From Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl Sun Jun 1 14:50:03 2008 From: Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl (Amiridze, Nino) Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2008 16:50:03 +0200 Subject: Second Call for Abstracts: Language Change in Bilingual Communities. Focus on the Post-Soviet Countries and their Immigrant Communities Elsewhere Message-ID: [Apologies for multiple posting] ***************************************************************************************************** Language Change in Bilingual Communities. Focus on the Post-Soviet Countries and Their Immigrant Communities Elsewhere. Workshop at The 23rd Scandinavian Conference of Linguistics October 3, 2008, Uppsala, Sweden http://www.let.uu.nl/~Nino.Amiridze/personal/organization/PSB08.html ****************************************************************************************************** Call for Abstracts ================== The workshop aims at giving a perspective on post-Soviet bilingualism while concentrating on the typology of linguistic changes under language contact. During the Soviet era, languages of the former Soviet republics have been influenced by Russian, the Soviet lingua franca. The collapse and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has caused reshaping of the relations between various ethnic groups within individual States, on the one hand, and between Russia and the rest of the States, on the other hand. Language situation and linguistic hierarchy within the newly independent countries have considerably changed, depending on the relations with Russia, and the growing influence of wider globalization. The fall of the Soviet Union has caused unprecedented waves of immigrants from the former Soviet republics to various parts of the world. Immigrant communities from the former Soviet Union do not always have institutional support for their native languages in the host countries. Keeping mother languages exclusively as a means of communication in the family and within the community, the speakers used to preserve some features of the languages that eventually got changed in the varieties spoken back at home by their compatriots. On the other hand, under the influence of the language(s) of the host countries, changes have occurred in the immigrant languages. Globalisation has influenced the area into a more open attitude with respect to sign language and bimodal bilingualism. The former Soviet Union maintained the medical model of disability, treating the deaf as a disabled group. However, in some of these States there are attempts to change the medical model with the social one, and view the deaf as a cultural and linguistic minority. One of the positive consequences of changing the approach is the promotion of bilingual education in the schools for deaf, rather than pursuing exclusively oralist educational policy. As a result of the changing attitudes towards sign language and Deaf culture, deaf people in the Post-Soviet States will become bilingual in a sign and a spoken language (a case of bimodal bilinguality). The following three topics will be addressed during the workshop: * contact-induced changes that have occurred in the languages of the Post-Soviet States under the declining role of Russian as a dominant language and the growing influence of other regionally and globally dominant languages; * contact-induced changes and contact-induced preservation in the language varieties spoken by communities that have immigrated from the Post-Soviet countries since 1991 to various parts of the world. * bimodal bilingualism and language situation in deaf communities of the Post-Soviet States. How changing of attitudes towards deafness affects sociolinguistic situation of users of sign languages across the former Soviet Union. Influences of the structure of one of their languages over that of the other language. Invited Speakers ================ * Anna Komarova (hearing) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education), Development of Bilingual Education of the Deaf in Post-Soviet Countries. * Tatiana Davidenko (Deaf) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education), Sign Language Diversity in Post-Soviet Countries (translation from the RSL into English by Anna Komarova). * Kristina Svartholm (hearing) (Stockholm University), Bilingual Education for the Deaf. A Swedish Experience. Important Dates =============== Abstract submission: June 16, 2008 Notification: July 7, 2008 Workshop: October 3, 2008 Organizers ========== * Nino Amiridze, Utrecht University (The Netherlands) * Anne Tamm, University of Florence (Italy) and Institute for the Estonian Language * Manana Topadze, University of Pavia (Italy) * Inge Zwitserlood, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands) Publication =========== If after the workshop there will be interest in publishing either a proceedings or a special journal issue, then the organizers will take responsibility of finding a suitable forum and will act as editors. Submission ========== Abstracts (in English, maximum 3 pages, including data and references) have to be submitted electronically as portable document format (.pdf) or Microsoft Word (.doc) files via the EasyChair conference management system: http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=psb08 If you do not have an EasyChair account, click on the button "I have no EasyChair Account" on that page and follow the instructions. When you receive a password, you can enter the site and upload your abstract. Workshop Web Page ================= http://www.let.uu.nl/~Nino.Amiridze/personal/organization/PSB08.html From Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU Sun Jun 1 19:13:44 2008 From: Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU (Erin Shay) Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2008 13:13:44 -0600 Subject: (no subject) Message-ID: Dear Funknet, May I submit this book notice for Funknet posting? Please let me know if you need additional information or a different format. Many thanks, Erin Erin Shay, Ph.D. Research Ass't Professor Dept. of Linguistics, Box 295 University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309-0295 USA Phone: 303-882-3786  From hilpert at rice.edu Mon Jun 2 08:23:28 2008 From: hilpert at rice.edu (Martin Hilpert) Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 03:23:28 -0500 Subject: PhD student position available Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I'd be thankful if you could forward the job posting below to students that might be interested. Many thanks, --Martin I would like to advertise one position for a PhD student (half-time, German payscale E13/2, i.e. around ?1400/month) for a research project at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Study (FRIAS) within the School of Language and Literature. The title of the project is 'Cognitive Linguistics at the interface of corpus linguistics and psycholinguistics'. The ideal candidate will have a Master's degree in linguistics, background knowledge of either corpus linguistics or experimental methodology, and a general interest in quantitative, usage-based approaches to language. Working knowledge of German is a plus but no necessity. The candidate will have the opportunity to work towards a PhD thesis and to collaborate with faculty members of the different philologies and the Cognitive Science department at the University of Freiburg. Potential applicants are invited to contact Martin Hilpert (martin.hilpert at frias.uni-freiburg.de) to find out more about the project. Applications should include a CV, one or two work samples, a brief research proposal (no more than 5 pages) and names of three references. Applications by qualified women are particularly welcome. Handicapped applicants are given preference in case of equal qualification. Applications received by June 30, 2008 will receive fullest consideration. The project has already started; the position will remain open until filled. The position will be funded for two years initially. Further funding is anticipated but cannot be guaranteed. Applications should be sent to: Dr. Martin Hilpert FRIAS (Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies) Universität Freiburg Albertstr. 19 79104 Freiburg Germany From Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU Mon Jun 2 16:22:35 2008 From: Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU (Erin Shay) Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 10:22:35 -0600 Subject: book notice Message-ID: Here is a book notice that may be of interest. I apologize for yesterday's empty posting. Thank you, Erin Erin Shay Research Ass't Professor Dept. of Linguistics, Box 295 University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309-0295 USA Phone: 303-882-3786 New Book Information JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY www.benjamins.com Table of contents Introduction Zygmunt Frajzyngier and Erin Shay Case marking, syntactic domains and information structure in Kabyle (Berber) Amina Mettouchi The internal and comparative reconstruction of verb extensions in early Chadic and Afroasiatic Christopher Ehret One way of becoming a dative subject Zygmunt Frajzyngier Coding the unexpected: Subject pronouns in East Dangla Erin Shay Ergative-active features of the Ethiopian Semitic type Grover Hudson Number as an exponent of gender in Cushitic Maarten Mous Relativization in Kambaata (Cushitic) Yvonne Treis Between coordination and subordination in Gawwada Mauro Tosco Author index Language index Subject index Linguistics Interaction of Morphology and Syntax Case studies in Afroasiatic Edited by Zygmunt Frajzyngier and Erin Shay University of Colorado The present volume deals with hitherto unexplored issues on the interaction of morphology and syntax. These selected and invited papers mainly concern Cushitic and Chadic languages, the least-described members of the Afroasiatic family. Three papers in the volume explore one or more typological characteristics across an entire language family or branch, while others focus on one or two languages within a family and the implications of their structures for the family, the phylum, or linguistic typology as a whole. The diversity of topics addressed within the present volume reflects the great diversity of language structures and functions within the Afroasiatic phylum. [Typological Studies in Language, 75] 2008. v, 234 pp. Hb 978 90 272 2987 8 EUR 110.00 From Chad.Nilep at Colorado.EDU Tue Jun 3 14:56:24 2008 From: Chad.Nilep at Colorado.EDU (Chad Douglas Nilep) Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2008 08:56:24 -0600 Subject: Colorado Research in Linguistics Message-ID: Colorado Research in Linguistics 21 is now on line. http://www.colorado.edu/ling/CRIL/ Colorado Research in Linguistics is the working papers journal of the Department of Linguistics at the University of Colorado. CRIL publishes working papers dealing with language and linguistics from affiliates of the University of Colorado at Boulder. Chad D. Nilep Linguistics University of Colorado at Boulder From paul at benjamins.com Wed Jun 4 20:07:51 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:07:51 -0400 Subject: Benjamins title: Butler et al: Functional Perspectives on Grammar and Discourse Message-ID: Functional Perspectives on Grammar and Discourse In honour of Angela Downing Edited by Christopher S. Butler, Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Julia Lavid University of Wales, Swansea / Universidad Complutense, Madrid Studies in Language Companion Series 85 2007. xxx, 481 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 3095 9 / EUR 125.00 / USD 188.00 This book, a tribute to Angela Downing, consists of twenty papers taking a broadly functional perspective on language, with topics ranging from the general (grammar as an evolutionary product, text comprehension, integrative linguistics) to particular aspects of the grammars of languages (Bulgarian, English, Icelandic, Spanish, Swedish). The more specific papers are sequenced according to Halliday's division into ideational, textual and interpersonal aspects of the grammar, and cover a wide range of areas, including aspect, argument structure, noun phrase/nominal group structure and nominalisations, pronominal clitics, theme in relation to writing skills, discourse structures and markers, the role of attention in conversation, the functions of topic, phatic communion, subjectification, formulaic language and modality. A recurrent theme in the volume is the use of corpus materials in order to base functional descriptions on authentic productions. Overall, the volume constitutes a panoramic but nevertheless detailed view of some important current trends in functional linguistics. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Contributors ix–xiv Editorial introduction Christopher S. Butler, Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Julia Lavid xvii–xxv Publications of Angela Downing xxvii–xxx Grammar as an adaptive evolutionary product T. Givón 1–40 Towards a cognitive-functional model of text comprehension Christopher S. Butler 41–80 Towards an integrational approach in linguistics Andrei Stoevsky 81–96 Expressing past habit in English and Swedish: A corpus-based contrastive study Bengt Altenberg 97–128 Do cognate and circumstantial complements of intransitive verbs form one 'Range'? A corpus-based discussion Kathleen Rymen and Kristin Davidse 129–148 The unconscious, irresponsible construction in Modern Icelandic Enrique Bernárdez 149–164 Modelling 'selection' between referents in the English nominal group: An essay in scientific inquiry in linguistics Robin P. Fawcett 165–204 Problems in NP structure: An example from British tabloid journalism Eirian C. Davies 205–216 Double-possessive nominalizations in English J. Lachlan Mackenzie 217–232 Pragmatics, word order and cross-reference: Some issues with pronominal clitics in Bulgarian Svilen B. Stanchev 233–256 Patterns of multiple theme and their role in developing English writing skills Mike Hannay 257–278 Interactive solution-problems: A set of structures in general and scientific writing Michael P. Jordan 279–300 The English Contrastive Discourse Marker instead Bruce Fraser 301–312 Global and local attention in task-oriented conversation: An empirical investigation Julia Lavid 313–326 Metadiscursive and interpersonal values of pronominal topics in spoken Spanish Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Laura Hidalgo Downing 327–348 Phatic communion and small talk in fictional dialogues Ludmila Urbanova 349–358 Mister so-called X: Discourse functions and subjectification of so-called Lieven Vandelanotte 359–394 'Sorry to muddy the waters': Accounting for speech act formulae and formulaic variation in a systemic functional model of language Gordon Tucker 395–418 The discourse functionality of adjectival and adverbial epistemic expressions: Evidence from present-day English Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen and Karin Aijmer 419–446 Modality across World Englishes: The modals and semi-modals of prediction and volition Peter C. Collins 447–468 Name index 469–472 Subject index 473–480 Language index 481 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Wed Jun 4 20:00:51 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:00:51 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins journal: Constrictions and Frames Message-ID: New Benjamins journal to begin 2009: Constructions and Frames Constructions and Frames Editors Kyoko Ohara, Keio University Kiki Nikiforidou, University of Athens ISSN: 1876-1933 E-ISSN: 1876-1941 Constructions and Frames is an international peer-reviewed journal that provides a forum for construction-based approaches to language analysis. Constructional models emphasize the role of constructions, as conventional pairings of meaning and form, in stating language-specific and cross-linguistic generalizations and in accounting equally for regular and semi-regular patterns. Frame Semantics, which has become a semantic complement of some constructional approaches, elaborates the analysis of form-meaning relationships by focusing on lexical semantic issues that are relevant to grammatical structure. The preoccupation of constructional theories with meaning allows for natural integration of grammatical inquiry with semantic, pragmatic, and discourse research; often coupled with corpus evidence, this orientation also enriches current perspectives on language acquisition, language change, and language use. Constructions and Frames publishes articles which range from descriptions of grammatical phenomena in different languages to constructionally-oriented work in cognitive linguistics, grammaticalization theory, typology, conversation analysis and interactional linguistics, poetics, and sociolinguistics. Articles that explore applications to or implications for related fields, such as communication studies, computational linguistics, lexicography, psychology, and anthropology are also invited. The aim of the journal is to promote innovative research that extends constructional approaches in new directions and along interdisciplinary paths. URL: http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_seriesview.cgi?series=CF Volume 1 (2009): 2 issues, 300 pp. EUR 140.00 Individuals may apply for a special subscription rate of EUR 70.00. Private subscriptions are for personal use only, and must be pre-paid and ordered directly from the publisher. Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Wed Jun 4 20:04:33 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:04:33 -0400 Subject: Benjamins title: Synchronic and Diachronic Perspectives on Contact Language Message-ID: Synchronic and Diachronic Perspectives on Contact Languages Edited by Magnus Huber and Viveka Velupillai University of Giessen Creole Language Library 32 2007. xii, 370 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 5254 8 / EUR 115.00 / USD 173.00 This collection of selected conference papers from three SPCL meetings brings together a cross-fertilization of approaches to the study of contact languages. The articles are grouped into three coherent sections dealing with, respectively, phonetics and phonology, including Optimality Theory; synchronic analyses of both morphology and syntax; and diachronic tracings of language change, with special focus on sound patterns as well as semantics. An added value of the volume is that most of the articles are in various ways significant for more than one linguistic subgrouping, and there is a significant overlap of interests; the sections also cover sociolinguistic subjects, give both theoretical and functional linguistic analyses of language data, and discuss issues of grammaticalization. Thus, in discussing a number of issues relevant far beyond the study of pidgin and creole languages, as well as providing a wealth of linguistic data, this volume also contributes to the broader field of linguistics in general. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Preface ix–xii Part I 1. Maintenance or assimilation? Phonological variation and change in the realization of /t / by British Barbadians Michelle C. Braña-Straw 3–22 2. Universal and substrate influence on the phonotactics and syllable structure of Krio Malcolm Awadajin Finney 23–42 3. Tone on quantifiers in Saramaccan as a transferred feature from Kikongo Marvin Kramer 43–66 4. Morphophonological properties of pitch accents in Jamaican Creole reduplication Shelome Gooden 67–90 5. Effort reduction and the grammar: Liquid phonology in Haitian and St. Lucian Eric Russell Webb 91–114 Part II 6. Reflexivity in Capeverdean: Predicate properties and sentence structure Maria Alexandra Fiéis and Fernanda Pratas 117–128 7. An additional pronoun and hierarchies in creolized Chinúk Wawa David D. Robertson 129–158 8. Three irregular verbs in Gullah David B. Frank 159–173 9. Afro-Bolivian Spanish: The survival of a true creole prototype John M. Lipski 175–198 10. Copula patterns in Hawai?i Creole: Creole origin and decreolization Aya Inoue 199–212 Part III 11. On the properties of Papiamentu pa: Synchronic and diachronic perspectives Claire Lefebvre and Isabelle Therrien 215–255 12. No exception to the rule: The tense-aspect-modality system of Papiamentu reconsidered Nicholas Faraclas, Yolanda Rivera-Castillo and Don E. Walicek 257–278 13. A look at so in Mauritian Creole: From possessive pronoun to emphatic determiner Diana Guillemin 279–296 14. Chinese Spanish in 19th century Cuba: Documenting sociohistorical context Don E. Walicek 297–324 15. Comparative perspectives on the origins, development and structure of Amazonian (Karipúna) French Creole Jo-Anne S. Ferreira and Mervyn C. Alleyne 325–357 Index 359–370 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From fjn at u.washington.edu Thu Jun 5 18:53:38 2008 From: fjn at u.washington.edu (Frederick J Newmeyer) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 11:53:38 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of mine: 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by generative grammarians are an artifact of ‘disembodied sentences that analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real people in real discourse situations’ (Michael Tomasello). Their view is that if one focuses on ‘naturally occurring discourse’, then grammar will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific level, it challenges Sandra Thompson’s claim that evidence from conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., 'you’re ready to go' in 'I guess you’re ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. The paper can be accessed at the following url: http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 Best wishes, Fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] From belenvenado at yahoo.com.ar Thu Jun 5 20:28:45 2008 From: belenvenado at yahoo.com.ar (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Mar=EDa_Bel=E9n_Carpio?=) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 13:28:45 -0700 Subject: Funknet subscription Message-ID: Dear Funknet administrator,   I am writing to you in order to confirm my subscription to the Funknet mailing list.   Sincerely,   María Belén Carpio       __________________________________________________ Correo Yahoo! Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! ¡Abrí tu cuenta ya! - http://correo.yahoo.com.ar From tgivon at uoregon.edu Fri Jun 6 01:49:22 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 18:49:22 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: Message-ID: The paper Fritz mentioned is surely worth reading (I have, a while back). It makes two important point, one explicitly, the other implicitly. (i) (explicit) That there are no independent syntactic tests showing that V-COMP constructions behave like a simplex rather than complex clauses. The examples of the two usage of V-COMPS, the "direct-speech-act" ('grammaticalized') use and the "complex" use (Diessel 2005) have not been shown to differ syntactically, only semantically. That is: Direct speech-act: I know she's not coming Complex use: He knew she wasn't coming. (ii) (implicit) That semantic grammaticalization does not automatically lead to immediate syntactic grammaticalization. In diachrony (and on-line communication, its progenitor) quite often form lags behind meaning. There is another point Fritz does not make explicitly in his paper, but it is still implicit in his discussion. This is part of his earlier agenda about "Grammar is grammar and usage is usage". Or, as corollary, that usage frequencies are irrelevant to synchronic grammar. In the case of Sandy Thompson's original paper, I think usage frequencies may be very interesting for understanding what grammar does, or how grammar arises both diachronically and developmentally. Both Fritz and Peter Harder have criticized Sandy's paper for claiming that the grammaticalized speech-act usage of V-COMP constructions is the "basic" use, and ignoring the "complex" use. This of course depends on which genre of language use is "basic". The grammaticalized use certainly predominates in spoken language. But in adult spoken language the "complex" use is already entrenched, and in certain usage context (talking about the past) may even predominate. In diachrony, there is strong tho by no means conclusive evidence that the direct speech-act usage is earlier, and that the "complex" use follows. And Diessel (2005) documents fairly conclusively that the same is true in early child language development. So while usage frequency (and its gradual change) may not interest Fritz, I think it interests many of us who look at grammar not only as a synchronic entity, but also as a product of developmentt, be it evolutionary, diachronic or acquisitional. There is a web site for the Rice 12th symposium (Rice U., Linguistics Dept.) where two of my papers on this topic are lodged (one on the diachrony of complex VPs, the other on the acquisition of same). I lost the specs for this web site, but more astute minds can probably find it. Cheers, TG =============== Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > Dear Funknetters, > > I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of > mine: > > 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' > > ABSTRACT > It has become an article of faith among many functional and cognitive > linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by generative > grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that analysts > have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by real > people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their view > is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then > grammar will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized > formulas and simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. > Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it > argues that the nature of real discourse reinforces the need for a > sophisticated engine for representing and accessing grammatical > knowledge. At a more specific level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's > claim that evidence from conversation leads to the conclusion that > sentential complements (e.g., 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're > ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. > > The paper can be accessed at the following url: > > http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > > Best wishes, > > Fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Sun Jun 8 11:55:45 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2008 04:55:45 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <8a37aa4e4f95dcaf.484b8596@ac-versailles.fr> Message-ID: Hey, Pablo. There is no need for /ad hominem/ comments about Fritz Newmeyer. First, he is still VERY active, and in addition to being Emeritus in UW he is still on the faculty of two other universities. (Just for the record, I am Emeritus too, and, alas, it hasn't slowed down the pace of my work; yet). And second, his agenda is based on intellectual considerations, not on retirement or senile dementia. He keeps up with the literature, both the side of it he likes & the side of it he is critical of. And do give him credit for counting text frequencies. I know a lot of ideologically right-thinking people who don't. Or if they do, they don't understand why they do it. So in a way, Fritz is a useful bridge person across the great linguistic divide. He does believe in Chomskian generative grammar, particularly in the separation between performance & competence. You may not share his position, but it is sincerely taken and articulately argued. So like, let's chill, dude. TG ======== Pablo.Kirtchuk at ac-versailles.fr wrote: > Newmeyer's 'grammar is grammar, usage is usage' claim denotes a profound misunderstanding that goes far beyond grammar and even language. Probably, being an Emeritus, FN is a man of his time, and he is not to be blamed for it. He is certainly not ahead of his time. > > > Pablo Kirtchuk > > >> The paper Fritz mentioned is surely worth reading (I have, a while >> back). It makes two important point, one explicitly, the other >> implicitly. (i) (explicit) That there are no independent syntactic >> tests >> showing that V-COMP constructions behave like a simplex rather than >> complex clauses. The examples of the two usage of V-COMPS, the >> "direct-speech-act" ('grammaticalized') use and the "complex" use >> (Diessel 2005) have not been shown to differ syntactically, only >> semantically. That is: >> >> Direct speech-act: I know she's not coming >> Complex use: He knew she wasn't coming. >> >> (ii) (implicit) That semantic grammaticalization does not >> automatically >> lead to immediate syntactic grammaticalization. In diachrony (and >> on-line communication, its progenitor) quite often form lags behind >> meaning. >> There is another point Fritz does not make explicitly in his paper, >> but >> it is still implicit in his discussion. This is part of his earlier >> agenda about "Grammar is grammar and usage is usage". Or, as >> corollary, >> that usage frequencies are irrelevant to synchronic grammar. In the >> case >> of Sandy Thompson's original paper, I think usage frequencies may >> be >> very interesting for understanding what grammar does, or how >> grammar >> arises both diachronically and developmentally. Both Fritz and >> Peter >> Harder have criticized Sandy's paper for claiming that the >> grammaticalized speech-act usage of V-COMP constructions is the >> "basic" >> use, and ignoring the "complex" use. This of course depends on >> which >> genre of language use is "basic". The grammaticalized use certainly >> predominates in spoken language. But in adult spoken language the >> "complex" use is already entrenched, and in certain usage context >> (talking about the past) may even predominate. >> >> In diachrony, there is strong tho by no means conclusive evidence >> that >> the direct speech-act usage is earlier, and that the "complex" use >> follows. And Diessel (2005) documents fairly conclusively that the >> same >> is true in early child language development. So while usage >> frequency >> (and its gradual change) may not interest Fritz, I think it >> interests >> many of us who look at grammar not only as a synchronic entity, but >> also >> as a product of developmentt, be it evolutionary, diachronic or >> acquisitional. >> >> There is a web site for the Rice 12th symposium (Rice U., >> Linguistics >> Dept.) where two of my papers on this topic are lodged (one on the >> diachrony of complex VPs, the other on the acquisition of same). I >> lost >> the specs for this web site, but more astute minds can probably >> find it. >> >> Cheers, TG >> >> =============== >> >> >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> >>> Dear Funknetters, >>> >>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following >>> >> paper of >> >>> mine: >>> >>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>> >>> ABSTRACT >>> It has become an article of faith among many functional and >>> >> cognitive >> >>> linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >>> >> generative >> >>> grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that >>> >> analysts >> >>> have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by real >>> people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their >>> >> view >> >>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then >>> grammar will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized >>> formulas and simple constructions. This paper challenges that >>> >> view. >> >>> Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it >>> argues that the nature of real discourse reinforces the need for >>> >> a >> >>> sophisticated engine for representing and accessing grammatical >>> knowledge. At a more specific level, it challenges Sandra >>> >> Thompson's >> >>> claim that evidence from conversation leads to the conclusion >>> >> that >> >>> sentential complements (e.g., 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess >>> >> you're >> >>> ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. >>> >>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>> >>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Fritz >>> >>> Frederick J. Newmeyer >>> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon >>> >> Fraser >> >>> University >>> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > From hopper at cmu.edu Mon Jun 9 11:02:22 2008 From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 07:02:22 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, What is to be the nature of Funknet? Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. - Paul > Dear Funknetters, > > I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of > mine: > > 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' > > ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and > cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by > generative grammarians are an artifact of ‘disembodied sentences that > analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real > people in real discourse situations’ (Michael Tomasello). Their view is > that if one focuses on ‘naturally occurring discourse’, then grammar will > reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple > constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a > 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real > discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for representing > and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific level, it > challenges Sandra Thompson’s claim that evidence from conversation leads > to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., 'you’re ready to go' > in 'I guess you’re ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. > > The paper can be accessed at the following url: > > http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > > Best wishes, > > Fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct > Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for > my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > -- Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper Senior Fellow Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA5213 From hopper at cmu.edu Mon Jun 9 12:06:33 2008 From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 08:06:33 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <4895.72.95.230.196.1213009342.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: um A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying calm [laughter] A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if you're panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head clear enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i don't know if there was an explosion or something i don't it it's a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and control themselves B: um B: right even with all the um B: (( [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) B: twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't be Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don’t think, and possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of ‘fragments’. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of ‘fragments’, then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker’s daily output?" Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. - Paul ----------------------------- did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. it’s about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times can’t imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times can really think about it\ occurs 69 times control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any number!] something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times ----------------------------------------------------------- > Dear Colleagues, > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics > within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing > conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz > Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be > responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points > he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply > because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only > another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone > else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > - Paul > > >> Dear Funknetters, >> >> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of >> mine: >> >> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >> >> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and >> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >> generative grammarians are an artifact of ‘disembodied sentences that >> analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real >> people in real discourse situations’ (Michael Tomasello). Their view >> is that if one focuses on ‘naturally occurring discourse’, then grammar >> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and >> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims >> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature >> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific >> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson’s claim that evidence from >> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., >> 'you’re ready to go' in 'I guess you’re ready to go') are not >> grammatically subordinate. >> >> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >> >> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> -- Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper Senior Fellow Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA5213 From dlevere at ilstu.edu Mon Jun 9 11:59:00 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Dan Everett) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 06:59:00 -0500 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <4895.72.95.230.196.1213009342.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: I agree with Paul. Yet, at the same time, I believe that Fritz's ideas aare worth debating here. Can it be shown that arguments from usage seriously undermine formal linguistics and favor functional linguistics? This seems particularly relevant for this list. I would love to see here a brief synopsis of an article that replies to Fritz's criticisms and a link to that article. That strikes me as quite a good thing to have on a list like this. Fritz's tone is always calm and his style circumspect. His arguments are careful and reasonable. This doesn't mean that they are right! But this kind of dialogue is very useful, at least it is to me, both in full articles and, when appropriate and doable, in less formal communication, e.g. this list. All the best, -- Dan Everett Quoting Paul Hopper : > Dear Colleagues, > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss > topics within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an > ongoing conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" > abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical > arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire > article. The controversial points he makes in the article will > basically go unanswered in this forum simply because the genre of > email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only another article > can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone else's > work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange > of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > - Paul > > >> Dear Funknetters, >> >> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of >> mine: >> >> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >> >> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and >> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >> generative grammarians are an artifact of ‘disembodied sentences that >> analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real >> people in real discourse situations’ (Michael Tomasello). Their view is >> that if one focuses on ‘naturally occurring discourse’, then grammar will >> reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple >> constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a >> 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real >> discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for representing >> and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific level, it >> challenges Sandra Thompson’s claim that evidence from conversation leads >> to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., 'you’re ready to go' >> in 'I guess you’re ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. >> >> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >> >> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct >> Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for >> my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> > > -- > Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper > Senior Fellow > Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies > Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg > and > Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities > Carnegie Mellon University > Pittsburgh, PA5213 > > -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From bjking at wm.edu Mon Jun 9 12:43:17 2008 From: bjking at wm.edu (bjking at wm.edu) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 08:43:17 -0400 Subject: reading articles Message-ID: Hello, I've been a quiet lurker here for years. But I would like to respond to Paul Hopper's comment that: >, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire article. If the overall question is "what is to be the nature of Funknet," I'd suggest that it's completely appropriate for an author to send an abstract of his own devising with a link to the full article. I don't find that 'sad' or upsetting. It seems, on the contrary, ONE useful way (among others) to invite discussion, in this case from people who are interested enough to read further. I see no benefit in legislating the way in which people should post about their own work. Barbara J. King Professor of Anthropology College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA, USA 23187 for more about my research + my books please see: http://people.wm.edu/~bjking/ From amnfn at well.com Mon Jun 9 13:33:13 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 06:33:13 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <1040.72.95.230.196.1213013193.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: The Newmeyer article does seem to be fostering fruitful debate on the nature of language, and thus does seem to be well within the scope of a Funknet discussion. I'd like to add this perspective on "formulaic" or unoriginal expressions in spontaneous speech. Just because two individuals came up with the same phrase or clause (or just because a thousand or more did) doesn't mean that their method of deriving the expressions was the same. Some may have dug them up already composed from their lexicon. Others may have put them together word for word by reference to synatctic rules. Determining which people did which requires more complex testing than simply statistical analysis of expressions in a corpus. Best, --Aya On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Paul Hopper wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: > > A: hi > B: hi so did you hear what the topic is > A: yes it's about terrorism right > B: yeah > B: um > A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter > B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying > calm [laughter] > A: yeah nor can i yeah > B: um you would even i- though if you're panicked i would assume you would try and > B: keep your head clear enough to act to protect yourself but > A: right > A: yeah i don't know if there was an explosion or something > i don't it it's a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and > control themselves > B: um > B: right even with all the um > B: (( [sigh] the )) > B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's been on > that topic > A: (( [mn] right )) > B: twenty months it's still um > B: is something that you wouldn't be > > Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don’t think, and possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of ‘fragments’. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of ‘fragments’, then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker’s daily output?" > > Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. > > - Paul > > ----------------------------- > did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. > > it’s about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times > > what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times > > can’t imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; > > staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times > > nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times > > you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times > > i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice > > to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. > > to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times > > if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) > > it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times > > i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times > > can really think about it\ occurs 69 times > > control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times > > even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times > > media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times > > on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times > > in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any number!] > > something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times > > able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > Dear Colleagues, > > > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics > > within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing > > conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz > > Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be > > responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points > > he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply > > because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only > > another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone > > else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of > > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > > > - Paul > > > > > >> Dear Funknetters, > >> > >> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of > >> mine: > >> > >> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' > >> > >> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and > >> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by > >> generative grammarians are an artifact of ‘disembodied sentences that > >> analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real > >> people in real discourse situations’ (Michael Tomasello). Their view > >> is that if one focuses on ‘naturally occurring discourse’, then grammar > >> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and > >> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims > >> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature > >> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for > >> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific > >> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson’s claim that evidence from > >> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., > >> 'you’re ready to go' in 'I guess you’re ready to go') are not > >> grammatically subordinate. > >> > >> The paper can be accessed at the following url: > >> > >> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Fritz > >> > >> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > >> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > >> > > > -- > Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper > Senior Fellow > Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies > Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg > and > Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities > Carnegie Mellon University > Pittsburgh, PA5213 > > From edith at uwm.edu Mon Jun 9 16:31:06 2008 From: edith at uwm.edu (Edith Moravcsik) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 11:31:06 -0500 Subject: reading articles Message-ID: I, too, am very happy that Fritz has used FUNKNET to call attention to this paper of his. It is a clear and fair study, one that is of great interest to all linguists, whether of a functional or formalist persuasion. Edith Moravcsik ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Monday, June 09, 2008 7:43 AM Subject: [FUNKNET] reading articles > Hello, I've been a quiet lurker here for years. But I would like to > respond to Paul Hopper's comment that: > >>, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round >>contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be responded to without >>reading the entire article. > > If the overall question is "what is to be the nature of Funknet," I'd > suggest that it's completely appropriate for an author to send an abstract > of his own devising with a link to the full article. I don't find that > 'sad' or upsetting. It seems, on the contrary, ONE useful way (among > others) to invite discussion, in this case from people who are interested > enough to read further. > > I see no benefit in legislating the way in which people should post about > their own work. > > Barbara J. King > Professor of Anthropology > College of William and Mary > Williamsburg, VA, USA 23187 > > for more about my research + my books please see: > http://people.wm.edu/~bjking/ > > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Jun 9 16:59:11 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 09:59:11 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <1040.72.95.230.196.1213013193.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: Dear FUNK folks, I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a while--serious substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's done us a service, however resentful of him some folks may be. I go with Barbara King in noting that the full article is available, and it is better to react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I have seen that article a couple of months ago, & read it in full, I think maybe I can share with you my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's raised. This comes out of private correspondence with Paul Hopper, who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's defense. Here goes: Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL uses of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically "grammaticalized" are not necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by syntactic tests, independently of semantics. This, by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is a run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: Semantic change precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho of, course, Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of his own argument. What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental ("emeregent") components, which are well backed up (I think) by frequency counts: (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), V-COMP constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct speech-act) use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the role of frequency distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed his lack of interest in development/emergence. And (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of these omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and his disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising usage frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's attitude is echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who believe only in emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of emergence. So all in all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its internal contradictions, or at the very least, it's lack of explanatory ambition. The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage frequencies from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an explanation of what these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only meaningful in CONTRASTS: "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". And if not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some BASE OF COMPARISON--"what is the total population within which X appears a certain number of times?" So frequencies by themselves are not all that meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you want to test, you can formulate a frequency count in a way that would be meaningful--and test your hypothesis. This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came out with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The phenomenon was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) What was the frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic usage in particular texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do we have higher vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't interested in frequencies at the time, so I talked one of my grad students, Lynn Yang, into doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a two-part experimental study, one with two contrasting videos ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast of cultural familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). Best, TG ===================== Paul Hopper wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: > > A: hi > B: hi so did you hear what the topic is > A: yes it's about terrorism right > B: yeah > B: um > A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter > B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying > calm [laughter] > A: yeah nor can i yeah > B: um you would even i- though if you're panicked i would assume you would try and > B: keep your head clear enough to act to protect yourself but > A: right > A: yeah i don't know if there was an explosion or something > i don't it it's a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and > control themselves > B: um > B: right even with all the um > B: (( [sigh] the )) > B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's been on > that topic > A: (( [mn] right )) > B: twenty months it's still um > B: is something that you wouldn't be > > Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of 'fragments', then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker's daily output?" > > Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. > > - Paul > > ----------------------------- > did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. > > it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times > > what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times > > can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; > > staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times > > nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times > > you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times > > i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice > > to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. > > to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times > > if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) > > it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times > > i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times > > can really think about it\ occurs 69 times > > control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times > > even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times > > media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times > > on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times > > in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any number!] > > something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times > > able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >> >> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics >> within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing >> conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz >> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be >> responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points >> he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply >> because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only >> another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone >> else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. >> >> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of >> titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. >> >> - Paul >> >> >> >>> Dear Funknetters, >>> >>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of >>> mine: >>> >>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>> >>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and >>> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >>> generative grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that >>> analysts have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by real >>> people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their view >>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then grammar >>> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and >>> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims >>> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature >>> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >>> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific >>> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that evidence from >>> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., >>> 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to go') are not >>> grammatically subordinate. >>> >>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>> >>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Fritz >>> >>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >>> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>> >>> > > > From rjacobs at townesquare.net Mon Jun 9 17:50:11 2008 From: rjacobs at townesquare.net (R. A. Jacobs) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 13:50:11 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <1040.72.95.230.196.1213013193.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, Paul Hopper's data on formulaics expressions in the mini-text Fritz Newmeyer presented is certainly to the point. I agree with him that it would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. But it seems to me reasonable that Fritz could give some details of an argument (polemical but on a topic of central interest to this list that he has dealt with much more fully in a paper, as long as that paper has been made accessible to list members. That's one way a good list like this is useful. Fritz did just that. I was interested, so I downloaded the paper. Paul's own brief discussion added to the value of the exchange, and I hope there would be others. Ricky >Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly >formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in >stride, I don’t think, and possibly a few >others. But in other respects the transcript >reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that >defies any meaningful analysis in terms of >fragments ... >Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight >Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason >the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, >I identified the groups of words that I would >suspect are formulaic and typed them into >Google.com to see if they were as unique (and >therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The >results are, it seems to me, consistent with the >idea that the speaker is indeed stringing >together formulaic fragments. ... > >- Paul > >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >> >> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics >> within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing >> conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz >> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be >> responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points >> he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply >> because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only >> another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone >> else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. >> > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of > > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > > > - Paul -- Roderick A. Jacobs, Author/Linguistic Consultant Recent Article: [Georgia State University] Review of 'Handbook of English Linguistics Em.Prof. Linguistics & 2nd Language Studies in JOURNAL OF ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, , Past Dean, College of Languages, Linguistics, 35:2 (June 2007), 188-193. & Literature, University of Hawai'i From fjn at u.washington.edu Mon Jun 9 18:54:04 2008 From: fjn at u.washington.edu (Frederick J Newmeyer) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 11:54:04 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <484D615F.1090401@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: First, I would like to thank those of you who defended the appropriateness of my posting and/or provided substantive comments on the topics that I discussed in the paper. Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. I have a couple of comments on Tom's useful posting of earlier today. 1. Tom says that 'Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization'. I can't imagine what it would mean 'not to believe in grammaticalization'. All that I have ever said in print is that what is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of interacting processes. There is no historical dimension to my analysis, it is true, but that is because I endorsed (and briefly outlined) Boye and Harder's account of the grammaticalization of complement clauses, which brings in historical developments. By the way, it is not always the case that in grammaticalization 'semantic change precedes syntactic readjustment'. For examples of the opposite order of events, see chapter 5 of my book 'Language Form and Language Function'. 2. For quite a few years now I have endorsed the position that grammars are to a large degree functionally motivated and that frequency is an important factor shaping them. Where I part company with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are stated in the grammar itself. I think not, though, obviously this is a complex and difficult question. I did not take up this question in my paper because I believe that one can make a strong case that sentential complements are syntactically subordinate and that grammars are far more than 'fragments' and 'formulas' without addressing the question of where the dividing line between competence and performance might be. That's a topic for a different paper. Best, --fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > > > > Dear FUNK folks, > > I think Fritz's article has already achieved > something, at least potentially, that has been > absent from FUNKNET for quite a while--serious > substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's > done us a service, however resentful of him some > folks may be. I go with Barbara King in noting that > the full article is available, and it is better to > react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I > have seen that article a couple of months ago, & > read it in full, I think maybe I can share with you > my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's raised. > This comes out of private correspondence with Paul > Hopper, who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's > defense. Here goes: > > > Well , in my innocence I thought there were at > least two empirical arguments in Fritz's article. > (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL uses of > V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" > ones. Some are not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses > that are semantically "grammaticalized" are not > necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. > Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by > syntactic tests, independently of semantics. This, > by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is a > run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: > Semantic change precede syntactic re-adjustment. > Tho of, course, Fritz does not believe in > grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of > his own argument. > > What was missing from Fritz' article were the > developmental ("emeregent") components, which are > well backed up (I think) by frequency counts: > (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language > acquisition), V-COMP constructions first emerge is > the "grammaticalized" (direct speech-act) use, and > only later develop the other (two-clause) use > (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack > of interest in the role of frequency distribution > in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed his lack of > interest in development/emergence. And > (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two > developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated > by frequency distribution (in this case, of the > "grammaticalized" sense). Both of these omissions > are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", > and his disinterest in the role of "performance" > (in this case, rising usage frequency) in creating > "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's attitude is > echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, > who believe only in emergence but not in any > RELATIVELY stable product of emergence. So all in > all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting > exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its > internal contradictions, or at the very least, it's > lack of explanatory ambition. > > The last comment I have goes to Paul's > demonstration of usage frequencies from Google. > What I missed in his demonstration is an > explanation of what these frequencies mean. > Frequency counts are only meaningful in CONTRASTS: > "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". And if > not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some > BASE OF COMPARISON--"what is the total population > within which X appears a certain number of times?" > So frequencies by themselves are not all that > meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you > want to test, you can formulate a frequency count > in a way that would be meaningful--and test your > hypothesis. > > This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy > Pawley when he came out with his formulaic usage > papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The phenomenon was > surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) > What was the frequency distribution of formulaic > vs. non formulaic usage in particular texts. Or (b) > in what communicative contexts do we have higher > vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy > wasn't interested in frequencies at the time, so I > talked one of my grad students, Lynn Yang, into > doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a > two-part experimental study, one with two > contrasting videos ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast > Story", a contrast of cultural familiarity) the > other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two > contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). > The results were quite instructive. That MA thesis > may be available wherever U. Oregon theses are > available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). > > > Best, TG > > ===================== > > > Paul Hopper wrote: >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and >> syntax, he gives the following example of a text >> in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity >> and formulaic fragments would be impossible: >> >> A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is >> A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: >> um A: so what are your feelings on that >> [laughter >> B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine >> anyone staying calm [laughter] >> A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- >> though if you're panicked i would assume you >> would try and B: keep your head clear enough to >> act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i >> don't know if there was an explosion or >> something i don't it it's a shock so i don't >> know that anybody can really think about it and >> control themselves B: um B: right even with all >> the um B: (( [sigh] the )) B: the publicity >> and media coverage you know that's been on that >> topic A: (( [mn] right )) >> B: twenty months it's still um B: is something >> that you wouldn't be Newmeyer writes (MS p. >> 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions >> here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, >> and possibly a few others. But in other respects >> the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge >> of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in >> terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know how to >> handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative >> clause attachment, participial complements, and >> much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed >> under the rubric of 'fragments', then I would >> say that this infinitisemally small sample of >> natural speech would have to contain at least >> two dozen fragments. How many more would be >> needed to describe a typical speaker's daily >> output?" >> >> Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight >> Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason >> the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, >> I identified the groups of words that I would >> suspect are formulaic and typed them into >> Google.com to see if they were as unique (and >> therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The >> results are, it seems to me, consistent with the >> idea that the speaker is indeed stringing >> together formulaic fragments. The statistics are >> Google's, of course--they are rough and may >> fluctuate with different trials. >> - Paul >> >> ----------------------------- >> did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't >> occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the >> formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. >> >> it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times >> >> what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times >> >> can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; >> staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times >> >> nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times >> >> you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times >> >> i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice >> >> to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 >> times. >> >> to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times >> >> if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 >> times (!) >> >> it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times >> >> i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times >> can really think about it\ occurs 69 times >> >> control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times >> >> even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times >> >> media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times >> >> on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times >> >> in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times >> [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any >> number!] >> >> something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times >> >> able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times >> >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >>> >>> Most of us would think of it as an arena in >>> which we can discuss topics >>> within the/a functionalist paradigm by >>> swapping ideas in an ongoing >>> conversation. However, the polemical "article >>> of faith" abstract Fritz >>> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical >>> arguments, so it cannot be >>> responded to without reading the entire >>> article. The controversial points >>> he makes in the article will basically go >>> unanswered in this forum simply >>> because the genre of email doesn't permit a >>> paradigm-level response. Only >>> another article can respond to an article. So >>> Fritz gets to trash someone >>> else's work in public on the basis of a >>> promissory note. >>> >>> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing >>> house for the exchange of >>> titles and abstracts rather than the actual >>> discussion of ideas. >>> >>> - Paul >>> >>> >>> >>>> Dear Funknetters, >>>> >>>> I think that some of you might be interested >>>> in the following paper of mine: >>>> >>>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About >>>> the Nature of Grammar' >>>> >>>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith >>>> among many functional and cognitive >>>> linguists that the complex abstract >>>> structures posited by generative grammarians >>>> are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences >>>> that analysts have made up ad hoc, ... >>>> rather than utterances produced by real >>>> people in real discourse situations' >>>> (Michael Tomasello). Their view >>>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally >>>> occurring discourse', then grammar >>>> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter >>>> of memorized formulas and >>>> simple constructions. This paper challenges >>>> that view. Basing its claims >>>> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, >>>> it argues that the nature >>>> of real discourse reinforces the need for a >>>> sophisticated engine for >>>> representing and accessing grammatical >>>> knowledge. At a more specific >>>> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim >>>> that evidence from >>>> conversation leads to the conclusion that >>>> sentential complements (e.g., >>>> 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're >>>> ready to go') are not >>>> grammatically subordinate. >>>> >>>> The paper can be accessed at the following >>>> url: >>>> >>>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Fritz >>>> >>>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, >>>> University of Washington >>>> Adjunct Professor, University of British >>>> Columbia and Simon Fraser >>>> University [for my postal address, please >>>> contact me by e-mail] >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > From hopper at cmu.edu Mon Jun 9 19:16:05 2008 From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 15:16:05 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <484D615F.1090401@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, Ricky Jacobs nicely sums up the two sides to this debate, and keeping my fingers crossed that we won't see a 'New Way' of Funknet messages consisting of an abstract and a link to an article in place of the off-the-cuff "squibs" we've all come to know and love, I'll sign off on the question of format. I would like to add, though, that I would hate readers to infer from Tom's message that I berated him for not defending Sandy -- who doesn't need defending, and most definitely not by me. In fact my one and only comment to him was a humorous one, which I cite in full: >Tom, > >Well, we may be at or approaching Emeritus status, but our memories haven't >necessarily faded. What happened to the good ol' days of "Fritz the >Enforcer"...? > >Paul Those of us who are getting long in the tooth, including Fritz, will recognize the reference here, so I won't pursue it. It belongs to an even more polemical age. And I too appreciate that Fritz has taken functionalism seriously enough to focus his very considerable intellect on our work. Paul > > > > Dear FUNK folks, > > I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least > potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a while--serious > substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's done us a service, > however resentful of him some folks may be. I go with Barbara King in > noting that the full article is available, and it is better to react to it > rather than to the abstract. Since I have seen that article a couple of > months ago, & read it in full, I think maybe I can share with you my (very > brief) take on the issues Fritz's raised. This comes out of private > correspondence with Paul Hopper, who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's > defense. Here goes: > > > Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical > arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL uses > of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are not. And > (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically "grammaticalized" are not > necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. Syntactic properties have to be > demonstrated by syntactic tests, independently of semantics. This, by the > way (unnoticed by Fritz) is a run-of-the-mill observation in > grammaticalization: Semantic change precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho > of, course, Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't > see this part of his own argument. > > What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental ("emeregent") > components, which are well backed up (I think) by frequency counts: (iii) > That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), V-COMP > constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct speech-act) > use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use (Diessel 2005). > This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the role of frequency > distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed his lack of interest in > development/emergence. And (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these > two developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency > distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of these > omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and his > disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising usage > frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's attitude is > echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who believe only in > emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of emergence. So all in > all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting exemplar, and people could > benefit from seeing its internal contradictions, or at the very least, > it's lack of explanatory ambition. > > The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage frequencies > from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an explanation of what > these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only meaningful in CONTRASTS: > "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". And if not in x-y contrasts, > than at least against some BASE OF COMPARISON--"what is the total > population within which X appears a certain number of times?" So > frequencies by themselves are not all that meaningful. Still, if you have > a hypothesis you want to test, you can formulate a frequency count in a > way that would be meaningful--and test your hypothesis. > > This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came out > with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The phenomenon > was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) What was the > frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic usage in particular > texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do we have higher vs. lower > frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't interested in frequencies at > the time, so I talked one of my grad students, Lynn Yang, into doing her > MA thesis on this issue. It was a two-part experimental study, one with > two contrasting videos ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast > of cultural familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under > two contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were > quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon > theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). > > > Best, TG > > ===================== > > > Paul Hopper wrote: >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the >> following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of >> formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: >> >> A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is A: yes it's about terrorism >> right B: yeah B: um A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter B: i >> have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying calm >> [laughter] A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if >> you're panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head clear >> enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i don't know if >> there was an explosion or something i don't it it's a shock so i don't >> know that anybody can really think about it and control themselves B: um >> B: right even with all the um B: (( [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and >> media coverage you know that's been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) B: >> twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't be >> >> Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions >> here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and possibly a few >> others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated >> knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of >> 'fragments'. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, >> wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and >> much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of >> 'fragments', then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of >> natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How >> many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker's daily >> output?" >> >> Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that >> there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I >> identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and >> typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore >> syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent >> with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic >> fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and >> may fluctuate with different trials. >> >> - Paul >> >> ----------------------------- did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" >> doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you >> hear what the * is\. >> >> it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times >> >> what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times >> >> can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; >> >> staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times >> >> nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times >> >> you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times >> >> i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice >> >> to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. >> >> to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times >> >> if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) >> >> it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times >> >> i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times >> >> can really think about it\ occurs 69 times >> >> control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times >> >> even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times >> >> media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times >> >> on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times >> >> in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with >> "twenty", not just any number!] >> >> something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times >> >> able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >>> >>> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss >>> topics within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an >>> ongoing conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" >>> abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical >>> arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire >>> article. The controversial points he makes in the article will >>> basically go unanswered in this forum simply because the genre of >>> email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only another article >>> can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone else's work >>> in public on the basis of a promissory note. >>> >>> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange >>> of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. >>> >>> - Paul >>> >>> >>> >>>> Dear Funknetters, >>>> >>>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper >>>> of mine: >>>> >>>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>>> >>>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional >>>> and cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited >>>> by generative grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences >>>> that analysts have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances >>>> produced by real people in real discourse situations' (Michael >>>> Tomasello). Their view is that if one focuses on 'naturally >>>> occurring discourse', then grammar will reveal itself to be >>>> primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple constructions. >>>> This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus >>>> of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real >>>> discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >>>> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more >>>> specific level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that evidence >>>> from conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential >>>> complements (e.g., 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to >>>> go') are not grammatically subordinate. >>>> >>>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>>> >>>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Fritz >>>> >>>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >>>> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > -- Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper Senior Fellow Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA5213 From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Jun 9 21:33:19 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 14:33:19 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I think we are finally getting a discussion of interesting issues, so again we should thank Fritz for initiating it, by whatever means. This once again brings home the fact that ideological homogeneity is not necessarily good for intellectual growth. Now, Fritz raises two issues that maybe I could respond to. GRAMMATICALIZATION: What does it really mean (quote) "...[All that I have ever said in print is that] what is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of interacting processes..."? Does this mean that there are many different communicative functions that get grammaticalized, and that the (by-)products of these multiple processes of grammaticalization are different morpho-syntactic constructions? If that's all it means, there is nothing earthshaking about it. I'll subscribe any time. On the other hand, it could also mean "there are no (strong!) general trends that characterize the diachronic rise of morpho-syntactic construction" (as the Campbell/Janda/Jacobs crowd would have it). This is is a substantive negative claim, one I don't see how one could accept. Having studied grammaticalization for ca. 40 years now, I'll have to take a strong exception to such an interpretation. What those of us who have spent a lifetime trying to understand the genesis of grammar (diachronically, ontogenetically, phylogenetiuvcally) would say is that there are VERY STRONG general tendencies--and principles--that characterize such a developmental process. Whether one would want to call them "theory", "rules" or "laws" is a matter of utter indifference to me. I would be satisfied with "high degree of generality" or "high degree of predictability". As the late Ernst Mayr said long ago, biological regularities are not like the laws of physics. They emerge out of multi-factored, complex, adaptive environments, where often adaptive factors clash with each other. So even the strongest regularities are less that 100% ("generative"). This has never discouraged biologists from seeking powerful theoretical explanations. Why should it discourage linguists? MAIN STEAM FUNCTIONALISM: Here is the other quote from Fritz: "...Where I part company with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are stated in the grammar itself...". First, I have no idea what Main Stream Functionalism is. For the record, I have never accepted the position that performance factors, such as frequency, are "stated in the grammar itself". They have, obviously, to be stated somewhere in the theory that explains how grammars arise, through the three developmental trends we know. So if we accept that in order to understand how "the grammar itself" arises diachronically, ontogenetically or phylogenetically, we must consider "performance factors", I would be quite happy to sign up on that, having spent a lifetime trying to understand just that. Once again, I would like to suggest an analogy from biology. In biological evolution, the interaction of adaptive behavior ("performance factors") with random genetic mutation is what actually controls adaptive selection--thus the emergence of new structures. Mutations don't do the trick by themselves. So there is a strong precedent for "performance factors" at least contributing to the genesis of structures. (If you want a more authoritative source than me, look up an article by Fernald & White (2000) in M. Gazanniga (ed.) "The New Cognitive Neouroscience", Cambridge:MIT Press). PS: It is a pity that FUNKNET does not allow attachments, because I have 4 (two diachronic, two child language) chapters strongly bearing on this discussion. I'll send them privately to anybody who expresses interest. They are also available on the Rice-lingfistics-12th-symposium website, I'm told). Peace, TG ========= Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > First, I would like to thank those of you who defended the > appropriateness of my posting and/or provided substantive comments on > the topics that I discussed in the paper. > > Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the > 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from > the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be > established. The converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that > rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if lists > can be established. Even if it were the case that a huge percentage of > language users' output could be characterized by lists (formulas, > fragments, etc.), that would not exclude their also have a grammar > composed of rules (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers > to analyze unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and > meaning. > > I have a couple of comments on Tom's useful posting of earlier today. > > 1. Tom says that 'Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization'. I > can't imagine what it would mean 'not to believe in > grammaticalization'. All that I have ever said in print is that what > is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of > interacting processes. There is no historical dimension to my > analysis, it is true, but that is because I endorsed (and briefly > outlined) Boye and Harder's account of the grammaticalization of > complement clauses, which brings in historical developments. By the > way, it is not always the case that in grammaticalization 'semantic > change precedes syntactic readjustment'. For examples of the opposite > order of events, see chapter 5 of my book 'Language Form and Language > Function'. > > 2. For quite a few years now I have endorsed the position that > grammars are to a large degree functionally motivated and that > frequency is an important factor shaping them. Where I part company > with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the > question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are > stated in the grammar itself. I think not, though, obviously this is a > complex and difficult question. I did not take up this question in my > paper because I believe that one can make a strong case that > sentential complements are syntactically subordinate and that grammars > are far more than 'fragments' and 'formulas' without addressing the > question of where the dividing line between competence and performance > might be. That's a topic for a different paper. > > Best, > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > >> >> >> >> Dear FUNK folks, >> >> I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least >> potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a >> while--serious substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's >> done us a service, however resentful of him some folks may be. I go >> with Barbara King in noting that the full article is available, and >> it is better to react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I have >> seen that article a couple of months ago, & read it in full, I think >> maybe I can share with you my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's >> raised. This comes out of private correspondence with Paul Hopper, >> who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's defense. Here goes: >> >> >> Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical >> arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL >> uses of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are >> not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically >> "grammaticalized" are not necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. >> Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by syntactic tests, >> independently of semantics. This, by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is >> a run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: Semantic change >> precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho of, course, Fritz does not >> believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of his >> own argument. >> >> What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental >> ("emeregent") components, which are well backed up (I think) by >> frequency counts: >> (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), >> V-COMP constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct >> speech-act) use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use >> (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the >> role of frequency distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed >> his lack of interest in development/emergence. And >> (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two >> developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency >> distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of >> these omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and >> his disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising >> usage frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's >> attitude is echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who >> believe only in emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of >> emergence. So all in all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting >> exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its internal >> contradictions, or at the very least, it's lack of explanatory ambition. >> >> The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage >> frequencies from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an >> explanation of what these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only >> meaningful in CONTRASTS: "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". >> And if not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some BASE OF >> COMPARISON--"what is the total population within which X appears a >> certain number of times?" So frequencies by themselves are not all >> that meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you want to test, >> you can formulate a frequency count in a way that would be >> meaningful--and test your hypothesis. >> >> This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came >> out with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The >> phenomenon was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) >> What was the frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic >> usage in particular texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do >> we have higher vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't >> interested in frequencies at the time, so I talked one of my grad >> students, Lynn Yang, into doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a >> two-part experimental study, one with two contrasting videos >> ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast of cultural >> familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two >> contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were >> quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon >> theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). >> >> >> Best, TG >> >> ===================== >> >> >> Paul Hopper wrote: >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the >>> following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of >>> formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: >>> >>> A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is >>> A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: um A: so what are >>> your feelings on that [laughter >>> B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying calm >>> [laughter] >>> A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if you're >>> panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head clear >>> enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i don't >>> know if there was an explosion or something i don't it it's a shock >>> so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and >>> control themselves B: um B: right even with all the um B: (( >>> [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's >>> been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) >>> B: twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't >>> be Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic >>> expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and >>> possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals >>> a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful >>> analysis in terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know how to handle >>> purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, >>> participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be >>> subsumed under the rubric of 'fragments', then I would say that this >>> infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain >>> at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to >>> describe a typical speaker's daily output?" >>> >>> Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere >>> that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! >>> Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are >>> formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as >>> unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, >>> it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed >>> stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, >>> of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. >>> - Paul >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a >>> dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. >>> >>> it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times >>> >>> what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times >>> >>> can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; staying calm\ occurs >>> 275,000 times >>> >>> nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times >>> >>> you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times >>> >>> i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice >>> >>> to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. >>> >>> to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times >>> >>> if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) >>> >>> it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times >>> >>> i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times can really think >>> about it\ occurs 69 times >>> >>> control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times >>> >>> even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times >>> >>> media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times >>> >>> on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times >>> >>> in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with >>> "twenty", not just any number!] >>> >>> something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times >>> >>> able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> >>>> Dear Colleagues, >>>> >>>> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >>>> >>>> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss >>>> topics >>>> within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing >>>> conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz >>>> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it >>>> cannot be >>>> responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial >>>> points >>>> he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum >>>> simply >>>> because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level >>>> response. Only >>>> another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash >>>> someone >>>> else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. >>>> >>>> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of >>>> titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. >>>> >>>> - Paul >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Dear Funknetters, >>>>> >>>>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following >>>>> paper of mine: >>>>> >>>>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>>>> >>>>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional >>>>> and cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures >>>>> posited by generative grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied >>>>> sentences that analysts have made up ad hoc, ... rather than >>>>> utterances produced by real >>>>> people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their view >>>>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then >>>>> grammar >>>>> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and >>>>> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its >>>>> claims >>>>> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the >>>>> nature >>>>> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >>>>> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific >>>>> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that evidence from >>>>> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements >>>>> (e.g., >>>>> 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to go') are not >>>>> grammatically subordinate. >>>>> >>>>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>>>> >>>>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> >>>>> Fritz >>>>> >>>>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>>>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >>>>> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Mon Jun 9 22:18:06 2008 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 01:18:06 +0300 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <484DA19F.3030605@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: I agree that this is an interesting emerging discussion. Related to the grammaticalization and the ontological and epistemological status of linguistic rules, I would like to refer to my recent presentation "Linguistic Categories as Social Constructions" in Pisa, Italy. The main parts of the presentation are available at http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/lingcat_as_socialconstructions_honkela_excerpts.pdf For those interested, I recommend the slide 17 that summarizes the inherent subjectivity and intersubjectivity of concept formation and the 18 slide that takes that into the domain of the practice of theory formation within linguistics. Best regards, Timo Honkela On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > I think we are finally getting a discussion of interesting issues, so again we > should thank Fritz for initiating it, by whatever means. This once again > brings home the fact that ideological homogeneity is not necessarily good for > intellectual growth. Now, Fritz raises two issues that maybe I could respond > to. > > GRAMMATICALIZATION: What does it really mean (quote) "...[All that I have ever > said in print is that] what is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product > of a number of interacting processes..."? Does this mean that there are many > different communicative functions that get grammaticalized, and that the > (by-)products of these multiple processes of grammaticalization are different > morpho-syntactic constructions? If that's all it means, there is nothing > earthshaking about it. I'll subscribe any time. On the other hand, it could > also mean "there are no (strong!) general trends that characterize the > diachronic rise of morpho-syntactic construction" (as the > Campbell/Janda/Jacobs crowd would have it). This is is a substantive negative > claim, one I don't see how one could accept. Having studied grammaticalization > for ca. 40 years now, I'll have to take a strong exception to such an > interpretation. What those of us who have spent a lifetime trying to > understand the genesis of grammar (diachronically, ontogenetically, > phylogenetiuvcally) would say is that there are VERY STRONG general > tendencies--and principles--that characterize such a developmental process. > Whether one would want to call them "theory", "rules" or "laws" is a matter of > utter indifference to me. I would be satisfied with "high degree of > generality" or "high degree of predictability". As the late Ernst Mayr said > long ago, biological regularities are not like the laws of physics. They > emerge out of multi-factored, complex, adaptive environments, where often > adaptive factors clash with each other. So even the strongest regularities are > less that 100% ("generative"). This has never discouraged biologists from > seeking powerful theoretical explanations. Why should it discourage linguists? > > MAIN STEAM FUNCTIONALISM: Here is the other quote from Fritz: "...Where I > part company with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is > over the question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are > stated in the grammar itself...". First, I have no idea what Main Stream > Functionalism is. For the record, I have never accepted the position that > performance factors, such as frequency, are "stated in the grammar itself". > They have, obviously, to be stated somewhere in the theory that explains how > grammars arise, through the three developmental trends we know. So if we > accept that in order to understand how "the grammar itself" arises > diachronically, ontogenetically or phylogenetically, we must consider > "performance factors", I would be quite happy to sign up on that, having spent > a lifetime trying to understand just that. Once again, I would like to suggest > an analogy from biology. In biological evolution, the interaction of adaptive > behavior ("performance factors") with random genetic mutation is what actually > controls adaptive selection--thus the emergence of new structures. Mutations > don't do the trick by themselves. So there is a strong precedent for > "performance factors" at least contributing to the genesis of structures. (If > you want a more authoritative source than me, look up an article by Fernald & > White (2000) in M. Gazanniga (ed.) "The New Cognitive Neouroscience", > Cambridge:MIT Press). > > PS: It is a pity that FUNKNET does not allow attachments, because I have 4 > (two diachronic, two child language) chapters strongly bearing on this > discussion. I'll send them privately to anybody who expresses interest. They > are also available on the Rice-lingfistics-12th-symposium website, I'm told). > > Peace, TG > > ========= > > > > > Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > > First, I would like to thank those of you who defended the > > appropriateness of my posting and/or provided substantive comments on the > > topics that I discussed in the paper. > > > > Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the > > 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, that > > it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from the > > grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be established. The > > converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that rules have to be be > > excised from the grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even > > if it were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output > > could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would > > not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their > > notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar > > collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. > > > > I have a couple of comments on Tom's useful posting of earlier today. > > > > 1. Tom says that 'Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization'. I can't > > imagine what it would mean 'not to believe in grammaticalization'. All > > that I have ever said in print is that what is called > > 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of interacting > > processes. There is no historical dimension to my analysis, it is true, > > but that is because I endorsed (and briefly outlined) Boye and Harder's > > account of the grammaticalization of complement clauses, which brings in > > historical developments. By the way, it is not always the case that in > > grammaticalization 'semantic change precedes syntactic readjustment'. For > > examples of the opposite order of events, see chapter 5 of my book > > 'Language Form and Language Function'. > > > > 2. For quite a few years now I have endorsed the position that grammars > > are to a large degree functionally motivated and that frequency is an > > important factor shaping them. Where I part company with 'mainstream > > functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the question of whether > > performance factors (including frequency) are stated in the grammar > > itself. I think not, though, obviously this is a complex and difficult > > question. I did not take up this question in my paper because I believe > > that one can make a strong case that sentential complements are > > syntactically subordinate and that grammars are far more than 'fragments' > > and 'formulas' without addressing the question of where the dividing line > > between competence and performance might be. That's a topic for a > > different paper. > > > > Best, > > > > --fritz > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > University > > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear FUNK folks, > > > > > > I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least > > > potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a > > > while--serious substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's > > > done us a service, however resentful of him some folks may be. I go > > > with Barbara King in noting that the full article is available, and > > > it is better to react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I have > > > seen that article a couple of months ago, & read it in full, I think > > > maybe I can share with you my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's > > > raised. This comes out of private correspondence with Paul Hopper, > > > who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's defense. Here goes: > > > > > > > > > Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical > > > arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL > > > uses of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are > > > not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically > > > "grammaticalized" are not necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. > > > Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by syntactic tests, > > > independently of semantics. This, by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is > > > a run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: Semantic change > > > precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho of, course, Fritz does not > > > believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of his > > > own argument. > > > > > > What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental > > > ("emeregent") components, which are well backed up (I think) by > > > frequency counts: > > > (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), > > > V-COMP constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct > > > speech-act) use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use > > > (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the > > > role of frequency distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed > > > his lack of interest in development/emergence. And > > > (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two > > > developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency > > > distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of > > > these omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and > > > his disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising > > > usage frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's > > > attitude is echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who > > > believe only in emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of > > > emergence. So all in all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting > > > exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its internal > > > contradictions, or at the very least, it's lack of explanatory > > > ambition. > > > > > > The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage > > > frequencies from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an > > > explanation of what these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only > > > meaningful in CONTRASTS: "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". > > > And if not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some BASE OF > > > COMPARISON--"what is the total population within which X appears a > > > certain number of times?" So frequencies by themselves are not all > > > that meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you want to test, > > > you can formulate a frequency count in a way that would be > > > meaningful--and test your hypothesis. > > > > > > This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came > > > out with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The > > > phenomenon was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) > > > What was the frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic > > > usage in particular texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do > > > we have higher vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't > > > interested in frequencies at the time, so I talked one of my grad > > > students, Lynn Yang, into doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a > > > two-part experimental study, one with two contrasting videos > > > ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast of cultural > > > familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two > > > contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were > > > quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon > > > theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). > > > > > > > > > Best, TG > > > > > > ===================== > > > > > > > > > Paul Hopper wrote: > > > > Dear Colleagues, > > > > > > > > In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives > > > > the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of > > > > formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: > > > > > > > > A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is > > > > A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: um A: so what > > > > A: are > > > > your feelings on that [laughter > > > > B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying > > > > calm [laughter] > > > > A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if you're > > > > panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head > > > > clear enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i > > > > don't know if there was an explosion or something i don't it it's > > > > a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it > > > > and > > > > control themselves B: um B: right even with all the um B: (( > > > > [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and media coverage you know > > > > that's been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) > > > > B: twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't > > > > be Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic > > > > expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and > > > > possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript > > > > reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any > > > > meaningful analysis in terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know > > > > how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause > > > > attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are > > > > somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of 'fragments', then I > > > > would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural > > > > speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How > > > > many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker's daily > > > > output?" > > > > > > > > Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere > > > > that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! > > > > Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are > > > > formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as > > > > unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results > > > > are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is > > > > indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are > > > > Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with > > > > different trials. > > > > - Paul > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > > > did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about > > > > a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * > > > > is\. > > > > > > > > it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times > > > > > > > > what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times > > > > > > > > can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; staying calm\ occurs > > > > 275,000 times > > > > > > > > nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times > > > > > > > > you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times > > > > > > > > i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice > > > > > > > > to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. > > > > > > > > to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times > > > > > > > > if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) > > > > > > > > it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times > > > > > > > > i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times can really think > > > > about it\ occurs 69 times > > > > > > > > control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times > > > > > > > > even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times > > > > > > > > media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times > > > > > > > > on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times > > > > > > > > in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically > > > > with "twenty", not just any number!] > > > > > > > > something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times > > > > > > > > able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear Colleagues, > > > > > > > > > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > > > > > > > > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can > > > > > discuss topics > > > > > within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an > > > > > ongoing > > > > > conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" > > > > > abstract Fritz > > > > > Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so > > > > > it cannot be > > > > > responded to without reading the entire article. The > > > > > controversial points > > > > > he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this > > > > > forum simply > > > > > because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level > > > > > response. Only > > > > > another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to > > > > > trash someone > > > > > else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > > > > > > > > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the > > > > > exchange of > > > > > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of > > > > > ideas. > > > > > > > > > > - Paul > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear Funknetters, > > > > > > > > > > > > I think that some of you might be interested in the > > > > > > following paper of mine: > > > > > > > > > > > > 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of > > > > > > Grammar' > > > > > > > > > > > > ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many > > > > > > functional and cognitive linguists that the complex > > > > > > abstract structures posited by generative grammarians are > > > > > > an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that analysts have > > > > > > made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by > > > > > > real > > > > > > people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). > > > > > > Their view > > > > > > is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring > > > > > > discourse', then grammar > > > > > > will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized > > > > > > formulas and > > > > > > simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. > > > > > > Basing its claims > > > > > > on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues > > > > > > that the nature > > > > > > of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated > > > > > > engine for > > > > > > representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a > > > > > > more specific > > > > > > level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that > > > > > > evidence from > > > > > > conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential > > > > > > complements (e.g., > > > > > > 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to go') are > > > > > > not > > > > > > grammatically subordinate. > > > > > > > > > > > > The paper can be accessed at the following url: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > > > > > > > > > > > > Best wishes, > > > > > > > > > > > > Fritz > > > > > > > > > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of > > > > > > Washington > > > > > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and > > > > > > Simon Fraser > > > > > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by > > > > > > e-mail] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From tgivon at uoregon.edu Tue Jun 10 00:12:21 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 17:12:21 -0700 Subject: [Fwd: Web site for the 12th Rice symposium] Message-ID: From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Tue Jun 10 13:10:32 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 15:10:32 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone accepts them. Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should assume that they don't. Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that they need rules for their work. Martin Haspelmath Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the > 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from > the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be > established. The converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that > rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if lists > can be established. Even if it were the case that a huge percentage of > language users' output could be characterized by lists (formulas, > fragments, etc.), that would not exclude their also have a grammar > composed of rules (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers > to analyze unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and > meaning. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From jim.mischler at okstate.edu Tue Jun 10 13:40:18 2008 From: jim.mischler at okstate.edu (Mischler, Jim) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 08:40:18 -0500 Subject: [Fwd: Web site for the 12th Rice symposium] In-Reply-To: <484DC6E5.6010805@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: All, For some reason, Tom Givon's post with the URL for the 12th Rice Symposium on Language did not come through intact. In case this happened to others, below is the Web address for the 2008 Symposium papers. http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~eivs/sympo/program.html Jim Mischler Department of English Oklahoma State University jim.mischler at okstate.edu ________________________________________ From: funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu [funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu] On Behalf Of Tom Givon [tgivon at uoregon.edu] Sent: Monday, June 09, 2008 7:12 PM To: Funknet Subject: [FUNKNET] [Fwd: Web site for the 12th Rice symposium] From amnfn at well.com Tue Jun 10 13:37:01 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 06:37:01 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <484E7D48.8080802@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Here is what I see as the problem with the treatment of rules and lists in both the functionalist and the formalist camps: the assumption, seemingly unrebuttable, of universality. Some speakers are prone to rely heavily on lists; others rely heavily on rules. Some languages are highly regular, and others are highly irregular. (I am using "regular" here in the etymological sense of "rule-based.) Turkish and Hebrew are highly regular languages, and they promote rule-based behavior in their speakers. English has its regular vestiges, but it is tending toward irregularity, and this promotes list-based behavior on the part of its speakers. But besides language difference, there are also individual differences in language processing. Highly social people tend to jump ahead and try to determine from context what an utterance must have meant. Relatively asocial people, such as high functioning autistics, process in a more rule-based manner, and they tend to interpret utterance in this way. They also generate "stiff and pedantic" language specimens. The different strategies used by different speakers to interpret the same language point to the fact that there is more to language than the behavior of speakers. Context induced reinterpretation, one of the mechanisms that fosters grammaticalization, can only be possible if there is something there to be interpreted -- something independent of the mind or brain of the person who generated the utterance. Best, --Aya From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Tue Jun 10 16:27:22 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 11:27:22 -0500 Subject: Floating Listlessly Message-ID: Only if one assumes that classical morphemes are the theoretical bottom line do lists become absolutely necessary- and I'd guess that this is the position many, if not most, linguists hold. However, in some language types, having large numbers of ideophones, where connotation seems a bit more salient than denotation- the list concept may become less useful. One could easily conceive of an extreme form of such a system- a language where all strings are formulaic or rule based- where context determines their reading frame- even the particulars of form/meaning mapping. In the real world, however, such a language might be hard to live with, literally. Processing takes time- something speakers may not have the luxury of when they need to make split-second decisions. Shifts from iconicity at the phonological-featural level to lexical roots and compounds, then to derivational and inflectional morphology and so on, seem to be changes in hierarchical prioritization, partly motivated by temporal economy. The sample of real languages we see in the world today may not be representative of the total possible- something to consider when arguing about lists and rules. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From macw at cmu.edu Tue Jun 10 18:23:02 2008 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:23:02 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <484E7D48.8080802@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, This posting is not directly about the Newmeyer analysis, which seemed reasonable enough to me, but rather about the issue of the rule- list fallacy. Basically, my point here is that thinking of this as a dichotomy is useful for a first pass, but soon becomes inadequate when you think of actual mental processing. Within psycholinguistics, the interplay between lists and rules is the centerpiece of the debate between single and dual-route models. In the dual-route account, one route is rule (or rather combination with the result adjusted by rule) and the other is rote (or lists). Evidence for lists usually relies on the existence of exceptions to rules. Evidence for rules usually relies on productivity for new forms. In child language, productivity is also evidenced by overregularizations and other errors. This interplay between combination and rote occurs on every linguistic level. The most powerful model of dual-route interactions sees the two processes as engaged in a horse race. Both operate all the time, but the winner in a given case is determined by item strength and support. In 1986, Joe Stemberger and I provided evidence indicating that even regular forms such as "wanted" are occasionally produced by rote (or lists), since high frequency regulars are more resistant to speech errors phenomena then low-frequency regulars. If all regulars were produced by rule, this type of frequency effect should not obtain. One can also describe the rule-list interplay in a single-route connectionist model. However, in my opinion, such models simply involve recharacterizing rules as gang effects. And these models have to enforce special procedures to guarantee that lists can survive. In the end, they just recharacterize the dual route . So, I see no real way out of the idea of an interplay between processes and a horse race between forms. What does this mean for the FunkNet discussion? Basically, it means that, in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied. Given this inherent ambiguity of real data and the essentially competitive nature of the underlying process, only models that provide a fundamental role of dual-process interplay make contact with psychological reality. Fortunately, by examining the numbers in large corpora, one can get an idea of the overall strengths of the various horses, but that is about the best one can do and doing that right takes some care. Given this horse race view, I find it difficult to understand how one can view either rules or lists as the unmarked or default case or suggest that there is any null hypothesis regarding this interplay. One can entertain opposing null hypotheses, of course, but their half- life would be measured in seconds. --Brian MacWhinney From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Tue Jun 10 18:49:47 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:49:47 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Thanks a lot, Brian, for this very lucid explanation of the issues from a psycholinguistic point of view! I have long shared your view that "in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied" (my view is probably due to your influence, however indirectly!). This also makes me quite skeptical of "cognitive linguistics" of any sort – the adjective "cognitive" sounds great, especially to linguists who don't know much about cognition, but it probably promises more than we can deliver as linguists. Concerning your last point: > Given this horse race view, I find it difficult to understand how one > can view either rules or lists as the unmarked or default case or > suggest that there is any null hypothesis regarding this interplay. > One can entertain opposing null hypotheses, of course, but their > half-life would be measured in seconds. What I meant is that rote processing and rule processing do not have the same status: Vervet monkeys and dogs are pretty good at rote processing, but to what extent they can deal with rules is unclear. Clearly, rote/list precedes rule phylogentically and ontogenetically, and while rote/list without rule can be fully functional, rule without rote/list is incoherent – there wouldn't be anything for the rule to apply to. Thus, one cannot cite the Rule-List Fallacy as an argument against the claim that rules don't exist (as Newmeyer has done in his paper and in a recent Funknet message). Sometimes (e.g. in vervet monkeys) they really don't seem to exist, and maybe someone wants to argue that human language is likewise fully rote/list-based, without rules. Martin Brian MacWhinney wrote: > Dear Funknetters, > This posting is not directly about the Newmeyer analysis, which seemed > reasonable enough to me, but rather about the issue of the rule-list > fallacy. Basically, my point here is that thinking of this as a > dichotomy is useful for a first pass, but soon becomes inadequate when > you think of actual mental processing. > Within psycholinguistics, the interplay between lists and rules is the > centerpiece of the debate between single and dual-route models. In the > dual-route account, one route is rule (or rather combination with the > result adjusted by rule) and the other is rote (or lists). Evidence > for lists usually relies on the existence of exceptions to rules. > Evidence for rules usually relies on productivity for new forms. In > child language, productivity is also evidenced by overregularizations > and other errors. This interplay between combination and rote occurs > on every linguistic level. > The most powerful model of dual-route interactions sees the two > processes as engaged in a horse race. Both operate all the time, but > the winner in a given case is determined by item strength and support. > In 1986, Joe Stemberger and I provided evidence indicating that even > regular forms such as "wanted" are occasionally produced by rote (or > lists), since high frequency regulars are more resistant to speech > errors phenomena then low-frequency regulars. If all regulars were > produced by rule, this type of frequency effect should not obtain. > One can also describe the rule-list interplay in a single-route > connectionist model. However, in my opinion, such models simply > involve recharacterizing rules as gang effects. And these models have > to enforce special procedures to guarantee that lists can survive. In > the end, they just recharacterize the dual route . So, I see no real > way out of the idea of an interplay between processes and a horse race > between forms. > What does this mean for the FunkNet discussion? Basically, it means > that, in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a > given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if > a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, > can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied. Given this > inherent ambiguity of real data and the essentially competitive nature > of the underlying process, only models that provide a fundamental role > of dual-process interplay make contact with psychological reality. > Fortunately, by examining the numbers in large corpora, one can get an > idea of the overall strengths of the various horses, but that is about > the best one can do and doing that right takes some care. > Given this horse race view, I find it difficult to understand how one > can view either rules or lists as the unmarked or default case or > suggest that there is any null hypothesis regarding this interplay. > One can entertain opposing null hypotheses, of course, but their > half-life would be measured in seconds. > > --Brian MacWhinney > > -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From macw at cmu.edu Tue Jun 10 19:20:03 2008 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:20:03 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <001c01c8cb2b$e94c67b0$c0135981@ad.uwm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Edith and Martin, I think Martin makes an excellent point by emphasizing the phylogenetic primacy of rote. In that sense, perhaps there is a null hypothesis. I definitely see his point. Finding real syntactic rules in monkeys is a pretty tall order. But, maybe we need to think about this in more perceptual terms, along the lines Edith suggests. If we go back to real basics phylogenetically, we want to think about stimulus-response pairings such as the response of the female firefly to the shape of the blinking pattern of the male. To make this work, the series of blinks are more or less hard-wired into a single receptor neuron chain in the female. But, at this point, I wonder if we really have neither lists or rules, but rather the primordial neural soup from which both lists (unanalyzed amalgams) and rules (combined pieces) arise. At this point, I think that Edith's points are the crucial ones. Indeed, everything can be seen in terms of either its pieces or as a whole. Even more remarkably, it appears that the brain has come to provide methods for both forms of analysis. Don Tucker (Tom's neuropsychologist colleague at Oregon) likes to emphasize the interplay between the ventral path that tends to tear down items into their pieces and the dorsal path that assembles wholes. Unsurprisingly, it is the ventral path in humans that appears to be the one where rules are most clearly assembled. Others point to punctate processing in the left hemisphere and wholistic processing in the right. In general, the brain seems to follow these divisions between yin and yang with a vengeance. Given this, is it surprising to see this interplay being played out in language, both in conversation and across historical change? But, yes, Martin I also sympathize with your wariness of the application of the term "cognitive" as a magic wand for linguistic analysis. I think the hope is that corpora and richer streams of data recording can help us reduce this huge indeterminacy, but I can't see how it would ever vanish entirely, given the complex dynamics of the interplay. --Brian MacWhinney From fjn at u.washington.edu Tue Jun 10 19:24:14 2008 From: fjn at u.washington.edu (Frederick J Newmeyer) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 12:24:14 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <484E7D48.8080802@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null hypothesis. I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes indispensable. Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). --fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > asymmetry between rules and lists: > > While lists are a necessary component of all > semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > addition they may have rules. But the burden of > proof is on those who want to claim that they have > rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > the evidence for rules has been considered > overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > accepts them. > > Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > one could show that it is in fact possible to > explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > assume that they don't. > > Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > > But while I think that this particular argument is > invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > ideological preferences) find that they need rules > for their work. > > Martin Haspelmath > > Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron >> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. >> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, >> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have >> to be be excised from the grammar of a language >> if rules that subsume them can be established. >> The converse of this fallacy is equally >> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised >> from the grammar of a language if lists can be >> established. Even if it were the case that a >> huge percentage of language users' output could >> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, >> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a >> grammar composed of rules (or their notional >> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them >> structure and meaning. > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > > > From dlevere at ilstu.edu Tue Jun 10 19:27:59 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Daniel Everett) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:27:59 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Fritz, If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work it does at all, then I might see your point. See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they should be to use 'cognitive'. Dan On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > the null hypothesis. > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production and > all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me > that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the > picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes > indispensable. > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' > here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an > argument for rules (schemas, constructions). > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of morphemes, >> and then in addition they may have rules. But the burden of proof >> is on those who want to claim that they have rules (or schemas, or >> constructions). In general, the evidence for rules has been >> considered overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >> accepts them. >> >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple list >> of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a powerful >> argument against the existence of rules. In other words, the null >> hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if not >> enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >> assume that they don't. >> >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. The >> Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are defending >> the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all linguists >> (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that they need >> rules for their work. >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called >>> the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my >>> opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be >>> excised from the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them >>> can be established. The converse of this fallacy is equally >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a >>> language if lists can be established. Even if it were the case >>> that a huge percentage of language users' output could be >>> characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would not >>> exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their >>> notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar >>> collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> +49-341-980 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From giorgos at ling.ed.ac.uk Tue Jun 10 20:24:24 2008 From: giorgos at ling.ed.ac.uk (GP Argyropoulos) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:24:24 +0100 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi all, I know it's the time the great ones are talking, but allow me a minor contribution here: While it's certainly the case that studies on formulaic language almost exclusively emphasize language production (like Prof. Newmeyer suggested), this does not mean that sentence comprehension involves to any lesser extent such associative (rote learning, formulaic, etc) computations (yet sure, on its own at least that's no evidence for a "rote learning"-only explanation). See for example Townsend and Bever's (2001) LAST model for sentence comprehension, where an associative habit-based pseudosyntax preempts the categorical syntactic computations. So, preemption of rule processing can be found not only in phylogeny and ontogeny, but also in online language processing, be it in comprehension or production. What I strongly believe is that if we introduce a dynamic perspective to such distinctions, we will need to acknowledge "usage-induced" demotions from stage 2 to stage 1 in processing, which are very promising for explaining grammaticalization operations. Plus, if you ask me at least, this "yin-yang" distinction could also be found in the one between cortico-cortical and cortico-cerebellar processing (Terry Deacon has already suggested such role for the subcortical structures in general). But that's another story altogether... Cheers Giorgos Quoting Frederick J Newmeyer : > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis. > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production and > all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me that > once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the picture, the > need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes indispensable. > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. > I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed > to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument > for rules (schemas, constructions). > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of morphemes, >> and then in addition they may have rules. But the burden of proof >> is on those who want to claim that they have rules (or schemas, or >> constructions). In general, the evidence for rules has been >> considered overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >> accepts them. >> >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple list >> of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a powerful >> argument against the existence of rules. In other words, the null >> hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if not >> enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >> assume that they don't. >> >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. The >> Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are defending >> the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all linguists >> (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that they need >> rules for their work. >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called >>> the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my >>> opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be >>> excised from the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them >>> can be established. The converse of this fallacy is equally >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a >>> language if lists can be established. Even if it were the case >>> that a huge percentage of language users' output could be >>> characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would not >>> exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their >>> notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar >>> collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> +49-341-980 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Giorgos P. Argyropoulos http://gargyropoulos.googlepages.com/giorgosargyropoulos PhD student Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit Linguistics and English Language School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences University of Edinburgh Room 323, Adam Ferguson Building, 40 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LL, Scotland -- The University of Edinburgh is a charitable body, registered in Scotland, with registration number SC005336. From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 01:29:18 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 18:29:18 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: The rule-based approach and the list approach are functionally equivalent, when they produce the same results. Most of the time, they do produce the same results. This argument is all about processing and maximizing of processing resources: time vs. space. But surely there is more to language than the divergent strategies employed by speakers to process it, whether in production or comprehension. Some people use more memory. Others use less memory, but they process rules more rapidly. Some languages promote the one approach over the other. Some individuals have less grammatical capacity, but compensate through social cuing. Some are socially clueless, but their ability to follow formal rules allows them to decode messages without reference to the sender's state of mind. The more powerful theory would be one that explains how it is possible for speakers and hearers with highly divergent templates for language processing to understand each other's linguistic messages. In order to do this, we must focus on the properties of the language code itself. --Aya From dlevere at ilstu.edu Wed Jun 11 09:47:19 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 04:47:19 -0500 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Just to clarify what I said earlier. It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest way to describe them. If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong predictions. So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. Dan Quoting Daniel Everett : > Fritz, > > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work > it does at all, then I might see your point. > > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they > should be to use 'cognitive'. > > Dan > > > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be >> the null hypothesis. >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes >> indispensable. >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). >> >> --fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> University >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >>> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so >>> almost everyone accepts them. >>> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we >>> should assume that they don't. >>> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >>> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that >>> they need rules for their work. >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >>> -- >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >>> +49-341-980 1616 >>> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 12:39:31 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 05:39:31 -0700 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: <20080611044719.wh8xm6qi8osoow4s@isuwebmail.ilstu.edu> Message-ID: It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us the freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. Best, --Aya On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > Just to clarify what I said earlier. > > It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature > of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. > Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we > don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can > tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. > > And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a > necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also > plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the > shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might > themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the > grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at > MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab > (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent > progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their > parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it > is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest > way to describe them. > > If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then > discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong > predictions. > > So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to > capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's > remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. > > Dan > > Quoting Daniel Everett : > > > Fritz, > > > > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work > > it does at all, then I might see your point. > > > > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, > > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone > > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely > > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like > > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should > > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they > > should be to use 'cognitive'. > > > > Dan > > > > > > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > > > >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > >> the null hypothesis. > >> > >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production > >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me > >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the > >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes > >> indispensable. > >> > >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' > >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just > >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). > >> > >> --fritz > >> > >> Frederick J. Newmeyer > >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > >> University > >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > >> > >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> > >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List > >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language > >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: > >>> > >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, > >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of > >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the > >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules > >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for > >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so > >>> almost everyone accepts them. > >>> > >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show > >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by > >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple > >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a > >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, > >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if > >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we > >>> should assume that they don't. > >>> > >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null > >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules > >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does > >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. > >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >>> > >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy > >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince > >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed > >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are > >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all > >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that > >>> they need rules for their work. > >>> > >>> Martin Haspelmath > >>> > >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has > >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly > >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to > >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that > >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is > >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the > >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it > >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output > >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that > >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules > >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. > >>> -- > >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher > >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) > >>> +49-341-980 1616 > >>> > >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > > > From dlevere at ilstu.edu Wed Jun 11 12:36:17 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 07:36:17 -0500 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: Message-ID: We find indeterminacy in many places. For example, to borrow an illustration from a draft of someone else's paper, consider the fact that we could say for any pine tree it is possible to find another that has more needles. Yet this is not an argument that there is a pine tree with an infinite number of needles. There are various ways to derive such facts, generative grammars being only one, perhaps not the best, way to do so. Note too that a generative grammar with recursion cannot be proven to derive an infinite language either. Further, whether a sentence in any language can be extended or not, is an empirical question. I think that it is probably the case that there are languages for which a longest sentence, actually quite short, might be given. -- Dan Quoting "A. Katz" : > It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can > see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever > uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the > fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the > history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on > whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us the > freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, > but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows > us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. > > > Best, > > --Aya > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > >> Just to clarify what I said earlier. >> >> It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature >> of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. >> Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we >> don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can >> tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. >> >> And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a >> necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also >> plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the >> shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might >> themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the >> grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at >> MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab >> (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent >> progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their >> parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it >> is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest >> way to describe them. >> >> If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then >> discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong >> predictions. >> >> So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to >> capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's >> remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. >> >> Dan >> >> Quoting Daniel Everett : >> >> > Fritz, >> > >> > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work >> > it does at all, then I might see your point. >> > >> > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, >> > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone >> > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely >> > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like >> > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should >> > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they >> > should be to use 'cognitive'. >> > >> > Dan >> > >> > >> > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> > >> >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete >> >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be >> >> the null hypothesis. >> >> >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic >> >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on >> >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production >> >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in >> >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of >> >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me >> >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the >> >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes >> >> indispensable. >> >> >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' >> >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as >> >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just >> >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). >> >> >> >> --fritz >> >> >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer >> >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> >> University >> >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> >> >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >> >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >> >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >>> >> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >> >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of >> >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the >> >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules >> >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for >> >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so >> >>> almost everyone accepts them. >> >>> >> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >> >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >> >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple >> >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a >> >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, >> >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if >> >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we >> >>> should assume that they don't. >> >>> >> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >> >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >> >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >> >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. >> >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >>> >> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >> >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >> >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >> >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are >> >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all >> >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that >> >>> they need rules for their work. >> >>> >> >>> Martin Haspelmath >> >>> >> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has >> >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly >> >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to >> >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that >> >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is >> >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the >> >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it >> >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output >> >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that >> >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules >> >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >> >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >> >>> -- >> >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> >>> +49-341-980 1616 >> >>> >> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------- >> This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. >> >> >> > -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 14:01:28 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 07:01:28 -0700 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: <20080611073617.rn2zesmdc44sk84g@isuwebmail.ilstu.edu> Message-ID: Dan, I wasn't arguing in favor of infinity. I agree there is no such thing in language. I also agree that there are processing limitations that place an upper bound on sentence length. My point is something quite different. It's that someone can use an existing language to say something unexpected. This is immensely important, despite the fact that it very rarely happens. The statistical approach, with its emphasis on the average person, ignores the most important aspect of human language: that it leaves us free to express new ideas. Best, --Aya On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > We find indeterminacy in many places. For example, to borrow an > illustration from a draft of someone else's paper, consider the fact > that we could say for any pine tree it is possible to find another > that has more needles. Yet this is not an argument that there is a > pine tree with an infinite number of needles. > > > There are various ways to derive such facts, generative grammars being > only one, perhaps not the best, way to do so. Note too that a > generative grammar with recursion cannot be proven to derive an > infinite language either. > > Further, whether a sentence in any language can be extended or not, is > an empirical question. I think that it is probably the case that there > are languages for which a longest sentence, actually quite short, > might be given. > > -- Dan > > Quoting "A. Katz" : > > > It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can > > see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever > > uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the > > fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the > > history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on > > whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us the > > freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, > > but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows > > us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. > > > > > > Best, > > > > --Aya > > > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > > > >> Just to clarify what I said earlier. > >> > >> It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature > >> of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. > >> Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we > >> don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can > >> tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. > >> > >> And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a > >> necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also > >> plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the > >> shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might > >> themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the > >> grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at > >> MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab > >> (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent > >> progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their > >> parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it > >> is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest > >> way to describe them. > >> > >> If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then > >> discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong > >> predictions. > >> > >> So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to > >> capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's > >> remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. > >> > >> Dan > >> > >> Quoting Daniel Everett : > >> > >> > Fritz, > >> > > >> > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work > >> > it does at all, then I might see your point. > >> > > >> > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, > >> > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone > >> > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely > >> > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like > >> > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should > >> > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they > >> > should be to use 'cognitive'. > >> > > >> > Dan > >> > > >> > > >> > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >> > > >> >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > >> >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > >> >> the null hypothesis. > >> >> > >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > >> >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > >> >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production > >> >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > >> >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > >> >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me > >> >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the > >> >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes > >> >> indispensable. > >> >> > >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' > >> >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > >> >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just > >> >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). > >> >> > >> >> --fritz > >> >> > >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer > >> >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > >> >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > >> >> University > >> >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > >> >> > >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> >> > >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List > >> >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language > >> >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: > >> >>> > >> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, > >> >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of > >> >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the > >> >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules > >> >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for > >> >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so > >> >>> almost everyone accepts them. > >> >>> > >> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show > >> >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by > >> >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple > >> >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a > >> >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, > >> >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if > >> >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we > >> >>> should assume that they don't. > >> >>> > >> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null > >> >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules > >> >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does > >> >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. > >> >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >> >>> > >> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy > >> >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince > >> >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed > >> >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are > >> >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all > >> >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that > >> >>> they need rules for their work. > >> >>> > >> >>> Martin Haspelmath > >> >>> > >> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >> >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has > >> >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly > >> >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to > >> >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that > >> >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is > >> >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the > >> >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it > >> >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output > >> >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that > >> >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules > >> >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >> >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. > >> >>> -- > >> >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >> >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher > >> >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) > >> >>> +49-341-980 1616 > >> >>> > >> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >> >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -------------------------------------------------------------- > >> This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Jun 11 16:31:10 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 11:31:10 -0500 Subject: Discrete Infinity Message-ID: Are all languages equal, though, in their ability to say new things? For example, where languages have reduced numbers of morphemes (as in polysynthetic types, according to Fortescue), it might be harder to get at a particular concept unless you either compare it to something else not quite identical, or coin a new lexical root, etc. In extreme cases what we normally think of as open classes can be closed. Not directly related to DI, perhaps, but part of the overall system. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 11 19:20:43 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:20:43 -0500 Subject: Re the rule-list fallacy Message-ID: Martin Haspelmath wrote: Thanks a lot, Brian, for this very lucid explanation of the issues from a psycholinguistic point of view! I have long shared your view that "in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied" (my view is probably due to your influence, however indirectly!). This also makes me quite skeptical of "cognitive linguistics" of any sort – the adjective "cognitive" sounds great, especially to linguists who don't know much about cognition, but it probably promises more than we can deliver as linguists. and Brian MacWhinney responded: > yes, Martin I also sympathize with your wariness of the > application of the term "cognitive" as a magic wand for linguistic > analysis. I think the hope is that corpora and richer streams of data > recording can help us reduce this huge indeterminacy, but I can't see > how it would ever vanish entirely, given the complex dynamics of the > interplay. To be sure, "cognitive" can be simply an impressive but empty buzzword. It can also be somewhat more legitimately used to describe a linguistics that hopes to be at least cognitively plausible and at best responsive to all the solid conclusions of cognitive psychology. In the case at hand, I do not follow Martin's logic, which I understand to be going from (a) we can almost never know for sure if something was produced by rote or by rule, to (b) we as linguists cannot deliver on a "cognitive linguistics" of any sort. Brian's answer, as well, seems to suggest that, as long as we cannot make the indeterminacy vanish entirely, or at least reduce it greatly, we do not have a linguistic analysis . What about a linguistics that would embrace the indeterminacy? What about one that would say precisely "we cannot, in the absence of empirical evidence, definitively say if something was produced by rote or by rule"? That would refuse to say that "since some Derived Nominals are related to their corresponding verbs only in an irregular fashion, DN's as a class are not produced by the grammar but rather listed in the lexicon " (my paraphrase of Newmeyer 1980 summarizing Chomsky 1967). And that would say that when Martin Haspelmath wrote "explanation" in his email of 10 June 08 at 1:49 pm, he almost certainly got the word "off the shelf" (i.e. from a list), but that without having measured his brain functions at that time, in ways we do not yet know how to do, we cannot know for a fact that no rules or gang effects were active in the process. In the end the question of whether a structure was produced by rote or by rule doesn't seem, in many cases at least, to be crucial for communication —a speaker may use either or both and a hearer use the opposite mechanism or the same one or both, and adequate communication can take place. So why does it have to be crucial for linguistics? If I have to choose between a linguistics that is determinate (absolutely predictive, yielding crisp judgements) and one that leads me to expect the indeterminacies that are there empirically in language, I prefer the latter. --David Tuggy From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 11 19:31:49 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:31:49 -0500 Subject: Re Discrete Infinity Message-ID: In what way are original sentences (or even original clauses) rare? How often will any of the sentences in Aya's post, or this one, have been produced in the history of the world? And even if some of them ever were, would that mean that Aya copied them, rather than producing them as, for her, effectively original sentences? --David Tuggy A. Katz wrote: > It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can > see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever > uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the > fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the > history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on > whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us > the > freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, > but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows > us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. > > > Best, > > --Aya > From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 11 19:33:05 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:33:05 -0500 Subject: Re Discrete Infinity Message-ID: Right. But isn't the point (or shouldn't the point be) that when we make original structures of whatever size we typically do so by stringing together in novel ways smaller structures or established sequences of structures? It seems obvious to me that original morphemes will (in every language) be pretty rare, original stems will be a bit more common but still likely rarer than original words, original words rarer than original phrases, original phrases than original clauses, original clauses than original sentences, and so on up the hierarchy of levels of complexity. (That is of course relatively speaking: i.e. each level will have a higher percentage of original structures than the next lower one, not necessarily a higher absolute number. I can easily imagine that more original sentences than original discourse sections might be produced in a language where most utterances did not rise to the level of sections. For many languages the stem/word level distinction may be irrelevant to such an extent that both levels would be manifest in all of the same structures. And of course otherwise comparable levels need not correspond all that well in this regard across languages: original Nahuatl words are much more common than original English words because Nahuatl does so much more in the morphology.) A structure does not cease to be original because it has pre-established parts. I believe it was Langacker who said that "our vaunted linguistic creativity typically reduces to stringing a few clichés together to make a sentence", and I think there is something very right about that. But it certainly does not deny creativity in the stringing of those clichés together. And that creativity is a very big deal. Which I think was your main point. --David T A. Katz wrote: > Good point. > > I'm willing to concede that original sentences as such may not be that > rare. However, I think many of our colleagues might like to suggest that > if we did a search, we might find many of the sequences of words occurring > in these sentences have been used by others. > > --Aya > > > > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008, David Tuggy wrote: > > >> In what way are original sentences (or even original clauses) rare? How >> often will any of the sentences in Aya's post, or this one, have been >> produced in the history of the world? And even if some of them ever >> were, would that mean that Aya copied them, rather than producing them >> as, for him, effectively original sentences? >> >> --David Tuggy >> > From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 21:05:11 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:05:11 -0700 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: <5883974.1213201870926.JavaMail.root@elwamui-little.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: But surely new words can very easily be derived in these languages. Isn't that so? --Aya On Wed, 11 Jun 2008, jess tauber wrote: > Are all languages equal, though, in their ability to say new things? > > For example, where languages have reduced numbers of morphemes (as in polysynthetic types, according to Fortescue), it might be harder to get at a particular concept unless you either compare it to something else not quite identical, or coin a new lexical root, etc. In extreme cases what we normally think of as open classes can be closed. > > Not directly related to DI, perhaps, but part of the overall system. > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Jun 12 01:35:55 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 18:35:55 -0700 Subject: Re the rule-list fallacy In-Reply-To: <4850258B.9080608@sil.org> Message-ID: Before everybody concedes to Martin his disdain for "cognitive", I'd like to maybe help him qualify his statement just a bit. Yes, we know people who say "cognitive" as a convenient slogan or as a sales pitch. No need to mention names. The test is actually quite simple: If the "cognitive" categories you propose are 100% isomorphic to your linguistic analysis done beforehand through purely linguistic methods, that was done with purely linguistic methods and without reference to the methodologically-independent neuro-cognitive literature, then chances are you are one of those people Martin frowns upon. But I hope Martin knows other people too, those who don't use "cognitive" as a convenient label, but try to keep up with the lit. of both cognition and neurology, and for an excellent reason: They know (or is it 'suspect'?) that if you develop a theory of language without letting it be strongly constrained by what is known about neuro-cognition, there is absolutely no guarantee that your theory is anything but a descriptive and/or methodological convenience, or a formalism driven by parsimony alone. Of course, among people who call themselves functionalists there are quite a few who don't want to bother with being accountable to cognition & neurology. We all have only one lifetime, alas. And as Leonard Bloomfield said, let other disciplines handle that. We'll stick to the facts of language. I don't begrudge people their myopia, or lack of ambition. But as far as I can see, we are slowly running out of purely linguistic facts. They are getting kinda skinny. So for people who have slightly more ambitious goals than just describing, I think trying to understand the neuro-cognition of language is a legitimate pursuit. After all, if you are for "usage" and "performance", where the heck do you think the real site of usage & performance is? Show me a language usage/performance outside the mind/brain & I'll show you a one-legged horse. y'all keep on truckin', TG ======== David Tuggy wrote: > Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > Thanks a lot, Brian, for this very lucid explanation of the issues > from a psycholinguistic point of view! I have long shared your view > that "in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a > given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if > a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, > can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied" (my view is > probably due to your influence, however indirectly!). This also makes > me quite skeptical of "cognitive linguistics" of any sort -- the > adjective "cognitive" sounds great, especially to linguists who don't > know much about cognition, but it probably promises more than we can > deliver as linguists. > > and Brian MacWhinney responded: >> yes, Martin I also sympathize with your wariness of the >> application of the term "cognitive" as a magic wand for linguistic >> analysis. I think the hope is that corpora and richer streams of data >> recording can help us reduce this huge indeterminacy, but I can't see >> how it would ever vanish entirely, given the complex dynamics of the >> interplay. > To be sure, "cognitive" can be simply an impressive but empty > buzzword. It can also be somewhat more legitimately used to describe a > linguistics that hopes to be at least cognitively plausible and at > best responsive to all the solid conclusions of cognitive psychology. > > In the case at hand, I do not follow Martin's logic, which I > understand to be going from (a) we can almost never know for sure if > something was produced by rote or by rule, to (b) we as linguists > cannot deliver on a "cognitive linguistics" of any sort. Brian's > answer, as well, seems to suggest that, as long as we cannot make the > indeterminacy vanish entirely, or at least reduce it greatly, we do > not have a linguistic analysis . > > What about a linguistics that would embrace the indeterminacy? What > about one that would say precisely "we cannot, in the absence of > empirical evidence, definitively say if something was produced by rote > or by rule"? That would refuse to say that "since some Derived > Nominals are related to their corresponding verbs only in an irregular > fashion, DN's as a class are not produced by the grammar but rather > listed in the lexicon " (my paraphrase of Newmeyer 1980 summarizing > Chomsky 1967). And that would say that when Martin Haspelmath wrote > "explanation" in his email of 10 June 08 at 1:49 pm, he almost > certainly got the word "off the shelf" (i.e. from a list), but that > without having measured his brain functions at that time, in ways we > do not yet know how to do, we cannot know for a fact that no rules or > gang effects were active in the process. > > In the end the question of whether a structure was produced by rote or > by rule doesn't seem, in many cases at least, to be crucial for > communication ---a speaker may use either or both and a hearer use the > opposite mechanism or the same one or both, and adequate communication > can take place. So why does it have to be crucial for linguistics? > > If I have to choose between a linguistics that is determinate > (absolutely predictive, yielding crisp judgements) and one that leads > me to expect the indeterminacies that are there empirically in > language, I prefer the latter. > > --David Tuggy > From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Jun 12 10:46:12 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 12:46:12 +0200 Subject: "cognitive linguistics" In-Reply-To: <48507D7B.9080101@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Thanks, Tom, for elaborating on my point: > If the "cognitive" categories you propose are 100% isomorphic to your > linguistic analysis done beforehand through purely linguistic methods, > that was done with purely linguistic methods and without reference to > the methodologically-independent neuro-cognitive literature, then > chances are you are one of those people Martin frowns upon. Yes, and what most linguists (who work on language structure) do most of the time is to provide descriptions, or "analyses", of language patterns, with purely linguistic methods. This keeps them busy enough, but because of the rule/list indeterminacy explained by Brian MacWhinney, it's often too rash to jump to "cognitive" conclusions. This concerns mostly generative linguistics (where the equation of linguist's analysis with cognitive pattern is part of the underlying ideology), but to some extent also non-generative linguistics. > So for people who have slightly more ambitious goals than just > describing, I think trying to understand the neuro-cognition of > language is a legitimate pursuit. Yes, but explanation comes after description/analysis, and we need quite a bit of the latter before we can go on to venture explanations. In particular, we generally need to identify universal patterns before we can propose cognitive explanations. This is also the point of Lazard (2007), the great French typologist who declares that "la linguistique cognitive n'existe pas", meaning that cognitive explanation comes only at the very end of a description-comparison-generalization process (and somewhat arbitrarily, he places cognitive explanation just outside linguistics proper). This was also the point of my 2004 paper: When I say that explanation does not presuppose description, I mean cognitive description and cognitive/functional explanation. We can formulate generalizations over non-cognitive ("phenomenological") descriptions and these have to be explained in cognitive/functional terms. It's not necessary to have cognitive descriptions before we can come up with universals and explanations for them (pace Newmeyer 1998). One other thing that I find lacking in much of current practice is the social aspect of language. The cognitive perspective is crucial, but without its social side, one wouldn't understand why languages are so uniform and why they can change. And without changing, languages wouldn't be able to adapt. As Aya Katz reminded us, it's quite possible that different speakers make different choices with respect to rules and lista. But they still produce remarkably similar outputs: While they may use different cognitive routes, they all want to fit into the same social structure. Without a social perspective, we wouldn't understand why there are languages, not just idolects. The only cognitive linguist I know who has really thought this through is Bill Croft ("Explaining language change", 2000). My sense is that the general overemphasis on cognitive over social patterns is another part of the heritage from Chomsky's obsession with the philosophy of mind. Martin ****** References and abstracts Haspelmath, Martin. 2004. "Does linguistic explanation presuppose linguistic description?" /Studies in Language/ 28.3: 554-579 (cf. http://email.eva.mpg.de/~haspelmt/publist.html) I argue that the following two assumptions are incorrect: (i) The properties of the innate Universal Grammar can be discovered by comparing language systems, and (ii) functional explanation of language structure presupposes a "correct", i.e. cognitively realistic, description. Thus, there are two ways in which linguistic explanation does not presuppose linguistic description. The generative program of building cross-linguistic generalizations into the hypothesized Universal Grammar cannot succeed because the actually observed generalizations are typically one-way implications or implicational scales, and because they typically have exceptions. The cross-linguistic generalizations are much more plausibly due to functional factors. I distinguish sharply between "phenomenological description" (which makes no claims about mental reality) and "cognitively realistic description", and I show that for functional explanation, phenomenological description is sufficient. Lazard, Gilbert. 2007. "La linguistique cognitive n'existe pas." (=Cognitive linguitics does not exist.) /Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris/ 102(1). 3–16. (http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=2028196&journal_code=BSL) L’expression «linguistique cognitive» n’a de sens que dans le contexte de la linguistique américaine, où elle signifie l’opposition à la grammaire générative et à la conception du langage comme un module autonome. Hors de ce contexte, elle ne désigne en fait que le retour à une conception traditionnelle du langage, de la langue et de la linguistique. Elle risque cependant de faire perdre de vue la spécificité de l’analyse des structures des langues. The notion of cognitive linguistics is only meaningful in connection with American linguistics, where it means opposition to Generative Grammar and to the conception of language as an autonomous module. Out of that context, it merely means a return to the traditional conception of language and linguistics. However, it involves the risk of downplaying the specificity of the analysis of language structures. Newmeyer, Frederick J. 1998. Language form and language function. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de Thu Jun 12 14:11:42 2008 From: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 16:11:42 +0200 Subject: "cognitive linguistics" In-Reply-To: <4850FE74.2020803@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, hitherto, I had been a silent reader of the current debate, but Martin's last posting drives me to a brief comment: Martin writes: > (...) (what most linguists (who work on language structure) do most of > the time is to provide descriptions, or "analyses", of language > patterns, with purely linguistic methods. This keeps them busy enough, > but because of the rule/list indeterminacy explained by Brian > MacWhinney, it's often too rash to jump to "cognitive" conclusions. > This concerns mostly generative linguistics (where the equation of > linguist's analysis with cognitive pattern is part of the underlying > ideology), but to some extent also non-generative linguistics. Starting from the (rather obvious) hypothesis that language production/comprehension is a cognitive 'event' embodied in individual cognitions leads us to the assumption that the 'mechanisms' for language production and comprehension are cognitive, too. What else should they be? Sure, this claim needs a more detailed definition of what 'cognition' is. To make it brief: In my eyes, the answer is quite 'simple': 'Cognition' is the functional behavior (or, functionality, if you want) of the neural substrate as such (related to the 'brain' in its broadest sense). In this broader perspective, the term 'Cognitive linguistics' becomes a tautology. Language IS cognitive, and hence Linguistics must be based on or described in terms of some sort of cognitivsm. I think this is rather trivial. But what is not trivial is the question of methodology: > (...) explanation comes after description/analysis, and we need quite > a bit of the latter before we can go on to venture explanations. In > particular, we generally need to identify universal patterns before we > can propose cognitive explanations. This is also the point of Lazard > (2007), the great French typologist who declares that "la linguistique > cognitive n'existe pas", meaning that cognitive explanation comes only > at the very end of a description-comparison-generalization process > (and somewhat arbitrarily, he places cognitive explanation just > outside linguistics proper). Before we can come to description-comparison-generalization, we have to make another step, namely that from phenomenology to (horribile dictu) 'objectivism'. The history of linguistics and the great diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches illustrate that linguistic 'data' are not 'objects' as such which can be 'described/compared' etc., but 'phenomena' the 'gestalt' of which heavily depends from the 'observer'. In this sense, linguistics is not a 'science of objects' (if ever such a science does exist at all), but a 'science of phenomena'. Sure, there are certain aspects of language that can be described in terms near to what one may call an 'object', e.g. articulatory processes in phonetics. However, this is not yet 'linguistics', but the analysis of language-related human articulation. The 'object' turns into a phenomenon as soon as we introduce the layer of function/semantics etc. And it is eher, where phenomenolgy because crucial. Thus we have to develop a sound methodology that a) accounts for the phenomenology of linguistics (and, as a consequence, for the relation between 'observer' and language phenomena); and b) that allows to heuristically (!) establish 'language objects'. This is by far not trivial, because we know that redefining phenomena as 'objects' always depends from the scientific paradigm we live by. An example for this is the Saussurian early 20th century understanding (and celebration) of 'systems', ending in the famous quote 'un système où tout se tient' (probably coined by Meillet perhaps taking up a wording by Hans Georg von der Gabelentz). Today, we may want to turn this phrase around: 'Un système où tout dépend'. On the other hand, no description/comparison etc. can be done without prior deductions, be they overt of covert. We have to know what we want to describe - and this knowledge stems from deductions and/or abductions. Now, if we start from the hypothesis that everything is language is cognition-based or cognition-driven, we logically come to the conclusion that the cognitive domain and its modeling should be the immediate source for relevant deductions. So, a proper way of augmenting Martin's methodological path would be to to start from what we currently know about cognition and to relate its architecture to the (observed!) architecture of language. All I want to say is that descriptivism itself is part of the phenomenology of language. There does not exist - in my humble mind - a kind of descriptivism 'as such' provoked by the very 'nature' of its 'objects'. This not not mean that descriptivism would play a minor role in the methodology of linguistics. I fully agree with Martin when he says that 'description' has priority. But I have difficulties to see that there is only one way of describing these 'objects'. And just because there are many such ways, we need some kind of theory that explains to us the heuristics of the descriptive approach chosen in a given treatment of our 'descriptive units' (once they have been isolated). This method naturally again depends from the type of model we chose for 'cognition': A modular hypothesis yields different results for the descriptive level than a gestalt-based, holistic one. In a gestalt-based approach, for instance, building blocks do not play a decisive role. Accordingly, one would not start from 'phonemes' as the basic descriptive units, being arranged in terms of 'words' -> phrases > sentences etc. Rather, one would claim that the syllable is the basic unit of language being 'gestaltet' (configurated) by articulatory variation. The same would hold for the descriptive hierarchy of other linguistic 'units'. Concerning the second point Martin made: > One other thing that I find lacking in much of current practice is the > social aspect of language. The cognitive perspective is crucial, but > without its social side, one wouldn't understand why languages are so > uniform and why they can change. And without changing, languages > wouldn't be able to adapt. As Aya Katz reminded us, it's quite > possible that different speakers make different choices with respect > to rules and lista. But they still produce remarkably similar outputs: > While they may use different cognitive routes, they all want to fit > into the same social structure. Without a social perspective, we > wouldn't understand why there are languages, not just idolects. The > only cognitive linguist I know who has really thought this through is > Bill Croft ("Explaining language change", 2000). My sense is that the > general overemphasis on cognitive over social patterns is another part > of the heritage from Chomsky's obsession with the philosophy of mind. Personally, I cannot see a dichotomy between 'cognitive' and 'social' aspects of language. An adequate cognitivism would easily integrate the social dimension, be it in the tradition of Mead, Vygostkij, Durkheim, Mauss, or whosoever, or in the tradition of (e.g.) Radical Constructivism. Again, we have to start from the hypothesis that 'social' parameters are produced and processed by the cognition of individuals. The social dimension (embodied in cognition by adaption, imitation etc.) is a subfunction of the functionality of cognition, or - as one might call it - a cognitive construction established by cognition in order to 'make sense' of its imitation/adaptation processes. Logically, social parameters of language would be immediately related to this cognitive construction. Just one linguistic example: The personal pronouns 'I' and 'you' (EGO/TU) are conventionally related to and grounded in a social parameter, namely that of interaction (speaker/hearer etc.). However, from a cognitive point of view (and we can corroborate this with the help of linguistic data), EGO plays a role different from TU: EGO is strongly referential, whereas TU is deictic in nature. This means that the two concept originally do not share a common paradigm. The integration of EGO and TU into a common paradigm stems from just this cognitive construction that helps a cognition out of its isolation. In other words: The social dimension of language is - in my eyes - an integral part of cognition, just as a 'language system' is.... P.S: I have outlined some of the ideas mentioned in this posting in a paper that still is print. A pre-final version can be downloaded from http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/fsjmz.pdf (in German!). Best wishes, Wolfgang -- ---------------------------------------------------------- *Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze * ---------------------------------------------------------- /Primary contact: / Institut für Allgemeine & Typologische Sprachwissenschaft Dept. II / F 13 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 D-80539 München Tel.: 0049-(0)89-2180-2486 (Secretary) 0049-(0)89-2180-5343 (Office) Fax: 0049-(0)89-2180-5345 Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de /// Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Web: New page (change bookmarks!): http://www.ats.lmu.de/index.html Personal homepage: http://www.wolfgangschulze.in-devir.com ---------------------------------------------------------- /Second contact: / Katedra Germanistiký Fakulta humanitných vied Univerzita Mateja Béla / Banská Bystrica Tajovského 40 SK-97401 Banská Bystrica Tel: (00421)-(0)48-4465108 Fax: (00421)-(0)48-4465512 Email: Schulze at fhv.umb.sk Web: http://www.fhv.umb.sk/app/user.php?user=schulze ---------------------------------------------------------- From amnfn at well.com Fri Jun 13 13:29:09 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 06:29:09 -0700 Subject: "cognitive linguistics" In-Reply-To: <48512E9E.2080704@lrz.uni-muenchen.de> Message-ID: Language is a kind of phenomenon, I agree. It has concrete manifestations, but it itself is abstract. It can be instantiated in many different ways: auditory, visual and tactile. While its origin is biological, in the sense that living entities are where it first arose, today there are non-animate entities that are pretty good at simulating it. The other day I called directory assistance to get the number of Staples in Rolla, Missouri. A computer generated voice tried to ask me what listing I wanted, and then it had trouble understanding what I said. "Do you want the listing of Staples in Sioux Falls, South Dakota?" I tried to enunciate as clearly as possible: "No." At this point, the AI construct switched me over to a real human. Despite the difficulties with speech recognition, it works amazingly well. We were on the same general topic, it understood I was looking for a Staples outlet, but it couldn't understand "Rolla, Missouri" as pronounced by me. More significantly, I understood every word it said. To me, it was like any other conversation -- some understanding, some misunderstanding, and a cooperative effort to get the information across. Soon AI constructs will do even better, and we won't be able to tell them apart from real people. The Turing test is a wonderful way to determine what language really is. By the same token, Alex the parrot, with his avian brain and quite distinct articulatory system, was able to have meaningful conversations about colors, numbers and feelings, in English. I have had the experience of a common chimpanzee letting me know that the bonobo sounds he was listening to were in fact English. It didn't sound like English to me, but Bow could recognize the bonobo sounds that Kanzi used to stand for the contrasting phonemes of English. There is fMRI data to show that autistics have different activation patterns from non-autistics in lexical retrieval tasks, even though their performance is comparable. When I say that the language code will not be cracked through close attention to brain patterns, I am not motivated by a disdain for hard science or biology. All the hard evidence indicates that language is a portable code which is very flexible as to its particular instantiations. There is more than one way to produce language correctly. It's not how you produce it that's important. The meaning is in the contrasts. Best, --Aya From paul at benjamins.com Fri Jun 13 15:27:58 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 11:27:58 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins book: Verhoeven Message-ID: Experiential Constructions in Yucatec Maya A typologically based analysis of a functional domain in a Mayan language Elisabeth Verhoeven University of Bremen Studies in Language Companion Series 87 2007. xiv, 380 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 3097 3 / EUR 120.00 / USD 180.00 This book combines a fieldwork-based language-specific analysis with a typological investigation. It offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the form and semantics of experiencer constructions in Yucatec, the Mayan language of the Yucatecan peninsula in Mexico. Since the linguistic expression of experience is not restricted to a specific grammatical area the study touches a great variety of grammatical fields in the language such as argument structure, grammatical relations, possessive constructions, subordinate constructions, etc. The empirical analysis of the Yucatec data is preceded by a thorough examination of the functional domain and the cross-linguistic coding of experience which until now could not be found in the literature. This study will be of interest to scholars working in the fields of typology and Native American linguistics, and especially to those interested in argument structure and the syntax-semantics interface. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Contents vii–x Figures and tables xi–xiv Preface xv–xvi Abbreviations xvii–xxi 1. Introduction 1–11 2. Theoretical preliminaries 13–33 3. Universal and typological aspects of experiential constructions 35–98 4. Introduction to Yucatec Maya 99–150 5. Experiential constructions 151–267 6. Grammatical properties of experiencers 269–289 7. Complementation with experiential predicates 291–327 8. Person and body parts in experiential collocations 329–341 9. Conclusions 343–356 References 357–371 Index 373–380 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Fri Jun 13 15:24:35 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 11:24:35 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins set - Nedjalkov Message-ID: This is a five volume set. Please excuse the length of the posting. Reciprocal Constructions Edited by Vladimir P. Nedjalkov Institute for Linguistic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences With the assistance of Emma Š. Geniušiene and Zlatka Guentchéva Typological Studies in Language 71 2007. xxiii, 2219 pp. (5 vols.) Hardbound 978 90 272 2983 0 / EUR 350.00 / USD 525.00 This monograph constitutes the first comprehensive investigation of reciprocal constructions and related phenomena in the world's languages. Reciprocal constructions (of the type The two boys hit each other, The poets admire each other's poems) have often been the subject of language-particular studies, but it is only in this work that a truly global comparative picture emerges. Nine stage-setting chapters dealing with general and theoretical matters are followed by 40 chapters containing in-depth descriptions of reciprocals in individual languages by renowned specialists. The introductory papers provide a conceptual and terminological framework that allows the authors of the individual chapters to characterize their languages in comparable terms, making it easy for the reader to see points of commonality between languages and constructions that have never been compared before. This set of volumes is an indispensable starting point and will be a lasting reference work for any future studies of reciprocals. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents List of contributors Foreword by Bernard Comrie Preface by Vladimir Nedjalkov Abbreviations Part I. Typological aspects of the investigation of reciprocals 1. Overview of the research. Definitions of terms, framework, and related issues Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 2. Lexical reciprocals as a means of expressing reciprocal situations Jurij P. Knjazev 3. Encoding of the reciprocal meaning Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 4. Sociativity, conjoining, reciprocity and the Latin prefix com- Anna A. Zaliznjak and Alexei D. Shmelev 5. Polysemy of reciprocal markers Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 6. Reciprocal and polyadic (Remarkable reciprocals in Bantu) Elena S. Maslova 7. Reciprocal derivation involving non-verbals Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 8. Questionnaire on reciprocals Vladimir P. Nedjalkov and Emma Š. Geniušiene 9. Some typologically relevant properties of reciprocal markers and arrangement of the subsequent chapters Emma Š. Geniušiene Part II. Reflexive-reciprocal polysemy of reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 10. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in German Björn Wiemer and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 11. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in Polish Björn Wiemer 12. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in French Zlatka Guentchéva and Nicole Rivière 13. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in Bulgarian Iordan Penchev 14. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in Lithuanian (with references to Latvian) Emma Š. Geniušiene 15. Reciprocal constructions in Russian Jurij P. Knjazev 16. Reciprocals in Vedic Leonid Kulikov 17. Reciprocal, comitative, sociative, and reflexive in Kabardian Konstantin I. Kazenin 18. Reciprocal, reflexive, and sociative in Adyghe Alexander Letuchiy 19. Reciprocals in West Greenlandic Eskimo Michael Fortescue B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 20. Reciprocals and reflexives in North Arawak languages of the Upper Rio Negro (Warekena, Bare, Baniwa of Içana) Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald C. Pronominal reciprocal marker only 21. Reciprocal constructions in Djaru Tasaku Tsunoda Part III. Sociative-reciprocal polysemy of reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 22. Reciprocal, sociative, and comitative constructions in Tagalog Lina I. Shkarban and Gennadij E. Rachkov 23. Reciprocal constructions in Udehe Irina Nikolaeva 24. Reciprocals, sociatives, and competitives in Karachay-Balkar Vladimir P. Nedjalkov and Igor'V. Nedjalkov 25. Reciprocal, sociative, and competitive constructions in Japanese Vladimir M. Alpatov and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 26. Reciprocals, sociatives, comitatives, and assistives in Yakut Igor'V. Nedjalkov and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 27. Reciprocals, sociatives, comitatives, and assistives in Tuvan Klara B. Kuular 28. Reciprocals, assistives, and plural in Kirghiz Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 29. Reciprocal, sociative, and assistive constructions in Buryat and Khalkha-Mongol Vladimir P. Nedjalkov, Elena K. Skribnik, Evgenij A. Kuzmenkov and Natalija S. Yakhontova B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 30. Reciprocal and sociative, reflexive and reciprocal in Tariana: Their genetic and areal properties Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald 31. Reciprocal constructions in Bolivian Quechua Simon van de Kerke Part IV. Reflexive-reciprocal-sociative polysemy of reciprocal markers. Verbal reciprocal marker only 32. Reciprocal constructions in Warrungu Tasaku Tsunoda Part V. Sociative-reciprocal-iterative polysemy of reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 33. Reciprocal constructions in Indonesian Aleksandr K. Ogloblin and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 34. Polysemy of the reciprocal marker in Nêlêmwa Isabelle Bril 35. Reciprocal, sociative, reflexive, and iterative constructions in East Futunan Claire Moyse-Faurie Part VI. Non-prototypical polysemy A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 36. Reciprocals and related meanings in To'aba'ita František Lichtenberk B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 37. Reciprocals in Mundari Toshiki Osada Part VII. Monosemous reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 38. Reciprocal and sociative constructions in Evenki (with an appendix on Manchu) Igor'V. Nedjalkov and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 39. Reciprocal and sociative constructions in Even Andrej Malchukov 40 Reciprocal constructions in Chukchi (with an appendix on Koryak) Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 41. Reciprocal constructions in Nivkh (Gilyak) Galina A. Otaina and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 42. Reciprocals and sociatives in Ainu Vladimir M. Alpatov, Anna Ju. Bugaeva and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 43. Reciprocals in Itelmen (Kamchadal) Aleksandr P. Volodin 44. Reciprocals in Yukaghir languages Elena S. Maslova 45. Reciprocal, response reciprocal, and distributive constructions in Cashinahua Eliane Camargo C. Mostly pronominal reciprocal markers 46. Reciprocal and sociative constructions in Bamana Valentin Vydrin 47. Reciprocal constructions in Vietnamese Igor S. Bystrov and Nonna V. Stankevich 48. Reciprocal constructions in Ancient Chinese Sergej E. Yakhontov 49. Reciprocal constructions in Modern Chinese Monique Hoa, Vladimir P. Nedjalkov and Tamara N. Nikitina Part VIII. Assessments 50. Comments Martin Haspelmath Name index Vladimir M. Alpatov and Sergej A, Krylov Language index Vladimir M. Alpatov and Sergej A, Krylov Subject index Vladimir M. Alpatov and Sergej A, Krylov Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Fri Jun 13 15:16:51 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 11:16:51 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins book: Salmons/Dubenion-Smith Message-ID: Historical linguistics but relevant to functional linguistics also. Historical Linguistics 2005 Selected papers from the 17th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, Madison, Wisconsin, 31 July - 5 August 2005 Edited by Joseph C. Salmons and Shannon Dubenion-Smith University of Wisconsin, Madison Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 284 2007. viii, 413 pp. Hardbound – In stock 978 90 272 4799 5 / EUR 125.00 / USD 188.00 This volume contains 22 revised papers originally presented at the 17th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, held August 2005 in Madison, Wisconsin, USA. The papers cover a broad range of languages, including well-studied languages of Europe but also Aramaic, Zoque and Uto-Aztecan, Japanese and Korean, Afrikaans, and the Pilbara languages of Australia. The theoretical approaches taken are equally diverse, often bringing together aspects of 'formal' and 'functional' theories in a single contribution. Many of the chapters provide fresh data, including several drawing on data from electronic corpora. Topics range from traditional comparative reconstruction to prosodic change and the role of processing in syntactic change. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Foreword vii–viii Part I. Grammaticalization Lexicalization and grammaticalization all over again Laurel J. Brinton and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 3–19 Grammaticalization as reduction: Focus constructions in Chiapas Zoque Jan Terje Faarlund 21–31 Metaphor and teleology do not drive grammaticalization Matthew L. Juge 33–48 Part II. Syntax and semantics Processing factors in syntactic variation and change: Clitics in Medieval and Renaissance Spanish Miriam Bouzouita 51–71 Dynamic Syntax and dialogue modelling: Preliminaries for a dialogue-driven account of syntactic change Ruth Kempson and Ronnie Cann 73–101 An economy approach to the triggering of the Russian instrumental predicate case Nerea Madariaga 103–117 Change and variation in ga/no conversion in Tokyo Japanese Satoshi Nambu and Kenjirô Matsuda 119–131 Perfect change: Synchrony meets diachrony Marie-Eve Ritz 133–147 Variable use of negation in Middle Low German John D. Sundquist 149–166 Is there a DP in Old English? Johanna L. Wood 167–187 Part III. Morphology Some semantic and pragmatic aspects of case-loss in Old French Richard Ashdowne and John Charles Smith 191–205 The final stages of deflection: The case of Afrikaans het "have" C. Jac Conradie 207–221 Demonstrative paradigm splitting in the Pilbara languages of Western Australia Alan Dench 223–237 Infinitival forms in Aramaic Steven E. Fassberg 239–256 The role of productivity in word-formation change Carmen Scherer 257–271 Part IV. Phonetics and phonology Structured imbalances in the emergence of the Korean vowel system Sang-Cheol Ahn and Gregory K. Iverson 275–293 Final features and proto-Uto-Aztecan: A contribution using morphological reconstruction Karen Dakin 295–310 Facts, theory and dogmas in historical linguistics: Vowel quantity from Latin to Romance Michele Loporcaro 311–336 On the irregularity of Open Syllable Lengthening in German B. Richard Page 337–350 The resilience of prosodic templates in the history of West Germanic Laura Catharine Smith 351–365 Part V: Variation Urban interactions and written standards in Early Modern German Bruce H. Spencer 369–384 The Hollandish roots of Pella Dutch in Iowa Pieter van Reenen 385–401 Language index 403–404 Name index 405–409 Subject index 411–413 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Fri Jun 13 19:30:11 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 14:30:11 -0500 Subject: Message-ID: The notion that different brains and brain patterns can still converge on the 'same' language seems very familiar to me- recent work in developmental biology (and I'm surprised one of the discussants hasn't chimed in here....) shows that genetic systems can operate in a very similar fashion. That is, in developing embryos, parental genes and donated structures guide the initial stages, providing a sort of memory or scaffolding upon which to build the phenotypically common baseline form. This latter form is converged upon, and there can be wild variation of ordering of subevents leading to it due to divergent evolution and adaptation (as for instance the switch from egg-laying to live birth). Only after this convergence to the phenotype does the embryo's own genetic configuration begin to dominate, and these genes also create divergent structural specification as growth proceeds to adulthood. Think of light coming to and moving beyond a focus as a convenient mental image. The latter half of this developmental scenario probably depends more on deactivation of genes than activation as cellular and organ specialization continues- the reverse perhaps of the initial stage? Does something similar happen with the development of the brain and communicative mechanisms? Automated mass creation of the scaffolding and connectivity followed by paring down of these connections selectively during experience and learning, with variable reinforcement of remaining connections mediating in between? New local connections creation might parallel activation of specialized genes within organs and tissues? Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From amnfn at well.com Fri Jun 13 20:11:30 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 13:11:30 -0700 Subject: In-Reply-To: <24901713.1213385411619.JavaMail.root@elwamui-polski.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Yes. I think it does work more or less like that. The process of paring down connections also helps to explain the limited period in our lives during which we can acquire a new language as native speakers. --Aya On Fri, 13 Jun 2008, jess tauber wrote: > The notion that different brains and brain patterns can still converge on the 'same' language seems very familiar to me- recent work in developmental biology (and I'm surprised one of the discussants hasn't chimed in here....) shows that genetic systems can operate in a very similar fashion. That is, in developing embryos, parental genes and donated structures guide the initial stages, providing a sort of memory or scaffolding upon which to build the phenotypically common baseline form. This latter form is converged upon, and there can be wild variation of ordering of subevents leading to it due to divergent evolution and adaptation (as for instance the switch from egg-laying to live birth). > > Only after this convergence to the phenotype does the embryo's own genetic configuration begin to dominate, and these genes also create divergent structural specification as growth proceeds to adulthood. Think of light coming to and moving beyond a focus as a convenient mental image. > > The latter half of this developmental scenario probably depends more on deactivation of genes than activation as cellular and organ specialization continues- the reverse perhaps of the initial stage? Does something similar happen with the development of the brain and communicative mechanisms? Automated mass creation of the scaffolding and connectivity followed by paring down of these connections selectively during experience and learning, with variable reinforcement of remaining connections mediating in between? New local connections creation might parallel activation of specialized genes within organs and tissues? > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > > From hougaard at language.sdu.dk Tue Jun 17 10:57:03 2008 From: hougaard at language.sdu.dk (Anders Hougaard) Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 12:57:03 +0200 Subject: LCM 3: Academic program Message-ID: ***** Apologies for cross-postings ***** LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND MIND 3 ANNOUNCEMENT: The academic program for Language, Culture and Mind III is now available at www.lcm.sdu.dk . (Direct link: http://www.lcm.sdu.dk/index.php?id=1467 ) On behalf of the local organizers and the international LCM committee, Anders R Hougaard The International LCM committee: Raphael Berthele Carlos Cornejo Caroline David Merlin Donald Barbara Fultner Anders R. Hougaard John A Lucy Aliyah Morgenster Eve Pinsker Vera da Silva Chris Sinha The Local organizing committee: Rineke Brouwer Dennis Day Lisa Loloma Froholdt Annette Grindsted Gitte R. Hougaard Anders R. Hougaard Kristian Mortensen Earlier LCM conferences: 1st LCM conference: Portsmouth 2004 2nd LCM conference: Paris 2006 ***** Anders R. Hougaard Assistant professor, PhD Center for Social Practises and Cognition (SoPraCon) Institute of Language and Communication University of Southern Denmark, Odense hougaard at language.sdu.dk Phone: +45 65503154 Fax: + 45 65932483. From dryer at buffalo.edu Tue Jun 17 20:05:15 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 16:05:15 -0400 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a week. I want to remark on Fritz's comment "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null hypothesis." I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) to the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a variation of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take it as a claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, I have argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if not most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or postpositions, but just a set of separate constructions that speakers store separately without generalizing across them. In other words, in this particular instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a list, and the burden of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize them as a class. But the general assumption of linguists of various stripes has usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules across them, and the idea that there might be a need to justify that assumption rarely arises. I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null hypothesis was one of its main themes. Matthew Dryer --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis. > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. > But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for > rules (schemas, constructions). > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial >> asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >> While lists are a necessary component of all >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, >> the evidence for rules has been considered >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >> accepts them. >> >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If >> one could show that it is in fact possible to >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >> assume that they don't. >> >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >> But while I think that this particular argument is >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules >> for their work. >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be >>> established. Even if it were the case that a >>> huge percentage of language users' output could >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them >>> structure and meaning. >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 >> 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From amnfn at well.com Tue Jun 17 20:22:19 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 13:22:19 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <3549780.1213718715@[192.168.1.45]> Message-ID: But why do we need a null hypothesis on the means by which language is processed? Is a null hypothesis based on the assumption that all speakers must do the same thing in order to arrive at the same linguistic form? Is there any evidence to support this assumption? --Aya On Tue, 17 Jun 2008 dryer at buffalo.edu wrote: > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a week. > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis." > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) to > the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a variation > of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take it as a > claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, I have > argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if not > most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or postpositions, > but just a set of separate constructions that speakers store separately > without generalizing across them. In other words, in this particular > instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a list, and the burden > of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize them as a > class. But the general assumption of linguists of various stripes has > usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules across them, > and the idea that there might be a need to justify that assumption rarely > arises. > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language > acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological > foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > Matthew Dryer > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > wrote: > > > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > > hypothesis. > > > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. > > But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) > > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability > > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never > > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment > > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, > > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I > > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, > > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for > > rules (schemas, constructions). > > > > --fritz > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > >> asymmetry between rules and lists: > >> > >> While lists are a necessary component of all > >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of > >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > >> the evidence for rules has been considered > >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > >> accepts them. > >> > >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > >> one could show that it is in fact possible to > >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > >> assume that they don't. > >> > >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >> > >> But while I think that this particular argument is > >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules > >> for their work. > >> > >> Martin Haspelmath > >> > >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron > >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. > >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have > >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language > >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. > >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally > >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised > >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be > >>> established. Even if it were the case that a > >>> huge percentage of language users' output could > >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, > >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a > >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional > >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them > >>> structure and meaning. > >> -- > >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > >> 1616 > >> > >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From edith at uwm.edu Wed Jun 18 17:49:11 2008 From: edith at uwm.edu (Edith Moravcsik) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 12:49:11 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: Matthew's interesting observation of people holistically memorizing expressions that are usually analyzed as adpositional phrases points up, to my mind, the need for simple, phenomenological, psychologically uninformed descriptions of grammars that analyze these expressions as having parts. If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing these expressions parted ways. The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we linguists can analyze them as having parts. Edith Moravcsik ----- Original Message ----- From: To: "Frederick J Newmeyer" ; "Martin Haspelmath" Cc: "Funknet" Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 3:05 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List Fallacy > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a > week. > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis." > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) > to the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a > variation of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take > it as a claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, > I have argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if > not most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or > postpositions, but just a set of separate constructions that speakers > store separately without generalizing across them. In other words, in > this particular instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a > list, and the burden of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that > speakers recognize them as a class. But the general assumption of > linguists of various stripes has usually been that they form a class, i.e. > that there are rules across them, and the idea that there might be a need > to justify that assumption rarely arises. > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language > acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological > foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > Matthew Dryer > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > wrote: > >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, >> the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null >> hypothesis. >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. >> But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) >> focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore >> comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability >> to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never >> heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment >> data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, >> constructions) becomes indispensable. >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I >> am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, >> say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for >> rules (schemas, constructions). >> >> --fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the >>> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument >>> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial >>> asymmetry between rules and lists: >>> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all >>> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must >>> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in >>> addition they may have rules. But the burden of >>> proof is on those who want to claim that they have >>> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, >>> the evidence for rules has been considered >>> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >>> accepts them. >>> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If >>> one could show that it is in fact possible to >>> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their >>> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of >>> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be >>> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. >>> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that >>> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence >>> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >>> assume that they don't. >>> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: >>> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have >>> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have >>> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not >>> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as >>> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >>> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is >>> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need >>> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no >>> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to >>> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they >>> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual >>> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their >>> ideological preferences) find that they need rules >>> for their work. >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron >>>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. >>>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, >>>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have >>>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language >>>> if rules that subsume them can be established. >>>> The converse of this fallacy is equally >>>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised >>>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be >>>> established. Even if it were the case that a >>>> huge percentage of language users' output could >>>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, >>>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a >>>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional >>>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them >>>> structure and meaning. >>> -- >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere >>> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig >>> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 >>> 1616 >>> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 18 18:33:55 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:33:55 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <007401c8d16b$a0a08780$c0135981@ad.uwm.edu> Message-ID: Edith Moravcsik wrote: > If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by > linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising > about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting > question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing > these expressions parted ways. > > The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is > interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we > linguists can analyze them as having parts. Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). --David Tuuggy From tgivon at uoregon.edu Wed Jun 18 20:30:30 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:30:30 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <48595513.8020908@sil.org> Message-ID: It seems to me that this discussion gravitates, slowly but surely, towards an empirical vacuum. Perhaps a better learning strategy for all of us would be to concede that, in principle, both holistic and analyzed processing of complex expressions are in principle ('cognitively') available to speakers. Then find methods by which we can tell one strategy (as used by speakers/hearers) from the other; then find contexts that induce speakers/hearers to prefer one strategy over the other; and then--voila, denouement--count the frequency distribution of the two types of behavior in various contexts. To simply express personal preference for one over the other as 'the default strategy' is not all that helpful. Cheers, TG ======== David Tuggy wrote: > Edith Moravcsik wrote: >> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising >> about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting >> question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing >> these expressions parted ways. >> >> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is >> interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we >> linguists can analyze them as having parts. > Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as > having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist > people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The > fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially > attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would > maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). > > --David Tuuggy > From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 18 20:42:21 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:42:21 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <3549780.1213718715@[192.168.1.45]> Message-ID: I am not sure what the reasoning is behind the idea of having the burden of proof set in advance for or against a particular claim. The concept of burden of proof is borrowed from the law, where it serves a very important purpose: creating a bias in favor of the defendant. When someone is found not guilty, this does not meant that he has been proved innocent. Since we deem it better that a guilty man go free than that an innocent be held responsible for a crime he did not commit, we intentionally build a bias into the system. The same is true in civil actions, where we prefer that the law not meddle with the status quo, unless the lesser civil burden of proof is met. But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it be better to avoid bias altogether? If there is not enough evidence to make a decisive case for or against any particular claim, wouldn't it be better to admit that for the time being we don't know? After all, it's not as if there are only two choices. It need not be either rule or list. It could be both. And how does a third possibility figure into the binary system of burden of proof? Best, --Aya On Tue, 17 Jun 2008 dryer at buffalo.edu wrote: > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a week. > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis." > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) to > the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a variation > of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take it as a > claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, I have > argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if not > most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or postpositions, > but just a set of separate constructions that speakers store separately > without generalizing across them. In other words, in this particular > instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a list, and the burden > of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize them as a > class. But the general assumption of linguists of various stripes has > usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules across them, > and the idea that there might be a need to justify that assumption rarely > arises. > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language > acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological > foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > Matthew Dryer > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > wrote: > > > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > > hypothesis. > > > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. > > But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) > > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability > > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never > > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment > > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, > > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I > > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, > > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for > > rules (schemas, constructions). > > > > --fritz > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > >> asymmetry between rules and lists: > >> > >> While lists are a necessary component of all > >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of > >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > >> the evidence for rules has been considered > >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > >> accepts them. > >> > >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > >> one could show that it is in fact possible to > >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > >> assume that they don't. > >> > >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >> > >> But while I think that this particular argument is > >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules > >> for their work. > >> > >> Martin Haspelmath > >> > >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron > >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. > >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have > >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language > >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. > >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally > >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised > >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be > >>> established. Even if it were the case that a > >>> huge percentage of language users' output could > >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, > >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a > >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional > >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them > >>> structure and meaning. > >> -- > >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > >> 1616 > >> > >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From dryer at buffalo.edu Thu Jun 19 01:21:54 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 21:21:54 -0400 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <48597066.5030409@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being something of a red herring. I confess to somewhat opportunistically using that topic as a segue into a related but more substantive point, which is that there is a widespead tendency of linguists of many stripes - not just generative linguists, but construction grammarians, cognitive semanticists, and even some deeply involved in grammaticalization - to assume that where we linguists find patterns in language, speakers must find the same patterns as well. I should also point out, in response to Edith's comment, that the case I was commenting on is actually not one that involves "people holistically memorizing expressions that are usually analyzed as adpositional phrases". Under the alternative I was proposing, people do analyse adpositional phrases into "adposition" plus noun phrase; it's just that people don't recognize that different "adpositions" all do the same thing. I.e. they don't recognize the pattern and thus don't reocgnize a class of adpositions. Unfortunately, I'm guilty of what Fritz was originally accused of. I've given a (brief) abstract of a paper without providing the arguments that are in the paper (which I haven't written up yet). Matthew --On Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:30 PM -0700 Tom Givon wrote: > > > It seems to me that this discussion gravitates, slowly but surely, > towards an empirical vacuum. Perhaps a better learning strategy for all > of us would be to concede that, in principle, both holistic and analyzed > processing of complex expressions are in principle ('cognitively') > available to speakers. Then find methods by which we can tell one > strategy (as used by speakers/hearers) from the other; then find contexts > that induce speakers/hearers to prefer one strategy over the other; and > then--voila, denouement--count the frequency distribution of the two > types of behavior in various contexts. To simply express personal > preference for one over the other as 'the default strategy' is not all > that helpful. Cheers, TG > > ======== > > > David Tuggy wrote: >> Edith Moravcsik wrote: >>> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >>> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising >>> about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting >>> question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing >>> these expressions parted ways. >>> >>> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is >>> interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we >>> linguists can analyze them as having parts. >> Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as >> having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist >> people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The >> fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially >> attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would >> maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). >> >> --David Tuuggy >> > > From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Jun 19 07:10:55 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 09:10:55 +0200 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <7010946.1213824113@[192.168.1.45]> Message-ID: It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which surprises me. Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: > I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being > something of a red herring. And Aya Katz wrote: > But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it > be better to avoid bias altogether? My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in favour of them. Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. The only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. Martin -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From cbutler at ntlworld.com Thu Jun 19 06:46:04 2008 From: cbutler at ntlworld.com (Chris Butler) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 08:46:04 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: Since recent developments in this discussion have touched on the issue of formulaic language, can I remind contributors of the detailed work done by Alison Wray on formulaic sequences in non-disadvantaged and aphasic adults, in children learning their L1 and in children and adults learning an L2. She argues that expressions are analysed on a needs-only basis during first language acquisition, holistic processing being the default. Her model thus recognises the possibility of parallel processing mechanisms, holistic and analytic. Wray, Alison (2002) Formulaic Language and the Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. I have recently written an article on 'Formulaic sequences in functional and cognitive linguistics' in which I argue that since many formulaic expressions can be found, in attested language, in variant forms involving insertions and substitutions, the linguistic systems of adult native speakers do treat them as analysable (this point has also been made by others, e.g. Gordon Tucker). I then examine three formulaic sequences of different types, and assess the extent to which four linguistic approaches which have paid some attention to such phenomena (the family of constructionist grammars, the collostructional analysis, the Simpler Syntax model, Systemic Functional Grammar) can account for their properties. I go on to propose a model in which differences in degree of formulaicity reflect the strengths of associations of between elements of sequences at different levels of description, whose linkage can be modelled in terms of constraint satisfaction. Sorry to be guilty of the same sin as Fritz and Matthew - the paper is finished and with the publishers, but has not yet come out. It will be published in the November 2008 issue of the Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses. Chris Butler Honorary Professor, Swansea University, UK From dlevere at ilstu.edu Thu Jun 19 09:01:38 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Daniel Everett) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 04:01:38 -0500 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <485A067F.9070503@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Peter Culicover, among others, has made related points in his book Syntactic Nuts. The question re: grammars that interests me most is just this: what do rules add empirically that we otherwise lack? We know that children and others have to learn arbitrary lists. (And presumably a great deal of language must be learned in this way). The question is whether the learning mechanism responsible for this arbitrary learning needs to be supplemented by a second mechanism or Language Acquisition Device. The principal selling point of the LAD is to be able to account for 'infinite use of finite means' (a phrase howbeit devoid of meaning it seems to me), which is supposed to account for speed of acquisition and many universals, among other things. Now, it is reasonable to claim that linguists' outputs, grammars, often predict infinite languages as a function of their goal of elegance (rules and schema are more elegant to some than lists). But no one has proven that any human language is infinite (though some of us have given reasonable evidence that there might be finite languages), only that the shortest grammars predict infinite languages (an example, most likely, of overgeneration, again in favor of elegance of presentation). So I believe that Martin's point is very strong. -- Dan Quoting Martin Haspelmath : > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >> being something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of > proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in > favour of them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems > with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, > e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and > the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. > Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course > agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because > Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the > rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because > everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker > behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed > reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never > possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules > and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to > find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often > (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these > rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers > are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but > this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get > away with just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about > speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As > soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. > The only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of > course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out > experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse > data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find > evidence for productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a > proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Jun 19 11:51:20 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 04:51:20 -0700 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <485A067F.9070503@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Well, I suppose Martin is right in a clear sense: One cannot generalize (make 'rules') on data unless one first has the data ('list'). That much is obviously a matter of logic. Note, however, that the minute the single list is divided into sub-categories ('sub-lists'), one has already begun to 'make rules'. I myself don't know a single cognitive system, however primitive (say, the amoeba), that has only a "list" in this logical sense. The amoeba already divides the 'list' of external input into temperature data, salt-concentration data, physical contact (touch) data, light data, etc. These are the categories it reacts to, differentially And it is obvious why it must sub-categorize, immediately--like all organisms, it needs to decide what the best *adaptive response* should be to the various sub-categories of input/context. What else are sub-categories good for? So the amoeba already has behavioral rules of the form "If category X, do Y", "If category P, do Q", etc. In child language studies (say Carter 1974), it appears that during the so-called "sensory-motor period"( 0-9 months) human neonates organize incoming input into the rudiment 'theoris' of what Geary (2007) call 'folks physics', 'folk biology' and 'folk psychology'. I think Alison Gopnik has a wonderful book called "The Scientist in the Crib" that touches on this too. What is more, child language data on lexicalization (my colleague Dare Baldwin has written on this extensively) suggest that children don't wait for a long cumulative list before they start categorizing. They start virtual;ly from item #2 (or 1?). So maybe Alison Gopnick should have changed the title of her book to "The Linguist in the Crib"? Clearly, the amoeba is hardly the only organism that finds a mere 'list' adaptively useless, let alone dangerous to her health. So--linguists notwithstanding--it seems to me that saying that "mere lists" can exist in any meaningful way without some categorization ('rules') is a funny exercise in a mock-Aristotelian denial of reality. Best, TG ======= Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >> being something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of > proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in > favour of them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems > with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, > e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and > the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical > argument. Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone > of course agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument > because Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of > the rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because > everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker > behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed > reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never > possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules > and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to > find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have > often (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have > these rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that > speakers are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as > linguists, but this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If > they can get away with just lists, they might well do without rules. > Any claim about speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional > evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As > soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for > rules. The only question is what we say in the absence of > productivity, and of course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if > we rule out experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on > natural discourse data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not > so easy to find evidence for productivity. In the absence of > productivity, providing a proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > From david_tuggy at sil.org Thu Jun 19 12:32:27 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 07:32:27 -0500 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <20080619040138.6xp1uvnv8k4o04sw@isuwebmail.ilstu.edu> Message-ID: Treading on thin waters here, as the saying is, but anyway: Must productivity be the *only* allowable evidence? Why can't reported intuition, even linguists' intuitions, be added to the list? Martin (was it?) suggested traffic signs as a case where there are only lists, not rules. I immediately experienced reportable intuitions that there are a good many rules involved in my understanding of them, and I would bet that an investigator would not have a hard time inducing other users to report similar intuitions. (If ten of us on Funknet listed (!) intuited rules re traffic signs, I'll bet there would be considerable convergence.) Even if solitary intuitions should be easily discounted, must the same hold true of coincident intuitions? Granted, I'm a linguist, and we linguists love to find rules. But arguably I became a linguist at least in part because I was already that kind of person. I know a lot of people who are not professional linguists who have intuitions about rules/regularities in many spheres of life. And when they talk about their intuitions they are likely to agree or disagree with each other on various points. (Thus linguistics was born, no doubt.) To my mind the fact that one is or is not a linguist should not be the main criterion for accepting or rejecting that person's intuitions as evidence of something, particularly as to the evidence of there being a rule of a certain type. You could quite legitimately set people a production task (e.g. design a traffic sign to warn of a particular traffic configuration ahead) and use their production, especially if coincident, as evidence for rules. If you just wait around for them to spontaneously design signs you are likely to wait a long time. But of course that can happen too. (It probably has a time or two in my lifetime.) Intuitions re listings are also, to my mind, allowable evidence. Allowable evidence, *of course*, does not mean incontrovertible evidence or proof. It needs to be sifted, be triangulated with other sorts of evidence, have its significance and relevance to different parts of one's understanding of language evaluated. My intuition that I perceive a regularity may be accepted as evidence that I indeed do perceive that regularity in some part of my cognition, but that does not necessarily prove that I use it in producing the linguistic forms that the regularity subsumes. But in principle all allowable evidence should be taken into account. Much discussion here really seems to assume that either rules only or lists only is some sort of default. That is precisely the point of the rule-list fallacy: you must logically consider (and you empirically find in many places) that the default is both. --David Tuggy dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > Peter Culicover, among others, has made related points in his book > Syntactic Nuts. > > The question re: grammars that interests me most is just this: what do > rules add empirically that we otherwise lack? We know that children > and others have to learn arbitrary lists. (And presumably a great deal > of language must be learned in this way). The question is whether the > learning mechanism responsible for this arbitrary learning needs to be > supplemented by a second mechanism or Language Acquisition Device. > > The principal selling point of the LAD is to be able to account for > 'infinite use of finite means' (a phrase howbeit devoid of meaning it > seems to me), which is supposed to account for speed of acquisition > and many universals, among other things. Now, it is reasonable to > claim that linguists' outputs, grammars, often predict infinite > languages as a function of their goal of elegance (rules and schema > are more elegant to some than lists). But no one has proven that any > human language is infinite (though some of us have given reasonable > evidence that there might be finite languages), only that the shortest > grammars predict infinite languages (an example, most likely, of > overgeneration, again in favor of elegance of presentation). > > So I believe that Martin's point is very strong. > > -- Dan > > > > Quoting Martin Haspelmath : > >> It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which >> surprises me. >> >> Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >>> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >>> being something of a red herring. >> And Aya Katz wrote: >>> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? >>> Wouldn't it >>> be better to avoid bias altogether? >> My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as >> language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules >> exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of >> proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in >> favour of them. >> >> Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems >> with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, >> e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are >> logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and >> the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. >> >> Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. >> Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course >> agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because >> Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the >> rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because >> everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker >> behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed >> reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never >> possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules >> and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) >> >> I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out >> (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to >> find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often >> (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these >> rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers >> are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but >> this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get >> away with just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about >> speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. >> >> The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and >> rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit >> abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: >> especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As >> soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. >> The only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of >> course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out >> experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse >> data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find >> evidence for productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a >> proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. >> >> Martin >> >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 >> D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 >> 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > > > From amnfn at well.com Thu Jun 19 13:17:14 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 06:17:14 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <83aa1c554eb12ebf.485a39f0@ac-versailles.fr> Message-ID: Under the law, the burden of proof isn't absolute as in logic. There are different degrees of proof: Criminal -- beyond a reasonable doubt Civil -- by a preponderance of the evidence The criminal burden of proof is much higher than the civil one. Under it, even if there is the slightest reasonable doubt, the burden has not been met. On the other hand, under civil law, the burden is lesser. If a majority of the evidence points one way, the burden has been met. I am speaking of the English common law as codified in American law, which is the only system I am familiar with. It is possible that the law is different under the inquisitorial system found elsewhere in Europe. The different degrees of proof required show that there is a heavy bias in favor of a criminal defendant and a lesser bias in favor of a civil defendant. In neither case is the law seeking after the exact "truth". It is all a question of whether any action should be taken by the system as opposed to allowing the status quo to remain in effect. Under logic, a single counterexample is enough to disprove a statement P. No amount of inductive evidence is enough to prove a hypothesis by logic alone. Nobody can ever meet an absolute requirement of proof. But disproving requires a single example, and is much easier. That is why the statement: "grammaticlization proceeds down a unidirectional cline from concrete to abstract" is merely a hypothesis, no matter how much evidence we amass in its favor. But a single counterexample is enough to disprove it. It has been disproved over and over again, but linguists have declined to use a logical standard. Instead, they behave as if linguistics were like the law, a means of settling disputes. Logic and the law are different tools for different purposes. The law is there to solve personal disputes. Logic addresses abstract truth values. What is linguistics for? Best, --Aya Katz On Thu, 19 Jun 2008 Pablo.Kirtchuk at ac-versailles.fr wrote: > > Regarding the law/logic interface, please note that the defendant doesn't claim anything, which is why he hasn't to prove anything. For a defendant to exist as such, there must be an accusation first, which claims P. Then the defendant either claims P (guilty) or non-P (innocent). In both cases, P implies P and non-P also implies P. Which is why tthe burden of proof rests within (s)he who claims P, and not because any bias. > > Pablo > > > > I am not sure what the reasoning is behind the idea of having the > > burdenof proof set in advance for or against a particular claim. > > > > The concept of burden of proof is borrowed from the law, where it > > serves a > > very important purpose: creating a bias in favor of the defendant. > > Whensomeone is found not guilty, this does not meant that he has been > > proved innocent. Since we deem it better that a guilty man go free > > thanthat an innocent be held responsible for a crime he did not > > commit, we > > intentionally build a bias into the system. The same is true in civil > > actions, where we prefer that the law not meddle with the status quo, > > unless the lesser civil burden of proof is met. > > > > But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? > > Wouldn't it > > be better to avoid bias altogether? If there is not enough evidence to > > make a decisive case for or against any particular claim, wouldn't > > it be > > better to admit that for the time being we don't know? After all, > > it's not > > as if there are only two choices. It need not be either rule or > > list. It > > could be both. And how does a third possibility figure into the binary > > system of burden of proof? > > > > Best, > > > > --Aya > > > > > > On Tue, 17 Jun 2008 dryer at buffalo.edu wrote: > > > > > > > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for > > over a week. > > > > > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > > > > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > > infinity,> the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > > the null > > > hypothesis." > > > > > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all > > would) to > > > the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a > > variation> of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is > > to take it as a > > > claim not in general but in any particular instance. For > > example, I have > > > argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many > > if not > > > most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or > > postpositions,> but just a set of separate constructions that > > speakers store separately > > > without generalizing across them. In other words, in this > > particular> instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a > > list, and the burden > > > of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize > > them as a > > > class. But the general assumption of linguists of various > > stripes has > > > usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules > > across them, > > > and the idea that there might be a need to justify that > > assumption rarely > > > arises. > > > > > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis > > by Bruce > > > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of > > language> acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and > > methodological> foundations of contemporary linguistics". The > > first half of the title is > > > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are > > the null > > > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > > > > > Matthew Dryer > > > > > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > > infinity,> > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would > > be the null > > > > hypothesis. > > > > > > > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > > language.> > But my impression is that those who put such language > > on centre stage (1) > > > > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > > > > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language > > users' ability > > > > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they > > have never > > > > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and > > judgment> > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules > > (schemas,> > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > > > > > > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for > > 'innateness' here. I > > > > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > > opposed to, > > > > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an > > argument for > > > > rules (schemas, constructions). > > > > > > > > --fritz > > > > > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > > > > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > > > > > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > > > >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > > > >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > > > >> asymmetry between rules and lists: > > > >> > > > >> While lists are a necessary component of all > > > >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > > > >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > > > >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of > > > >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have > > > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > > > >> the evidence for rules has been considered > > > >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > > > >> accepts them. > > > >> > > > >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > > > >> one could show that it is in fact possible to > > > >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > > > >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > > > >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > > > >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > > > >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > > > >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > > > >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > > > >> assume that they don't. > > > >> > > > >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > > > >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > > > >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > > > >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > > > >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > > > >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > > > >> > > > >> But while I think that this particular argument is > > > >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > > > >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > > > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > > > >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > > > >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > > > >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > > > >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules > > > >> for their work. > > > >> > > > >> Martin Haspelmath > > > >> > > > >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > > > >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron > > > >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. > > > >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > > > >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have > > > >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language > > > >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. > > > >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally > > > >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised > > > >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be > > > >>> established. Even if it were the case that a > > > >>> huge percentage of language users' output could > > > >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, > > > >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a > > > >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional > > > >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > > > >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them > > > >>> structure and meaning. > > > >> -- > > > >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > > > >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > > > >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > > > >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > > > >> 1616 > > > >> > > > >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > > > >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From edith at uwm.edu Thu Jun 19 14:21:41 2008 From: edith at uwm.edu (Edith Moravcsik) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 09:21:41 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: That people can see expressions both as wholes and also as having parts is evident from "grammar itself" as well. Noun phrases behave as whole for purposes of anaphoric pronominalization; yet, the lexical composition of a noun phrase is variable showing that speakers are aware of the parts. And the same is true of course in how we view objects outside language. We see most things around us both as units and as having parts. Edith Moravcsik ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Tuggy" To: Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:33 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List Fallacy > Edith Moravcsik wrote: >> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising about >> how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting question of why >> linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing these expressions >> parted ways. >> >> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is >> interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we linguists >> can analyze them as having parts. > Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as having > parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist people are > often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The fact that both > modes are available (though perhaps differentially attractive) to both > linguists and language speakers is, I would maintain, highly important (as > well as interesting). > > --David Tuuggy > From david_tuggy at sil.org Thu Jun 19 16:33:52 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 11:33:52 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <001501c8d217$ce3c53c0$c0135981@ad.uwm.edu> Message-ID: Agreed, emphgatically. --David T Edith Moravcsik wrote: > That people can see expressions both as wholes and also as having > parts is evident from "grammar itself" as well. Noun phrases behave as > whole for purposes of anaphoric pronominalization; yet, the lexical > composition of a noun phrase is variable showing that speakers are > aware of the parts. > > And the same is true of course in how we view objects outside > language. We see most things around us both as units and as having parts. > > Edith Moravcsik > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Tuggy" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:33 PM > Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List Fallacy > > >> Edith Moravcsik wrote: >>> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >>> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising >>> about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting >>> question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing >>> these expressions parted ways. >>> >>> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it >>> is interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we >>> linguists can analyze them as having parts. >> Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as >> having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist >> people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The >> fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially >> attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would >> maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). >> >> --David Tuuggy >> > > From paul at benjamins.com Thu Jun 19 17:31:41 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 13:31:41 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins Book: Heyd - Email Hoaxes Message-ID: Email Hoaxes Form, function, genre ecology Theresa Heyd Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Düsseldorf Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 174 2008. vii, 239 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 5418 4 / EUR 95.00 / USD 143.00 How genres emerge and evolve on the Internet has become one of the central questions in studies of computer-mediated communication (CMC). This book addresses the issue of genrefication by giving an in-depth analysis of email hoaxes as a candidate for digital genre status. Email hoaxes are deceptive messages that spread in digital social networks; they are a fascinating object for discourse linguistics as they exemplify a major pragmatic tendency in CMC, namely deceptivity and a lowering of sincerity standards. This study examines formal and functional aspects of email hoaxes and provides ample evidence both from a systematized corpus and in situ data collected online. Besides a structural and microlinguistic analysis, it identifies key issues such as pragmatic duality, narrativity and textual variation and change in email hoaxes. In conclusion, a digital genre model is outlined that bridges both the old/new and the formal/functional gaps and may be applied to many other digital genre ecologies. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents 1. Introduction 2. Introducing the data 3. Formal aspects of EHs: A microlinguistic analysis 4. The dynamics of EH transmission: Chronological aspects 5. The pragmatics of EHs 6. Narrativity in EHs 7. A genre study of EHs 8. References 9. Appendix Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Thu Jun 19 17:28:22 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 13:28:22 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins title: Goddard Cross-Linguistic Semantics Message-ID: Cross-Linguistic Semantics Edited by Cliff Goddard University of New England Studies in Language Companion Series 102 2008. xvi, 356 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 0569 8 / EUR 120.00 / USD 180.00 Cross-linguistic semantics – investigating how languages package and express meanings differently – is central to the linguistic quest to understand the nature of human language. This set of studies explores and demonstrates cross-linguistic semantics as practised in the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) framework, originated by Anna Wierzbicka. The opening chapters give a state-of-the-art overview of the NSM model, propose several theoretical innovations and advance a number of original analyses in connection with names and naming, clefts and other specificational sentences, and discourse anaphora. Subsequent chapters describe and analyse diverse phenomena in ten languages from multiple families, geographical locations, and cultural settings around the globe. Three substantial studies document how the metalanguage of NSM semantic primes can be realised in languages of widely differing types: Amharic (Ethiopia), Korean, and East Cree. Each constitutes a lexicogrammatical portrait in miniature of the language concerned. Other chapters probe topics such as inalienable possession in Koromu (Papua New Guinea), epistemic verbs in Swedish, hyperpolysemy in Bunuba (Australia), the expression of "momentariness" in Berber, ethnogeometry in Makasai (East Timor), value concepts in Russian, and "virtuous emotions" in Japanese. This book will be valuable for linguists working on language description, lexical semantics, or the semantics of grammar, for advanced students of linguistics, and for others interested in language universals and language diversity. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Acknowledgements List of contributors List of tables, figures and appendices Part I. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage theory 1. Natural Semantic Metalanguage: The state of the art Cliff Goddard 2. New semantic primes and new syntactic frames: "Specificational BE" and "abstract THIS/IT" Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka 3. Towards a systematic table of semantic elements Cliff Goddard Part II. Whole metalanguage studies 4. Semantic primes in Amharic Mengistu Amberber 5. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage of Korean Kyung-Joo Yoon 6. Semantic primes and their grammar in a polysynthetic language: East Cree Marie-Odile Junker Part III. Problems in semantic metalanguage 7. Hyperpolysemy in Bunuba, a polysynthetic language of the Kimberley, Western Australia Emily Knight 8. Re-thinking THINK in contrastive perspective: Swedish vs. English Cliff Goddard and Susanna Karlsson 9. Identification and syntax of semantic prime MOMENT in Tarifyt Berber Noureddine Elouazizi and Radoslava Trnavac Part IV. Semantic studies across languages 10. The ethnogeometry of Makasai (East Timor) Anna Brotherson 11. The semantics of "inalienable possession" in Koromu (PNG) Carol Priestley 12. Tolerance: New and traditional values in Russian in comparison with English Anna Gladkova 13. Two "virtuous emotions" in Japanese: Nasake/joo and jihi Rie Hasada -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject classification Linguistics Semantics Theoretical linguistics Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Thu Jun 19 19:13:14 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 14:13:14 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: Perhaps a look at the history of manufacturing could be useful. Mass production. Divergent parts and process standardization replacing convergent unique productions made out of whatever tailored to individuals, blueprints replacing master builders' mental images, standard training and specialization of the workforce versus apprenticeships and generalized skills, warehousing, etc. (and parallels in management, purchases/sales, advertizing?). Automation too. Mass production revolutionized the economics, speed of production, interchangability, etc., but companies eventually learned that, given a choice, customers prefer the personal touch, not one-size-fits-all. How to balance needs versus wants, for both producer and consumer? Multiple but fixed choices? Where in the hierarchy from parts to wholes? Looking across the spectrum of language types and their cyclic evolution might we see parallelisms to the above? And of course there are also bioinformatic parallels- genome vs. proteome, code vs. cellular memory, and all the interesting regulatory mechanisms mediating- also with different balance points depending on genetic 'type'. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From dryer at buffalo.edu Fri Jun 20 11:38:59 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 07:38:59 -0400 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <485A067F.9070503@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: I realize that I have probably misrepresented Bruce Derwing's position. While it is true that he argued that the burden of proof on those who claim that there are rules in particular cases is to provide empirical evidence that there are rules rather than lists, he did so only because the prevalent practice was (and is) to assume rules without any evidence for such, not because he considered lists the default. If there had been people claiming in particular instances that people only stored lists and saw no reason to provide any empirical evidence for that claim, I believe Derwing would have raised the same objection, in effect "You have to provide empirical evidence; you cannot simply claim that on a priori grounds." In other words, in the absence of empirical evidence in a particular instance whether there is a list or a rule, rather than saying "In the absence of empirical evidence, we should assume there is just a list" we should be saying instead "In the absence of empirical evidence, we shouldn't assume anything; we should look for empirical evidence." So while Martin may be right that at some abstract level, lists are logically more basic than rules, this is ultimately beside the point. It does not justify assuming in any particular instance in the absence of empirical evidence that there is a list rather than a rule. To do so runs the risk of committing the error that Derwing argued against, namely that of deciding an empirical issue on a priori grounds. And that is why I think Tom was right when he said that in arguing which was the default, we were gravitating towards an empirical vacuum. Matthew --On Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:10 AM +0200 Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being >> something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of proof, > because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in favour of > them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems with > lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. > traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and the > domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. > Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course > agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because Fritz > Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list > fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything can be > explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be > fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to assume > that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that > speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are needed. > Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to find > rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often (too > often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, > without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as > eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but this is > not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with > just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about speakers > that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As soon > as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. The > only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of > course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out experimental > evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as Sandy > Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for > productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for rules > is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > > > From harder at hum.ku.dk Fri Jun 20 14:36:58 2008 From: harder at hum.ku.dk (Peter Harder) Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:36:58 +0200 Subject: SV: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry Message-ID: There is a sense in which it is fairly obvious that rules exist. This is already implicit in Martin's reference to systems that consist only of lists, such as traffic signs - which invites the inference that human languages are not of that kind. If you do not subscribe to a generative view of linguistic rules, you have the problem that there is no agreed precise alternative for what a rule then is. However, consider a messy informal 'direction-for-use' rule such as "after verbs like say or think you can put a that-clauses, indicating the propositional content of what was said or thought". This can only be an empirically misguided description of English if speakers never combine verbs and complement clauses freely, and invariably limit themselves to repeating whole statements that they have heard previously and added to their lists of possible utterances, like lists of traffic signs in driver's manuals. Not all speakers do that, so it follows that English has rules of that kind. This does not answer the question of the psychological reality of rules, or of the less exalted semi-general combination strategies that functionalists might be satisfied with instead of fully general rules. But if we pursue the same abstract agenda as Martin, we can say that this is an extra issue that is external to the semiotic system as a set of social options available to speakers of English. You cannot make full use of the options offered by the English language, if your cognitive system works only by listing. Therefore listing as a theory of how English works (as a public code) does not cover all there is to say about it. This is, of course, a very modest level of abstraction to be working at, but the way I see it, it gets us just a little beyond total agnosticism with respect to the existence of anything beyond lists. Peter Harder Copenhagen ________________________________ Fra: funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu på vegne af dryer at buffalo.edu Sendt: fr 20-06-2008 13:38 Til: Martin Haspelmath; funknet at mailman.rice.edu Emne: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry I realize that I have probably misrepresented Bruce Derwing's position. While it is true that he argued that the burden of proof on those who claim that there are rules in particular cases is to provide empirical evidence that there are rules rather than lists, he did so only because the prevalent practice was (and is) to assume rules without any evidence for such, not because he considered lists the default. If there had been people claiming in particular instances that people only stored lists and saw no reason to provide any empirical evidence for that claim, I believe Derwing would have raised the same objection, in effect "You have to provide empirical evidence; you cannot simply claim that on a priori grounds." In other words, in the absence of empirical evidence in a particular instance whether there is a list or a rule, rather than saying "In the absence of empirical evidence, we should assume there is just a list" we should be saying instead "In the absence of empirical evidence, we shouldn't assume anything; we should look for empirical evidence." So while Martin may be right that at some abstract level, lists are logically more basic than rules, this is ultimately beside the point. It does not justify assuming in any particular instance in the absence of empirical evidence that there is a list rather than a rule. To do so runs the risk of committing the error that Derwing argued against, namely that of deciding an empirical issue on a priori grounds. And that is why I think Tom was right when he said that in arguing which was the default, we were gravitating towards an empirical vacuum. Matthew --On Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:10 AM +0200 Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being >> something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of proof, > because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in favour of > them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems with > lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. > traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and the > domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. > Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course > agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because Fritz > Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list > fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything can be > explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be > fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to assume > that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that > speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are needed. > Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to find > rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often (too > often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, > without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as > eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but this is > not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with > just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about speakers > that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As soon > as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. The > only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of > course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out experimental > evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as Sandy > Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for > productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for rules > is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org ) > > > > > > From macw at cmu.edu Fri Jun 20 20:13:09 2008 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:13:09 -0400 Subject: SV: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <857A4D84DE6D1D41837DD9284F2729AB04B95323@exchangesrv1.hum2005.hum.ku.dk> Message-ID: Dear Peter et al., I think one gets out of this "commitment-to-a-formalism" quandary by thinking in terms of "combination" rather than "rules". Let me explain. As I noted in my earlier posting on this thread (as I argued in my 1978 monograph on the acquisition of morphophonology) the three crucial processes in a learning-theoretic account of language learning and processing are rote, combination, and analogy. Rote is what people have been calling "lists" in the context of this discussion. In formulations from Derwing, Bybee, PDP, and even perhaps de Saussure, you can hook up rote to analogy and get productivity and generativity in this way. In that system, rules are completely and thoroughly embedded in the between-item similarity matrix. The other option hooks up rote with combination. In that framework, rules emerge during learning as methods of adjusting combinations for semantic, phonological, prosodic, or positional patterns. In both of these accounts, rules are not really on center stage, so the issue of how to "talk about rules" is no longer the key issue. We can view linguistic processing as an ongoing horse race between rote and combination where the winner is rote whenever the relevant rote form has high frequency and easy retrieval. The processes that "patch up" combinations are called analogy in one tradition and rules in another, but as long as we are talking about learned modification processes based on evidence in the inventory of stored rote forms, then there is no empirical difference between rules and analogy. I am not saying that pattern or rule learning is trivial or uninteresting. Far from it. However, I am saying that the core contrast is between rote and combination and that rule or pattern learning is triggered by the fact that we have decided to build up utterances at least in part through combination. The generative view is different from this three-process account. Unlike the 3-process account, minimalism passes everything through the MERGE operation. So everything is combination. Moreover, rules are much more on center stage during the process of MERGE because they are often innate and not learned. And, if learned, they are acquired through an innate system of parameterized options. None of this, except for the core operation of MERGE, is involved in the learning- theoretic 3-process account. -- Brian MacWhinney On Jun 20, 2008, at 10:36 AM, Peter Harder wrote: > There is a sense in which it is fairly obvious that rules exist. > This is already implicit in Martin's reference to systems that > consist only of lists, such as traffic signs - which invites the > inference that human languages are not of that kind. > > > > If you do not subscribe to a generative view of linguistic rules, > you have the problem that there is no agreed precise alternative for > what a rule then is. However, consider a messy informal 'direction- > for-use' rule such as "after verbs like say or think you can put a > that-clauses, indicating the propositional content of what was said > or thought". This can only be an empirically misguided description > of English if speakers never combine verbs and complement clauses > freely, and invariably limit themselves to repeating whole > statements that they have heard previously and added to their lists > of possible utterances, like lists of traffic signs in driver's > manuals. Not all speakers do that, so it follows that English has > rules of that kind. > > > > This does not answer the question of the psychological reality of > rules, or of the less exalted semi-general combination strategies > that functionalists might be satisfied with instead of fully general > rules. But if we pursue the same abstract agenda as Martin, we can > say that this is an extra issue that is external to the semiotic > system as a set of social options available to speakers of English. > You cannot make full use of the options offered by the English > language, if your cognitive system works only by listing. Therefore > listing as a theory of how English works (as a public code) does not > cover all there is to say about it. This is, of course, a very > modest level of abstraction to be working at, but the way I see it, > it gets us just a little beyond total agnosticism with respect to > the existence of anything beyond lists. > > > > Peter Harder > > Copenhagen > > > ________________________________ > > Fra: funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu på vegne af dryer at buffalo.edu > Sendt: fr 20-06-2008 13:38 > Til: Martin Haspelmath; funknet at mailman.rice.edu > Emne: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry > > > > > I realize that I have probably misrepresented Bruce Derwing's > position. > While it is true that he argued that the burden of proof on those > who claim > that there are rules in particular cases is to provide empirical > evidence > that there are rules rather than lists, he did so only because the > prevalent practice was (and is) to assume rules without any evidence > for > such, not because he considered lists the default. If there had been > people claiming in particular instances that people only stored > lists and > saw no reason to provide any empirical evidence for that claim, I > believe > Derwing would have raised the same objection, in effect "You have to > provide empirical evidence; you cannot simply claim that on a priori > grounds." > > In other words, in the absence of empirical evidence in a particular > instance whether there is a list or a rule, rather than saying "In the > absence of empirical evidence, we should assume there is just a > list" we > should be saying instead "In the absence of empirical evidence, we > shouldn't assume anything; we should look for empirical evidence." > > So while Martin may be right that at some abstract level, lists are > logically more basic than rules, this is ultimately beside the > point. It > does not justify assuming in any particular instance in the absence of > empirical evidence that there is a list rather than a rule. To do > so runs > the risk of committing the error that Derwing argued against, namely > that > of deciding an empirical issue on a priori grounds. > > And that is why I think Tom was right when he said that in arguing > which > was the default, we were gravitating towards an empirical vacuum. > > Matthew > > --On Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:10 AM +0200 Martin Haspelmath > wrote: > >> It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, >> which >> surprises me. >> >> Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >>> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >>> being >>> something of a red herring. >> And Aya Katz wrote: >>> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? >>> Wouldn't it >>> be better to avoid bias altogether? >> My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as >> language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that >> rules >> exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of >> proof, >> because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in >> favour of >> them. >> >> Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic >> systems with >> lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. >> traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are >> logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, >> and the >> domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. >> >> Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical >> argument. >> Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course >> agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because >> Fritz >> Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list >> fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything >> can be >> explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be >> fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to >> assume >> that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that >> speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are >> needed. >> Some lists are always needed.) >> >> I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out >> (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to >> find >> rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often >> (too >> often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, >> without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as >> eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but >> this is >> not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with >> just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about >> speakers >> that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. >> >> The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists >> and >> rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers >> exhibit >> abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: >> especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. >> As soon >> as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. >> The >> only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of >> course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out >> experimental >> evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as >> Sandy >> Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for >> productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for >> rules >> is a very heavy burden indeed. >> >> Martin >> >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> Platz 6 >> D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> +49-341-980 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org ) >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > > From comrie at eva.mpg.de Mon Jun 23 16:45:30 2008 From: comrie at eva.mpg.de (Bernard Comrie) Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 18:45:30 +0200 Subject: Zurich University Chair of Linguistics (Typology) Message-ID: The University of Zurich is advertising a Chair in Linguistics with an emphasis in Typology. For more details, please see below. Bernard Comrie ----- An der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Zürich ist zum 1. Februar 2010 (oder früher) eine Professur für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (Nachfolge Prof. Dr. Karen H. Ebert) zu besetzen. Die Stelleninhaberin oder der Stelleninhaber soll das Fach Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft in seiner vollen Breite in Forschung und Lehre vertreten. Die Professur ist sprachtypologisch ausgerichtet. Gewünscht wird Erfahrung in der Feldforschung, insbesondere zu wenig dokumentierten und/oder bedrohten Sprachen ausserhalb Europas. Die Bereitschaft zu interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit wird erwartet. Voraussetzung für die Einstellung ist die Habilitation oder der Nachweis gleichwertiger Leistungen. Die Universität strebt eine Erhöhung des Anteils der Frauen in Forschung und Lehre an und lädt deshalb qualifizierte Wissenschaftlerinnen ein, sich zu bewerben. Bewerbungen mit den üblichen Unterlagen (Lebenslauf, Verzeichnis der Publikationen, Angaben über bisherige Lehrtätigkeit – jedoch ohne Publikationen) sind bis zum 3. August 2008 in schriftlicher und elektronischer Form zu richten an das Dekanat der Philosophischen Fakultät, Universität Zürich, Rämistr. 71, CH-8006 Zürich. Elektronische Bewerbung an . -- [I am currently based in Leipzig.] Prof. Dr. Bernard Comrie Director, Department of Linguistics, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Distinguished Professor of Linguistics, University of California Santa Barbara E-mail: comrie at eva.mpg.de Home page: http://email.eva.mpg.de/~comrie/ Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Germany tel. +49 341 35 50 315 fax +49 341 35 50 333 Department of Linguistics University of California Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3100 USA fax +1 805 893 7769 A copy of all incoming e-mail is forwarded to my secretary. If you do not wish your message to be read other than by me, please put "private" in the subject box. From Vyv.Evans at brighton.ac.uk Wed Jun 25 08:30:50 2008 From: Vyv.Evans at brighton.ac.uk (Vyvyan Evans) Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 09:30:50 +0100 Subject: Conference programme: Language, Communication & Cognition, Brighton Aug 4-7th 2008 Message-ID: Dear All. Re. International conference on LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION & COGNITION, Brighton, UK. Aug. 4th-7th 2008 The conference programme for this August's conference has now been finalised, and the definitive programme is available on the conference website: www.languageandcognition.net. The website contains full details of all sessions including theme sessions, keynote speakers and entertainments. Please note, pre-conference registrations must be received no later than JULY 18th. This relates to BOTH electronic and postal registrations. Due to the number of delegates attending the conference we regret that we shall be unable to accept pre-conference registrations after this date. All presenters are required to register by July 18th. We look forward to welcoming colleagues to Brighton this summer. Sincerely, Vyv Evans --------------------------------------------------- Vyv Evans Professor of Cognitive Linguistics www.vyvevans.net From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Mon Jun 30 05:59:40 2008 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2008 13:59:40 +0800 Subject: Rules vs. lists Message-ID: Dear All, I was glad to find the recent rule vs. list discussion. I like to see fundamental issues debated. In line with my own particular interests I hope I can shine a new perspective. Can anyone tell me, if the utterances of natural language are thought of primarily as a list, how many ways might the elements of that list be generalized to abstract one or other rule? That is to say, how many rules might a list of elements define in principle? Also how many partial rules, if the requirement of global generalizability is dropped? -Rob Freeman From david_tuggy at sil.org Mon Jun 30 12:48:29 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2008 07:48:29 -0500 Subject: Rules vs. lists In-Reply-To: <7616afbc0806292259i1e2277e4oade36d5ac3f63088@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Any number that language users come up with, in either case. More-general and less-general rules, and whether or not there is one, or a set of, global generalizations to be made. --David Tuggy Rob Freeman wrote: > Dear All, > > I was glad to find the recent rule vs. list discussion. I like to see > fundamental issues debated. > > In line with my own particular interests I hope I can shine a new perspective. > > Can anyone tell me, if the utterances of natural language are thought > of primarily as a list, how many ways might the elements of that list > be generalized to abstract one or other rule? > > That is to say, how many rules might a list of elements define in > principle? Also how many partial rules, if the requirement of global > generalizability is dropped? > > -Rob Freeman > > From Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl Sun Jun 1 14:50:03 2008 From: Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl (Amiridze, Nino) Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2008 16:50:03 +0200 Subject: Second Call for Abstracts: Language Change in Bilingual Communities. Focus on the Post-Soviet Countries and their Immigrant Communities Elsewhere Message-ID: [Apologies for multiple posting] ***************************************************************************************************** Language Change in Bilingual Communities. Focus on the Post-Soviet Countries and Their Immigrant Communities Elsewhere. Workshop at The 23rd Scandinavian Conference of Linguistics October 3, 2008, Uppsala, Sweden http://www.let.uu.nl/~Nino.Amiridze/personal/organization/PSB08.html ****************************************************************************************************** Call for Abstracts ================== The workshop aims at giving a perspective on post-Soviet bilingualism while concentrating on the typology of linguistic changes under language contact. During the Soviet era, languages of the former Soviet republics have been influenced by Russian, the Soviet lingua franca. The collapse and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has caused reshaping of the relations between various ethnic groups within individual States, on the one hand, and between Russia and the rest of the States, on the other hand. Language situation and linguistic hierarchy within the newly independent countries have considerably changed, depending on the relations with Russia, and the growing influence of wider globalization. The fall of the Soviet Union has caused unprecedented waves of immigrants from the former Soviet republics to various parts of the world. Immigrant communities from the former Soviet Union do not always have institutional support for their native languages in the host countries. Keeping mother languages exclusively as a means of communication in the family and within the community, the speakers used to preserve some features of the languages that eventually got changed in the varieties spoken back at home by their compatriots. On the other hand, under the influence of the language(s) of the host countries, changes have occurred in the immigrant languages. Globalisation has influenced the area into a more open attitude with respect to sign language and bimodal bilingualism. The former Soviet Union maintained the medical model of disability, treating the deaf as a disabled group. However, in some of these States there are attempts to change the medical model with the social one, and view the deaf as a cultural and linguistic minority. One of the positive consequences of changing the approach is the promotion of bilingual education in the schools for deaf, rather than pursuing exclusively oralist educational policy. As a result of the changing attitudes towards sign language and Deaf culture, deaf people in the Post-Soviet States will become bilingual in a sign and a spoken language (a case of bimodal bilinguality). The following three topics will be addressed during the workshop: * contact-induced changes that have occurred in the languages of the Post-Soviet States under the declining role of Russian as a dominant language and the growing influence of other regionally and globally dominant languages; * contact-induced changes and contact-induced preservation in the language varieties spoken by communities that have immigrated from the Post-Soviet countries since 1991 to various parts of the world. * bimodal bilingualism and language situation in deaf communities of the Post-Soviet States. How changing of attitudes towards deafness affects sociolinguistic situation of users of sign languages across the former Soviet Union. Influences of the structure of one of their languages over that of the other language. Invited Speakers ================ * Anna Komarova (hearing) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education), Development of Bilingual Education of the Deaf in Post-Soviet Countries. * Tatiana Davidenko (Deaf) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education), Sign Language Diversity in Post-Soviet Countries (translation from the RSL into English by Anna Komarova). * Kristina Svartholm (hearing) (Stockholm University), Bilingual Education for the Deaf. A Swedish Experience. Important Dates =============== Abstract submission: June 16, 2008 Notification: July 7, 2008 Workshop: October 3, 2008 Organizers ========== * Nino Amiridze, Utrecht University (The Netherlands) * Anne Tamm, University of Florence (Italy) and Institute for the Estonian Language * Manana Topadze, University of Pavia (Italy) * Inge Zwitserlood, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands) Publication =========== If after the workshop there will be interest in publishing either a proceedings or a special journal issue, then the organizers will take responsibility of finding a suitable forum and will act as editors. Submission ========== Abstracts (in English, maximum 3 pages, including data and references) have to be submitted electronically as portable document format (.pdf) or Microsoft Word (.doc) files via the EasyChair conference management system: http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=psb08 If you do not have an EasyChair account, click on the button "I have no EasyChair Account" on that page and follow the instructions. When you receive a password, you can enter the site and upload your abstract. Workshop Web Page ================= http://www.let.uu.nl/~Nino.Amiridze/personal/organization/PSB08.html From Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU Sun Jun 1 19:13:44 2008 From: Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU (Erin Shay) Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2008 13:13:44 -0600 Subject: (no subject) Message-ID: Dear Funknet, May I submit this book notice for Funknet posting? Please let me know if you need additional information or a different format. Many thanks, Erin Erin Shay, Ph.D. Research Ass't Professor Dept. of Linguistics, Box 295 University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309-0295 USA Phone: 303-882-3786 ? From hilpert at rice.edu Mon Jun 2 08:23:28 2008 From: hilpert at rice.edu (Martin Hilpert) Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 03:23:28 -0500 Subject: PhD student position available Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I'd be thankful if you could forward the job posting below to students that might be interested. Many thanks, --Martin I would like to advertise one position for a PhD student (half-time, German payscale E13/2, i.e. around ?1400/month) for a research project at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Study (FRIAS) within the School of Language and Literature. The title of the project is 'Cognitive Linguistics at the interface of corpus linguistics and psycholinguistics'. The ideal candidate will have a Master's degree in linguistics, background knowledge of either corpus linguistics or experimental methodology, and a general interest in quantitative, usage-based approaches to language. Working knowledge of German is a plus but no necessity. The candidate will have the opportunity to work towards a PhD thesis and to collaborate with faculty members of the different philologies and the Cognitive Science department at the University of Freiburg. Potential applicants are invited to contact Martin Hilpert (martin.hilpert at frias.uni-freiburg.de) to find out more about the project. Applications should include a CV, one or two work samples, a brief research proposal (no more than 5 pages) and names of three references. Applications by qualified women are particularly welcome. Handicapped applicants are given preference in case of equal qualification. Applications received by June 30, 2008 will receive fullest consideration. The project has already started; the position will remain open until filled. The position will be funded for two years initially. Further funding is anticipated but cannot be guaranteed. Applications should be sent to: Dr. Martin Hilpert FRIAS (Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies) Universit?t Freiburg Albertstr. 19 79104 Freiburg Germany From Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU Mon Jun 2 16:22:35 2008 From: Erin.Shay at Colorado.EDU (Erin Shay) Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 10:22:35 -0600 Subject: book notice Message-ID: Here is a book notice that may be of interest. I apologize for yesterday's empty posting. Thank you, Erin Erin Shay Research Ass't Professor Dept. of Linguistics, Box 295 University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309-0295 USA Phone: 303-882-3786 New Book Information JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY www.benjamins.com Table of contents Introduction Zygmunt Frajzyngier and Erin Shay Case marking, syntactic domains and information structure in Kabyle (Berber) Amina Mettouchi The internal and comparative reconstruction of verb extensions in early Chadic and Afroasiatic Christopher Ehret One way of becoming a dative subject Zygmunt Frajzyngier Coding the unexpected: Subject pronouns in East Dangla Erin Shay Ergative-active features of the Ethiopian Semitic type Grover Hudson Number as an exponent of gender in Cushitic Maarten Mous Relativization in Kambaata (Cushitic) Yvonne Treis Between coordination and subordination in Gawwada Mauro Tosco Author index Language index Subject index Linguistics Interaction of Morphology and Syntax Case studies in Afroasiatic Edited by Zygmunt Frajzyngier and Erin Shay University of Colorado The present volume deals with hitherto unexplored issues on the interaction of morphology and syntax. These selected and invited papers mainly concern Cushitic and Chadic languages, the least-described members of the Afroasiatic family. Three papers in the volume explore one or more typological characteristics across an entire language family or branch, while others focus on one or two languages within a family and the implications of their structures for the family, the phylum, or linguistic typology as a whole. The diversity of topics addressed within the present volume reflects the great diversity of language structures and functions within the Afroasiatic phylum. [Typological Studies in Language, 75] 2008. v, 234 pp. Hb 978 90 272 2987 8 EUR 110.00 From Chad.Nilep at Colorado.EDU Tue Jun 3 14:56:24 2008 From: Chad.Nilep at Colorado.EDU (Chad Douglas Nilep) Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2008 08:56:24 -0600 Subject: Colorado Research in Linguistics Message-ID: Colorado Research in Linguistics 21 is now on line. http://www.colorado.edu/ling/CRIL/ Colorado Research in Linguistics is the working papers journal of the Department of Linguistics at the University of Colorado. CRIL publishes working papers dealing with language and linguistics from affiliates of the University of Colorado at Boulder. Chad D. Nilep Linguistics University of Colorado at Boulder From paul at benjamins.com Wed Jun 4 20:07:51 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:07:51 -0400 Subject: Benjamins title: Butler et al: Functional Perspectives on Grammar and Discourse Message-ID: Functional Perspectives on Grammar and Discourse In honour of Angela Downing Edited by Christopher S. Butler, Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Julia Lavid University of Wales, Swansea / Universidad Complutense, Madrid Studies in Language Companion Series 85 2007. xxx, 481 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 3095 9 / EUR 125.00 / USD 188.00 This book, a tribute to Angela Downing, consists of twenty papers taking a broadly functional perspective on language, with topics ranging from the general (grammar as an evolutionary product, text comprehension, integrative linguistics) to particular aspects of the grammars of languages (Bulgarian, English, Icelandic, Spanish, Swedish). The more specific papers are sequenced according to Halliday's division into ideational, textual and interpersonal aspects of the grammar, and cover a wide range of areas, including aspect, argument structure, noun phrase/nominal group structure and nominalisations, pronominal clitics, theme in relation to writing skills, discourse structures and markers, the role of attention in conversation, the functions of topic, phatic communion, subjectification, formulaic language and modality. A recurrent theme in the volume is the use of corpus materials in order to base functional descriptions on authentic productions. Overall, the volume constitutes a panoramic but nevertheless detailed view of some important current trends in functional linguistics. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Contributors ix?xiv Editorial introduction Christopher S. Butler, Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Julia Lavid xvii?xxv Publications of Angela Downing xxvii?xxx Grammar as an adaptive evolutionary product T. Giv?n 1?40 Towards a cognitive-functional model of text comprehension Christopher S. Butler 41?80 Towards an integrational approach in linguistics Andrei Stoevsky 81?96 Expressing past habit in English and Swedish: A corpus-based contrastive study Bengt Altenberg 97?128 Do cognate and circumstantial complements of intransitive verbs form one 'Range'? A corpus-based discussion Kathleen Rymen and Kristin Davidse 129?148 The unconscious, irresponsible construction in Modern Icelandic Enrique Bern?rdez 149?164 Modelling 'selection' between referents in the English nominal group: An essay in scientific inquiry in linguistics Robin P. Fawcett 165?204 Problems in NP structure: An example from British tabloid journalism Eirian C. Davies 205?216 Double-possessive nominalizations in English J. Lachlan Mackenzie 217?232 Pragmatics, word order and cross-reference: Some issues with pronominal clitics in Bulgarian Svilen B. Stanchev 233?256 Patterns of multiple theme and their role in developing English writing skills Mike Hannay 257?278 Interactive solution-problems: A set of structures in general and scientific writing Michael P. Jordan 279?300 The English Contrastive Discourse Marker instead Bruce Fraser 301?312 Global and local attention in task-oriented conversation: An empirical investigation Julia Lavid 313?326 Metadiscursive and interpersonal values of pronominal topics in spoken Spanish Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Laura Hidalgo Downing 327?348 Phatic communion and small talk in fictional dialogues Ludmila Urbanova 349?358 Mister so-called X: Discourse functions and subjectification of so-called Lieven Vandelanotte 359?394 'Sorry to muddy the waters': Accounting for speech act formulae and formulaic variation in a systemic functional model of language Gordon Tucker 395?418 The discourse functionality of adjectival and adverbial epistemic expressions: Evidence from present-day English Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen and Karin Aijmer 419?446 Modality across World Englishes: The modals and semi-modals of prediction and volition Peter C. Collins 447?468 Name index 469?472 Subject index 473?480 Language index 481 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Wed Jun 4 20:00:51 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:00:51 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins journal: Constrictions and Frames Message-ID: New Benjamins journal to begin 2009: Constructions and Frames Constructions and Frames Editors Kyoko Ohara, Keio University Kiki Nikiforidou, University of Athens ISSN: 1876-1933 E-ISSN: 1876-1941 Constructions and Frames is an international peer-reviewed journal that provides a forum for construction-based approaches to language analysis. Constructional models emphasize the role of constructions, as conventional pairings of meaning and form, in stating language-specific and cross-linguistic generalizations and in accounting equally for regular and semi-regular patterns. Frame Semantics, which has become a semantic complement of some constructional approaches, elaborates the analysis of form-meaning relationships by focusing on lexical semantic issues that are relevant to grammatical structure. The preoccupation of constructional theories with meaning allows for natural integration of grammatical inquiry with semantic, pragmatic, and discourse research; often coupled with corpus evidence, this orientation also enriches current perspectives on language acquisition, language change, and language use. Constructions and Frames publishes articles which range from descriptions of grammatical phenomena in different languages to constructionally-oriented work in cognitive linguistics, grammaticalization theory, typology, conversation analysis and interactional linguistics, poetics, and sociolinguistics. Articles that explore applications to or implications for related fields, such as communication studies, computational linguistics, lexicography, psychology, and anthropology are also invited. The aim of the journal is to promote innovative research that extends constructional approaches in new directions and along interdisciplinary paths. URL: http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_seriesview.cgi?series=CF Volume 1 (2009): 2 issues, 300 pp. EUR 140.00 Individuals may apply for a special subscription rate of EUR 70.00. Private subscriptions are for personal use only, and must be pre-paid and ordered directly from the publisher. Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Wed Jun 4 20:04:33 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:04:33 -0400 Subject: Benjamins title: Synchronic and Diachronic Perspectives on Contact Language Message-ID: Synchronic and Diachronic Perspectives on Contact Languages Edited by Magnus Huber and Viveka Velupillai University of Giessen Creole Language Library 32 2007. xii, 370 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 5254 8 / EUR 115.00 / USD 173.00 This collection of selected conference papers from three SPCL meetings brings together a cross-fertilization of approaches to the study of contact languages. The articles are grouped into three coherent sections dealing with, respectively, phonetics and phonology, including Optimality Theory; synchronic analyses of both morphology and syntax; and diachronic tracings of language change, with special focus on sound patterns as well as semantics. An added value of the volume is that most of the articles are in various ways significant for more than one linguistic subgrouping, and there is a significant overlap of interests; the sections also cover sociolinguistic subjects, give both theoretical and functional linguistic analyses of language data, and discuss issues of grammaticalization. Thus, in discussing a number of issues relevant far beyond the study of pidgin and creole languages, as well as providing a wealth of linguistic data, this volume also contributes to the broader field of linguistics in general. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Preface ix?xii Part I 1. Maintenance or assimilation? Phonological variation and change in the realization of /t / by British Barbadians Michelle C. Bra?a-Straw 3?22 2. Universal and substrate influence on the phonotactics and syllable structure of Krio Malcolm Awadajin Finney 23?42 3. Tone on quantifiers in Saramaccan as a transferred feature from Kikongo Marvin Kramer 43?66 4. Morphophonological properties of pitch accents in Jamaican Creole reduplication Shelome Gooden 67?90 5. Effort reduction and the grammar: Liquid phonology in Haitian and St. Lucian Eric Russell Webb 91?114 Part II 6. Reflexivity in Capeverdean: Predicate properties and sentence structure Maria Alexandra Fi?is and Fernanda Pratas 117?128 7. An additional pronoun and hierarchies in creolized Chin?k Wawa David D. Robertson 129?158 8. Three irregular verbs in Gullah David B. Frank 159?173 9. Afro-Bolivian Spanish: The survival of a true creole prototype John M. Lipski 175?198 10. Copula patterns in Hawai?i Creole: Creole origin and decreolization Aya Inoue 199?212 Part III 11. On the properties of Papiamentu pa: Synchronic and diachronic perspectives Claire Lefebvre and Isabelle Therrien 215?255 12. No exception to the rule: The tense-aspect-modality system of Papiamentu reconsidered Nicholas Faraclas, Yolanda Rivera-Castillo and Don E. Walicek 257?278 13. A look at so in Mauritian Creole: From possessive pronoun to emphatic determiner Diana Guillemin 279?296 14. Chinese Spanish in 19th century Cuba: Documenting sociohistorical context Don E. Walicek 297?324 15. Comparative perspectives on the origins, development and structure of Amazonian (Karip?na) French Creole Jo-Anne S. Ferreira and Mervyn C. Alleyne 325?357 Index 359?370 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From fjn at u.washington.edu Thu Jun 5 18:53:38 2008 From: fjn at u.washington.edu (Frederick J Newmeyer) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 11:53:38 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of mine: 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by generative grammarians are an artifact of ?disembodied sentences that analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real people in real discourse situations? (Michael Tomasello). Their view is that if one focuses on ?naturally occurring discourse?, then grammar will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific level, it challenges Sandra Thompson?s claim that evidence from conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., 'you?re ready to go' in 'I guess you?re ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. The paper can be accessed at the following url: http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 Best wishes, Fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] From belenvenado at yahoo.com.ar Thu Jun 5 20:28:45 2008 From: belenvenado at yahoo.com.ar (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Mar=EDa_Bel=E9n_Carpio?=) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 13:28:45 -0700 Subject: Funknet subscription Message-ID: Dear Funknet administrator,   I am writing to you in order to confirm my subscription to the Funknet mailing list.   Sincerely,   Mar?a Bel?n Carpio       __________________________________________________ Correo Yahoo! Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ?gratis! ?Abr? tu cuenta ya! - http://correo.yahoo.com.ar From tgivon at uoregon.edu Fri Jun 6 01:49:22 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 18:49:22 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: Message-ID: The paper Fritz mentioned is surely worth reading (I have, a while back). It makes two important point, one explicitly, the other implicitly. (i) (explicit) That there are no independent syntactic tests showing that V-COMP constructions behave like a simplex rather than complex clauses. The examples of the two usage of V-COMPS, the "direct-speech-act" ('grammaticalized') use and the "complex" use (Diessel 2005) have not been shown to differ syntactically, only semantically. That is: Direct speech-act: I know she's not coming Complex use: He knew she wasn't coming. (ii) (implicit) That semantic grammaticalization does not automatically lead to immediate syntactic grammaticalization. In diachrony (and on-line communication, its progenitor) quite often form lags behind meaning. There is another point Fritz does not make explicitly in his paper, but it is still implicit in his discussion. This is part of his earlier agenda about "Grammar is grammar and usage is usage". Or, as corollary, that usage frequencies are irrelevant to synchronic grammar. In the case of Sandy Thompson's original paper, I think usage frequencies may be very interesting for understanding what grammar does, or how grammar arises both diachronically and developmentally. Both Fritz and Peter Harder have criticized Sandy's paper for claiming that the grammaticalized speech-act usage of V-COMP constructions is the "basic" use, and ignoring the "complex" use. This of course depends on which genre of language use is "basic". The grammaticalized use certainly predominates in spoken language. But in adult spoken language the "complex" use is already entrenched, and in certain usage context (talking about the past) may even predominate. In diachrony, there is strong tho by no means conclusive evidence that the direct speech-act usage is earlier, and that the "complex" use follows. And Diessel (2005) documents fairly conclusively that the same is true in early child language development. So while usage frequency (and its gradual change) may not interest Fritz, I think it interests many of us who look at grammar not only as a synchronic entity, but also as a product of developmentt, be it evolutionary, diachronic or acquisitional. There is a web site for the Rice 12th symposium (Rice U., Linguistics Dept.) where two of my papers on this topic are lodged (one on the diachrony of complex VPs, the other on the acquisition of same). I lost the specs for this web site, but more astute minds can probably find it. Cheers, TG =============== Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > Dear Funknetters, > > I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of > mine: > > 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' > > ABSTRACT > It has become an article of faith among many functional and cognitive > linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by generative > grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that analysts > have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by real > people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their view > is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then > grammar will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized > formulas and simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. > Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it > argues that the nature of real discourse reinforces the need for a > sophisticated engine for representing and accessing grammatical > knowledge. At a more specific level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's > claim that evidence from conversation leads to the conclusion that > sentential complements (e.g., 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're > ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. > > The paper can be accessed at the following url: > > http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > > Best wishes, > > Fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Sun Jun 8 11:55:45 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2008 04:55:45 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <8a37aa4e4f95dcaf.484b8596@ac-versailles.fr> Message-ID: Hey, Pablo. There is no need for /ad hominem/ comments about Fritz Newmeyer. First, he is still VERY active, and in addition to being Emeritus in UW he is still on the faculty of two other universities. (Just for the record, I am Emeritus too, and, alas, it hasn't slowed down the pace of my work; yet). And second, his agenda is based on intellectual considerations, not on retirement or senile dementia. He keeps up with the literature, both the side of it he likes & the side of it he is critical of. And do give him credit for counting text frequencies. I know a lot of ideologically right-thinking people who don't. Or if they do, they don't understand why they do it. So in a way, Fritz is a useful bridge person across the great linguistic divide. He does believe in Chomskian generative grammar, particularly in the separation between performance & competence. You may not share his position, but it is sincerely taken and articulately argued. So like, let's chill, dude. TG ======== Pablo.Kirtchuk at ac-versailles.fr wrote: > Newmeyer's 'grammar is grammar, usage is usage' claim denotes a profound misunderstanding that goes far beyond grammar and even language. Probably, being an Emeritus, FN is a man of his time, and he is not to be blamed for it. He is certainly not ahead of his time. > > > Pablo Kirtchuk > > >> The paper Fritz mentioned is surely worth reading (I have, a while >> back). It makes two important point, one explicitly, the other >> implicitly. (i) (explicit) That there are no independent syntactic >> tests >> showing that V-COMP constructions behave like a simplex rather than >> complex clauses. The examples of the two usage of V-COMPS, the >> "direct-speech-act" ('grammaticalized') use and the "complex" use >> (Diessel 2005) have not been shown to differ syntactically, only >> semantically. That is: >> >> Direct speech-act: I know she's not coming >> Complex use: He knew she wasn't coming. >> >> (ii) (implicit) That semantic grammaticalization does not >> automatically >> lead to immediate syntactic grammaticalization. In diachrony (and >> on-line communication, its progenitor) quite often form lags behind >> meaning. >> There is another point Fritz does not make explicitly in his paper, >> but >> it is still implicit in his discussion. This is part of his earlier >> agenda about "Grammar is grammar and usage is usage". Or, as >> corollary, >> that usage frequencies are irrelevant to synchronic grammar. In the >> case >> of Sandy Thompson's original paper, I think usage frequencies may >> be >> very interesting for understanding what grammar does, or how >> grammar >> arises both diachronically and developmentally. Both Fritz and >> Peter >> Harder have criticized Sandy's paper for claiming that the >> grammaticalized speech-act usage of V-COMP constructions is the >> "basic" >> use, and ignoring the "complex" use. This of course depends on >> which >> genre of language use is "basic". The grammaticalized use certainly >> predominates in spoken language. But in adult spoken language the >> "complex" use is already entrenched, and in certain usage context >> (talking about the past) may even predominate. >> >> In diachrony, there is strong tho by no means conclusive evidence >> that >> the direct speech-act usage is earlier, and that the "complex" use >> follows. And Diessel (2005) documents fairly conclusively that the >> same >> is true in early child language development. So while usage >> frequency >> (and its gradual change) may not interest Fritz, I think it >> interests >> many of us who look at grammar not only as a synchronic entity, but >> also >> as a product of developmentt, be it evolutionary, diachronic or >> acquisitional. >> >> There is a web site for the Rice 12th symposium (Rice U., >> Linguistics >> Dept.) where two of my papers on this topic are lodged (one on the >> diachrony of complex VPs, the other on the acquisition of same). I >> lost >> the specs for this web site, but more astute minds can probably >> find it. >> >> Cheers, TG >> >> =============== >> >> >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> >>> Dear Funknetters, >>> >>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following >>> >> paper of >> >>> mine: >>> >>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>> >>> ABSTRACT >>> It has become an article of faith among many functional and >>> >> cognitive >> >>> linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >>> >> generative >> >>> grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that >>> >> analysts >> >>> have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by real >>> people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their >>> >> view >> >>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then >>> grammar will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized >>> formulas and simple constructions. This paper challenges that >>> >> view. >> >>> Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it >>> argues that the nature of real discourse reinforces the need for >>> >> a >> >>> sophisticated engine for representing and accessing grammatical >>> knowledge. At a more specific level, it challenges Sandra >>> >> Thompson's >> >>> claim that evidence from conversation leads to the conclusion >>> >> that >> >>> sentential complements (e.g., 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess >>> >> you're >> >>> ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. >>> >>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>> >>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Fritz >>> >>> Frederick J. Newmeyer >>> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon >>> >> Fraser >> >>> University >>> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > From hopper at cmu.edu Mon Jun 9 11:02:22 2008 From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 07:02:22 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, What is to be the nature of Funknet? Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. - Paul > Dear Funknetters, > > I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of > mine: > > 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' > > ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and > cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by > generative grammarians are an artifact of ?disembodied sentences that > analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real > people in real discourse situations? (Michael Tomasello). Their view is > that if one focuses on ?naturally occurring discourse?, then grammar will > reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple > constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a > 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real > discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for representing > and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific level, it > challenges Sandra Thompson?s claim that evidence from conversation leads > to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., 'you?re ready to go' > in 'I guess you?re ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. > > The paper can be accessed at the following url: > > http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > > Best wishes, > > Fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct > Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for > my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > -- Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper Senior Fellow Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies Albert-Ludwigs-Universit?t Freiburg and Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA5213 From hopper at cmu.edu Mon Jun 9 12:06:33 2008 From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 08:06:33 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <4895.72.95.230.196.1213009342.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: um A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying calm [laughter] A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if you're panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head clear enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i don't know if there was an explosion or something i don't it it's a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and control themselves B: um B: right even with all the um B: (( [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) B: twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't be Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don?t think, and possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of ?fragments?. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of ?fragments?, then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker?s daily output?" Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. - Paul ----------------------------- did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. it?s about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times can?t imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times can really think about it\ occurs 69 times control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any number!] something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times ----------------------------------------------------------- > Dear Colleagues, > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics > within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing > conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz > Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be > responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points > he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply > because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only > another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone > else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > - Paul > > >> Dear Funknetters, >> >> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of >> mine: >> >> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >> >> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and >> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >> generative grammarians are an artifact of ?disembodied sentences that >> analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real >> people in real discourse situations? (Michael Tomasello). Their view >> is that if one focuses on ?naturally occurring discourse?, then grammar >> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and >> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims >> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature >> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific >> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson?s claim that evidence from >> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., >> 'you?re ready to go' in 'I guess you?re ready to go') are not >> grammatically subordinate. >> >> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >> >> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> -- Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper Senior Fellow Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies Albert-Ludwigs-Universit?t Freiburg and Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA5213 From dlevere at ilstu.edu Mon Jun 9 11:59:00 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Dan Everett) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 06:59:00 -0500 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <4895.72.95.230.196.1213009342.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: I agree with Paul. Yet, at the same time, I believe that Fritz's ideas aare worth debating here. Can it be shown that arguments from usage seriously undermine formal linguistics and favor functional linguistics? This seems particularly relevant for this list. I would love to see here a brief synopsis of an article that replies to Fritz's criticisms and a link to that article. That strikes me as quite a good thing to have on a list like this. Fritz's tone is always calm and his style circumspect. His arguments are careful and reasonable. This doesn't mean that they are right! But this kind of dialogue is very useful, at least it is to me, both in full articles and, when appropriate and doable, in less formal communication, e.g. this list. All the best, -- Dan Everett Quoting Paul Hopper : > Dear Colleagues, > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss > topics within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an > ongoing conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" > abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical > arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire > article. The controversial points he makes in the article will > basically go unanswered in this forum simply because the genre of > email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only another article > can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone else's > work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange > of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > - Paul > > >> Dear Funknetters, >> >> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of >> mine: >> >> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >> >> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and >> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >> generative grammarians are an artifact of ?disembodied sentences that >> analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real >> people in real discourse situations? (Michael Tomasello). Their view is >> that if one focuses on ?naturally occurring discourse?, then grammar will >> reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple >> constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a >> 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real >> discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for representing >> and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific level, it >> challenges Sandra Thompson?s claim that evidence from conversation leads >> to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., 'you?re ready to go' >> in 'I guess you?re ready to go') are not grammatically subordinate. >> >> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >> >> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct >> Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for >> my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> > > -- > Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper > Senior Fellow > Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies > Albert-Ludwigs-Universit?t Freiburg > and > Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities > Carnegie Mellon University > Pittsburgh, PA5213 > > -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From bjking at wm.edu Mon Jun 9 12:43:17 2008 From: bjking at wm.edu (bjking at wm.edu) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 08:43:17 -0400 Subject: reading articles Message-ID: Hello, I've been a quiet lurker here for years. But I would like to respond to Paul Hopper's comment that: >, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire article. If the overall question is "what is to be the nature of Funknet," I'd suggest that it's completely appropriate for an author to send an abstract of his own devising with a link to the full article. I don't find that 'sad' or upsetting. It seems, on the contrary, ONE useful way (among others) to invite discussion, in this case from people who are interested enough to read further. I see no benefit in legislating the way in which people should post about their own work. Barbara J. King Professor of Anthropology College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA, USA 23187 for more about my research + my books please see: http://people.wm.edu/~bjking/ From amnfn at well.com Mon Jun 9 13:33:13 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 06:33:13 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <1040.72.95.230.196.1213013193.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: The Newmeyer article does seem to be fostering fruitful debate on the nature of language, and thus does seem to be well within the scope of a Funknet discussion. I'd like to add this perspective on "formulaic" or unoriginal expressions in spontaneous speech. Just because two individuals came up with the same phrase or clause (or just because a thousand or more did) doesn't mean that their method of deriving the expressions was the same. Some may have dug them up already composed from their lexicon. Others may have put them together word for word by reference to synatctic rules. Determining which people did which requires more complex testing than simply statistical analysis of expressions in a corpus. Best, --Aya On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Paul Hopper wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: > > A: hi > B: hi so did you hear what the topic is > A: yes it's about terrorism right > B: yeah > B: um > A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter > B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying > calm [laughter] > A: yeah nor can i yeah > B: um you would even i- though if you're panicked i would assume you would try and > B: keep your head clear enough to act to protect yourself but > A: right > A: yeah i don't know if there was an explosion or something > i don't it it's a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and > control themselves > B: um > B: right even with all the um > B: (( [sigh] the )) > B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's been on > that topic > A: (( [mn] right )) > B: twenty months it's still um > B: is something that you wouldn't be > > Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don?t think, and possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of ?fragments?. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of ?fragments?, then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker?s daily output?" > > Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. > > - Paul > > ----------------------------- > did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. > > it?s about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times > > what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times > > can?t imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; > > staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times > > nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times > > you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times > > i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice > > to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. > > to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times > > if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) > > it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times > > i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times > > can really think about it\ occurs 69 times > > control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times > > even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times > > media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times > > on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times > > in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any number!] > > something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times > > able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > Dear Colleagues, > > > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics > > within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing > > conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz > > Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be > > responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points > > he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply > > because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only > > another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone > > else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of > > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > > > - Paul > > > > > >> Dear Funknetters, > >> > >> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of > >> mine: > >> > >> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' > >> > >> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and > >> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by > >> generative grammarians are an artifact of ?disembodied sentences that > >> analysts have made up ad hoc, rather than utterances produced by real > >> people in real discourse situations? (Michael Tomasello). Their view > >> is that if one focuses on ?naturally occurring discourse?, then grammar > >> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and > >> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims > >> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature > >> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for > >> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific > >> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson?s claim that evidence from > >> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., > >> 'you?re ready to go' in 'I guess you?re ready to go') are not > >> grammatically subordinate. > >> > >> The paper can be accessed at the following url: > >> > >> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Fritz > >> > >> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > >> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > >> > > > -- > Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper > Senior Fellow > Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies > Albert-Ludwigs-Universit?t Freiburg > and > Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities > Carnegie Mellon University > Pittsburgh, PA5213 > > From edith at uwm.edu Mon Jun 9 16:31:06 2008 From: edith at uwm.edu (Edith Moravcsik) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 11:31:06 -0500 Subject: reading articles Message-ID: I, too, am very happy that Fritz has used FUNKNET to call attention to this paper of his. It is a clear and fair study, one that is of great interest to all linguists, whether of a functional or formalist persuasion. Edith Moravcsik ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Monday, June 09, 2008 7:43 AM Subject: [FUNKNET] reading articles > Hello, I've been a quiet lurker here for years. But I would like to > respond to Paul Hopper's comment that: > >>, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round >>contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be responded to without >>reading the entire article. > > If the overall question is "what is to be the nature of Funknet," I'd > suggest that it's completely appropriate for an author to send an abstract > of his own devising with a link to the full article. I don't find that > 'sad' or upsetting. It seems, on the contrary, ONE useful way (among > others) to invite discussion, in this case from people who are interested > enough to read further. > > I see no benefit in legislating the way in which people should post about > their own work. > > Barbara J. King > Professor of Anthropology > College of William and Mary > Williamsburg, VA, USA 23187 > > for more about my research + my books please see: > http://people.wm.edu/~bjking/ > > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Jun 9 16:59:11 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 09:59:11 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <1040.72.95.230.196.1213013193.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: Dear FUNK folks, I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a while--serious substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's done us a service, however resentful of him some folks may be. I go with Barbara King in noting that the full article is available, and it is better to react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I have seen that article a couple of months ago, & read it in full, I think maybe I can share with you my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's raised. This comes out of private correspondence with Paul Hopper, who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's defense. Here goes: Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL uses of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically "grammaticalized" are not necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by syntactic tests, independently of semantics. This, by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is a run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: Semantic change precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho of, course, Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of his own argument. What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental ("emeregent") components, which are well backed up (I think) by frequency counts: (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), V-COMP constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct speech-act) use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the role of frequency distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed his lack of interest in development/emergence. And (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of these omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and his disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising usage frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's attitude is echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who believe only in emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of emergence. So all in all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its internal contradictions, or at the very least, it's lack of explanatory ambition. The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage frequencies from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an explanation of what these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only meaningful in CONTRASTS: "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". And if not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some BASE OF COMPARISON--"what is the total population within which X appears a certain number of times?" So frequencies by themselves are not all that meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you want to test, you can formulate a frequency count in a way that would be meaningful--and test your hypothesis. This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came out with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The phenomenon was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) What was the frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic usage in particular texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do we have higher vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't interested in frequencies at the time, so I talked one of my grad students, Lynn Yang, into doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a two-part experimental study, one with two contrasting videos ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast of cultural familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). Best, TG ===================== Paul Hopper wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: > > A: hi > B: hi so did you hear what the topic is > A: yes it's about terrorism right > B: yeah > B: um > A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter > B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying > calm [laughter] > A: yeah nor can i yeah > B: um you would even i- though if you're panicked i would assume you would try and > B: keep your head clear enough to act to protect yourself but > A: right > A: yeah i don't know if there was an explosion or something > i don't it it's a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and > control themselves > B: um > B: right even with all the um > B: (( [sigh] the )) > B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's been on > that topic > A: (( [mn] right )) > B: twenty months it's still um > B: is something that you wouldn't be > > Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of 'fragments', then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker's daily output?" > > Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. > > - Paul > > ----------------------------- > did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. > > it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times > > what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times > > can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; > > staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times > > nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times > > you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times > > i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice > > to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. > > to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times > > if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) > > it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times > > i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times > > can really think about it\ occurs 69 times > > control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times > > even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times > > media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times > > on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times > > in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any number!] > > something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times > > able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >> >> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics >> within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing >> conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz >> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be >> responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points >> he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply >> because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only >> another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone >> else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. >> >> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of >> titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. >> >> - Paul >> >> >> >>> Dear Funknetters, >>> >>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper of >>> mine: >>> >>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>> >>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional and >>> cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited by >>> generative grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that >>> analysts have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by real >>> people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their view >>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then grammar >>> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and >>> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims >>> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the nature >>> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >>> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific >>> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that evidence from >>> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements (e.g., >>> 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to go') are not >>> grammatically subordinate. >>> >>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>> >>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Fritz >>> >>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >>> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>> >>> > > > From rjacobs at townesquare.net Mon Jun 9 17:50:11 2008 From: rjacobs at townesquare.net (R. A. Jacobs) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 13:50:11 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <1040.72.95.230.196.1213013193.squirrel@72.95.230.196> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, Paul Hopper's data on formulaics expressions in the mini-text Fritz Newmeyer presented is certainly to the point. I agree with him that it would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. But it seems to me reasonable that Fritz could give some details of an argument (polemical but on a topic of central interest to this list that he has dealt with much more fully in a paper, as long as that paper has been made accessible to list members. That's one way a good list like this is useful. Fritz did just that. I was interested, so I downloaded the paper. Paul's own brief discussion added to the value of the exchange, and I hope there would be others. Ricky >Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly >formulaic expressions here: hi, right, take in >stride, I don?t think, and possibly a few >others. But in other respects the transcript >reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that >defies any meaningful analysis in terms of >fragments ... >Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight >Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason >the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, >I identified the groups of words that I would >suspect are formulaic and typed them into >Google.com to see if they were as unique (and >therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The >results are, it seems to me, consistent with the >idea that the speaker is indeed stringing >together formulaic fragments. ... > >- Paul > >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >> >> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss topics >> within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing >> conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz >> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it cannot be >> responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial points >> he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum simply >> because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only >> another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone >> else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. >> > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of > > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. > > > > - Paul -- Roderick A. Jacobs, Author/Linguistic Consultant Recent Article: [Georgia State University] Review of 'Handbook of English Linguistics Em.Prof. Linguistics & 2nd Language Studies in JOURNAL OF ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, , Past Dean, College of Languages, Linguistics, 35:2 (June 2007), 188-193. & Literature, University of Hawai'i From fjn at u.washington.edu Mon Jun 9 18:54:04 2008 From: fjn at u.washington.edu (Frederick J Newmeyer) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 11:54:04 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <484D615F.1090401@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: First, I would like to thank those of you who defended the appropriateness of my posting and/or provided substantive comments on the topics that I discussed in the paper. Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. I have a couple of comments on Tom's useful posting of earlier today. 1. Tom says that 'Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization'. I can't imagine what it would mean 'not to believe in grammaticalization'. All that I have ever said in print is that what is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of interacting processes. There is no historical dimension to my analysis, it is true, but that is because I endorsed (and briefly outlined) Boye and Harder's account of the grammaticalization of complement clauses, which brings in historical developments. By the way, it is not always the case that in grammaticalization 'semantic change precedes syntactic readjustment'. For examples of the opposite order of events, see chapter 5 of my book 'Language Form and Language Function'. 2. For quite a few years now I have endorsed the position that grammars are to a large degree functionally motivated and that frequency is an important factor shaping them. Where I part company with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are stated in the grammar itself. I think not, though, obviously this is a complex and difficult question. I did not take up this question in my paper because I believe that one can make a strong case that sentential complements are syntactically subordinate and that grammars are far more than 'fragments' and 'formulas' without addressing the question of where the dividing line between competence and performance might be. That's a topic for a different paper. Best, --fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > > > > Dear FUNK folks, > > I think Fritz's article has already achieved > something, at least potentially, that has been > absent from FUNKNET for quite a while--serious > substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's > done us a service, however resentful of him some > folks may be. I go with Barbara King in noting that > the full article is available, and it is better to > react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I > have seen that article a couple of months ago, & > read it in full, I think maybe I can share with you > my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's raised. > This comes out of private correspondence with Paul > Hopper, who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's > defense. Here goes: > > > Well , in my innocence I thought there were at > least two empirical arguments in Fritz's article. > (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL uses of > V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" > ones. Some are not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses > that are semantically "grammaticalized" are not > necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. > Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by > syntactic tests, independently of semantics. This, > by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is a > run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: > Semantic change precede syntactic re-adjustment. > Tho of, course, Fritz does not believe in > grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of > his own argument. > > What was missing from Fritz' article were the > developmental ("emeregent") components, which are > well backed up (I think) by frequency counts: > (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language > acquisition), V-COMP constructions first emerge is > the "grammaticalized" (direct speech-act) use, and > only later develop the other (two-clause) use > (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack > of interest in the role of frequency distribution > in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed his lack of > interest in development/emergence. And > (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two > developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated > by frequency distribution (in this case, of the > "grammaticalized" sense). Both of these omissions > are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", > and his disinterest in the role of "performance" > (in this case, rising usage frequency) in creating > "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's attitude is > echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, > who believe only in emergence but not in any > RELATIVELY stable product of emergence. So all in > all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting > exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its > internal contradictions, or at the very least, it's > lack of explanatory ambition. > > The last comment I have goes to Paul's > demonstration of usage frequencies from Google. > What I missed in his demonstration is an > explanation of what these frequencies mean. > Frequency counts are only meaningful in CONTRASTS: > "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". And if > not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some > BASE OF COMPARISON--"what is the total population > within which X appears a certain number of times?" > So frequencies by themselves are not all that > meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you > want to test, you can formulate a frequency count > in a way that would be meaningful--and test your > hypothesis. > > This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy > Pawley when he came out with his formulaic usage > papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The phenomenon was > surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) > What was the frequency distribution of formulaic > vs. non formulaic usage in particular texts. Or (b) > in what communicative contexts do we have higher > vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy > wasn't interested in frequencies at the time, so I > talked one of my grad students, Lynn Yang, into > doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a > two-part experimental study, one with two > contrasting videos ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast > Story", a contrast of cultural familiarity) the > other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two > contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). > The results were quite instructive. That MA thesis > may be available wherever U. Oregon theses are > available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). > > > Best, TG > > ===================== > > > Paul Hopper wrote: >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and >> syntax, he gives the following example of a text >> in which an analysis in terms of formulaicity >> and formulaic fragments would be impossible: >> >> A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is >> A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: >> um A: so what are your feelings on that >> [laughter >> B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine >> anyone staying calm [laughter] >> A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- >> though if you're panicked i would assume you >> would try and B: keep your head clear enough to >> act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i >> don't know if there was an explosion or >> something i don't it it's a shock so i don't >> know that anybody can really think about it and >> control themselves B: um B: right even with all >> the um B: (( [sigh] the )) B: the publicity >> and media coverage you know that's been on that >> topic A: (( [mn] right )) >> B: twenty months it's still um B: is something >> that you wouldn't be Newmeyer writes (MS p. >> 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions >> here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, >> and possibly a few others. But in other respects >> the transcript reveals a sophisticated knowledge >> of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in >> terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know how to >> handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative >> clause attachment, participial complements, and >> much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed >> under the rubric of 'fragments', then I would >> say that this infinitisemally small sample of >> natural speech would have to contain at least >> two dozen fragments. How many more would be >> needed to describe a typical speaker's daily >> output?" >> >> Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight >> Bolinger said somewhere that there's a reason >> the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, >> I identified the groups of words that I would >> suspect are formulaic and typed them into >> Google.com to see if they were as unique (and >> therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The >> results are, it seems to me, consistent with the >> idea that the speaker is indeed stringing >> together formulaic fragments. The statistics are >> Google's, of course--they are rough and may >> fluctuate with different trials. >> - Paul >> >> ----------------------------- >> did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't >> occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the >> formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. >> >> it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times >> >> what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times >> >> can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; >> staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times >> >> nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times >> >> you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times >> >> i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice >> >> to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 >> times. >> >> to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times >> >> if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 >> times (!) >> >> it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times >> >> i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times >> can really think about it\ occurs 69 times >> >> control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times >> >> even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times >> >> media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times >> >> on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times >> >> in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times >> [NB specifically with "twenty", not just any >> number!] >> >> something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times >> >> able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times >> >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >>> >>> Most of us would think of it as an arena in >>> which we can discuss topics >>> within the/a functionalist paradigm by >>> swapping ideas in an ongoing >>> conversation. However, the polemical "article >>> of faith" abstract Fritz >>> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical >>> arguments, so it cannot be >>> responded to without reading the entire >>> article. The controversial points >>> he makes in the article will basically go >>> unanswered in this forum simply >>> because the genre of email doesn't permit a >>> paradigm-level response. Only >>> another article can respond to an article. So >>> Fritz gets to trash someone >>> else's work in public on the basis of a >>> promissory note. >>> >>> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing >>> house for the exchange of >>> titles and abstracts rather than the actual >>> discussion of ideas. >>> >>> - Paul >>> >>> >>> >>>> Dear Funknetters, >>>> >>>> I think that some of you might be interested >>>> in the following paper of mine: >>>> >>>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About >>>> the Nature of Grammar' >>>> >>>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith >>>> among many functional and cognitive >>>> linguists that the complex abstract >>>> structures posited by generative grammarians >>>> are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences >>>> that analysts have made up ad hoc, ... >>>> rather than utterances produced by real >>>> people in real discourse situations' >>>> (Michael Tomasello). Their view >>>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally >>>> occurring discourse', then grammar >>>> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter >>>> of memorized formulas and >>>> simple constructions. This paper challenges >>>> that view. Basing its claims >>>> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, >>>> it argues that the nature >>>> of real discourse reinforces the need for a >>>> sophisticated engine for >>>> representing and accessing grammatical >>>> knowledge. At a more specific >>>> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim >>>> that evidence from >>>> conversation leads to the conclusion that >>>> sentential complements (e.g., >>>> 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're >>>> ready to go') are not >>>> grammatically subordinate. >>>> >>>> The paper can be accessed at the following >>>> url: >>>> >>>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Fritz >>>> >>>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, >>>> University of Washington >>>> Adjunct Professor, University of British >>>> Columbia and Simon Fraser >>>> University [for my postal address, please >>>> contact me by e-mail] >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > From hopper at cmu.edu Mon Jun 9 19:16:05 2008 From: hopper at cmu.edu (Paul Hopper) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 15:16:05 -0400 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <484D615F.1090401@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, Ricky Jacobs nicely sums up the two sides to this debate, and keeping my fingers crossed that we won't see a 'New Way' of Funknet messages consisting of an abstract and a link to an article in place of the off-the-cuff "squibs" we've all come to know and love, I'll sign off on the question of format. I would like to add, though, that I would hate readers to infer from Tom's message that I berated him for not defending Sandy -- who doesn't need defending, and most definitely not by me. In fact my one and only comment to him was a humorous one, which I cite in full: >Tom, > >Well, we may be at or approaching Emeritus status, but our memories haven't >necessarily faded. What happened to the good ol' days of "Fritz the >Enforcer"...? > >Paul Those of us who are getting long in the tooth, including Fritz, will recognize the reference here, so I won't pursue it. It belongs to an even more polemical age. And I too appreciate that Fritz has taken functionalism seriously enough to focus his very considerable intellect on our work. Paul > > > > Dear FUNK folks, > > I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least > potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a while--serious > substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's done us a service, > however resentful of him some folks may be. I go with Barbara King in > noting that the full article is available, and it is better to react to it > rather than to the abstract. Since I have seen that article a couple of > months ago, & read it in full, I think maybe I can share with you my (very > brief) take on the issues Fritz's raised. This comes out of private > correspondence with Paul Hopper, who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's > defense. Here goes: > > > Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical > arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL uses > of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are not. And > (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically "grammaticalized" are not > necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. Syntactic properties have to be > demonstrated by syntactic tests, independently of semantics. This, by the > way (unnoticed by Fritz) is a run-of-the-mill observation in > grammaticalization: Semantic change precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho > of, course, Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't > see this part of his own argument. > > What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental ("emeregent") > components, which are well backed up (I think) by frequency counts: (iii) > That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), V-COMP > constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct speech-act) > use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use (Diessel 2005). > This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the role of frequency > distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed his lack of interest in > development/emergence. And (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these > two developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency > distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of these > omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and his > disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising usage > frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's attitude is > echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who believe only in > emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of emergence. So all in > all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting exemplar, and people could > benefit from seeing its internal contradictions, or at the very least, > it's lack of explanatory ambition. > > The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage frequencies > from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an explanation of what > these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only meaningful in CONTRASTS: > "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". And if not in x-y contrasts, > than at least against some BASE OF COMPARISON--"what is the total > population within which X appears a certain number of times?" So > frequencies by themselves are not all that meaningful. Still, if you have > a hypothesis you want to test, you can formulate a frequency count in a > way that would be meaningful--and test your hypothesis. > > This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came out > with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The phenomenon > was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) What was the > frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic usage in particular > texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do we have higher vs. lower > frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't interested in frequencies at > the time, so I talked one of my grad students, Lynn Yang, into doing her > MA thesis on this issue. It was a two-part experimental study, one with > two contrasting videos ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast > of cultural familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under > two contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were > quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon > theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). > > > Best, TG > > ===================== > > > Paul Hopper wrote: >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the >> following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of >> formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: >> >> A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is A: yes it's about terrorism >> right B: yeah B: um A: so what are your feelings on that [laughter B: i >> have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying calm >> [laughter] A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if >> you're panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head clear >> enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i don't know if >> there was an explosion or something i don't it it's a shock so i don't >> know that anybody can really think about it and control themselves B: um >> B: right even with all the um B: (( [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and >> media coverage you know that's been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) B: >> twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't be >> >> Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic expressions >> here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and possibly a few >> others. But in other respects the transcript reveals a sophisticated >> knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful analysis in terms of >> 'fragments'. The speakers know how to handle purpose clauses, >> wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, participial complements, and >> much more. If these are somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of >> 'fragments', then I would say that this infinitisemally small sample of >> natural speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How >> many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker's daily >> output?" >> >> Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere that >> there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! Well, I >> identified the groups of words that I would suspect are formulaic and >> typed them into Google.com to see if they were as unique (and therefore >> syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, it seems to me, consistent >> with the idea that the speaker is indeed stringing together formulaic >> fragments. The statistics are Google's, of course--they are rough and >> may fluctuate with different trials. >> >> - Paul >> >> ----------------------------- did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" >> doesn't occur, but about a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you >> hear what the * is\. >> >> it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times >> >> what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times >> >> can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; >> >> staying calm\ occurs 275,000 times >> >> nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times >> >> you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times >> >> i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice >> >> to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. >> >> to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times >> >> if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) >> >> it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times >> >> i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times >> >> can really think about it\ occurs 69 times >> >> control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times >> >> even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times >> >> media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times >> >> on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times >> >> in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with >> "twenty", not just any number!] >> >> something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times >> >> able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >>> >>> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss >>> topics within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an >>> ongoing conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" >>> abstract Fritz Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical >>> arguments, so it cannot be responded to without reading the entire >>> article. The controversial points he makes in the article will >>> basically go unanswered in this forum simply because the genre of >>> email doesn't permit a paradigm-level response. Only another article >>> can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash someone else's work >>> in public on the basis of a promissory note. >>> >>> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange >>> of titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. >>> >>> - Paul >>> >>> >>> >>>> Dear Funknetters, >>>> >>>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following paper >>>> of mine: >>>> >>>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>>> >>>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional >>>> and cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures posited >>>> by generative grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied sentences >>>> that analysts have made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances >>>> produced by real people in real discourse situations' (Michael >>>> Tomasello). Their view is that if one focuses on 'naturally >>>> occurring discourse', then grammar will reveal itself to be >>>> primarily a matter of memorized formulas and simple constructions. >>>> This paper challenges that view. Basing its claims on a 170MB corpus >>>> of conversational English, it argues that the nature of real >>>> discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >>>> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more >>>> specific level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that evidence >>>> from conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential >>>> complements (e.g., 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to >>>> go') are not grammatically subordinate. >>>> >>>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>>> >>>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Fritz >>>> >>>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >>>> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > -- Prof. Dr. Paul J. Hopper Senior Fellow Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies Albert-Ludwigs-Universit?t Freiburg and Paul Mellon Distinguished Professor of Humanities Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA5213 From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Jun 9 21:33:19 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 14:33:19 -0700 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I think we are finally getting a discussion of interesting issues, so again we should thank Fritz for initiating it, by whatever means. This once again brings home the fact that ideological homogeneity is not necessarily good for intellectual growth. Now, Fritz raises two issues that maybe I could respond to. GRAMMATICALIZATION: What does it really mean (quote) "...[All that I have ever said in print is that] what is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of interacting processes..."? Does this mean that there are many different communicative functions that get grammaticalized, and that the (by-)products of these multiple processes of grammaticalization are different morpho-syntactic constructions? If that's all it means, there is nothing earthshaking about it. I'll subscribe any time. On the other hand, it could also mean "there are no (strong!) general trends that characterize the diachronic rise of morpho-syntactic construction" (as the Campbell/Janda/Jacobs crowd would have it). This is is a substantive negative claim, one I don't see how one could accept. Having studied grammaticalization for ca. 40 years now, I'll have to take a strong exception to such an interpretation. What those of us who have spent a lifetime trying to understand the genesis of grammar (diachronically, ontogenetically, phylogenetiuvcally) would say is that there are VERY STRONG general tendencies--and principles--that characterize such a developmental process. Whether one would want to call them "theory", "rules" or "laws" is a matter of utter indifference to me. I would be satisfied with "high degree of generality" or "high degree of predictability". As the late Ernst Mayr said long ago, biological regularities are not like the laws of physics. They emerge out of multi-factored, complex, adaptive environments, where often adaptive factors clash with each other. So even the strongest regularities are less that 100% ("generative"). This has never discouraged biologists from seeking powerful theoretical explanations. Why should it discourage linguists? MAIN STEAM FUNCTIONALISM: Here is the other quote from Fritz: "...Where I part company with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are stated in the grammar itself...". First, I have no idea what Main Stream Functionalism is. For the record, I have never accepted the position that performance factors, such as frequency, are "stated in the grammar itself". They have, obviously, to be stated somewhere in the theory that explains how grammars arise, through the three developmental trends we know. So if we accept that in order to understand how "the grammar itself" arises diachronically, ontogenetically or phylogenetically, we must consider "performance factors", I would be quite happy to sign up on that, having spent a lifetime trying to understand just that. Once again, I would like to suggest an analogy from biology. In biological evolution, the interaction of adaptive behavior ("performance factors") with random genetic mutation is what actually controls adaptive selection--thus the emergence of new structures. Mutations don't do the trick by themselves. So there is a strong precedent for "performance factors" at least contributing to the genesis of structures. (If you want a more authoritative source than me, look up an article by Fernald & White (2000) in M. Gazanniga (ed.) "The New Cognitive Neouroscience", Cambridge:MIT Press). PS: It is a pity that FUNKNET does not allow attachments, because I have 4 (two diachronic, two child language) chapters strongly bearing on this discussion. I'll send them privately to anybody who expresses interest. They are also available on the Rice-lingfistics-12th-symposium website, I'm told). Peace, TG ========= Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > First, I would like to thank those of you who defended the > appropriateness of my posting and/or provided substantive comments on > the topics that I discussed in the paper. > > Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the > 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from > the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be > established. The converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that > rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if lists > can be established. Even if it were the case that a huge percentage of > language users' output could be characterized by lists (formulas, > fragments, etc.), that would not exclude their also have a grammar > composed of rules (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers > to analyze unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and > meaning. > > I have a couple of comments on Tom's useful posting of earlier today. > > 1. Tom says that 'Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization'. I > can't imagine what it would mean 'not to believe in > grammaticalization'. All that I have ever said in print is that what > is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of > interacting processes. There is no historical dimension to my > analysis, it is true, but that is because I endorsed (and briefly > outlined) Boye and Harder's account of the grammaticalization of > complement clauses, which brings in historical developments. By the > way, it is not always the case that in grammaticalization 'semantic > change precedes syntactic readjustment'. For examples of the opposite > order of events, see chapter 5 of my book 'Language Form and Language > Function'. > > 2. For quite a few years now I have endorsed the position that > grammars are to a large degree functionally motivated and that > frequency is an important factor shaping them. Where I part company > with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the > question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are > stated in the grammar itself. I think not, though, obviously this is a > complex and difficult question. I did not take up this question in my > paper because I believe that one can make a strong case that > sentential complements are syntactically subordinate and that grammars > are far more than 'fragments' and 'formulas' without addressing the > question of where the dividing line between competence and performance > might be. That's a topic for a different paper. > > Best, > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > >> >> >> >> Dear FUNK folks, >> >> I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least >> potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a >> while--serious substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's >> done us a service, however resentful of him some folks may be. I go >> with Barbara King in noting that the full article is available, and >> it is better to react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I have >> seen that article a couple of months ago, & read it in full, I think >> maybe I can share with you my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's >> raised. This comes out of private correspondence with Paul Hopper, >> who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's defense. Here goes: >> >> >> Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical >> arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL >> uses of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are >> not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically >> "grammaticalized" are not necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. >> Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by syntactic tests, >> independently of semantics. This, by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is >> a run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: Semantic change >> precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho of, course, Fritz does not >> believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of his >> own argument. >> >> What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental >> ("emeregent") components, which are well backed up (I think) by >> frequency counts: >> (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), >> V-COMP constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct >> speech-act) use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use >> (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the >> role of frequency distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed >> his lack of interest in development/emergence. And >> (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two >> developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency >> distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of >> these omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and >> his disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising >> usage frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's >> attitude is echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who >> believe only in emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of >> emergence. So all in all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting >> exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its internal >> contradictions, or at the very least, it's lack of explanatory ambition. >> >> The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage >> frequencies from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an >> explanation of what these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only >> meaningful in CONTRASTS: "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". >> And if not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some BASE OF >> COMPARISON--"what is the total population within which X appears a >> certain number of times?" So frequencies by themselves are not all >> that meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you want to test, >> you can formulate a frequency count in a way that would be >> meaningful--and test your hypothesis. >> >> This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came >> out with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The >> phenomenon was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) >> What was the frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic >> usage in particular texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do >> we have higher vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't >> interested in frequencies at the time, so I talked one of my grad >> students, Lynn Yang, into doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a >> two-part experimental study, one with two contrasting videos >> ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast of cultural >> familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two >> contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were >> quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon >> theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). >> >> >> Best, TG >> >> ===================== >> >> >> Paul Hopper wrote: >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives the >>> following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of >>> formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: >>> >>> A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is >>> A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: um A: so what are >>> your feelings on that [laughter >>> B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying calm >>> [laughter] >>> A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if you're >>> panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head clear >>> enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i don't >>> know if there was an explosion or something i don't it it's a shock >>> so i don't know that anybody can really think about it and >>> control themselves B: um B: right even with all the um B: (( >>> [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and media coverage you know that's >>> been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) >>> B: twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't >>> be Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic >>> expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and >>> possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript reveals >>> a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any meaningful >>> analysis in terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know how to handle >>> purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause attachment, >>> participial complements, and much more. If these are somehow to be >>> subsumed under the rubric of 'fragments', then I would say that this >>> infinitisemally small sample of natural speech would have to contain >>> at least two dozen fragments. How many more would be needed to >>> describe a typical speaker's daily output?" >>> >>> Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere >>> that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! >>> Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are >>> formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as >>> unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results are, >>> it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is indeed >>> stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are Google's, >>> of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with different trials. >>> - Paul >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about a >>> dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * is\. >>> >>> it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times >>> >>> what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times >>> >>> can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; staying calm\ occurs >>> 275,000 times >>> >>> nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times >>> >>> you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times >>> >>> i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice >>> >>> to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. >>> >>> to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times >>> >>> if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) >>> >>> it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times >>> >>> i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times can really think >>> about it\ occurs 69 times >>> >>> control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times >>> >>> even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times >>> >>> media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times >>> >>> on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times >>> >>> in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically with >>> "twenty", not just any number!] >>> >>> something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times >>> >>> able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> >>>> Dear Colleagues, >>>> >>>> What is to be the nature of Funknet? >>>> >>>> Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can discuss >>>> topics >>>> within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an ongoing >>>> conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" abstract Fritz >>>> Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so it >>>> cannot be >>>> responded to without reading the entire article. The controversial >>>> points >>>> he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this forum >>>> simply >>>> because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level >>>> response. Only >>>> another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to trash >>>> someone >>>> else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. >>>> >>>> It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the exchange of >>>> titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of ideas. >>>> >>>> - Paul >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Dear Funknetters, >>>>> >>>>> I think that some of you might be interested in the following >>>>> paper of mine: >>>>> >>>>> 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of Grammar' >>>>> >>>>> ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many functional >>>>> and cognitive linguists that the complex abstract structures >>>>> posited by generative grammarians are an artifact of 'disembodied >>>>> sentences that analysts have made up ad hoc, ... rather than >>>>> utterances produced by real >>>>> people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). Their view >>>>> is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring discourse', then >>>>> grammar >>>>> will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized formulas and >>>>> simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. Basing its >>>>> claims >>>>> on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues that the >>>>> nature >>>>> of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated engine for >>>>> representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a more specific >>>>> level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that evidence from >>>>> conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential complements >>>>> (e.g., >>>>> 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to go') are not >>>>> grammatically subordinate. >>>>> >>>>> The paper can be accessed at the following url: >>>>> >>>>> http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> >>>>> Fritz >>>>> >>>>> Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >>>>> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >>>>> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Mon Jun 9 22:18:06 2008 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 01:18:06 +0300 Subject: conversation and syntax In-Reply-To: <484DA19F.3030605@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: I agree that this is an interesting emerging discussion. Related to the grammaticalization and the ontological and epistemological status of linguistic rules, I would like to refer to my recent presentation "Linguistic Categories as Social Constructions" in Pisa, Italy. The main parts of the presentation are available at http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/lingcat_as_socialconstructions_honkela_excerpts.pdf For those interested, I recommend the slide 17 that summarizes the inherent subjectivity and intersubjectivity of concept formation and the 18 slide that takes that into the domain of the practice of theory formation within linguistics. Best regards, Timo Honkela On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > I think we are finally getting a discussion of interesting issues, so again we > should thank Fritz for initiating it, by whatever means. This once again > brings home the fact that ideological homogeneity is not necessarily good for > intellectual growth. Now, Fritz raises two issues that maybe I could respond > to. > > GRAMMATICALIZATION: What does it really mean (quote) "...[All that I have ever > said in print is that] what is called 'grammaticalization' is the by-product > of a number of interacting processes..."? Does this mean that there are many > different communicative functions that get grammaticalized, and that the > (by-)products of these multiple processes of grammaticalization are different > morpho-syntactic constructions? If that's all it means, there is nothing > earthshaking about it. I'll subscribe any time. On the other hand, it could > also mean "there are no (strong!) general trends that characterize the > diachronic rise of morpho-syntactic construction" (as the > Campbell/Janda/Jacobs crowd would have it). This is is a substantive negative > claim, one I don't see how one could accept. Having studied grammaticalization > for ca. 40 years now, I'll have to take a strong exception to such an > interpretation. What those of us who have spent a lifetime trying to > understand the genesis of grammar (diachronically, ontogenetically, > phylogenetiuvcally) would say is that there are VERY STRONG general > tendencies--and principles--that characterize such a developmental process. > Whether one would want to call them "theory", "rules" or "laws" is a matter of > utter indifference to me. I would be satisfied with "high degree of > generality" or "high degree of predictability". As the late Ernst Mayr said > long ago, biological regularities are not like the laws of physics. They > emerge out of multi-factored, complex, adaptive environments, where often > adaptive factors clash with each other. So even the strongest regularities are > less that 100% ("generative"). This has never discouraged biologists from > seeking powerful theoretical explanations. Why should it discourage linguists? > > MAIN STEAM FUNCTIONALISM: Here is the other quote from Fritz: "...Where I > part company with 'mainstream functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is > over the question of whether performance factors (including frequency) are > stated in the grammar itself...". First, I have no idea what Main Stream > Functionalism is. For the record, I have never accepted the position that > performance factors, such as frequency, are "stated in the grammar itself". > They have, obviously, to be stated somewhere in the theory that explains how > grammars arise, through the three developmental trends we know. So if we > accept that in order to understand how "the grammar itself" arises > diachronically, ontogenetically or phylogenetically, we must consider > "performance factors", I would be quite happy to sign up on that, having spent > a lifetime trying to understand just that. Once again, I would like to suggest > an analogy from biology. In biological evolution, the interaction of adaptive > behavior ("performance factors") with random genetic mutation is what actually > controls adaptive selection--thus the emergence of new structures. Mutations > don't do the trick by themselves. So there is a strong precedent for > "performance factors" at least contributing to the genesis of structures. (If > you want a more authoritative source than me, look up an article by Fernald & > White (2000) in M. Gazanniga (ed.) "The New Cognitive Neouroscience", > Cambridge:MIT Press). > > PS: It is a pity that FUNKNET does not allow attachments, because I have 4 > (two diachronic, two child language) chapters strongly bearing on this > discussion. I'll send them privately to anybody who expresses interest. They > are also available on the Rice-lingfistics-12th-symposium website, I'm told). > > Peace, TG > > ========= > > > > > Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > > First, I would like to thank those of you who defended the > > appropriateness of my posting and/or provided substantive comments on the > > topics that I discussed in the paper. > > > > Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the > > 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, that > > it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from the > > grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be established. The > > converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that rules have to be be > > excised from the grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even > > if it were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output > > could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would > > not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their > > notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar > > collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. > > > > I have a couple of comments on Tom's useful posting of earlier today. > > > > 1. Tom says that 'Fritz does not believe in grammaticalization'. I can't > > imagine what it would mean 'not to believe in grammaticalization'. All > > that I have ever said in print is that what is called > > 'grammaticalization' is the by-product of a number of interacting > > processes. There is no historical dimension to my analysis, it is true, > > but that is because I endorsed (and briefly outlined) Boye and Harder's > > account of the grammaticalization of complement clauses, which brings in > > historical developments. By the way, it is not always the case that in > > grammaticalization 'semantic change precedes syntactic readjustment'. For > > examples of the opposite order of events, see chapter 5 of my book > > 'Language Form and Language Function'. > > > > 2. For quite a few years now I have endorsed the position that grammars > > are to a large degree functionally motivated and that frequency is an > > important factor shaping them. Where I part company with 'mainstream > > functionalism' (if there is such a thing) is over the question of whether > > performance factors (including frequency) are stated in the grammar > > itself. I think not, though, obviously this is a complex and difficult > > question. I did not take up this question in my paper because I believe > > that one can make a strong case that sentential complements are > > syntactically subordinate and that grammars are far more than 'fragments' > > and 'formulas' without addressing the question of where the dividing line > > between competence and performance might be. That's a topic for a > > different paper. > > > > Best, > > > > --fritz > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > University > > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > On Mon, 9 Jun 2008, Tom Givon wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear FUNK folks, > > > > > > I think Fritz's article has already achieved something, at least > > > potentially, that has been absent from FUNKNET for quite a > > > while--serious substantive discussion of a relevant topic. So he's > > > done us a service, however resentful of him some folks may be. I go > > > with Barbara King in noting that the full article is available, and > > > it is better to react to it rather than to the abstract. Since I have > > > seen that article a couple of months ago, & read it in full, I think > > > maybe I can share with you my (very brief) take on the issues Fritz's > > > raised. This comes out of private correspondence with Paul Hopper, > > > who berated me for not jumping to Sandy's defense. Here goes: > > > > > > > > > Well , in my innocence I thought there were at least two empirical > > > arguments in Fritz's article. (i) Semantic: It is not true that ALL > > > uses of V-COMP constructions are the "grammaticalized" ones. Some are > > > not. And (ii) Syntactic: The uses that are semantically > > > "grammaticalized" are not necessarily syntactically one-clause--yet. > > > Syntactic properties have to be demonstrated by syntactic tests, > > > independently of semantics. This, by the way (unnoticed by Fritz) is > > > a run-of-the-mill observation in grammaticalization: Semantic change > > > precede syntactic re-adjustment. Tho of, course, Fritz does not > > > believe in grammaticalization, so he couldn't see this part of his > > > own argument. > > > > > > What was missing from Fritz' article were the developmental > > > ("emeregent") components, which are well backed up (I think) by > > > frequency counts: > > > (iii) That in diachrony & ontogeny (child language acquisition), > > > V-COMP constructions first emerge is the "grammaticalized" (direct > > > speech-act) use, and only later develop the other (two-clause) use > > > (Diessel 2005). This omission exposes Fritz's lack of interest in the > > > role of frequency distribution in the "emergence" of syntax, indeed > > > his lack of interest in development/emergence. And > > > (iv) The primacy of spoken language in these two > > > developmental/emergent processes, as demonstrated by frequency > > > distribution (in this case, of the "grammaticalized" sense). Both of > > > these omissions are due to Fritz' abiding faith in "competence", and > > > his disinterest in the role of "performance" (in this case, rising > > > usage frequency) in creating "competence" (syntax). But Fritz's > > > attitude is echoed by that of some confirmed functionalists, who > > > believe only in emergence but not in any RELATIVELY stable product of > > > emergence. So all in all, Fritz' article is indeed an interesting > > > exemplar, and people could benefit from seeing its internal > > > contradictions, or at the very least, it's lack of explanatory > > > ambition. > > > > > > The last comment I have goes to Paul's demonstration of usage > > > frequencies from Google. What I missed in his demonstration is an > > > explanation of what these frequencies mean. Frequency counts are only > > > meaningful in CONTRASTS: "X is frequent, as against Y that isn't". > > > And if not in x-y contrasts, than at least against some BASE OF > > > COMPARISON--"what is the total population within which X appears a > > > certain number of times?" So frequencies by themselves are not all > > > that meaningful. Still, if you have a hypothesis you want to test, > > > you can formulate a frequency count in a way that would be > > > meaningful--and test your hypothesis. > > > > > > This is, by the way, an argument I had with Andy Pawley when he came > > > out with his formulaic usage papers from the 1970s and 1980s. The > > > phenomenon was surely recognizable. What I wanted to know was (a) > > > What was the frequency distribution of formulaic vs. non formulaic > > > usage in particular texts. Or (b) in what communicative contexts do > > > we have higher vs. lower frequencies of formulaic usage. Andy wasn't > > > interested in frequencies at the time, so I talked one of my grad > > > students, Lynn Yang, into doing her MA thesis on this issue. It was a > > > two-part experimental study, one with two contrasting videos > > > ("Chicken story" vs. "Breakfast Story", a contrast of cultural > > > familiarity) the other with recorded coffee-shop chats under two > > > contrasting conditions (familiars vs. strangers). The results were > > > quite instructive. That MA thesis may be available wherever U. Oregon > > > theses are available (somewhere in cyberspace, I guess). > > > > > > > > > Best, TG > > > > > > ===================== > > > > > > > > > Paul Hopper wrote: > > > > Dear Colleagues, > > > > > > > > In Fritz Newmeyer's article on conversation and syntax, he gives > > > > the following example of a text in which an analysis in terms of > > > > formulaicity and formulaic fragments would be impossible: > > > > > > > > A: hi B: hi so did you hear what the topic is > > > > A: yes it's about terrorism right B: yeah B: um A: so what > > > > A: are > > > > your feelings on that [laughter > > > > B: i have [laughter] i personally can't imagine anyone staying > > > > calm [laughter] > > > > A: yeah nor can i yeah B: um you would even i- though if you're > > > > panicked i would assume you would try and B: keep your head > > > > clear enough to act to protect yourself but A: right A: yeah i > > > > don't know if there was an explosion or something i don't it it's > > > > a shock so i don't know that anybody can really think about it > > > > and > > > > control themselves B: um B: right even with all the um B: (( > > > > [sigh] the )) B: the publicity and media coverage you know > > > > that's been on that topic A: (( [mn] right )) > > > > B: twenty months it's still um B: is something that you wouldn't > > > > be Newmeyer writes (MS p. 13): "There are certainly formulaic > > > > expressions here: hi, right, take in stride, I don't think, and > > > > possibly a few others. But in other respects the transcript > > > > reveals a sophisticated knowledge of syntax that defies any > > > > meaningful analysis in terms of 'fragments'. The speakers know > > > > how to handle purpose clauses, wh-inversion, relative clause > > > > attachment, participial complements, and much more. If these are > > > > somehow to be subsumed under the rubric of 'fragments', then I > > > > would say that this infinitisemally small sample of natural > > > > speech would have to contain at least two dozen fragments. How > > > > many more would be needed to describe a typical speaker's daily > > > > output?" > > > > > > > > Regarding Fritz's last statement: Dwight Bolinger said somewhere > > > > that there's a reason the human brain has trillions of cells...! > > > > Well, I identified the groups of words that I would suspect are > > > > formulaic and typed them into Google.com to see if they were as > > > > unique (and therefore syntactic) as Fritz claims. The results > > > > are, it seems to me, consistent with the idea that the speaker is > > > > indeed stringing together formulaic fragments. The statistics are > > > > Google's, of course--they are rough and may fluctuate with > > > > different trials. > > > > - Paul > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > > > did you hear what the topic is\ "Topic" doesn't occur, but about > > > > a dozen other NPs do; the formula is: \did you hear what the * > > > > is\. > > > > > > > > it's about terrorism\ occurs 5,240 times > > > > > > > > what are your feelings on that\ occurs 266 times > > > > > > > > can't imagine anyone\ occurs 387,000 times; staying calm\ occurs > > > > 275,000 times > > > > > > > > nor can I\ occurs 1,210,000 times > > > > > > > > you're panicked\ occurs 2,090 times > > > > > > > > i would assume you would try and\ occurs twice > > > > > > > > to keep your head clear enough to\ occurs 14 times. > > > > > > > > to act to protect yourself\ occurs 14 times > > > > > > > > if there was an explosion or something\ occurs 6 times (!) > > > > > > > > it's a shock\ occurs 98,400 times > > > > > > > > i don't know that anybody\ occurs 17,900 times can really think > > > > about it\ occurs 69 times > > > > > > > > control themselves\ occurs 406,000 times > > > > > > > > even with all the publicity\ occurs 190 times > > > > > > > > media coverage\ occurs 295,000 times > > > > > > > > on that topic\ occurs 2,970,000 times > > > > > > > > in the last twenty months\ occurs 1,070 times [NB specifically > > > > with "twenty", not just any number!] > > > > > > > > something that you wouldn't be\ occurs 140 times > > > > > > > > able to take in stride\ occurs 289 times > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear Colleagues, > > > > > > > > > > What is to be the nature of Funknet? > > > > > > > > > > Most of us would think of it as an arena in which we can > > > > > discuss topics > > > > > within the/a functionalist paradigm by swapping ideas in an > > > > > ongoing > > > > > conversation. However, the polemical "article of faith" > > > > > abstract Fritz > > > > > Newmeyer has sent round contains no empirical arguments, so > > > > > it cannot be > > > > > responded to without reading the entire article. The > > > > > controversial points > > > > > he makes in the article will basically go unanswered in this > > > > > forum simply > > > > > because the genre of email doesn't permit a paradigm-level > > > > > response. Only > > > > > another article can respond to an article. So Fritz gets to > > > > > trash someone > > > > > else's work in public on the basis of a promissory note. > > > > > > > > > > It would be sad if Funknet became a clearing house for the > > > > > exchange of > > > > > titles and abstracts rather than the actual discussion of > > > > > ideas. > > > > > > > > > > - Paul > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear Funknetters, > > > > > > > > > > > > I think that some of you might be interested in the > > > > > > following paper of mine: > > > > > > > > > > > > 'What Conversational English Tells Us About the Nature of > > > > > > Grammar' > > > > > > > > > > > > ABSTRACT It has become an article of faith among many > > > > > > functional and cognitive linguists that the complex > > > > > > abstract structures posited by generative grammarians are > > > > > > an artifact of 'disembodied sentences that analysts have > > > > > > made up ad hoc, ... rather than utterances produced by > > > > > > real > > > > > > people in real discourse situations' (Michael Tomasello). > > > > > > Their view > > > > > > is that if one focuses on 'naturally occurring > > > > > > discourse', then grammar > > > > > > will reveal itself to be primarily a matter of memorized > > > > > > formulas and > > > > > > simple constructions. This paper challenges that view. > > > > > > Basing its claims > > > > > > on a 170MB corpus of conversational English, it argues > > > > > > that the nature > > > > > > of real discourse reinforces the need for a sophisticated > > > > > > engine for > > > > > > representing and accessing grammatical knowledge. At a > > > > > > more specific > > > > > > level, it challenges Sandra Thompson's claim that > > > > > > evidence from > > > > > > conversation leads to the conclusion that sentential > > > > > > complements (e.g., > > > > > > 'you're ready to go' in 'I guess you're ready to go') are > > > > > > not > > > > > > grammatically subordinate. > > > > > > > > > > > > The paper can be accessed at the following url: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/000679 > > > > > > > > > > > > Best wishes, > > > > > > > > > > > > Fritz > > > > > > > > > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of > > > > > > Washington > > > > > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and > > > > > > Simon Fraser > > > > > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by > > > > > > e-mail] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From tgivon at uoregon.edu Tue Jun 10 00:12:21 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 17:12:21 -0700 Subject: [Fwd: Web site for the 12th Rice symposium] Message-ID: From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Tue Jun 10 13:10:32 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 15:10:32 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone accepts them. Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should assume that they don't. Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that they need rules for their work. Martin Haspelmath Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called the > 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be excised from > the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them can be > established. The converse of this fallacy is equally fallacious: that > rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a language if lists > can be established. Even if it were the case that a huge percentage of > language users' output could be characterized by lists (formulas, > fragments, etc.), that would not exclude their also have a grammar > composed of rules (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers > to analyze unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and > meaning. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From jim.mischler at okstate.edu Tue Jun 10 13:40:18 2008 From: jim.mischler at okstate.edu (Mischler, Jim) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 08:40:18 -0500 Subject: [Fwd: Web site for the 12th Rice symposium] In-Reply-To: <484DC6E5.6010805@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: All, For some reason, Tom Givon's post with the URL for the 12th Rice Symposium on Language did not come through intact. In case this happened to others, below is the Web address for the 2008 Symposium papers. http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~eivs/sympo/program.html Jim Mischler Department of English Oklahoma State University jim.mischler at okstate.edu ________________________________________ From: funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu [funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu] On Behalf Of Tom Givon [tgivon at uoregon.edu] Sent: Monday, June 09, 2008 7:12 PM To: Funknet Subject: [FUNKNET] [Fwd: Web site for the 12th Rice symposium] From amnfn at well.com Tue Jun 10 13:37:01 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 06:37:01 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <484E7D48.8080802@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Here is what I see as the problem with the treatment of rules and lists in both the functionalist and the formalist camps: the assumption, seemingly unrebuttable, of universality. Some speakers are prone to rely heavily on lists; others rely heavily on rules. Some languages are highly regular, and others are highly irregular. (I am using "regular" here in the etymological sense of "rule-based.) Turkish and Hebrew are highly regular languages, and they promote rule-based behavior in their speakers. English has its regular vestiges, but it is tending toward irregularity, and this promotes list-based behavior on the part of its speakers. But besides language difference, there are also individual differences in language processing. Highly social people tend to jump ahead and try to determine from context what an utterance must have meant. Relatively asocial people, such as high functioning autistics, process in a more rule-based manner, and they tend to interpret utterance in this way. They also generate "stiff and pedantic" language specimens. The different strategies used by different speakers to interpret the same language point to the fact that there is more to language than the behavior of speakers. Context induced reinterpretation, one of the mechanisms that fosters grammaticalization, can only be possible if there is something there to be interpreted -- something independent of the mind or brain of the person who generated the utterance. Best, --Aya From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Tue Jun 10 16:27:22 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 11:27:22 -0500 Subject: Floating Listlessly Message-ID: Only if one assumes that classical morphemes are the theoretical bottom line do lists become absolutely necessary- and I'd guess that this is the position many, if not most, linguists hold. However, in some language types, having large numbers of ideophones, where connotation seems a bit more salient than denotation- the list concept may become less useful. One could easily conceive of an extreme form of such a system- a language where all strings are formulaic or rule based- where context determines their reading frame- even the particulars of form/meaning mapping. In the real world, however, such a language might be hard to live with, literally. Processing takes time- something speakers may not have the luxury of when they need to make split-second decisions. Shifts from iconicity at the phonological-featural level to lexical roots and compounds, then to derivational and inflectional morphology and so on, seem to be changes in hierarchical prioritization, partly motivated by temporal economy. The sample of real languages we see in the world today may not be representative of the total possible- something to consider when arguing about lists and rules. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From macw at cmu.edu Tue Jun 10 18:23:02 2008 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:23:02 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <484E7D48.8080802@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, This posting is not directly about the Newmeyer analysis, which seemed reasonable enough to me, but rather about the issue of the rule- list fallacy. Basically, my point here is that thinking of this as a dichotomy is useful for a first pass, but soon becomes inadequate when you think of actual mental processing. Within psycholinguistics, the interplay between lists and rules is the centerpiece of the debate between single and dual-route models. In the dual-route account, one route is rule (or rather combination with the result adjusted by rule) and the other is rote (or lists). Evidence for lists usually relies on the existence of exceptions to rules. Evidence for rules usually relies on productivity for new forms. In child language, productivity is also evidenced by overregularizations and other errors. This interplay between combination and rote occurs on every linguistic level. The most powerful model of dual-route interactions sees the two processes as engaged in a horse race. Both operate all the time, but the winner in a given case is determined by item strength and support. In 1986, Joe Stemberger and I provided evidence indicating that even regular forms such as "wanted" are occasionally produced by rote (or lists), since high frequency regulars are more resistant to speech errors phenomena then low-frequency regulars. If all regulars were produced by rule, this type of frequency effect should not obtain. One can also describe the rule-list interplay in a single-route connectionist model. However, in my opinion, such models simply involve recharacterizing rules as gang effects. And these models have to enforce special procedures to guarantee that lists can survive. In the end, they just recharacterize the dual route . So, I see no real way out of the idea of an interplay between processes and a horse race between forms. What does this mean for the FunkNet discussion? Basically, it means that, in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied. Given this inherent ambiguity of real data and the essentially competitive nature of the underlying process, only models that provide a fundamental role of dual-process interplay make contact with psychological reality. Fortunately, by examining the numbers in large corpora, one can get an idea of the overall strengths of the various horses, but that is about the best one can do and doing that right takes some care. Given this horse race view, I find it difficult to understand how one can view either rules or lists as the unmarked or default case or suggest that there is any null hypothesis regarding this interplay. One can entertain opposing null hypotheses, of course, but their half- life would be measured in seconds. --Brian MacWhinney From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Tue Jun 10 18:49:47 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:49:47 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Thanks a lot, Brian, for this very lucid explanation of the issues from a psycholinguistic point of view! I have long shared your view that "in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied" (my view is probably due to your influence, however indirectly!). This also makes me quite skeptical of "cognitive linguistics" of any sort ? the adjective "cognitive" sounds great, especially to linguists who don't know much about cognition, but it probably promises more than we can deliver as linguists. Concerning your last point: > Given this horse race view, I find it difficult to understand how one > can view either rules or lists as the unmarked or default case or > suggest that there is any null hypothesis regarding this interplay. > One can entertain opposing null hypotheses, of course, but their > half-life would be measured in seconds. What I meant is that rote processing and rule processing do not have the same status: Vervet monkeys and dogs are pretty good at rote processing, but to what extent they can deal with rules is unclear. Clearly, rote/list precedes rule phylogentically and ontogenetically, and while rote/list without rule can be fully functional, rule without rote/list is incoherent ? there wouldn't be anything for the rule to apply to. Thus, one cannot cite the Rule-List Fallacy as an argument against the claim that rules don't exist (as Newmeyer has done in his paper and in a recent Funknet message). Sometimes (e.g. in vervet monkeys) they really don't seem to exist, and maybe someone wants to argue that human language is likewise fully rote/list-based, without rules. Martin Brian MacWhinney wrote: > Dear Funknetters, > This posting is not directly about the Newmeyer analysis, which seemed > reasonable enough to me, but rather about the issue of the rule-list > fallacy. Basically, my point here is that thinking of this as a > dichotomy is useful for a first pass, but soon becomes inadequate when > you think of actual mental processing. > Within psycholinguistics, the interplay between lists and rules is the > centerpiece of the debate between single and dual-route models. In the > dual-route account, one route is rule (or rather combination with the > result adjusted by rule) and the other is rote (or lists). Evidence > for lists usually relies on the existence of exceptions to rules. > Evidence for rules usually relies on productivity for new forms. In > child language, productivity is also evidenced by overregularizations > and other errors. This interplay between combination and rote occurs > on every linguistic level. > The most powerful model of dual-route interactions sees the two > processes as engaged in a horse race. Both operate all the time, but > the winner in a given case is determined by item strength and support. > In 1986, Joe Stemberger and I provided evidence indicating that even > regular forms such as "wanted" are occasionally produced by rote (or > lists), since high frequency regulars are more resistant to speech > errors phenomena then low-frequency regulars. If all regulars were > produced by rule, this type of frequency effect should not obtain. > One can also describe the rule-list interplay in a single-route > connectionist model. However, in my opinion, such models simply > involve recharacterizing rules as gang effects. And these models have > to enforce special procedures to guarantee that lists can survive. In > the end, they just recharacterize the dual route . So, I see no real > way out of the idea of an interplay between processes and a horse race > between forms. > What does this mean for the FunkNet discussion? Basically, it means > that, in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a > given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if > a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, > can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied. Given this > inherent ambiguity of real data and the essentially competitive nature > of the underlying process, only models that provide a fundamental role > of dual-process interplay make contact with psychological reality. > Fortunately, by examining the numbers in large corpora, one can get an > idea of the overall strengths of the various horses, but that is about > the best one can do and doing that right takes some care. > Given this horse race view, I find it difficult to understand how one > can view either rules or lists as the unmarked or default case or > suggest that there is any null hypothesis regarding this interplay. > One can entertain opposing null hypotheses, of course, but their > half-life would be measured in seconds. > > --Brian MacWhinney > > -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From macw at cmu.edu Tue Jun 10 19:20:03 2008 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:20:03 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <001c01c8cb2b$e94c67b0$c0135981@ad.uwm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Edith and Martin, I think Martin makes an excellent point by emphasizing the phylogenetic primacy of rote. In that sense, perhaps there is a null hypothesis. I definitely see his point. Finding real syntactic rules in monkeys is a pretty tall order. But, maybe we need to think about this in more perceptual terms, along the lines Edith suggests. If we go back to real basics phylogenetically, we want to think about stimulus-response pairings such as the response of the female firefly to the shape of the blinking pattern of the male. To make this work, the series of blinks are more or less hard-wired into a single receptor neuron chain in the female. But, at this point, I wonder if we really have neither lists or rules, but rather the primordial neural soup from which both lists (unanalyzed amalgams) and rules (combined pieces) arise. At this point, I think that Edith's points are the crucial ones. Indeed, everything can be seen in terms of either its pieces or as a whole. Even more remarkably, it appears that the brain has come to provide methods for both forms of analysis. Don Tucker (Tom's neuropsychologist colleague at Oregon) likes to emphasize the interplay between the ventral path that tends to tear down items into their pieces and the dorsal path that assembles wholes. Unsurprisingly, it is the ventral path in humans that appears to be the one where rules are most clearly assembled. Others point to punctate processing in the left hemisphere and wholistic processing in the right. In general, the brain seems to follow these divisions between yin and yang with a vengeance. Given this, is it surprising to see this interplay being played out in language, both in conversation and across historical change? But, yes, Martin I also sympathize with your wariness of the application of the term "cognitive" as a magic wand for linguistic analysis. I think the hope is that corpora and richer streams of data recording can help us reduce this huge indeterminacy, but I can't see how it would ever vanish entirely, given the complex dynamics of the interplay. --Brian MacWhinney From fjn at u.washington.edu Tue Jun 10 19:24:14 2008 From: fjn at u.washington.edu (Frederick J Newmeyer) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 12:24:14 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <484E7D48.8080802@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null hypothesis. I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes indispensable. Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). --fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor Emeritus, University of Washington Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > asymmetry between rules and lists: > > While lists are a necessary component of all > semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > addition they may have rules. But the burden of > proof is on those who want to claim that they have > rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > the evidence for rules has been considered > overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > accepts them. > > Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > one could show that it is in fact possible to > explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > assume that they don't. > > Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > > But while I think that this particular argument is > invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > ideological preferences) find that they need rules > for their work. > > Martin Haspelmath > > Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron >> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. >> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, >> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have >> to be be excised from the grammar of a language >> if rules that subsume them can be established. >> The converse of this fallacy is equally >> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised >> from the grammar of a language if lists can be >> established. Even if it were the case that a >> huge percentage of language users' output could >> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, >> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a >> grammar composed of rules (or their notional >> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them >> structure and meaning. > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > > > From dlevere at ilstu.edu Tue Jun 10 19:27:59 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Daniel Everett) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:27:59 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Fritz, If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work it does at all, then I might see your point. See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they should be to use 'cognitive'. Dan On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > the null hypothesis. > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production and > all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me > that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the > picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes > indispensable. > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' > here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an > argument for rules (schemas, constructions). > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of morphemes, >> and then in addition they may have rules. But the burden of proof >> is on those who want to claim that they have rules (or schemas, or >> constructions). In general, the evidence for rules has been >> considered overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >> accepts them. >> >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple list >> of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a powerful >> argument against the existence of rules. In other words, the null >> hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if not >> enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >> assume that they don't. >> >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. The >> Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are defending >> the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all linguists >> (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that they need >> rules for their work. >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called >>> the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my >>> opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be >>> excised from the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them >>> can be established. The converse of this fallacy is equally >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a >>> language if lists can be established. Even if it were the case >>> that a huge percentage of language users' output could be >>> characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would not >>> exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their >>> notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar >>> collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> +49-341-980 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From giorgos at ling.ed.ac.uk Tue Jun 10 20:24:24 2008 From: giorgos at ling.ed.ac.uk (GP Argyropoulos) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:24:24 +0100 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi all, I know it's the time the great ones are talking, but allow me a minor contribution here: While it's certainly the case that studies on formulaic language almost exclusively emphasize language production (like Prof. Newmeyer suggested), this does not mean that sentence comprehension involves to any lesser extent such associative (rote learning, formulaic, etc) computations (yet sure, on its own at least that's no evidence for a "rote learning"-only explanation). See for example Townsend and Bever's (2001) LAST model for sentence comprehension, where an associative habit-based pseudosyntax preempts the categorical syntactic computations. So, preemption of rule processing can be found not only in phylogeny and ontogeny, but also in online language processing, be it in comprehension or production. What I strongly believe is that if we introduce a dynamic perspective to such distinctions, we will need to acknowledge "usage-induced" demotions from stage 2 to stage 1 in processing, which are very promising for explaining grammaticalization operations. Plus, if you ask me at least, this "yin-yang" distinction could also be found in the one between cortico-cortical and cortico-cerebellar processing (Terry Deacon has already suggested such role for the subcortical structures in general). But that's another story altogether... Cheers Giorgos Quoting Frederick J Newmeyer : > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis. > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production and > all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me that > once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the picture, the > need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes indispensable. > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. > I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed > to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument > for rules (schemas, constructions). > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University > [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of morphemes, >> and then in addition they may have rules. But the burden of proof >> is on those who want to claim that they have rules (or schemas, or >> constructions). In general, the evidence for rules has been >> considered overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >> accepts them. >> >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple list >> of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a powerful >> argument against the existence of rules. In other words, the null >> hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if not >> enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >> assume that they don't. >> >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. The >> Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are defending >> the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all linguists >> (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that they need >> rules for their work. >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has called >>> the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly in my >>> opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to be be >>> excised from the grammar of a language if rules that subsume them >>> can be established. The converse of this fallacy is equally >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the grammar of a >>> language if lists can be established. Even if it were the case >>> that a huge percentage of language users' output could be >>> characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that would not >>> exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules (or their >>> notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze unfamiliar >>> collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> +49-341-980 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Giorgos P. Argyropoulos http://gargyropoulos.googlepages.com/giorgosargyropoulos PhD student Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit Linguistics and English Language School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences University of Edinburgh Room 323, Adam Ferguson Building, 40 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LL, Scotland -- The University of Edinburgh is a charitable body, registered in Scotland, with registration number SC005336. From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 01:29:18 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 18:29:18 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: The rule-based approach and the list approach are functionally equivalent, when they produce the same results. Most of the time, they do produce the same results. This argument is all about processing and maximizing of processing resources: time vs. space. But surely there is more to language than the divergent strategies employed by speakers to process it, whether in production or comprehension. Some people use more memory. Others use less memory, but they process rules more rapidly. Some languages promote the one approach over the other. Some individuals have less grammatical capacity, but compensate through social cuing. Some are socially clueless, but their ability to follow formal rules allows them to decode messages without reference to the sender's state of mind. The more powerful theory would be one that explains how it is possible for speakers and hearers with highly divergent templates for language processing to understand each other's linguistic messages. In order to do this, we must focus on the properties of the language code itself. --Aya From dlevere at ilstu.edu Wed Jun 11 09:47:19 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 04:47:19 -0500 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Just to clarify what I said earlier. It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest way to describe them. If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong predictions. So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. Dan Quoting Daniel Everett : > Fritz, > > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work > it does at all, then I might see your point. > > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they > should be to use 'cognitive'. > > Dan > > > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be >> the null hypothesis. >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes >> indispensable. >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). >> >> --fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> University >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >>> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so >>> almost everyone accepts them. >>> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we >>> should assume that they don't. >>> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >>> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that >>> they need rules for their work. >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >>> -- >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >>> +49-341-980 1616 >>> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 12:39:31 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 05:39:31 -0700 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: <20080611044719.wh8xm6qi8osoow4s@isuwebmail.ilstu.edu> Message-ID: It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us the freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. Best, --Aya On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > Just to clarify what I said earlier. > > It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature > of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. > Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we > don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can > tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. > > And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a > necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also > plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the > shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might > themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the > grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at > MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab > (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent > progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their > parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it > is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest > way to describe them. > > If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then > discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong > predictions. > > So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to > capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's > remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. > > Dan > > Quoting Daniel Everett : > > > Fritz, > > > > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work > > it does at all, then I might see your point. > > > > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, > > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone > > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely > > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like > > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should > > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they > > should be to use 'cognitive'. > > > > Dan > > > > > > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > > > >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > >> the null hypothesis. > >> > >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production > >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me > >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the > >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes > >> indispensable. > >> > >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' > >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just > >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). > >> > >> --fritz > >> > >> Frederick J. Newmeyer > >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > >> University > >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > >> > >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> > >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List > >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language > >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: > >>> > >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, > >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of > >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the > >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules > >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for > >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so > >>> almost everyone accepts them. > >>> > >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show > >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by > >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple > >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a > >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, > >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if > >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we > >>> should assume that they don't. > >>> > >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null > >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules > >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does > >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. > >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >>> > >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy > >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince > >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed > >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are > >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all > >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that > >>> they need rules for their work. > >>> > >>> Martin Haspelmath > >>> > >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has > >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly > >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to > >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that > >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is > >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the > >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it > >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output > >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that > >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules > >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. > >>> -- > >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher > >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) > >>> +49-341-980 1616 > >>> > >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > > > From dlevere at ilstu.edu Wed Jun 11 12:36:17 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Dan Everett) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 07:36:17 -0500 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: Message-ID: We find indeterminacy in many places. For example, to borrow an illustration from a draft of someone else's paper, consider the fact that we could say for any pine tree it is possible to find another that has more needles. Yet this is not an argument that there is a pine tree with an infinite number of needles. There are various ways to derive such facts, generative grammars being only one, perhaps not the best, way to do so. Note too that a generative grammar with recursion cannot be proven to derive an infinite language either. Further, whether a sentence in any language can be extended or not, is an empirical question. I think that it is probably the case that there are languages for which a longest sentence, actually quite short, might be given. -- Dan Quoting "A. Katz" : > It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can > see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever > uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the > fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the > history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on > whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us the > freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, > but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows > us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. > > > Best, > > --Aya > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > >> Just to clarify what I said earlier. >> >> It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature >> of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. >> Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we >> don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can >> tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. >> >> And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a >> necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also >> plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the >> shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might >> themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the >> grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at >> MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab >> (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent >> progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their >> parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it >> is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest >> way to describe them. >> >> If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then >> discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong >> predictions. >> >> So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to >> capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's >> remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. >> >> Dan >> >> Quoting Daniel Everett : >> >> > Fritz, >> > >> > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work >> > it does at all, then I might see your point. >> > >> > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, >> > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone >> > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely >> > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like >> > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should >> > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they >> > should be to use 'cognitive'. >> > >> > Dan >> > >> > >> > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> > >> >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete >> >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be >> >> the null hypothesis. >> >> >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic >> >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on >> >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production >> >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in >> >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of >> >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me >> >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the >> >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes >> >> indispensable. >> >> >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' >> >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as >> >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just >> >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). >> >> >> >> --fritz >> >> >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer >> >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> >> University >> >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> >> >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List >> >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language >> >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >>> >> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, >> >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of >> >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the >> >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules >> >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for >> >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so >> >>> almost everyone accepts them. >> >>> >> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show >> >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by >> >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple >> >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a >> >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, >> >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if >> >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we >> >>> should assume that they don't. >> >>> >> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null >> >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules >> >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does >> >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. >> >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >>> >> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy >> >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince >> >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed >> >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are >> >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all >> >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that >> >>> they need rules for their work. >> >>> >> >>> Martin Haspelmath >> >>> >> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >> >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has >> >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly >> >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to >> >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that >> >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is >> >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the >> >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it >> >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output >> >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that >> >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules >> >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >> >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. >> >>> -- >> >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> >>> +49-341-980 1616 >> >>> >> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------- >> This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. >> >> >> > -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 14:01:28 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 07:01:28 -0700 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: <20080611073617.rn2zesmdc44sk84g@isuwebmail.ilstu.edu> Message-ID: Dan, I wasn't arguing in favor of infinity. I agree there is no such thing in language. I also agree that there are processing limitations that place an upper bound on sentence length. My point is something quite different. It's that someone can use an existing language to say something unexpected. This is immensely important, despite the fact that it very rarely happens. The statistical approach, with its emphasis on the average person, ignores the most important aspect of human language: that it leaves us free to express new ideas. Best, --Aya On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > We find indeterminacy in many places. For example, to borrow an > illustration from a draft of someone else's paper, consider the fact > that we could say for any pine tree it is possible to find another > that has more needles. Yet this is not an argument that there is a > pine tree with an infinite number of needles. > > > There are various ways to derive such facts, generative grammars being > only one, perhaps not the best, way to do so. Note too that a > generative grammar with recursion cannot be proven to derive an > infinite language either. > > Further, whether a sentence in any language can be extended or not, is > an empirical question. I think that it is probably the case that there > are languages for which a longest sentence, actually quite short, > might be given. > > -- Dan > > Quoting "A. Katz" : > > > It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can > > see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever > > uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the > > fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the > > history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on > > whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us the > > freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, > > but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows > > us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. > > > > > > Best, > > > > --Aya > > > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > > > >> Just to clarify what I said earlier. > >> > >> It isn't clear what 'discrete' adds to our understanding of the nature > >> of language since we already have to have linguistic units like words. > >> Since no one would utter half a word, based on what a SIGN is, we > >> don't need the mathematical concept of 'discrete' so far as I can > >> tell. Saussure already got this fact for us. > >> > >> And since no language can be proved to be infinite nor is infinitude a > >> necessary nor a sufficient condition for any language, 'infinity' also > >> plays no role in understanding language. Now, it is true that the > >> shortest grammars that describe many/all natural languages might > >> themselves generate infinite languages, but that is an artifact of the > >> grammar, not the language the grammar is describing. Recent work at > >> MIT (Brain and Cognitive Sciences) by Josh Tenenbaum and his lab > >> (http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html) has made some excellent > >> progress in offering ways to select among grammars based on their > >> parsimony. And parsimony is the big attraction to infinitude - but it > >> is not a fact about languages so far as I can tell, just the shortest > >> way to describe them. > >> > >> If I am correct that Piraha and other languages are finite, then > >> discrete infinity is not only unnecessary, it makes the wrong > >> predictions. > >> > >> So when someone says that our main task in describing language is to > >> capture its 'discrete infinity', then, to quote Paul Feyerabend's > >> remarks on people who take their views seriously, 'smell a rat'. > >> > >> Dan > >> > >> Quoting Daniel Everett : > >> > >> > Fritz, > >> > > >> > If anyone had a clear idea of what discrete infinity was or what work > >> > it does at all, then I might see your point. > >> > > >> > See the special recursion issue to appear from The Linguistic Review, > >> > based on papers from the MPI-ISU conference that I organized, or anyone > >> > of a number of recent papers by Geoff Pullum for some extremely > >> > interesting criticisms of linguists' ineptness in the use of terms like > >> > infinity and discrete in such contexts. Linguists by and large should > >> > be as wary of using math to justify analyses as Martin H advises they > >> > should be to use 'cognitive'. > >> > > >> > Dan > >> > > >> > > >> > On Jun 10, 2008, at 9:24 PM, Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >> > > >> >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > >> >> infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > >> >> the null hypothesis. > >> >> > >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > >> >> language. But my impression is that those who put such language on > >> >> centre stage (1) focus almost exclusively on language production > >> >> and all but ignore comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in > >> >> language users' ability to make judgments of well-formedness of > >> >> sentences that they have never heard. It seems self-evident to me > >> >> that once comprehension and judgment data are brought into the > >> >> picture, the need for rules (schemas, constructions) becomes > >> >> indispensable. > >> >> > >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' > >> >> here. I am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > >> >> opposed to, say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just > >> >> an argument for rules (schemas, constructions). > >> >> > >> >> --fritz > >> >> > >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer > >> >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > >> >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > >> >> University > >> >> [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > >> >> > >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> >> > >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the Rule-List > >> >>> Fallacy in the context of the argument about formulaic language > >> >>> overlooks a crucial asymmetry between rules and lists: > >> >>> > >> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all semiotic systems, > >> >>> rules are not. All languages must at least have lists of > >> >>> morphemes, and then in addition they may have rules. But the > >> >>> burden of proof is on those who want to claim that they have rules > >> >>> (or schemas, or constructions). In general, the evidence for > >> >>> rules has been considered overwhelming (in all languages), so > >> >>> almost everyone accepts them. > >> >>> > >> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If one could show > >> >>> that it is in fact possible to explain speakers' behaviour by > >> >>> claiming that their knowledge of language consists of a simple > >> >>> list of morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be a > >> >>> powerful argument against the existence of rules. In other words, > >> >>> the null hypothesis should be that languages have no rules, and if > >> >>> not enough evidence can be found to reject this hypothesis, we > >> >>> should assume that they don't. > >> >>> > >> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: The null > >> >>> hypothesis cannot be that languages have no lists, but only rules > >> >>> -- languages must have lists. So if one discovers rules, this does > >> >>> not mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as lists. > >> >>> The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >> >>> > >> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is invalid, Sandy > >> >>> Thompson and Paul Hopper will need to do a lot more to convince > >> >>> linguists that no rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed > >> >>> to explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they are > >> >>> defending the null hypothesis, but in actual practice, almost all > >> >>> linguists (regardless of their ideological preferences) find that > >> >>> they need rules for their work. > >> >>> > >> >>> Martin Haspelmath > >> >>> > >> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >> >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron Langacker has > >> >>>> called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. Ron noted, completely correctly > >> >>>> in my opinion, that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have to > >> >>>> be be excised from the grammar of a language if rules that > >> >>>> subsume them can be established. The converse of this fallacy is > >> >>>> equally fallacious: that rules have to be be excised from the > >> >>>> grammar of a language if lists can be established. Even if it > >> >>>> were the case that a huge percentage of language users' output > >> >>>> could be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, etc.), that > >> >>>> would not exclude their also have a grammar composed of rules > >> >>>> (or their notional equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >> >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them structure and meaning. > >> >>> -- > >> >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >> >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher > >> >>> Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) > >> >>> +49-341-980 1616 > >> >>> > >> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >> >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -------------------------------------------------------------- > >> This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Wed Jun 11 16:31:10 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 11:31:10 -0500 Subject: Discrete Infinity Message-ID: Are all languages equal, though, in their ability to say new things? For example, where languages have reduced numbers of morphemes (as in polysynthetic types, according to Fortescue), it might be harder to get at a particular concept unless you either compare it to something else not quite identical, or coin a new lexical root, etc. In extreme cases what we normally think of as open classes can be closed. Not directly related to DI, perhaps, but part of the overall system. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 11 19:20:43 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:20:43 -0500 Subject: Re the rule-list fallacy Message-ID: Martin Haspelmath wrote: Thanks a lot, Brian, for this very lucid explanation of the issues from a psycholinguistic point of view! I have long shared your view that "in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied" (my view is probably due to your influence, however indirectly!). This also makes me quite skeptical of "cognitive linguistics" of any sort ? the adjective "cognitive" sounds great, especially to linguists who don't know much about cognition, but it probably promises more than we can deliver as linguists. and Brian MacWhinney responded: > yes, Martin I also sympathize with your wariness of the > application of the term "cognitive" as a magic wand for linguistic > analysis. I think the hope is that corpora and richer streams of data > recording can help us reduce this huge indeterminacy, but I can't see > how it would ever vanish entirely, given the complex dynamics of the > interplay. To be sure, "cognitive" can be simply an impressive but empty buzzword. It can also be somewhat more legitimately used to describe a linguistics that hopes to be at least cognitively plausible and at best responsive to all the solid conclusions of cognitive psychology. In the case at hand, I do not follow Martin's logic, which I understand to be going from (a) we can almost never know for sure if something was produced by rote or by rule, to (b) we as linguists cannot deliver on a "cognitive linguistics" of any sort. Brian's answer, as well, seems to suggest that, as long as we cannot make the indeterminacy vanish entirely, or at least reduce it greatly, we do not have a linguistic analysis . What about a linguistics that would embrace the indeterminacy? What about one that would say precisely "we cannot, in the absence of empirical evidence, definitively say if something was produced by rote or by rule"? That would refuse to say that "since some Derived Nominals are related to their corresponding verbs only in an irregular fashion, DN's as a class are not produced by the grammar but rather listed in the lexicon " (my paraphrase of Newmeyer 1980 summarizing Chomsky 1967). And that would say that when Martin Haspelmath wrote "explanation" in his email of 10 June 08 at 1:49 pm, he almost certainly got the word "off the shelf" (i.e. from a list), but that without having measured his brain functions at that time, in ways we do not yet know how to do, we cannot know for a fact that no rules or gang effects were active in the process. In the end the question of whether a structure was produced by rote or by rule doesn't seem, in many cases at least, to be crucial for communication ?a speaker may use either or both and a hearer use the opposite mechanism or the same one or both, and adequate communication can take place. So why does it have to be crucial for linguistics? If I have to choose between a linguistics that is determinate (absolutely predictive, yielding crisp judgements) and one that leads me to expect the indeterminacies that are there empirically in language, I prefer the latter. --David Tuggy From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 11 19:31:49 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:31:49 -0500 Subject: Re Discrete Infinity Message-ID: In what way are original sentences (or even original clauses) rare? How often will any of the sentences in Aya's post, or this one, have been produced in the history of the world? And even if some of them ever were, would that mean that Aya copied them, rather than producing them as, for her, effectively original sentences? --David Tuggy A. Katz wrote: > It seems we are all agreed that the issue isn't infinity. As far as I can > see, it's indeterminate length. Despite the fact that no person has ever > uttered an infinitely long utterance -- nor ever will -- and despite the > fact that the inventory of actually spoken sentences throughout the > history of any language is also a finite number, the upper bound on > whatever that finite number is is indeterminate. That is what gives us > the > freedom to say something original. Granted, original sentences are rare, > but the possibility of having them crop up is a very big deal. It allows > us to express new ideas, if and when they occur to us. > > > Best, > > --Aya > From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 11 19:33:05 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:33:05 -0500 Subject: Re Discrete Infinity Message-ID: Right. But isn't the point (or shouldn't the point be) that when we make original structures of whatever size we typically do so by stringing together in novel ways smaller structures or established sequences of structures? It seems obvious to me that original morphemes will (in every language) be pretty rare, original stems will be a bit more common but still likely rarer than original words, original words rarer than original phrases, original phrases than original clauses, original clauses than original sentences, and so on up the hierarchy of levels of complexity. (That is of course relatively speaking: i.e. each level will have a higher percentage of original structures than the next lower one, not necessarily a higher absolute number. I can easily imagine that more original sentences than original discourse sections might be produced in a language where most utterances did not rise to the level of sections. For many languages the stem/word level distinction may be irrelevant to such an extent that both levels would be manifest in all of the same structures. And of course otherwise comparable levels need not correspond all that well in this regard across languages: original Nahuatl words are much more common than original English words because Nahuatl does so much more in the morphology.) A structure does not cease to be original because it has pre-established parts. I believe it was Langacker who said that "our vaunted linguistic creativity typically reduces to stringing a few clich?s together to make a sentence", and I think there is something very right about that. But it certainly does not deny creativity in the stringing of those clich?s together. And that creativity is a very big deal. Which I think was your main point. --David T A. Katz wrote: > Good point. > > I'm willing to concede that original sentences as such may not be that > rare. However, I think many of our colleagues might like to suggest that > if we did a search, we might find many of the sequences of words occurring > in these sentences have been used by others. > > --Aya > > > > > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008, David Tuggy wrote: > > >> In what way are original sentences (or even original clauses) rare? How >> often will any of the sentences in Aya's post, or this one, have been >> produced in the history of the world? And even if some of them ever >> were, would that mean that Aya copied them, rather than producing them >> as, for him, effectively original sentences? >> >> --David Tuggy >> > From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 11 21:05:11 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:05:11 -0700 Subject: Discrete Infinity In-Reply-To: <5883974.1213201870926.JavaMail.root@elwamui-little.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: But surely new words can very easily be derived in these languages. Isn't that so? --Aya On Wed, 11 Jun 2008, jess tauber wrote: > Are all languages equal, though, in their ability to say new things? > > For example, where languages have reduced numbers of morphemes (as in polysynthetic types, according to Fortescue), it might be harder to get at a particular concept unless you either compare it to something else not quite identical, or coin a new lexical root, etc. In extreme cases what we normally think of as open classes can be closed. > > Not directly related to DI, perhaps, but part of the overall system. > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Jun 12 01:35:55 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 18:35:55 -0700 Subject: Re the rule-list fallacy In-Reply-To: <4850258B.9080608@sil.org> Message-ID: Before everybody concedes to Martin his disdain for "cognitive", I'd like to maybe help him qualify his statement just a bit. Yes, we know people who say "cognitive" as a convenient slogan or as a sales pitch. No need to mention names. The test is actually quite simple: If the "cognitive" categories you propose are 100% isomorphic to your linguistic analysis done beforehand through purely linguistic methods, that was done with purely linguistic methods and without reference to the methodologically-independent neuro-cognitive literature, then chances are you are one of those people Martin frowns upon. But I hope Martin knows other people too, those who don't use "cognitive" as a convenient label, but try to keep up with the lit. of both cognition and neurology, and for an excellent reason: They know (or is it 'suspect'?) that if you develop a theory of language without letting it be strongly constrained by what is known about neuro-cognition, there is absolutely no guarantee that your theory is anything but a descriptive and/or methodological convenience, or a formalism driven by parsimony alone. Of course, among people who call themselves functionalists there are quite a few who don't want to bother with being accountable to cognition & neurology. We all have only one lifetime, alas. And as Leonard Bloomfield said, let other disciplines handle that. We'll stick to the facts of language. I don't begrudge people their myopia, or lack of ambition. But as far as I can see, we are slowly running out of purely linguistic facts. They are getting kinda skinny. So for people who have slightly more ambitious goals than just describing, I think trying to understand the neuro-cognition of language is a legitimate pursuit. After all, if you are for "usage" and "performance", where the heck do you think the real site of usage & performance is? Show me a language usage/performance outside the mind/brain & I'll show you a one-legged horse. y'all keep on truckin', TG ======== David Tuggy wrote: > Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > Thanks a lot, Brian, for this very lucid explanation of the issues > from a psycholinguistic point of view! I have long shared your view > that "in a given usage of a particular form by a given person at a > given moment, one seldom knows whether rules or lists applied. Only if > a clear productive overgeneralization occurs, and this is very rare, > can one know for sure that a rule or gang effect applied" (my view is > probably due to your influence, however indirectly!). This also makes > me quite skeptical of "cognitive linguistics" of any sort -- the > adjective "cognitive" sounds great, especially to linguists who don't > know much about cognition, but it probably promises more than we can > deliver as linguists. > > and Brian MacWhinney responded: >> yes, Martin I also sympathize with your wariness of the >> application of the term "cognitive" as a magic wand for linguistic >> analysis. I think the hope is that corpora and richer streams of data >> recording can help us reduce this huge indeterminacy, but I can't see >> how it would ever vanish entirely, given the complex dynamics of the >> interplay. > To be sure, "cognitive" can be simply an impressive but empty > buzzword. It can also be somewhat more legitimately used to describe a > linguistics that hopes to be at least cognitively plausible and at > best responsive to all the solid conclusions of cognitive psychology. > > In the case at hand, I do not follow Martin's logic, which I > understand to be going from (a) we can almost never know for sure if > something was produced by rote or by rule, to (b) we as linguists > cannot deliver on a "cognitive linguistics" of any sort. Brian's > answer, as well, seems to suggest that, as long as we cannot make the > indeterminacy vanish entirely, or at least reduce it greatly, we do > not have a linguistic analysis . > > What about a linguistics that would embrace the indeterminacy? What > about one that would say precisely "we cannot, in the absence of > empirical evidence, definitively say if something was produced by rote > or by rule"? That would refuse to say that "since some Derived > Nominals are related to their corresponding verbs only in an irregular > fashion, DN's as a class are not produced by the grammar but rather > listed in the lexicon " (my paraphrase of Newmeyer 1980 summarizing > Chomsky 1967). And that would say that when Martin Haspelmath wrote > "explanation" in his email of 10 June 08 at 1:49 pm, he almost > certainly got the word "off the shelf" (i.e. from a list), but that > without having measured his brain functions at that time, in ways we > do not yet know how to do, we cannot know for a fact that no rules or > gang effects were active in the process. > > In the end the question of whether a structure was produced by rote or > by rule doesn't seem, in many cases at least, to be crucial for > communication ---a speaker may use either or both and a hearer use the > opposite mechanism or the same one or both, and adequate communication > can take place. So why does it have to be crucial for linguistics? > > If I have to choose between a linguistics that is determinate > (absolutely predictive, yielding crisp judgements) and one that leads > me to expect the indeterminacies that are there empirically in > language, I prefer the latter. > > --David Tuggy > From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Jun 12 10:46:12 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 12:46:12 +0200 Subject: "cognitive linguistics" In-Reply-To: <48507D7B.9080101@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Thanks, Tom, for elaborating on my point: > If the "cognitive" categories you propose are 100% isomorphic to your > linguistic analysis done beforehand through purely linguistic methods, > that was done with purely linguistic methods and without reference to > the methodologically-independent neuro-cognitive literature, then > chances are you are one of those people Martin frowns upon. Yes, and what most linguists (who work on language structure) do most of the time is to provide descriptions, or "analyses", of language patterns, with purely linguistic methods. This keeps them busy enough, but because of the rule/list indeterminacy explained by Brian MacWhinney, it's often too rash to jump to "cognitive" conclusions. This concerns mostly generative linguistics (where the equation of linguist's analysis with cognitive pattern is part of the underlying ideology), but to some extent also non-generative linguistics. > So for people who have slightly more ambitious goals than just > describing, I think trying to understand the neuro-cognition of > language is a legitimate pursuit. Yes, but explanation comes after description/analysis, and we need quite a bit of the latter before we can go on to venture explanations. In particular, we generally need to identify universal patterns before we can propose cognitive explanations. This is also the point of Lazard (2007), the great French typologist who declares that "la linguistique cognitive n'existe pas", meaning that cognitive explanation comes only at the very end of a description-comparison-generalization process (and somewhat arbitrarily, he places cognitive explanation just outside linguistics proper). This was also the point of my 2004 paper: When I say that explanation does not presuppose description, I mean cognitive description and cognitive/functional explanation. We can formulate generalizations over non-cognitive ("phenomenological") descriptions and these have to be explained in cognitive/functional terms. It's not necessary to have cognitive descriptions before we can come up with universals and explanations for them (pace Newmeyer 1998). One other thing that I find lacking in much of current practice is the social aspect of language. The cognitive perspective is crucial, but without its social side, one wouldn't understand why languages are so uniform and why they can change. And without changing, languages wouldn't be able to adapt. As Aya Katz reminded us, it's quite possible that different speakers make different choices with respect to rules and lista. But they still produce remarkably similar outputs: While they may use different cognitive routes, they all want to fit into the same social structure. Without a social perspective, we wouldn't understand why there are languages, not just idolects. The only cognitive linguist I know who has really thought this through is Bill Croft ("Explaining language change", 2000). My sense is that the general overemphasis on cognitive over social patterns is another part of the heritage from Chomsky's obsession with the philosophy of mind. Martin ****** References and abstracts Haspelmath, Martin. 2004. "Does linguistic explanation presuppose linguistic description?" /Studies in Language/ 28.3: 554-579 (cf. http://email.eva.mpg.de/~haspelmt/publist.html) I argue that the following two assumptions are incorrect: (i) The properties of the innate Universal Grammar can be discovered by comparing language systems, and (ii) functional explanation of language structure presupposes a "correct", i.e. cognitively realistic, description. Thus, there are two ways in which linguistic explanation does not presuppose linguistic description. The generative program of building cross-linguistic generalizations into the hypothesized Universal Grammar cannot succeed because the actually observed generalizations are typically one-way implications or implicational scales, and because they typically have exceptions. The cross-linguistic generalizations are much more plausibly due to functional factors. I distinguish sharply between "phenomenological description" (which makes no claims about mental reality) and "cognitively realistic description", and I show that for functional explanation, phenomenological description is sufficient. Lazard, Gilbert. 2007. "La linguistique cognitive n'existe pas." (=Cognitive linguitics does not exist.) /Bulletin de la Soci?t? de Linguistique de Paris/ 102(1). 3?16. (http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=2028196&journal_code=BSL) L?expression ?linguistique cognitive? n?a de sens que dans le contexte de la linguistique am?ricaine, o? elle signifie l?opposition ? la grammaire g?n?rative et ? la conception du langage comme un module autonome. Hors de ce contexte, elle ne d?signe en fait que le retour ? une conception traditionnelle du langage, de la langue et de la linguistique. Elle risque cependant de faire perdre de vue la sp?cificit? de l?analyse des structures des langues. The notion of cognitive linguistics is only meaningful in connection with American linguistics, where it means opposition to Generative Grammar and to the conception of language as an autonomous module. Out of that context, it merely means a return to the traditional conception of language and linguistics. However, it involves the risk of downplaying the specificity of the analysis of language structures. Newmeyer, Frederick J. 1998. Language form and language function. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de Thu Jun 12 14:11:42 2008 From: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 16:11:42 +0200 Subject: "cognitive linguistics" In-Reply-To: <4850FE74.2020803@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, hitherto, I had been a silent reader of the current debate, but Martin's last posting drives me to a brief comment: Martin writes: > (...) (what most linguists (who work on language structure) do most of > the time is to provide descriptions, or "analyses", of language > patterns, with purely linguistic methods. This keeps them busy enough, > but because of the rule/list indeterminacy explained by Brian > MacWhinney, it's often too rash to jump to "cognitive" conclusions. > This concerns mostly generative linguistics (where the equation of > linguist's analysis with cognitive pattern is part of the underlying > ideology), but to some extent also non-generative linguistics. Starting from the (rather obvious) hypothesis that language production/comprehension is a cognitive 'event' embodied in individual cognitions leads us to the assumption that the 'mechanisms' for language production and comprehension are cognitive, too. What else should they be? Sure, this claim needs a more detailed definition of what 'cognition' is. To make it brief: In my eyes, the answer is quite 'simple': 'Cognition' is the functional behavior (or, functionality, if you want) of the neural substrate as such (related to the 'brain' in its broadest sense). In this broader perspective, the term 'Cognitive linguistics' becomes a tautology. Language IS cognitive, and hence Linguistics must be based on or described in terms of some sort of cognitivsm. I think this is rather trivial. But what is not trivial is the question of methodology: > (...) explanation comes after description/analysis, and we need quite > a bit of the latter before we can go on to venture explanations. In > particular, we generally need to identify universal patterns before we > can propose cognitive explanations. This is also the point of Lazard > (2007), the great French typologist who declares that "la linguistique > cognitive n'existe pas", meaning that cognitive explanation comes only > at the very end of a description-comparison-generalization process > (and somewhat arbitrarily, he places cognitive explanation just > outside linguistics proper). Before we can come to description-comparison-generalization, we have to make another step, namely that from phenomenology to (horribile dictu) 'objectivism'. The history of linguistics and the great diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches illustrate that linguistic 'data' are not 'objects' as such which can be 'described/compared' etc., but 'phenomena' the 'gestalt' of which heavily depends from the 'observer'. In this sense, linguistics is not a 'science of objects' (if ever such a science does exist at all), but a 'science of phenomena'. Sure, there are certain aspects of language that can be described in terms near to what one may call an 'object', e.g. articulatory processes in phonetics. However, this is not yet 'linguistics', but the analysis of language-related human articulation. The 'object' turns into a phenomenon as soon as we introduce the layer of function/semantics etc. And it is eher, where phenomenolgy because crucial. Thus we have to develop a sound methodology that a) accounts for the phenomenology of linguistics (and, as a consequence, for the relation between 'observer' and language phenomena); and b) that allows to heuristically (!) establish 'language objects'. This is by far not trivial, because we know that redefining phenomena as 'objects' always depends from the scientific paradigm we live by. An example for this is the Saussurian early 20th century understanding (and celebration) of 'systems', ending in the famous quote 'un syst?me o? tout se tient' (probably coined by Meillet perhaps taking up a wording by Hans Georg von der Gabelentz). Today, we may want to turn this phrase around: 'Un syst?me o? tout d?pend'. On the other hand, no description/comparison etc. can be done without prior deductions, be they overt of covert. We have to know what we want to describe - and this knowledge stems from deductions and/or abductions. Now, if we start from the hypothesis that everything is language is cognition-based or cognition-driven, we logically come to the conclusion that the cognitive domain and its modeling should be the immediate source for relevant deductions. So, a proper way of augmenting Martin's methodological path would be to to start from what we currently know about cognition and to relate its architecture to the (observed!) architecture of language. All I want to say is that descriptivism itself is part of the phenomenology of language. There does not exist - in my humble mind - a kind of descriptivism 'as such' provoked by the very 'nature' of its 'objects'. This not not mean that descriptivism would play a minor role in the methodology of linguistics. I fully agree with Martin when he says that 'description' has priority. But I have difficulties to see that there is only one way of describing these 'objects'. And just because there are many such ways, we need some kind of theory that explains to us the heuristics of the descriptive approach chosen in a given treatment of our 'descriptive units' (once they have been isolated). This method naturally again depends from the type of model we chose for 'cognition': A modular hypothesis yields different results for the descriptive level than a gestalt-based, holistic one. In a gestalt-based approach, for instance, building blocks do not play a decisive role. Accordingly, one would not start from 'phonemes' as the basic descriptive units, being arranged in terms of 'words' -> phrases > sentences etc. Rather, one would claim that the syllable is the basic unit of language being 'gestaltet' (configurated) by articulatory variation. The same would hold for the descriptive hierarchy of other linguistic 'units'. Concerning the second point Martin made: > One other thing that I find lacking in much of current practice is the > social aspect of language. The cognitive perspective is crucial, but > without its social side, one wouldn't understand why languages are so > uniform and why they can change. And without changing, languages > wouldn't be able to adapt. As Aya Katz reminded us, it's quite > possible that different speakers make different choices with respect > to rules and lista. But they still produce remarkably similar outputs: > While they may use different cognitive routes, they all want to fit > into the same social structure. Without a social perspective, we > wouldn't understand why there are languages, not just idolects. The > only cognitive linguist I know who has really thought this through is > Bill Croft ("Explaining language change", 2000). My sense is that the > general overemphasis on cognitive over social patterns is another part > of the heritage from Chomsky's obsession with the philosophy of mind. Personally, I cannot see a dichotomy between 'cognitive' and 'social' aspects of language. An adequate cognitivism would easily integrate the social dimension, be it in the tradition of Mead, Vygostkij, Durkheim, Mauss, or whosoever, or in the tradition of (e.g.) Radical Constructivism. Again, we have to start from the hypothesis that 'social' parameters are produced and processed by the cognition of individuals. The social dimension (embodied in cognition by adaption, imitation etc.) is a subfunction of the functionality of cognition, or - as one might call it - a cognitive construction established by cognition in order to 'make sense' of its imitation/adaptation processes. Logically, social parameters of language would be immediately related to this cognitive construction. Just one linguistic example: The personal pronouns 'I' and 'you' (EGO/TU) are conventionally related to and grounded in a social parameter, namely that of interaction (speaker/hearer etc.). However, from a cognitive point of view (and we can corroborate this with the help of linguistic data), EGO plays a role different from TU: EGO is strongly referential, whereas TU is deictic in nature. This means that the two concept originally do not share a common paradigm. The integration of EGO and TU into a common paradigm stems from just this cognitive construction that helps a cognition out of its isolation. In other words: The social dimension of language is - in my eyes - an integral part of cognition, just as a 'language system' is.... P.S: I have outlined some of the ideas mentioned in this posting in a paper that still is print. A pre-final version can be downloaded from http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/fsjmz.pdf (in German!). Best wishes, Wolfgang -- ---------------------------------------------------------- *Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze * ---------------------------------------------------------- /Primary contact: / Institut f?r Allgemeine & Typologische Sprachwissenschaft Dept. II / F 13 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit?t M?nchen Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 D-80539 M?nchen Tel.: 0049-(0)89-2180-2486 (Secretary) 0049-(0)89-2180-5343 (Office) Fax: 0049-(0)89-2180-5345 Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de /// Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Web: New page (change bookmarks!): http://www.ats.lmu.de/index.html Personal homepage: http://www.wolfgangschulze.in-devir.com ---------------------------------------------------------- /Second contact: / Katedra Germanistik? Fakulta humanitn?ch vied Univerzita Mateja B?la / Bansk? Bystrica Tajovsk?ho 40 SK-97401 Bansk? Bystrica Tel: (00421)-(0)48-4465108 Fax: (00421)-(0)48-4465512 Email: Schulze at fhv.umb.sk Web: http://www.fhv.umb.sk/app/user.php?user=schulze ---------------------------------------------------------- From amnfn at well.com Fri Jun 13 13:29:09 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 06:29:09 -0700 Subject: "cognitive linguistics" In-Reply-To: <48512E9E.2080704@lrz.uni-muenchen.de> Message-ID: Language is a kind of phenomenon, I agree. It has concrete manifestations, but it itself is abstract. It can be instantiated in many different ways: auditory, visual and tactile. While its origin is biological, in the sense that living entities are where it first arose, today there are non-animate entities that are pretty good at simulating it. The other day I called directory assistance to get the number of Staples in Rolla, Missouri. A computer generated voice tried to ask me what listing I wanted, and then it had trouble understanding what I said. "Do you want the listing of Staples in Sioux Falls, South Dakota?" I tried to enunciate as clearly as possible: "No." At this point, the AI construct switched me over to a real human. Despite the difficulties with speech recognition, it works amazingly well. We were on the same general topic, it understood I was looking for a Staples outlet, but it couldn't understand "Rolla, Missouri" as pronounced by me. More significantly, I understood every word it said. To me, it was like any other conversation -- some understanding, some misunderstanding, and a cooperative effort to get the information across. Soon AI constructs will do even better, and we won't be able to tell them apart from real people. The Turing test is a wonderful way to determine what language really is. By the same token, Alex the parrot, with his avian brain and quite distinct articulatory system, was able to have meaningful conversations about colors, numbers and feelings, in English. I have had the experience of a common chimpanzee letting me know that the bonobo sounds he was listening to were in fact English. It didn't sound like English to me, but Bow could recognize the bonobo sounds that Kanzi used to stand for the contrasting phonemes of English. There is fMRI data to show that autistics have different activation patterns from non-autistics in lexical retrieval tasks, even though their performance is comparable. When I say that the language code will not be cracked through close attention to brain patterns, I am not motivated by a disdain for hard science or biology. All the hard evidence indicates that language is a portable code which is very flexible as to its particular instantiations. There is more than one way to produce language correctly. It's not how you produce it that's important. The meaning is in the contrasts. Best, --Aya From paul at benjamins.com Fri Jun 13 15:27:58 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 11:27:58 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins book: Verhoeven Message-ID: Experiential Constructions in Yucatec Maya A typologically based analysis of a functional domain in a Mayan language Elisabeth Verhoeven University of Bremen Studies in Language Companion Series 87 2007. xiv, 380 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 3097 3 / EUR 120.00 / USD 180.00 This book combines a fieldwork-based language-specific analysis with a typological investigation. It offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the form and semantics of experiencer constructions in Yucatec, the Mayan language of the Yucatecan peninsula in Mexico. Since the linguistic expression of experience is not restricted to a specific grammatical area the study touches a great variety of grammatical fields in the language such as argument structure, grammatical relations, possessive constructions, subordinate constructions, etc. The empirical analysis of the Yucatec data is preceded by a thorough examination of the functional domain and the cross-linguistic coding of experience which until now could not be found in the literature. This study will be of interest to scholars working in the fields of typology and Native American linguistics, and especially to those interested in argument structure and the syntax-semantics interface. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Contents vii?x Figures and tables xi?xiv Preface xv?xvi Abbreviations xvii?xxi 1. Introduction 1?11 2. Theoretical preliminaries 13?33 3. Universal and typological aspects of experiential constructions 35?98 4. Introduction to Yucatec Maya 99?150 5. Experiential constructions 151?267 6. Grammatical properties of experiencers 269?289 7. Complementation with experiential predicates 291?327 8. Person and body parts in experiential collocations 329?341 9. Conclusions 343?356 References 357?371 Index 373?380 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Fri Jun 13 15:24:35 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 11:24:35 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins set - Nedjalkov Message-ID: This is a five volume set. Please excuse the length of the posting. Reciprocal Constructions Edited by Vladimir P. Nedjalkov Institute for Linguistic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences With the assistance of Emma ?. Geniu?iene and Zlatka Guentch?va Typological Studies in Language 71 2007. xxiii, 2219 pp. (5 vols.) Hardbound 978 90 272 2983 0 / EUR 350.00 / USD 525.00 This monograph constitutes the first comprehensive investigation of reciprocal constructions and related phenomena in the world's languages. Reciprocal constructions (of the type The two boys hit each other, The poets admire each other's poems) have often been the subject of language-particular studies, but it is only in this work that a truly global comparative picture emerges. Nine stage-setting chapters dealing with general and theoretical matters are followed by 40 chapters containing in-depth descriptions of reciprocals in individual languages by renowned specialists. The introductory papers provide a conceptual and terminological framework that allows the authors of the individual chapters to characterize their languages in comparable terms, making it easy for the reader to see points of commonality between languages and constructions that have never been compared before. This set of volumes is an indispensable starting point and will be a lasting reference work for any future studies of reciprocals. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents List of contributors Foreword by Bernard Comrie Preface by Vladimir Nedjalkov Abbreviations Part I. Typological aspects of the investigation of reciprocals 1. Overview of the research. Definitions of terms, framework, and related issues Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 2. Lexical reciprocals as a means of expressing reciprocal situations Jurij P. Knjazev 3. Encoding of the reciprocal meaning Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 4. Sociativity, conjoining, reciprocity and the Latin prefix com- Anna A. Zaliznjak and Alexei D. Shmelev 5. Polysemy of reciprocal markers Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 6. Reciprocal and polyadic (Remarkable reciprocals in Bantu) Elena S. Maslova 7. Reciprocal derivation involving non-verbals Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 8. Questionnaire on reciprocals Vladimir P. Nedjalkov and Emma ?. Geniu?iene 9. Some typologically relevant properties of reciprocal markers and arrangement of the subsequent chapters Emma ?. Geniu?iene Part II. Reflexive-reciprocal polysemy of reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 10. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in German Bj?rn Wiemer and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 11. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in Polish Bj?rn Wiemer 12. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in French Zlatka Guentch?va and Nicole Rivi?re 13. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in Bulgarian Iordan Penchev 14. Reciprocal and reflexive constructions in Lithuanian (with references to Latvian) Emma ?. Geniu?iene 15. Reciprocal constructions in Russian Jurij P. Knjazev 16. Reciprocals in Vedic Leonid Kulikov 17. Reciprocal, comitative, sociative, and reflexive in Kabardian Konstantin I. Kazenin 18. Reciprocal, reflexive, and sociative in Adyghe Alexander Letuchiy 19. Reciprocals in West Greenlandic Eskimo Michael Fortescue B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 20. Reciprocals and reflexives in North Arawak languages of the Upper Rio Negro (Warekena, Bare, Baniwa of I?ana) Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald C. Pronominal reciprocal marker only 21. Reciprocal constructions in Djaru Tasaku Tsunoda Part III. Sociative-reciprocal polysemy of reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 22. Reciprocal, sociative, and comitative constructions in Tagalog Lina I. Shkarban and Gennadij E. Rachkov 23. Reciprocal constructions in Udehe Irina Nikolaeva 24. Reciprocals, sociatives, and competitives in Karachay-Balkar Vladimir P. Nedjalkov and Igor'V. Nedjalkov 25. Reciprocal, sociative, and competitive constructions in Japanese Vladimir M. Alpatov and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 26. Reciprocals, sociatives, comitatives, and assistives in Yakut Igor'V. Nedjalkov and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 27. Reciprocals, sociatives, comitatives, and assistives in Tuvan Klara B. Kuular 28. Reciprocals, assistives, and plural in Kirghiz Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 29. Reciprocal, sociative, and assistive constructions in Buryat and Khalkha-Mongol Vladimir P. Nedjalkov, Elena K. Skribnik, Evgenij A. Kuzmenkov and Natalija S. Yakhontova B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 30. Reciprocal and sociative, reflexive and reciprocal in Tariana: Their genetic and areal properties Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald 31. Reciprocal constructions in Bolivian Quechua Simon van de Kerke Part IV. Reflexive-reciprocal-sociative polysemy of reciprocal markers. Verbal reciprocal marker only 32. Reciprocal constructions in Warrungu Tasaku Tsunoda Part V. Sociative-reciprocal-iterative polysemy of reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 33. Reciprocal constructions in Indonesian Aleksandr K. Ogloblin and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 34. Polysemy of the reciprocal marker in N?l?mwa Isabelle Bril 35. Reciprocal, sociative, reflexive, and iterative constructions in East Futunan Claire Moyse-Faurie Part VI. Non-prototypical polysemy A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 36. Reciprocals and related meanings in To'aba'ita Franti?ek Lichtenberk B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 37. Reciprocals in Mundari Toshiki Osada Part VII. Monosemous reciprocal markers A. Verbal and pronominal reciprocal markers 38. Reciprocal and sociative constructions in Evenki (with an appendix on Manchu) Igor'V. Nedjalkov and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 39. Reciprocal and sociative constructions in Even Andrej Malchukov 40 Reciprocal constructions in Chukchi (with an appendix on Koryak) Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 41. Reciprocal constructions in Nivkh (Gilyak) Galina A. Otaina and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov B. Verbal reciprocal marker only 42. Reciprocals and sociatives in Ainu Vladimir M. Alpatov, Anna Ju. Bugaeva and Vladimir P. Nedjalkov 43. Reciprocals in Itelmen (Kamchadal) Aleksandr P. Volodin 44. Reciprocals in Yukaghir languages Elena S. Maslova 45. Reciprocal, response reciprocal, and distributive constructions in Cashinahua Eliane Camargo C. Mostly pronominal reciprocal markers 46. Reciprocal and sociative constructions in Bamana Valentin Vydrin 47. Reciprocal constructions in Vietnamese Igor S. Bystrov and Nonna V. Stankevich 48. Reciprocal constructions in Ancient Chinese Sergej E. Yakhontov 49. Reciprocal constructions in Modern Chinese Monique Hoa, Vladimir P. Nedjalkov and Tamara N. Nikitina Part VIII. Assessments 50. Comments Martin Haspelmath Name index Vladimir M. Alpatov and Sergej A, Krylov Language index Vladimir M. Alpatov and Sergej A, Krylov Subject index Vladimir M. Alpatov and Sergej A, Krylov Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Fri Jun 13 15:16:51 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 11:16:51 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins book: Salmons/Dubenion-Smith Message-ID: Historical linguistics but relevant to functional linguistics also. Historical Linguistics 2005 Selected papers from the 17th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, Madison, Wisconsin, 31 July - 5 August 2005 Edited by Joseph C. Salmons and Shannon Dubenion-Smith University of Wisconsin, Madison Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 284 2007. viii, 413 pp. Hardbound ? In stock 978 90 272 4799 5 / EUR 125.00 / USD 188.00 This volume contains 22 revised papers originally presented at the 17th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, held August 2005 in Madison, Wisconsin, USA. The papers cover a broad range of languages, including well-studied languages of Europe but also Aramaic, Zoque and Uto-Aztecan, Japanese and Korean, Afrikaans, and the Pilbara languages of Australia. The theoretical approaches taken are equally diverse, often bringing together aspects of 'formal' and 'functional' theories in a single contribution. Many of the chapters provide fresh data, including several drawing on data from electronic corpora. Topics range from traditional comparative reconstruction to prosodic change and the role of processing in syntactic change. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Foreword vii?viii Part I. Grammaticalization Lexicalization and grammaticalization all over again Laurel J. Brinton and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 3?19 Grammaticalization as reduction: Focus constructions in Chiapas Zoque Jan Terje Faarlund 21?31 Metaphor and teleology do not drive grammaticalization Matthew L. Juge 33?48 Part II. Syntax and semantics Processing factors in syntactic variation and change: Clitics in Medieval and Renaissance Spanish Miriam Bouzouita 51?71 Dynamic Syntax and dialogue modelling: Preliminaries for a dialogue-driven account of syntactic change Ruth Kempson and Ronnie Cann 73?101 An economy approach to the triggering of the Russian instrumental predicate case Nerea Madariaga 103?117 Change and variation in ga/no conversion in Tokyo Japanese Satoshi Nambu and Kenjir? Matsuda 119?131 Perfect change: Synchrony meets diachrony Marie-Eve Ritz 133?147 Variable use of negation in Middle Low German John D. Sundquist 149?166 Is there a DP in Old English? Johanna L. Wood 167?187 Part III. Morphology Some semantic and pragmatic aspects of case-loss in Old French Richard Ashdowne and John Charles Smith 191?205 The final stages of deflection: The case of Afrikaans het "have" C. Jac Conradie 207?221 Demonstrative paradigm splitting in the Pilbara languages of Western Australia Alan Dench 223?237 Infinitival forms in Aramaic Steven E. Fassberg 239?256 The role of productivity in word-formation change Carmen Scherer 257?271 Part IV. Phonetics and phonology Structured imbalances in the emergence of the Korean vowel system Sang-Cheol Ahn and Gregory K. Iverson 275?293 Final features and proto-Uto-Aztecan: A contribution using morphological reconstruction Karen Dakin 295?310 Facts, theory and dogmas in historical linguistics: Vowel quantity from Latin to Romance Michele Loporcaro 311?336 On the irregularity of Open Syllable Lengthening in German B. Richard Page 337?350 The resilience of prosodic templates in the history of West Germanic Laura Catharine Smith 351?365 Part V: Variation Urban interactions and written standards in Early Modern German Bruce H. Spencer 369?384 The Hollandish roots of Pella Dutch in Iowa Pieter van Reenen 385?401 Language index 403?404 Name index 405?409 Subject index 411?413 Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Fri Jun 13 19:30:11 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 14:30:11 -0500 Subject: No subject Message-ID: The notion that different brains and brain patterns can still converge on the 'same' language seems very familiar to me- recent work in developmental biology (and I'm surprised one of the discussants hasn't chimed in here....) shows that genetic systems can operate in a very similar fashion. That is, in developing embryos, parental genes and donated structures guide the initial stages, providing a sort of memory or scaffolding upon which to build the phenotypically common baseline form. This latter form is converged upon, and there can be wild variation of ordering of subevents leading to it due to divergent evolution and adaptation (as for instance the switch from egg-laying to live birth). Only after this convergence to the phenotype does the embryo's own genetic configuration begin to dominate, and these genes also create divergent structural specification as growth proceeds to adulthood. Think of light coming to and moving beyond a focus as a convenient mental image. The latter half of this developmental scenario probably depends more on deactivation of genes than activation as cellular and organ specialization continues- the reverse perhaps of the initial stage? Does something similar happen with the development of the brain and communicative mechanisms? Automated mass creation of the scaffolding and connectivity followed by paring down of these connections selectively during experience and learning, with variable reinforcement of remaining connections mediating in between? New local connections creation might parallel activation of specialized genes within organs and tissues? Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From amnfn at well.com Fri Jun 13 20:11:30 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 13:11:30 -0700 Subject: No subject In-Reply-To: <24901713.1213385411619.JavaMail.root@elwamui-polski.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Yes. I think it does work more or less like that. The process of paring down connections also helps to explain the limited period in our lives during which we can acquire a new language as native speakers. --Aya On Fri, 13 Jun 2008, jess tauber wrote: > The notion that different brains and brain patterns can still converge on the 'same' language seems very familiar to me- recent work in developmental biology (and I'm surprised one of the discussants hasn't chimed in here....) shows that genetic systems can operate in a very similar fashion. That is, in developing embryos, parental genes and donated structures guide the initial stages, providing a sort of memory or scaffolding upon which to build the phenotypically common baseline form. This latter form is converged upon, and there can be wild variation of ordering of subevents leading to it due to divergent evolution and adaptation (as for instance the switch from egg-laying to live birth). > > Only after this convergence to the phenotype does the embryo's own genetic configuration begin to dominate, and these genes also create divergent structural specification as growth proceeds to adulthood. Think of light coming to and moving beyond a focus as a convenient mental image. > > The latter half of this developmental scenario probably depends more on deactivation of genes than activation as cellular and organ specialization continues- the reverse perhaps of the initial stage? Does something similar happen with the development of the brain and communicative mechanisms? Automated mass creation of the scaffolding and connectivity followed by paring down of these connections selectively during experience and learning, with variable reinforcement of remaining connections mediating in between? New local connections creation might parallel activation of specialized genes within organs and tissues? > > Jess Tauber > phonosemantics at earthlink.net > > > From hougaard at language.sdu.dk Tue Jun 17 10:57:03 2008 From: hougaard at language.sdu.dk (Anders Hougaard) Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 12:57:03 +0200 Subject: LCM 3: Academic program Message-ID: ***** Apologies for cross-postings ***** LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND MIND 3 ANNOUNCEMENT: The academic program for Language, Culture and Mind III is now available at www.lcm.sdu.dk . (Direct link: http://www.lcm.sdu.dk/index.php?id=1467 ) On behalf of the local organizers and the international LCM committee, Anders R Hougaard The International LCM committee: Raphael Berthele Carlos Cornejo Caroline David Merlin Donald Barbara Fultner Anders R. Hougaard John A Lucy Aliyah Morgenster Eve Pinsker Vera da Silva Chris Sinha The Local organizing committee: Rineke Brouwer Dennis Day Lisa Loloma Froholdt Annette Grindsted Gitte R. Hougaard Anders R. Hougaard Kristian Mortensen Earlier LCM conferences: 1st LCM conference: Portsmouth 2004 2nd LCM conference: Paris 2006 ***** Anders R. Hougaard Assistant professor, PhD Center for Social Practises and Cognition (SoPraCon) Institute of Language and Communication University of Southern Denmark, Odense hougaard at language.sdu.dk Phone: +45 65503154 Fax: + 45 65932483. From dryer at buffalo.edu Tue Jun 17 20:05:15 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 16:05:15 -0400 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a week. I want to remark on Fritz's comment "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null hypothesis." I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) to the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a variation of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take it as a claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, I have argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if not most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or postpositions, but just a set of separate constructions that speakers store separately without generalizing across them. In other words, in this particular instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a list, and the burden of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize them as a class. But the general assumption of linguists of various stripes has usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules across them, and the idea that there might be a need to justify that assumption rarely arises. I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null hypothesis was one of its main themes. Matthew Dryer --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis. > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. > But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for > rules (schemas, constructions). > > --fritz > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial >> asymmetry between rules and lists: >> >> While lists are a necessary component of all >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, >> the evidence for rules has been considered >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >> accepts them. >> >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If >> one could show that it is in fact possible to >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >> assume that they don't. >> >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >> >> But while I think that this particular argument is >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules >> for their work. >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be >>> established. Even if it were the case that a >>> huge percentage of language users' output could >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them >>> structure and meaning. >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 >> 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From amnfn at well.com Tue Jun 17 20:22:19 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 13:22:19 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <3549780.1213718715@[192.168.1.45]> Message-ID: But why do we need a null hypothesis on the means by which language is processed? Is a null hypothesis based on the assumption that all speakers must do the same thing in order to arrive at the same linguistic form? Is there any evidence to support this assumption? --Aya On Tue, 17 Jun 2008 dryer at buffalo.edu wrote: > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a week. > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis." > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) to > the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a variation > of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take it as a > claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, I have > argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if not > most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or postpositions, > but just a set of separate constructions that speakers store separately > without generalizing across them. In other words, in this particular > instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a list, and the burden > of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize them as a > class. But the general assumption of linguists of various stripes has > usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules across them, > and the idea that there might be a need to justify that assumption rarely > arises. > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language > acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological > foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > Matthew Dryer > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > wrote: > > > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > > hypothesis. > > > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. > > But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) > > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability > > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never > > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment > > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, > > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I > > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, > > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for > > rules (schemas, constructions). > > > > --fritz > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > >> asymmetry between rules and lists: > >> > >> While lists are a necessary component of all > >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of > >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > >> the evidence for rules has been considered > >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > >> accepts them. > >> > >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > >> one could show that it is in fact possible to > >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > >> assume that they don't. > >> > >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >> > >> But while I think that this particular argument is > >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules > >> for their work. > >> > >> Martin Haspelmath > >> > >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron > >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. > >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have > >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language > >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. > >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally > >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised > >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be > >>> established. Even if it were the case that a > >>> huge percentage of language users' output could > >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, > >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a > >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional > >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them > >>> structure and meaning. > >> -- > >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > >> 1616 > >> > >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From edith at uwm.edu Wed Jun 18 17:49:11 2008 From: edith at uwm.edu (Edith Moravcsik) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 12:49:11 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: Matthew's interesting observation of people holistically memorizing expressions that are usually analyzed as adpositional phrases points up, to my mind, the need for simple, phenomenological, psychologically uninformed descriptions of grammars that analyze these expressions as having parts. If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing these expressions parted ways. The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we linguists can analyze them as having parts. Edith Moravcsik ----- Original Message ----- From: To: "Frederick J Newmeyer" ; "Martin Haspelmath" Cc: "Funknet" Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 3:05 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List Fallacy > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a > week. > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis." > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) > to the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a > variation of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take > it as a claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, > I have argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if > not most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or > postpositions, but just a set of separate constructions that speakers > store separately without generalizing across them. In other words, in > this particular instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a > list, and the burden of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that > speakers recognize them as a class. But the general assumption of > linguists of various stripes has usually been that they form a class, i.e. > that there are rules across them, and the idea that there might be a need > to justify that assumption rarely arises. > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language > acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological > foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > Matthew Dryer > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > wrote: > >> I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, >> the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null >> hypothesis. >> >> I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. >> But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) >> focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore >> comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability >> to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never >> heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment >> data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, >> constructions) becomes indispensable. >> >> Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I >> am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, >> say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for >> rules (schemas, constructions). >> >> --fritz >> >> Frederick J. Newmeyer >> Professor Emeritus, University of Washington >> Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser >> University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] >> >> On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> >>> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the >>> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument >>> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial >>> asymmetry between rules and lists: >>> >>> While lists are a necessary component of all >>> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must >>> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in >>> addition they may have rules. But the burden of >>> proof is on those who want to claim that they have >>> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, >>> the evidence for rules has been considered >>> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone >>> accepts them. >>> >>> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If >>> one could show that it is in fact possible to >>> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their >>> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of >>> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be >>> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. >>> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that >>> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence >>> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should >>> assume that they don't. >>> >>> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: >>> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have >>> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have >>> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not >>> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as >>> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. >>> >>> But while I think that this particular argument is >>> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need >>> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no >>> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to >>> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they >>> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual >>> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their >>> ideological preferences) find that they need rules >>> for their work. >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: >>>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron >>>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. >>>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, >>>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have >>>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language >>>> if rules that subsume them can be established. >>>> The converse of this fallacy is equally >>>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised >>>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be >>>> established. Even if it were the case that a >>>> huge percentage of language users' output could >>>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, >>>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a >>>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional >>>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze >>>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them >>>> structure and meaning. >>> -- >>> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >>> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere >>> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig >>> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 >>> 1616 >>> >>> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >>> (http://www.glottopedia.org) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From david_tuggy at sil.org Wed Jun 18 18:33:55 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:33:55 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <007401c8d16b$a0a08780$c0135981@ad.uwm.edu> Message-ID: Edith Moravcsik wrote: > If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by > linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising > about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting > question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing > these expressions parted ways. > > The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is > interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we > linguists can analyze them as having parts. Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). --David Tuuggy From tgivon at uoregon.edu Wed Jun 18 20:30:30 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:30:30 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <48595513.8020908@sil.org> Message-ID: It seems to me that this discussion gravitates, slowly but surely, towards an empirical vacuum. Perhaps a better learning strategy for all of us would be to concede that, in principle, both holistic and analyzed processing of complex expressions are in principle ('cognitively') available to speakers. Then find methods by which we can tell one strategy (as used by speakers/hearers) from the other; then find contexts that induce speakers/hearers to prefer one strategy over the other; and then--voila, denouement--count the frequency distribution of the two types of behavior in various contexts. To simply express personal preference for one over the other as 'the default strategy' is not all that helpful. Cheers, TG ======== David Tuggy wrote: > Edith Moravcsik wrote: >> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising >> about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting >> question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing >> these expressions parted ways. >> >> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is >> interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we >> linguists can analyze them as having parts. > Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as > having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist > people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The > fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially > attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would > maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). > > --David Tuuggy > From amnfn at well.com Wed Jun 18 20:42:21 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:42:21 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <3549780.1213718715@[192.168.1.45]> Message-ID: I am not sure what the reasoning is behind the idea of having the burden of proof set in advance for or against a particular claim. The concept of burden of proof is borrowed from the law, where it serves a very important purpose: creating a bias in favor of the defendant. When someone is found not guilty, this does not meant that he has been proved innocent. Since we deem it better that a guilty man go free than that an innocent be held responsible for a crime he did not commit, we intentionally build a bias into the system. The same is true in civil actions, where we prefer that the law not meddle with the status quo, unless the lesser civil burden of proof is met. But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it be better to avoid bias altogether? If there is not enough evidence to make a decisive case for or against any particular claim, wouldn't it be better to admit that for the time being we don't know? After all, it's not as if there are only two choices. It need not be either rule or list. It could be both. And how does a third possibility figure into the binary system of burden of proof? Best, --Aya On Tue, 17 Jun 2008 dryer at buffalo.edu wrote: > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for over a week. > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > hypothesis." > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all would) to > the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a variation > of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is to take it as a > claim not in general but in any particular instance. For example, I have > argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many if not > most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or postpositions, > but just a set of separate constructions that speakers store separately > without generalizing across them. In other words, in this particular > instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a list, and the burden > of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize them as a > class. But the general assumption of linguists of various stripes has > usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules across them, > and the idea that there might be a need to justify that assumption rarely > arises. > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis by Bruce > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of language > acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and methodological > foundations of contemporary linguistics". The first half of the title is > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are the null > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > Matthew Dryer > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > wrote: > > > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete infinity, > > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be the null > > hypothesis. > > > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic language. > > But my impression is that those who put such language on centre stage (1) > > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language users' ability > > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they have never > > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and judgment > > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules (schemas, > > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for 'innateness' here. I > > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as opposed to, > > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an argument for > > rules (schemas, constructions). > > > > --fritz > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > >> asymmetry between rules and lists: > >> > >> While lists are a necessary component of all > >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of > >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > >> the evidence for rules has been considered > >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > >> accepts them. > >> > >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > >> one could show that it is in fact possible to > >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > >> assume that they don't. > >> > >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > >> > >> But while I think that this particular argument is > >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules > >> for their work. > >> > >> Martin Haspelmath > >> > >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron > >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. > >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have > >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language > >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. > >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally > >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised > >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be > >>> established. Even if it were the case that a > >>> huge percentage of language users' output could > >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, > >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a > >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional > >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them > >>> structure and meaning. > >> -- > >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > >> 1616 > >> > >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From dryer at buffalo.edu Thu Jun 19 01:21:54 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 21:21:54 -0400 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <48597066.5030409@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being something of a red herring. I confess to somewhat opportunistically using that topic as a segue into a related but more substantive point, which is that there is a widespead tendency of linguists of many stripes - not just generative linguists, but construction grammarians, cognitive semanticists, and even some deeply involved in grammaticalization - to assume that where we linguists find patterns in language, speakers must find the same patterns as well. I should also point out, in response to Edith's comment, that the case I was commenting on is actually not one that involves "people holistically memorizing expressions that are usually analyzed as adpositional phrases". Under the alternative I was proposing, people do analyse adpositional phrases into "adposition" plus noun phrase; it's just that people don't recognize that different "adpositions" all do the same thing. I.e. they don't recognize the pattern and thus don't reocgnize a class of adpositions. Unfortunately, I'm guilty of what Fritz was originally accused of. I've given a (brief) abstract of a paper without providing the arguments that are in the paper (which I haven't written up yet). Matthew --On Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:30 PM -0700 Tom Givon wrote: > > > It seems to me that this discussion gravitates, slowly but surely, > towards an empirical vacuum. Perhaps a better learning strategy for all > of us would be to concede that, in principle, both holistic and analyzed > processing of complex expressions are in principle ('cognitively') > available to speakers. Then find methods by which we can tell one > strategy (as used by speakers/hearers) from the other; then find contexts > that induce speakers/hearers to prefer one strategy over the other; and > then--voila, denouement--count the frequency distribution of the two > types of behavior in various contexts. To simply express personal > preference for one over the other as 'the default strategy' is not all > that helpful. Cheers, TG > > ======== > > > David Tuggy wrote: >> Edith Moravcsik wrote: >>> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >>> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising >>> about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting >>> question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing >>> these expressions parted ways. >>> >>> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is >>> interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we >>> linguists can analyze them as having parts. >> Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as >> having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist >> people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The >> fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially >> attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would >> maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). >> >> --David Tuuggy >> > > From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Jun 19 07:10:55 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 09:10:55 +0200 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <7010946.1213824113@[192.168.1.45]> Message-ID: It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which surprises me. Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: > I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being > something of a red herring. And Aya Katz wrote: > But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it > be better to avoid bias altogether? My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in favour of them. Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. The only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. Martin -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From cbutler at ntlworld.com Thu Jun 19 06:46:04 2008 From: cbutler at ntlworld.com (Chris Butler) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 08:46:04 +0200 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: Since recent developments in this discussion have touched on the issue of formulaic language, can I remind contributors of the detailed work done by Alison Wray on formulaic sequences in non-disadvantaged and aphasic adults, in children learning their L1 and in children and adults learning an L2. She argues that expressions are analysed on a needs-only basis during first language acquisition, holistic processing being the default. Her model thus recognises the possibility of parallel processing mechanisms, holistic and analytic. Wray, Alison (2002) Formulaic Language and the Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. I have recently written an article on 'Formulaic sequences in functional and cognitive linguistics' in which I argue that since many formulaic expressions can be found, in attested language, in variant forms involving insertions and substitutions, the linguistic systems of adult native speakers do treat them as analysable (this point has also been made by others, e.g. Gordon Tucker). I then examine three formulaic sequences of different types, and assess the extent to which four linguistic approaches which have paid some attention to such phenomena (the family of constructionist grammars, the collostructional analysis, the Simpler Syntax model, Systemic Functional Grammar) can account for their properties. I go on to propose a model in which differences in degree of formulaicity reflect the strengths of associations of between elements of sequences at different levels of description, whose linkage can be modelled in terms of constraint satisfaction. Sorry to be guilty of the same sin as Fritz and Matthew - the paper is finished and with the publishers, but has not yet come out. It will be published in the November 2008 issue of the Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses. Chris Butler Honorary Professor, Swansea University, UK From dlevere at ilstu.edu Thu Jun 19 09:01:38 2008 From: dlevere at ilstu.edu (Daniel Everett) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 04:01:38 -0500 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <485A067F.9070503@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Peter Culicover, among others, has made related points in his book Syntactic Nuts. The question re: grammars that interests me most is just this: what do rules add empirically that we otherwise lack? We know that children and others have to learn arbitrary lists. (And presumably a great deal of language must be learned in this way). The question is whether the learning mechanism responsible for this arbitrary learning needs to be supplemented by a second mechanism or Language Acquisition Device. The principal selling point of the LAD is to be able to account for 'infinite use of finite means' (a phrase howbeit devoid of meaning it seems to me), which is supposed to account for speed of acquisition and many universals, among other things. Now, it is reasonable to claim that linguists' outputs, grammars, often predict infinite languages as a function of their goal of elegance (rules and schema are more elegant to some than lists). But no one has proven that any human language is infinite (though some of us have given reasonable evidence that there might be finite languages), only that the shortest grammars predict infinite languages (an example, most likely, of overgeneration, again in favor of elegance of presentation). So I believe that Martin's point is very strong. -- Dan Quoting Martin Haspelmath : > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >> being something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of > proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in > favour of them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems > with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, > e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and > the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. > Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course > agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because > Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the > rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because > everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker > behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed > reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never > possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules > and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to > find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often > (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these > rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers > are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but > this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get > away with just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about > speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As > soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. > The only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of > course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out > experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse > data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find > evidence for productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a > proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) -------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Jun 19 11:51:20 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 04:51:20 -0700 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <485A067F.9070503@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Well, I suppose Martin is right in a clear sense: One cannot generalize (make 'rules') on data unless one first has the data ('list'). That much is obviously a matter of logic. Note, however, that the minute the single list is divided into sub-categories ('sub-lists'), one has already begun to 'make rules'. I myself don't know a single cognitive system, however primitive (say, the amoeba), that has only a "list" in this logical sense. The amoeba already divides the 'list' of external input into temperature data, salt-concentration data, physical contact (touch) data, light data, etc. These are the categories it reacts to, differentially And it is obvious why it must sub-categorize, immediately--like all organisms, it needs to decide what the best *adaptive response* should be to the various sub-categories of input/context. What else are sub-categories good for? So the amoeba already has behavioral rules of the form "If category X, do Y", "If category P, do Q", etc. In child language studies (say Carter 1974), it appears that during the so-called "sensory-motor period"( 0-9 months) human neonates organize incoming input into the rudiment 'theoris' of what Geary (2007) call 'folks physics', 'folk biology' and 'folk psychology'. I think Alison Gopnik has a wonderful book called "The Scientist in the Crib" that touches on this too. What is more, child language data on lexicalization (my colleague Dare Baldwin has written on this extensively) suggest that children don't wait for a long cumulative list before they start categorizing. They start virtual;ly from item #2 (or 1?). So maybe Alison Gopnick should have changed the title of her book to "The Linguist in the Crib"? Clearly, the amoeba is hardly the only organism that finds a mere 'list' adaptively useless, let alone dangerous to her health. So--linguists notwithstanding--it seems to me that saying that "mere lists" can exist in any meaningful way without some categorization ('rules') is a funny exercise in a mock-Aristotelian denial of reality. Best, TG ======= Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >> being something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of > proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in > favour of them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems > with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, > e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and > the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical > argument. Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone > of course agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument > because Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of > the rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because > everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker > behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed > reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never > possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules > and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to > find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have > often (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have > these rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that > speakers are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as > linguists, but this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If > they can get away with just lists, they might well do without rules. > Any claim about speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional > evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As > soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for > rules. The only question is what we say in the absence of > productivity, and of course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if > we rule out experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on > natural discourse data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not > so easy to find evidence for productivity. In the absence of > productivity, providing a proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > From david_tuggy at sil.org Thu Jun 19 12:32:27 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 07:32:27 -0500 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <20080619040138.6xp1uvnv8k4o04sw@isuwebmail.ilstu.edu> Message-ID: Treading on thin waters here, as the saying is, but anyway: Must productivity be the *only* allowable evidence? Why can't reported intuition, even linguists' intuitions, be added to the list? Martin (was it?) suggested traffic signs as a case where there are only lists, not rules. I immediately experienced reportable intuitions that there are a good many rules involved in my understanding of them, and I would bet that an investigator would not have a hard time inducing other users to report similar intuitions. (If ten of us on Funknet listed (!) intuited rules re traffic signs, I'll bet there would be considerable convergence.) Even if solitary intuitions should be easily discounted, must the same hold true of coincident intuitions? Granted, I'm a linguist, and we linguists love to find rules. But arguably I became a linguist at least in part because I was already that kind of person. I know a lot of people who are not professional linguists who have intuitions about rules/regularities in many spheres of life. And when they talk about their intuitions they are likely to agree or disagree with each other on various points. (Thus linguistics was born, no doubt.) To my mind the fact that one is or is not a linguist should not be the main criterion for accepting or rejecting that person's intuitions as evidence of something, particularly as to the evidence of there being a rule of a certain type. You could quite legitimately set people a production task (e.g. design a traffic sign to warn of a particular traffic configuration ahead) and use their production, especially if coincident, as evidence for rules. If you just wait around for them to spontaneously design signs you are likely to wait a long time. But of course that can happen too. (It probably has a time or two in my lifetime.) Intuitions re listings are also, to my mind, allowable evidence. Allowable evidence, *of course*, does not mean incontrovertible evidence or proof. It needs to be sifted, be triangulated with other sorts of evidence, have its significance and relevance to different parts of one's understanding of language evaluated. My intuition that I perceive a regularity may be accepted as evidence that I indeed do perceive that regularity in some part of my cognition, but that does not necessarily prove that I use it in producing the linguistic forms that the regularity subsumes. But in principle all allowable evidence should be taken into account. Much discussion here really seems to assume that either rules only or lists only is some sort of default. That is precisely the point of the rule-list fallacy: you must logically consider (and you empirically find in many places) that the default is both. --David Tuggy dlevere at ilstu.edu wrote: > Peter Culicover, among others, has made related points in his book > Syntactic Nuts. > > The question re: grammars that interests me most is just this: what do > rules add empirically that we otherwise lack? We know that children > and others have to learn arbitrary lists. (And presumably a great deal > of language must be learned in this way). The question is whether the > learning mechanism responsible for this arbitrary learning needs to be > supplemented by a second mechanism or Language Acquisition Device. > > The principal selling point of the LAD is to be able to account for > 'infinite use of finite means' (a phrase howbeit devoid of meaning it > seems to me), which is supposed to account for speed of acquisition > and many universals, among other things. Now, it is reasonable to > claim that linguists' outputs, grammars, often predict infinite > languages as a function of their goal of elegance (rules and schema > are more elegant to some than lists). But no one has proven that any > human language is infinite (though some of us have given reasonable > evidence that there might be finite languages), only that the shortest > grammars predict infinite languages (an example, most likely, of > overgeneration, again in favor of elegance of presentation). > > So I believe that Martin's point is very strong. > > -- Dan > > > > Quoting Martin Haspelmath : > >> It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which >> surprises me. >> >> Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >>> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >>> being something of a red herring. >> And Aya Katz wrote: >>> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? >>> Wouldn't it >>> be better to avoid bias altogether? >> My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as >> language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules >> exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of >> proof, because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in >> favour of them. >> >> Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems >> with lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, >> e.g. traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are >> logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and >> the domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. >> >> Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. >> Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course >> agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because >> Fritz Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the >> rule-list fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because >> everything can be explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker >> behaviour can be fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed >> reasonable to assume that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never >> possible to claim that speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules >> and no lists are needed. Some lists are always needed.) >> >> I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out >> (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to >> find rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often >> (too often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these >> rules, without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers >> are as eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but >> this is not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get >> away with just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about >> speakers that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. >> >> The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and >> rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit >> abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: >> especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As >> soon as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. >> The only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of >> course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out >> experimental evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse >> data, as Sandy Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find >> evidence for productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a >> proof for rules is a very heavy burden indeed. >> >> Martin >> >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 >> D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 >> 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > This message was sent using Illinois State University Webmail. > > > From amnfn at well.com Thu Jun 19 13:17:14 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 06:17:14 -0700 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <83aa1c554eb12ebf.485a39f0@ac-versailles.fr> Message-ID: Under the law, the burden of proof isn't absolute as in logic. There are different degrees of proof: Criminal -- beyond a reasonable doubt Civil -- by a preponderance of the evidence The criminal burden of proof is much higher than the civil one. Under it, even if there is the slightest reasonable doubt, the burden has not been met. On the other hand, under civil law, the burden is lesser. If a majority of the evidence points one way, the burden has been met. I am speaking of the English common law as codified in American law, which is the only system I am familiar with. It is possible that the law is different under the inquisitorial system found elsewhere in Europe. The different degrees of proof required show that there is a heavy bias in favor of a criminal defendant and a lesser bias in favor of a civil defendant. In neither case is the law seeking after the exact "truth". It is all a question of whether any action should be taken by the system as opposed to allowing the status quo to remain in effect. Under logic, a single counterexample is enough to disprove a statement P. No amount of inductive evidence is enough to prove a hypothesis by logic alone. Nobody can ever meet an absolute requirement of proof. But disproving requires a single example, and is much easier. That is why the statement: "grammaticlization proceeds down a unidirectional cline from concrete to abstract" is merely a hypothesis, no matter how much evidence we amass in its favor. But a single counterexample is enough to disprove it. It has been disproved over and over again, but linguists have declined to use a logical standard. Instead, they behave as if linguistics were like the law, a means of settling disputes. Logic and the law are different tools for different purposes. The law is there to solve personal disputes. Logic addresses abstract truth values. What is linguistics for? Best, --Aya Katz On Thu, 19 Jun 2008 Pablo.Kirtchuk at ac-versailles.fr wrote: > > Regarding the law/logic interface, please note that the defendant doesn't claim anything, which is why he hasn't to prove anything. For a defendant to exist as such, there must be an accusation first, which claims P. Then the defendant either claims P (guilty) or non-P (innocent). In both cases, P implies P and non-P also implies P. Which is why tthe burden of proof rests within (s)he who claims P, and not because any bias. > > Pablo > > > > I am not sure what the reasoning is behind the idea of having the > > burdenof proof set in advance for or against a particular claim. > > > > The concept of burden of proof is borrowed from the law, where it > > serves a > > very important purpose: creating a bias in favor of the defendant. > > Whensomeone is found not guilty, this does not meant that he has been > > proved innocent. Since we deem it better that a guilty man go free > > thanthat an innocent be held responsible for a crime he did not > > commit, we > > intentionally build a bias into the system. The same is true in civil > > actions, where we prefer that the law not meddle with the status quo, > > unless the lesser civil burden of proof is met. > > > > But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? > > Wouldn't it > > be better to avoid bias altogether? If there is not enough evidence to > > make a decisive case for or against any particular claim, wouldn't > > it be > > better to admit that for the time being we don't know? After all, > > it's not > > as if there are only two choices. It need not be either rule or > > list. It > > could be both. And how does a third possibility figure into the binary > > system of burden of proof? > > > > Best, > > > > --Aya > > > > > > On Tue, 17 Jun 2008 dryer at buffalo.edu wrote: > > > > > > > > I'm joining this discussion late, after being off of email for > > over a week. > > > > > > I want to remark on Fritz's comment > > > > > > "I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > > infinity,> the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would be > > the null > > > hypothesis." > > > > > > I would agree with this argument (though I recognize that not all > > would) to > > > the extent that it means that there must exist SOME rules. But a > > variation> of Martin's claim that lists are the null hypothesis is > > to take it as a > > > claim not in general but in any particular instance. For > > example, I have > > > argued in a talk I have given in a number of places that in many > > if not > > > most languages, there is no word class of prepositions or > > postpositions,> but just a set of separate constructions that > > speakers store separately > > > without generalizing across them. In other words, in this > > particular> instance, the null hypothesis is that there is just a > > list, and the burden > > > of proof is on anyone who wishes to claim that speakers recognize > > them as a > > > class. But the general assumption of linguists of various > > stripes has > > > usually been that they form a class, i.e. that there are rules > > across them, > > > and the idea that there might be a need to justify that > > assumption rarely > > > arises. > > > > > > I was persuaded many years ago that lists are the null hypothesis > > by Bruce > > > Derwing's 1973 book "Transformational grammar as a theory of > > language> acquisition: A study in the empirical, conceptual and > > methodological> foundations of contemporary linguistics". The > > first half of the title is > > > somewhat misleading. I would say that the idea that lists are > > the null > > > hypothesis was one of its main themes. > > > > > > Matthew Dryer > > > > > > --On Tuesday, June 10, 2008 12:24 PM -0700 Frederick J Newmeyer > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I would think that for any semiotic system involving discrete > > infinity,> > the existence of rules (schemas, constructions) would > > be the null > > > > hypothesis. > > > > > > > > I don't pretend to have read all of the literature on formulaic > > language.> > But my impression is that those who put such language > > on centre stage (1) > > > > focus almost exclusively on language production and all but ignore > > > > comprehension and (2) show no interest at all in language > > users' ability > > > > to make judgments of well-formedness of sentences that they > > have never > > > > heard. It seems self-evident to me that once comprehension and > > judgment> > data are brought into the picture, the need for rules > > (schemas,> > constructions) becomes indispensable. > > > > > > > > Let me stress that I am NOT offering an argument for > > 'innateness' here. I > > > > am not even offering an argument for generative grammar, as > > opposed to, > > > > say, cognitive grammar or construction grammar. Just an > > argument for > > > > rules (schemas, constructions). > > > > > > > > --fritz > > > > > > > > Frederick J. Newmeyer > > > > Professor Emeritus, University of Washington > > > > Adjunct Professor, University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser > > > > University [for my postal address, please contact me by e-mail] > > > > > > > > On Tue, 10 Jun 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > > > > > >> It seems to me that Fritz Newmeyer's appeal to the > > > >> Rule-List Fallacy in the context of the argument > > > >> about formulaic language overlooks a crucial > > > >> asymmetry between rules and lists: > > > >> > > > >> While lists are a necessary component of all > > > >> semiotic systems, rules are not. All languages must > > > >> at least have lists of morphemes, and then in > > > >> addition they may have rules. But the burden of > > > >> proof is on those who want to claim that they have > > > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions). In general, > > > >> the evidence for rules has been considered > > > >> overwhelming (in all languages), so almost everyone > > > >> accepts them. > > > >> > > > >> Now I think Fritz's argument doesn't go through: If > > > >> one could show that it is in fact possible to > > > >> explain speakers' behaviour by claiming that their > > > >> knowledge of language consists of a simple list of > > > >> morphemes (or formulas), then this would indeed be > > > >> a powerful argument against the existence of rules. > > > >> In other words, the null hypothesis should be that > > > >> languages have no rules, and if not enough evidence > > > >> can be found to reject this hypothesis, we should > > > >> assume that they don't. > > > >> > > > >> Notice that this doesn't work the other way round: > > > >> The null hypothesis cannot be that languages have > > > >> no lists, but only rules -- languages must have > > > >> lists. So if one discovers rules, this does not > > > >> mean that the same phenomena are not also stored as > > > >> lists. The Rule-List Fallacy is unidirectional. > > > >> > > > >> But while I think that this particular argument is > > > >> invalid, Sandy Thompson and Paul Hopper will need > > > >> to do a lot more to convince linguists that no > > > >> rules (or schemas, or constructions) are needed to > > > >> explain speaker behaviour. Strictly speaking, they > > > >> are defending the null hypothesis, but in actual > > > >> practice, almost all linguists (regardless of their > > > >> ideological preferences) find that they need rules > > > >> for their work. > > > >> > > > >> Martin Haspelmath > > > >> > > > >> Frederick J Newmeyer wrote: > > > >>> Let me start by calling attention to what Ron > > > >>> Langacker has called the 'Rule-List Fallacy'. > > > >>> Ron noted, completely correctly in my opinion, > > > >>> that it was a fallacy to assume that lists have > > > >>> to be be excised from the grammar of a language > > > >>> if rules that subsume them can be established. > > > >>> The converse of this fallacy is equally > > > >>> fallacious: that rules have to be be excised > > > >>> from the grammar of a language if lists can be > > > >>> established. Even if it were the case that a > > > >>> huge percentage of language users' output could > > > >>> be characterized by lists (formulas, fragments, > > > >>> etc.), that would not exclude their also have a > > > >>> grammar composed of rules (or their notional > > > >>> equivalents) that allow hearers to analyze > > > >>> unfamiliar collocations and assign to them > > > >>> structure and meaning. > > > >> -- > > > >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > > > >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere > > > >> Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig > > > >> Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 > > > >> 1616 > > > >> > > > >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > > > >> (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From edith at uwm.edu Thu Jun 19 14:21:41 2008 From: edith at uwm.edu (Edith Moravcsik) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 09:21:41 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: That people can see expressions both as wholes and also as having parts is evident from "grammar itself" as well. Noun phrases behave as whole for purposes of anaphoric pronominalization; yet, the lexical composition of a noun phrase is variable showing that speakers are aware of the parts. And the same is true of course in how we view objects outside language. We see most things around us both as units and as having parts. Edith Moravcsik ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Tuggy" To: Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:33 PM Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List Fallacy > Edith Moravcsik wrote: >> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising about >> how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting question of why >> linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing these expressions >> parted ways. >> >> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it is >> interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we linguists >> can analyze them as having parts. > Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as having > parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist people are > often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The fact that both > modes are available (though perhaps differentially attractive) to both > linguists and language speakers is, I would maintain, highly important (as > well as interesting). > > --David Tuuggy > From david_tuggy at sil.org Thu Jun 19 16:33:52 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 11:33:52 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy In-Reply-To: <001501c8d217$ce3c53c0$c0135981@ad.uwm.edu> Message-ID: Agreed, emphgatically. --David T Edith Moravcsik wrote: > That people can see expressions both as wholes and also as having > parts is evident from "grammar itself" as well. Noun phrases behave as > whole for purposes of anaphoric pronominalization; yet, the lexical > composition of a noun phrase is variable showing that speakers are > aware of the parts. > > And the same is true of course in how we view objects outside > language. We see most things around us both as units and as having parts. > > Edith Moravcsik > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Tuggy" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:33 PM > Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List Fallacy > > >> Edith Moravcsik wrote: >>> If we did not know that these expressions might be analyzed by >>> linguists as multi-part phrases, there would be nothing suprising >>> about how people treat them; and we would lose the interesting >>> question of why linguists' analyses and people's ways of processing >>> these expressions parted ways. >>> >>> The same holds for formulaic expressions in general. The reason it >>> is interesting that people treat them as atomic wholes is that we >>> linguists can analyze them as having parts. >> Well, it is also interesting that people can also analyze them as >> having parts. Linguists are people too, of course, but non-linguist >> people are often quite aware of parts of formulaic structures. The >> fact that both modes are available (though perhaps differentially >> attractive) to both linguists and language speakers is, I would >> maintain, highly important (as well as interesting). >> >> --David Tuuggy >> > > From paul at benjamins.com Thu Jun 19 17:31:41 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 13:31:41 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins Book: Heyd - Email Hoaxes Message-ID: Email Hoaxes Form, function, genre ecology Theresa Heyd Heinrich-Heine-Universit?t, D?sseldorf Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 174 2008. vii, 239 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 5418 4 / EUR 95.00 / USD 143.00 How genres emerge and evolve on the Internet has become one of the central questions in studies of computer-mediated communication (CMC). This book addresses the issue of genrefication by giving an in-depth analysis of email hoaxes as a candidate for digital genre status. Email hoaxes are deceptive messages that spread in digital social networks; they are a fascinating object for discourse linguistics as they exemplify a major pragmatic tendency in CMC, namely deceptivity and a lowering of sincerity standards. This study examines formal and functional aspects of email hoaxes and provides ample evidence both from a systematized corpus and in situ data collected online. Besides a structural and microlinguistic analysis, it identifies key issues such as pragmatic duality, narrativity and textual variation and change in email hoaxes. In conclusion, a digital genre model is outlined that bridges both the old/new and the formal/functional gaps and may be applied to many other digital genre ecologies. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents 1. Introduction 2. Introducing the data 3. Formal aspects of EHs: A microlinguistic analysis 4. The dynamics of EH transmission: Chronological aspects 5. The pragmatics of EHs 6. Narrativity in EHs 7. A genre study of EHs 8. References 9. Appendix Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From paul at benjamins.com Thu Jun 19 17:28:22 2008 From: paul at benjamins.com (Paul Peranteau) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 13:28:22 -0400 Subject: New Benjamins title: Goddard Cross-Linguistic Semantics Message-ID: Cross-Linguistic Semantics Edited by Cliff Goddard University of New England Studies in Language Companion Series 102 2008. xvi, 356 pp. Hardbound 978 90 272 0569 8 / EUR 120.00 / USD 180.00 Cross-linguistic semantics ? investigating how languages package and express meanings differently ? is central to the linguistic quest to understand the nature of human language. This set of studies explores and demonstrates cross-linguistic semantics as practised in the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) framework, originated by Anna Wierzbicka. The opening chapters give a state-of-the-art overview of the NSM model, propose several theoretical innovations and advance a number of original analyses in connection with names and naming, clefts and other specificational sentences, and discourse anaphora. Subsequent chapters describe and analyse diverse phenomena in ten languages from multiple families, geographical locations, and cultural settings around the globe. Three substantial studies document how the metalanguage of NSM semantic primes can be realised in languages of widely differing types: Amharic (Ethiopia), Korean, and East Cree. Each constitutes a lexicogrammatical portrait in miniature of the language concerned. Other chapters probe topics such as inalienable possession in Koromu (Papua New Guinea), epistemic verbs in Swedish, hyperpolysemy in Bunuba (Australia), the expression of "momentariness" in Berber, ethnogeometry in Makasai (East Timor), value concepts in Russian, and "virtuous emotions" in Japanese. This book will be valuable for linguists working on language description, lexical semantics, or the semantics of grammar, for advanced students of linguistics, and for others interested in language universals and language diversity. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents Acknowledgements List of contributors List of tables, figures and appendices Part I. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage theory 1. Natural Semantic Metalanguage: The state of the art Cliff Goddard 2. New semantic primes and new syntactic frames: "Specificational BE" and "abstract THIS/IT" Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka 3. Towards a systematic table of semantic elements Cliff Goddard Part II. Whole metalanguage studies 4. Semantic primes in Amharic Mengistu Amberber 5. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage of Korean Kyung-Joo Yoon 6. Semantic primes and their grammar in a polysynthetic language: East Cree Marie-Odile Junker Part III. Problems in semantic metalanguage 7. Hyperpolysemy in Bunuba, a polysynthetic language of the Kimberley, Western Australia Emily Knight 8. Re-thinking THINK in contrastive perspective: Swedish vs. English Cliff Goddard and Susanna Karlsson 9. Identification and syntax of semantic prime MOMENT in Tarifyt Berber Noureddine Elouazizi and Radoslava Trnavac Part IV. Semantic studies across languages 10. The ethnogeometry of Makasai (East Timor) Anna Brotherson 11. The semantics of "inalienable possession" in Koromu (PNG) Carol Priestley 12. Tolerance: New and traditional values in Russian in comparison with English Anna Gladkova 13. Two "virtuous emotions" in Japanese: Nasake/joo and jihi Rie Hasada -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject classification Linguistics Semantics Theoretical linguistics Paul Peranteau (paul at benjamins.com) General Manager John Benjamins Publishing Company 763 N. 24th St. Philadelphia PA 19130 Phone: 215 769-3444 Fax: 215 769-3446 John Benjamins Publishing Co. website: http://www.benjamins.com From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Thu Jun 19 19:13:14 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 14:13:14 -0500 Subject: Rule-List Fallacy Message-ID: Perhaps a look at the history of manufacturing could be useful. Mass production. Divergent parts and process standardization replacing convergent unique productions made out of whatever tailored to individuals, blueprints replacing master builders' mental images, standard training and specialization of the workforce versus apprenticeships and generalized skills, warehousing, etc. (and parallels in management, purchases/sales, advertizing?). Automation too. Mass production revolutionized the economics, speed of production, interchangability, etc., but companies eventually learned that, given a choice, customers prefer the personal touch, not one-size-fits-all. How to balance needs versus wants, for both producer and consumer? Multiple but fixed choices? Where in the hierarchy from parts to wholes? Looking across the spectrum of language types and their cyclic evolution might we see parallelisms to the above? And of course there are also bioinformatic parallels- genome vs. proteome, code vs. cellular memory, and all the interesting regulatory mechanisms mediating- also with different balance points depending on genetic 'type'. Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From dryer at buffalo.edu Fri Jun 20 11:38:59 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 07:38:59 -0400 Subject: Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <485A067F.9070503@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: I realize that I have probably misrepresented Bruce Derwing's position. While it is true that he argued that the burden of proof on those who claim that there are rules in particular cases is to provide empirical evidence that there are rules rather than lists, he did so only because the prevalent practice was (and is) to assume rules without any evidence for such, not because he considered lists the default. If there had been people claiming in particular instances that people only stored lists and saw no reason to provide any empirical evidence for that claim, I believe Derwing would have raised the same objection, in effect "You have to provide empirical evidence; you cannot simply claim that on a priori grounds." In other words, in the absence of empirical evidence in a particular instance whether there is a list or a rule, rather than saying "In the absence of empirical evidence, we should assume there is just a list" we should be saying instead "In the absence of empirical evidence, we shouldn't assume anything; we should look for empirical evidence." So while Martin may be right that at some abstract level, lists are logically more basic than rules, this is ultimately beside the point. It does not justify assuming in any particular instance in the absence of empirical evidence that there is a list rather than a rule. To do so runs the risk of committing the error that Derwing argued against, namely that of deciding an empirical issue on a priori grounds. And that is why I think Tom was right when he said that in arguing which was the default, we were gravitating towards an empirical vacuum. Matthew --On Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:10 AM +0200 Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being >> something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of proof, > because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in favour of > them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems with > lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. > traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and the > domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. > Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course > agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because Fritz > Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list > fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything can be > explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be > fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to assume > that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that > speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are needed. > Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to find > rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often (too > often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, > without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as > eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but this is > not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with > just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about speakers > that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As soon > as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. The > only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of > course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out experimental > evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as Sandy > Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for > productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for rules > is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > > > From harder at hum.ku.dk Fri Jun 20 14:36:58 2008 From: harder at hum.ku.dk (Peter Harder) Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:36:58 +0200 Subject: SV: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry Message-ID: There is a sense in which it is fairly obvious that rules exist. This is already implicit in Martin's reference to systems that consist only of lists, such as traffic signs - which invites the inference that human languages are not of that kind. If you do not subscribe to a generative view of linguistic rules, you have the problem that there is no agreed precise alternative for what a rule then is. However, consider a messy informal 'direction-for-use' rule such as "after verbs like say or think you can put a that-clauses, indicating the propositional content of what was said or thought". This can only be an empirically misguided description of English if speakers never combine verbs and complement clauses freely, and invariably limit themselves to repeating whole statements that they have heard previously and added to their lists of possible utterances, like lists of traffic signs in driver's manuals. Not all speakers do that, so it follows that English has rules of that kind. This does not answer the question of the psychological reality of rules, or of the less exalted semi-general combination strategies that functionalists might be satisfied with instead of fully general rules. But if we pursue the same abstract agenda as Martin, we can say that this is an extra issue that is external to the semiotic system as a set of social options available to speakers of English. You cannot make full use of the options offered by the English language, if your cognitive system works only by listing. Therefore listing as a theory of how English works (as a public code) does not cover all there is to say about it. This is, of course, a very modest level of abstraction to be working at, but the way I see it, it gets us just a little beyond total agnosticism with respect to the existence of anything beyond lists. Peter Harder Copenhagen ________________________________ Fra: funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu p? vegne af dryer at buffalo.edu Sendt: fr 20-06-2008 13:38 Til: Martin Haspelmath; funknet at mailman.rice.edu Emne: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry I realize that I have probably misrepresented Bruce Derwing's position. While it is true that he argued that the burden of proof on those who claim that there are rules in particular cases is to provide empirical evidence that there are rules rather than lists, he did so only because the prevalent practice was (and is) to assume rules without any evidence for such, not because he considered lists the default. If there had been people claiming in particular instances that people only stored lists and saw no reason to provide any empirical evidence for that claim, I believe Derwing would have raised the same objection, in effect "You have to provide empirical evidence; you cannot simply claim that on a priori grounds." In other words, in the absence of empirical evidence in a particular instance whether there is a list or a rule, rather than saying "In the absence of empirical evidence, we should assume there is just a list" we should be saying instead "In the absence of empirical evidence, we shouldn't assume anything; we should look for empirical evidence." So while Martin may be right that at some abstract level, lists are logically more basic than rules, this is ultimately beside the point. It does not justify assuming in any particular instance in the absence of empirical evidence that there is a list rather than a rule. To do so runs the risk of committing the error that Derwing argued against, namely that of deciding an empirical issue on a priori grounds. And that is why I think Tom was right when he said that in arguing which was the default, we were gravitating towards an empirical vacuum. Matthew --On Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:10 AM +0200 Martin Haspelmath wrote: > It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, which > surprises me. > > Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default being >> something of a red herring. > And Aya Katz wrote: >> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? Wouldn't it >> be better to avoid bias altogether? > My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as > language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that rules > exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of proof, > because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in favour of > them. > > Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic systems with > lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. > traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are > logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, and the > domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. > > Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical argument. > Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course > agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because Fritz > Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list > fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything can be > explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be > fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to assume > that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that > speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are needed. > Some lists are always needed.) > > I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out > (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to find > rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often (too > often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, > without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as > eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but this is > not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with > just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about speakers > that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. > > The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists and > rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers exhibit > abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: > especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. As soon > as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. The > only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of > course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out experimental > evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as Sandy > Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for > productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for rules > is a very heavy burden indeed. > > Martin > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org ) > > > > > > From macw at cmu.edu Fri Jun 20 20:13:09 2008 From: macw at cmu.edu (Brian MacWhinney) Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:13:09 -0400 Subject: SV: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry In-Reply-To: <857A4D84DE6D1D41837DD9284F2729AB04B95323@exchangesrv1.hum2005.hum.ku.dk> Message-ID: Dear Peter et al., I think one gets out of this "commitment-to-a-formalism" quandary by thinking in terms of "combination" rather than "rules". Let me explain. As I noted in my earlier posting on this thread (as I argued in my 1978 monograph on the acquisition of morphophonology) the three crucial processes in a learning-theoretic account of language learning and processing are rote, combination, and analogy. Rote is what people have been calling "lists" in the context of this discussion. In formulations from Derwing, Bybee, PDP, and even perhaps de Saussure, you can hook up rote to analogy and get productivity and generativity in this way. In that system, rules are completely and thoroughly embedded in the between-item similarity matrix. The other option hooks up rote with combination. In that framework, rules emerge during learning as methods of adjusting combinations for semantic, phonological, prosodic, or positional patterns. In both of these accounts, rules are not really on center stage, so the issue of how to "talk about rules" is no longer the key issue. We can view linguistic processing as an ongoing horse race between rote and combination where the winner is rote whenever the relevant rote form has high frequency and easy retrieval. The processes that "patch up" combinations are called analogy in one tradition and rules in another, but as long as we are talking about learned modification processes based on evidence in the inventory of stored rote forms, then there is no empirical difference between rules and analogy. I am not saying that pattern or rule learning is trivial or uninteresting. Far from it. However, I am saying that the core contrast is between rote and combination and that rule or pattern learning is triggered by the fact that we have decided to build up utterances at least in part through combination. The generative view is different from this three-process account. Unlike the 3-process account, minimalism passes everything through the MERGE operation. So everything is combination. Moreover, rules are much more on center stage during the process of MERGE because they are often innate and not learned. And, if learned, they are acquired through an innate system of parameterized options. None of this, except for the core operation of MERGE, is involved in the learning- theoretic 3-process account. -- Brian MacWhinney On Jun 20, 2008, at 10:36 AM, Peter Harder wrote: > There is a sense in which it is fairly obvious that rules exist. > This is already implicit in Martin's reference to systems that > consist only of lists, such as traffic signs - which invites the > inference that human languages are not of that kind. > > > > If you do not subscribe to a generative view of linguistic rules, > you have the problem that there is no agreed precise alternative for > what a rule then is. However, consider a messy informal 'direction- > for-use' rule such as "after verbs like say or think you can put a > that-clauses, indicating the propositional content of what was said > or thought". This can only be an empirically misguided description > of English if speakers never combine verbs and complement clauses > freely, and invariably limit themselves to repeating whole > statements that they have heard previously and added to their lists > of possible utterances, like lists of traffic signs in driver's > manuals. Not all speakers do that, so it follows that English has > rules of that kind. > > > > This does not answer the question of the psychological reality of > rules, or of the less exalted semi-general combination strategies > that functionalists might be satisfied with instead of fully general > rules. But if we pursue the same abstract agenda as Martin, we can > say that this is an extra issue that is external to the semiotic > system as a set of social options available to speakers of English. > You cannot make full use of the options offered by the English > language, if your cognitive system works only by listing. Therefore > listing as a theory of how English works (as a public code) does not > cover all there is to say about it. This is, of course, a very > modest level of abstraction to be working at, but the way I see it, > it gets us just a little beyond total agnosticism with respect to > the existence of anything beyond lists. > > > > Peter Harder > > Copenhagen > > > ________________________________ > > Fra: funknet-bounces at mailman.rice.edu p? vegne af dryer at buffalo.edu > Sendt: fr 20-06-2008 13:38 > Til: Martin Haspelmath; funknet at mailman.rice.edu > Emne: Re: [FUNKNET] Rule-List asymmetry > > > > > I realize that I have probably misrepresented Bruce Derwing's > position. > While it is true that he argued that the burden of proof on those > who claim > that there are rules in particular cases is to provide empirical > evidence > that there are rules rather than lists, he did so only because the > prevalent practice was (and is) to assume rules without any evidence > for > such, not because he considered lists the default. If there had been > people claiming in particular instances that people only stored > lists and > saw no reason to provide any empirical evidence for that claim, I > believe > Derwing would have raised the same objection, in effect "You have to > provide empirical evidence; you cannot simply claim that on a priori > grounds." > > In other words, in the absence of empirical evidence in a particular > instance whether there is a list or a rule, rather than saying "In the > absence of empirical evidence, we should assume there is just a > list" we > should be saying instead "In the absence of empirical evidence, we > shouldn't assume anything; we should look for empirical evidence." > > So while Martin may be right that at some abstract level, lists are > logically more basic than rules, this is ultimately beside the > point. It > does not justify assuming in any particular instance in the absence of > empirical evidence that there is a list rather than a rule. To do > so runs > the risk of committing the error that Derwing argued against, namely > that > of deciding an empirical issue on a priori grounds. > > And that is why I think Tom was right when he said that in arguing > which > was the default, we were gravitating towards an empirical vacuum. > > Matthew > > --On Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:10 AM +0200 Martin Haspelmath > wrote: > >> It seems that some people still have not seen my original point, >> which >> surprises me. >> >> Thus, Matthew Dryer wrote: >>> I think Tom's quite right about the issue of what is the default >>> being >>> something of a red herring. >> And Aya Katz wrote: >>> But in scientific enquiry, why do we need a burden of proof? >>> Wouldn't it >>> be better to avoid bias altogether? >> My claim was and is that in the study of semiotic systems such as >> language, the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that >> rules >> exist. Those who claim that lists exist do not have this burden of >> proof, >> because lists are the default, and there is an inherent bias in >> favour of >> them. >> >> Rules and lists simply do not have the same status. Semiotic >> systems with >> lists and no rules are perfectly possible (and widely attested, e.g. >> traffic signs), but semiotic systems with rules and no lists are >> logically impossible. Rules have to range over a certain domain, >> and the >> domain must be defined in terms of lists. There is no symmetry here. >> >> Sorry, Tom, this is not an empirical argument, it's a logical >> argument. >> Perhaps it's not particularly interesting, because everyone of course >> agrees that languages have lists. I just made this argument because >> Fritz >> Newmeyer had claimed that Sandy Thompson was guilty of the rule-list >> fallacy: Assuming that there are no rules just because everything >> can be >> explained by lists. But this is not true: If speaker behaviour can be >> fully explained by assuming only lists, it is indeed reasonable to >> assume >> that no rules exist. (Conversely, it is never possible to claim that >> speaker behaviour is fully explained by rules and no lists are >> needed. >> Some lists are always needed.) >> >> I think this point is important because as Matthew Dryer pointed out >> (citing Bruce Derwing), linguists have generally been very eager to >> find >> rules, which is OK, because that is their job. But they have often >> (too >> often) jumped to the conclusion that speakers also have these rules, >> without any evidence. It has been widely assumed that speakers are as >> eager to extract generalizations from the data as linguists, but >> this is >> not reasonable. Speakers just want to talk. If they can get away with >> just lists, they might well do without rules. Any claim about >> speakers >> that goes beyond lists needs additional evidence. >> >> The reason why linguists generally agree that there are both lists >> and >> rules is that this evidence is often easy to come by: Speakers >> exhibit >> abundant productivity in different areas of language structure: >> especially in syntax and phonology, but often also in morphology. >> As soon >> as we observe productivity, we have knock-down evidence for rules. >> The >> only question is what we say in the absence of productivity, and of >> course how exactly we diagnose productivity; if we rule out >> experimental >> evidence and try to rely exclusively on natural discourse data, as >> Sandy >> Thompson seems to be doing, it's not so easy to find evidence for >> productivity. In the absence of productivity, providing a proof for >> rules >> is a very heavy burden indeed. >> >> Martin >> >> -- >> Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) >> Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher >> Platz 6 >> D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) >> +49-341-980 1616 >> >> Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics >> (http://www.glottopedia.org ) >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > > From comrie at eva.mpg.de Mon Jun 23 16:45:30 2008 From: comrie at eva.mpg.de (Bernard Comrie) Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 18:45:30 +0200 Subject: Zurich University Chair of Linguistics (Typology) Message-ID: The University of Zurich is advertising a Chair in Linguistics with an emphasis in Typology. For more details, please see below. Bernard Comrie ----- An der Philosophischen Fakult?t der Universit?t Z?rich ist zum 1. Februar 2010 (oder fr?her) eine Professur f?r Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (Nachfolge Prof. Dr. Karen H. Ebert) zu besetzen. Die Stelleninhaberin oder der Stelleninhaber soll das Fach Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft in seiner vollen Breite in Forschung und Lehre vertreten. Die Professur ist sprachtypologisch ausgerichtet. Gew?nscht wird Erfahrung in der Feldforschung, insbesondere zu wenig dokumentierten und/oder bedrohten Sprachen ausserhalb Europas. Die Bereitschaft zu interdisziplin?rer Zusammenarbeit wird erwartet. Voraussetzung f?r die Einstellung ist die Habilitation oder der Nachweis gleichwertiger Leistungen. Die Universit?t strebt eine Erh?hung des Anteils der Frauen in Forschung und Lehre an und l?dt deshalb qualifizierte Wissenschaftlerinnen ein, sich zu bewerben. Bewerbungen mit den ?blichen Unterlagen (Lebenslauf, Verzeichnis der Publikationen, Angaben ?ber bisherige Lehrt?tigkeit ? jedoch ohne Publikationen) sind bis zum 3. August 2008 in schriftlicher und elektronischer Form zu richten an das Dekanat der Philosophischen Fakult?t, Universit?t Z?rich, R?mistr. 71, CH-8006 Z?rich. Elektronische Bewerbung an . -- [I am currently based in Leipzig.] Prof. Dr. Bernard Comrie Director, Department of Linguistics, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Distinguished Professor of Linguistics, University of California Santa Barbara E-mail: comrie at eva.mpg.de Home page: http://email.eva.mpg.de/~comrie/ Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Germany tel. +49 341 35 50 315 fax +49 341 35 50 333 Department of Linguistics University of California Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3100 USA fax +1 805 893 7769 A copy of all incoming e-mail is forwarded to my secretary. If you do not wish your message to be read other than by me, please put "private" in the subject box. From Vyv.Evans at brighton.ac.uk Wed Jun 25 08:30:50 2008 From: Vyv.Evans at brighton.ac.uk (Vyvyan Evans) Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 09:30:50 +0100 Subject: Conference programme: Language, Communication & Cognition, Brighton Aug 4-7th 2008 Message-ID: Dear All. Re. International conference on LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION & COGNITION, Brighton, UK. Aug. 4th-7th 2008 The conference programme for this August's conference has now been finalised, and the definitive programme is available on the conference website: www.languageandcognition.net. The website contains full details of all sessions including theme sessions, keynote speakers and entertainments. Please note, pre-conference registrations must be received no later than JULY 18th. This relates to BOTH electronic and postal registrations. Due to the number of delegates attending the conference we regret that we shall be unable to accept pre-conference registrations after this date. All presenters are required to register by July 18th. We look forward to welcoming colleagues to Brighton this summer. Sincerely, Vyv Evans --------------------------------------------------- Vyv Evans Professor of Cognitive Linguistics www.vyvevans.net From lists at chaoticlanguage.com Mon Jun 30 05:59:40 2008 From: lists at chaoticlanguage.com (Rob Freeman) Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2008 13:59:40 +0800 Subject: Rules vs. lists Message-ID: Dear All, I was glad to find the recent rule vs. list discussion. I like to see fundamental issues debated. In line with my own particular interests I hope I can shine a new perspective. Can anyone tell me, if the utterances of natural language are thought of primarily as a list, how many ways might the elements of that list be generalized to abstract one or other rule? That is to say, how many rules might a list of elements define in principle? Also how many partial rules, if the requirement of global generalizability is dropped? -Rob Freeman From david_tuggy at sil.org Mon Jun 30 12:48:29 2008 From: david_tuggy at sil.org (David Tuggy) Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2008 07:48:29 -0500 Subject: Rules vs. lists In-Reply-To: <7616afbc0806292259i1e2277e4oade36d5ac3f63088@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Any number that language users come up with, in either case. More-general and less-general rules, and whether or not there is one, or a set of, global generalizations to be made. --David Tuggy Rob Freeman wrote: > Dear All, > > I was glad to find the recent rule vs. list discussion. I like to see > fundamental issues debated. > > In line with my own particular interests I hope I can shine a new perspective. > > Can anyone tell me, if the utterances of natural language are thought > of primarily as a list, how many ways might the elements of that list > be generalized to abstract one or other rule? > > That is to say, how many rules might a list of elements define in > principle? Also how many partial rules, if the requirement of global > generalizability is dropped? > > -Rob Freeman > >