" in my book "The growth and maintenance of linguistic >> complexity", Benjamins 2004. > > Rob Freeman says: > >> Can you outline the main issues for us? I would like to hear what you >> have > to >> say about "emergence" (especially in the epiphenomenal sense of >> "having no >> direct causes" rather than the evolutionary sense of gradual change!!) > > Actually, the gist of the argument can be found by digging into the > FUNKNET > archive. On July 30, 1999, I had a posting with the title “What is > emergence > anyway?” > (http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa? > A2=ind9907&L=FUNKNET&P=R349&I=- > 3), with quite a few comments from other people, which can be read on > the > Linguist List website. I quote the concluding part of my own posting > (which, > as can be seen, hooks onto the original definition of “emergence” > quoted by > Steve Long): > > “In the older tradition, … "emergence" stands for new and > interesting higher-order structures that are not reducible to the > lower-order ones. MacWhinney and Hopper, on the contrary, seem to use > the > same term precisely for the opposite: seemingly complex systems that > are in > fact derivable from -- "epiphenomenal by-products" of -- other simpler > systems. One may ask how such a radical shift in meaning may have > occurred. > > It seems that we can find the seed of the conflict in the original > notion of > emergence. On one hand, the target has new and interesting properties > that > cannot be described in terms of the source, on the other, there is > presumably some kind of causal chain that leads from the source to the > target. The essence of the notion of a self-organizing system seems to > be > precisely the fact that unexpected things happen as it were by > themselves. > Depending on whether one is more fascinated by the novel or the > predictable > component in this process, one may come to see different and seemingly > contradictory aspects of "emergence" as criterial. Hopefully, we will > eventually be able to see both sides of the phenomena at the same time. > ” > Steve Long writes: > >> Perhaps Dennett has made the same unappreciated observations about >> inconsistencies with regard to such terms as "cognition" or >> "language" or >> "evolution"? >> He certainly has a lot of opportunity to do a lot more pointing out >> that >> someone might care about. > > It seems to me that Dennett has in fact made quite a few observations > about > troublesome concepts of this kind (after all, that’s what he’s paid > for, > being a philosophy professor), but to say that they have been > “unappreciated” would certainly be rather misleading. > > We have to live with ambiguous terms, but the trouble starts when > people > think they mean the same thing, although they don’t, or when terms are > used > as convenient labels to sweep things away. In my book, I point out that > although “emergence” was originally used in an anti-reductionist > spirit, > later uses in linguistics of “emergence” and “epiphenomenon” reveal a > reductionist attitude. I conclude with the following which I think is > essentially in the same spirit as Suzanne Kemmer’s comments: “There > seems to > be a reductionist hiding in all of us, although many tend to claim > otherwise. It may well be that the readiness of the “other side” to > define > away the notions that we ourselves find useful should make us wary of > reductionist tactics.” > > - Östen > > > *************************************************** Jordan Zlatev, Associate Professor Department of Linguistics Center for Languages and Literature Lund University Box 201 221 00 Lund, Sweden email: jordan.zlatev at ling.lu.se http://www.ling.lu.se/persons/JordanZlatev.html *************************************************** From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Mar 1 14:42:15 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:42:15 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (2) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/1/06 4:54:13 AM, oesten at ling.su.se writes: << It seems to me that Dennett has in fact made quite a few observations about troublesome concepts of this kind (after all, that’s what he’s paid for, being a philosophy professor), but to say that they have been “unappreciated” would certainly be rather misleading. >> Hey, it wasn't me who said Dennett was unappreciated, it was Dennett -- in the very quote you used: "although I have pointed this out time and again, no one seems to care." I was just pointing out that there's plenty of opportunity in the terminological jungles out there for Dennett to feel even more unappreciated. It might start with evolutionists who try to "reduce" evolution to an "algorithm" -- wink, wink. <> There's a word that needs some disciplined defining -- reductionism. Does it just mean "opprobrium" or something like that? Copernicus, Newton and Darwin were all reductionists. I wonder why a reductionist attitude is always a bad thing to have? I'd argue that Lewes use of "emergence" did have a definite "reducing" intent. He was aiming for a coherent explanation of the body-mind duality problem, and emergence was a way of explaining how body and mind could be seen as parts of a single entity. And later, C. Lloyd Morgan, in his "Emergent Evolution" (1923), was to some de gree countering the creationist argument that Darwinian evolution could not account for new forms, only "the re-grouping of pre-existing events." In this sense, emergence was used to "reduce" alledgedly unexplainable novelty to a scientific principle. Regards, Steve Long From oesten at ling.su.se Wed Mar 1 15:25:31 2006 From: oesten at ling.su.se (=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D6sten_Dahl?=) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 16:25:31 +0100 Subject: Reductionism Message-ID: Steve Long writes: ” I wonder why a reductionist attitude is always a bad thing to have?” Obviously, it is not. You could say that reductionism just amounts to applying Occam’s Razor (not assuming the existence of something if you don’t need to). And it is clear that like “epiphenomenon”, “reductionism” can be misused, as a label for things you don’t like. But my warning against reductionism concerns the refusal to acknowledge that you sometimes need higher-level constructs in order to say interesting things. For instance, you could claim that a forest is “nothing but” a set of trees, but you cannot reduce the statement that a forest is dense, or that it is a good hiding-place, to a set of statements about the individual trees. - östen From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 1 18:05:49 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 13:05:49 -0500 Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization- links Message-ID: I thought it might be useful to provide some URLs of papers discussing some of the points I cited- here is a first batch. Long-Range Periodic Patterns in Microbial Genomes Indicate Significant Multi-Scale Chromosomal Organization http://compbiol.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020002 The Fragile Breakage versus Random Breakage Models of Chromosome Evolution http://compbiol.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020014 DNA Sequences Shaped by Selection for Stability http://genetics.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pgen.0020022 I've read about these things elsewhere as well, but these are public access. Not 'random house' ;-) Jess Tauber From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Wed Mar 1 21:55:36 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:55:36 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena In-Reply-To: <47f6a6f5a57f14faeb5dcb17b62ae1a4@ling.lu.se> Message-ID: On Thursday 02 March 2006 00:26, Jordan Zlatev wrote: > And if the referenences that Östen mentions are not enough - the latest > number of Journal of Consciousness Studies (vol 13/1-2) (which I have > yet not read...) is entirely devoted to "Epiphenomenalism"... > > I admit that I have not made up my mind on these issues, but one thing > is clear: even epiphenomena are phenomena (that need to be described > and eventually explained). Sure Jordan. There is no real mystery about it. There are causes. Still, there is a difference. I've tried to express the difference by distinguishing "direct causes" and "indirect causes". In the Conway's Life sim. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_Game_of_Life) you see this in the glider gun. The gliders move, but their movement is caused only indirectly (by rules for the birth and death of cells.) You can't formulate a single "rule of movement" to describe the movement of these "gliders", and yet they move (with apologies to Galileo :-) You can draw a parallel between this and grammar. We perceive grammar (movement), but if grammar is emergent then it will be impossible to formulate a "rule of grammar" to describe it. We must look for indirect causes to model grammar, like ways of generalizing over usage. There is no real mystery about saying something is emergent, but it does have consequences. In the case of language it means if we look to directly describe grammar in terms of rules we will fail. We must attempt to describe grammar indirectly (for example, in terms of rules for generalizing over usage.) By the way, this is a good thing for functionalists. It fits nicely with a model which sees language as a product of systemic contrast (indirect causes), and not something which can be described in terms of formal rules (direct causes). -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Thu Mar 2 04:57:34 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 23:57:34 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/1/06 4:49:10 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << In the Conway's Life sim. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_Game_of_Life) you see this in the glider gun. The gliders move, but their movement is caused only indirectly (by rules for the birth and death of cells.) You can't formulate a single "rule of movement" to describe the movement of these "gliders", and yet they move >> That's not the case. Those familiar with the Game of Life will know that "gliders" are highly regular patterns compared to the chaos that other starting patterns can generate and that makes them relatively predictable. They appear to "move" precisely because of the recurring pattern and the fact that the rules of the basic game say that spaces are filled or emptied according to what is adjacent to them on a particular turn - which can be rendered as an algorithm. In fact, many of the solutions to "Game of Life" pattern problems -- like the glider gun, which was designed to continually grow a specific pattern indefinitely -- were worked out mathematically first. What might be relevant to language growth and structure in the Game of Life is that chaotic growth started by a particular pattern sometimes eventually reverts to an order or symmetry after a long number of "turns" in the game. As in the case of fractals -- the more current example of mathematical weirdness -- this eventual orderliness has elements that reflect something of the original pattern -- which appeared to be lost in the chaos. Just like in the entanglement concept of quantum physics, there seems to be a deep layer of information underlying mathematics and maybe other natural phenomena that we are simply not able to read -- maybe because the math is beyond us. So that we may have to settle for concepts like "emergence" to account for patterns disappearing into chaos and reappearing again -- with us having no idea where they came from. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Thu Mar 2 10:20:40 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 23:20:40 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) In-Reply-To: <1d4.4eb6b91f.3137d53e@aol.com> Message-ID: On Thursday 02 March 2006 17:57, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/1/06 4:49:10 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > ...You can't formulate a single "rule of movement" to describe > the movement of these "gliders" > > That's not the case. What is the single "rule of movement" for these gliders, Steve? > ... the rules of the basic game say that spaces are filled or emptied > according to what is adjacent to them on a particular turn... These rules are the same whatever the system does. They are not movement rules. > ...we may have to settle for concepts like "emergence" to > account for patterns disappearing into chaos and reappearing again -- with > us having no idea where they came from. Isn't it a contradiction to say the behavior of the system is governed by rules, but you have "no idea" what causes the behavior of the system? -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Mar 3 04:14:23 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 23:14:23 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/2/06 5:18:53 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << What is the single "rule of movement" for these gliders, Steve? >> What is the single rule of movement for a real glider or an airplane wing? Do we somehow claim that all the variables mean that there's no way to explain a real glider's movement? The only uncontrolled variable in the the original Game of Life is the initial pattern. The rules entirely dictate every change of state after that -- that cells will either be filled, unfilled or remain the same at each turn, entirely dependent on the status of adjacent cells. Three adjacent cells are needed to fill a new cell that creates the impression of "movement" in any direction. I haven't played the game in years -- but I know that a starting pattern for a basic glider alone will produce the same results every time, with exactly the same periodicity. From the same spot it will always "move" along the same three adjacent diagonal paths adding cells in the same proportion as the empty cells behind it. (These gliders always move diagonally because of that need of proximity of exactly 3 cells to create the appearance of movement.) It is totally predictable. To create a south-east bound glider, starting at 0 on the grid (away from a border), simply fill in Row 1 Col1, Row2 Col2&3, Row3 Col 1&2. By the GOL rules of adjacency, the 2d generation MUST be Row 1Col2, Row2 Col3, Row3 Col 2,3&4, the 3rd gen MUST be Row 1Col3, Row2 Col 1&3, Row 3 Col 2&3, and the fourth gen MUST go back to the original pattern except all live cells are now one column over. And EVERY 4th generation the original pattern repeats itself over and over again "moving" a column in those exact same amt of turns into infinity. THAT is the law of "movement" you are asking for -- the patterns must follow the rules of the game -- there is no variation in it. There is NOTHING random or mysterious about this. It's simply a systematic filling and unfilling of cells in the same ways over and over again in the direction that the adjacency rules dictate. And it is highly regular. The particular rules make this particular set of patterns recur -- in other versions of GOL rules this pattern does not create gliders and they do not "move." This means the independent variables come from the rules of the original GOL and they entirely motivate this pattern shape of the glider -- if you started only with the glider and its movement, you should be able to derive the fundamental rules of the game without knowing them beforehand. <> Gravity is the same no matter what it affects. However it effects "movement" in some things and not others. In that, the law of gravity and the rules of GOL are exactly alike. Not all patterns move. But when they do, it's the rules that dictate the movement. <> Not if you see a pattern disappear into chaos and then see the exact same pattern re-appear. Unless there is something supernatural going on, it simply means we cannot perceive the process, not that it's not there. Any other explanation IS supernatural. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Fri Mar 3 07:45:44 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 20:45:44 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) In-Reply-To: <2cb.46d79be.31391c9f@aol.com> Message-ID: On Friday 03 March 2006 17:14, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/2/06 5:18:53 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > << What is the single "rule of movement" for these gliders, Steve? >> > > To create a south-east bound glider, starting at 0 on the grid (away from a > border), simply fill in Row 1 Col1, Row2 Col2&3, Row3 Col 1&2. By the GOL > rules of adjacency, the 2d generation MUST be Row 1Col2, Row2 Col3, Row3 > Col 2,3&4, the 3rd gen MUST be Row 1Col3, Row2 Col 1&3, Row 3 Col 2&3, and > the fourth gen MUST go back to the original pattern except all live cells > are now one column over. And EVERY 4th generation the original pattern > repeats itself over and over again "moving" a column in those exact same > amt of turns into infinity. That's the _single_ rule then is it? Seriously Steve, don't you see what you have done here is describe something like a corpus, citing the GOL rules which generate it, the _real_ rules, as you go. You might as well claim to describe the grammar of English by dictating a text. > < rules, but you have "no idea" what causes the behavior of the system?>> > > ... it simply means we cannot perceive the process... You cite what you claim is a rule, and then say we cannot perceive it, and say this is not contradictory? I don't know what point you are trying to make. You don't seem to like my characterization of "direct causes" and "indirect causes" so much is clear. Other than that, what is your point? If you want to characterize what is different about emergent systems as "we cannot perceive the process" then let's put it that way. The up-shot is the same. If grammar is emergent then we need to describe grammar, which we can perceive, in terms of processes which we cannot perceive (like rules for making generalizations over corpora.) And again, if the underlying system is such that "we cannot perceive the process", so long as we go on trying to formalize it in terms of what we can perceive (grammar itself), we will not succeed. That is my point. That is what "emergent grammar" is trying to say. Is anyone still failing to see this? -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Mar 3 14:42:03 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 09:42:03 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (4) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/3/06 2:43:07 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << That's the _single_ rule then is it?>> It's how the rule works. The rule at every turn for every cell is state A = 1 state B = 0 state C = same, where the state is determined by the # of adjacent filled squares (3, <3, >3). This generates EVERY resulting pattern you see, unless God and his angels are intervening to make gliders. <> No, not as YOU go. YOU are out of it after the first turn. The rules given above take over, your input is done. The rules generate gliders but also generate in most cases empty grids or no "movement" of patterns at all. The rules absolutely dictate the shape of gliders, not the user. If you want to make a glider, the starting shape is not up to you. Start with a four-sided square and you will be disappointed into infinity. It will disappear in 3 turns, every time. It's decided by the rules. The best mysterious movement generator is a version I call Coppola's Game of Life. The rules are 1. Every empty cell adjacent to the left of a filled cell becomes a filled cell. 2. Every filled cell becomes an empty cell, except if it is adjacent to the left of a filled cell. When you use these rules, you never have to worry about your patterns disappearing or being static -- every pattern is a glider. What a difference a change in rules makes! <> That am not a bad ideas. <> The effects of the law of gravity were always felt. Stating the law of gravity awaited Newton. I don't understand how that is a contradiction. <> Well, for one thing -- there's nothing mysterious about gliders. Also, yes, I don't understand how direct or indirect causes helps anything. If the issue is emergence, I'd suggest that what's missing is functionality. When we say a combination produces an unforeseen effect, doesn't that happen all the time, in all and even the simplest processes? The real question is what does this unforeseen effect have in terms of intended results. Language is seeping with intentions, goals, objectives. But a pure structural approach appears to be blind to all that. <> And I would say that's not correct in this sense -- capturing the process of cause and effect does not demand that we directly perceive the process, only that we can deduce it. We don't see the change in state of electrical wires when we throw on the light switch, but our deductions about the process are highly predictive. For the most part, the lights do go on. When they don't, we look for a burnt filament. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Fri Mar 3 21:44:48 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 10:44:48 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (4) In-Reply-To: <27.4839062.3139afbb@aol.com> Message-ID: On Saturday 04 March 2006 03:42, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/3/06 2:43:07 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > > <<...what is your point?>> > > Well, for one thing -- there's nothing mysterious about gliders. Also, yes, > I don't understand how direct or indirect causes helps anything. > > If the issue is emergence, I'd suggest that what's missing is > functionality... You are changing your characterization of what is different about emergent systems from "we cannot perceive the process" to "what's missing is functionality"? > The real question is what does this unforeseen effect have in terms of > intended results. Language is seeping with intentions, goals, objectives. > But a pure structural approach appears to be blind to all that. So the whole emergent structure debate really comes down to a war between structuralists and functionalists? What is it they say? When all you have is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail. Anyway, for anyone interested, my point is that there is something different about emergent systems, and I think this difference is informative for those who seek to model language. As I said a few messages back: "There is no real mystery about saying something is emergent, but it does have consequences. In the case of language it means if we look to directly describe grammar in terms of rules we will fail. We must attempt to describe grammar indirectly (for example, in terms of rules for generalizing over usage.) ..this is a good thing for functionalists. It fits nicely with a model which sees language as a product of systemic contrast (indirect causes), and not something which can be described in terms of formal rules (direct causes)." If anyone is interested in an implementation of this they can write to me and I can give them a model, right down to algorithms. -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Sat Mar 4 16:34:31 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 11:34:31 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/3/06 4:38:39 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << You are changing your characterization of what is different about emergent systems from "we cannot perceive the process" to "what's missing is functionality"? >> So, you can't see how they can be one and the same? Perhaps the reason "we cannot perceive the process" is because we are leaving out the functional parts. <> Well, if you leave the functional out of language, you are not describing what makes it move, change or emerge. If the structure were the only purpose of language -- if it were only a pattern generating machine for our aesthetic or contemplative appreciation -- then there'd be no point to looking beyond that for language's function. But that's not what language is. <> No, I think they say -- When you have no hammer, every nail is a problem. <> I confess I'm not sure what you are saying here, but if you mean by "indirect causes" factors outside of language drive the structure of language, that has to be true or language is merely an exercise in logic. But there are also structural imperatives that say how so much information has to be handled - if that's what you mean by direct causes. I think that's a real difference -- if that's the difference you mean. There is why we want to build a boat in the first place, what we would do with it. Then there is how a boat must be built to float. Both determine what the structure of the boat should be, if not will be. <> Or you can summarize it here so the rest of the list can see it. I don't suppose anyone would complain. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Sun Mar 5 21:38:49 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 10:38:49 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) In-Reply-To: <190.52472297.313b1b97@aol.com> Message-ID: On Sunday 05 March 2006 05:34, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/3/06 4:38:39 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > > < and I can give them a model, right down to algorithms.>> > > Or you can summarize it here so the rest of the list can see it. I don't > suppose anyone would complain. No point. By way of flavor, though, I think contemporary work which attempts to explain language in terms of emergence, such as that of Joan Bybee (also Cognitive, Langacker, etc, and almost all exemplar-based or connectionist NLP) is chiefly limited by a failure to realize it is not enough that your model be based on generalizations of usage, you must also allow for the possibility of discontinuous change. What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the novelty of syntax. -Rob From rcameron at uic.edu Sun Mar 5 22:44:15 2006 From: rcameron at uic.edu (Cameron, Richard) Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 16:44:15 -0600 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) In-Reply-To: <200603061038.49382.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Hi folks, I find the following comments from Rob Freeman very interesting. "...you must also allow for the possibility of discontinuous change. What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the novelty of syntax." A question or two: What do you mean by discontinuous change? How would you know that "Grammar is in a state of constant, discontinuous change."? No challenge is implied, just curiosity. Thanks - Richard Cameron On Sun, March 5, 2006 3:38 pm, Rob Freeman said: > On Sunday 05 March 2006 05:34, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >> In a message dated 3/3/06 4:38:39 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: >> >> <> me >> and I can give them a model, right down to algorithms.>> >> >> Or you can summarize it here so the rest of the list can see it. I >> don't >> suppose anyone would complain. > > No point. > > By way of flavor, though, I think contemporary work which attempts to > explain > language in terms of emergence, such as that of Joan Bybee (also > Cognitive, > Langacker, etc, and almost all exemplar-based or connectionist NLP) is > chiefly limited by a failure to realize it is not enough that your model > be > based on generalizations of usage, you must also allow for the possibility > of > discontinuous change. > > What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of > constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the > novelty of syntax. > > -Rob > From hdls at unm.edu Mon Mar 6 19:38:40 2006 From: hdls at unm.edu (High Desert Linguistics Society) Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 12:38:40 -0700 Subject: 7th High Desert International Linguistics Conference (HDLS-7) Nov. 9-11, 2006 Message-ID: The Seventh High Desert International Linguistics Conference (HDLS-7) will be held at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, November 9-11, 2006. With invited keynote speakers: William Croft (University of New Mexico) Sally Rice (University of Alberta) Elizabeth Traugott (Stanford University) We invite you to submit proposals for 20-minute talks with 10-minute discussion sessions in any area of linguistics - especially those from a cognitive / functional linguistics perspective. Papers in the following areas are particularly welcome: Evolution of Language, Grammaticization, Metaphor & Metonymy, Native American Languages, Typology, Spanish and Languages of the American Southwest, Language Revitalization and Maintenance, Language Change & Variation, Sociolinguistics, Bilingualism, Discourse Analysis, Signed Languages, Language Acquisition and Computational Linguistics. The deadline for submitting abstracts is Friday August 25th, 2006. Abstracts should be sent via email, as an attachment, to hdls at unm.edu Please include the title ''HDLS-7 abstract ''in the subject line. MS-Word format is preferred or RTF if necessary. The e-mail and attached abstract must include the following: 1. Author's Name(s) 2. Author's Affiliation(s) 3. Title of the Paper 4. E-mail address of the primary author The abstract should be no more than one page and no less than 11-point font. A second page is permitted for references and/or data. Only two submissions per author will be accepted and we will only consider submissions that conform to the above guidelines. Notification of acceptance will be sent out by September 1st, 2006. If you have any questions or need for further information please contact us at hdls at unm.edu with ''HDLS-7 Conference'' in the subject line. From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Tue Mar 7 01:27:54 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 14:27:54 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) In-Reply-To: <2354.68.21.175.91.1141598655.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: Hi Richard, I'll give you the concise answers. If you want me to expand more on them I can do that too. Give me some idea what kind of a perspective you are approaching the problem from and I can probably be more clear. On Monday 06 March 2006 11:44, Cameron, Richard wrote: > Hi folks, I find the following comments from Rob Freeman very interesting. > > "...you must also allow for the possibility of discontinuous change. > > What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of > constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the > novelty of syntax." > > A question or two: > What do you mean by discontinuous change? Something like what you get in a kaleidoscope. An instantaneous shift from one pattern to another. > How would you know that "Grammar is in a state of constant, > discontinuous change."? Discontinuous change from sentence to sentence. That is just syntax. We have no other way of explaining syntax. Also, multiple inconsistent grammars are what we see (even at a level of considerable abstraction from raw syntax.) The plethora of contradictory labelling systems with which linguistics is plagued suggest that perhaps no single complete system is to be found. (That the true system of language just finds one or other contradictory order from moment to moment.) -Rob From language at sprynet.com Wed Mar 15 18:28:05 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 13:28:05 -0500 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: Well, that was one of the most remarkable dustups i've ever seen here on FUNKNET, so remarkable that some awards are surely in order. Unless I'm mistaken, one of those awards would have to be for sheer length--what I've seen so far in the archives suggests that it's the second longest thread in FUNKNET history since September of 1994, measuring some 45 messages. And also the second most verbose, coming close to 18,000 words. Which is one reason it's taken me a while to absorb, I've even had to print it out. Plus which, it's truly profound stuff. But then it was meant to be, wasn't it? Some of it was positively brilliant. And just so it doesn't sound as though I'm merely being satirical, I'd also like to present a few awards for some of the very best comments by those taking part, at least from my point of view. Here they come now: "The plethora of contradictory labeling systems with which linguistics is plagued suggest that perhaps no single complete system is to be found." --Rob Freeman "I hope this word [epiphenomenon] falls out of fashion in linguistics sooner rather than later." --Suzanne Kemmer "We probably should assume that the rules of effective information exchange are at least as rigid as putting up a barn. There is not a lot of wiggle room." --Steve Long "Seems to me that 'paradigm shift' is more like an earthquake or someone popping your balloon." --Jess Tauber "Insularity/isolation, rather than multidisciplinary interfacing, is the norm in the publish or perish world (speaking as a member of the latter realm). Who has time and resources for anything else?" --Jess Tauber "I think that in linguistics and in phonology this is a big problem. I used to get a lot of pressure not to read--just get in there and crack phonemes. It is part of the crisis of linguistics as a science--which I find to be quite Balkanized, and waters are tricky to navigate. When that hurdle is overcome there is the aspect of competition and professional jealousy--a minefield for a newcomer in the field." --Diane Lesley-Neuman "I think that the apparent crisis of linguistics as a science looks a lot less dangerous if we realize that not all linguists are actually practicing science, nor even want to practice science -- even if some of them may think and say otherwise." --Mark P. Line I'm particularly pleased by these barbed remarks since they seem to be going at least part-way in the direction I set forth at last year's LACUS Conference. But I was also a bit dismayed by how much else I had to wade through to find these gems. And by how much of that material couldn't possibly qualify as functional linguistics, on the contrary it was mostly an apologetic for structural linguistics, even (yugh!) the generative kind. I'm playing with the idea that Linguistics has truly come no further than where it was in 1983, except that back then Geoffrey Pullum was at least able to deliver a pep talk to the troops containing two inspiring arguments that provided a ray of hope. Even though both of those arguments have long since fallen flat on their face. It was in that year that he first published his essay that was re-published in 1991 as "The Stranger in the Bar," as part of that delightfully written book "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax," which for all its geniality contained a great deal of misinformation about language and linguistics. Pullum wanted to help linguists raise their own self-esteem by being able to persuade laypersons, even someone they might meet in a bar, that there is after all a useful, practical point to the work they do. His first ploy was to suggest to such strangers that linguists are busily at work trying "to program a computer to understand plain English, like the HAL 9000 computer in Stanley Kubrick's film `2001: A Space Odyssey.' Linguistics is the subject that figures out what you'd need to know about language in order to do that, for English or for any other language, in a general and theoretically principled way." And just in case linguists themselves were less than convinced by this explanation, in a further pep talk he urged them to attend a conference of the Association for Computational Linguistics, as he has just done, where they would soon discover that the work of theoretical linguistics is so advanced that it will soon launch unbelievably powerful machine translation systems that will be so successful that it is difficult to "take in how fast the technology is progressing, or how much money will be made by the companies involved in producing it, or how many diverse sorts of people it is going to put out of work." It ought to be obvious that both these arguments have failed. Assuming a project to construct a HAL-like computer were launched today, does any one still imagine it might be feasible, much less a good idea? And far from putting anyone out of work--read translators--it also ought to be obvious that those companies still active in what is left of the MT field, after they and their colleagues have spent decades squandering billions* in public and private funding, are now desperately trying to entice translators to strap themselves into the demanding translation memory systems they have finally blundered their way into devising. Of course these failures go even deeper and date back far beyond 1983 for almost a full fifty years. They spring from two major errors subscribed to by far too many linguists, one altogether abstract and theoretical, the other altogether practical. The first error lay in the unfounded and unprovable belief that somehow, despite the obvious diversity of languages, there simply _had_ to be a unifying pattern, there _had_ to be a unifying principle that would tie all these seemingly disparate phenomena together, even an ultimate "universal" solution. And having evolved such an all-embracing concept, it was naturally only a short step for these same linguists to assign themselves the unerring ability to ferret out and define this unifying principle in great detail. After all, this unifying principle simply had to exist, there could be no other possible solution, how could there be? The second practical error lay in the willingness of the US military to not merely believe this theoretical approach had merit but to provide vast funding for it over several decades. To his credit Pullum provides at least a partial critique of this aspect in the same piece. And there you have it, fifty years of linguistics--or most of it--in a nutshell. Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time period. Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality whenever it becomes necessary. And that different peoples have created their own systems for doing so in different ways under different circumstances in various cultures over the centuries, even over the millennia. And that this process may in fact furnish at least part of the reason, part of the underlying cause, for all the conflicting religious, political, and social ideologies we find on all sides of us. And finally, if any of the foregoing is true, how do we break out of it and move on to something less artificial and more real? Such a study of linguistics would be truly worthy of the time we spent studying it and once we had even a few solutions in hand would be fairly easy to explain to others, even to "the stranger in the bar." all the best to all! alex *In his extremely thorough analysis of MT for WIRED Magazine in 2000, Sheldon Silverman credited this project with having "burned through billions of dollars." Among all the Ph. D. theses in linguistics approved each year, it might be useful if one could finally come up with a definitive total for the amount spent. Whoever authored it would require far greater skills than mere knowledge of linguistics and MT--such a researcher would also need the accounting skills to search through national and institutional spending going back decades and ferret out funding for MT & related NLP projects hidden within our nation's military balance sheet, itself hidden within the total national budget. ------------------------------- Some relevant references: Pullum, Geoffrey. 1991 & 1983. "The stranger in the bar." Part of (pp. 17-22) "The great Eskimo vocabulary hoax" (University of Chicago Press). Originally published as "Linguists and computers" in the journal "Natural Language and Linguistic Theory" (D. Reidel Publishing Company). Silverman, Sheldon. "Machine Translation Today," WIRED Magazine, May, 2000. Two presentations on evidence based linguistics at last year's LACUS conference, online at: http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evidence.htm http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evishop.htm Also: "Suggested Minimal Requirements for the Advanced Study of Linguistics," online at: http://language.home.sprynet.com/lingdex/minimum.htm From mark at polymathix.com Wed Mar 15 19:28:40 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 13:28:40 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <003b01c6485e$341bca40$1b2bf7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander Gross wrote: > > Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger > truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time > period. > > Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a > system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part > of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about > the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality > whenever it becomes necessary. Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand, but the distinction is important enough to influence the quality of my nightly sleep. (As an aside, I'd note the teleological demon that crept into Alexander's language above: I don't think our biological defense system has any "intended" functions; it just has the functions that it has.) -- Mark [1] Alternatively, to create that reality -- if you choose not to postulate that there's a reality out there that could be made intelligible in the first place. Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From language at sprynet.com Wed Mar 15 22:05:59 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 17:05:59 -0500 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: Thanks for your reply, Mark. Have no argument with the points you make, though I believe you may be using the term teleological in a sense different from the one I learned. As so often happens in our field. Take for instance, Chomsky 1957: 'Suppose we have a machine that can be in any one of a finite number of different internal states…Each such machine thus defines a certain language; namely the set of sentences that can be produced in this way.' or Chomsky 2000: 'We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed network connected to a switch box; the network is constituted of the principles of language, while the switches are the options to be determined by experience. When the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when they are set another way, we have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a particular setting of the switches - a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. If the research program succeeds, we should be able literally to deduce Swahili from one choice of settings, Japanese from another, and so on through the languages that humans can acquire...' Now if that's not a τέλος, I'd like you to explain to me exactly what a τέλος is. I'd be quite surprised if the Department of Defense regarded it as any other than a τέλος, a teleological statement of intention, ultimately aimed at creating MT systems and related applications. Are we truly in a postion to spurn teleological statements when they may be paying most of the salaries in the field of linguistics? all the best! alex ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mark P. Line" To: Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:28 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... > Alexander Gross wrote: >> >> Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger >> truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time >> period. >> >> Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a >> system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part >> of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about >> the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality >> whenever it becomes necessary. > > > Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] > intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have > the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the > reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand, but the distinction is > important enough to influence the quality of my nightly sleep. > > (As an aside, I'd note the teleological demon that crept into Alexander's > language above: I don't think our biological defense system has any > "intended" functions; it just has the functions that it has.) > > > -- Mark > > [1] Alternatively, to create that reality -- if you choose not to > postulate that there's a reality out there that could be made intelligible > in the first place. > > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 15 22:15:07 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 17:15:07 -0500 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: I'm not the first to suggest also that in many cases language is used as well to stop communications. All sorts of sociolinguistic phenomena help identify one as in- or out-member of a group (actually multidimensional grading). One doesn't necessarily want an enemy to know your plans (or have things changed radically re linguistic profiling since 9/11?), and its always good to be forewarned when some member of the riff-raff attempts to nose his way into the old-boy club. Perhaps language might be thought of as a social/technical regulatory system, with analogies not only at the genetic level, but also higher up, where other parts of the biochemical realm (such as hormones, growth factors, etc.) help to integrate or isolate multiple or individual compartments/components as needed. Even simple organisms such as sea anemonies can recognize each other chemically, as in- or out- group. And parasites must evade immune defenses in order to gain access to internal resources. The secret handshake can get you past the bouncer. As for MT, which along with NLAI got me interested in linguistics in the first place, my own take is that it is largely a positivistic reductionist mindset which is at fault for so many of the failed efforts, though giving due weight to the inertia created by establishment of powerful theoretical schools. Linguistics came very late to the 'scientific' table, and in some ways is still a party crasher (much as I am also ironically). Scott DeLancey's 'physics envy'. The ghost of Bloomfield haunts the hallowed halls, egged on by a gallery of dead Neogrammarian ancestors. But is some of this really possibly just symptomatic of the relationship linguistics (and increasingly most maturing fields) often has with funders, who don't want complex explanations as they stare at their watches and their eyes cross? A sort of evolutionary selection, where shiny, sparkly promises of simple and quick solutions to otherwise natty problems open the dollar floodgates? What kind of personal and political psychological makeup predisposes one to success in such an environment? How often does self-promoting, carefully groomed professional dynamic image prevail over substance and ability in the less appealing (and verbose) package? It is also interesting that the oversimplification of real complexity when dealing with outsiders has its inverse in the overcomplexification of simplicity in communications within the field itself to help create one's professional persona in the first place. A growing problem in many fields, blah blah blah. One tries to hope that things don't get as desperate for folks in MT as they must have been for that Korean stem-cell scientist who is in the news just now. Is it just a matter of time before somebody peers behind the curtain and sees the truth about Oz? Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From mark at polymathix.com Wed Mar 15 22:40:41 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 16:40:41 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <00ae01c6487c$a50d61a0$1b2bf7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander -- As I understood it, you were not ascribing a purpose to Chomsky, to his imaginary generative machine, to his imaginary switch box, to the U.S. Department of Defense or to the community of linguists. You were ascribing a purpose to "our biological defense system", which I understood to mean a functional subset of the human physiome. By implying that biological evolution is goal-directed, such an ascription opens up a Pandora's Box that bioscience has no need to see opened. So the short answer is that we are truly in a position to spurn teleological statements when they pertain to biological evolution. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX Alexander Gross2 wrote: > Thanks for your reply, Mark. Have no argument with the points you make, > though I believe you may be using the term teleological in a sense > different > from the one I learned. As so often happens in our field. Take for > instance, Chomsky 1957: > > 'Suppose we have a machine that can be in any one of a finite number of > different internal states…Each such machine thus defines a certain > language; > namely the set of sentences that can be produced in this way.' > > or Chomsky 2000: > > 'We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed > network connected to a switch box; the network is constituted of the > principles of language, while the switches are the options to be > determined > by experience. When the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when > they > are set another way, we have Japanese. Each possible human language is > identified as a particular setting of the switches - a setting of > parameters, in technical terminology. If the research program succeeds, we > should be able literally to deduce Swahili from one choice of settings, > Japanese from another, and so on through the languages that humans can > acquire...' > > Now if that's not a τέλος, I'd like you to explain to me exactly what > a > τέλος is. I'd be quite surprised if the Department of Defense > regarded it > as any other than a τέλος, a teleological statement of intention, > ultimately > aimed at creating MT systems and related applications. > > Are we truly in a postion to spurn teleological statements when they may > be > paying most of the salaries in the field of linguistics? > > all the best! > > alex > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Mark P. Line" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:28 PM > Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, > etc.... > > >> Alexander Gross wrote: >>> >>> Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far >>> larger >>> truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time >>> period. >>> >>> Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a >>> system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part >>> of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us >>> about >>> the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality >>> whenever it becomes necessary. >> >> >> Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] >> intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have >> the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the >> reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand, but the distinction >> is >> important enough to influence the quality of my nightly sleep. >> >> (As an aside, I'd note the teleological demon that crept into >> Alexander's >> language above: I don't think our biological defense system has any >> "intended" functions; it just has the functions that it has.) >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> [1] Alternatively, to create that reality -- if you choose not to >> postulate that there's a reality out there that could be made >> intelligible >> in the first place. >> >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX From cc at cds-web.net Wed Mar 15 23:21:19 2006 From: cc at cds-web.net (cc at cds-web.net) Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 10:21:19 +1100 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <15759317.1142460907520.JavaMail.root@elwamui-ovcar.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Indeed, we see the immunological function of language everytime an antigen is attacked by antibodies on this list. cheers, chris Quoting jess tauber : > I'm not the first to suggest also that in many cases language is used > as well to stop communications. All sorts of sociolinguistic > phenomena help identify one as in- or out-member of a group (actually > multidimensional grading). One doesn't necessarily want an enemy to > know your plans (or have things changed radically re linguistic > profiling since 9/11?), and its always good to be forewarned when > some member of the riff-raff attempts to nose his way into the > old-boy club. > > Perhaps language might be thought of as a social/technical regulatory > system, with analogies not only at the genetic level, but also higher > up, where other parts of the biochemical realm (such as hormones, > growth factors, etc.) help to integrate or isolate multiple or > individual compartments/components as needed. Even simple organisms > such as sea anemonies can recognize each other chemically, as in- or > out- group. And parasites must evade immune defenses in order to gain > access to internal resources. The secret handshake can get you past > the bouncer. > > As for MT, which along with NLAI got me interested in linguistics in > the first place, my own take is that it is largely a positivistic > reductionist mindset which is at fault for so many of the failed > efforts, though giving due weight to the inertia created by > establishment of powerful theoretical schools. Linguistics came very > late to the 'scientific' table, and in some ways is still a party > crasher (much as I am also ironically). Scott DeLancey's 'physics > envy'. The ghost of Bloomfield haunts the hallowed halls, egged on by > a gallery of dead Neogrammarian ancestors. > > But is some of this really possibly just symptomatic of the > relationship linguistics (and increasingly most maturing fields) > often has with funders, who don't want complex explanations as they > stare at their watches and their eyes cross? A sort of evolutionary > selection, where shiny, sparkly promises of simple and quick > solutions to otherwise natty problems open the dollar floodgates? > What kind of personal and political psychological makeup predisposes > one to success in such an environment? How often does self-promoting, > carefully groomed professional dynamic image prevail over substance > and ability in the less appealing (and verbose) package? > > It is also interesting that the oversimplification of real complexity > when dealing with outsiders has its inverse in the > overcomplexification of simplicity in communications within the field > itself to help create one's professional persona in the first place. > A growing problem in many fields, blah blah blah. > > One tries to hope that things don't get as desperate for folks in MT > as they must have been for that Korean stem-cell scientist who is in > the news just now. Is it just a matter of time before somebody peers > behind the curtain and sees the truth about Oz? > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > > From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 16 04:48:34 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 21:48:34 -0700 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: Alexander, Thank you for paying me the compliment by including my quote on your favorites list. I never knew that my experience as a political refugee in the phonology wars could prove so useful.I have been appreciative of the intellectual company of my fellow functionalists since joining Funknet this year--both from the quality of the debate, which I learn from, but also from the camaraderie from the intellectual wise-assing among folks with shared interests and perspectives. I actually began my training in a very strictly generative department, and take great pains not to copy that their rather extreme and repressive parochialism. I therefore never rule out where aspects of their model might come into use. Psycholinguistic tests of garden path sentences show a certain validity, and notions of constituency might be useful for examining stuttering behaviors. It might turn out that both functionalist and formalist models are describing real aspects of our speech/language cognitive system, which has a lot of built-in redundancies. An equivalent example is in theories of speech perception between Quantal Theory, based on the Distinctive Features (Ken Stevens, and the MIT crowd), and Motor Theory, based on gestures (Haskins & Co.). Investigations in neuroscience show that both models are essentially correct--they reflect two simultanous but separate streams of the same signal along parallel neural pathways, and provide redundant cues for the perception of speech. The functionalist/formalist debate may turn out the same, so when I see tribal warfare brewing, I question both sides. This has not earned me many points in popularity contests, and has denied me funding on more than one occasion. However, it is something that linguists need to be doing, and I do indeed wish to practice science as a linguist. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Alexander Gross2 : > Well, that was one of the most remarkable dustups i've ever seen here on > FUNKNET, so remarkable that some awards are surely in order. Unless I'm > mistaken, one of those awards would have to be for sheer length--what I've > seen so far in the archives suggests that it's the second longest thread in > FUNKNET history since September of 1994, measuring some 45 messages. And > also the second most verbose, coming close to 18,000 words. Which is one > reason it's taken me a while to absorb, I've even had to print it out. Plus > which, it's truly profound stuff. But then it was meant to be, wasn't it? > > Some of it was positively brilliant. And just so it doesn't sound as though > I'm merely being satirical, I'd also like to present a few awards for some of > the very best comments by those taking part, at least from my point of view. > Here they come now: > > "The plethora of contradictory labeling systems with which linguistics is > plagued suggest that perhaps no single complete system is to be found." > --Rob Freeman > > "I hope this word [epiphenomenon] falls out of fashion in linguistics sooner > rather than later." --Suzanne Kemmer > > "We probably should assume that the rules of effective information > exchange are at least as rigid as putting up a barn. There is not a lot of > wiggle > room." --Steve Long > > "Seems to me that 'paradigm shift' is more like an earthquake or someone > popping your balloon." --Jess Tauber > > "Insularity/isolation, rather than multidisciplinary interfacing, is the norm > in the publish or perish world (speaking as a member of the latter realm). > Who has time and resources for anything else?" --Jess Tauber > > "I think that in linguistics and in phonology this is a big problem. I used > to > get a lot of pressure not to read--just get in there and crack phonemes. It > is > part of the crisis of linguistics as a science--which I find to be quite > Balkanized, and waters are tricky to navigate. When that hurdle is overcome > there is the aspect of competition and professional jealousy--a minefield for > a > newcomer in the field." --Diane Lesley-Neuman > > "I think that the apparent crisis of linguistics as a science looks a lot > less dangerous if we realize that not all linguists are actually practicing > science, nor even want to practice science -- even if some of them may think > and say otherwise." --Mark P. Line > > I'm particularly pleased by these barbed remarks since they seem to be going > at least part-way in the direction I set forth at last year's LACUS > Conference. > > But I was also a bit dismayed by how much else I had to wade through to find > these gems. And by how much of that material couldn't possibly qualify as > functional linguistics, on the contrary it was mostly an apologetic for > structural linguistics, even (yugh!) the generative kind. > > I'm playing with the idea that Linguistics has truly come no further than > where it was in 1983, except that back then Geoffrey Pullum was at least able > to deliver a pep talk to the troops containing two inspiring arguments that > provided a ray of hope. > > Even though both of those arguments have long since fallen flat on their > face. It was in that year that he first published his essay that was > re-published in 1991 as "The Stranger in the Bar," as part of that > delightfully written book "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax," which for all > its geniality contained a great deal of misinformation about language and > linguistics. > > Pullum wanted to help linguists raise their own self-esteem by being able to > persuade laypersons, even someone they might meet in a bar, that there is > after all a useful, practical point to the work they do. His first ploy was > to suggest to such strangers that linguists are busily at work trying "to > program a computer to understand plain English, like the HAL 9000 computer in > Stanley Kubrick's film `2001: A Space Odyssey.' Linguistics is the subject > that figures out what you'd need to know about language in order to do that, > for English or for any other language, in a general and theoretically > principled way." > > And just in case linguists themselves were less than convinced by this > explanation, in a further pep talk he urged them to attend a conference of > the Association for Computational Linguistics, as he has just done, where > they would soon discover that the work of theoretical linguistics is so > advanced that it will soon launch unbelievably powerful machine translation > systems that will be so successful that it is difficult to "take in how fast > the technology is progressing, or how much money will be made by the > companies involved in producing it, or how many diverse sorts of people it is > going to put out of work." > > It ought to be obvious that both these arguments have failed. Assuming a > project to construct a HAL-like computer were launched today, does any one > still imagine it might be feasible, much less a good idea? And far from > putting anyone out of work--read translators--it also ought to be obvious > that those companies still active in what is left of the MT field, after they > and their colleagues have spent decades squandering billions* in public and > private funding, are now desperately trying to entice translators to strap > themselves into the demanding translation memory systems they have finally > blundered their way into devising. > > Of course these failures go even deeper and date back far beyond 1983 for > almost a full fifty years. They spring from two major errors subscribed to > by far too many linguists, one altogether abstract and theoretical, the other > altogether practical. > > The first error lay in the unfounded and unprovable belief that somehow, > despite the obvious diversity of languages, there simply _had_ to be a > unifying pattern, there _had_ to be a unifying principle that would tie all > these seemingly disparate phenomena together, even an ultimate "universal" > solution. And having evolved such an all-embracing concept, it was naturally > only a short step for these same linguists to assign themselves the unerring > ability to ferret out and define this unifying principle in great detail. > > After all, this unifying principle simply had to exist, there could be no > other possible solution, how could there be? > > The second practical error lay in the willingness of the US military to not > merely believe this theoretical approach had merit but to provide vast > funding for it over several decades. To his credit Pullum provides at least > a partial critique of this aspect in the same piece. > > And there you have it, fifty years of linguistics--or most of it--in a > nutshell. > > Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger > truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time period. > > Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a system > of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part of our > biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about the nature > of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality whenever it > becomes necessary. > > And that different peoples have created their own systems for doing so in > different ways under different circumstances in various cultures over the > centuries, even over the millennia. > > And that this process may in fact furnish at least part of the reason, part > of the underlying cause, for all the conflicting religious, political, and > social ideologies we find on all sides of us. > > And finally, if any of the foregoing is true, how do we break out of it and > move on to something less artificial and more real? > > Such a study of linguistics would be truly worthy of the time we spent > studying it and once we had even a few solutions in hand would be fairly easy > to explain to others, even to "the stranger in the bar." > > all the best to all! > > alex > > *In his extremely thorough analysis of MT for WIRED Magazine in 2000, Sheldon > Silverman credited this project with having "burned through billions of > dollars." Among all the Ph. D. theses in linguistics approved each year, it > might be useful if one could finally come up with a definitive total for the > amount spent. Whoever authored it would require far greater skills than mere > knowledge of linguistics and MT--such a researcher would also need the > accounting skills to search through national and institutional spending going > back decades and ferret out funding for MT & related NLP projects hidden > within our nation's military balance sheet, itself hidden within the total > national budget. > > ------------------------------- > Some relevant references: > > Pullum, Geoffrey. 1991 & 1983. "The stranger in the bar." Part of (pp. > 17-22) "The great Eskimo vocabulary hoax" (University of Chicago Press). > Originally published as "Linguists and computers" in the journal "Natural > Language and Linguistic Theory" (D. Reidel Publishing Company). > > Silverman, Sheldon. "Machine Translation Today," WIRED Magazine, May, 2000. > > Two presentations on evidence based linguistics at last year's LACUS > conference, online at: > > http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evidence.htm > > http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evishop.htm > > Also: "Suggested Minimal Requirements for the Advanced Study of Linguistics," > online at: > > http://language.home.sprynet.com/lingdex/minimum.htm > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Thu Mar 16 21:10:41 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 16:10:41 -0500 Subject: Functional explanations for geographical typological variation? Message-ID: I've read here and there (don't ask me if I can remember where/when) speculations that morphosyntactic type varied to some extent by latitude and elevation. Dunno if its true, and even if it is to some extent there are lots of exceptions. The claim: polysynthesis tends to be concentrated around higher elevations and away from the equator, whereas analytical languages are in lower ones and have a more equatorial distribution. At first blush one notes that part of any truth to this could have to do with subsistence patterns- agriculture does very well indeed in the warmer, wetter areas (equatorial, low elevation), whereas animal husbandry or hunting/gathering will be found more in dryer, colder areas (poleward, high elevation). Obviously resource abundance must be taken as a factor- population size and packing density of different populations (such as between California on the one hand, and the Arctic/Subarctic, on the other), and people DO move. But anyway, this little tidbit just crossed my screen: (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314085155.htm). It seems that the degree of sociality in stingless sweat bees varies in just such a fashion. Quoting one researcher: "In modern halictid bees, social behavior varies among species and even within species as a function of latitude and altitude such that species and populations at low latitudes and in warmer regions are often fully social, whereas they are solitary at higher latitudes and altitudes, which are colder." The piece continues- >Warmer regions have longer growing seasons, he explained, which allows two broods to emerge instead of one. The first brood (workers) helps raise the second brood (reproductives).< Yet- "Other social insects (such as ants, termites, paper wasps and honey bees) have reached 'a point of no return' in social evolution in which members of the lineage are now unable to revert back to a solitary condition. These insects, however, seem to be able to revert fairly easily," he concluded. Now whether this sort of thing is relevant to a human linguistic typological distribution which is itself hypothetical is at least an open question. But sometimes one can look outside ourselves to gain comparative insights, for instance geographically/environmentally motivated acoustic signal variation in animals versus perhaps similar variation in human language phonologies? Most of the very fortis phonologies are found in mountainous and other, harsher regions? Cosmopolitan societies tend to concentrate in warmer, wetter areas, develop a great deal of internal stratification/hierarchicalization, etc. which allow a single polity or overarching social identity to keep all the needed social/technical roles under one roof. Perhaps with more isolated societies many of the roles become externalized- specialization between groups which trade for goods and services they themselves cannot provide (at least as well). The hills have eyes.... Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From Salinas17 at aol.com Thu Mar 16 21:58:46 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 16:58:46 EST Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: In a message dated 3/15/06 2:29:27 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: << Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand >> On the cheery assumption that every comment is helpful, here's yet another comment. Is "reality intelligible" to my cat or dog? They certainly act like they understand what's going on, sometimes, at least for their purposes -- maybe not as much as I do, but I know some who would argue with that. These two animals navigate about the world in what seems a relatively rational way. They particularly know how to get me to give them food, open the door, get the lease, liberally provide catnip and noisy toys. Is their reality "intelligible" to them? If so, how did they do it without human language? Or is "intelligible" in some way reserved to humans? And if so, how is it defined so that it excludes animals? It would be circular to say intelligible reality is reserved to language users and then say language is what makes reality intelligible. You might as well say reality is linguistic, which would mean my dog and cat are somehow deprived of reality. Before the first human set foot in America, America was already there. It already had a geological and biological history that can be read today. It was REAL before any human ever got there. Most things are like that. They don't depend on us to be created. If we get the odd idea that we can negotiate them out by cognitively creating a reality without them in it, they will fall off the shelf and hit us in the head. Just to remind us that we don't really "make" reality. Language does to some degree have to be "a mirror of the world" in order for it to make any sense. Grammar -- no matter how "correct" -- still makes absolutely no sense if it is referring to a six foot rabbit in the room and there is no six foot rabbit in the room. The ultimate test, after all, of an MT machine is not whether or not we can harmonize the corresponding switches in the heads of speakers of different languages, but whether those speakers end up talking about the same things -- out there, where nature seems to be impatient with "realities" that don't conform to reality, no matter how the switches in our heads are set. Regards, Steve Long From Arie.Verhagen at let.LeidenUniv.nl Fri Mar 17 18:15:00 2006 From: Arie.Verhagen at let.LeidenUniv.nl (Arie Verhagen) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 19:15:00 +0100 Subject: 1 April Message-ID: Beste collega's, Zaterdag 1 april (geen grap) 2006 (en de vrijdagmiddag ervoor) vieren we in Leiden de oprichting van het LUCL, een taalkundig onderzoeksinstituut dat alle Leidse taalkundigen omvat. We doen dat met een internationaal symposium dat bepaald de moeite waard is (sprekers: John Lucy, Marianne Mithun, Neil Smith, Bernard Comrie). Ik sluit het persbericht bij. Details van het programma zijn te vinden op http://www.lucl.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?m=1&c=203 Graag nodig ik jullie uit om dit symposium bij te wonen. Als je kunt komen, stellen we het op prijs als je dat even van te voren laat weten aan het secretariaat van het LUCL (lucl at let.leidenuniv.nl). Mocht je van bepaalde medewerkers denken dat ze ook geïnteresseerd zijn, geef dit bericht dan gerust door, graag wel met hetzelfde verzoek tot aanmelding. Hartelijke groeten, --Arie ---------------------------------------- Arie Verhagen Opleiding Nederlands/LUCL Postbus 9515 2300 RA Leiden tel. +31 (0)71 527-4152 www.arieverhagen.nl ---------------------------------------- From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 17 19:31:45 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 13:31:45 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <2b6.69a6b34.314b3996@aol.com> Message-ID: Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/15/06 2:29:27 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > << Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] > intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have > the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the > reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand >> > > Is "reality intelligible" to my cat or dog? They certainly act like they > understand what's going on, sometimes, at least for their purposes -- > maybe not as much as I do, but I know some who would argue with that. I think that cats and dogs ontogenetically construct models of their environment that are not usefully reducible to physiological states (so we can go ahead and call them _cognitive_ models), and I think that's a useful working definition for intelligible-making. So, yeah. (All viruses and organisms can be said to have phylogenetic models of their environment in some sense, and presumably all organisms construct models (in some sense) ontogenetically that *are* usefully reducible to physiological states, but these are not the phenomena I was getting at in the bit you quoted above.) > Is their reality "intelligible" to them? If so, how did they do it > without human language? I didn't mean to imply that human language is the only mechanism in the universe by which an adaptive system (human, non-human animate or otherwise) might make reality intelligible to itself, and I don't think I did so imply. What I said was that I consider the intelligible-making effect of language to be primary with respect to the blinding and protecting effects mentioned by my interlocutor. > Or is "intelligible" in some way reserved to humans? No, assuming the kind of working definition I indicated above. > Before the first human set foot in America, America was already there. > It already had a geological and biological history that can be read > today. It was REAL before any human ever got there. Most things are like > that. They don't depend on us to be created. Models which emanate from this realist postulate are typically more useful than models which emanate from its absence or negation, but that doesn't mean that such alternative models cannot exist nor that they cannot be useful. > Language does to some degree have to be "a mirror of the world" in order > for it to make any sense. Grammar -- no matter how "correct" -- still > makes absolutely no sense if it is referring to a six foot rabbit in the > room and there is no six foot rabbit in the room. I would tend to disagree. I think that hearers generally cause perceived language to make sense almost at any cost, even when there may be no sense to be made of it from a more privileged frame of reference (if you can identify a more privileged frame of reference, that is). (Instance for, print in sentence this understand to fail would English of speakers native few.) -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Mar 17 20:41:05 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 15:41:05 EST Subject: Reflections cont'd Message-ID: In a message dated 3/17/06 2:35:53 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: << (Instance for, print in sentence this understand to fail would English of speakers native few.) >> Your example does not apply to what I wrote. What I wrote was that Grammar can be perfectly correct and still make no sense. Your example is about English syntax, not sense. In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it makes absolutely no sense. One doesn't even have to raise observation to the level of discourse to suspect that there was no intention to do anything with this sentence but make it grammatical and that the words are random. Grammar, naked and by itself, conveys little or no meaning at all, either to oneself ("cognitively") or to others, pragmatically. <> Listeners will give speakers the benefit of the doubt, no doubt. And grammar can give the impression of meaning, but we know that we can generate grammatical sentences that objectively intend no meaning and convey no information in terms of communication to others. That tells us that grammar -- despite everything that you hear otherwise -- is not the core of language. Grammar is like the shape of a common hammer. We can contemplate the shape of a hammer all we like. But unless we get around to asking what it is for, it will appear to hold many hidden mysteries and yield many different theories to no point. There are those of us who believe that language is most basically only another partially evolved, partially developed tool (but one of immense processing power) used by humans to affect their environment. And we have to regard any structural approaches as being deficient -- UNLESS they take central account of what that structure is aimed at. Regards, Steve Long From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 17 21:24:02 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 15:24:02 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd In-Reply-To: <303.dc3e46.314c78e1@aol.com> Message-ID: Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > > In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you > ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. > > That's fine grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I > don't -- it makes absolutely no sense. One doesn't even have to raise > observation to the level of discourse to suspect that there was no > intention to do anything with this sentence but make it grammatical and > that the words are random. While that is presumably true in the context of a linguistics mailing list, I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to study. > Grammar, naked and by itself, conveys little or no meaning at all, either > to oneself ("cognitively") or to others, pragmatically. Grammar, naked and by itself, exists in the same way as the sound of one hand clapping exists. So you can claim anything at all to be true about it as an abstraction of your own device, and nobody can say you're wrong. > That tells us that grammar -- despite everything that you hear otherwise > -- is not the core of language. Some models of language have grammar as their core, while others do not. Both kinds of model can be useful. I didn't know this was an issue here, though. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From language at sprynet.com Mon Mar 20 22:32:03 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 17:32:03 -0500 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... Message-ID: I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: _________________________ Have flicked though it and find it quite tame and utterly boring. It's this sort of linguistics that alienates me from linguistics. In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not learning foreign ones! In this way, these funknetters are as adrift as the sic-langeurs.* Just to annoy you, I think it's mostly a US-American phenomenon (sic). Smile! ---------------------------------------- *"sic langeurs" is my friend's term for those linguists who forgather on the sci.lang USENET newsgroup. all the best! alex From mark at polymathix.com Tue Mar 21 01:16:46 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 19:16:46 -0600 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... In-Reply-To: <002801c64c6e$1d986d00$912af7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander Gross2 wrote: > I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena > discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone > who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently > resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: Holy cow! An M.A. in linguistics, and publishes technical articles about language! I guess FUNKNET can only *dream* of ever getting anybody like *that* to subscribe here. Good thing we have your friend to set us straight by proxy. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Tue Mar 21 02:25:44 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 14:25:44 +1200 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... In-Reply-To: <002801c64c6e$1d986d00$912af7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: You _are_ a card, Alex! Inspired by your example I also printed out the whole thread. Uncertain who to give it to first I gave it to my dog. He ate it. What does that prove? :-) -Rob On Tuesday 21 March 2006 10:32, Alexander Gross2 wrote: > I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena > discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone > who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently > resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: > _________________________ > > Have flicked though it and find it quite tame and utterly boring. It's this > sort of linguistics that alienates me from linguistics. > > In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or > even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. > > Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not > learning foreign ones! In this way, these funknetters are as adrift as the > sic-langeurs.* Just to annoy you, I think it's mostly a US-American > phenomenon (sic). Smile! > > ---------------------------------------- > *"sic langeurs" is my friend's term for those linguists who forgather on > the sci.lang USENET newsgroup. > > all the best! > > alex From rjacobs at townesquare.net Tue Mar 21 03:10:46 2006 From: rjacobs at townesquare.net (R. A. Jacobs) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 22:10:46 -0500 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... In-Reply-To: <200603211425.44332.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Langeurs is too too langoureux! As another bloody-minded Brit, I barely skimmed Alex's friend's bloody-minded harangue-typical of the kind that lost us our empire! Still, it's obvious that Yanks don't know how to do anything properly except BS, the virtuous limeys murmur over their PG tips. Long live the Queen! Ricky >On Tuesday 21 March 2006 10:32, Alexander Gross2 wrote: >> I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena >> discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone >> who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently >> resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: >> _________________________ >> >> Have flicked though it and find it quite tame and utterly boring. It's this >> sort of linguistics that alienates me from linguistics. >> >> In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or >> even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. >> >> Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not >> learning foreign ones! In this way, these funknetters are as adrift as the >> sic-langeurs.* Just to annoy you, I think it's mostly a US-American >> phenomenon (sic). Smile! >> >> ---------------------------------------- >> *"sic langeurs" is my friend's term for those linguists who forgather on >> the sci.lang USENET newsgroup. >> >> all the best! >> >> alex From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Tue Mar 21 03:02:39 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 16:02:39 +1300 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <22668.4.230.156.122.1142450920.squirrel@webmail3.pair.com> Message-ID: Just an aside, Mark. I thought this earlier comment worked rather well on several levels: On Thursday 16 March 2006 08:28, Mark P. Line wrote: > ...Making reality intelligible does have > the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the > reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand... Did you intend to point out that intellectual blindness, as a side-effect, would thus be by some definitions itself an epiphenomenon? :-) What makes this observation really great is that this kind of blindness, and an epiphenomenon at that, seems indeed to be what is at the root of cognition. It tempts me to repeat something I read recently in the enjoyable popular book "The Unfolding of Language", by Guy Deutscher. According to Guy there is a story by Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges about a man who loses the ability to forget, and so can no longer think. Deutscher writes (p.g. 173): "Borges understood that the ability to pick out patterns, to draw analogies between unequal yet similar things, in short, to 'forget a difference', is at the very core of our intelligence." "To think is to forget a difference" says Deutscher. With appropriate corollaries to be drawn about language. -Rob From mark at polymathix.com Tue Mar 21 03:48:16 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 21:48:16 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <200603211502.39849.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote: > Just an aside, Mark. > > I thought this earlier comment worked rather well on several levels: > > On Thursday 16 March 2006 08:28, Mark P. Line wrote: >> ...Making reality intelligible does have >> the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the >> reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand... > > Did you intend to point out that intellectual blindness, as a > side-effect, would thus be by some definitions itself an epiphenomenon? Not particularly, since I wanted to stay out of the discussion of epiphenomena -- mostly because the term means too many different things to different people. If I'd jumped into that one, I'd've wanted to take it into the ontology of emergence. But emergence means too many different things to different people, too, so I'm not sure anything would be gained. > What makes this observation really great is that this kind of blindness, > and an epiphenomenon at that, seems indeed to be what is at the root of > cognition. Mm hmm. All modelling involves being blind in one eye. Cognition is modelling in the wild. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 21 04:26:22 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 23:26:22 EST Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... Message-ID: In a message dated 3/20/06 5:32:31 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not learning foreign ones! >> I have picked up a few useful phrases at the Armenian market. But there we mainly "talk about language," e.g., my new friends there ask me why English doesn't look anything like it sounds? I tell them it's because English was once a foreign language, too. But when the Brits learned it, they never really figured out how to get the sounds to match up with the letters. So, bad spelling became a kind of time-honored tradition. Then they shake their heads -- philosophically -- and say "Ah, yes, that sounds like the British..." Then we have a contest to see who knows the most esoteric verb-endings in Latin. Steve Long From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 21 13:03:12 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 08:03:12 EST Subject: Correction re Reflections Message-ID: In a message dated 3/20/06 5:32:31 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. >> Actually, this is incorrect. Alex's correspondent did not read close enough. See the following noteworthy comment by Dan Everett: In a message dated 2/27/06 2:57:05 PM, daniel.everett at uol.com.br writes: << The EU is investing several hundred thousand euros in the study of Piraha over the next three years, with several psycholinguists and linguists visiting the Pirahas to conduct follow-up experiments on my claims. So we shall have the evidence requested below over the next year or three. >> Steve Long From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 21 13:24:42 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 08:24:42 EST Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) Message-ID: I wrote: <> In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: <> No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make no sense as well. Maybe they are connected? This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality intelligible. My point is it's more useful to see it the other way around. That reality makes language intelligible. And when reality doesn't check-off on a sentence like the one above, it will tend not to make sense and therefore tend not to be used. If you turn Chomsky on his head -- "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" -- you may think what he proved was that language that makes no sense is not language. What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that any model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects of language is fundamentally inaccurate. Regards, Steve Long From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Tue Mar 21 16:51:44 2006 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 18:51:44 +0200 Subject: Reflections, etc-- English spelling Message-ID: On Mon, 20 Mar 2006 Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/20/06 5:32:31 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: > << Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not > learning foreign ones! >> > > I have picked up a few useful phrases at the Armenian market. But there we > mainly "talk about language," e.g., my new friends there ask me why English > doesn't look anything like it sounds? Below is an attempt to renew English spelling towards the situation in which the spelling would be much closer to the spoken form than nowadays. The paragraph below rephrases the paragraph above. Here I have used Finnish as the starting point as we have the fortunate situation that children have the chance to learn to spell very easily. The example makes easily sense to those who speak Latin, Italian, German, etc. with some details to explained. For example, the notations "a and "o refer to a-umlaut and o-umlaut that in Finnish are separate phonemes of their own. Ai h"av pikd ap "o fjuu juusful freisis "at th"o aarmeini"on maakit. Bat the"o wii meinli 'took "abaut l"angwitsh,' ii zii, mai njuu frends the"o aask mii whai Inglish dasnt luk enithing laik it saunds? There are still many details to be considered. For instance, the combination of letters 'th' (in 'there', 'this', etc.) could be replaced by a single letter. One might also wish to use some more commonly spoken language as starting point. It would be useful that the language would be rich in vowels and consonants that are explicitly and systematically distinguished in their written form. On the other hand, speakers of English and French might be less annoyed if the basis was Finnish rather than, e.g., German or Italian. For those of you who only speak one language it may be difficult to see any sense in this. However, in this way it would be much easier: for those future generations who still need to learn to write in English it would be useful to renew the system to save resources to some other tasks than learning to find with a lot of effort the complex mapping between spoken and written forms of language. This might feel quite outrageous from the point of view of those who have already learned this system. For many it may be difficult even to recognize the high complexity (cf. the famous "ghoti" = "fish" example). Moreover, some people might have some concerns about the preservation of cultural values... If you are aware of any such radical attempts, please send me information on them, especially if there are web-based resources available such as online lexica. I am not completely serious with this theme but I find it intriguing to point out this kind of opportunity as potentially many future generations will use English as their common ground for communication. As said, a more useful focus might be something else than learning to spell. For example, one might be able to familiarize oneself with some thousands of poems with the effort that is required for this basic task. Best regards, Timo P.S. There is also some new interest in the Finnish educational system that in practice also benefits from the simplicity of spelling (please, see the quote below). On the other hand, learning Finnish cannot be recommended before we are able to replace our case endings and other means for inflectional word formation with prepositions, etc. "In fact, the Finns, who have long felt neglected by the rest of the world, are delighted to show off their schools. But they do have a logistical problem. Foreign educators in droves want to visit Finnish schools for the simple reason that they are so good -- ..." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/23/AR2005052301622.html -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Laboratory of Computer and Information Science Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From langconf at acs.bu.edu Tue Mar 21 19:38:56 2006 From: langconf at acs.bu.edu (BUCLD) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 14:38:56 -0500 Subject: BUCLD 31 - Call for papers Message-ID: CALL FOR PAPERS THE 31st ANNUAL BOSTON UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 3-5, 2006 Keynote Speakers: Roberta Golinkoff, University of Delaware Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Temple University "Breaking the Language Barrier: The View from the Radical Middle" Plenary Speaker: Jürgen M. Meisel, University of Hamburg & University of Calgary “Multiple First Language Acquisition: A Case for Autonomous Syntactic Development in the Simultaneous Acquisition of More Than One Language” Lunch Symposium: “Future Directions in Search of Genes that Influence Language: Phenotypes, Molecules, Brains, and Growth” Mabel Rice, University of Kansas Helen Tager-Flusberg, Boston University Simon Fisher, University of Oxford Discussant: Gary Marcus, New York University  All topics in the fields of first and second language acquisition from all theoretical perspectives will be fully considered, including: * Bilingualism * Cognition & Language * Creoles & Pidgins * Dialects * Discourse * Exceptional Language * Gesture * Hearing Impairment and Deafness * Input & Interaction * Language Disorders * Linguistic Theory (Syntax, Semantics, Phonology, Morphology, Lexicon) * Literacy & Narrative * Neurolinguistics * Pragmatics * Pre-linguistic Development * Signed Languages * Sociolinguistics * Speech Perception & Production Presentations will be 20 minutes long followed by a 10 minute question period. Posters will be on display for a full day with two attended sessions during the day. ABSTRACT FORMAT AND CONTENT Abstracts submitted must represent original, unpublished research. Abstracts should be anonymous, clearly titled and no more than 450 words in length. They should also fit on one page, with an optional second page for references or figures if required. Abstracts longer than 450 words will be rejected without being evaluated. Please note the word count at the bottom of the abstract. Note that words counts need not include the abstract title or the list of references. A suggested format and style for abstracts is available at: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/template.html An excellent example of how to formulate the content of the abstract can be found on the LSA website at: http://www.lsadc.org/info/dec02bulletin/model.html The criteria used by the reviewers to evaluate abstracts can be found at: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/reviewprocess.html#rate All abstracts must be submitted as PDF documents. Specific instructions for how to create PDF documents are available at: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/pdfinfo.html. If you encounter a problem creating a PDF file, please contact us for further assistance. Please use the first author's last name as the file name (eg. Smith.pdf). No author information should appear anywhere in the contents of the PDF file itself. SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS Electronic submission: To facilitate the abstract submission process, abstracts will be submitted using the form available at the conference website at http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/abstract.htm. Specific instructions for abstract submission are available on this website. Abstracts will be accepted between April 1 and May 15. Contact information for each author must be submitted via webform. No author information should appear anywhere in the abstract PDF. At the time of submission you will be asked whether you would like your abstract to be considered for a poster, a paper, or both. Although each author may submit as many abstracts as desired, we will accept for presentation by each author: (a) a maximum of 1 first authored paper/poster, and (b) a maximum of 2 papers/posters in any authorship status. Note that no changes in authorship (including deleting an author or changing author order) will be possible after the review process is completed or for publication in the conference proceedings. DEADLINE All submissions must be received by 8:00 PM EST, May 15, 2006. Late abstracts will not be considered, whatever the reason for the delay. We regret that we cannot accept abstract submissions by fax or email. Submissions via surface mail will only be accepted in special circumstances, on a case by case basis. Please contact us well in advance of the submission deadline (May 15, 2006) to make these arrangements. ABSTRACT SELECTION Each abstract is blind reviewed by 5 reviewers from a panel of approximately 100 international scholars. Further information about the review process is available at http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/reviewprocess.html. Acknowledgment of receipt of the abstract will be sent by email as soon as possible after receipt. Notice of acceptance or rejection will be sent to first authors only, in early August, by email. Pre-registration materials and preliminary schedule will be available in late August, 2006. If your abstract is accepted, you will need to submit a 150-word abstract including title, author(s) and affiliation(s) for inclusion in the conference handbook. Guidelines will be provided along with notification of acceptance. Abstracts accepted as papers will be invited for publication in the BUCLD Proceedings. Abstracts accepted as posters will be invited for publication online only, but not in the printed version. All conference papers will be selected on the basis of abstracts submitted. Although each abstract will be evaluated individually, we will attempt to honor requests to schedule accepted papers together in group sessions. No schedule changes will be possible once the schedule is set. Scheduling requests for religious reasons only must be made before the review process is complete (i.e. at the time of submission). A space is provided on the abstract submission webform to specify such requests. FURTHER INFORMATION Information regarding the conference may be accessed on the BUCLD website: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/ Boston University Conference on Language Development 96 Cummington Street, Room 244 Boston, MA 02215 U.S.A. Telephone: (617) 353-3085 e-mail: langconf at bu.edu From mark at polymathix.com Tue Mar 21 21:21:10 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 15:21:10 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <333.63e431.3151589a@aol.com> Message-ID: Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > I wrote: > < ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine > grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it > makes absolutely no sense.>> > > > In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > > < list, > I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the > populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to study. > >> > > No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make > no sense as well. Maybe they are connected? Perhaps when you say the sentence "makes no sense" you really mean that certain semantic processes lead to contradictory entailments when applied to the sentence in the usual fashion. There's no doubt that the fact that a sentence is improbable and the fact that conventional semantic processing leads to contradiction are indeed related, as you suggest: speakers tend to devise utterances that lead to intended and generally non-contradictory entailments. But my point was that every utterance makes sense in the context of its occurrence, regardless of how poorly suited it might be for conventional semantic processing. Linguistically naive speaker/hearers confronted with contradictions are observed to engage in a divergent, *unconventional* form of semantic processing in order to produce a non-contradictory set of entailments. "In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed." I do try hard not to vent to teachers, but it did happen just this once. The fact that we'd both been waiting in the left-hand line at the ticket counter for over three hours just made me lose it. As most people know, the Society for Teacher Ventilation Recovery in Carmel, Indiana was responsible for their trademark 'carmelization' technique for dealing with teachers just such as this one, and I'm thankful that your mastery of the technique was adequate to get her back on an even keel. It was smart of you to do it with such a tender touch. On another level, I appreciate the fact that you were able to walk the fine line between condensing your response to the point of being overly terse and introducing verbal weeds for me to fight through to get to your point. > This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality > intelligible. My point is it's more useful to see it the other way > around. That reality makes language intelligible. Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing. But it turns out that nothing extra at all is needed to make language intelligible: naive speaker/hearers tend to create sense for every utterance, no matter how far they have to diverge from semantic convention. > What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that > any model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects > of language is fundamentally inaccurate. That, of course, is not news, nor would I expect you to find anybody here who disagrees. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From language at sprynet.com Wed Mar 22 05:14:32 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 00:14:32 -0500 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) Message-ID: Rob, I believe you may be overlooking a rather important element in my friend's point of view, something even Geoffrey Pullum for all his faults quite clearly recognized. He tried out two arguments to justify the work of linguists to the "stranger in the bar," but neither one remains persuasive today. The identity crisis Pullum ascribes to linguists has clearly not gone away, all the more so if the person expressing doubts about the field is not a stranger in the bar but someone who has bothered to obtain an M.A in the field and works with language on an advanced level. Mark, the offbeat example of Carmelization depends on a missing piece of context, and even though such missing context confronts us at various stages of our learning, this one is still a fairly unusual instance, as noted below. Here's something a good deal less recondite, an example I devised using an English structure to show how common Chinese four-character structures or "proverbs" work: Blows Strokes Sweep Breaths I've left out the punctuation because there wouldn't be any in Chinese. There wouldn't even be an 's' marking three of the words, because the Chinese don't usually record the plural in nouns and verbs. So how about: Blow Stroke Sweep Breath. How would you translate that into another language? Or since it's English, what would you imagine it means in your own language? Would you interpret it as something poetic and inspiring, such as "The vast wind beats on my heart, sweeping my breath away?" Or is it a tale of oarsmen being swept away while pursuing a whale? Or could it be something overtly sexual? These are typical of the sort of errors awaiting anyone trying to understand Chinese, much less translate it—and some have fallen into such traps. Or here in simply trying to understand it in English. The precise meaning of the phrase Blows, Strokes, Sweep, Breaths refers to a medical context in American English: it is a mnemonic for remembering the correct order of actions in dealing with an unconscious non-breathing patient and is regularly taught in courses on cardio-pulmonary resuscitation: blows on the back, artificial respiration, clearing the patient's air channel with one's fingers, and the "kiss of life." Such structures are quite common in Chinese and operate quite independently of grammar, even though a grammatical substructure may be imposed on them after the fact. all the best! alex ps--Three decades ago in California my wife and I, hoping to improve our education, went driving furiously around Carmel trying to find the Society for Teacher Ventilation Recovery. We were told they had pulled up stakes with no forwarding address. Perhaps we were in the wrong state. Fortunately just four miles down the road we came to Monterey, where there is an excellent translation school. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mark P. Line" To: Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 4:21 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Reflections cont'd (2) > Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >> I wrote: >> <> ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine >> grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it >> makes absolutely no sense.>> >> >> >> In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: >> >> <> list, >> I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the >> populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to >> study. >> >> >> >> No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make >> no sense as well. Maybe they are connected? > > Perhaps when you say the sentence "makes no sense" you really mean that > certain semantic processes lead to contradictory entailments when applied > to the sentence in the usual fashion. > > There's no doubt that the fact that a sentence is improbable and the fact > that conventional semantic processing leads to contradiction are indeed > related, as you suggest: speakers tend to devise utterances that lead to > intended and generally non-contradictory entailments. > > But my point was that every utterance makes sense in the context of its > occurrence, regardless of how poorly suited it might be for conventional > semantic processing. Linguistically naive speaker/hearers confronted with > contradictions are observed to engage in a divergent, *unconventional* > form of semantic processing in order to produce a non-contradictory set of > entailments. > > "In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you > ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed." > > I do try hard not to vent to teachers, but it did happen just this once. > The fact that we'd both been waiting in the left-hand line at the ticket > counter for over three hours just made me lose it. As most people know, > the Society for Teacher Ventilation Recovery in Carmel, Indiana was > responsible for their trademark 'carmelization' technique for dealing with > teachers just such as this one, and I'm thankful that your mastery of the > technique was adequate to get her back on an even keel. It was smart of > you to do it with such a tender touch. > > On another level, I appreciate the fact that you were able to walk the > fine line between condensing your response to the point of being overly > terse and introducing verbal weeds for me to fight through to get to your > point. > > >> This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality >> intelligible. My point is it's more useful to see it the other way >> around. That reality makes language intelligible. > > Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's > *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. > I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to > intervene directly in language processing. > > But it turns out that nothing extra at all is needed to make language > intelligible: naive speaker/hearers tend to create sense for every > utterance, no matter how far they have to diverge from semantic > convention. > > >> What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that >> any model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects >> of language is fundamentally inaccurate. > > That, of course, is not news, nor would I expect you to find anybody here > who disagrees. > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > From mark at polymathix.com Wed Mar 22 07:39:03 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 01:39:03 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <00b601c64d6f$81bd1900$5e28f7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander Gross2 wrote: > The identity crisis Pullum ascribes to linguists has clearly not > gone away, all the more so if the person expressing doubts about the > field is not a stranger in the bar but someone who has bothered to obtain > an M.A in the field and works with language on an advanced level. Would all linguists who are currently experiencing an identity crisis as a linguist please stand up? (I'm sure there *are* linguists who are currently experiencing an identity crisis as linguists, but I wouldn't expect very many of them to be on this list. I assume that they consist mostly of (a) the old ones who are now recognizing that things didn't work out the way they expected back in the 60's and 70's, and (b) the young ones who are now recognizing that they're doing computer science, mathematics or philosophy, but not linguistics. The rest of us are pretty much still doing the same thing we've always done, with reasonable success.) > Blow Stroke Sweep Breath. > > How would you translate that into another language? Or since it's > English, what would you imagine it means in your own language? It's probably a rule of thumb for some first-aid technique... Mnemonic phrases that do not form complete sentences are not limited to Chinese -- we have them in English as well. (Note, though, that the Mandarin original can possibly be read as a sequence of four one-word imperative clauses.) Dad Mom Sister Brother (rules for long division) First Outer Inner Last (FOIL rule for multiplying binomials) Port Out Starboard Home (POSH staterooms) Spring Forward Fall Behind (rule for Daylight Savings Time) Roy G. Biv (color spectrum) Of course, most common mnemonics in English seem to use some kind of word play and form at least one complete sentence: Pregnant Camels Ordinarily Sit Down Carefully. Perhaps Their Joints Creak (geological eras) Some Old Horse Caught Another Horse Taking Oats Away (right-triangle trig functions) -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 00:13:10 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 17:13:10 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <333.63e431.3151589a@aol.com> Message-ID: "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality intelligible." How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Salinas17 at aol.com: > I wrote: > < ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine grammar > but -- > unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it makes absolutely no > sense.>> > > > In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > > < I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the > populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to study. >> > > No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make no > sense as well. Maybe they are connected? > > This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality intelligible. > My point is it's more useful to see it the other way around. That reality > makes language intelligible. And when reality doesn't check-off on a > sentence > like the one above, it will tend not to make sense and therefore tend not to > be used. > > If you turn Chomsky on his head -- "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" > -- you may think what he proved was that language that makes no sense is not > language. > > What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that any > model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects of > language is fundamentally inaccurate. > > Regards, > Steve Long > > From mark at polymathix.com Thu Mar 23 00:36:04 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 18:36:04 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <1143072790.4421e816c5ba7@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > intelligible." > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene with my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or more realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 01:33:21 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 18:33:21 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <5274.4.230.174.87.1143074164.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by experience. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science Hellums 02 University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > > intelligible." > > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > > I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene with > my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want > to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or more > realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From mark at polymathix.com Thu Mar 23 16:00:41 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 10:00:41 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <1143077601.4421fae15e027@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > experience. That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that perception would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality >> > intelligible." >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene >> with >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or >> more >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. From remlingk at gvsu.edu Thu Mar 23 17:36:46 2006 From: remlingk at gvsu.edu (Kathryn Remlinger) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 12:36:46 -0500 Subject: Second call for papers: ADS at MMLA Message-ID: Call for Papers: Language Variation and Change in the United States The American Dialect Society, Midwest Region With the Midwest Modern Language Association, 9-12 November 2006, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago We welcome papers dealing with varieties of English and other languages spoken in the United States. Presentations may be based in traditional dialectology or in other areas of language variation and change, including sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, anthropological linguistics, folk linguistics, language and gender/sexuality, language attitudes, linguistics in the schools, critical discourse analysis, or narratology. April 15, 2006 is the deadline for 300-word abstracts. Email submissions only. Send abstracts to: Kathryn Remlinger remlingk at gvsu.edu American Dialect Society, Midwest Secretary Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan 1-616-331-3122 Membership to ADS is recommended. Membership is $50 and includes a year's subscription to the society's journal, American Speech, and a copy of the Publication of the American Dialect Society (PADS, an annual hardbound supplement). Membership information is available at www.americandialect.org Membership to MMLA is required. Membership is $35 for full and associate professors, $30 for assistant professors and schoolteachers, $20 for adjunct and part-time faculty, and $15 for students, retired, and unemployed. Information on membership is available at the website below or by writing to MMLA, 302 English-Philosophy Bldg, U of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408, tel: 1-319-335-0331. For more information about ADS at MMLA, see the MMLA website, www.uiowa.edu/~mmla, go to "Call for Papers," scroll down to "Associated Organizations," then to "American Dialect Society." -- Kathryn Remlinger, Ph.D. Associate Professor of English: Linguistics Grand Valley State University Allendale, MI 49401 USA remlingk at gvsu.edu tel: 616-331-3122 fax: 616-331-3430 From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 22:21:43 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 15:21:43 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <5282.4.230.174.131.1143129641.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: Mark, People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific standards in our field. Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > > experience. > > That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? > > In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that perception > would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to > construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it > has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > > > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > >> > intelligible." > >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > >> > >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene > >> with > >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want > >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or > >> more > >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > > From mark at polymathix.com Thu Mar 23 23:08:23 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 17:08:23 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <1143152503.44231f77cec88@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Interesting response. Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something that I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money trying to make them work today. -- Mark P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific standards in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of any signs of improvement. P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of an argument either, is it? Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > Mark, > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific > standards in our field. > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. > -- > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > Linguistics Department > Institute for Cognitive Science > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by >> > experience. >> >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? >> >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that >> perception >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. >> >> -- Mark >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX >> >> >> >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : >> > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality >> >> > intelligible." >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? >> >> >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene >> >> with >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I >> want >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or >> >> more >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. >> >> > > -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 23:41:03 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 16:41:03 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <5452.4.230.156.166.1143155303.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: Mark, Why don't you spend a week or two reading Carol Fowler's carefully planned and executed scientific research on the matter and report back to us? Start with her chapter in the latest edition of Handbook of Speech Perception (a little pricey, sorry, it just came out) and work backward for about the last 25 years. Also, take a few grad level proseminars in the psychology of perception, memory and cognition regarding the relationship between experience and mental images. They do not even have to be graduate level:400-level undergraduate courses will do. Also look at the research on Motor Theory, mirror neurons regarding how even seeing others execute speech and motor actions inform our language articulation and physical actions. Any elementary sociological study on the effect of television, any baseline study on memory will provide the evidence that you need. Combine this with a refresher course in research methods, and then see if you will still be making the same claims in this space. That is not to say that mental images as those in dreams cannot be creative, as language is creative, but we have a creative capacity to build on our experiences. My apologies for losing my patience--but linguists who shoot from the hip without reading for the background they need are one of my pet peeves. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Interesting response. > > Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct > realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something that > I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I > believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, > psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten > themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good > reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money trying > to make them work today. > > > -- Mark > > P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific standards > in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and > ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of any > signs of improvement. > > P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because > they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of > an argument either, is it? > > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > > > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > Mark, > > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and > > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage > > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am > > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you > > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy > > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific > > standards in our field. > > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining > > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their > > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over > > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground > > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. > > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and > > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, > > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. > > -- > > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > > Linguistics Department > > Institute for Cognitive Science > > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > > > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > >> > experience. > >> > >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? > >> > >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that > >> perception > >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to > >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it > >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. > >> > >> -- Mark > >> > >> Mark P. Line > >> Polymathix > >> San Antonio, TX > >> > >> > >> > >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> > > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > >> >> > intelligible." > >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > >> >> > >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene > >> >> with > >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I > >> want > >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or > >> >> more > >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 24 00:18:00 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 18:18:00 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <1143157263.4423320fd0d40@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > Mark, > Why don't you spend a week or two reading Carol Fowler's carefully planned > and > executed scientific research on the matter and report back to us? Start > with > her chapter in the latest edition of Handbook of Speech Perception (a > little > pricey, sorry, it just came out) and work backward for about the last 25 > years. Also, take a few grad level proseminars in the psychology of > perception, memory and cognition regarding the relationship between > experience > and mental images. They do not even have to be graduate level:400-level > undergraduate courses will do. > Also look at the research on Motor Theory, mirror neurons regarding how > even > seeing others execute speech and motor actions inform our language > articulation > and physical actions. Any elementary sociological study on the effect of > television, any baseline study on memory will provide the evidence that > you > need. Combine this with a refresher course in research methods, and then > see > if you will still be making the same claims in this space. That is not to > say > that mental images as those in dreams cannot be creative, as language is > creative, but we have a creative capacity to build on our experiences. > My apologies for losing my patience--but linguists who shoot from the > hip > without reading for the background they need are one of my pet peeves. > -- > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > Linguistics Department > Institute for Cognitive Science > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> Interesting response. >> >> Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct >> realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something >> that >> I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I >> believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, >> psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten >> themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good >> reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money >> trying >> to make them work today. >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific >> standards >> in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and >> ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of >> any >> signs of improvement. >> >> P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because >> they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of >> an argument either, is it? >> >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX >> >> >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> > Mark, >> > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech >> and >> > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields >> manage >> > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am >> > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and >> you >> > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy >> > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific >> > standards in our field. >> > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining >> > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and >> their >> > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war >> over >> > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground >> > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university >> programs. >> > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and >> > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, >> > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. >> > -- >> > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. >> > Linguistics Department >> > Institute for Cognitive Science >> > University of Colorado at Boulder >> > >> > >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : >> > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? >> >> >> >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that >> >> perception >> >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to >> >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that >> it >> >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. >> >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> >> >> Mark P. Line >> >> Polymathix >> >> San Antonio, TX >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : >> >> > >> >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality >> >> >> > intelligible." >> >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? >> >> >> >> >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no >> direct >> >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a >> scene >> >> >> with >> >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would >> I >> >> want >> >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct >> or >> >> >> more >> >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* >> of >> >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX >> > > -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From andrea.schalley at une.edu.au Fri Mar 24 00:18:05 2006 From: andrea.schalley at une.edu.au (Andrea Schalley) Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2006 11:18:05 +1100 Subject: Language and Cognition: PhD Student, University of New England, Australia Message-ID: PhD Scholarship in Language and Cognition The Language and Cognition Research Centre, University of New England, seeks candidates for a PhD scholarship in one of the following areas: • The origins and evolution of language • Semantic and conceptual analysis across languages • Cognitive processes in language acquisition • Models of rationality • Moral and ethical concepts. The Centre brings together researchers in psychology, linguistics, archaeology and philosophy. Details of the Centre, and of the cross-disciplinary supervision teams available for each of the research areas, can be found at: http://www.une.edu.au/arts/LangCog/ The scholarship is funded as a UNE Research Scholarship (UNERS) for three years of full-time study. This year, the stipend stands at AU$ 19,231. Relocation expenses will be subsidized (limited to the UNE maximum). Applicants should have an Honours I or II (1) Bachelor or a research Masters degree with a minimum 25% research/thesis component in a relevant discipline, or equivalent. Send expressions of interest to Professor Brian Byrne at Lang_Cog_Centre at une.edu.au. Include a cv, an outline of topics and/or areas of interest, contact details of 2 referees, and any other information that may be relevant. For further information, contact Prof. Brian Byrne or Prof. Cliff Goddard at Lang_Cog_Centre at une.edu.au. Closing date: 1 May 2006 From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Fri Mar 24 00:19:21 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 17:19:21 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <5452.4.230.156.166.1143155303.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: Direct falsifiability is not the only method of proof. there is evidence from the method of converging operations that would eventually set up the precise experiment you are looking for. You have made other claims that images have nothing to do with experience--easy ones to test and dismiss. Right now the evidence for direct realsim is deduced through converging operations from many different fields of investigation. The separation of the distal and proximal stimulus is more of a theoretical proposition that is being used in ongoing research. Do we directly perceive the tree or the sensations produced by the tree? Separating the physical object from our perception of it is a problem. Sometimes people get "burned"from very cold dishes they think are hot. Blisters form. The McGurk effect shows how our pereceptual system merges visual and auditory modalities for the construction of a percept. This evidence does show that the actual sound can differ from our percept of it--in other words, the distal stimulus and the proximal stimulus can give different information to "perceive"the object. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science Hellums 02 University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Interesting response. > > Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct > realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something that > I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I > believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, > psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten > themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good > reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money trying > to make them work today. > > > -- Mark > > P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific standards > in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and > ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of any > signs of improvement. > > P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because > they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of > an argument either, is it? > > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > > > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > Mark, > > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and > > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage > > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am > > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you > > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy > > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific > > standards in our field. > > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining > > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their > > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over > > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground > > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. > > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and > > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, > > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. > > -- > > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > > Linguistics Department > > Institute for Cognitive Science > > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > > > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > >> > experience. > >> > >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? > >> > >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that > >> perception > >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to > >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it > >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. > >> > >> -- Mark > >> > >> Mark P. Line > >> Polymathix > >> San Antonio, TX > >> > >> > >> > >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> > > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > >> >> > intelligible." > >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > >> >> > >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene > >> >> with > >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I > >> want > >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or > >> >> more > >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 24 01:10:26 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 19:10:26 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <1143159561.44233b0933582@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > Direct falsifiability is not the only method of proof. Proof is for mathematics and other kinds of philosophy, not for science. Falsifiability is an uncircumventable criterion of scientific hypotheses. Should I follow your style and suggest that you read up on the philosophy of science before trying to debate it? > You have made other claims that images have nothing to do with > experience--easy ones to test and dismiss. Where did I claim that? > Right now the evidence for direct realism is deduced through converging > operations from many different fields of investigation. The "evidence" for the Language Acquisition Device was "deduced", too. How is any of this science? And what good is it anyway, looking for evidence for something that can only be postulated? Scientific models have to be built on hypotheses, which are falsifiable, not on postulates, which are not. It suffices for hypotheses to be falsifiable *in principle*: many very successful models are rooted in hypotheses (e.g. the existence of electrons) that cannot yet be falsified empirically due to technological limitations. But statements that cannot be falsified even in principle, such as, say, that electrical current can flow only in accordance with the divine will of members of the Greek pantheon, are not hypotheses and are not a useful part of scientific progress (except by virtue of their exposure as non-hypotheses, which of course is progress in almost anybody's book). -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Fri Mar 24 15:53:11 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2006 08:53:11 -0700 Subject: Scientific methods In-Reply-To: <5576.4.230.156.206.1143162626.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: The method of converging operations is part of the scientific method. It works from a series of operations. You are testing a series of falsifiable hypotheses,using in the scientific method that you advocate, and advance through the results. These are methods that are used when trying to open the black box of perception. Direct Realism is not necessarily a postulation that I advocate. There is, however,a basis for the claims for the distal and proximal stimulus which is part of the theory. Regarding the other claims that you were making, there is indeed evidence that experience influences mental images--pretty basic stuff. Findings from mirror neuron research are pretty exciting in that they show that when actions and vocalizations are observed by a subject, the areas of the brain which execute the motor actions to imitate them are activated in the brain of the observer, and that there are neurons dedicated to making that happen. This is important to how we learn language--and provide some evidence to support the concept of gestures in Motor Theory. We learn the gestures-- combined motor actions--or even the neural motor commands--needed to articulate sounds. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > Direct falsifiability is not the only method of proof. > > Proof is for mathematics and other kinds of philosophy, not for science. > Falsifiability is an uncircumventable criterion of scientific hypotheses. > > Should I follow your style and suggest that you read up on the philosophy > of science before trying to debate it? > > > > You have made other claims that images have nothing to do with > > experience--easy ones to test and dismiss. > > Where did I claim that? > > > > Right now the evidence for direct realism is deduced through converging > > operations from many different fields of investigation. > > The "evidence" for the Language Acquisition Device was "deduced", too. > How is any of this science? And what good is it anyway, looking for > evidence for something that can only be postulated? > > Scientific models have to be built on hypotheses, which are falsifiable, > not on postulates, which are not. It suffices for hypotheses to be > falsifiable *in principle*: many very successful models are rooted in > hypotheses (e.g. the existence of electrons) that cannot yet be falsified > empirically due to technological limitations. But statements that cannot > be falsified even in principle, such as, say, that electrical current can > flow only in accordance with the divine will of members of the Greek > pantheon, are not hypotheses and are not a useful part of scientific > progress (except by virtue of their exposure as non-hypotheses, which of > course is progress in almost anybody's book). > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Sun Mar 26 00:12:13 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2006 19:12:13 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels?? Message-ID: I want to broach another possible parallelism between biological and linguistic organization. Whether it has any reality I can't say. Words obviously have more going on than just their form and meaning- there are all the various class memberships, collocational privileges and statistics, understandings of where and when they are properly or improperly used, and so on. All the things that make NLP so easy! Gene products- proteins, various RNA's- are not purely linear after transcription or translation. They fold into 2 and 3 dimensional shapes (4 if these shapes time-vary). These higher dimensional shapes, distributing mass, energy, charge, and so on, depend on internal and external interactions for their folding instructions, which can be either based on the amino acid sequence or on long-distance interactions, either within the string, or between strings, or with other molecular species and groupings. Some of these folds with their charges, solubilities, shapes naturally fit together with others. Because of external and long distance internal interactions, complete prediction of three-dimensional protein conformation for most proteins has been impossible just using sequence data, and it will stay that way until we have complete interactive maps of entire 'proteomes' (coming soon to a laboratory near you!). Some simple sequences, though, have conformations that are predictable. Could it be that something analogous goes on with languages? My own work on ideophones shows that their form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological inventory of the language. They evolve into normal lexical roots (at least some of them do, with attrition perhaps reflecting some sort of Darwin-style selection for the new function?), just as similar selection goes on in the evolution of grams from lexical items. As roots lexicalize they lose some of their form/meaning transparency (at least as concerns the 'meaning' of the root in terms of external, real world meaning). Is this simply disappearing, or is there perhaps a transferrence of function, where some of the phonology now starts coding lexical properties? Similarly, do grammaticalizing forms utilize some of their phonology to encode grammatical and later pragmatic meaning? I'm not suggesting that if this were true that there would only be one single universal pattern that all languages would adhere to- even in ideophones there are different patterns that seem to depend on the shape of the phonology, and different feature prioritizations. Thus in the path from form/meaning mapping isomorphism in ideophones through possible shift in lexemes to grams with remapping there may be many possible trajectories that different languages may take, but not perhaps an infinite number. I am reminded here of the color-term schemes of Berlin and Kay and later workers. The parallel to biology might be the creation of higher level form/function mappings which operate in greater numbers of dimensions than the very basic form/meaning type found in ideophones. We have only the external signals to look at- how all this would be instantiated in living brains would be useful to know. With functional shift there seems to be a drift also from the segmental to the prosodic. Could the opposition between the phonological types be relatable to the differences between biopolymer types? One might have to involve hydrocarbon and sugar polymers as well in the comparison. I may have mentioned that sugar polymers have been recently hypothesized to consitute a kind of mailing-address system for complex cells and organisms. Membrane hydrocarbons create all the working surfaces of cells, partial or complete boundaries between compartments, thus linking them intimately to any putative address system. I guess for most of you such musings as the above bear little resemblance to linguistics-as-we-know-it. Hoping for a little debate in any case, given the paucity of what has shown up so far. Hey, T.G., I know you're out there somewhere. Been awfully quiet. This should be right up your alley. Jess Tauber From macw at mac.com Sun Mar 26 21:09:49 2006 From: macw at mac.com (Brian Macwhinney) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 13:09:49 -0800 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Jess, I have found your comments regarding parallels between genetics and language stimulating. But I am having trouble with the details of your current claims. I agree that protein folding is one of the most beautiful examples of emergence in biology. In fact, my intro college bio textbook (Campbell, Reece, Mitchell, p. 71) says, "The function of a protein is an emergent property resulting from exquisite molecular order." The book then goes on to describe the four levels of emergent structure. Beautiful stuff that can clearly serve as a model for emergentist thinking of relations across structure. On that level, I follow your thinking. But there is nothing here about Darwinian selection of proteins. So, this level of analogy with your ideas about the emergence of the lexicon doesn't go through. This issue illustrates a general concern regarding accounts of linguistic structure as emergent phenomena. In the end, there is no doubt that all language structure is a result of emergence, albeit across many diverse time scales supported by many different mechanisms. But a proposal for a specific emergentist mechanism can be either right or wrong. I don't see how viewing the lexical inventory of a language in terms of protein folding is going to work. You could well decide instead to use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at least allow us to keep out analogies straight. But, then we need to have some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological inventory of the language." Is this basically the insight of Paget (1930) regarding sound symbolism in Indonesian? If so, getting this to work universally is going to be a pretty big project. I like the idea of getting Tom G. involved in this discussion, but maybe first we can get the details of the emergentist proposal clarified a bit. --Brian MacWhinney, CMU From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Mon Mar 27 00:17:32 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 12:17:32 +1200 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? In-Reply-To: <5565923.1143407389306.JavaMail.macw@mac.com> Message-ID: Sorry Jess, I didn't read you message in detail, but as Brian has distilled it down to protein folding for me :-) I would like to say that I for one would agree with you that there might be an analogy. Once again I wish we would get past talking about evolution (why should he "use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism" for his emergent language analogy Brian?) and consider the synchronic possibilities of syntax as alternate emergent forms, of proteins if you will. Particularly if those proteins can constantly snap back and forth into different configurations, with different functions. As far as form/meaning mappings go, I do think there is a form/meaning mapping for syntax, but as syntax becomes habitual it gathers extrinsic associations until, as a word, it is largely (completely?) symbolic (and as a phoneme even less meaningful.) I don't know what proof there is for this form/meaning mapping. It is of course suggested by Cognitive Linguistics (though they kind of turn it around and try to use it to govern syntax, a slightly chicken and egg argument to my mind.) For me it is enough that such a model gives you what I regard as the necessary power to model the complexity and elusiveness of syntax. The fact it suggests a native model for meaning as form as well is just a bonus. -Rob On Monday 27 March 2006 09:09, Brian Macwhinney wrote: > Jess, > I have found your comments regarding parallels between genetics and > language stimulating. But I am having trouble with the details of your > current claims. I agree that protein folding is one of the most beautiful > examples of emergence in biology. In fact, my intro college bio textbook > (Campbell, Reece, Mitchell, p. 71) says, "The function of a protein is an > emergent property resulting from exquisite molecular order." The book then > goes on to describe the four levels of emergent structure. Beautiful stuff > that can clearly serve as a model for emergentist thinking of relations > across structure. On that level, I follow your thinking. But there is > nothing here about Darwinian selection of proteins. So, this level of > analogy with your ideas about the emergence of the lexicon doesn't go > through. This issue illustrates a general concern regarding accounts of > linguistic structure as emergent phenomena. In the end, there is no doubt > that all language structure is a result of emergence, albeit across many > diverse time scales supported by many different mechanisms. But a proposal > for a specific emergentist mechanism can be either right or wrong. I don't > see how viewing the lexical inventory of a language in terms of protein > folding is going to work. You could well decide instead to use another, > more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at > least allow us to keep out analogies straight. But, then we need to have > some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and > based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological > inventory of the language." Is this basically the insight of Paget (1930) > regarding sound symbolism in Indonesian? If so, getting this to work > universally is going to be a pretty big project. I like the idea of getting > Tom G. involved in this discussion, but maybe first we can get the details > of the emergentist proposal clarified a bit. > > --Brian MacWhinney, CMU From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Mon Mar 27 00:39:31 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 19:39:31 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Looks like it will be you and me for the moment, though others are very welcome to join in anytime. For me the Darwinian aspect has to do with the local environment that any particular translated protein has to deal with. It must fulfill its functions. Things can go awry in various ways- it may not fit shapewise, the important functional sites on the molecule may be incorrectly structured, positioned, or instantiated in terms of chemical group. It may not appear in the right places, in the right times, or in the right amounts. It may not be amenable to proper tagging for transport, or disposal. Some changes are fatal to the organism, some only to the molecular usefulness (which in an organism with large pathway redundancy might be a drag on the system, but won't necessarily kill it). And of course there are many changes which are relatively neutral, and the occasional ones that improve the overall function of the system. Various experimentalists have pointed out that often one can substitute protein (or corresponding genes) from one species for the cognate one from another, and have it perform its primary functions. That is true- as far as it goes. Its like saying that the Datsun got us to the pet shop so it is equivalent to the Cadillac. It was recently announced (just in the last weeks) that there is vastly more juggling, in the overall proteome, of functional linkages between individual proteins, than anyone had suspected, between even relatively closely related species. This has been a rather disconcerting surprise to people who imagined they had it all figured out. A newly born protein does not find itself in either a physico-chemical or functional vacuum. It is faced with all that has come before. It will act, and be acted upon. If the environment has changed (lets suppose that a mutation in another molecule has rendered a former linkage dead), the protein may no longer be of use, at all, or to the same extent, or the same ways. Making useless parts is costly in terms of energy and material. Any further mutation at this point that stops such waste will be advantageous to the overall chemical economy. If new linkages appear, or old ones re-emerge, proteins may find themselves of use again, and mutations that help them fulfill the new functions will be advantageous. Mind you I am speaking not of Darwinian fitness of whole organisms in the outside world, but of 'parts' within the internal cellular world. Words/roots also find themselves in a preexisting economy- they stay around as long as they are useful. Sometimes they become marginalized, or expand their use. They may find their parts subsumed to new wholes, or be truncated, or built upon. In languages with a written tradition they can reappear after long disuse. They can be borrowed. And so on. All this is also true of genes, and the proteins they code. Even in languages the overall phonological shapes (both segmentally and prosodically) of words tends to be fitted to the prevailing norms of the language, unless those norms themselves shift, which is inevitable in the long term. We see this as well for genes in chromosomal structure, and in proteins, and fatty acids, polysaccharides, etc. Overall percentage of the four DNA nucleotide bases varies from species to species, sometimes vastly. It seems to have partially to do with environmental adaptation (due to 'melting temperature' of DNA), cell pressure differences, and so on. The only reason I can think of imposing such uniformity on both types of system is for ease of production and regulation. Similar logic goes into the evolution of the industrial assembly line, hierarchicalization, and such. Systemically different languages and different genomes/proteomes all have the same general objects, but the particulars of instantiation, the fine details, are where one gets the most variability. /p/ in my language may be systemically the same as /p/ in yours, but the exact phonetic value may not be, even if they are phonemically identical in terms of the usual distinctive features. We have 'accents'. Allegro speech in one language may be similar to slow speech in another. Some of these particulars may help communication in different physical (or social) environments. Linguists have in the past decades been more and more focused on the general properties of languages, seeking out the imagined essence of Language. Extremely variable fine details tend to be ignored or trivialized (but also large scaling effects may also not catch ones attention). Similar things can be seen in the development of physics of the classical, continuous kind. Later the rise of quantum physics on the one hand, and relativistic, on the other, show that systems may have very interesting and important things going on at the upper and lower bounds (not to mention linkages between these extremes that 'go around' the usual level of interest). Emergence is not the only thing going on with proteins- as I've mentioned the code does not necessarily contain all the information that goes into determining the nature of the end product. The pre-existing proteome, the lipid membranes, sugar polymers, plus all sorts of monomeric, molecular, and ionic factors act back upon the emerging object, helping to direct its immediate evolution, even its correct shape when there are choices. Genes get edited. The proteins themselves are often edited. Or tagged. Annotations. Such things are major reasons that cloning has been so difficult, and health/viability generally less than perfect. I just finished reading last night a review of a new theory of genetic imprinting which claims to explain autism as an overmasculinization of the brain. It seems that the maternal and paternal genes are neither equally nor randomly distributed in it. Paternal genes seem to be grossly relatively overactive in the action-oriented parts of the brain, while maternal ones are overactive relatively in the socially-oriented ones (such as the frontal lobes)- this is the situation in normals. Pushing the system further than this leads to overmasculinization on the one hand (and autism, with enhanced technical capacity) or overfeminization on the other (and oversociability and reduced technical capacity- it almost sounds like a bad joke based on stereotypes!). Anyway, if true the only mechanisms that could accomplish such functional/anatomical split are editing and tagging of the DNA, RNA, or protein 'from above'. Selection does not have to be mindless- molecule as stranger in a strange land. The system itself can if complex enough make decisions whether to accept a new entry into the fold that depend on its overall state at that time. Sexual selection is an example. In any case I am NOT hypothesizing any direct comparability between protein folding and linguistic phenomena. The one relates to real physical objects in an objectively real universe (but lets not get started on that...) and the other to 'virtual objects' real only within functioning brains. But what I said about dimensional shift should still hold in some fashion. Not homology but analogy. Nucleic acid polymer storage forms are mostly linearized (spiral often, on nucleosomes- you might want to think 'fractals' here)- but RNA transcripts have kinks, hairpins, local same-strand self-spirals, etc. which add dimensionality relative to the parent DNA. Translated protein has much more dimensional elaboration- and incorporation into a larger protein universe with myriad (though spatially limited) dimensionalities. Seems to be some sort of trade-off between low dimensionality but large continuity (DNA, or in physics the four dimensions of space-time, or in chemistry pure phases, and so on), versus high dimensionality and relative discontinuity, and mixture (as in the proteome, hidden dimensions popularized in String Theory, and chemical dynamic interface/interphase (such as a shaken salad dressing, or the bands of Jupiter's atmosphere and their finer and finer gradations of eddying). It may also be telling that the low-dimensional forms seem to be the most 'object' or 'patient'-like in that they are capable of being acted upon, but not acting of their own accord. Great for storing information, or for providing fodder to be plugged in elsewhere. They provide the continuity, stability. High-dimensional parts of the system, however, appear to be constantly in flux, always robbing Peter to pay Paul, jockeying for position in the hierarchy they've created. Perhaps it is the very 'spatial' (or other property) truncations that lead to such infighting. This is where one sees the making and breaking of inter-linkages between members, wheeling and dealing, negotiations and renegotiations. But one also sees complexity differences even within DNA- more with actual genes, a bit less for intervening sequences within the intron/exon system, and minimal for the long stretches of regulatory material (zillions of short repeats) between actual genes. It would be interesting to see how this maps to the higher dimensional parts of the system up in the hierarchy- inverse complexity? My hypothesis (not a claim, since the evidence isn't all in, even for me) is that the communicative signals must contain the information actually being transferred (not terribly controversial, I hope)- but that it is perhaps possible that some of the information is iconically encoded. For ideophones this is very much the case- but then ideophones are NOT terribly intertwined with syntax and hierarchical discourse structure- their focus rather is with the immediate physicomechanical characterization of a material property or action of sorts usually uncontrollable by the experiencer or executor. At this level of coding initial labial stops associate with relaxation of pressure nearly universally in the world's languages (either by complete or partial material failure of the holding wall of the container- leading to either popped or bulbous shapes, etc.), initial apical stops with directed blunt impacts, and so on. Part of the motivation is the exapted function of the articulators in eating, drinking, tasting, breathing, and so on, but also these have evolved from the primate condition to be primarily communicative in function, and so the acoustic features of the articulations have also been systematized (as ears have evolved, also). Paget's work was to some extent crosslinguistic, but not vastly so, but also remember the period in which he was working, the level of knowledge at the time. If you want to see a good thorough bibliography on sound symbolism visit Margaret Magnus' web pages (www.conknet.com/~mmagnus, and various pages within). M.M. has a rather New Age take on the phenomena in question, while I'm a dyed-in-the-wool evolutionist. I've been working on this, but not publishing, for the past 25 years, and have looked very closely now at dozens of languages, less so for hundreds more. As ideophones evolve towards lexical status they begin to lose their formulaic iconicity (imagic for the acoustic side, diagrammatic for the articulatory) mapping to 'real world, non-human' static or dynamic properties. Lexical features get picked up. But my question is whether they are done so in random fashion, or is there something more going on? People have noticed before that different lexical classes in some languages (such as English) don't statistically have the same average makeup phonologically- a lot of this is due to the history of these classes diachronically, but this is exactly the same sort of system 'drift' I posit for the genome/proteome. Again- is this random, or are there more things happening out of sight, out of mind? Classical physics emerges from quantum democracy- we 'see' the former, but but have to infer the latter. Brownian motion just too fine-grained for visibility. We see the rise of morphological marking often helping us differentiate form/function classes (though this can be lost, fossilized- just as one sees in the genome). Are the marks chosen for grammaticalization randomly? No. They tend to be from particular types of semantic fields (time, space, etc.), with more general senses than other forms. Kinda reminds me of the dimensional thing. We see loss of segmentalism and rise of prosody in the realm beyond the lexicon. Is this just an accidental fact- or is there something systemic going on here, going back to the way brains function? What about dimensionality in this area? Phase purity, versus mixture, and featural complexity? Synthesis versus analysis, and remixing, renegotiating links, functions? Paralleling this is change of focus from the content of the message to the message of the content, as one goes from lexical meaning to grammatical to pragmatic. I've hypothesized that the 'soup' of features present beyond morphological evolution is to some extent similar in some ways to that found in cells at certain points in their cycles- elaborated structure broken down leaving only the seeds (but always remembering that cells never completely break down- there is always enough infrastructure left to rebuild upon)- perhaps another example of this sort of thing is the insect pupa? The ultimate origin of ideophones has often been dismissively characterized as 'imitative'- but this says nothing about class status, semantic and morphosyntactic behavior, diagrammatic iconicity (following the existing phonological system architecture)- why should any of this be there, and exhibiting universals as well, if it is only 'imitation'? It is now becoming generally understood by historical linguists that ideophones do in fact often feed the lexicon, just as it is well known that the lexicon feeds the grammatical morphology. Does it end here? As grams wear away to 'just the smile' do they disappear? Segmentally yes. Does anything survive, a ghost perhaps within the historical cumulation of the whole system? Prosody? We also don't have a good theory of the origins of nonideophonic interjections- whose crosslinguistic study lags way behind even the few compartative works on ideophones. I hypothesize that SOME of these interjections form the phonological cores around which many ideophones crystallize segmentally. There seems to be selection and attrition at each change of state. Bridging the gap between grams and interjections, if there is one, will be the hardest part of making this a cycling system. Much of what I write here is just reiteration of things I've said before, with my usual overdense dose of rambling. There do seem to be analogies to different types of evolution within cells- just as between cells, between organisms, populations, etc. There doesn't seem to be any reason to assume any break at the cell wall. Our bodies are complex organismal systems which have minds, cells are complex chemical systems- which may have some analogue of a mind. Ask an amoeba. Bottom-up emergence may explain some properties of systems and their parts, but not all. There are also top-down effects. The really interesting stuff happens in between, at the level of greatest mixing, interaction, complexity, dimensionality. Of course if the highest levels are also of simple dimension, and there is 'back-door' interaction between bottom and top (as there seems to be in many cases in nature), then the snake bites its own tail. Einstein might approve, one would think. No loose ends, no priveleged reference frames, perhaps? And I haven't even touched today on the evolution OF language! My inbox has more replies- will answer them in turn as I can. Thanks! Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Mon Mar 27 01:10:56 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 18:10:56 -0700 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? In-Reply-To: <200603271217.32727.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Juan Uriagereka at University of Maryland College Park is working on this-- in conjunction with Chomskyian syntax. He is broadminded enough to work with people in any framework, however, in the spirit of a true scientist. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Rob Freeman : > Sorry Jess, I didn't read you message in detail, but as Brian has distilled > it > down to protein folding for me :-) I would like to say that I for one would > agree with you that there might be an analogy. > > Once again I wish we would get past talking about evolution (why should he > "use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism" for his emergent > language analogy Brian?) and consider the synchronic possibilities of syntax > as alternate emergent forms, of proteins if you will. Particularly if those > proteins can constantly snap back and forth into different configurations, > with different functions. > > As far as form/meaning mappings go, I do think there is a form/meaning > mapping > for syntax, but as syntax becomes habitual it gathers extrinsic associations > until, as a word, it is largely (completely?) symbolic (and as a phoneme even > less meaningful.) > > I don't know what proof there is for this form/meaning mapping. It is of > course suggested by Cognitive Linguistics (though they kind of turn it around > and try to use it to govern syntax, a slightly chicken and egg argument to my > mind.) For me it is enough that such a model gives you what I regard as the > necessary power to model the complexity and elusiveness of syntax. The fact > it suggests a native model for meaning as form as well is just a bonus. > > -Rob > > On Monday 27 March 2006 09:09, Brian Macwhinney wrote: > > Jess, > > I have found your comments regarding parallels between genetics and > > language stimulating. But I am having trouble with the details of your > > current claims. I agree that protein folding is one of the most beautiful > > examples of emergence in biology. In fact, my intro college bio textbook > > (Campbell, Reece, Mitchell, p. 71) says, "The function of a protein is an > > emergent property resulting from exquisite molecular order." The book then > > goes on to describe the four levels of emergent structure. Beautiful stuff > > that can clearly serve as a model for emergentist thinking of relations > > across structure. On that level, I follow your thinking. But there is > > nothing here about Darwinian selection of proteins. So, this level of > > analogy with your ideas about the emergence of the lexicon doesn't go > > through. This issue illustrates a general concern regarding accounts of > > linguistic structure as emergent phenomena. In the end, there is no doubt > > that all language structure is a result of emergence, albeit across many > > diverse time scales supported by many different mechanisms. But a proposal > > for a specific emergentist mechanism can be either right or wrong. I don't > > see how viewing the lexical inventory of a language in terms of protein > > folding is going to work. You could well decide instead to use another, > > more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at > > least allow us to keep out analogies straight. But, then we need to have > > some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and > > based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological > > inventory of the language." Is this basically the insight of Paget (1930) > > regarding sound symbolism in Indonesian? If so, getting this to work > > universally is going to be a pretty big project. I like the idea of getting > > Tom G. involved in this discussion, but maybe first we can get the details > > of the emergentist proposal clarified a bit. > > > > --Brian MacWhinney, CMU > From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Mar 27 04:55:02 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 23:55:02 EST Subject: Reality and Language Message-ID: In a message dated 3/21/06 4:21:52 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: << Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing. >> (Please forgive the late response.) If you want to experience "what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing," all you have to do is wake up in the morning. I find yours a strange statement and I'm amazed that there was so little reaction on the list to it. I presume that you are talking from some kind of non-scientific or mystic point of view. Which I respect, but it has nothing to do with science or hopefully this forum. >>From a naturalistic point of view, the real world is an independent objective reality. It does not depend on subjective understandings for its existence. Human language is part of that reality. It does not depend on subjective understanding for its existence. If your "understanding of reality" is that there is no such thing as human language, you'd be wrong -- scientifically speaking. The same goes for "language processing." We can use language any way we like. We can adopt an "understanding of reality" that makes us walk around all day repeating nothing but four-letter words. But our personal subjective understanding will not affect the real world consequences of walking around all day repeating nothing but four-letter words. The real world is an 18-wheeler and it will run you over no matter what your subjective "understanding of reality" is. Over the long term, the real objective world has shaped our language. I think that the categories of grammar -- noun, verb, etc. -- mirrors what humans have learned about the world -- that it contains objects and actions, an arrow of time reflected in tense and conditionality, etc. There may be alternative "realities" but human language has done a very good job of storing a fair picture of the independently existing real world. Our technological prowess demonstrates this, I believe. Perhaps the real world becomes less apparent in the comfortable condition all our technology has produced for us. If we had to dig and scratch to find food or shelter every minute of the day, we might be more inclined to take reality a bit more seriously in our theorizing. And we might be more aware how reality shapes our language, our thinking and our actions, if it was a constant matter of survival rather than our favorite cognitive imagings. Regards, Steve Long From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Mon Mar 27 05:27:59 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 22:27:59 -0700 Subject: Reality and Language In-Reply-To: <36b.717a63.3158ca26@aol.com> Message-ID: Steve, I think people are ignoring Mark because he's stirring up trouble in a sometimes unproductive way, They are letting it drop because there is no list manager to police things. But actually, some of the disagreements in phonology are similar to the issues you two are raising. The functionalist-- phsyiologically-based, vs. the formalist -'"it's in your head" is a common disagreement. My view is that more research is needed. Shoot for an operational definition for when a "phonetic process" becomes phonologized. The debate over where phonetics ends and phonology begins needs to be explored with more scientific accuracy. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Salinas17 at aol.com: > In a message dated 3/21/06 4:21:52 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > << Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's > *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I > can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to > intervene > directly in language processing. >> > > (Please forgive the late response.) > > If you want to experience "what the universe would have to be like for > reality to intervene directly in language processing," all you have to do is > wake up > in the morning. > > I find yours a strange statement and I'm amazed that there was so little > reaction on the list to it. > > I presume that you are talking from some kind of non-scientific or mystic > point of view. Which I respect, but it has nothing to do with science or > hopefully this forum. > > >From a naturalistic point of view, the real world is an independent > objective > reality. It does not depend on subjective understandings for its existence. > Human language is part of that reality. It does not depend on subjective > understanding for its existence. If your "understanding of reality" is that > there is no such thing as human language, you'd be wrong -- scientifically > speaking. The same goes for "language processing." > > We can use language any way we like. We can adopt an "understanding of > reality" that makes us walk around all day repeating nothing but four-letter > words. > But our personal subjective understanding will not affect the real world > consequences of walking around all day repeating nothing but four-letter > words. > The real world is an 18-wheeler and it will run you over no matter what your > subjective "understanding of reality" is. > > Over the long term, the real objective world has shaped our language. I > think that the categories of grammar -- noun, verb, etc. -- mirrors what > humans > have learned about the world -- that it contains objects and actions, an > arrow > of time reflected in tense and conditionality, etc. There may be alternative > "realities" but human language has done a very good job of storing a fair > picture of the independently existing real world. Our technological prowess > demonstrates this, I believe. > > Perhaps the real world becomes less apparent in the comfortable condition all > our technology has produced for us. If we had to dig and scratch to find > food or shelter every minute of the day, we might be more inclined to take > reality a bit more seriously in our theorizing. And we might be more aware > how > reality shapes our language, our thinking and our actions, if it was a > constant > matter of survival rather than our favorite cognitive imagings. > > Regards, > Steve Long > From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Mar 27 06:45:44 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 01:45:44 EST Subject: Better than biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: In a message dated 3/26/06 4:10:23 PM, macw at mac.com writes: << You could well decide instead to use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at least allow us to keep our analogies straight. >> Or, better yet, one might use a more purposeful form of development than biology or evolution. Proteins reflect a highly complex process, but I hope no one is saying that their structure or function is intentional. There are probably excellent examples of complexity and emergence in human technology that would make far superior analogies to the very intention driven structure of language. For example, if you trace the physics, mathematics, chemical and material engineering necessary to bring Stone Age projectile to Mars explorer, you'd see a long line of emergences, wouldn't you? And, like language, all were objective-driven. Some of them perhaps as elegant as protein folding? Or how about the emergence over time of technologies that allow us to observe and decipher proteins? Or do the human genome? Or cell phones and race cars, for that matter? At least you'd be comparing apples and apples, one would think. << But, then we need to have some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological inventory of the language." >> Or even that such processing -- whether crisp or not -- is somehow independent of action/effect mapping that may include not just dictionary "meanings" of words, but more importantly what the effect of using a particular piece of language has been and therefore might be in the future. The phonological part of matching would be far less complex than the "mapping" of everything words can make happen when we use them or hear them. When we read Shakespeare's "Sleep, that mends the raveled sleeve of care," do we really think that the phonemes would be the most difficult thing to map? Regards, Steve Long From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Mon Mar 27 07:38:55 2006 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 10:38:55 +0300 Subject: Reality and Language In-Reply-To: <36b.717a63.3158ca26@aol.com> Message-ID: On Sun, 26 Mar 2006 Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/21/06 4:21:52 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > << Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's > *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I > can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene > directly in language processing. >> > > (Please forgive the late response.) > > If you want to experience "what the universe would have to be like for > reality to intervene directly in language processing," all you have to do is wake up > in the morning. > > I find yours a strange statement and I'm amazed that there was so little > reaction on the list to it. > > I presume that you are talking from some kind of non-scientific or mystic > point of view. Which I respect, but it has nothing to do with science or > hopefully this forum. I understand Mark's comment from quite a different point of view. His comment is quite short and gives thus, of course, room for many kinds of interpretations. For me, though, the first interpretation is the one that has nothing to do with non-scientific or mystic point of view. A side remark: In general I have found some recent communications in the list have been quite unscientific (to use this beloved term) because of many kinds of examples of fallacious argumentation (see, for examples, http://www.don-lindsay-archive.org/skeptic/arguments.html). Some categories (quoting the web site): - Ad hominem: attacking the person instead of attacking his argument. - Appeal to anonymous authority: an appeal to authority is made, but the authority is not named. For example, "Experts agree that ..", "scientists say .." - Bad analogy: claiming that two situations are highly similar, when they aren't. - Argument by emotive language (appeal to the people): using emotionally loaded words to sway the audience's sentiments instead of their minds. - Argument by selective reading: making it seem as if the weakest of an opponent's arguments was the best he had. - Inflation of conflict: arguing that scholars debate a certain point. Therefore, they must know nothing, and their entire field of knowledge is "in crisis" or does not properly exist at all. One would be tempted, for example, to follow these recent tendencies by saying that one should not take seriously a scholar who uses spelling "Chomskyian" (this is not what I personally think but let's use it as a new example of fallacious argumentation). Back to the original question: You mention that > Over the long term, the real objective world has shaped our language. I > think that the categories of grammar -- noun, verb, etc. -- mirrors what humans > have learned about the world -- that it contains objects and actions, an arrow > of time reflected in tense and conditionality, etc. There may be alternative > "realities" but human language has done a very good job of storing a fair > picture of the independently existing real world. Our technological prowess > demonstrates this, I believe. I don't see a great mismatch with your point of view and when Mark says, "[a]t best, a person's *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible." As you say, the real objective world has shaped our language over the long term. This shaping process has taken place through human beings, individual persons' understandings. A very large number of individuals have contributed to the formation of the language*s*, the great variety of them, not to forget the individual level (we all have a language of our own that probabilistically resembles more or less the language of some other person - I am aware of the "private language argument" and quite critical towards the common formulations of it that do not take into account the statistical nature of language learning and emergence). The languages mirror the world thanks to this process of distilling. However, the process is far from deterministic and "logic-based". Moreover, I think it is important to keep in mind what Maturana, Varela, von Foerster etc. have presented about the nature of living and cognitive systems. For instance, Von Foerster has presented very clear arguments supporting the idea that our primitive experiences do not consist of objects and events. The emergent mapping between emerging language and world is a culturally, socially and cognitively grounded complex process. Those regularities that are important for human being become reflected in our languages but there is no logical more or less one-to-one mapping between the language and the world (cf. e.g. early Wittgenstein as a prototypical proponent of such a debatable view that many logicians and formal semanticians still seem to support). Best regards, Timo P.S. Heinz von Foester: Notes on an Epistemology for Living Things, BCL Report. No. 9.3 (BCL Fiche No. 104/1), Biological Computer Laboratory, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illionois, Urbana, 24 S., 1972. -- Reprinted in the books "Observing Systems" and "Understanding Understanding". -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Laboratory of Computer and Information Science Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From a.m.koskela at sussex.ac.uk Mon Mar 27 17:31:39 2006 From: a.m.koskela at sussex.ac.uk (Anu Koskela) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 18:31:39 +0100 Subject: Extended call deadline: PG Conference in Cognitive Linguistics Message-ID: **EXTENDED DEADLINE** CALL FOR PAPERS: The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics Department of Linguistics and English Language, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK We are delighted to announce the first UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics, to take place at the University of Sussex on Saturday, 27th May 2006. This is the first conference in the UK aimed specifically for postgraduates working in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Linguistics is a relatively new, interdisciplinary approach to the study of language which focuses on the interaction between human language, cognition and experience. The purpose of the conference is to provide a forum for postgraduate researchers in Cognitive Linguistics to exchange ideas and present new research. The conference will also feature plenary talks and workshops by the following invited speakers: Dr Vyvyan Evans (University of Sussex): keynote lecture on "The Cognitive Linguistics Enterprise: An Overview" Prof. Gilles Fauconnier (University of California San Diego): a workshop on conceptual blending theory Prof. Chris Sinha (University of Portsmouth): a keynote lecture on "Language as a biocultural niche" Abstract submissions: We invite submissions of abstracts for 20 minute presentations (followed by 10 minutes of discussion) on research pertaining to any area of Cognitive Linguistics. ***Extended deadline for abstracts: 3rd April*** Notification of acceptance: 24th April Abstract format: - Only electronic submissions are accepted. - The abstracts should be submitted to the email address abstracts at cogling.org.uk, with the email subject "First PG Conference in Cognitive Linguistics" - The abstract should be sent as an attachment to an email message, in either MS Word (.doc), Rich Text Format (.rtf) or Adobe Acrobat (.pdf ) format - The length of the submissions is a maximum of 500 words or 1 A4 side. The abstract should clearly indicate the title of the talk, and may include references, but the total word count should not exceed 500 words. - The abstracts will be subject to anonymous review, so the abstract should not include the name(s) of the author(s) - The body of the email message should contain the following information: The author's name, affiliation, title of the paper and contact details (postal and email address) For further details about the conference, please visit www.cogling.org.uk/pgccl. The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics is associated with the Portsmouth-Sussex Symposium on Language and Cognition, which takes place at the Universities of Sussex and Portsmouth on the two days preceding the First Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics - 25-26th May 2006. Links to further information about the Portsmouth-Sussex Symposium on Language and Cognition can be found under Conferences at www.cogling.org.uk. The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics is sponsored by the Linguistic Association of Great Britain and the University of Sussex Graduate Centre in the School of Humanities. We look forward to receiving your abstract(s) and seeing you at Sussex at The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics! Anu Koskela Chair of the Organising Committee for the First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics Anu Koskela DPhil Candidate Dept. of Linguistics and English Language/ Centre for Research in Cognitive Science University of Sussex Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN UK From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Mon Mar 27 19:58:46 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 12:58:46 -0700 Subject: Language, reality, meaning questions/considerations for the list Message-ID: I would like to pose the following questions/considerations stemming from recent postings, with an appreciation for the diversity of ideas that may result. While some may take the position that phonetics and phonology may be "simple"or simpler than other types of mapping, we still have not truly figured out many aspects of language processing in which it is involved. We also may use it to track and aid our understanding of what are considered to be higher level processes, which bear on the language and reality debate. Keeping in mind: 1. The phenomenon of semantic priming in lexical access experiments.("doctor" will allow a faster retrieval of "nurse" in lexical access tasks.) 2. The fact that in some languages single phonemes, nasalization, tone,aspiration, glottalization are factors in the morphological, syntactic and semantic systems. 3. Even in languages where phonetics/phonology have a predominantly alphabetic encoding function of longer units of meaning,social meanings are attached to nasalization, velarization,and other phonological processes, as well as to prosody. Social meanings are interpretations of reality and affect word choice and conversational pragmatics during the communication process. 4. Even in these more alphabetic-style languages, speakers will take the trouble to preserve segments that are weaker in the hierarchy of targets and triggers (weaker segments that are targets of assimilation and elision) because there are meanings important to the speech community attached to their presence in the communication stream. While these considerations constitute a more "nuts-and-bolts"take on the debate over language and reality, and are possibly considered to be more proletarian, I would appreciate ideas from the list contributors regarding how they integrate these considerations into their models of language and the interpretation of reality. Many thanks to all, -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Mon Mar 27 21:45:26 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 16:45:26 -0500 Subject: Language, reality, meaning questions/considerations for the list Message-ID: Thanks, Diane. Open the floodgates and see what happens! All sorts of nifty little phenomena here. The late Roger Wescott promoted the notion of 'labioderogation', where labial segments are used (especially as replacement initials in rhyming forms) expressing negative, dismissive and related feelings towards the referent of the original form. These are not found universally in the world's languages, but are mainly found across Eurasia, all the way from Basque in the west to at least one Tungusic language in the east, and also in India. One interesting thing is that this swath has been mostly areally case-marking, verb-final languages. Where language type is changing (as in Europe), these forms may be slowly becoming historical curiosities. A mirror system seems to be more prevalent in South-East Asia (with India as a mixing zone), where palatal or alveopalatal (articulation zone) segments seem to have belittling function in reduplicative replacements. My own survey seems to indicate that while both replacements can be used negatively, the total evaluation is different- the labials are more in line with pejorative augmentatives, while the palatal area phonemes are more hyperchoristic diminutives. Another interesting thing is the languages using mostly the palatal type seem to be be largely in a left-headed zone areally. Furthermore John Haiman has written about poetic preferences- left headed languages prefer alliteration, right headed prefer rhyming. I'm guessing the phonemic replacement phenomena are linked to this as well- we see palatal finals or suffixes in many right-headed languages used as diminutives (versus the form-initial replacement augmentative derogates)- in the South East Asian situation there may also be some leaning towards labial finals in derogational senses. Overall a mirror symmetry, if this is in fact true. In Chinook (Penutian, Oregon/Washington) there was a very extensive system of augmentative/diminutive alternations (the most thorough in the Americas). It involved both articulatory position as well as manner- Edward Sapir wrote about this after his journey through the region in the first years of the 20th century with Franz Boas. More recently Michael Silverstein has reviewed the system. Interestingly here, the Chinookan phonological system had two extreme outliers that had no manner series- /qp/, a hyperaugmentative, and /t-th (thorn-affricate?)/, a hyperdiminutive. The phonological system in my work has been based on geometrical oppositions- many of the systems in the North American Pacific Northwest can be visualized as cubes, with two axes representing grave versus acute, and compact versus diffuse (in Jakobsonian parlance). The phonosemantic extrema /qp/ and /t-th/ in the Chinook system are at opposite vertices (through the cube center). The other alternations of augmentative versus diminutive values in the system fall along the diagonals of faces, and legs. Similar systematicity may be found in the very extensive sound symbolic alternations of Korean, which appear also to have affected the development of their writing system by King Sejong (and friends), and the notion of Yin/Yang opposition. One should not neglect manner and secondary featural 'symbolism' either. Uvularization in Salishan languages is used to secondarily mark roots as being 'pressed' in its real-world semantic notion more than the unmarked form. Salishan is left-headed. In right-headed Athapaskan languages, it is instead an augmentative. Johanna Nichols wrote about such language and family differences in a paper from the early '70's, but did not look for any typological factors that might dispose choices one way or the other, ironic from the POV of her later work. Nasalization often has a negative evaluation- as in some South East Asian languages. In Japanese, on the other hand, when added to ideophone roots finally, it lends a sense of internal damped vibration. Onomatopes in the Muskogean family (Alabama, Choctaw, etc.) in the gulf region of North America are almost entirely limited to representing animal cries (but not all of the latter are nasalized). Nasals are phonologically anti-resonant, so the Japanese damping idea may not be unnatural in motivation. In at least my ideolect of English, in affective interjections, the series of mmm, nnnn, nynyny, ngngng seems to be associated grossly with increasing levels of reservation and doubt (though other additional features come into play as well). Against this the more resonant palatals, velars, uvulars- the palatals at least crosslinguistically associate with brightness, external visibility, ringing tones, and so on. There is probably a complete symmetrical system behind all this, mapping differentially onto the various semantic areas of sound, light, motion, evaluation, and so on. We see a complex mixture and assume that it is all a kluge. But underlyingly the notions of damped vibration, internality (introversion?), doubt, and lowered animacy may actually be part of the same model of reality. Many of you might question why I'm writing here about this rather than on the typology discussion lists- frankly most of the chattier typologists I've encountered don't seem to be remotely interested in it. Sound symbolism studies tend to throw a monkey wrench into many of the the more controversial historical linguistic ideas of Joseph Greenberg and his students (you know who you are), and there seems to be some sort of unwarrented reactionary wagon-circling extending to typological work which followed from his. Comments? Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 28 03:08:21 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 22:08:21 EST Subject: Reality and Language (2) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/27/06 2:41:53 AM, timo.honkela at tkk.fi writes: << A side remark: In general I have found some recent communications in the list have been quite unscientific (to use this beloved term) because of many kinds of examples of fallacious argumentation >> I, for one, appreciate your listing of many kinds of examples of fallacious argumentation and, based on it, I have forsworn all and any further such fallacious arguments, starting right after this e-mail. <> I think Chomskyi himself prefers Chomskayan. <> Timo, what Mark also wrote was: "Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible... I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing." Though I'm a firm believer in favorable interpretations (especially of anything I write), forgive me, but I think you may be stretching things a bit here. And my original point was, of course, that our personal or communal *understanding* is in the end irrelevant. That point is there is an objective reality -- independent of our understanding -- and that point simply has been a consistent working assumption of "science" for a long time. I don't see where the misunderstanding could be. But if you have no trouble reconciling "Reality makes language intelligible" with "Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible," be my guest. <> To the extent that there is "no logical more or less one-to-one mapping between the language and the world", a very logical conclusion (if such things matter) might be that this is due to the inadequacy of language, not the world. It would appear to be simply incorrect to say that human language is NOT an ATTEMPT to make a map of the world. Language not doubt does have other functions. But one of the primary functions -- purposeful objectives -- of language is to create symbolic counterparts to the real world. That is where we get our communal "understanding" in language from. Otherwise we have no common reference or sense -- and we all blabbering to ourselves in our own private "cognitive" compartments. <<(cf. e.g. early Wittgenstein as a prototypical proponent of such a debatable view that many logicians and formal semanticians still seem to support).>> Long before Wittgenstein, language as a "mirror of the world" was a well-developed and well-informed concept. At the dawn of printing technology, an encylopedia of "all thyngs" printed by Caxton was called quite knowingly "Mirror of the World." Over all those centuries what you call a debateable view has really only been contested by the persisting neo-platonists' view that language and cognition were actually a mirror or map of a higher reality, of which the world is only a rough approximation. I'd suggest that what is highly debateable is any view that language is not an attempt to mirror or map the world. Such a view fundamentally denies the symbolic nature of language -- what could language be symbolic of otherwise, if not the world? (And by the world, I mean anything in it, including cognition, perception, grammar, syntax and all the other processes we attempt to mirror or map by using language on this forum.) I believe that Wittgenstein left the thinking in Tractatus behind because he was faced with a different difficulty -- where language is used aside from or in opposition to its basic communal mapping and communicative function -- as happens when, for example, language is used to deceive, the perpetration of a false map in communication -- or used without regard to reference, as in rituals or games. That's where the other effects of language use trump the communicative functions. <> If you mean by "our primitive experiences" the period of early development, I don't understand at all how any of that contradicts that language will become a purposeful attempt to map the world. Let's start with when the objective 3-dimensionality of the world starts to enter a child's language. There may be instances where a particular individual's language never reflects more than 2-dimensions, but that simply implies a less accurate "mirror of the world" than a language that reflects 3 dimensions. As far as the "emergent mapping between emerging language and world [being] a culturally, socially and cognitively grounded complex process," that's no doubt true. In fact, I'd extend that process to anyway we learn about world, including the most simple mechanical manipulation of objects in the world. And, what makes it so complex a process therefore would not be the complexity of language, but the complexity of the world. Regards, Steve Long From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Tue Mar 28 20:43:14 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 15:43:14 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Another possible parallel between biological and linguistic processes was brought to mind today by another newsfeed piece- 'Scientists Discover Interplay Between Genes And Viruses In Tiny Ocean Plankton' (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060328083400.htm). Apparently in the ocean lower planktonic species are constantly updating their genetic makeup not just through random mutation or sexual exchange, but by massive turnover mediated by seaborne viruses. One big happy genetic near-continuum. In a way, this very much resembles the sorts of areal clusters of (politically independent) languages (such as in the North American Pacific Northwest, or aboriginal Australia) that can wreak havoc with nice clean historical genetic analyses, where form/structure borrowing may be extreme. The organisms in question are not known for very sophisticated immunity-type reactions to outside gene insertion, unlike higher ones that get most of their variability from internal recombination and mutation. But this adds tp a point I tried to make in earlier posts that the big generalized 'cosmopolitan' societies tend to internally differentiate and thus control their own development- whereas smaller specialized ones tend to be more at the mercy of outside forces. Other factors such as environmental compartmentalization, may also contribute to continuum/isolation effects which in linguistics can be modeled using areal groupings versus branching tree models. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From amnfn at well.com Tue Mar 28 21:00:19 2006 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 13:00:19 -0800 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? In-Reply-To: <19780832.1143578594890.JavaMail.root@elwamui-cypress.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Jess, Was it you who mentioned that some related species of bees are social and have specialized functions, while others live alone and carry on all functions? If so, what effect on communicative behavior does socialization or lack thereof have? Do loner bees still dance the dance that helps locate sources of nectar? Is the dance intentional and manipulative or is it merely expressive and involuntary? One of the often unspoken assumptions of grammaticalization theory is that human language developed from intentional signals meant to manipulate the behavior of others, as opposed to involuntary vocalizations and gestures that served an expressive function for the individual which just happened to be useful to others in acquiring information from the speaker. --Aya ================================================================ Dr. Aya Katz, Inverted-A, Inc, P.O. Box 267, Licking, MO 65542 USA http://www.well.com/user/amnfn ================================================================= On Tue, 28 Mar 2006, jess tauber wrote: > Another possible parallel between biological and linguistic processes was brought to mind today by another newsfeed piece- 'Scientists Discover Interplay Between Genes And Viruses In Tiny Ocean Plankton' (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060328083400.htm). > > Apparently in the ocean lower planktonic species are constantly updating their genetic makeup not just through random mutation or sexual exchange, but by massive turnover mediated by seaborne viruses. One big happy genetic near-continuum. > > In a way, this very much resembles the sorts of areal clusters of (politically independent) languages (such as in the North American Pacific Northwest, or aboriginal Australia) that can wreak havoc with nice clean historical genetic analyses, where form/structure borrowing may be extreme. > > The organisms in question are not known for very sophisticated immunity-type reactions to outside gene insertion, unlike higher ones that get most of their variability from internal recombination and mutation. But this adds tp a point I tried to make in earlier posts that the big generalized 'cosmopolitan' societies tend to internally differentiate and thus control their own development- whereas smaller specialized ones tend to be more at the mercy of outside forces. > > Other factors such as environmental compartmentalization, may also contribute to continuum/isolation effects which in linguistics can be modeled using areal groupings versus branching tree models. > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 29 03:10:27 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 22:10:27 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Aya Katz wrote: 'what effect on communicative behavior does socialization or lack thereof have? Do loner bees still dance the dance that helps locate sources of nectar? Is the dance intentional and manipulative or is it merely expressive and involuntary?' I am not up to date on research in this area- all I know is what I saw in the newsfeed piece. I'm also not aware if the dance is intentional- my guess is it is involuntary, but that doesn't necessarily mean nonawarenss- chimps involuntarily emit food calls when they find ripening fruit in trees, but have been known to cover their mouth with their hands to block this signal. But what I find interesting about honeybee dances is that they have since their original discovery been found to be used in a number of different circumstances- finding nectar and pollen sources of course, but also for water sources, and possible new nesting sites (if memory serves). So it is a general sort of pathfinder signalling system, similar in spirit to a deictic demonstrative system in a language. One wonders how such a thing could have evolved, but likely bees already used sun angle etc. to find their way home, aided by their ability to sense polarized light. A cognitive flip and now you can use the same internal model to find your way there. Coding this in the waggle dance is another issue- clearly the angle represented is a sort of demonstration, acting out, as a sort of iconicity with imagic and diagrammatic components. Intensity of the waggle if I remember right corresponds to richness of source implied, so another iconic representation (but do they do the same for water, or holes in trees? It would be interesting if audience size and recruitment correlated with enthusiasm of the signaller- and if the causal effect went both ways. How is 'topic' established? Is there some sort of indexical value understood?). Also, it may take time for the bee to get everyone together to do a dance, as well as the time taken to fly (which in the dance is I think is related via the number of figure-8 turns per demonstration- which may remind one of vocalic demonstrative iconicity in many human languages, if one thinks of the number of turns as a kind of frequency analogue)- does the bee compensate for the time lag from where the sun IS versus where it WAS? Another question I have is whether the angle is in practice variable continuously, or in quantized fashion (into pie slices, as it were, from a circle- and if so how many?). A grosser angle range would mean greater misses by bees following the dance to the source. I've also read that different bees within a hive have different 'attitudes'- toward hard work, towards flying from the nest, etc. Co-worker bees punish laggarts physically, and degree of extroversion seems also to evolve over time (newly ex-pupa bees are stay-at-homes, tending the young, older ones go outside, but there must be some older ones that would rather stay indoors, and younger ones that would rather fly). In many vertebrate species (such as monkeys), the 'topic' continuum seems to be very roughly divided by gross signal type- but then the particulars of the situation seem to be more or less finely differentiably depictable (depending on species) by tweaking that signal along its various parameters and features. Eugene Morton (of the National Zoo) came up with his 'motivation structure theory' which deals with signals that relate to intraspecific conflicts (attacker versus defender, approaching loss or win, sureness/security of position, and so on). A handful of acoustic features correlate with different aspects- roughness or smoothness of the formants, angle (rise, fall, even, etc.). Humans still use these. Morton suggests animals may even quantize these into cells in a multidimensional grid, the way humans do phonemes. And there seem to be similar systems being discovered for signals used in other forms of social interaction. Not all are intraspecific. Is a tiger's roar as he attacks just a measure of his aggression, or is he trying to affect the ability of the prey to save itself? The tiger may not have a choice, but is he aware of its possible purpose when he emits it? Can he suppress it when stalking, or is it unconscious? A human's cry of triumph may be hard to suppress given the right situation. But it seems a lot of the evolution of humanity from apes lay in suppression of otherwise uncontrollable behaviors- the frontal cortex which controls this is so very much larger in our species than in any other relative to brain size elsewhere. The key to successful large scale intricate social interaction is to NOT act like a monad animal all the time. A lot if not most linguists are satisfied that language is something radically different from animal vocal communication- a number believe it somehow magically evolved from external gestures. However, given the newer work hinted at above, my own take is that language (separate from its oral instantiation, which is less relevant than its organization) just takes the existing system, speeds it up radically, allows for mixing of single instances of each signal type (rather than just repetition of the same simple ones as found in so many other species) creating higher level strings (which we mistakenly think are basic) as well as hierarchical combination of these strings even higher up. Plus other stuff :-) I'm also not the first to suggest this, though I would venture that others feel there was a distinct form/meaning break when this happened, so that arbitrariness existed in human language from the beginning. But the existance of the kind of iconic mapping one sees in ideophones, plus the new realization among historical linguists that such ideophones may feed large parts of the lexicon, may mean that one would have to be very careful about this. Adam or Og may not have simply put string A to idea or referent B on Naming Day. There may already have been firmly in place an existing connotational reference system, that only later worked itself into a more classically arbitrarist denotational one. And remember I've touched on cyclicity typologically in modern human languages- did a similar cycle exist before human language? There is evidence for this in animal signal systems, but the cycle may be much longer in duration, and relate to speciation and adaptation to new environments. If true, then my hypothetical speeding up of human signaling could help explain why our typological cycles only take thousands of years. BTW, I'm not sure that speakers are that conscious all the time of their word choices, or think about the degree of generality that grammatalizable terms are supposed to have, etc.- in fact given that these are usually the most common terms in a language, people might be LESS likely to think about them- thus their ultimate automaticization. Jess Tauber From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Wed Mar 1 01:01:42 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 14:01:42 +1300 Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization In-Reply-To: <10500620.1141156127363.JavaMail.oesten@ling.su.se> Message-ID: Hi ?sten, On Wednesday 01 March 2006 08:48, ?sten Dahl wrote: > ... > (The two meanings are "a nonfunctional property or byproduct" and "an > effect which by itself has no effects in the physical world whatever".) I don't think we need be surprised, all words have different and even contradictory meanings. If they do it is probably because we need them all. In particular it is not unusual for causes and effects to get mixed up. To me it is your first meaning of "byproduct", in the sense of "not being a direct effect", or "having no direct causes" which is the most interesting and relevant for epiphenomena in the context of language. Of course an epiphenomenal model of language does not mean there are no causes, only that the causes are not direct. We would still have grammar, it is just identification as an epiphenomenon would mean we would not seek to directly describe the grammar in terms of rules. What rules we have would only describe indirect causes, like ways of generalizing usage. > The term "emergence", by the way, is arguably even more ambiguously used by > linguists and others. I discuss the two terms "emergence" and > "epiphenomena" in my book "The growth and maintenance of linguistic > complexity", Benjamins 2004. Can you outline the main issues for us? I would like to hear what you have to say about "emergence" (especially in the epiphenomenal sense of "having no direct causes" rather than the evolutionary sense of gradual change!!) -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Mar 1 01:55:41 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 20:55:41 EST Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization (2) Message-ID: In a message dated 2/28/06 1:19:35 PM, phonosemantics at earthlink.net writes: << Things aren't as random as all that- each new generation takes its cue from the prior one, however imperfectly. This means there is already a 'memory' of prior selection. >> Of course, new generations take biological "cues" from prior ones - that's exactly what genetics is. And of course there's a memory of prior selection -- that's exactly what genes are. But non-mutating genes could not produce the diversity of evolution. We'd all be unicellular if it wasn't for mutation. Yes, from all the evidence we have, things ARE THAT random in biological evolution -- unless you are talking about something non-naturalistic like intelligent design. Even organism that appear to induce mutations (those that "have evolved to evolve") are not using any other means than accelerated random mutation. In contrast, the larva may turn into a butterfly without randomly mutating, but that controlled morphological change is not evolution, but a product of evolution. All the examples you give, as far as I can tell, go to complexity. Traits held in reserve reflect nothing more than the evolution of organisms that hold traits in reserve. None of this contradicts randomness as the generating engine of diversity. The choice is basic. Either there is randomness or there is some intentionality intervening that generates variations. The only way to make raw biological evolution and language evolution congruent is to say that either language changes are all randomly generated or that the expansion of biological diversity on this planet was somehow intentional. This brings us back to "unidirectionality" and functionalism. If changes in language are fundamentally driven by the intentions of individual humans, wherefrom the uni- in unidirectionality? The answer is the common objectives of those intentions -- what humans have in common to SPEAK ABOUT, i.e., communication. We probably should assume that the rules of effective information exchange are at least as rigid as putting up a barn. There is not a lot of wiggle room. And "growth" in grammar was probably driven by the same intentionality that morphed neolithic wagons into Ferraris, or megaphones into cellphones. But, of course, where local objectives in language might diverge, we'd expect to see Dan's Pirahas, or Homer mysteriously calling a blue Aegean sea, "wine-dark." We technically should not call any of this "evolution." Regards, Steve Long From anggarrgoon at gmail.com Wed Mar 1 02:26:35 2006 From: anggarrgoon at gmail.com (Anggarrgoon) Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 20:26:35 -0600 Subject: criticisms of grammaticalization In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I'd like to return to Martin's first point, and Joan's comment: > > 1. Unidirectionality, if it exists, is an even greater problem for > functionalism than if it turns out to be false. Developments that span > centuries would have to be explained independently of speakers, who only > have access to three generations of other speakers. (I attribute this one to > Janda 2001.) > Point 1 is only a problem if you assume that language change takes place > in language acquisition. If you assume that grammaticization is driven > by processes that occur as language is used, by everyone all the time, > then unidirectionality is what you would expect. > I don't think it's necessarily problematic for acquisition-based theories. If I wanted to construct an argument about unidirectionality within a acquisition-based/Minimalist framework of language change I would argue that certain operations are privileged (Move over Merge, for example), so there's a "built-in" bias for kids to prefer one potential Grammar over another. I think Elly van Gelderen has done some work on developing this line of argument, and privileging certain operations is already part of Minimalism, as is a more general idea of economy. I would further note that there are a number of one-way processes in language change other than grammaticalization. For example, nasal-stop assimilation is always anticipatory. For example, the sequence [*anpa] becomes [ampa] but never [anda] (that is, the nasal assimilates to the p.o.a. of the stop, not vice versa). *k > ? (glottal stop) is common, while the reverse isn't. Whether you model such change as the result of misacquisition of the 'correct' target or as a change in the speech of adults (or both) is irrelevant to issues of directionality, as far as I can see. It's shaped by a combination of perceptual and articulatory factors. Kids acquiring language are still subject to those factors. Claire From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 1 04:30:58 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 23:30:58 -0500 Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization (2) Message-ID: First apologies for how far off linguistics this will be getting... Again, things ain't that random. Free or bound. Black or white. Tastes great or less filling. What happened to intermediate states, all the nice gray areas and fuzzy boundaries? I have this sort of argument with a Chomskyoid friend of mine all the time. OK- if things were completely random then anything could mutate into anything. But that's not what we see. There are limits. There is relative freedom between the limits when that's what's been selected for. Take for example conserved parts of genes, which code for important functional molecular groups in proteins. Conservation implies some sort of form/function fit which living organisms literally cannot live without. Histone proteins, which bind DNA into chromatin for compact storage and now also apparently for periodic organization as in my previous post, are hardly variable across all eukaryotic organisms. Sure they can mutate beyond these limits, but then its bye-bye baby! Other proteins, such as serum albumins, vary wildly in their particular 3-D conformation and most of their individual peptide identities. Except for the ones that bind molecules and ions that need to be carted around the bloodstream. The shape of the molecule is just not that important, so selection allows a great latitude here. Most proteins are somewhere in between- they have the structure they need to function (the business ends, regulatory sites, docking sites for attachments to various pieces of architecture or other parts of more complex multi-protein machines), or to fold into their proper shapes (with the oil-loving side chains in the center, and the water-loving ones on the periphery), and so on. Shapes and charges are often complementary- both within-unit and between. Parts of larger protein complexes have to interact- therefore if one part changes its conformation due to a mutation, another in its partner unit may undo the significance of the original one. And so on, across the board of the 'proteome' as its now being called. In spirit rather like a gigantic multidimensional and dynamic jigsaw puzzle, whose pieces' borders shift around a bit, but complementarily. Even so, the flexibility of the system is rather large. My growth hormone will work in a fruit fly in a pinch, thank you very much. The vast majority of such point mutations either kill the organism outright, make its reproductive success less likely, or are simply neutral. Sometimes mutations are simply out of the control of the cell- radiation, chemical damage, a kink in the DNA at the wrong place and time, etc. At other times these (and other types of) mutation(s) seem to be facilitated by the organism. This isn't 'intelligent design', its regulation of repair and reproductive genetic shuffling. In other words, the organism actually has some (unconscious but based on tried and true 'memory') control over where and when mutations take place. The repair of DNA can be scaled up or down in accuracy or rate. This often seems to happen in reaction to outside events having to do with size of populations, resource availability, moving to new environments, etc. It adapts. The events of meiosis are also very interesting in terms of error correction. Although nobody has looked yet, I'm betting the system has an internal model of itself- whether it is centralized or distributed who can say? First the existance of such a thing would have to be demonstrated. But most point mutations have little to do with evolution at the level most biologists are interested in. From a systems point of view a hydra is little different from a hamster. Sure the hamster has more bells and whistles, and a bigger staff cellwise, but this comes far more from regulation changes than from the particulars of individual protein structure generated by DNA point mutations. In the jigsaw analogy I'm making, one can make and break links between pieces, change the nature and degree, spacing and timing of interactions. The basic parts- the mortar and bricks- are still essentially the same. In eukaryotic DNA, much of the regulation comes from the 'junk' DNA that comes in between actual protein-translated genes. And the 'junk' makes up the vast majority of the DNA (think of it as 'dark matter'). Most of the 'junk' (interesting how easily one can dismiss what one isn't currently examining, isn't it?) is made of repeated patterns of DNA, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter. Far from random. If your random mutation hypothesis were correct, then one would expect to find the 'junk' cumulating mutations. But this is not so. It appears that such mutations (though they MUST occur) are weeded out, either by death, failure to reproduce successfully, or by repair mechanism in cell. Since as I said the bulk of interesting evolution comes from changes in such DNA (changes in the population sizes of the repeat variants, their placements, their N-mer number), that doesn't leave much room for randomness, at least from the point mutation POV. Perhaps you meant the outcome of the struggle to occupy space on the DNA wasn't predictable (these repeats may be originally viral in origin, by the way- remember what I said about integration of structurally reduced parasites into the host? Other larger parasites are now regularly being found to modify the behaviors of their hosts to increase their own reproductive fitness- maybe this is the origin of split genes and junk DNA in the first place, as eukaryotes were cobbled together by otherwise mindless ancient viruses for their own use). External context, though, may end up canalizing such changes in regular ways- something perhaps similar in spirit to grammaticalization, by the way. Neither complete randomness nor complete predictability. Now, are all cell-induced mutations or other modifications (such as methylation of nucleotide bases and similar marks added or subtracted from proteins, polysaccharides, lipids etc., all of which also play very important large roles I've ignored here- for instance a new theory that polysaccharides form a system of mailing addresses that direct proteins and other molecules to the right places at the right times) always random? NO. Because the DNA itself can be opened and closed up in controlled fashion, and because there are proteins and other molecules which can recognize sequences, plain or tagged, the cell actually can pick and choose to a certain degree what its modificational targets will be at any given time. I'm not implying intention here- its all automatic- but a sufficiently complex multilevel hierarchical dynamical system optimized to dam holes in the dyke may start to seem like it has intention. If you want to invoke the butterfly effect (which isn't what you were getting at but I couldn't resist- and if Laura Dern would lend me her hand now I'd be most gratified!) maybe that might start to resemble randomness because we have no access either to initial conditions or a God-like overarching perspective (but watch out for quantum and relativistic effects). That supernova over there in Orion a couple of thousand years ago may turn your grandchildren blue as the cosmic rays reach their mark- but it is not likely to turn them into bats. Now it may be (trying to give this post some FUNKNET-relevant linguistic content) that similar-flavor system regulatory effects happen historically intergenerationally as well as during the lifetime of a language user. Such things as regular sound changes, some of which act together (chain effects, series effects, such as in Tai-Kadai tones, etc.) come to mind. Some sort of matrix like thing going on, kinda sorta? What about at higher levels hierarchically? H/D order harmonies, for instance, or prosody? Never 100%, but interesting nonetheless. And often competitive to boot. I read years ago that over phylogenetic time different groups/populations of nerve cells have vied for physical hierarchical position and concomitant resources/connectivity in the nervous system- akin to what gets recapitulated in ontogeny. Something like this go on in language acquisition/processing? Now your added bonus feature: The genetic code itself has evolved to minimize the impact of point mutations while at the same time giving enough variety of translation products- it is 'degenerate'. Because of this some mutations give the same peptide unit But it goes further- the entire system of 'cubies' in the 4x4x4 matrix is arranged such that even when the coding shift doesn't give the same unit, it often gives a near equivalent (in terms of relevant side chain chemical/physical or torsional properties). Ok so I don't have oranges today- here's a tangerine... It also turns out (unpublished work) that when you slightly (and motivatedly..) rearrange the order of nucleotides on the matrix axes the system becomes even more balanced and geometrically clean- with the cube center-crossing diagonals representing opposing properties such as positive or negative charge, shapes and sizes of side chains, etc. All the known code variants (in archaea, for instance) seem to take advantage of this design, as do the stop/start signals. Oops, did I call it a design? Pattern, how's that? In a purely arbitrary system one would not see such well-balanced patterning. Was this system designed? Do I think so? Not hardly! But given the bits and pieces available and reproducible at the time, and the larger physical context of early earth, this is the optimal coding system currently surviving life hit upon- there may have been others. I guess in the end it really all boils down to issues of generativity/production versus filtering/selection, and how much the various levels of System have over each- where, when, how much, fidelity, etc. I say biological systems have far more control than you think they do- that we are NOT merely kluges. Whether we have control over overall directions of change ('drift') is an open question. From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Mar 1 05:03:49 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 00:03:49 EST Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization (3) Message-ID: In a message dated 2/28/06 2:49:19 PM, oesten at ling.su.se writes: << I recommend reading Daniel Dennett's discussion in "Consciousness explained"... As will be clear from the following quote, it's not only in linguistics that the term is problematic. "The term "epiphenomena" ... is used with *entirely* different meanings... although I have pointed this out time and again, no one seems to care." Perhaps Dennett has made the same unappreciated observations about inconsistencies with regard to such terms as "cognition" or "language" or "evolution"? He certainly has a lot of opportunity to do a lot more pointing out that someone might care about. <> I'd suggest that the multiple meanings reflect different theoretical positions. And that would also be true with terms like "cognition" and such. The trouble is that this word has a history that doesn't reflect either meaning given above. Without the benefit of ?sten Dahl's discussions in his book -- "epiphenomenon" simply meant symptom in its original modern usages, which were in medicine. e.g., "Fever is always secondary to some specific disease or other of which it is a mere epiphenomenon or symptom." (1876) The notion obviously was that phenomenon itself was the disease and that the symptom -- epiphenomenon -- was peripheral. Here it is a diagnostic term - a manner of characterizing evidence. But a symptom is a valuable thing in diagnostics -- it's not useless or meaningless. In physics, it has been used to mean nothing more than "irrelevance to the matters being observed," i.e, data gathered in an experiment but peripheral to variables being measured. In this sense, it was an "operational" definition -- a way of distinguishing types of raw data -- impacts appearing on an x-ray plate that were not on the principal particle's path. Given these senses, it's hard to see how it applies to the original poster's statement --"Grammaticalization should really be decomposed into its independently existing component processes. There's no point in granting explanatory power to an epiphenomenon." In this sense, epiphenomenon seems to be used to indicate an ineffective or unnecessary concept -- not data or symptoms -- which are observations. A concept is not really an epiphenomenon. Occam's Razor would provide better phrasing. Emergence is something different. In one sense, "emergence" did mean a incidental effect, but it's original use in a psychological sense was by George Henry Lewes in the late 1800's, who defined the term as "an effect produced by a combination of causes, but not capable of being regarded as the sum of their individual effects." This was in reference to a gestalt kind of approach to mind and body. The whole ending up being greater than the sum of its parts. Emergent in that sense is an excellent word to use if one is talking about sodium and chloride, two poisons, coming together to make table salt. And it is probably useful in describing how human language evolved out of whatever pre-language traits preceded it. It goes to unpredictability of effects based on a prior examination of causes. Thus, the use of a phrase like "emergent epiphenomenon" -- in these original senses -- is admittedly a little difficult to picture. But no more so than much terminology in a cognitive field that reflects many different theoretical approaches and accompanying shades of wording. If one wants to complain about multiple meanings, there's plenty to complain about in other approaches as well -- including evolutionary psychology. Regards, Steve Long From oesten at ling.su.se Wed Mar 1 09:52:37 2006 From: oesten at ling.su.se (=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D6sten_Dahl?=) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 10:52:37 +0100 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena Message-ID: In my previous posting, I said: > The term "emergence", by the way, is arguably even more ambiguously used by > linguists and others. I discuss the two terms "emergence" and > "epiphenomena" in my book "The growth and maintenance of linguistic > complexity", Benjamins 2004. Rob Freeman says: >Can you outline the main issues for us? I would like to hear what you have to >say about "emergence" (especially in the epiphenomenal sense of "having no >direct causes" rather than the evolutionary sense of gradual change!!) Actually, the gist of the argument can be found by digging into the FUNKNET archive. On July 30, 1999, I had a posting with the title ?What is emergence anyway?? (http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9907&L=FUNKNET&P=R349&I=- 3), with quite a few comments from other people, which can be read on the Linguist List website. I quote the concluding part of my own posting (which, as can be seen, hooks onto the original definition of ?emergence? quoted by Steve Long): ?In the older tradition, "emergence" stands for new and interesting higher-order structures that are not reducible to the lower-order ones. MacWhinney and Hopper, on the contrary, seem to use the same term precisely for the opposite: seemingly complex systems that are in fact derivable from -- "epiphenomenal by-products" of -- other simpler systems. One may ask how such a radical shift in meaning may have occurred. It seems that we can find the seed of the conflict in the original notion of emergence. On one hand, the target has new and interesting properties that cannot be described in terms of the source, on the other, there is presumably some kind of causal chain that leads from the source to the target. The essence of the notion of a self-organizing system seems to be precisely the fact that unexpected things happen as it were by themselves. Depending on whether one is more fascinated by the novel or the predictable component in this process, one may come to see different and seemingly contradictory aspects of "emergence" as criterial. Hopefully, we will eventually be able to see both sides of the phenomena at the same time. ? Steve Long writes: >Perhaps Dennett has made the same unappreciated observations about >inconsistencies with regard to such terms as "cognition" or "language" or >"evolution"? >He certainly has a lot of opportunity to do a lot more pointing out that >someone might care about. It seems to me that Dennett has in fact made quite a few observations about troublesome concepts of this kind (after all, that?s what he?s paid for, being a philosophy professor), but to say that they have been ?unappreciated? would certainly be rather misleading. We have to live with ambiguous terms, but the trouble starts when people think they mean the same thing, although they don?t, or when terms are used as convenient labels to sweep things away. In my book, I point out that although ?emergence? was originally used in an anti-reductionist spirit, later uses in linguistics of ?emergence? and ?epiphenomenon? reveal a reductionist attitude. I conclude with the following which I think is essentially in the same spirit as Suzanne Kemmer?s comments: ?There seems to be a reductionist hiding in all of us, although many tend to claim otherwise. It may well be that the readiness of the ?other side? to define away the notions that we ourselves find useful should make us wary of reductionist tactics.? - ?sten From jordan.zlatev at ling.lu.se Wed Mar 1 11:26:53 2006 From: jordan.zlatev at ling.lu.se (Jordan Zlatev) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 12:26:53 +0100 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena In-Reply-To: <20060301095240.4605E3C0CC@smtp3.su.se> Message-ID: And if the referenences that ?sten mentions are not enough - the latest number of Journal of Consciousness Studies (vol 13/1-2) (which I have yet not read...) is entirely devoted to "Epiphenomenalism"... I admit that I have not made up my mind on these issues, but one thing is clear: even epiphenomena are phenomena (that need to be described and eventually explained). Best, Jordan 2006-03-01 kl. 10.52 skrev ?sten Dahl: > In my previous posting, I said: > >> The term "emergence", by the way, is arguably even more ambiguously >> used > by >> linguists and others. I discuss the two terms "emergence" and >> "epiphenomena" in my book "The growth and maintenance of linguistic >> complexity", Benjamins 2004. > > Rob Freeman says: > >> Can you outline the main issues for us? I would like to hear what you >> have > to >> say about "emergence" (especially in the epiphenomenal sense of >> "having no >> direct causes" rather than the evolutionary sense of gradual change!!) > > Actually, the gist of the argument can be found by digging into the > FUNKNET > archive. On July 30, 1999, I had a posting with the title ?What is > emergence > anyway?? > (http://listserv.linguistlist.org/cgi-bin/wa? > A2=ind9907&L=FUNKNET&P=R349&I=- > 3), with quite a few comments from other people, which can be read on > the > Linguist List website. I quote the concluding part of my own posting > (which, > as can be seen, hooks onto the original definition of ?emergence? > quoted by > Steve Long): > > ?In the older tradition, ? "emergence" stands for new and > interesting higher-order structures that are not reducible to the > lower-order ones. MacWhinney and Hopper, on the contrary, seem to use > the > same term precisely for the opposite: seemingly complex systems that > are in > fact derivable from -- "epiphenomenal by-products" of -- other simpler > systems. One may ask how such a radical shift in meaning may have > occurred. > > It seems that we can find the seed of the conflict in the original > notion of > emergence. On one hand, the target has new and interesting properties > that > cannot be described in terms of the source, on the other, there is > presumably some kind of causal chain that leads from the source to the > target. The essence of the notion of a self-organizing system seems to > be > precisely the fact that unexpected things happen as it were by > themselves. > Depending on whether one is more fascinated by the novel or the > predictable > component in this process, one may come to see different and seemingly > contradictory aspects of "emergence" as criterial. Hopefully, we will > eventually be able to see both sides of the phenomena at the same time. > ? > Steve Long writes: > >> Perhaps Dennett has made the same unappreciated observations about >> inconsistencies with regard to such terms as "cognition" or >> "language" or >> "evolution"? >> He certainly has a lot of opportunity to do a lot more pointing out >> that >> someone might care about. > > It seems to me that Dennett has in fact made quite a few observations > about > troublesome concepts of this kind (after all, that?s what he?s paid > for, > being a philosophy professor), but to say that they have been > ?unappreciated? would certainly be rather misleading. > > We have to live with ambiguous terms, but the trouble starts when > people > think they mean the same thing, although they don?t, or when terms are > used > as convenient labels to sweep things away. In my book, I point out that > although ?emergence? was originally used in an anti-reductionist > spirit, > later uses in linguistics of ?emergence? and ?epiphenomenon? reveal a > reductionist attitude. I conclude with the following which I think is > essentially in the same spirit as Suzanne Kemmer?s comments: ?There > seems to > be a reductionist hiding in all of us, although many tend to claim > otherwise. It may well be that the readiness of the ?other side? to > define > away the notions that we ourselves find useful should make us wary of > reductionist tactics.? > > - ?sten > > > *************************************************** Jordan Zlatev, Associate Professor Department of Linguistics Center for Languages and Literature Lund University Box 201 221 00 Lund, Sweden email: jordan.zlatev at ling.lu.se http://www.ling.lu.se/persons/JordanZlatev.html *************************************************** From Salinas17 at aol.com Wed Mar 1 14:42:15 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 09:42:15 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (2) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/1/06 4:54:13 AM, oesten at ling.su.se writes: << It seems to me that Dennett has in fact made quite a few observations about troublesome concepts of this kind (after all, that?s what he?s paid for, being a philosophy professor), but to say that they have been ?unappreciated? would certainly be rather misleading. >> Hey, it wasn't me who said Dennett was unappreciated, it was Dennett -- in the very quote you used: "although I have pointed this out time and again, no one seems to care." I was just pointing out that there's plenty of opportunity in the terminological jungles out there for Dennett to feel even more unappreciated. It might start with evolutionists who try to "reduce" evolution to an "algorithm" -- wink, wink. <> There's a word that needs some disciplined defining -- reductionism. Does it just mean "opprobrium" or something like that? Copernicus, Newton and Darwin were all reductionists. I wonder why a reductionist attitude is always a bad thing to have? I'd argue that Lewes use of "emergence" did have a definite "reducing" intent. He was aiming for a coherent explanation of the body-mind duality problem, and emergence was a way of explaining how body and mind could be seen as parts of a single entity. And later, C. Lloyd Morgan, in his "Emergent Evolution" (1923), was to some de gree countering the creationist argument that Darwinian evolution could not account for new forms, only "the re-grouping of pre-existing events." In this sense, emergence was used to "reduce" alledgedly unexplainable novelty to a scientific principle. Regards, Steve Long From oesten at ling.su.se Wed Mar 1 15:25:31 2006 From: oesten at ling.su.se (=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D6sten_Dahl?=) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 16:25:31 +0100 Subject: Reductionism Message-ID: Steve Long writes: ? I wonder why a reductionist attitude is always a bad thing to have?? Obviously, it is not. You could say that reductionism just amounts to applying Occam?s Razor (not assuming the existence of something if you don?t need to). And it is clear that like ?epiphenomenon?, ?reductionism? can be misused, as a label for things you don?t like. But my warning against reductionism concerns the refusal to acknowledge that you sometimes need higher-level constructs in order to say interesting things. For instance, you could claim that a forest is ?nothing but? a set of trees, but you cannot reduce the statement that a forest is dense, or that it is a good hiding-place, to a set of statements about the individual trees. - ?sten From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 1 18:05:49 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 13:05:49 -0500 Subject: Evolution and Grammaticalization- links Message-ID: I thought it might be useful to provide some URLs of papers discussing some of the points I cited- here is a first batch. Long-Range Periodic Patterns in Microbial Genomes Indicate Significant Multi-Scale Chromosomal Organization http://compbiol.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020002 The Fragile Breakage versus Random Breakage Models of Chromosome Evolution http://compbiol.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020014 DNA Sequences Shaped by Selection for Stability http://genetics.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pgen.0020022 I've read about these things elsewhere as well, but these are public access. Not 'random house' ;-) Jess Tauber From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Wed Mar 1 21:55:36 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 10:55:36 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena In-Reply-To: <47f6a6f5a57f14faeb5dcb17b62ae1a4@ling.lu.se> Message-ID: On Thursday 02 March 2006 00:26, Jordan Zlatev wrote: > And if the referenences that ?sten mentions are not enough - the latest > number of Journal of Consciousness Studies (vol 13/1-2) (which I have > yet not read...) is entirely devoted to "Epiphenomenalism"... > > I admit that I have not made up my mind on these issues, but one thing > is clear: even epiphenomena are phenomena (that need to be described > and eventually explained). Sure Jordan. There is no real mystery about it. There are causes. Still, there is a difference. I've tried to express the difference by distinguishing "direct causes" and "indirect causes". In the Conway's Life sim. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_Game_of_Life) you see this in the glider gun. The gliders move, but their movement is caused only indirectly (by rules for the birth and death of cells.) You can't formulate a single "rule of movement" to describe the movement of these "gliders", and yet they move (with apologies to Galileo :-) You can draw a parallel between this and grammar. We perceive grammar (movement), but if grammar is emergent then it will be impossible to formulate a "rule of grammar" to describe it. We must look for indirect causes to model grammar, like ways of generalizing over usage. There is no real mystery about saying something is emergent, but it does have consequences. In the case of language it means if we look to directly describe grammar in terms of rules we will fail. We must attempt to describe grammar indirectly (for example, in terms of rules for generalizing over usage.) By the way, this is a good thing for functionalists. It fits nicely with a model which sees language as a product of systemic contrast (indirect causes), and not something which can be described in terms of formal rules (direct causes). -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Thu Mar 2 04:57:34 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 23:57:34 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/1/06 4:49:10 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << In the Conway's Life sim. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_Game_of_Life) you see this in the glider gun. The gliders move, but their movement is caused only indirectly (by rules for the birth and death of cells.) You can't formulate a single "rule of movement" to describe the movement of these "gliders", and yet they move >> That's not the case. Those familiar with the Game of Life will know that "gliders" are highly regular patterns compared to the chaos that other starting patterns can generate and that makes them relatively predictable. They appear to "move" precisely because of the recurring pattern and the fact that the rules of the basic game say that spaces are filled or emptied according to what is adjacent to them on a particular turn - which can be rendered as an algorithm. In fact, many of the solutions to "Game of Life" pattern problems -- like the glider gun, which was designed to continually grow a specific pattern indefinitely -- were worked out mathematically first. What might be relevant to language growth and structure in the Game of Life is that chaotic growth started by a particular pattern sometimes eventually reverts to an order or symmetry after a long number of "turns" in the game. As in the case of fractals -- the more current example of mathematical weirdness -- this eventual orderliness has elements that reflect something of the original pattern -- which appeared to be lost in the chaos. Just like in the entanglement concept of quantum physics, there seems to be a deep layer of information underlying mathematics and maybe other natural phenomena that we are simply not able to read -- maybe because the math is beyond us. So that we may have to settle for concepts like "emergence" to account for patterns disappearing into chaos and reappearing again -- with us having no idea where they came from. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Thu Mar 2 10:20:40 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 23:20:40 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) In-Reply-To: <1d4.4eb6b91f.3137d53e@aol.com> Message-ID: On Thursday 02 March 2006 17:57, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/1/06 4:49:10 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > ...You can't formulate a single "rule of movement" to describe > the movement of these "gliders" > > That's not the case. What is the single "rule of movement" for these gliders, Steve? > ... the rules of the basic game say that spaces are filled or emptied > according to what is adjacent to them on a particular turn... These rules are the same whatever the system does. They are not movement rules. > ...we may have to settle for concepts like "emergence" to > account for patterns disappearing into chaos and reappearing again -- with > us having no idea where they came from. Isn't it a contradiction to say the behavior of the system is governed by rules, but you have "no idea" what causes the behavior of the system? -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Mar 3 04:14:23 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2006 23:14:23 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/2/06 5:18:53 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << What is the single "rule of movement" for these gliders, Steve? >> What is the single rule of movement for a real glider or an airplane wing? Do we somehow claim that all the variables mean that there's no way to explain a real glider's movement? The only uncontrolled variable in the the original Game of Life is the initial pattern. The rules entirely dictate every change of state after that -- that cells will either be filled, unfilled or remain the same at each turn, entirely dependent on the status of adjacent cells. Three adjacent cells are needed to fill a new cell that creates the impression of "movement" in any direction. I haven't played the game in years -- but I know that a starting pattern for a basic glider alone will produce the same results every time, with exactly the same periodicity. From the same spot it will always "move" along the same three adjacent diagonal paths adding cells in the same proportion as the empty cells behind it. (These gliders always move diagonally because of that need of proximity of exactly 3 cells to create the appearance of movement.) It is totally predictable. To create a south-east bound glider, starting at 0 on the grid (away from a border), simply fill in Row 1 Col1, Row2 Col2&3, Row3 Col 1&2. By the GOL rules of adjacency, the 2d generation MUST be Row 1Col2, Row2 Col3, Row3 Col 2,3&4, the 3rd gen MUST be Row 1Col3, Row2 Col 1&3, Row 3 Col 2&3, and the fourth gen MUST go back to the original pattern except all live cells are now one column over. And EVERY 4th generation the original pattern repeats itself over and over again "moving" a column in those exact same amt of turns into infinity. THAT is the law of "movement" you are asking for -- the patterns must follow the rules of the game -- there is no variation in it. There is NOTHING random or mysterious about this. It's simply a systematic filling and unfilling of cells in the same ways over and over again in the direction that the adjacency rules dictate. And it is highly regular. The particular rules make this particular set of patterns recur -- in other versions of GOL rules this pattern does not create gliders and they do not "move." This means the independent variables come from the rules of the original GOL and they entirely motivate this pattern shape of the glider -- if you started only with the glider and its movement, you should be able to derive the fundamental rules of the game without knowing them beforehand. <> Gravity is the same no matter what it affects. However it effects "movement" in some things and not others. In that, the law of gravity and the rules of GOL are exactly alike. Not all patterns move. But when they do, it's the rules that dictate the movement. <> Not if you see a pattern disappear into chaos and then see the exact same pattern re-appear. Unless there is something supernatural going on, it simply means we cannot perceive the process, not that it's not there. Any other explanation IS supernatural. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Fri Mar 3 07:45:44 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 20:45:44 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (3) In-Reply-To: <2cb.46d79be.31391c9f@aol.com> Message-ID: On Friday 03 March 2006 17:14, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/2/06 5:18:53 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > << What is the single "rule of movement" for these gliders, Steve? >> > > To create a south-east bound glider, starting at 0 on the grid (away from a > border), simply fill in Row 1 Col1, Row2 Col2&3, Row3 Col 1&2. By the GOL > rules of adjacency, the 2d generation MUST be Row 1Col2, Row2 Col3, Row3 > Col 2,3&4, the 3rd gen MUST be Row 1Col3, Row2 Col 1&3, Row 3 Col 2&3, and > the fourth gen MUST go back to the original pattern except all live cells > are now one column over. And EVERY 4th generation the original pattern > repeats itself over and over again "moving" a column in those exact same > amt of turns into infinity. That's the _single_ rule then is it? Seriously Steve, don't you see what you have done here is describe something like a corpus, citing the GOL rules which generate it, the _real_ rules, as you go. You might as well claim to describe the grammar of English by dictating a text. > < rules, but you have "no idea" what causes the behavior of the system?>> > > ... it simply means we cannot perceive the process... You cite what you claim is a rule, and then say we cannot perceive it, and say this is not contradictory? I don't know what point you are trying to make. You don't seem to like my characterization of "direct causes" and "indirect causes" so much is clear. Other than that, what is your point? If you want to characterize what is different about emergent systems as "we cannot perceive the process" then let's put it that way. The up-shot is the same. If grammar is emergent then we need to describe grammar, which we can perceive, in terms of processes which we cannot perceive (like rules for making generalizations over corpora.) And again, if the underlying system is such that "we cannot perceive the process", so long as we go on trying to formalize it in terms of what we can perceive (grammar itself), we will not succeed. That is my point. That is what "emergent grammar" is trying to say. Is anyone still failing to see this? -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Mar 3 14:42:03 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 09:42:03 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (4) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/3/06 2:43:07 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << That's the _single_ rule then is it?>> It's how the rule works. The rule at every turn for every cell is state A = 1 state B = 0 state C = same, where the state is determined by the # of adjacent filled squares (3, <3, >3). This generates EVERY resulting pattern you see, unless God and his angels are intervening to make gliders. <> No, not as YOU go. YOU are out of it after the first turn. The rules given above take over, your input is done. The rules generate gliders but also generate in most cases empty grids or no "movement" of patterns at all. The rules absolutely dictate the shape of gliders, not the user. If you want to make a glider, the starting shape is not up to you. Start with a four-sided square and you will be disappointed into infinity. It will disappear in 3 turns, every time. It's decided by the rules. The best mysterious movement generator is a version I call Coppola's Game of Life. The rules are 1. Every empty cell adjacent to the left of a filled cell becomes a filled cell. 2. Every filled cell becomes an empty cell, except if it is adjacent to the left of a filled cell. When you use these rules, you never have to worry about your patterns disappearing or being static -- every pattern is a glider. What a difference a change in rules makes! <> That am not a bad ideas. <> The effects of the law of gravity were always felt. Stating the law of gravity awaited Newton. I don't understand how that is a contradiction. <> Well, for one thing -- there's nothing mysterious about gliders. Also, yes, I don't understand how direct or indirect causes helps anything. If the issue is emergence, I'd suggest that what's missing is functionality. When we say a combination produces an unforeseen effect, doesn't that happen all the time, in all and even the simplest processes? The real question is what does this unforeseen effect have in terms of intended results. Language is seeping with intentions, goals, objectives. But a pure structural approach appears to be blind to all that. <> And I would say that's not correct in this sense -- capturing the process of cause and effect does not demand that we directly perceive the process, only that we can deduce it. We don't see the change in state of electrical wires when we throw on the light switch, but our deductions about the process are highly predictive. For the most part, the lights do go on. When they don't, we look for a burnt filament. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Fri Mar 3 21:44:48 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 10:44:48 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (4) In-Reply-To: <27.4839062.3139afbb@aol.com> Message-ID: On Saturday 04 March 2006 03:42, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/3/06 2:43:07 AM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > > <<...what is your point?>> > > Well, for one thing -- there's nothing mysterious about gliders. Also, yes, > I don't understand how direct or indirect causes helps anything. > > If the issue is emergence, I'd suggest that what's missing is > functionality... You are changing your characterization of what is different about emergent systems from "we cannot perceive the process" to "what's missing is functionality"? > The real question is what does this unforeseen effect have in terms of > intended results. Language is seeping with intentions, goals, objectives. > But a pure structural approach appears to be blind to all that. So the whole emergent structure debate really comes down to a war between structuralists and functionalists? What is it they say? When all you have is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail. Anyway, for anyone interested, my point is that there is something different about emergent systems, and I think this difference is informative for those who seek to model language. As I said a few messages back: "There is no real mystery about saying something is emergent, but it does have consequences. In the case of language it means if we look to directly describe grammar in terms of rules we will fail. We must attempt to describe grammar indirectly (for example, in terms of rules for generalizing over usage.) ..this is a good thing for functionalists. It fits nicely with a model which sees language as a product of systemic contrast (indirect causes), and not something which can be described in terms of formal rules (direct causes)." If anyone is interested in an implementation of this they can write to me and I can give them a model, right down to algorithms. -Rob From Salinas17 at aol.com Sat Mar 4 16:34:31 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2006 11:34:31 EST Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/3/06 4:38:39 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: << You are changing your characterization of what is different about emergent systems from "we cannot perceive the process" to "what's missing is functionality"? >> So, you can't see how they can be one and the same? Perhaps the reason "we cannot perceive the process" is because we are leaving out the functional parts. <> Well, if you leave the functional out of language, you are not describing what makes it move, change or emerge. If the structure were the only purpose of language -- if it were only a pattern generating machine for our aesthetic or contemplative appreciation -- then there'd be no point to looking beyond that for language's function. But that's not what language is. <> No, I think they say -- When you have no hammer, every nail is a problem. <> I confess I'm not sure what you are saying here, but if you mean by "indirect causes" factors outside of language drive the structure of language, that has to be true or language is merely an exercise in logic. But there are also structural imperatives that say how so much information has to be handled - if that's what you mean by direct causes. I think that's a real difference -- if that's the difference you mean. There is why we want to build a boat in the first place, what we would do with it. Then there is how a boat must be built to float. Both determine what the structure of the boat should be, if not will be. <> Or you can summarize it here so the rest of the list can see it. I don't suppose anyone would complain. Regards, Steve Long From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Sun Mar 5 21:38:49 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 10:38:49 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) In-Reply-To: <190.52472297.313b1b97@aol.com> Message-ID: On Sunday 05 March 2006 05:34, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/3/06 4:38:39 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: > > < and I can give them a model, right down to algorithms.>> > > Or you can summarize it here so the rest of the list can see it. I don't > suppose anyone would complain. No point. By way of flavor, though, I think contemporary work which attempts to explain language in terms of emergence, such as that of Joan Bybee (also Cognitive, Langacker, etc, and almost all exemplar-based or connectionist NLP) is chiefly limited by a failure to realize it is not enough that your model be based on generalizations of usage, you must also allow for the possibility of discontinuous change. What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the novelty of syntax. -Rob From rcameron at uic.edu Sun Mar 5 22:44:15 2006 From: rcameron at uic.edu (Cameron, Richard) Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2006 16:44:15 -0600 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) In-Reply-To: <200603061038.49382.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Hi folks, I find the following comments from Rob Freeman very interesting. "...you must also allow for the possibility of discontinuous change. What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the novelty of syntax." A question or two: What do you mean by discontinuous change? How would you know that "Grammar is in a state of constant, discontinuous change."? No challenge is implied, just curiosity. Thanks - Richard Cameron On Sun, March 5, 2006 3:38 pm, Rob Freeman said: > On Sunday 05 March 2006 05:34, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >> In a message dated 3/3/06 4:38:39 PM, lists at chaoticlanguage.com writes: >> >> <> me >> and I can give them a model, right down to algorithms.>> >> >> Or you can summarize it here so the rest of the list can see it. I >> don't >> suppose anyone would complain. > > No point. > > By way of flavor, though, I think contemporary work which attempts to > explain > language in terms of emergence, such as that of Joan Bybee (also > Cognitive, > Langacker, etc, and almost all exemplar-based or connectionist NLP) is > chiefly limited by a failure to realize it is not enough that your model > be > based on generalizations of usage, you must also allow for the possibility > of > discontinuous change. > > What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of > constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the > novelty of syntax. > > -Rob > From hdls at unm.edu Mon Mar 6 19:38:40 2006 From: hdls at unm.edu (High Desert Linguistics Society) Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 12:38:40 -0700 Subject: 7th High Desert International Linguistics Conference (HDLS-7) Nov. 9-11, 2006 Message-ID: The Seventh High Desert International Linguistics Conference (HDLS-7) will be held at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, November 9-11, 2006. With invited keynote speakers: William Croft (University of New Mexico) Sally Rice (University of Alberta) Elizabeth Traugott (Stanford University) We invite you to submit proposals for 20-minute talks with 10-minute discussion sessions in any area of linguistics - especially those from a cognitive / functional linguistics perspective. Papers in the following areas are particularly welcome: Evolution of Language, Grammaticization, Metaphor & Metonymy, Native American Languages, Typology, Spanish and Languages of the American Southwest, Language Revitalization and Maintenance, Language Change & Variation, Sociolinguistics, Bilingualism, Discourse Analysis, Signed Languages, Language Acquisition and Computational Linguistics. The deadline for submitting abstracts is Friday August 25th, 2006. Abstracts should be sent via email, as an attachment, to hdls at unm.edu Please include the title ''HDLS-7 abstract ''in the subject line. MS-Word format is preferred or RTF if necessary. The e-mail and attached abstract must include the following: 1. Author's Name(s) 2. Author's Affiliation(s) 3. Title of the Paper 4. E-mail address of the primary author The abstract should be no more than one page and no less than 11-point font. A second page is permitted for references and/or data. Only two submissions per author will be accepted and we will only consider submissions that conform to the above guidelines. Notification of acceptance will be sent out by September 1st, 2006. If you have any questions or need for further information please contact us at hdls at unm.edu with ''HDLS-7 Conference'' in the subject line. From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Tue Mar 7 01:27:54 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 14:27:54 +1300 Subject: Emergence and epiphenomena (5) In-Reply-To: <2354.68.21.175.91.1141598655.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: Hi Richard, I'll give you the concise answers. If you want me to expand more on them I can do that too. Give me some idea what kind of a perspective you are approaching the problem from and I can probably be more clear. On Monday 06 March 2006 11:44, Cameron, Richard wrote: > Hi folks, I find the following comments from Rob Freeman very interesting. > > "...you must also allow for the possibility of discontinuous change. > > What evolves gradually is the corpus of usage. Grammar is in a state of > constant, discontinuous change. It is that which is responsible for the > novelty of syntax." > > A question or two: > What do you mean by discontinuous change? Something like what you get in a kaleidoscope. An instantaneous shift from one pattern to another. > How would you know that "Grammar is in a state of constant, > discontinuous change."? Discontinuous change from sentence to sentence. That is just syntax. We have no other way of explaining syntax. Also, multiple inconsistent grammars are what we see (even at a level of considerable abstraction from raw syntax.) The plethora of contradictory labelling systems with which linguistics is plagued suggest that perhaps no single complete system is to be found. (That the true system of language just finds one or other contradictory order from moment to moment.) -Rob From language at sprynet.com Wed Mar 15 18:28:05 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 13:28:05 -0500 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: Well, that was one of the most remarkable dustups i've ever seen here on FUNKNET, so remarkable that some awards are surely in order. Unless I'm mistaken, one of those awards would have to be for sheer length--what I've seen so far in the archives suggests that it's the second longest thread in FUNKNET history since September of 1994, measuring some 45 messages. And also the second most verbose, coming close to 18,000 words. Which is one reason it's taken me a while to absorb, I've even had to print it out. Plus which, it's truly profound stuff. But then it was meant to be, wasn't it? Some of it was positively brilliant. And just so it doesn't sound as though I'm merely being satirical, I'd also like to present a few awards for some of the very best comments by those taking part, at least from my point of view. Here they come now: "The plethora of contradictory labeling systems with which linguistics is plagued suggest that perhaps no single complete system is to be found." --Rob Freeman "I hope this word [epiphenomenon] falls out of fashion in linguistics sooner rather than later." --Suzanne Kemmer "We probably should assume that the rules of effective information exchange are at least as rigid as putting up a barn. There is not a lot of wiggle room." --Steve Long "Seems to me that 'paradigm shift' is more like an earthquake or someone popping your balloon." --Jess Tauber "Insularity/isolation, rather than multidisciplinary interfacing, is the norm in the publish or perish world (speaking as a member of the latter realm). Who has time and resources for anything else?" --Jess Tauber "I think that in linguistics and in phonology this is a big problem. I used to get a lot of pressure not to read--just get in there and crack phonemes. It is part of the crisis of linguistics as a science--which I find to be quite Balkanized, and waters are tricky to navigate. When that hurdle is overcome there is the aspect of competition and professional jealousy--a minefield for a newcomer in the field." --Diane Lesley-Neuman "I think that the apparent crisis of linguistics as a science looks a lot less dangerous if we realize that not all linguists are actually practicing science, nor even want to practice science -- even if some of them may think and say otherwise." --Mark P. Line I'm particularly pleased by these barbed remarks since they seem to be going at least part-way in the direction I set forth at last year's LACUS Conference. But I was also a bit dismayed by how much else I had to wade through to find these gems. And by how much of that material couldn't possibly qualify as functional linguistics, on the contrary it was mostly an apologetic for structural linguistics, even (yugh!) the generative kind. I'm playing with the idea that Linguistics has truly come no further than where it was in 1983, except that back then Geoffrey Pullum was at least able to deliver a pep talk to the troops containing two inspiring arguments that provided a ray of hope. Even though both of those arguments have long since fallen flat on their face. It was in that year that he first published his essay that was re-published in 1991 as "The Stranger in the Bar," as part of that delightfully written book "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax," which for all its geniality contained a great deal of misinformation about language and linguistics. Pullum wanted to help linguists raise their own self-esteem by being able to persuade laypersons, even someone they might meet in a bar, that there is after all a useful, practical point to the work they do. His first ploy was to suggest to such strangers that linguists are busily at work trying "to program a computer to understand plain English, like the HAL 9000 computer in Stanley Kubrick's film `2001: A Space Odyssey.' Linguistics is the subject that figures out what you'd need to know about language in order to do that, for English or for any other language, in a general and theoretically principled way." And just in case linguists themselves were less than convinced by this explanation, in a further pep talk he urged them to attend a conference of the Association for Computational Linguistics, as he has just done, where they would soon discover that the work of theoretical linguistics is so advanced that it will soon launch unbelievably powerful machine translation systems that will be so successful that it is difficult to "take in how fast the technology is progressing, or how much money will be made by the companies involved in producing it, or how many diverse sorts of people it is going to put out of work." It ought to be obvious that both these arguments have failed. Assuming a project to construct a HAL-like computer were launched today, does any one still imagine it might be feasible, much less a good idea? And far from putting anyone out of work--read translators--it also ought to be obvious that those companies still active in what is left of the MT field, after they and their colleagues have spent decades squandering billions* in public and private funding, are now desperately trying to entice translators to strap themselves into the demanding translation memory systems they have finally blundered their way into devising. Of course these failures go even deeper and date back far beyond 1983 for almost a full fifty years. They spring from two major errors subscribed to by far too many linguists, one altogether abstract and theoretical, the other altogether practical. The first error lay in the unfounded and unprovable belief that somehow, despite the obvious diversity of languages, there simply _had_ to be a unifying pattern, there _had_ to be a unifying principle that would tie all these seemingly disparate phenomena together, even an ultimate "universal" solution. And having evolved such an all-embracing concept, it was naturally only a short step for these same linguists to assign themselves the unerring ability to ferret out and define this unifying principle in great detail. After all, this unifying principle simply had to exist, there could be no other possible solution, how could there be? The second practical error lay in the willingness of the US military to not merely believe this theoretical approach had merit but to provide vast funding for it over several decades. To his credit Pullum provides at least a partial critique of this aspect in the same piece. And there you have it, fifty years of linguistics--or most of it--in a nutshell. Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time period. Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality whenever it becomes necessary. And that different peoples have created their own systems for doing so in different ways under different circumstances in various cultures over the centuries, even over the millennia. And that this process may in fact furnish at least part of the reason, part of the underlying cause, for all the conflicting religious, political, and social ideologies we find on all sides of us. And finally, if any of the foregoing is true, how do we break out of it and move on to something less artificial and more real? Such a study of linguistics would be truly worthy of the time we spent studying it and once we had even a few solutions in hand would be fairly easy to explain to others, even to "the stranger in the bar." all the best to all! alex *In his extremely thorough analysis of MT for WIRED Magazine in 2000, Sheldon Silverman credited this project with having "burned through billions of dollars." Among all the Ph. D. theses in linguistics approved each year, it might be useful if one could finally come up with a definitive total for the amount spent. Whoever authored it would require far greater skills than mere knowledge of linguistics and MT--such a researcher would also need the accounting skills to search through national and institutional spending going back decades and ferret out funding for MT & related NLP projects hidden within our nation's military balance sheet, itself hidden within the total national budget. ------------------------------- Some relevant references: Pullum, Geoffrey. 1991 & 1983. "The stranger in the bar." Part of (pp. 17-22) "The great Eskimo vocabulary hoax" (University of Chicago Press). Originally published as "Linguists and computers" in the journal "Natural Language and Linguistic Theory" (D. Reidel Publishing Company). Silverman, Sheldon. "Machine Translation Today," WIRED Magazine, May, 2000. Two presentations on evidence based linguistics at last year's LACUS conference, online at: http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evidence.htm http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evishop.htm Also: "Suggested Minimal Requirements for the Advanced Study of Linguistics," online at: http://language.home.sprynet.com/lingdex/minimum.htm From mark at polymathix.com Wed Mar 15 19:28:40 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 13:28:40 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <003b01c6485e$341bca40$1b2bf7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander Gross wrote: > > Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger > truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time > period. > > Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a > system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part > of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about > the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality > whenever it becomes necessary. Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand, but the distinction is important enough to influence the quality of my nightly sleep. (As an aside, I'd note the teleological demon that crept into Alexander's language above: I don't think our biological defense system has any "intended" functions; it just has the functions that it has.) -- Mark [1] Alternatively, to create that reality -- if you choose not to postulate that there's a reality out there that could be made intelligible in the first place. Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From language at sprynet.com Wed Mar 15 22:05:59 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 17:05:59 -0500 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: Thanks for your reply, Mark. Have no argument with the points you make, though I believe you may be using the term teleological in a sense different from the one I learned. As so often happens in our field. Take for instance, Chomsky 1957: 'Suppose we have a machine that can be in any one of a finite number of different internal states?Each such machine thus defines a certain language; namely the set of sentences that can be produced in this way.' or Chomsky 2000: 'We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed network connected to a switch box; the network is constituted of the principles of language, while the switches are the options to be determined by experience. When the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when they are set another way, we have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a particular setting of the switches - a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. If the research program succeeds, we should be able literally to deduce Swahili from one choice of settings, Japanese from another, and so on through the languages that humans can acquire...' Now if that's not a ?????, I'd like you to explain to me exactly what a ????? is. I'd be quite surprised if the Department of Defense regarded it as any other than a ?????, a teleological statement of intention, ultimately aimed at creating MT systems and related applications. Are we truly in a postion to spurn teleological statements when they may be paying most of the salaries in the field of linguistics? all the best! alex ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mark P. Line" To: Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:28 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... > Alexander Gross wrote: >> >> Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger >> truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time >> period. >> >> Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a >> system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part >> of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about >> the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality >> whenever it becomes necessary. > > > Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] > intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have > the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the > reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand, but the distinction is > important enough to influence the quality of my nightly sleep. > > (As an aside, I'd note the teleological demon that crept into Alexander's > language above: I don't think our biological defense system has any > "intended" functions; it just has the functions that it has.) > > > -- Mark > > [1] Alternatively, to create that reality -- if you choose not to > postulate that there's a reality out there that could be made intelligible > in the first place. > > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 15 22:15:07 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 17:15:07 -0500 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: I'm not the first to suggest also that in many cases language is used as well to stop communications. All sorts of sociolinguistic phenomena help identify one as in- or out-member of a group (actually multidimensional grading). One doesn't necessarily want an enemy to know your plans (or have things changed radically re linguistic profiling since 9/11?), and its always good to be forewarned when some member of the riff-raff attempts to nose his way into the old-boy club. Perhaps language might be thought of as a social/technical regulatory system, with analogies not only at the genetic level, but also higher up, where other parts of the biochemical realm (such as hormones, growth factors, etc.) help to integrate or isolate multiple or individual compartments/components as needed. Even simple organisms such as sea anemonies can recognize each other chemically, as in- or out- group. And parasites must evade immune defenses in order to gain access to internal resources. The secret handshake can get you past the bouncer. As for MT, which along with NLAI got me interested in linguistics in the first place, my own take is that it is largely a positivistic reductionist mindset which is at fault for so many of the failed efforts, though giving due weight to the inertia created by establishment of powerful theoretical schools. Linguistics came very late to the 'scientific' table, and in some ways is still a party crasher (much as I am also ironically). Scott DeLancey's 'physics envy'. The ghost of Bloomfield haunts the hallowed halls, egged on by a gallery of dead Neogrammarian ancestors. But is some of this really possibly just symptomatic of the relationship linguistics (and increasingly most maturing fields) often has with funders, who don't want complex explanations as they stare at their watches and their eyes cross? A sort of evolutionary selection, where shiny, sparkly promises of simple and quick solutions to otherwise natty problems open the dollar floodgates? What kind of personal and political psychological makeup predisposes one to success in such an environment? How often does self-promoting, carefully groomed professional dynamic image prevail over substance and ability in the less appealing (and verbose) package? It is also interesting that the oversimplification of real complexity when dealing with outsiders has its inverse in the overcomplexification of simplicity in communications within the field itself to help create one's professional persona in the first place. A growing problem in many fields, blah blah blah. One tries to hope that things don't get as desperate for folks in MT as they must have been for that Korean stem-cell scientist who is in the news just now. Is it just a matter of time before somebody peers behind the curtain and sees the truth about Oz? Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From mark at polymathix.com Wed Mar 15 22:40:41 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 16:40:41 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <00ae01c6487c$a50d61a0$1b2bf7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander -- As I understood it, you were not ascribing a purpose to Chomsky, to his imaginary generative machine, to his imaginary switch box, to the U.S. Department of Defense or to the community of linguists. You were ascribing a purpose to "our biological defense system", which I understood to mean a functional subset of the human physiome. By implying that biological evolution is goal-directed, such an ascription opens up a Pandora's Box that bioscience has no need to see opened. So the short answer is that we are truly in a position to spurn teleological statements when they pertain to biological evolution. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX Alexander Gross2 wrote: > Thanks for your reply, Mark. Have no argument with the points you make, > though I believe you may be using the term teleological in a sense > different > from the one I learned. As so often happens in our field. Take for > instance, Chomsky 1957: > > 'Suppose we have a machine that can be in any one of a finite number of > different internal states???Each such machine thus defines a certain > language; > namely the set of sentences that can be produced in this way.' > > or Chomsky 2000: > > 'We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed > network connected to a switch box; the network is constituted of the > principles of language, while the switches are the options to be > determined > by experience. When the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when > they > are set another way, we have Japanese. Each possible human language is > identified as a particular setting of the switches - a setting of > parameters, in technical terminology. If the research program succeeds, we > should be able literally to deduce Swahili from one choice of settings, > Japanese from another, and so on through the languages that humans can > acquire...' > > Now if that's not a ??????????, I'd like you to explain to me exactly what > a > ?????????? is. I'd be quite surprised if the Department of Defense > regarded it > as any other than a ??????????, a teleological statement of intention, > ultimately > aimed at creating MT systems and related applications. > > Are we truly in a postion to spurn teleological statements when they may > be > paying most of the salaries in the field of linguistics? > > all the best! > > alex > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Mark P. Line" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:28 PM > Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, > etc.... > > >> Alexander Gross wrote: >>> >>> Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far >>> larger >>> truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time >>> period. >>> >>> Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a >>> system of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part >>> of our biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us >>> about >>> the nature of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality >>> whenever it becomes necessary. >> >> >> Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] >> intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have >> the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the >> reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand, but the distinction >> is >> important enough to influence the quality of my nightly sleep. >> >> (As an aside, I'd note the teleological demon that crept into >> Alexander's >> language above: I don't think our biological defense system has any >> "intended" functions; it just has the functions that it has.) >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> [1] Alternatively, to create that reality -- if you choose not to >> postulate that there's a reality out there that could be made >> intelligible >> in the first place. >> >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX From cc at cds-web.net Wed Mar 15 23:21:19 2006 From: cc at cds-web.net (cc at cds-web.net) Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 10:21:19 +1100 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <15759317.1142460907520.JavaMail.root@elwamui-ovcar.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Indeed, we see the immunological function of language everytime an antigen is attacked by antibodies on this list. cheers, chris Quoting jess tauber : > I'm not the first to suggest also that in many cases language is used > as well to stop communications. All sorts of sociolinguistic > phenomena help identify one as in- or out-member of a group (actually > multidimensional grading). One doesn't necessarily want an enemy to > know your plans (or have things changed radically re linguistic > profiling since 9/11?), and its always good to be forewarned when > some member of the riff-raff attempts to nose his way into the > old-boy club. > > Perhaps language might be thought of as a social/technical regulatory > system, with analogies not only at the genetic level, but also higher > up, where other parts of the biochemical realm (such as hormones, > growth factors, etc.) help to integrate or isolate multiple or > individual compartments/components as needed. Even simple organisms > such as sea anemonies can recognize each other chemically, as in- or > out- group. And parasites must evade immune defenses in order to gain > access to internal resources. The secret handshake can get you past > the bouncer. > > As for MT, which along with NLAI got me interested in linguistics in > the first place, my own take is that it is largely a positivistic > reductionist mindset which is at fault for so many of the failed > efforts, though giving due weight to the inertia created by > establishment of powerful theoretical schools. Linguistics came very > late to the 'scientific' table, and in some ways is still a party > crasher (much as I am also ironically). Scott DeLancey's 'physics > envy'. The ghost of Bloomfield haunts the hallowed halls, egged on by > a gallery of dead Neogrammarian ancestors. > > But is some of this really possibly just symptomatic of the > relationship linguistics (and increasingly most maturing fields) > often has with funders, who don't want complex explanations as they > stare at their watches and their eyes cross? A sort of evolutionary > selection, where shiny, sparkly promises of simple and quick > solutions to otherwise natty problems open the dollar floodgates? > What kind of personal and political psychological makeup predisposes > one to success in such an environment? How often does self-promoting, > carefully groomed professional dynamic image prevail over substance > and ability in the less appealing (and verbose) package? > > It is also interesting that the oversimplification of real complexity > when dealing with outsiders has its inverse in the > overcomplexification of simplicity in communications within the field > itself to help create one's professional persona in the first place. > A growing problem in many fields, blah blah blah. > > One tries to hope that things don't get as desperate for folks in MT > as they must have been for that Korean stem-cell scientist who is in > the news just now. Is it just a matter of time before somebody peers > behind the curtain and sees the truth about Oz? > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > > From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 16 04:48:34 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 21:48:34 -0700 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: Alexander, Thank you for paying me the compliment by including my quote on your favorites list. I never knew that my experience as a political refugee in the phonology wars could prove so useful.I have been appreciative of the intellectual company of my fellow functionalists since joining Funknet this year--both from the quality of the debate, which I learn from, but also from the camaraderie from the intellectual wise-assing among folks with shared interests and perspectives. I actually began my training in a very strictly generative department, and take great pains not to copy that their rather extreme and repressive parochialism. I therefore never rule out where aspects of their model might come into use. Psycholinguistic tests of garden path sentences show a certain validity, and notions of constituency might be useful for examining stuttering behaviors. It might turn out that both functionalist and formalist models are describing real aspects of our speech/language cognitive system, which has a lot of built-in redundancies. An equivalent example is in theories of speech perception between Quantal Theory, based on the Distinctive Features (Ken Stevens, and the MIT crowd), and Motor Theory, based on gestures (Haskins & Co.). Investigations in neuroscience show that both models are essentially correct--they reflect two simultanous but separate streams of the same signal along parallel neural pathways, and provide redundant cues for the perception of speech. The functionalist/formalist debate may turn out the same, so when I see tribal warfare brewing, I question both sides. This has not earned me many points in popularity contests, and has denied me funding on more than one occasion. However, it is something that linguists need to be doing, and I do indeed wish to practice science as a linguist. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Alexander Gross2 : > Well, that was one of the most remarkable dustups i've ever seen here on > FUNKNET, so remarkable that some awards are surely in order. Unless I'm > mistaken, one of those awards would have to be for sheer length--what I've > seen so far in the archives suggests that it's the second longest thread in > FUNKNET history since September of 1994, measuring some 45 messages. And > also the second most verbose, coming close to 18,000 words. Which is one > reason it's taken me a while to absorb, I've even had to print it out. Plus > which, it's truly profound stuff. But then it was meant to be, wasn't it? > > Some of it was positively brilliant. And just so it doesn't sound as though > I'm merely being satirical, I'd also like to present a few awards for some of > the very best comments by those taking part, at least from my point of view. > Here they come now: > > "The plethora of contradictory labeling systems with which linguistics is > plagued suggest that perhaps no single complete system is to be found." > --Rob Freeman > > "I hope this word [epiphenomenon] falls out of fashion in linguistics sooner > rather than later." --Suzanne Kemmer > > "We probably should assume that the rules of effective information > exchange are at least as rigid as putting up a barn. There is not a lot of > wiggle > room." --Steve Long > > "Seems to me that 'paradigm shift' is more like an earthquake or someone > popping your balloon." --Jess Tauber > > "Insularity/isolation, rather than multidisciplinary interfacing, is the norm > in the publish or perish world (speaking as a member of the latter realm). > Who has time and resources for anything else?" --Jess Tauber > > "I think that in linguistics and in phonology this is a big problem. I used > to > get a lot of pressure not to read--just get in there and crack phonemes. It > is > part of the crisis of linguistics as a science--which I find to be quite > Balkanized, and waters are tricky to navigate. When that hurdle is overcome > there is the aspect of competition and professional jealousy--a minefield for > a > newcomer in the field." --Diane Lesley-Neuman > > "I think that the apparent crisis of linguistics as a science looks a lot > less dangerous if we realize that not all linguists are actually practicing > science, nor even want to practice science -- even if some of them may think > and say otherwise." --Mark P. Line > > I'm particularly pleased by these barbed remarks since they seem to be going > at least part-way in the direction I set forth at last year's LACUS > Conference. > > But I was also a bit dismayed by how much else I had to wade through to find > these gems. And by how much of that material couldn't possibly qualify as > functional linguistics, on the contrary it was mostly an apologetic for > structural linguistics, even (yugh!) the generative kind. > > I'm playing with the idea that Linguistics has truly come no further than > where it was in 1983, except that back then Geoffrey Pullum was at least able > to deliver a pep talk to the troops containing two inspiring arguments that > provided a ray of hope. > > Even though both of those arguments have long since fallen flat on their > face. It was in that year that he first published his essay that was > re-published in 1991 as "The Stranger in the Bar," as part of that > delightfully written book "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax," which for all > its geniality contained a great deal of misinformation about language and > linguistics. > > Pullum wanted to help linguists raise their own self-esteem by being able to > persuade laypersons, even someone they might meet in a bar, that there is > after all a useful, practical point to the work they do. His first ploy was > to suggest to such strangers that linguists are busily at work trying "to > program a computer to understand plain English, like the HAL 9000 computer in > Stanley Kubrick's film `2001: A Space Odyssey.' Linguistics is the subject > that figures out what you'd need to know about language in order to do that, > for English or for any other language, in a general and theoretically > principled way." > > And just in case linguists themselves were less than convinced by this > explanation, in a further pep talk he urged them to attend a conference of > the Association for Computational Linguistics, as he has just done, where > they would soon discover that the work of theoretical linguistics is so > advanced that it will soon launch unbelievably powerful machine translation > systems that will be so successful that it is difficult to "take in how fast > the technology is progressing, or how much money will be made by the > companies involved in producing it, or how many diverse sorts of people it is > going to put out of work." > > It ought to be obvious that both these arguments have failed. Assuming a > project to construct a HAL-like computer were launched today, does any one > still imagine it might be feasible, much less a good idea? And far from > putting anyone out of work--read translators--it also ought to be obvious > that those companies still active in what is left of the MT field, after they > and their colleagues have spent decades squandering billions* in public and > private funding, are now desperately trying to entice translators to strap > themselves into the demanding translation memory systems they have finally > blundered their way into devising. > > Of course these failures go even deeper and date back far beyond 1983 for > almost a full fifty years. They spring from two major errors subscribed to > by far too many linguists, one altogether abstract and theoretical, the other > altogether practical. > > The first error lay in the unfounded and unprovable belief that somehow, > despite the obvious diversity of languages, there simply _had_ to be a > unifying pattern, there _had_ to be a unifying principle that would tie all > these seemingly disparate phenomena together, even an ultimate "universal" > solution. And having evolved such an all-embracing concept, it was naturally > only a short step for these same linguists to assign themselves the unerring > ability to ferret out and define this unifying principle in great detail. > > After all, this unifying principle simply had to exist, there could be no > other possible solution, how could there be? > > The second practical error lay in the willingness of the US military to not > merely believe this theoretical approach had merit but to provide vast > funding for it over several decades. To his credit Pullum provides at least > a partial critique of this aspect in the same piece. > > And there you have it, fifty years of linguistics--or most of it--in a > nutshell. > > Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that a far larger > truth about language has gone largely unexamined during the same time period. > > Namely that language--any language, all language--may not truly be a system > of communication at all but functions in large measure as a part of our > biological defense system, intended not so much to inform us about the nature > of reality but to blind us and protect us from that reality whenever it > becomes necessary. > > And that different peoples have created their own systems for doing so in > different ways under different circumstances in various cultures over the > centuries, even over the millennia. > > And that this process may in fact furnish at least part of the reason, part > of the underlying cause, for all the conflicting religious, political, and > social ideologies we find on all sides of us. > > And finally, if any of the foregoing is true, how do we break out of it and > move on to something less artificial and more real? > > Such a study of linguistics would be truly worthy of the time we spent > studying it and once we had even a few solutions in hand would be fairly easy > to explain to others, even to "the stranger in the bar." > > all the best to all! > > alex > > *In his extremely thorough analysis of MT for WIRED Magazine in 2000, Sheldon > Silverman credited this project with having "burned through billions of > dollars." Among all the Ph. D. theses in linguistics approved each year, it > might be useful if one could finally come up with a definitive total for the > amount spent. Whoever authored it would require far greater skills than mere > knowledge of linguistics and MT--such a researcher would also need the > accounting skills to search through national and institutional spending going > back decades and ferret out funding for MT & related NLP projects hidden > within our nation's military balance sheet, itself hidden within the total > national budget. > > ------------------------------- > Some relevant references: > > Pullum, Geoffrey. 1991 & 1983. "The stranger in the bar." Part of (pp. > 17-22) "The great Eskimo vocabulary hoax" (University of Chicago Press). > Originally published as "Linguists and computers" in the journal "Natural > Language and Linguistic Theory" (D. Reidel Publishing Company). > > Silverman, Sheldon. "Machine Translation Today," WIRED Magazine, May, 2000. > > Two presentations on evidence based linguistics at last year's LACUS > conference, online at: > > http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evidence.htm > > http://languag2.home.sprynet.com/f/evishop.htm > > Also: "Suggested Minimal Requirements for the Advanced Study of Linguistics," > online at: > > http://language.home.sprynet.com/lingdex/minimum.htm > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Thu Mar 16 21:10:41 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 16:10:41 -0500 Subject: Functional explanations for geographical typological variation? Message-ID: I've read here and there (don't ask me if I can remember where/when) speculations that morphosyntactic type varied to some extent by latitude and elevation. Dunno if its true, and even if it is to some extent there are lots of exceptions. The claim: polysynthesis tends to be concentrated around higher elevations and away from the equator, whereas analytical languages are in lower ones and have a more equatorial distribution. At first blush one notes that part of any truth to this could have to do with subsistence patterns- agriculture does very well indeed in the warmer, wetter areas (equatorial, low elevation), whereas animal husbandry or hunting/gathering will be found more in dryer, colder areas (poleward, high elevation). Obviously resource abundance must be taken as a factor- population size and packing density of different populations (such as between California on the one hand, and the Arctic/Subarctic, on the other), and people DO move. But anyway, this little tidbit just crossed my screen: (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314085155.htm). It seems that the degree of sociality in stingless sweat bees varies in just such a fashion. Quoting one researcher: "In modern halictid bees, social behavior varies among species and even within species as a function of latitude and altitude such that species and populations at low latitudes and in warmer regions are often fully social, whereas they are solitary at higher latitudes and altitudes, which are colder." The piece continues- >Warmer regions have longer growing seasons, he explained, which allows two broods to emerge instead of one. The first brood (workers) helps raise the second brood (reproductives).< Yet- "Other social insects (such as ants, termites, paper wasps and honey bees) have reached 'a point of no return' in social evolution in which members of the lineage are now unable to revert back to a solitary condition. These insects, however, seem to be able to revert fairly easily," he concluded. Now whether this sort of thing is relevant to a human linguistic typological distribution which is itself hypothetical is at least an open question. But sometimes one can look outside ourselves to gain comparative insights, for instance geographically/environmentally motivated acoustic signal variation in animals versus perhaps similar variation in human language phonologies? Most of the very fortis phonologies are found in mountainous and other, harsher regions? Cosmopolitan societies tend to concentrate in warmer, wetter areas, develop a great deal of internal stratification/hierarchicalization, etc. which allow a single polity or overarching social identity to keep all the needed social/technical roles under one roof. Perhaps with more isolated societies many of the roles become externalized- specialization between groups which trade for goods and services they themselves cannot provide (at least as well). The hills have eyes.... Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From Salinas17 at aol.com Thu Mar 16 21:58:46 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 16:58:46 EST Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... Message-ID: In a message dated 3/15/06 2:29:27 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: << Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand >> On the cheery assumption that every comment is helpful, here's yet another comment. Is "reality intelligible" to my cat or dog? They certainly act like they understand what's going on, sometimes, at least for their purposes -- maybe not as much as I do, but I know some who would argue with that. These two animals navigate about the world in what seems a relatively rational way. They particularly know how to get me to give them food, open the door, get the lease, liberally provide catnip and noisy toys. Is their reality "intelligible" to them? If so, how did they do it without human language? Or is "intelligible" in some way reserved to humans? And if so, how is it defined so that it excludes animals? It would be circular to say intelligible reality is reserved to language users and then say language is what makes reality intelligible. You might as well say reality is linguistic, which would mean my dog and cat are somehow deprived of reality. Before the first human set foot in America, America was already there. It already had a geological and biological history that can be read today. It was REAL before any human ever got there. Most things are like that. They don't depend on us to be created. If we get the odd idea that we can negotiate them out by cognitively creating a reality without them in it, they will fall off the shelf and hit us in the head. Just to remind us that we don't really "make" reality. Language does to some degree have to be "a mirror of the world" in order for it to make any sense. Grammar -- no matter how "correct" -- still makes absolutely no sense if it is referring to a six foot rabbit in the room and there is no six foot rabbit in the room. The ultimate test, after all, of an MT machine is not whether or not we can harmonize the corresponding switches in the heads of speakers of different languages, but whether those speakers end up talking about the same things -- out there, where nature seems to be impatient with "realities" that don't conform to reality, no matter how the switches in our heads are set. Regards, Steve Long From Arie.Verhagen at let.LeidenUniv.nl Fri Mar 17 18:15:00 2006 From: Arie.Verhagen at let.LeidenUniv.nl (Arie Verhagen) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 19:15:00 +0100 Subject: 1 April Message-ID: Beste collega's, Zaterdag 1 april (geen grap) 2006 (en de vrijdagmiddag ervoor) vieren we in Leiden de oprichting van het LUCL, een taalkundig onderzoeksinstituut dat alle Leidse taalkundigen omvat. We doen dat met een internationaal symposium dat bepaald de moeite waard is (sprekers: John Lucy, Marianne Mithun, Neil Smith, Bernard Comrie). Ik sluit het persbericht bij. Details van het programma zijn te vinden op http://www.lucl.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?m=1&c=203 Graag nodig ik jullie uit om dit symposium bij te wonen. Als je kunt komen, stellen we het op prijs als je dat even van te voren laat weten aan het secretariaat van het LUCL (lucl at let.leidenuniv.nl). Mocht je van bepaalde medewerkers denken dat ze ook ge?nteresseerd zijn, geef dit bericht dan gerust door, graag wel met hetzelfde verzoek tot aanmelding. Hartelijke groeten, --Arie ---------------------------------------- Arie Verhagen Opleiding Nederlands/LUCL Postbus 9515 2300 RA Leiden tel. +31 (0)71 527-4152 www.arieverhagen.nl ---------------------------------------- From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 17 19:31:45 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 13:31:45 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <2b6.69a6b34.314b3996@aol.com> Message-ID: Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/15/06 2:29:27 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > << Perhaps not so much to blind and protect us, but to make reality[1] > intelligible (whatever the cost). Making reality intelligible does have > the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the > reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand >> > > Is "reality intelligible" to my cat or dog? They certainly act like they > understand what's going on, sometimes, at least for their purposes -- > maybe not as much as I do, but I know some who would argue with that. I think that cats and dogs ontogenetically construct models of their environment that are not usefully reducible to physiological states (so we can go ahead and call them _cognitive_ models), and I think that's a useful working definition for intelligible-making. So, yeah. (All viruses and organisms can be said to have phylogenetic models of their environment in some sense, and presumably all organisms construct models (in some sense) ontogenetically that *are* usefully reducible to physiological states, but these are not the phenomena I was getting at in the bit you quoted above.) > Is their reality "intelligible" to them? If so, how did they do it > without human language? I didn't mean to imply that human language is the only mechanism in the universe by which an adaptive system (human, non-human animate or otherwise) might make reality intelligible to itself, and I don't think I did so imply. What I said was that I consider the intelligible-making effect of language to be primary with respect to the blinding and protecting effects mentioned by my interlocutor. > Or is "intelligible" in some way reserved to humans? No, assuming the kind of working definition I indicated above. > Before the first human set foot in America, America was already there. > It already had a geological and biological history that can be read > today. It was REAL before any human ever got there. Most things are like > that. They don't depend on us to be created. Models which emanate from this realist postulate are typically more useful than models which emanate from its absence or negation, but that doesn't mean that such alternative models cannot exist nor that they cannot be useful. > Language does to some degree have to be "a mirror of the world" in order > for it to make any sense. Grammar -- no matter how "correct" -- still > makes absolutely no sense if it is referring to a six foot rabbit in the > room and there is no six foot rabbit in the room. I would tend to disagree. I think that hearers generally cause perceived language to make sense almost at any cost, even when there may be no sense to be made of it from a more privileged frame of reference (if you can identify a more privileged frame of reference, that is). (Instance for, print in sentence this understand to fail would English of speakers native few.) -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Salinas17 at aol.com Fri Mar 17 20:41:05 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 15:41:05 EST Subject: Reflections cont'd Message-ID: In a message dated 3/17/06 2:35:53 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: << (Instance for, print in sentence this understand to fail would English of speakers native few.) >> Your example does not apply to what I wrote. What I wrote was that Grammar can be perfectly correct and still make no sense. Your example is about English syntax, not sense. In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it makes absolutely no sense. One doesn't even have to raise observation to the level of discourse to suspect that there was no intention to do anything with this sentence but make it grammatical and that the words are random. Grammar, naked and by itself, conveys little or no meaning at all, either to oneself ("cognitively") or to others, pragmatically. <> Listeners will give speakers the benefit of the doubt, no doubt. And grammar can give the impression of meaning, but we know that we can generate grammatical sentences that objectively intend no meaning and convey no information in terms of communication to others. That tells us that grammar -- despite everything that you hear otherwise -- is not the core of language. Grammar is like the shape of a common hammer. We can contemplate the shape of a hammer all we like. But unless we get around to asking what it is for, it will appear to hold many hidden mysteries and yield many different theories to no point. There are those of us who believe that language is most basically only another partially evolved, partially developed tool (but one of immense processing power) used by humans to affect their environment. And we have to regard any structural approaches as being deficient -- UNLESS they take central account of what that structure is aimed at. Regards, Steve Long From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 17 21:24:02 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 15:24:02 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd In-Reply-To: <303.dc3e46.314c78e1@aol.com> Message-ID: Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > > In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you > ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. > > That's fine grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I > don't -- it makes absolutely no sense. One doesn't even have to raise > observation to the level of discourse to suspect that there was no > intention to do anything with this sentence but make it grammatical and > that the words are random. While that is presumably true in the context of a linguistics mailing list, I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to study. > Grammar, naked and by itself, conveys little or no meaning at all, either > to oneself ("cognitively") or to others, pragmatically. Grammar, naked and by itself, exists in the same way as the sound of one hand clapping exists. So you can claim anything at all to be true about it as an abstraction of your own device, and nobody can say you're wrong. > That tells us that grammar -- despite everything that you hear otherwise > -- is not the core of language. Some models of language have grammar as their core, while others do not. Both kinds of model can be useful. I didn't know this was an issue here, though. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From language at sprynet.com Mon Mar 20 22:32:03 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 17:32:03 -0500 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... Message-ID: I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: _________________________ Have flicked though it and find it quite tame and utterly boring. It's this sort of linguistics that alienates me from linguistics. In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not learning foreign ones! In this way, these funknetters are as adrift as the sic-langeurs.* Just to annoy you, I think it's mostly a US-American phenomenon (sic). Smile! ---------------------------------------- *"sic langeurs" is my friend's term for those linguists who forgather on the sci.lang USENET newsgroup. all the best! alex From mark at polymathix.com Tue Mar 21 01:16:46 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 19:16:46 -0600 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... In-Reply-To: <002801c64c6e$1d986d00$912af7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander Gross2 wrote: > I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena > discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone > who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently > resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: Holy cow! An M.A. in linguistics, and publishes technical articles about language! I guess FUNKNET can only *dream* of ever getting anybody like *that* to subscribe here. Good thing we have your friend to set us straight by proxy. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Tue Mar 21 02:25:44 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 14:25:44 +1200 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... In-Reply-To: <002801c64c6e$1d986d00$912af7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: You _are_ a card, Alex! Inspired by your example I also printed out the whole thread. Uncertain who to give it to first I gave it to my dog. He ate it. What does that prove? :-) -Rob On Tuesday 21 March 2006 10:32, Alexander Gross2 wrote: > I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena > discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone > who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently > resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: > _________________________ > > Have flicked though it and find it quite tame and utterly boring. It's this > sort of linguistics that alienates me from linguistics. > > In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or > even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. > > Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not > learning foreign ones! In this way, these funknetters are as adrift as the > sic-langeurs.* Just to annoy you, I think it's mostly a US-American > phenomenon (sic). Smile! > > ---------------------------------------- > *"sic langeurs" is my friend's term for those linguists who forgather on > the sci.lang USENET newsgroup. > > all the best! > > alex From rjacobs at townesquare.net Tue Mar 21 03:10:46 2006 From: rjacobs at townesquare.net (R. A. Jacobs) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 22:10:46 -0500 Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... In-Reply-To: <200603211425.44332.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Langeurs is too too langoureux! As another bloody-minded Brit, I barely skimmed Alex's friend's bloody-minded harangue-typical of the kind that lost us our empire! Still, it's obvious that Yanks don't know how to do anything properly except BS, the virtuous limeys murmur over their PG tips. Long live the Queen! Ricky >On Tuesday 21 March 2006 10:32, Alexander Gross2 wrote: >> I sent a copy of the entire 183 KB grammaticalization/epiphenomena >> discussion file to an English friend with an M.A. in linguistics, someone >> who regularly publishes technical articles about language & currently >> resides in Germany. Here was his reaction: >> _________________________ >> >> Have flicked though it and find it quite tame and utterly boring. It's this >> sort of linguistics that alienates me from linguistics. >> >> In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or >> even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. >> >> Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not >> learning foreign ones! In this way, these funknetters are as adrift as the >> sic-langeurs.* Just to annoy you, I think it's mostly a US-American >> phenomenon (sic). Smile! >> >> ---------------------------------------- >> *"sic langeurs" is my friend's term for those linguists who forgather on >> the sci.lang USENET newsgroup. >> >> all the best! >> >> alex From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Tue Mar 21 03:02:39 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 16:02:39 +1300 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <22668.4.230.156.122.1142450920.squirrel@webmail3.pair.com> Message-ID: Just an aside, Mark. I thought this earlier comment worked rather well on several levels: On Thursday 16 March 2006 08:28, Mark P. Line wrote: > ...Making reality intelligible does have > the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the > reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand... Did you intend to point out that intellectual blindness, as a side-effect, would thus be by some definitions itself an epiphenomenon? :-) What makes this observation really great is that this kind of blindness, and an epiphenomenon at that, seems indeed to be what is at the root of cognition. It tempts me to repeat something I read recently in the enjoyable popular book "The Unfolding of Language", by Guy Deutscher. According to Guy there is a story by Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges about a man who loses the ability to forget, and so can no longer think. Deutscher writes (p.g. 173): "Borges understood that the ability to pick out patterns, to draw analogies between unequal yet similar things, in short, to 'forget a difference', is at the very core of our intelligence." "To think is to forget a difference" says Deutscher. With appropriate corollaries to be drawn about language. -Rob From mark at polymathix.com Tue Mar 21 03:48:16 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 21:48:16 -0600 Subject: Reflections on Grammaticalization, Epiphenomena, etc.... In-Reply-To: <200603211502.39849.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Rob Freeman wrote: > Just an aside, Mark. > > I thought this earlier comment worked rather well on several levels: > > On Thursday 16 March 2006 08:28, Mark P. Line wrote: >> ...Making reality intelligible does have >> the common *side-effect* of blinding us to and protecting us from the >> reality (or lack thereof) we ostensibly understand... > > Did you intend to point out that intellectual blindness, as a > side-effect, would thus be by some definitions itself an epiphenomenon? Not particularly, since I wanted to stay out of the discussion of epiphenomena -- mostly because the term means too many different things to different people. If I'd jumped into that one, I'd've wanted to take it into the ontology of emergence. But emergence means too many different things to different people, too, so I'm not sure anything would be gained. > What makes this observation really great is that this kind of blindness, > and an epiphenomenon at that, seems indeed to be what is at the root of > cognition. Mm hmm. All modelling involves being blind in one eye. Cognition is modelling in the wild. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 21 04:26:22 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 23:26:22 EST Subject: Reflections, etc--Another point of view... Message-ID: In a message dated 3/20/06 5:32:31 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not learning foreign ones! >> I have picked up a few useful phrases at the Armenian market. But there we mainly "talk about language," e.g., my new friends there ask me why English doesn't look anything like it sounds? I tell them it's because English was once a foreign language, too. But when the Brits learned it, they never really figured out how to get the sounds to match up with the letters. So, bad spelling became a kind of time-honored tradition. Then they shake their heads -- philosophically -- and say "Ah, yes, that sounds like the British..." Then we have a contest to see who knows the most esoteric verb-endings in Latin. Steve Long From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 21 13:03:12 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 08:03:12 EST Subject: Correction re Reflections Message-ID: In a message dated 3/20/06 5:32:31 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: << In all the exchanges, there is not one reference to foreign languages or even speaking English that I can see. It's philosophy. >> Actually, this is incorrect. Alex's correspondent did not read close enough. See the following noteworthy comment by Dan Everett: In a message dated 2/27/06 2:57:05 PM, daniel.everett at uol.com.br writes: << The EU is investing several hundred thousand euros in the study of Piraha over the next three years, with several psycholinguists and linguists visiting the Pirahas to conduct follow-up experiments on my claims. So we shall have the evidence requested below over the next year or three. >> Steve Long From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 21 13:24:42 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 08:24:42 EST Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) Message-ID: I wrote: <> In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: <> No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make no sense as well. Maybe they are connected? This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality intelligible. My point is it's more useful to see it the other way around. That reality makes language intelligible. And when reality doesn't check-off on a sentence like the one above, it will tend not to make sense and therefore tend not to be used. If you turn Chomsky on his head -- "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" -- you may think what he proved was that language that makes no sense is not language. What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that any model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects of language is fundamentally inaccurate. Regards, Steve Long From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Tue Mar 21 16:51:44 2006 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 18:51:44 +0200 Subject: Reflections, etc-- English spelling Message-ID: On Mon, 20 Mar 2006 Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/20/06 5:32:31 PM, language at sprynet.com writes: > << Linguistics has become a talking shop for talking about language and not > learning foreign ones! >> > > I have picked up a few useful phrases at the Armenian market. But there we > mainly "talk about language," e.g., my new friends there ask me why English > doesn't look anything like it sounds? Below is an attempt to renew English spelling towards the situation in which the spelling would be much closer to the spoken form than nowadays. The paragraph below rephrases the paragraph above. Here I have used Finnish as the starting point as we have the fortunate situation that children have the chance to learn to spell very easily. The example makes easily sense to those who speak Latin, Italian, German, etc. with some details to explained. For example, the notations "a and "o refer to a-umlaut and o-umlaut that in Finnish are separate phonemes of their own. Ai h"av pikd ap "o fjuu juusful freisis "at th"o aarmeini"on maakit. Bat the"o wii meinli 'took "abaut l"angwitsh,' ii zii, mai njuu frends the"o aask mii whai Inglish dasnt luk enithing laik it saunds? There are still many details to be considered. For instance, the combination of letters 'th' (in 'there', 'this', etc.) could be replaced by a single letter. One might also wish to use some more commonly spoken language as starting point. It would be useful that the language would be rich in vowels and consonants that are explicitly and systematically distinguished in their written form. On the other hand, speakers of English and French might be less annoyed if the basis was Finnish rather than, e.g., German or Italian. For those of you who only speak one language it may be difficult to see any sense in this. However, in this way it would be much easier: for those future generations who still need to learn to write in English it would be useful to renew the system to save resources to some other tasks than learning to find with a lot of effort the complex mapping between spoken and written forms of language. This might feel quite outrageous from the point of view of those who have already learned this system. For many it may be difficult even to recognize the high complexity (cf. the famous "ghoti" = "fish" example). Moreover, some people might have some concerns about the preservation of cultural values... If you are aware of any such radical attempts, please send me information on them, especially if there are web-based resources available such as online lexica. I am not completely serious with this theme but I find it intriguing to point out this kind of opportunity as potentially many future generations will use English as their common ground for communication. As said, a more useful focus might be something else than learning to spell. For example, one might be able to familiarize oneself with some thousands of poems with the effort that is required for this basic task. Best regards, Timo P.S. There is also some new interest in the Finnish educational system that in practice also benefits from the simplicity of spelling (please, see the quote below). On the other hand, learning Finnish cannot be recommended before we are able to replace our case endings and other means for inflectional word formation with prepositions, etc. "In fact, the Finns, who have long felt neglected by the rest of the world, are delighted to show off their schools. But they do have a logistical problem. Foreign educators in droves want to visit Finnish schools for the simple reason that they are so good -- ..." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/23/AR2005052301622.html -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Laboratory of Computer and Information Science Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From langconf at acs.bu.edu Tue Mar 21 19:38:56 2006 From: langconf at acs.bu.edu (BUCLD) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 14:38:56 -0500 Subject: BUCLD 31 - Call for papers Message-ID: CALL FOR PAPERS THE 31st ANNUAL BOSTON UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 3-5, 2006 Keynote Speakers: Roberta Golinkoff, University of Delaware Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Temple University "Breaking the Language Barrier: The View from the Radical Middle" Plenary Speaker: J?rgen M. Meisel, University of Hamburg & University of Calgary ?Multiple First Language Acquisition: A Case for Autonomous Syntactic Development in the Simultaneous Acquisition of More Than One Language? Lunch Symposium: ?Future Directions in Search of Genes that Influence Language: Phenotypes, Molecules, Brains, and Growth? Mabel Rice, University of Kansas Helen Tager-Flusberg, Boston University Simon Fisher, University of Oxford Discussant: Gary Marcus, New York University? All topics in the fields of first and second language acquisition from all theoretical perspectives will be fully considered, including: * Bilingualism * Cognition & Language * Creoles & Pidgins * Dialects * Discourse * Exceptional Language * Gesture * Hearing Impairment and Deafness * Input & Interaction * Language Disorders * Linguistic Theory (Syntax, Semantics, Phonology, Morphology, Lexicon) * Literacy & Narrative * Neurolinguistics * Pragmatics * Pre-linguistic Development * Signed Languages * Sociolinguistics * Speech Perception & Production Presentations will be 20 minutes long followed by a 10 minute question period. Posters will be on display for a full day with two attended sessions during the day. ABSTRACT FORMAT AND CONTENT Abstracts submitted must represent original, unpublished research. Abstracts should be anonymous, clearly titled and no more than 450 words in length. They should also fit on one page, with an optional second page for references or figures if required. Abstracts longer than 450 words will be rejected without being evaluated. Please note the word count at the bottom of the abstract. Note that words counts need not include the abstract title or the list of references. A suggested format and style for abstracts is available at: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/template.html An excellent example of how to formulate the content of the abstract can be found on the LSA website at: http://www.lsadc.org/info/dec02bulletin/model.html The criteria used by the reviewers to evaluate abstracts can be found at: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/reviewprocess.html#rate All abstracts must be submitted as PDF documents. Specific instructions for how to create PDF documents are available at: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/pdfinfo.html. If you encounter a problem creating a PDF file, please contact us for further assistance. Please use the first author's last name as the file name (eg. Smith.pdf). No author information should appear anywhere in the contents of the PDF file itself. SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS Electronic submission: To facilitate the abstract submission process, abstracts will be submitted using the form available at the conference website at http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/abstract.htm. Specific instructions for abstract submission are available on this website. Abstracts will be accepted between April 1 and May 15. Contact information for each author must be submitted via webform. No author information should appear anywhere in the abstract PDF. At the time of submission you will be asked whether you would like your abstract to be considered for a poster, a paper, or both. Although each author may submit as many abstracts as desired, we will accept for presentation by each author: (a) a maximum of 1 first authored paper/poster, and (b) a maximum of 2 papers/posters in any authorship status. Note that no changes in authorship (including deleting an author or changing author order) will be possible after the review process is completed or for publication in the conference proceedings. DEADLINE All submissions must be received by 8:00 PM EST, May 15, 2006. Late abstracts will not be considered, whatever the reason for the delay. We regret that we cannot accept abstract submissions by fax or email. Submissions via surface mail will only be accepted in special circumstances, on a case by case basis. Please contact us well in advance of the submission deadline (May 15, 2006) to make these arrangements. ABSTRACT SELECTION Each abstract is blind reviewed by 5 reviewers from a panel of approximately 100 international scholars. Further information about the review process is available at http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/reviewprocess.html. Acknowledgment of receipt of the abstract will be sent by email as soon as possible after receipt. Notice of acceptance or rejection will be sent to first authors only, in early August, by email. Pre-registration materials and preliminary schedule will be available in late August, 2006. If your abstract is accepted, you will need to submit a 150-word abstract including title, author(s) and affiliation(s) for inclusion in the conference handbook. Guidelines will be provided along with notification of acceptance. Abstracts accepted as papers will be invited for publication in the BUCLD Proceedings. Abstracts accepted as posters will be invited for publication online only, but not in the printed version. All conference papers will be selected on the basis of abstracts submitted. Although each abstract will be evaluated individually, we will attempt to honor requests to schedule accepted papers together in group sessions. No schedule changes will be possible once the schedule is set. Scheduling requests for religious reasons only must be made before the review process is complete (i.e. at the time of submission). A space is provided on the abstract submission webform to specify such requests. FURTHER INFORMATION Information regarding the conference may be accessed on the BUCLD website: http://www.bu.edu/linguistics/APPLIED/BUCLD/ Boston University Conference on Language Development 96 Cummington Street, Room 244 Boston, MA 02215 U.S.A. Telephone: (617) 353-3085 e-mail: langconf at bu.edu From mark at polymathix.com Tue Mar 21 21:21:10 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 15:21:10 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <333.63e431.3151589a@aol.com> Message-ID: Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > I wrote: > < ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine > grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it > makes absolutely no sense.>> > > > In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > > < list, > I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the > populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to study. > >> > > No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make > no sense as well. Maybe they are connected? Perhaps when you say the sentence "makes no sense" you really mean that certain semantic processes lead to contradictory entailments when applied to the sentence in the usual fashion. There's no doubt that the fact that a sentence is improbable and the fact that conventional semantic processing leads to contradiction are indeed related, as you suggest: speakers tend to devise utterances that lead to intended and generally non-contradictory entailments. But my point was that every utterance makes sense in the context of its occurrence, regardless of how poorly suited it might be for conventional semantic processing. Linguistically naive speaker/hearers confronted with contradictions are observed to engage in a divergent, *unconventional* form of semantic processing in order to produce a non-contradictory set of entailments. "In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed." I do try hard not to vent to teachers, but it did happen just this once. The fact that we'd both been waiting in the left-hand line at the ticket counter for over three hours just made me lose it. As most people know, the Society for Teacher Ventilation Recovery in Carmel, Indiana was responsible for their trademark 'carmelization' technique for dealing with teachers just such as this one, and I'm thankful that your mastery of the technique was adequate to get her back on an even keel. It was smart of you to do it with such a tender touch. On another level, I appreciate the fact that you were able to walk the fine line between condensing your response to the point of being overly terse and introducing verbal weeds for me to fight through to get to your point. > This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality > intelligible. My point is it's more useful to see it the other way > around. That reality makes language intelligible. Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing. But it turns out that nothing extra at all is needed to make language intelligible: naive speaker/hearers tend to create sense for every utterance, no matter how far they have to diverge from semantic convention. > What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that > any model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects > of language is fundamentally inaccurate. That, of course, is not news, nor would I expect you to find anybody here who disagrees. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From language at sprynet.com Wed Mar 22 05:14:32 2006 From: language at sprynet.com (Alexander Gross2) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 00:14:32 -0500 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) Message-ID: Rob, I believe you may be overlooking a rather important element in my friend's point of view, something even Geoffrey Pullum for all his faults quite clearly recognized. He tried out two arguments to justify the work of linguists to the "stranger in the bar," but neither one remains persuasive today. The identity crisis Pullum ascribes to linguists has clearly not gone away, all the more so if the person expressing doubts about the field is not a stranger in the bar but someone who has bothered to obtain an M.A in the field and works with language on an advanced level. Mark, the offbeat example of Carmelization depends on a missing piece of context, and even though such missing context confronts us at various stages of our learning, this one is still a fairly unusual instance, as noted below. Here's something a good deal less recondite, an example I devised using an English structure to show how common Chinese four-character structures or "proverbs" work: Blows Strokes Sweep Breaths I've left out the punctuation because there wouldn't be any in Chinese. There wouldn't even be an 's' marking three of the words, because the Chinese don't usually record the plural in nouns and verbs. So how about: Blow Stroke Sweep Breath. How would you translate that into another language? Or since it's English, what would you imagine it means in your own language? Would you interpret it as something poetic and inspiring, such as "The vast wind beats on my heart, sweeping my breath away?" Or is it a tale of oarsmen being swept away while pursuing a whale? Or could it be something overtly sexual? These are typical of the sort of errors awaiting anyone trying to understand Chinese, much less translate it?and some have fallen into such traps. Or here in simply trying to understand it in English. The precise meaning of the phrase Blows, Strokes, Sweep, Breaths refers to a medical context in American English: it is a mnemonic for remembering the correct order of actions in dealing with an unconscious non-breathing patient and is regularly taught in courses on cardio-pulmonary resuscitation: blows on the back, artificial respiration, clearing the patient's air channel with one's fingers, and the "kiss of life." Such structures are quite common in Chinese and operate quite independently of grammar, even though a grammatical substructure may be imposed on them after the fact. all the best! alex ps--Three decades ago in California my wife and I, hoping to improve our education, went driving furiously around Carmel trying to find the Society for Teacher Ventilation Recovery. We were told they had pulled up stakes with no forwarding address. Perhaps we were in the wrong state. Fortunately just four miles down the road we came to Monterey, where there is an excellent translation school. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mark P. Line" To: Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 4:21 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Reflections cont'd (2) > Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >> I wrote: >> <> ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine >> grammar but -- unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it >> makes absolutely no sense.>> >> >> >> In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: >> >> <> list, >> I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the >> populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to >> study. >> >> >> >> No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make >> no sense as well. Maybe they are connected? > > Perhaps when you say the sentence "makes no sense" you really mean that > certain semantic processes lead to contradictory entailments when applied > to the sentence in the usual fashion. > > There's no doubt that the fact that a sentence is improbable and the fact > that conventional semantic processing leads to contradiction are indeed > related, as you suggest: speakers tend to devise utterances that lead to > intended and generally non-contradictory entailments. > > But my point was that every utterance makes sense in the context of its > occurrence, regardless of how poorly suited it might be for conventional > semantic processing. Linguistically naive speaker/hearers confronted with > contradictions are observed to engage in a divergent, *unconventional* > form of semantic processing in order to produce a non-contradictory set of > entailments. > > "In response, I only can tenderly carmelize the teacher to whom you > ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed." > > I do try hard not to vent to teachers, but it did happen just this once. > The fact that we'd both been waiting in the left-hand line at the ticket > counter for over three hours just made me lose it. As most people know, > the Society for Teacher Ventilation Recovery in Carmel, Indiana was > responsible for their trademark 'carmelization' technique for dealing with > teachers just such as this one, and I'm thankful that your mastery of the > technique was adequate to get her back on an even keel. It was smart of > you to do it with such a tender touch. > > On another level, I appreciate the fact that you were able to walk the > fine line between condensing your response to the point of being overly > terse and introducing verbal weeds for me to fight through to get to your > point. > > >> This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality >> intelligible. My point is it's more useful to see it the other way >> around. That reality makes language intelligible. > > Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's > *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. > I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to > intervene directly in language processing. > > But it turns out that nothing extra at all is needed to make language > intelligible: naive speaker/hearers tend to create sense for every > utterance, no matter how far they have to diverge from semantic > convention. > > >> What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that >> any model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects >> of language is fundamentally inaccurate. > > That, of course, is not news, nor would I expect you to find anybody here > who disagrees. > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > From mark at polymathix.com Wed Mar 22 07:39:03 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 01:39:03 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <00b601c64d6f$81bd1900$5e28f7a5@woowoo> Message-ID: Alexander Gross2 wrote: > The identity crisis Pullum ascribes to linguists has clearly not > gone away, all the more so if the person expressing doubts about the > field is not a stranger in the bar but someone who has bothered to obtain > an M.A in the field and works with language on an advanced level. Would all linguists who are currently experiencing an identity crisis as a linguist please stand up? (I'm sure there *are* linguists who are currently experiencing an identity crisis as linguists, but I wouldn't expect very many of them to be on this list. I assume that they consist mostly of (a) the old ones who are now recognizing that things didn't work out the way they expected back in the 60's and 70's, and (b) the young ones who are now recognizing that they're doing computer science, mathematics or philosophy, but not linguistics. The rest of us are pretty much still doing the same thing we've always done, with reasonable success.) > Blow Stroke Sweep Breath. > > How would you translate that into another language? Or since it's > English, what would you imagine it means in your own language? It's probably a rule of thumb for some first-aid technique... Mnemonic phrases that do not form complete sentences are not limited to Chinese -- we have them in English as well. (Note, though, that the Mandarin original can possibly be read as a sequence of four one-word imperative clauses.) Dad Mom Sister Brother (rules for long division) First Outer Inner Last (FOIL rule for multiplying binomials) Port Out Starboard Home (POSH staterooms) Spring Forward Fall Behind (rule for Daylight Savings Time) Roy G. Biv (color spectrum) Of course, most common mnemonics in English seem to use some kind of word play and form at least one complete sentence: Pregnant Camels Ordinarily Sit Down Carefully. Perhaps Their Joints Creak (geological eras) Some Old Horse Caught Another Horse Taking Oats Away (right-triangle trig functions) -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 00:13:10 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 17:13:10 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <333.63e431.3151589a@aol.com> Message-ID: "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality intelligible." How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Salinas17 at aol.com: > I wrote: > < ventilated in the left column, weedlessly uncondensed. That's fine grammar > but -- > unless you are privileged to know something I don't -- it makes absolutely no > sense.>> > > > In a message dated 3/17/06 7:56:12 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > > < I doubt there's much evidence of the same kind of phenomenon in the > populations of mere mortals and their utterances that we purport to study. >> > > No doubt that it is an improbable sentence. And it just happens to make no > sense as well. Maybe they are connected? > > This goes back to your suggestion about language making reality intelligible. > My point is it's more useful to see it the other way around. That reality > makes language intelligible. And when reality doesn't check-off on a > sentence > like the one above, it will tend not to make sense and therefore tend not to > be used. > > If you turn Chomsky on his head -- "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" > -- you may think what he proved was that language that makes no sense is not > language. > > What does that suggest about "language models?" It might suggests that any > model of language that does not include the extra-linguistic effects of > language is fundamentally inaccurate. > > Regards, > Steve Long > > From mark at polymathix.com Thu Mar 23 00:36:04 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 18:36:04 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <1143072790.4421e816c5ba7@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > intelligible." > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene with my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or more realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 01:33:21 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 18:33:21 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <5274.4.230.174.87.1143074164.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by experience. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science Hellums 02 University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > > intelligible." > > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > > I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene with > my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want > to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or more > realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From mark at polymathix.com Thu Mar 23 16:00:41 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 10:00:41 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (2) In-Reply-To: <1143077601.4421fae15e027@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > experience. That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that perception would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality >> > intelligible." >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene >> with >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or >> more >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. From remlingk at gvsu.edu Thu Mar 23 17:36:46 2006 From: remlingk at gvsu.edu (Kathryn Remlinger) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 12:36:46 -0500 Subject: Second call for papers: ADS at MMLA Message-ID: Call for Papers: Language Variation and Change in the United States The American Dialect Society, Midwest Region With the Midwest Modern Language Association, 9-12 November 2006, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago We welcome papers dealing with varieties of English and other languages spoken in the United States. Presentations may be based in traditional dialectology or in other areas of language variation and change, including sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, anthropological linguistics, folk linguistics, language and gender/sexuality, language attitudes, linguistics in the schools, critical discourse analysis, or narratology. April 15, 2006 is the deadline for 300-word abstracts. Email submissions only. Send abstracts to: Kathryn Remlinger remlingk at gvsu.edu American Dialect Society, Midwest Secretary Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan 1-616-331-3122 Membership to ADS is recommended. Membership is $50 and includes a year's subscription to the society's journal, American Speech, and a copy of the Publication of the American Dialect Society (PADS, an annual hardbound supplement). Membership information is available at www.americandialect.org Membership to MMLA is required. Membership is $35 for full and associate professors, $30 for assistant professors and schoolteachers, $20 for adjunct and part-time faculty, and $15 for students, retired, and unemployed. Information on membership is available at the website below or by writing to MMLA, 302 English-Philosophy Bldg, U of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408, tel: 1-319-335-0331. For more information about ADS at MMLA, see the MMLA website, www.uiowa.edu/~mmla, go to "Call for Papers," scroll down to "Associated Organizations," then to "American Dialect Society." -- Kathryn Remlinger, Ph.D. Associate Professor of English: Linguistics Grand Valley State University Allendale, MI 49401 USA remlingk at gvsu.edu tel: 616-331-3122 fax: 616-331-3430 From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 22:21:43 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 15:21:43 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <5282.4.230.174.131.1143129641.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: Mark, People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific standards in our field. Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > > experience. > > That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? > > In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that perception > would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to > construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it > has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > > > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > >> > intelligible." > >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > >> > >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene > >> with > >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I want > >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or > >> more > >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > > From mark at polymathix.com Thu Mar 23 23:08:23 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 17:08:23 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <1143152503.44231f77cec88@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Interesting response. Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something that I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money trying to make them work today. -- Mark P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific standards in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of any signs of improvement. P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of an argument either, is it? Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > Mark, > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific > standards in our field. > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. > -- > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > Linguistics Department > Institute for Cognitive Science > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by >> > experience. >> >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? >> >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that >> perception >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. >> >> -- Mark >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX >> >> >> >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : >> > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality >> >> > intelligible." >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? >> >> >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene >> >> with >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I >> want >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or >> >> more >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. >> >> > > -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Thu Mar 23 23:41:03 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 16:41:03 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <5452.4.230.156.166.1143155303.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: Mark, Why don't you spend a week or two reading Carol Fowler's carefully planned and executed scientific research on the matter and report back to us? Start with her chapter in the latest edition of Handbook of Speech Perception (a little pricey, sorry, it just came out) and work backward for about the last 25 years. Also, take a few grad level proseminars in the psychology of perception, memory and cognition regarding the relationship between experience and mental images. They do not even have to be graduate level:400-level undergraduate courses will do. Also look at the research on Motor Theory, mirror neurons regarding how even seeing others execute speech and motor actions inform our language articulation and physical actions. Any elementary sociological study on the effect of television, any baseline study on memory will provide the evidence that you need. Combine this with a refresher course in research methods, and then see if you will still be making the same claims in this space. That is not to say that mental images as those in dreams cannot be creative, as language is creative, but we have a creative capacity to build on our experiences. My apologies for losing my patience--but linguists who shoot from the hip without reading for the background they need are one of my pet peeves. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Interesting response. > > Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct > realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something that > I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I > believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, > psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten > themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good > reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money trying > to make them work today. > > > -- Mark > > P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific standards > in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and > ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of any > signs of improvement. > > P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because > they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of > an argument either, is it? > > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > > > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > Mark, > > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and > > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage > > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am > > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you > > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy > > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific > > standards in our field. > > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining > > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their > > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over > > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground > > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. > > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and > > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, > > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. > > -- > > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > > Linguistics Department > > Institute for Cognitive Science > > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > > > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > >> > experience. > >> > >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? > >> > >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that > >> perception > >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to > >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it > >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. > >> > >> -- Mark > >> > >> Mark P. Line > >> Polymathix > >> San Antonio, TX > >> > >> > >> > >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> > > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > >> >> > intelligible." > >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > >> >> > >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene > >> >> with > >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I > >> want > >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or > >> >> more > >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 24 00:18:00 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 18:18:00 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <1143157263.4423320fd0d40@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > Mark, > Why don't you spend a week or two reading Carol Fowler's carefully planned > and > executed scientific research on the matter and report back to us? Start > with > her chapter in the latest edition of Handbook of Speech Perception (a > little > pricey, sorry, it just came out) and work backward for about the last 25 > years. Also, take a few grad level proseminars in the psychology of > perception, memory and cognition regarding the relationship between > experience > and mental images. They do not even have to be graduate level:400-level > undergraduate courses will do. > Also look at the research on Motor Theory, mirror neurons regarding how > even > seeing others execute speech and motor actions inform our language > articulation > and physical actions. Any elementary sociological study on the effect of > television, any baseline study on memory will provide the evidence that > you > need. Combine this with a refresher course in research methods, and then > see > if you will still be making the same claims in this space. That is not to > say > that mental images as those in dreams cannot be creative, as language is > creative, but we have a creative capacity to build on our experiences. > My apologies for losing my patience--but linguists who shoot from the > hip > without reading for the background they need are one of my pet peeves. > -- > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > Linguistics Department > Institute for Cognitive Science > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> Interesting response. >> >> Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct >> realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something >> that >> I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I >> believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, >> psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten >> themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good >> reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money >> trying >> to make them work today. >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific >> standards >> in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and >> ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of >> any >> signs of improvement. >> >> P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because >> they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of >> an argument either, is it? >> >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX >> >> >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> > Mark, >> > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech >> and >> > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields >> manage >> > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am >> > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and >> you >> > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy >> > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific >> > standards in our field. >> > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining >> > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and >> their >> > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war >> over >> > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground >> > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university >> programs. >> > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and >> > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, >> > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. >> > -- >> > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. >> > Linguistics Department >> > Institute for Cognitive Science >> > University of Colorado at Boulder >> > >> > >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : >> > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? >> >> >> >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that >> >> perception >> >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to >> >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that >> it >> >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. >> >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> >> >> Mark P. Line >> >> Polymathix >> >> San Antonio, TX >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : >> >> > >> >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: >> >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality >> >> >> > intelligible." >> >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? >> >> >> >> >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no >> direct >> >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a >> scene >> >> >> with >> >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would >> I >> >> want >> >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct >> or >> >> >> more >> >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* >> of >> >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> >> >> -- Mark >> >> Mark P. Line >> Polymathix >> San Antonio, TX >> > > -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From andrea.schalley at une.edu.au Fri Mar 24 00:18:05 2006 From: andrea.schalley at une.edu.au (Andrea Schalley) Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2006 11:18:05 +1100 Subject: Language and Cognition: PhD Student, University of New England, Australia Message-ID: PhD Scholarship in Language and Cognition The Language and Cognition Research Centre, University of New England, seeks candidates for a PhD scholarship in one of the following areas: ? The origins and evolution of language ??Semantic and conceptual analysis across languages ? Cognitive processes in language acquisition ??Models of rationality ??Moral and ethical concepts. The Centre brings together researchers in psychology, linguistics, archaeology and philosophy. Details of the Centre, and of the cross-disciplinary supervision teams available for each of the research areas, can be found at: http://www.une.edu.au/arts/LangCog/ The scholarship is funded as a UNE Research Scholarship (UNERS) for three years of full-time study. This year, the stipend stands at AU$ 19,231. Relocation expenses will be subsidized (limited to the UNE maximum). Applicants should have an Honours I or II (1) Bachelor or a research Masters degree with a minimum 25% research/thesis component in a relevant discipline, or equivalent. Send expressions of interest to Professor Brian Byrne at Lang_Cog_Centre at une.edu.au. Include a cv, an outline of topics and/or areas of interest, contact details of 2 referees, and any other information that may be relevant. For further information, contact Prof. Brian Byrne or Prof. Cliff Goddard at Lang_Cog_Centre at une.edu.au. Closing date: 1 May 2006 From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Fri Mar 24 00:19:21 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 17:19:21 -0700 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <5452.4.230.156.166.1143155303.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: Direct falsifiability is not the only method of proof. there is evidence from the method of converging operations that would eventually set up the precise experiment you are looking for. You have made other claims that images have nothing to do with experience--easy ones to test and dismiss. Right now the evidence for direct realsim is deduced through converging operations from many different fields of investigation. The separation of the distal and proximal stimulus is more of a theoretical proposition that is being used in ongoing research. Do we directly perceive the tree or the sensations produced by the tree? Separating the physical object from our perception of it is a problem. Sometimes people get "burned"from very cold dishes they think are hot. Blisters form. The McGurk effect shows how our pereceptual system merges visual and auditory modalities for the construction of a percept. This evidence does show that the actual sound can differ from our percept of it--in other words, the distal stimulus and the proximal stimulus can give different information to "perceive"the object. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science Hellums 02 University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Interesting response. > > Does that mean you're not going to try to rebut my point about direct > realism being unfalsifiable? I don't blame you, since it's something that > I consider unchanged since the days of Thomas Reid and David Hume. I > believe that if people in the related fields of psychology, > psycholinguistics, speech, hearing and cognitive science had gotten > themselves up to speed on ideas that were tried and discarded for good > reason in the 18th century, they wouldn't be wasting time and money trying > to make them work today. > > > -- Mark > > P.S. You are in fact preaching to the choir about low scientific standards > in linguistics. I was harping on that over thirty years ago, and > ultimately left linguistics for a while partly because of the lack of any > signs of improvement. > > P.P.S. Undergraduates know exactly what you're talking about because > they've been indoctrinated to your system of beliefs. That's not much of > an argument either, is it? > > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > > > > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > Mark, > > People in the related fields of psychology, psycholinguistics, speech and > > hearing do it all of the time. Even undergraduates in these fields manage > > these research paradigms, execute projects and know exactly what I am > > talking about. You simply are not familiar with the literature, and you > > are calling things nonsense without reading anything, which is an easy > > thing to get away with in linguistics, because of the low scientific > > standards in our field. > > Linguistics as a field can no longer afford the luxury of remaining > > willfully ignorant of research that applies to their theories and their > > professional practice, in order to maintain their autonomy in a war over > > political turf. Because this behavior causes us to lose ground > > scientifically, and dictates funding priorities of university programs. > > Eventually, linguistics programs will lose their standing and > > credibility, be unfunded or so underfunded as to lose their autonomy, > > because of their intellectually and scientifically backward behavior. > > -- > > Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. > > Linguistics Department > > Institute for Cognitive Science > > University of Colorado at Boulder > > > > > > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > > > >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> > You are calling upon concepts and images built and generated by > >> > experience. > >> > >> That's a pretty hard claim to substantiate, isn't it? > >> > >> In any event, the point is that it doesn't make much sense that > >> perception > >> would evolve to work independently of all this magnificent ability to > >> construct images of anything on the fly, and that an hypothesis that it > >> has done so anyway would be unfalsifiable. > >> > >> -- Mark > >> > >> Mark P. Line > >> Polymathix > >> San Antonio, TX > >> > >> > >> > >> > Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > >> > > >> >> Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > >> >> > "Reality makes language intelligible.""Language makes reality > >> >> > intelligible." > >> >> > How about Carol Fowler and Direct Realism? > >> >> > >> >> I can see images in my mind when I hallucinate, and there's no direct > >> >> realism involved. I can see images in my mind when I imagine a scene > >> >> with > >> >> my eyes closed, and there's no direct realism involved. Why would I > >> want > >> >> to postulate that there's anything special, much less more direct or > >> >> more > >> >> realistic, about perception? If direct realists had any *evidence* of > >> >> something special, they wouldn't have to postulate it. > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From mark at polymathix.com Fri Mar 24 01:10:26 2006 From: mark at polymathix.com (Mark P. Line) Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 19:10:26 -0600 Subject: Reflections cont'd (3) In-Reply-To: <1143159561.44233b0933582@webmail.colorado.edu> Message-ID: Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > Direct falsifiability is not the only method of proof. Proof is for mathematics and other kinds of philosophy, not for science. Falsifiability is an uncircumventable criterion of scientific hypotheses. Should I follow your style and suggest that you read up on the philosophy of science before trying to debate it? > You have made other claims that images have nothing to do with > experience--easy ones to test and dismiss. Where did I claim that? > Right now the evidence for direct realism is deduced through converging > operations from many different fields of investigation. The "evidence" for the Language Acquisition Device was "deduced", too. How is any of this science? And what good is it anyway, looking for evidence for something that can only be postulated? Scientific models have to be built on hypotheses, which are falsifiable, not on postulates, which are not. It suffices for hypotheses to be falsifiable *in principle*: many very successful models are rooted in hypotheses (e.g. the existence of electrons) that cannot yet be falsified empirically due to technological limitations. But statements that cannot be falsified even in principle, such as, say, that electrical current can flow only in accordance with the divine will of members of the Greek pantheon, are not hypotheses and are not a useful part of scientific progress (except by virtue of their exposure as non-hypotheses, which of course is progress in almost anybody's book). -- Mark Mark P. Line Polymathix San Antonio, TX From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Fri Mar 24 15:53:11 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2006 08:53:11 -0700 Subject: Scientific methods In-Reply-To: <5576.4.230.156.206.1143162626.squirrel@webmail2.pair.com> Message-ID: The method of converging operations is part of the scientific method. It works from a series of operations. You are testing a series of falsifiable hypotheses,using in the scientific method that you advocate, and advance through the results. These are methods that are used when trying to open the black box of perception. Direct Realism is not necessarily a postulation that I advocate. There is, however,a basis for the claims for the distal and proximal stimulus which is part of the theory. Regarding the other claims that you were making, there is indeed evidence that experience influences mental images--pretty basic stuff. Findings from mirror neuron research are pretty exciting in that they show that when actions and vocalizations are observed by a subject, the areas of the brain which execute the motor actions to imitate them are activated in the brain of the observer, and that there are neurons dedicated to making that happen. This is important to how we learn language--and provide some evidence to support the concept of gestures in Motor Theory. We learn the gestures-- combined motor actions--or even the neural motor commands--needed to articulate sounds. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting "Mark P. Line" : > Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman wrote: > > Direct falsifiability is not the only method of proof. > > Proof is for mathematics and other kinds of philosophy, not for science. > Falsifiability is an uncircumventable criterion of scientific hypotheses. > > Should I follow your style and suggest that you read up on the philosophy > of science before trying to debate it? > > > > You have made other claims that images have nothing to do with > > experience--easy ones to test and dismiss. > > Where did I claim that? > > > > Right now the evidence for direct realism is deduced through converging > > operations from many different fields of investigation. > > The "evidence" for the Language Acquisition Device was "deduced", too. > How is any of this science? And what good is it anyway, looking for > evidence for something that can only be postulated? > > Scientific models have to be built on hypotheses, which are falsifiable, > not on postulates, which are not. It suffices for hypotheses to be > falsifiable *in principle*: many very successful models are rooted in > hypotheses (e.g. the existence of electrons) that cannot yet be falsified > empirically due to technological limitations. But statements that cannot > be falsified even in principle, such as, say, that electrical current can > flow only in accordance with the divine will of members of the Greek > pantheon, are not hypotheses and are not a useful part of scientific > progress (except by virtue of their exposure as non-hypotheses, which of > course is progress in almost anybody's book). > > > -- Mark > > Mark P. Line > Polymathix > San Antonio, TX > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Sun Mar 26 00:12:13 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2006 19:12:13 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels?? Message-ID: I want to broach another possible parallelism between biological and linguistic organization. Whether it has any reality I can't say. Words obviously have more going on than just their form and meaning- there are all the various class memberships, collocational privileges and statistics, understandings of where and when they are properly or improperly used, and so on. All the things that make NLP so easy! Gene products- proteins, various RNA's- are not purely linear after transcription or translation. They fold into 2 and 3 dimensional shapes (4 if these shapes time-vary). These higher dimensional shapes, distributing mass, energy, charge, and so on, depend on internal and external interactions for their folding instructions, which can be either based on the amino acid sequence or on long-distance interactions, either within the string, or between strings, or with other molecular species and groupings. Some of these folds with their charges, solubilities, shapes naturally fit together with others. Because of external and long distance internal interactions, complete prediction of three-dimensional protein conformation for most proteins has been impossible just using sequence data, and it will stay that way until we have complete interactive maps of entire 'proteomes' (coming soon to a laboratory near you!). Some simple sequences, though, have conformations that are predictable. Could it be that something analogous goes on with languages? My own work on ideophones shows that their form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological inventory of the language. They evolve into normal lexical roots (at least some of them do, with attrition perhaps reflecting some sort of Darwin-style selection for the new function?), just as similar selection goes on in the evolution of grams from lexical items. As roots lexicalize they lose some of their form/meaning transparency (at least as concerns the 'meaning' of the root in terms of external, real world meaning). Is this simply disappearing, or is there perhaps a transferrence of function, where some of the phonology now starts coding lexical properties? Similarly, do grammaticalizing forms utilize some of their phonology to encode grammatical and later pragmatic meaning? I'm not suggesting that if this were true that there would only be one single universal pattern that all languages would adhere to- even in ideophones there are different patterns that seem to depend on the shape of the phonology, and different feature prioritizations. Thus in the path from form/meaning mapping isomorphism in ideophones through possible shift in lexemes to grams with remapping there may be many possible trajectories that different languages may take, but not perhaps an infinite number. I am reminded here of the color-term schemes of Berlin and Kay and later workers. The parallel to biology might be the creation of higher level form/function mappings which operate in greater numbers of dimensions than the very basic form/meaning type found in ideophones. We have only the external signals to look at- how all this would be instantiated in living brains would be useful to know. With functional shift there seems to be a drift also from the segmental to the prosodic. Could the opposition between the phonological types be relatable to the differences between biopolymer types? One might have to involve hydrocarbon and sugar polymers as well in the comparison. I may have mentioned that sugar polymers have been recently hypothesized to consitute a kind of mailing-address system for complex cells and organisms. Membrane hydrocarbons create all the working surfaces of cells, partial or complete boundaries between compartments, thus linking them intimately to any putative address system. I guess for most of you such musings as the above bear little resemblance to linguistics-as-we-know-it. Hoping for a little debate in any case, given the paucity of what has shown up so far. Hey, T.G., I know you're out there somewhere. Been awfully quiet. This should be right up your alley. Jess Tauber From macw at mac.com Sun Mar 26 21:09:49 2006 From: macw at mac.com (Brian Macwhinney) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 13:09:49 -0800 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Jess, I have found your comments regarding parallels between genetics and language stimulating. But I am having trouble with the details of your current claims. I agree that protein folding is one of the most beautiful examples of emergence in biology. In fact, my intro college bio textbook (Campbell, Reece, Mitchell, p. 71) says, "The function of a protein is an emergent property resulting from exquisite molecular order." The book then goes on to describe the four levels of emergent structure. Beautiful stuff that can clearly serve as a model for emergentist thinking of relations across structure. On that level, I follow your thinking. But there is nothing here about Darwinian selection of proteins. So, this level of analogy with your ideas about the emergence of the lexicon doesn't go through. This issue illustrates a general concern regarding accounts of linguistic structure as emergent phenomena. In the end, there is no doubt that all language structure is a result of emergence, albeit across many diverse time scales supported by many different mechanisms. But a proposal for a specific emergentist mechanism can be either right or wrong. I don't see how viewing the lexical inventory of a language in terms of protein folding is going to work. You could well decide instead to use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at least allow us to keep out analogies straight. But, then we need to have some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological inventory of the language." Is this basically the insight of Paget (1930) regarding sound symbolism in Indonesian? If so, getting this to work universally is going to be a pretty big project. I like the idea of getting Tom G. involved in this discussion, but maybe first we can get the details of the emergentist proposal clarified a bit. --Brian MacWhinney, CMU From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Mon Mar 27 00:17:32 2006 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 12:17:32 +1200 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? In-Reply-To: <5565923.1143407389306.JavaMail.macw@mac.com> Message-ID: Sorry Jess, I didn't read you message in detail, but as Brian has distilled it down to protein folding for me :-) I would like to say that I for one would agree with you that there might be an analogy. Once again I wish we would get past talking about evolution (why should he "use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism" for his emergent language analogy Brian?) and consider the synchronic possibilities of syntax as alternate emergent forms, of proteins if you will. Particularly if those proteins can constantly snap back and forth into different configurations, with different functions. As far as form/meaning mappings go, I do think there is a form/meaning mapping for syntax, but as syntax becomes habitual it gathers extrinsic associations until, as a word, it is largely (completely?) symbolic (and as a phoneme even less meaningful.) I don't know what proof there is for this form/meaning mapping. It is of course suggested by Cognitive Linguistics (though they kind of turn it around and try to use it to govern syntax, a slightly chicken and egg argument to my mind.) For me it is enough that such a model gives you what I regard as the necessary power to model the complexity and elusiveness of syntax. The fact it suggests a native model for meaning as form as well is just a bonus. -Rob On Monday 27 March 2006 09:09, Brian Macwhinney wrote: > Jess, > I have found your comments regarding parallels between genetics and > language stimulating. But I am having trouble with the details of your > current claims. I agree that protein folding is one of the most beautiful > examples of emergence in biology. In fact, my intro college bio textbook > (Campbell, Reece, Mitchell, p. 71) says, "The function of a protein is an > emergent property resulting from exquisite molecular order." The book then > goes on to describe the four levels of emergent structure. Beautiful stuff > that can clearly serve as a model for emergentist thinking of relations > across structure. On that level, I follow your thinking. But there is > nothing here about Darwinian selection of proteins. So, this level of > analogy with your ideas about the emergence of the lexicon doesn't go > through. This issue illustrates a general concern regarding accounts of > linguistic structure as emergent phenomena. In the end, there is no doubt > that all language structure is a result of emergence, albeit across many > diverse time scales supported by many different mechanisms. But a proposal > for a specific emergentist mechanism can be either right or wrong. I don't > see how viewing the lexical inventory of a language in terms of protein > folding is going to work. You could well decide instead to use another, > more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at > least allow us to keep out analogies straight. But, then we need to have > some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and > based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological > inventory of the language." Is this basically the insight of Paget (1930) > regarding sound symbolism in Indonesian? If so, getting this to work > universally is going to be a pretty big project. I like the idea of getting > Tom G. involved in this discussion, but maybe first we can get the details > of the emergentist proposal clarified a bit. > > --Brian MacWhinney, CMU From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Mon Mar 27 00:39:31 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 19:39:31 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Looks like it will be you and me for the moment, though others are very welcome to join in anytime. For me the Darwinian aspect has to do with the local environment that any particular translated protein has to deal with. It must fulfill its functions. Things can go awry in various ways- it may not fit shapewise, the important functional sites on the molecule may be incorrectly structured, positioned, or instantiated in terms of chemical group. It may not appear in the right places, in the right times, or in the right amounts. It may not be amenable to proper tagging for transport, or disposal. Some changes are fatal to the organism, some only to the molecular usefulness (which in an organism with large pathway redundancy might be a drag on the system, but won't necessarily kill it). And of course there are many changes which are relatively neutral, and the occasional ones that improve the overall function of the system. Various experimentalists have pointed out that often one can substitute protein (or corresponding genes) from one species for the cognate one from another, and have it perform its primary functions. That is true- as far as it goes. Its like saying that the Datsun got us to the pet shop so it is equivalent to the Cadillac. It was recently announced (just in the last weeks) that there is vastly more juggling, in the overall proteome, of functional linkages between individual proteins, than anyone had suspected, between even relatively closely related species. This has been a rather disconcerting surprise to people who imagined they had it all figured out. A newly born protein does not find itself in either a physico-chemical or functional vacuum. It is faced with all that has come before. It will act, and be acted upon. If the environment has changed (lets suppose that a mutation in another molecule has rendered a former linkage dead), the protein may no longer be of use, at all, or to the same extent, or the same ways. Making useless parts is costly in terms of energy and material. Any further mutation at this point that stops such waste will be advantageous to the overall chemical economy. If new linkages appear, or old ones re-emerge, proteins may find themselves of use again, and mutations that help them fulfill the new functions will be advantageous. Mind you I am speaking not of Darwinian fitness of whole organisms in the outside world, but of 'parts' within the internal cellular world. Words/roots also find themselves in a preexisting economy- they stay around as long as they are useful. Sometimes they become marginalized, or expand their use. They may find their parts subsumed to new wholes, or be truncated, or built upon. In languages with a written tradition they can reappear after long disuse. They can be borrowed. And so on. All this is also true of genes, and the proteins they code. Even in languages the overall phonological shapes (both segmentally and prosodically) of words tends to be fitted to the prevailing norms of the language, unless those norms themselves shift, which is inevitable in the long term. We see this as well for genes in chromosomal structure, and in proteins, and fatty acids, polysaccharides, etc. Overall percentage of the four DNA nucleotide bases varies from species to species, sometimes vastly. It seems to have partially to do with environmental adaptation (due to 'melting temperature' of DNA), cell pressure differences, and so on. The only reason I can think of imposing such uniformity on both types of system is for ease of production and regulation. Similar logic goes into the evolution of the industrial assembly line, hierarchicalization, and such. Systemically different languages and different genomes/proteomes all have the same general objects, but the particulars of instantiation, the fine details, are where one gets the most variability. /p/ in my language may be systemically the same as /p/ in yours, but the exact phonetic value may not be, even if they are phonemically identical in terms of the usual distinctive features. We have 'accents'. Allegro speech in one language may be similar to slow speech in another. Some of these particulars may help communication in different physical (or social) environments. Linguists have in the past decades been more and more focused on the general properties of languages, seeking out the imagined essence of Language. Extremely variable fine details tend to be ignored or trivialized (but also large scaling effects may also not catch ones attention). Similar things can be seen in the development of physics of the classical, continuous kind. Later the rise of quantum physics on the one hand, and relativistic, on the other, show that systems may have very interesting and important things going on at the upper and lower bounds (not to mention linkages between these extremes that 'go around' the usual level of interest). Emergence is not the only thing going on with proteins- as I've mentioned the code does not necessarily contain all the information that goes into determining the nature of the end product. The pre-existing proteome, the lipid membranes, sugar polymers, plus all sorts of monomeric, molecular, and ionic factors act back upon the emerging object, helping to direct its immediate evolution, even its correct shape when there are choices. Genes get edited. The proteins themselves are often edited. Or tagged. Annotations. Such things are major reasons that cloning has been so difficult, and health/viability generally less than perfect. I just finished reading last night a review of a new theory of genetic imprinting which claims to explain autism as an overmasculinization of the brain. It seems that the maternal and paternal genes are neither equally nor randomly distributed in it. Paternal genes seem to be grossly relatively overactive in the action-oriented parts of the brain, while maternal ones are overactive relatively in the socially-oriented ones (such as the frontal lobes)- this is the situation in normals. Pushing the system further than this leads to overmasculinization on the one hand (and autism, with enhanced technical capacity) or overfeminization on the other (and oversociability and reduced technical capacity- it almost sounds like a bad joke based on stereotypes!). Anyway, if true the only mechanisms that could accomplish such functional/anatomical split are editing and tagging of the DNA, RNA, or protein 'from above'. Selection does not have to be mindless- molecule as stranger in a strange land. The system itself can if complex enough make decisions whether to accept a new entry into the fold that depend on its overall state at that time. Sexual selection is an example. In any case I am NOT hypothesizing any direct comparability between protein folding and linguistic phenomena. The one relates to real physical objects in an objectively real universe (but lets not get started on that...) and the other to 'virtual objects' real only within functioning brains. But what I said about dimensional shift should still hold in some fashion. Not homology but analogy. Nucleic acid polymer storage forms are mostly linearized (spiral often, on nucleosomes- you might want to think 'fractals' here)- but RNA transcripts have kinks, hairpins, local same-strand self-spirals, etc. which add dimensionality relative to the parent DNA. Translated protein has much more dimensional elaboration- and incorporation into a larger protein universe with myriad (though spatially limited) dimensionalities. Seems to be some sort of trade-off between low dimensionality but large continuity (DNA, or in physics the four dimensions of space-time, or in chemistry pure phases, and so on), versus high dimensionality and relative discontinuity, and mixture (as in the proteome, hidden dimensions popularized in String Theory, and chemical dynamic interface/interphase (such as a shaken salad dressing, or the bands of Jupiter's atmosphere and their finer and finer gradations of eddying). It may also be telling that the low-dimensional forms seem to be the most 'object' or 'patient'-like in that they are capable of being acted upon, but not acting of their own accord. Great for storing information, or for providing fodder to be plugged in elsewhere. They provide the continuity, stability. High-dimensional parts of the system, however, appear to be constantly in flux, always robbing Peter to pay Paul, jockeying for position in the hierarchy they've created. Perhaps it is the very 'spatial' (or other property) truncations that lead to such infighting. This is where one sees the making and breaking of inter-linkages between members, wheeling and dealing, negotiations and renegotiations. But one also sees complexity differences even within DNA- more with actual genes, a bit less for intervening sequences within the intron/exon system, and minimal for the long stretches of regulatory material (zillions of short repeats) between actual genes. It would be interesting to see how this maps to the higher dimensional parts of the system up in the hierarchy- inverse complexity? My hypothesis (not a claim, since the evidence isn't all in, even for me) is that the communicative signals must contain the information actually being transferred (not terribly controversial, I hope)- but that it is perhaps possible that some of the information is iconically encoded. For ideophones this is very much the case- but then ideophones are NOT terribly intertwined with syntax and hierarchical discourse structure- their focus rather is with the immediate physicomechanical characterization of a material property or action of sorts usually uncontrollable by the experiencer or executor. At this level of coding initial labial stops associate with relaxation of pressure nearly universally in the world's languages (either by complete or partial material failure of the holding wall of the container- leading to either popped or bulbous shapes, etc.), initial apical stops with directed blunt impacts, and so on. Part of the motivation is the exapted function of the articulators in eating, drinking, tasting, breathing, and so on, but also these have evolved from the primate condition to be primarily communicative in function, and so the acoustic features of the articulations have also been systematized (as ears have evolved, also). Paget's work was to some extent crosslinguistic, but not vastly so, but also remember the period in which he was working, the level of knowledge at the time. If you want to see a good thorough bibliography on sound symbolism visit Margaret Magnus' web pages (www.conknet.com/~mmagnus, and various pages within). M.M. has a rather New Age take on the phenomena in question, while I'm a dyed-in-the-wool evolutionist. I've been working on this, but not publishing, for the past 25 years, and have looked very closely now at dozens of languages, less so for hundreds more. As ideophones evolve towards lexical status they begin to lose their formulaic iconicity (imagic for the acoustic side, diagrammatic for the articulatory) mapping to 'real world, non-human' static or dynamic properties. Lexical features get picked up. But my question is whether they are done so in random fashion, or is there something more going on? People have noticed before that different lexical classes in some languages (such as English) don't statistically have the same average makeup phonologically- a lot of this is due to the history of these classes diachronically, but this is exactly the same sort of system 'drift' I posit for the genome/proteome. Again- is this random, or are there more things happening out of sight, out of mind? Classical physics emerges from quantum democracy- we 'see' the former, but but have to infer the latter. Brownian motion just too fine-grained for visibility. We see the rise of morphological marking often helping us differentiate form/function classes (though this can be lost, fossilized- just as one sees in the genome). Are the marks chosen for grammaticalization randomly? No. They tend to be from particular types of semantic fields (time, space, etc.), with more general senses than other forms. Kinda reminds me of the dimensional thing. We see loss of segmentalism and rise of prosody in the realm beyond the lexicon. Is this just an accidental fact- or is there something systemic going on here, going back to the way brains function? What about dimensionality in this area? Phase purity, versus mixture, and featural complexity? Synthesis versus analysis, and remixing, renegotiating links, functions? Paralleling this is change of focus from the content of the message to the message of the content, as one goes from lexical meaning to grammatical to pragmatic. I've hypothesized that the 'soup' of features present beyond morphological evolution is to some extent similar in some ways to that found in cells at certain points in their cycles- elaborated structure broken down leaving only the seeds (but always remembering that cells never completely break down- there is always enough infrastructure left to rebuild upon)- perhaps another example of this sort of thing is the insect pupa? The ultimate origin of ideophones has often been dismissively characterized as 'imitative'- but this says nothing about class status, semantic and morphosyntactic behavior, diagrammatic iconicity (following the existing phonological system architecture)- why should any of this be there, and exhibiting universals as well, if it is only 'imitation'? It is now becoming generally understood by historical linguists that ideophones do in fact often feed the lexicon, just as it is well known that the lexicon feeds the grammatical morphology. Does it end here? As grams wear away to 'just the smile' do they disappear? Segmentally yes. Does anything survive, a ghost perhaps within the historical cumulation of the whole system? Prosody? We also don't have a good theory of the origins of nonideophonic interjections- whose crosslinguistic study lags way behind even the few compartative works on ideophones. I hypothesize that SOME of these interjections form the phonological cores around which many ideophones crystallize segmentally. There seems to be selection and attrition at each change of state. Bridging the gap between grams and interjections, if there is one, will be the hardest part of making this a cycling system. Much of what I write here is just reiteration of things I've said before, with my usual overdense dose of rambling. There do seem to be analogies to different types of evolution within cells- just as between cells, between organisms, populations, etc. There doesn't seem to be any reason to assume any break at the cell wall. Our bodies are complex organismal systems which have minds, cells are complex chemical systems- which may have some analogue of a mind. Ask an amoeba. Bottom-up emergence may explain some properties of systems and their parts, but not all. There are also top-down effects. The really interesting stuff happens in between, at the level of greatest mixing, interaction, complexity, dimensionality. Of course if the highest levels are also of simple dimension, and there is 'back-door' interaction between bottom and top (as there seems to be in many cases in nature), then the snake bites its own tail. Einstein might approve, one would think. No loose ends, no priveleged reference frames, perhaps? And I haven't even touched today on the evolution OF language! My inbox has more replies- will answer them in turn as I can. Thanks! Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Mon Mar 27 01:10:56 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 18:10:56 -0700 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? In-Reply-To: <200603271217.32727.lists@chaoticlanguage.com> Message-ID: Juan Uriagereka at University of Maryland College Park is working on this-- in conjunction with Chomskyian syntax. He is broadminded enough to work with people in any framework, however, in the spirit of a true scientist. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Rob Freeman : > Sorry Jess, I didn't read you message in detail, but as Brian has distilled > it > down to protein folding for me :-) I would like to say that I for one would > agree with you that there might be an analogy. > > Once again I wish we would get past talking about evolution (why should he > "use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism" for his emergent > language analogy Brian?) and consider the synchronic possibilities of syntax > as alternate emergent forms, of proteins if you will. Particularly if those > proteins can constantly snap back and forth into different configurations, > with different functions. > > As far as form/meaning mappings go, I do think there is a form/meaning > mapping > for syntax, but as syntax becomes habitual it gathers extrinsic associations > until, as a word, it is largely (completely?) symbolic (and as a phoneme even > less meaningful.) > > I don't know what proof there is for this form/meaning mapping. It is of > course suggested by Cognitive Linguistics (though they kind of turn it around > and try to use it to govern syntax, a slightly chicken and egg argument to my > mind.) For me it is enough that such a model gives you what I regard as the > necessary power to model the complexity and elusiveness of syntax. The fact > it suggests a native model for meaning as form as well is just a bonus. > > -Rob > > On Monday 27 March 2006 09:09, Brian Macwhinney wrote: > > Jess, > > I have found your comments regarding parallels between genetics and > > language stimulating. But I am having trouble with the details of your > > current claims. I agree that protein folding is one of the most beautiful > > examples of emergence in biology. In fact, my intro college bio textbook > > (Campbell, Reece, Mitchell, p. 71) says, "The function of a protein is an > > emergent property resulting from exquisite molecular order." The book then > > goes on to describe the four levels of emergent structure. Beautiful stuff > > that can clearly serve as a model for emergentist thinking of relations > > across structure. On that level, I follow your thinking. But there is > > nothing here about Darwinian selection of proteins. So, this level of > > analogy with your ideas about the emergence of the lexicon doesn't go > > through. This issue illustrates a general concern regarding accounts of > > linguistic structure as emergent phenomena. In the end, there is no doubt > > that all language structure is a result of emergence, albeit across many > > diverse time scales supported by many different mechanisms. But a proposal > > for a specific emergentist mechanism can be either right or wrong. I don't > > see how viewing the lexical inventory of a language in terms of protein > > folding is going to work. You could well decide instead to use another, > > more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at > > least allow us to keep out analogies straight. But, then we need to have > > some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and > > based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological > > inventory of the language." Is this basically the insight of Paget (1930) > > regarding sound symbolism in Indonesian? If so, getting this to work > > universally is going to be a pretty big project. I like the idea of getting > > Tom G. involved in this discussion, but maybe first we can get the details > > of the emergentist proposal clarified a bit. > > > > --Brian MacWhinney, CMU > From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Mar 27 04:55:02 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 23:55:02 EST Subject: Reality and Language Message-ID: In a message dated 3/21/06 4:21:52 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: << Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing. >> (Please forgive the late response.) If you want to experience "what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing," all you have to do is wake up in the morning. I find yours a strange statement and I'm amazed that there was so little reaction on the list to it. I presume that you are talking from some kind of non-scientific or mystic point of view. Which I respect, but it has nothing to do with science or hopefully this forum. >>From a naturalistic point of view, the real world is an independent objective reality. It does not depend on subjective understandings for its existence. Human language is part of that reality. It does not depend on subjective understanding for its existence. If your "understanding of reality" is that there is no such thing as human language, you'd be wrong -- scientifically speaking. The same goes for "language processing." We can use language any way we like. We can adopt an "understanding of reality" that makes us walk around all day repeating nothing but four-letter words. But our personal subjective understanding will not affect the real world consequences of walking around all day repeating nothing but four-letter words. The real world is an 18-wheeler and it will run you over no matter what your subjective "understanding of reality" is. Over the long term, the real objective world has shaped our language. I think that the categories of grammar -- noun, verb, etc. -- mirrors what humans have learned about the world -- that it contains objects and actions, an arrow of time reflected in tense and conditionality, etc. There may be alternative "realities" but human language has done a very good job of storing a fair picture of the independently existing real world. Our technological prowess demonstrates this, I believe. Perhaps the real world becomes less apparent in the comfortable condition all our technology has produced for us. If we had to dig and scratch to find food or shelter every minute of the day, we might be more inclined to take reality a bit more seriously in our theorizing. And we might be more aware how reality shapes our language, our thinking and our actions, if it was a constant matter of survival rather than our favorite cognitive imagings. Regards, Steve Long From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Mon Mar 27 05:27:59 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2006 22:27:59 -0700 Subject: Reality and Language In-Reply-To: <36b.717a63.3158ca26@aol.com> Message-ID: Steve, I think people are ignoring Mark because he's stirring up trouble in a sometimes unproductive way, They are letting it drop because there is no list manager to police things. But actually, some of the disagreements in phonology are similar to the issues you two are raising. The functionalist-- phsyiologically-based, vs. the formalist -'"it's in your head" is a common disagreement. My view is that more research is needed. Shoot for an operational definition for when a "phonetic process" becomes phonologized. The debate over where phonetics ends and phonology begins needs to be explored with more scientific accuracy. -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder Quoting Salinas17 at aol.com: > In a message dated 3/21/06 4:21:52 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > << Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's > *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I > can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to > intervene > directly in language processing. >> > > (Please forgive the late response.) > > If you want to experience "what the universe would have to be like for > reality to intervene directly in language processing," all you have to do is > wake up > in the morning. > > I find yours a strange statement and I'm amazed that there was so little > reaction on the list to it. > > I presume that you are talking from some kind of non-scientific or mystic > point of view. Which I respect, but it has nothing to do with science or > hopefully this forum. > > >From a naturalistic point of view, the real world is an independent > objective > reality. It does not depend on subjective understandings for its existence. > Human language is part of that reality. It does not depend on subjective > understanding for its existence. If your "understanding of reality" is that > there is no such thing as human language, you'd be wrong -- scientifically > speaking. The same goes for "language processing." > > We can use language any way we like. We can adopt an "understanding of > reality" that makes us walk around all day repeating nothing but four-letter > words. > But our personal subjective understanding will not affect the real world > consequences of walking around all day repeating nothing but four-letter > words. > The real world is an 18-wheeler and it will run you over no matter what your > subjective "understanding of reality" is. > > Over the long term, the real objective world has shaped our language. I > think that the categories of grammar -- noun, verb, etc. -- mirrors what > humans > have learned about the world -- that it contains objects and actions, an > arrow > of time reflected in tense and conditionality, etc. There may be alternative > "realities" but human language has done a very good job of storing a fair > picture of the independently existing real world. Our technological prowess > demonstrates this, I believe. > > Perhaps the real world becomes less apparent in the comfortable condition all > our technology has produced for us. If we had to dig and scratch to find > food or shelter every minute of the day, we might be more inclined to take > reality a bit more seriously in our theorizing. And we might be more aware > how > reality shapes our language, our thinking and our actions, if it was a > constant > matter of survival rather than our favorite cognitive imagings. > > Regards, > Steve Long > From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Mar 27 06:45:44 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 01:45:44 EST Subject: Better than biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: In a message dated 3/26/06 4:10:23 PM, macw at mac.com writes: << You could well decide instead to use another, more selectionist, biological mechanism as his analogy. That would at least allow us to keep our analogies straight. >> Or, better yet, one might use a more purposeful form of development than biology or evolution. Proteins reflect a highly complex process, but I hope no one is saying that their structure or function is intentional. There are probably excellent examples of complexity and emergence in human technology that would make far superior analogies to the very intention driven structure of language. For example, if you trace the physics, mathematics, chemical and material engineering necessary to bring Stone Age projectile to Mars explorer, you'd see a long line of emergences, wouldn't you? And, like language, all were objective-driven. Some of them perhaps as elegant as protein folding? Or how about the emergence over time of technologies that allow us to observe and decipher proteins? Or do the human genome? Or cell phones and race cars, for that matter? At least you'd be comparing apples and apples, one would think. << But, then we need to have some evidence that the "form/meaning mapping is usually very crisp, and based on the internal symmetries of the used portion of the phonological inventory of the language." >> Or even that such processing -- whether crisp or not -- is somehow independent of action/effect mapping that may include not just dictionary "meanings" of words, but more importantly what the effect of using a particular piece of language has been and therefore might be in the future. The phonological part of matching would be far less complex than the "mapping" of everything words can make happen when we use them or hear them. When we read Shakespeare's "Sleep, that mends the raveled sleeve of care," do we really think that the phonemes would be the most difficult thing to map? Regards, Steve Long From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Mon Mar 27 07:38:55 2006 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 10:38:55 +0300 Subject: Reality and Language In-Reply-To: <36b.717a63.3158ca26@aol.com> Message-ID: On Sun, 26 Mar 2006 Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > In a message dated 3/21/06 4:21:52 PM, mark at polymathix.com writes: > << Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible. At best, a person's > *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible. I > can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene > directly in language processing. >> > > (Please forgive the late response.) > > If you want to experience "what the universe would have to be like for > reality to intervene directly in language processing," all you have to do is wake up > in the morning. > > I find yours a strange statement and I'm amazed that there was so little > reaction on the list to it. > > I presume that you are talking from some kind of non-scientific or mystic > point of view. Which I respect, but it has nothing to do with science or > hopefully this forum. I understand Mark's comment from quite a different point of view. His comment is quite short and gives thus, of course, room for many kinds of interpretations. For me, though, the first interpretation is the one that has nothing to do with non-scientific or mystic point of view. A side remark: In general I have found some recent communications in the list have been quite unscientific (to use this beloved term) because of many kinds of examples of fallacious argumentation (see, for examples, http://www.don-lindsay-archive.org/skeptic/arguments.html). Some categories (quoting the web site): - Ad hominem: attacking the person instead of attacking his argument. - Appeal to anonymous authority: an appeal to authority is made, but the authority is not named. For example, "Experts agree that ..", "scientists say .." - Bad analogy: claiming that two situations are highly similar, when they aren't. - Argument by emotive language (appeal to the people): using emotionally loaded words to sway the audience's sentiments instead of their minds. - Argument by selective reading: making it seem as if the weakest of an opponent's arguments was the best he had. - Inflation of conflict: arguing that scholars debate a certain point. Therefore, they must know nothing, and their entire field of knowledge is "in crisis" or does not properly exist at all. One would be tempted, for example, to follow these recent tendencies by saying that one should not take seriously a scholar who uses spelling "Chomskyian" (this is not what I personally think but let's use it as a new example of fallacious argumentation). Back to the original question: You mention that > Over the long term, the real objective world has shaped our language. I > think that the categories of grammar -- noun, verb, etc. -- mirrors what humans > have learned about the world -- that it contains objects and actions, an arrow > of time reflected in tense and conditionality, etc. There may be alternative > "realities" but human language has done a very good job of storing a fair > picture of the independently existing real world. Our technological prowess > demonstrates this, I believe. I don't see a great mismatch with your point of view and when Mark says, "[a]t best, a person's *understanding* of reality might be claimed to make language intelligible." As you say, the real objective world has shaped our language over the long term. This shaping process has taken place through human beings, individual persons' understandings. A very large number of individuals have contributed to the formation of the language*s*, the great variety of them, not to forget the individual level (we all have a language of our own that probabilistically resembles more or less the language of some other person - I am aware of the "private language argument" and quite critical towards the common formulations of it that do not take into account the statistical nature of language learning and emergence). The languages mirror the world thanks to this process of distilling. However, the process is far from deterministic and "logic-based". Moreover, I think it is important to keep in mind what Maturana, Varela, von Foerster etc. have presented about the nature of living and cognitive systems. For instance, Von Foerster has presented very clear arguments supporting the idea that our primitive experiences do not consist of objects and events. The emergent mapping between emerging language and world is a culturally, socially and cognitively grounded complex process. Those regularities that are important for human being become reflected in our languages but there is no logical more or less one-to-one mapping between the language and the world (cf. e.g. early Wittgenstein as a prototypical proponent of such a debatable view that many logicians and formal semanticians still seem to support). Best regards, Timo P.S. Heinz von Foester: Notes on an Epistemology for Living Things, BCL Report. No. 9.3 (BCL Fiche No. 104/1), Biological Computer Laboratory, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illionois, Urbana, 24 S., 1972. -- Reprinted in the books "Observing Systems" and "Understanding Understanding". -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Laboratory of Computer and Information Science Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From a.m.koskela at sussex.ac.uk Mon Mar 27 17:31:39 2006 From: a.m.koskela at sussex.ac.uk (Anu Koskela) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 18:31:39 +0100 Subject: Extended call deadline: PG Conference in Cognitive Linguistics Message-ID: **EXTENDED DEADLINE** CALL FOR PAPERS: The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics Department of Linguistics and English Language, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK We are delighted to announce the first UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics, to take place at the University of Sussex on Saturday, 27th May 2006. This is the first conference in the UK aimed specifically for postgraduates working in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Linguistics is a relatively new, interdisciplinary approach to the study of language which focuses on the interaction between human language, cognition and experience. The purpose of the conference is to provide a forum for postgraduate researchers in Cognitive Linguistics to exchange ideas and present new research. The conference will also feature plenary talks and workshops by the following invited speakers: Dr Vyvyan Evans (University of Sussex): keynote lecture on "The Cognitive Linguistics Enterprise: An Overview" Prof. Gilles Fauconnier (University of California San Diego): a workshop on conceptual blending theory Prof. Chris Sinha (University of Portsmouth): a keynote lecture on "Language as a biocultural niche" Abstract submissions: We invite submissions of abstracts for 20 minute presentations (followed by 10 minutes of discussion) on research pertaining to any area of Cognitive Linguistics. ***Extended deadline for abstracts: 3rd April*** Notification of acceptance: 24th April Abstract format: - Only electronic submissions are accepted. - The abstracts should be submitted to the email address abstracts at cogling.org.uk, with the email subject "First PG Conference in Cognitive Linguistics" - The abstract should be sent as an attachment to an email message, in either MS Word (.doc), Rich Text Format (.rtf) or Adobe Acrobat (.pdf ) format - The length of the submissions is a maximum of 500 words or 1 A4 side. The abstract should clearly indicate the title of the talk, and may include references, but the total word count should not exceed 500 words. - The abstracts will be subject to anonymous review, so the abstract should not include the name(s) of the author(s) - The body of the email message should contain the following information: The author's name, affiliation, title of the paper and contact details (postal and email address) For further details about the conference, please visit www.cogling.org.uk/pgccl. The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics is associated with the Portsmouth-Sussex Symposium on Language and Cognition, which takes place at the Universities of Sussex and Portsmouth on the two days preceding the First Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics - 25-26th May 2006. Links to further information about the Portsmouth-Sussex Symposium on Language and Cognition can be found under Conferences at www.cogling.org.uk. The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics is sponsored by the Linguistic Association of Great Britain and the University of Sussex Graduate Centre in the School of Humanities. We look forward to receiving your abstract(s) and seeing you at Sussex at The First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics! Anu Koskela Chair of the Organising Committee for the First UK Postgraduate Conference in Cognitive Linguistics Anu Koskela DPhil Candidate Dept. of Linguistics and English Language/ Centre for Research in Cognitive Science University of Sussex Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN UK From Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu Mon Mar 27 19:58:46 2006 From: Diane.Lesley-neuman at colorado.edu (Diane Frances Lesley-Neuman) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 12:58:46 -0700 Subject: Language, reality, meaning questions/considerations for the list Message-ID: I would like to pose the following questions/considerations stemming from recent postings, with an appreciation for the diversity of ideas that may result. While some may take the position that phonetics and phonology may be "simple"or simpler than other types of mapping, we still have not truly figured out many aspects of language processing in which it is involved. We also may use it to track and aid our understanding of what are considered to be higher level processes, which bear on the language and reality debate. Keeping in mind: 1. The phenomenon of semantic priming in lexical access experiments.("doctor" will allow a faster retrieval of "nurse" in lexical access tasks.) 2. The fact that in some languages single phonemes, nasalization, tone,aspiration, glottalization are factors in the morphological, syntactic and semantic systems. 3. Even in languages where phonetics/phonology have a predominantly alphabetic encoding function of longer units of meaning,social meanings are attached to nasalization, velarization,and other phonological processes, as well as to prosody. Social meanings are interpretations of reality and affect word choice and conversational pragmatics during the communication process. 4. Even in these more alphabetic-style languages, speakers will take the trouble to preserve segments that are weaker in the hierarchy of targets and triggers (weaker segments that are targets of assimilation and elision) because there are meanings important to the speech community attached to their presence in the communication stream. While these considerations constitute a more "nuts-and-bolts"take on the debate over language and reality, and are possibly considered to be more proletarian, I would appreciate ideas from the list contributors regarding how they integrate these considerations into their models of language and the interpretation of reality. Many thanks to all, -- Diane Lesley-Neuman, M. Ed. Linguistics Department Institute for Cognitive Science University of Colorado at Boulder From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Mon Mar 27 21:45:26 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 16:45:26 -0500 Subject: Language, reality, meaning questions/considerations for the list Message-ID: Thanks, Diane. Open the floodgates and see what happens! All sorts of nifty little phenomena here. The late Roger Wescott promoted the notion of 'labioderogation', where labial segments are used (especially as replacement initials in rhyming forms) expressing negative, dismissive and related feelings towards the referent of the original form. These are not found universally in the world's languages, but are mainly found across Eurasia, all the way from Basque in the west to at least one Tungusic language in the east, and also in India. One interesting thing is that this swath has been mostly areally case-marking, verb-final languages. Where language type is changing (as in Europe), these forms may be slowly becoming historical curiosities. A mirror system seems to be more prevalent in South-East Asia (with India as a mixing zone), where palatal or alveopalatal (articulation zone) segments seem to have belittling function in reduplicative replacements. My own survey seems to indicate that while both replacements can be used negatively, the total evaluation is different- the labials are more in line with pejorative augmentatives, while the palatal area phonemes are more hyperchoristic diminutives. Another interesting thing is the languages using mostly the palatal type seem to be be largely in a left-headed zone areally. Furthermore John Haiman has written about poetic preferences- left headed languages prefer alliteration, right headed prefer rhyming. I'm guessing the phonemic replacement phenomena are linked to this as well- we see palatal finals or suffixes in many right-headed languages used as diminutives (versus the form-initial replacement augmentative derogates)- in the South East Asian situation there may also be some leaning towards labial finals in derogational senses. Overall a mirror symmetry, if this is in fact true. In Chinook (Penutian, Oregon/Washington) there was a very extensive system of augmentative/diminutive alternations (the most thorough in the Americas). It involved both articulatory position as well as manner- Edward Sapir wrote about this after his journey through the region in the first years of the 20th century with Franz Boas. More recently Michael Silverstein has reviewed the system. Interestingly here, the Chinookan phonological system had two extreme outliers that had no manner series- /qp/, a hyperaugmentative, and /t-th (thorn-affricate?)/, a hyperdiminutive. The phonological system in my work has been based on geometrical oppositions- many of the systems in the North American Pacific Northwest can be visualized as cubes, with two axes representing grave versus acute, and compact versus diffuse (in Jakobsonian parlance). The phonosemantic extrema /qp/ and /t-th/ in the Chinook system are at opposite vertices (through the cube center). The other alternations of augmentative versus diminutive values in the system fall along the diagonals of faces, and legs. Similar systematicity may be found in the very extensive sound symbolic alternations of Korean, which appear also to have affected the development of their writing system by King Sejong (and friends), and the notion of Yin/Yang opposition. One should not neglect manner and secondary featural 'symbolism' either. Uvularization in Salishan languages is used to secondarily mark roots as being 'pressed' in its real-world semantic notion more than the unmarked form. Salishan is left-headed. In right-headed Athapaskan languages, it is instead an augmentative. Johanna Nichols wrote about such language and family differences in a paper from the early '70's, but did not look for any typological factors that might dispose choices one way or the other, ironic from the POV of her later work. Nasalization often has a negative evaluation- as in some South East Asian languages. In Japanese, on the other hand, when added to ideophone roots finally, it lends a sense of internal damped vibration. Onomatopes in the Muskogean family (Alabama, Choctaw, etc.) in the gulf region of North America are almost entirely limited to representing animal cries (but not all of the latter are nasalized). Nasals are phonologically anti-resonant, so the Japanese damping idea may not be unnatural in motivation. In at least my ideolect of English, in affective interjections, the series of mmm, nnnn, nynyny, ngngng seems to be associated grossly with increasing levels of reservation and doubt (though other additional features come into play as well). Against this the more resonant palatals, velars, uvulars- the palatals at least crosslinguistically associate with brightness, external visibility, ringing tones, and so on. There is probably a complete symmetrical system behind all this, mapping differentially onto the various semantic areas of sound, light, motion, evaluation, and so on. We see a complex mixture and assume that it is all a kluge. But underlyingly the notions of damped vibration, internality (introversion?), doubt, and lowered animacy may actually be part of the same model of reality. Many of you might question why I'm writing here about this rather than on the typology discussion lists- frankly most of the chattier typologists I've encountered don't seem to be remotely interested in it. Sound symbolism studies tend to throw a monkey wrench into many of the the more controversial historical linguistic ideas of Joseph Greenberg and his students (you know who you are), and there seems to be some sort of unwarrented reactionary wagon-circling extending to typological work which followed from his. Comments? Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From Salinas17 at aol.com Tue Mar 28 03:08:21 2006 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 22:08:21 EST Subject: Reality and Language (2) Message-ID: In a message dated 3/27/06 2:41:53 AM, timo.honkela at tkk.fi writes: << A side remark: In general I have found some recent communications in the list have been quite unscientific (to use this beloved term) because of many kinds of examples of fallacious argumentation >> I, for one, appreciate your listing of many kinds of examples of fallacious argumentation and, based on it, I have forsworn all and any further such fallacious arguments, starting right after this e-mail. <> I think Chomskyi himself prefers Chomskayan. <> Timo, what Mark also wrote was: "Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible... I can't imagine what the universe would have to be like for reality to intervene directly in language processing." Though I'm a firm believer in favorable interpretations (especially of anything I write), forgive me, but I think you may be stretching things a bit here. And my original point was, of course, that our personal or communal *understanding* is in the end irrelevant. That point is there is an objective reality -- independent of our understanding -- and that point simply has been a consistent working assumption of "science" for a long time. I don't see where the misunderstanding could be. But if you have no trouble reconciling "Reality makes language intelligible" with "Reality couldn't possibly make language intelligible," be my guest. <> To the extent that there is "no logical more or less one-to-one mapping between the language and the world", a very logical conclusion (if such things matter) might be that this is due to the inadequacy of language, not the world. It would appear to be simply incorrect to say that human language is NOT an ATTEMPT to make a map of the world. Language not doubt does have other functions. But one of the primary functions -- purposeful objectives -- of language is to create symbolic counterparts to the real world. That is where we get our communal "understanding" in language from. Otherwise we have no common reference or sense -- and we all blabbering to ourselves in our own private "cognitive" compartments. <<(cf. e.g. early Wittgenstein as a prototypical proponent of such a debatable view that many logicians and formal semanticians still seem to support).>> Long before Wittgenstein, language as a "mirror of the world" was a well-developed and well-informed concept. At the dawn of printing technology, an encylopedia of "all thyngs" printed by Caxton was called quite knowingly "Mirror of the World." Over all those centuries what you call a debateable view has really only been contested by the persisting neo-platonists' view that language and cognition were actually a mirror or map of a higher reality, of which the world is only a rough approximation. I'd suggest that what is highly debateable is any view that language is not an attempt to mirror or map the world. Such a view fundamentally denies the symbolic nature of language -- what could language be symbolic of otherwise, if not the world? (And by the world, I mean anything in it, including cognition, perception, grammar, syntax and all the other processes we attempt to mirror or map by using language on this forum.) I believe that Wittgenstein left the thinking in Tractatus behind because he was faced with a different difficulty -- where language is used aside from or in opposition to its basic communal mapping and communicative function -- as happens when, for example, language is used to deceive, the perpetration of a false map in communication -- or used without regard to reference, as in rituals or games. That's where the other effects of language use trump the communicative functions. <> If you mean by "our primitive experiences" the period of early development, I don't understand at all how any of that contradicts that language will become a purposeful attempt to map the world. Let's start with when the objective 3-dimensionality of the world starts to enter a child's language. There may be instances where a particular individual's language never reflects more than 2-dimensions, but that simply implies a less accurate "mirror of the world" than a language that reflects 3 dimensions. As far as the "emergent mapping between emerging language and world [being] a culturally, socially and cognitively grounded complex process," that's no doubt true. In fact, I'd extend that process to anyway we learn about world, including the most simple mechanical manipulation of objects in the world. And, what makes it so complex a process therefore would not be the complexity of language, but the complexity of the world. Regards, Steve Long From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Tue Mar 28 20:43:14 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 15:43:14 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Another possible parallel between biological and linguistic processes was brought to mind today by another newsfeed piece- 'Scientists Discover Interplay Between Genes And Viruses In Tiny Ocean Plankton' (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060328083400.htm). Apparently in the ocean lower planktonic species are constantly updating their genetic makeup not just through random mutation or sexual exchange, but by massive turnover mediated by seaborne viruses. One big happy genetic near-continuum. In a way, this very much resembles the sorts of areal clusters of (politically independent) languages (such as in the North American Pacific Northwest, or aboriginal Australia) that can wreak havoc with nice clean historical genetic analyses, where form/structure borrowing may be extreme. The organisms in question are not known for very sophisticated immunity-type reactions to outside gene insertion, unlike higher ones that get most of their variability from internal recombination and mutation. But this adds tp a point I tried to make in earlier posts that the big generalized 'cosmopolitan' societies tend to internally differentiate and thus control their own development- whereas smaller specialized ones tend to be more at the mercy of outside forces. Other factors such as environmental compartmentalization, may also contribute to continuum/isolation effects which in linguistics can be modeled using areal groupings versus branching tree models. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From amnfn at well.com Tue Mar 28 21:00:19 2006 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 13:00:19 -0800 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? In-Reply-To: <19780832.1143578594890.JavaMail.root@elwamui-cypress.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Jess, Was it you who mentioned that some related species of bees are social and have specialized functions, while others live alone and carry on all functions? If so, what effect on communicative behavior does socialization or lack thereof have? Do loner bees still dance the dance that helps locate sources of nectar? Is the dance intentional and manipulative or is it merely expressive and involuntary? One of the often unspoken assumptions of grammaticalization theory is that human language developed from intentional signals meant to manipulate the behavior of others, as opposed to involuntary vocalizations and gestures that served an expressive function for the individual which just happened to be useful to others in acquiring information from the speaker. --Aya ================================================================ Dr. Aya Katz, Inverted-A, Inc, P.O. Box 267, Licking, MO 65542 USA http://www.well.com/user/amnfn ================================================================= On Tue, 28 Mar 2006, jess tauber wrote: > Another possible parallel between biological and linguistic processes was brought to mind today by another newsfeed piece- 'Scientists Discover Interplay Between Genes And Viruses In Tiny Ocean Plankton' (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060328083400.htm). > > Apparently in the ocean lower planktonic species are constantly updating their genetic makeup not just through random mutation or sexual exchange, but by massive turnover mediated by seaborne viruses. One big happy genetic near-continuum. > > In a way, this very much resembles the sorts of areal clusters of (politically independent) languages (such as in the North American Pacific Northwest, or aboriginal Australia) that can wreak havoc with nice clean historical genetic analyses, where form/structure borrowing may be extreme. > > The organisms in question are not known for very sophisticated immunity-type reactions to outside gene insertion, unlike higher ones that get most of their variability from internal recombination and mutation. But this adds tp a point I tried to make in earlier posts that the big generalized 'cosmopolitan' societies tend to internally differentiate and thus control their own development- whereas smaller specialized ones tend to be more at the mercy of outside forces. > > Other factors such as environmental compartmentalization, may also contribute to continuum/isolation effects which in linguistics can be modeled using areal groupings versus branching tree models. > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Mar 29 03:10:27 2006 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 22:10:27 -0500 Subject: Further biological/linguistic parallels? Message-ID: Aya Katz wrote: 'what effect on communicative behavior does socialization or lack thereof have? Do loner bees still dance the dance that helps locate sources of nectar? Is the dance intentional and manipulative or is it merely expressive and involuntary?' I am not up to date on research in this area- all I know is what I saw in the newsfeed piece. I'm also not aware if the dance is intentional- my guess is it is involuntary, but that doesn't necessarily mean nonawarenss- chimps involuntarily emit food calls when they find ripening fruit in trees, but have been known to cover their mouth with their hands to block this signal. But what I find interesting about honeybee dances is that they have since their original discovery been found to be used in a number of different circumstances- finding nectar and pollen sources of course, but also for water sources, and possible new nesting sites (if memory serves). So it is a general sort of pathfinder signalling system, similar in spirit to a deictic demonstrative system in a language. One wonders how such a thing could have evolved, but likely bees already used sun angle etc. to find their way home, aided by their ability to sense polarized light. A cognitive flip and now you can use the same internal model to find your way there. Coding this in the waggle dance is another issue- clearly the angle represented is a sort of demonstration, acting out, as a sort of iconicity with imagic and diagrammatic components. Intensity of the waggle if I remember right corresponds to richness of source implied, so another iconic representation (but do they do the same for water, or holes in trees? It would be interesting if audience size and recruitment correlated with enthusiasm of the signaller- and if the causal effect went both ways. How is 'topic' established? Is there some sort of indexical value understood?). Also, it may take time for the bee to get everyone together to do a dance, as well as the time taken to fly (which in the dance is I think is related via the number of figure-8 turns per demonstration- which may remind one of vocalic demonstrative iconicity in many human languages, if one thinks of the number of turns as a kind of frequency analogue)- does the bee compensate for the time lag from where the sun IS versus where it WAS? Another question I have is whether the angle is in practice variable continuously, or in quantized fashion (into pie slices, as it were, from a circle- and if so how many?). A grosser angle range would mean greater misses by bees following the dance to the source. I've also read that different bees within a hive have different 'attitudes'- toward hard work, towards flying from the nest, etc. Co-worker bees punish laggarts physically, and degree of extroversion seems also to evolve over time (newly ex-pupa bees are stay-at-homes, tending the young, older ones go outside, but there must be some older ones that would rather stay indoors, and younger ones that would rather fly). In many vertebrate species (such as monkeys), the 'topic' continuum seems to be very roughly divided by gross signal type- but then the particulars of the situation seem to be more or less finely differentiably depictable (depending on species) by tweaking that signal along its various parameters and features. Eugene Morton (of the National Zoo) came up with his 'motivation structure theory' which deals with signals that relate to intraspecific conflicts (attacker versus defender, approaching loss or win, sureness/security of position, and so on). A handful of acoustic features correlate with different aspects- roughness or smoothness of the formants, angle (rise, fall, even, etc.). Humans still use these. Morton suggests animals may even quantize these into cells in a multidimensional grid, the way humans do phonemes. And there seem to be similar systems being discovered for signals used in other forms of social interaction. Not all are intraspecific. Is a tiger's roar as he attacks just a measure of his aggression, or is he trying to affect the ability of the prey to save itself? The tiger may not have a choice, but is he aware of its possible purpose when he emits it? Can he suppress it when stalking, or is it unconscious? A human's cry of triumph may be hard to suppress given the right situation. But it seems a lot of the evolution of humanity from apes lay in suppression of otherwise uncontrollable behaviors- the frontal cortex which controls this is so very much larger in our species than in any other relative to brain size elsewhere. The key to successful large scale intricate social interaction is to NOT act like a monad animal all the time. A lot if not most linguists are satisfied that language is something radically different from animal vocal communication- a number believe it somehow magically evolved from external gestures. However, given the newer work hinted at above, my own take is that language (separate from its oral instantiation, which is less relevant than its organization) just takes the existing system, speeds it up radically, allows for mixing of single instances of each signal type (rather than just repetition of the same simple ones as found in so many other species) creating higher level strings (which we mistakenly think are basic) as well as hierarchical combination of these strings even higher up. Plus other stuff :-) I'm also not the first to suggest this, though I would venture that others feel there was a distinct form/meaning break when this happened, so that arbitrariness existed in human language from the beginning. But the existance of the kind of iconic mapping one sees in ideophones, plus the new realization among historical linguists that such ideophones may feed large parts of the lexicon, may mean that one would have to be very careful about this. Adam or Og may not have simply put string A to idea or referent B on Naming Day. There may already have been firmly in place an existing connotational reference system, that only later worked itself into a more classically arbitrarist denotational one. And remember I've touched on cyclicity typologically in modern human languages- did a similar cycle exist before human language? There is evidence for this in animal signal systems, but the cycle may be much longer in duration, and relate to speciation and adaptation to new environments. If true, then my hypothetical speeding up of human signaling could help explain why our typological cycles only take thousands of years. BTW, I'm not sure that speakers are that conscious all the time of their word choices, or think about the degree of generality that grammatalizable terms are supposed to have, etc.- in fact given that these are usually the most common terms in a language, people might be LESS likely to think about them- thus their ultimate automaticization. Jess Tauber