From eitkonen at utu.fi Mon Nov 3 14:51:51 2008 From: eitkonen at utu.fi (Esa Itkonen) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2008 16:51:51 +0200 Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! Esa Itkonen Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Nov 6 14:37:02 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 15:37:02 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Esa, Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at http://wals.info.) Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views of different authors." Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". My view is that typological definitions are inherently linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this is not a flaw in the design of the project. Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers and handouts".) Martin Haspelmath Esa Itkonen wrote: > Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a 30-page commentary on it, available > on the homepage below. Enjoy! > > Esa Itkonen > > > Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen > -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) http://email.eva.mpg.de/~haspelmt/index.html Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Nov 6 17:06:55 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 10:06:55 -0700 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <4913010E.1030105@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that some of us have felt about the WALS project from its very inception--it's relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this project has chosen to follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) that facts are, somehow, theory- independent, and that one can do a theory-free typology. This is done by two implicit moves: First, by defining grammatical phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping them by the* grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them And second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. To my mind, the geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is neigh meaningless without considering the diachrony of the particular languages (or families) in the region. It is of course true that a project could choose to be less ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in anticipation that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts to build their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", even as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height of self delusion. Cheers, TG ========= Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Dear Esa, > > Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas > of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that > has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the > individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors > should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning > future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at > http://wals.info.) > > Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: > > You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek > *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this > clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views > of different authors." > > Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be > sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very > compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link > case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking > (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural > marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if > the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might > still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation > between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not > between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". > > My view is that typological definitions are inherently > linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different > linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure > comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care > has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this > is not a flaw in the design of the project. > > Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of > grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, > i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is > that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its > own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their > comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. > > (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive > categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers > and handouts".) > > Martin Haspelmath > > Esa Itkonen wrote: >> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures >> (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish >> linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a >> 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >> >> Esa Itkonen >> >> >> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >> > From collfitz at gmail.com Thu Nov 6 18:06:10 2008 From: collfitz at gmail.com (Colleen Fitzgerald) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 12:06:10 -0600 Subject: Job openings Message-ID: Dear All,We have an unexpected vacancy for the spring 2009 semester and are offering a one-semester position in applied linguistics/TESOL/SLA. This will be in the Department of Linguistics and TESOL at the University of Texas at Arlington. (Note: I have moved.) We expect to move quickly on this. I hope you will circulate the below job ad (plus two links to our tenure-track positions, which begin in Fall 2009), and encourage any qualified applicants to come our way. (Please direct questions to me at my work account, cmfitz at uta.edu) Links to the two tenure-track positions: Syntax: http://ling.uta.edu/documents/Syntax-TT-UTArlington.pdf Applied linguistics/TESOL: http://ling.uta.edu/documents/TESOL-TT-UTArlington.pdf Job ad for the Visiting Assistant Professor Position: The Department of Linguistics and TESOL at The University of Texas at Arlington invites applications for a one semester, non-tenure track position as a Visiting Assistant Professor in TESOL, for the Spring 2009, starting January 12, 2009. Candidates will have a doctorate or be ABD in Applied Linguistics or a closely related field by the time of the appointment. We have a specific need for the candidate to teach two courses (Pedagogical Grammar of English, Second Language Acquisition) and to condict the TESOL practicum. Although these courses are cross-listed undergraduate/graduate, the main audience will consist of graduate students working towards the M.A. in TESOL. Candidates are encouraged to provide supporting documentation for their teaching experience in these courses and graduate student teaching. Please note that this job is separate from the tenure-track position that we are advertising in the same area, which has a start date of Fall 2009. Candidates may apply to both positions (with separate cover letters and supporting materials as requested for the two different positions), but should be advised that the positions are not linked. The Department has a thriving PhD program, strong MA programs in linguistics and in TESOL, and a Graduate Certificate in TESOL. Our graduate student organization hosts an annual student conference. The Department is also in the process of building its undergraduate offerings, which currently includes a linguistics minor. The Department also includes the English Language Institute, which offers intensive English instruction at various levels. Successful candidates must demonstrate the ability to teach undergraduate and graduate courses, particularly in areas of TESOL and second language pedagogy. Applications from members of underrepresented groups are especially encouraged. The University of Texas at Arlington is a doctoral, research-intensive public institution of over 25,000 students located in the heart of the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, a region with excellent cultural, recreational and entertainment facilities. A letter of application describing teaching and research interests, current curriculum vitae, one writing samples, evidence of teaching excellence, and three letters of reference from those most familiar with the applicant's research and teaching should be sent to: TESOL VAP Search Department of Linguistics and TESOL UT Arlington, Box 19559--Hammond Hall 403 Arlington, TX 76019-0559 For more information about the department, visit http://ling.uta.edu, or contact by phone (817) 272-3133. Review of the applicants will begin Dec. 1, 2008 but will continue until successful candidates are identified. This is a security sensitive position, and a criminal background check will be conducted on finalists. UT Arlington is an Equal Opportunity & Affirmative Action Employer. ************************************ Dr. Colleen Fitzgerald Chair Dept. of Linguistics & TESOL The University of Texas at Arlington Box 19559 Arlington, TX 76019-0559 Webpage: http://ling.uta.edu/~colleen Email: cmfitz at uta.edu (O)817-272-3133 (F)817-272-2731 From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Nov 6 19:47:48 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 20:47:48 +0100 Subject: WALS and empiricism In-Reply-To: <4913242F.4010805@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Thanks, Tom, for these interesting comments! But they demand a response: > I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that > some of us have felt about the WALS project from its very > inception--it's relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this > project has chosen to follow the old empiricist misonception (vis > Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) that facts are, somehow, > theory-independent, and that one can do a theory-free typology. That data and theory are interdependent is a truism. But the problem with the term "theory" in linguistics is that it has been virtually monopolized by the generative view of the world. The Greenbergian functionalist theory underlying WALS is of a very different sort. What matters to me (and to empirical typology in general) is that it makes no sense to postpone typology till we somehow find "the right theory", which provides all the categories that languages might have. This is basically the generative approach, and for this reason generative linguistics has not led to any major insights into cross-linguistic regularities. Boas, Sapir and Bloomfield were right that all languages have their own categories (a position that was more recently articulated by people such as Lazard, Dryer, LaPolla, Croft, Bickel), so the typological concepts have to be different from linguistic categories. > This is done by two implicit moves: First, by defining grammatical > phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping them by the > *grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them. And second, > by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. I find these remarks puzzling. Many of the WALS chapters have been conceived of in terms of functional domains, and of course many of the generalizations are ultimately due to diachronic factors. I think most WALS authors are fully aware of this. Still, to make systematic cross-linguistic databases, we need consistently applicable definitions of the types (which one might call "purely structural definitions"). The main difference between WALS and Givonian work is the scale: In WALS, each chapter looks at 200 languages or more (the average number of languages per map is 400). We feel that this is necessary, because the earlier practice of taking a few languages and jumping to generalizations, while suggestive and interesting, does not provide a firm basis about what is truly general. > To my mind, the geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is > neigh meaningless without considering the diachrony of the particular > languages (or families) in the region. I don't know anyone who would disagree with this statement. The problem is that while grammaticalization gives us the beginning of a theory of morphosyntactic patterns, we don't even have the beginning of a diachronic theory of the large-scale areal patterns. That these are so common for all areas of language structure is a fascinating, though currently quite enigmatic observation. > It is of course true that a project could choose to be less ambitious, > and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in anticipation that > theory-oriented people would later on use those facts to build their > theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that matter, > Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never > theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", > even as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the > height of self delusion. > > Cheers, TG I don't think that the Greenbergian work from the 1960s is rightly characterized as "the height of self-delusion", and WALS represents a continuation of that tradition. While practically all of the famous Chomskyan parameters of the 1980s have dissipated and disappeared from the scene (see my 2008 paper in the Biberauer volume), the great majority of Greenberg's universals from 1963 have survived. We are still struggling to understand these patterns, but nobody is deluding themselves. World-wide linguistics is much like geology: You first need to do a lot of on-site fieldwork to get a good sense of what the mountain range is like, before you can begin to construct your ambitious (catastrophist, gradualist, etc.) explanatory stories. Best, Martin > Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> Dear Esa, >> >> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >> http://wals.info.) >> >> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >> >> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >> of different authors." >> >> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking >> (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural >> marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if >> the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might >> still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation >> between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not >> between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". >> >> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care >> has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But >> this is not a flaw in the design of the project. >> >> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it >> is that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has >> its own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >> >> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive >> categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers >> and handouts".) >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language >>> Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid >>> Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write >>> a 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >>> >>> Esa Itkonen >>> >>> >>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>> >> > > From Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Thu Nov 6 20:24:09 2008 From: Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 21:24:09 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: Dear Tom and others, > (...) But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that matter, Chomsky, > perish the thought...) that in science facts are never theory-neutral, > and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", even as a > preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height of > self delusion. Yes! It is good to see someone making this point! All the more, linguistic data are in fact /phenomena/ (in the Kantian sense) not 'true objects'. They take shape in terms of their (scientific) perception (> description, classification etc.). In fact, linguistics is by large a phenomenology (see http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/redling.pdf on more about this problem, if you want [alas, in German ]). This shouldn't prevent us from doing empirical work even in the sense of Martin's 'comparative concepts', but just as Basic Linguistic Theory (BLT) à la Bob Dixon cannot be theory-neutral, 'comparative concepts' cannot be either.... The main point is that we should always integrate (and pronounce!) our (scientific) perceptual background when giving a gestalt to linguistic phenomena.... Best wishes, Wolfgang -- --------------------------------------------------------- *Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze * ---------------------------------------------------------- /Primary contact: / Institut für Allgemeine & Typologische Sprachwissenschaft Dept. II / F 13 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München *Neue Adresse / New address* Ludwigstraße 25 D-80539 München Tel.: 0049-(0)89-2180-2486 (Secretary) [1.OG, R 102] 0049-(0)89-2180-5343 (Office) [1. OG, R 105] Fax: 0049-(0)89-2180-5345 Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de /// Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Web: New page (change bookmarks!): http://www.ats.lmu.de/index.html Personal homepage: http://www.wolfgangschulze.in-devir.com ---------------------------------------------------------- /Second contact: / Katedra Germanistiký Fakulta humanitných vied Univerzita Mateja Béla / Banská Bystrica Tajovského 40 SK-97401 Banská Bystrica Tel: (00421)-(0)48-4465108 Fax: (00421)-(0)48-4465512 Email: Schulze at fhv.umb.sk Web: http://www.fhv.umb.sk/app/user.php?user=schulze ---------------------------------------------------------- From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Nov 6 22:12:59 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 15:12:59 -0700 Subject: WALS and empiricism In-Reply-To: <491349E4.9070702@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Fair enough, Martin. But with some caveats: Some of us have NEVER conceded "theory" to the Chomskians. So I would suggest that the work of many of us has been theoretical from the word go, in the best sense of the word--seeking explanations from wider and wider domains. This is articulated as clear as a bell in my "On Understanding Grammar" (1979), and was an implicit practice since the very start of the anti-Chomskian rebellion (dating in my life to Haj Ross & George Lakoff's 1967 paper "Is deep structure necessary?"). So it is high time we stop conceding to Chomsky more than his necessary dues (which are extensive but not absolute). Second: Greenberg's work in typology has been theoretical from the very start, in at least three senses I am aware of: (a) the work on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the diachronic foundations of typology; (c) His later forays into diachrony and evolution. It is of course true that he didn't explicitly try to explain his famous "Greenbergian correlations". But it is also true that he encouraged those of us who did try to explain them, and at least in person accepted our theoretical explanations as a matter of course. Alas, he was not as explicit as Hermann Paul on these issue (indeed, he never cited him, to my knowledge). Lastly: bigvs. small sample. How big is big enough? The advantage of a large sample could only be demonstrated if you can show that you have discovered a body of important facts that were ignored by those of us who "impressionistically" started their theoretical work on smaller samples without waiting for a 100% world-wide data-base (and didn;'t apologizing for it). In other words, as in all good empirical science, you can falsify our hypotheses by collecting data from a larger sample and showing facts in them that are incompatible with those hypotheses. So go ahead, we're not perfect. But, quoting from memory from a 1980 interview with George Watson: "...we didn't just want to find the right solution. We wanted to find it with the minimum amount of data...". Cheers, TG ======== Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Thanks, Tom, for these interesting comments! But they demand a response: >> I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that >> some of us have felt about the WALS project from its very >> inception--it's relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this >> project has chosen to follow the old empiricist misonception (vis >> Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) that facts are, somehow, >> theory-independent, and that one can do a theory-free typology. > That data and theory are interdependent is a truism. But the problem > with the term "theory" in linguistics is that it has been virtually > monopolized by the generative view of the world. The Greenbergian > functionalist theory underlying WALS is of a very different sort. > > What matters to me (and to empirical typology in general) is that it > makes no sense to postpone typology till we somehow find "the right > theory", which provides all the categories that languages might have. > This is basically the generative approach, and for this reason > generative linguistics has not led to any major insights into > cross-linguistic regularities. Boas, Sapir and Bloomfield were right > that all languages have their own categories (a position that was more > recently articulated by people such as Lazard, Dryer, LaPolla, Croft, > Bickel), so the typological concepts have to be different from > linguistic categories. >> This is done by two implicit moves: First, by defining grammatical >> phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping them by the >> *grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them. And second, >> by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. > I find these remarks puzzling. Many of the WALS chapters have been > conceived of in terms of functional domains, and of course many of the > generalizations are ultimately due to diachronic factors. I think most > WALS authors are fully aware of this. Still, to make systematic > cross-linguistic databases, we need consistently applicable > definitions of the types (which one might call "purely structural > definitions"). > > The main difference between WALS and Givonian work is the scale: In > WALS, each chapter looks at 200 languages or more (the average number > of languages per map is 400). We feel that this is necessary, because > the earlier practice of taking a few languages and jumping to > generalizations, while suggestive and interesting, does not provide a > firm basis about what is truly general. >> To my mind, the geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is >> neigh meaningless without considering the diachrony of the particular >> languages (or families) in the region. > I don't know anyone who would disagree with this statement. The > problem is that while grammaticalization gives us the beginning of a > theory of morphosyntactic patterns, we don't even have the beginning > of a diachronic theory of the large-scale areal patterns. That these > are so common for all areas of language structure is a fascinating, > though currently quite enigmatic observation. >> It is of course true that a project could choose to be less >> ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in anticipation >> that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts to build >> their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that >> matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are >> never theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure >> facts", even as a preliminary exercise to subsequent >> theory-building, is the height of self delusion. >> >> Cheers, TG > I don't think that the Greenbergian work from the 1960s is rightly > characterized as "the height of self-delusion", and WALS represents a > continuation of that tradition. While practically all of the famous > Chomskyan parameters of the 1980s have dissipated and disappeared from > the scene (see my 2008 paper in the Biberauer volume), the great > majority of Greenberg's universals from 1963 have survived. > > We are still struggling to understand these patterns, but nobody is > deluding themselves. World-wide linguistics is much like geology: You > first need to do a lot of on-site fieldwork to get a good sense of > what the mountain range is like, before you can begin to construct > your ambitious (catastrophist, gradualist, etc.) explanatory stories. > > Best, > Martin > > > > >> Martin Haspelmath wrote: >>> Dear Esa, >>> >>> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >>> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >>> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >>> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >>> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >>> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >>> http://wals.info.) >>> >>> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >>> >>> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >>> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >>> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >>> of different authors." >>> >>> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >>> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >>> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >>> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal >>> case-marking (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with >>> affixal plural marking (as opposed to pluralization by number >>> words). Then even if the two chapters use different definitions of >>> "affixal", you might still get a true correlation. But it will of >>> course be a correlation between affixal(1) case-marking and >>> affixal(2) pluralization, not between "affixal (tout court) >>> case-marking and pluralization". >>> >>> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >>> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >>> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >>> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So >>> care has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. >>> But this is not a flaw in the design of the project. >>> >>> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >>> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >>> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it >>> is that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has >>> its own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >>> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >>> >>> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and >>> descriptive categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website >>> under "Papers and handouts".) >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language >>>> Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two >>>> intrepid Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have >>>> ventured to write a 30-page commentary on it, available on the >>>> homepage below. Enjoy! >>>> >>>> Esa Itkonen >>>> >>>> >>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>>> >>> >> >> > From dryer at buffalo.edu Fri Nov 7 17:50:12 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 12:50:12 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <4913242F.4010805@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Tom, I think you're imagining a difference in belief where there isn't one. There is no belief behind WALS that typology can be theory-neutral (in any sense of "theory") and no sense in which WALS is based on Bloomfieldian empiricism. If there's a difference in anything, it's simply a difference in taste and interest. But let me address one, ultimately terminological, issue. You seem to think that theory means explanation. But the theoretical questions that I'm most interested in are questions of the form "What are languages like?" I'm interested in theories about the range of typological variation and the limits on this variation. I'm also interested in theories about why languages are the way they are, but for me those questions are more like a hobby than the core of what I do as a linguist. There are a number of reasons for this. For one thing, theories about why languages are the way they are "neigh meaningless" if what they are explaining isn't true or even if what they purport to explain is something that we don't know yet if it's true or not. There is a huge body of literature from the past 40 years that falls into this category. Unfortunately, Tom, that includes some of your work. For another, even if the explanandum is something that we can be fairly confident of, hypotheses about why languages are the way they are ultimately just that, hypotheses. All too often, they are untestable and unfalsifiable and always will be. Now I don't want to sound like a Martin Joos and say that we shouldn't be asking such questions or trying to answer them. I'm just explaining why I personally am more interested in theoretical questions about what languages are like. But that's ultimately just a matter of taste, not really any different from why I chose to be a linguist rather than something else. I'm glad that there are others whose tastes have led them to devote their energy to questions of explanation, especially you, I might add, since in my opinion no linguist has come up with more interesting hypotheses over the past 35 years than you have. But let's not confuse these differences in taste with differences in belief. But I do object to your trying to use the term "theory" exclusively for questions of explanation. I think you do Greenberg a disservice when you say "Greenberg's work in typology has been theoretical from the very start, in at least three senses I am aware of: (a) the work on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the diachronic foundations of typology; (c) His later forays into diachrony and evolution." You miss a very important fourth sense: his work on what languages are like. Greenberg loved reading grammars. His unique contribution to the field resulted from the fact that he was interested in what languages were like in a way that none of his contemporaries were. Of course, you're free to use the word "theory" as you wish and you're free to object to how I use the word. But that's not a substantive issue either. Matthew --On Thursday, November 6, 2008 10:06 AM -0700 Tom Givon wrote: > > > I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that some > of us have felt about the WALS project from its very inception--it's > relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this project has chosen to > follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) > that facts are, somehow, theory- independent, and that one can do a > theory-free typology. This is done by two implicit moves: First, by > defining grammatical phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping > them by the* grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them And > second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. To my mind, the > geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is neigh meaningless > without considering the diachrony of the particular languages (or > families) in the region. It is of course true that a project could choose > to be less ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in > anticipation that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts > to build their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that > matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never > theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", even > as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height > of self delusion. > > Cheers, TG > > ========= > > > > Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> Dear Esa, >> >> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >> http://wals.info.) >> >> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >> >> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >> of different authors." >> >> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking >> (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural >> marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if >> the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might >> still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation >> between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not >> between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". >> >> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care >> has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this >> is not a flaw in the design of the project. >> >> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is >> that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its >> own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >> >> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive >> categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers >> and handouts".) >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures >>> (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish >>> linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a >>> 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >>> >>> Esa Itkonen >>> >>> >>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>> >> > > From bernd.heine at uni-koeln.de Sat Nov 8 02:01:00 2008 From: bernd.heine at uni-koeln.de (Bernd Heine) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2008 03:01:00 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <2147483647.1226062212@dryer-osx.caset.buffalo.edu> Message-ID: Matthew, I am a little bit confused. In your understanding: What is 'functional linguistics'? Does it have any meaning? Is it just a label? And how would you relate your own work to this term? Bernd > > Tom, > > I think you're imagining a difference in belief where there isn't one. > There is no belief behind WALS that typology can be theory-neutral (in > any sense of "theory") and no sense in which WALS is based on > Bloomfieldian empiricism. If there's a difference in anything, it's > simply a difference in taste and interest. > > But let me address one, ultimately terminological, issue. You seem to > think that theory means explanation. But the theoretical questions > that I'm most interested in are questions of the form "What are > languages like?" I'm interested in theories about the range of > typological variation and the limits on this variation. I'm also > interested in theories about why languages are the way they are, but > for me those questions are more like a hobby than the core of what I > do as a linguist. There are a number of reasons for this. For one > thing, theories about why languages are the way they are "neigh > meaningless" if what they are explaining isn't true or even if what > they purport to explain is something that we don't know yet if it's > true or not. There is a huge body of literature from the past 40 > years that falls into this category. Unfortunately, Tom, that > includes some of your work. For another, even if the explanandum is > something that we can be fairly confident of, hypotheses about why > languages are the way they are ultimately just that, hypotheses. All > too often, they are untestable and unfalsifiable and always will be. > Now I don't want to sound like a Martin Joos and say that we shouldn't > be asking such questions or trying to answer them. I'm just > explaining why I personally am more interested in theoretical > questions about what languages are like. But that's ultimately just a > matter of taste, not really any different from why I chose to be a > linguist rather than something else. I'm glad that there are others > whose tastes have led them to devote their energy to questions of > explanation, especially you, I might add, since in my opinion no > linguist has come up with more interesting hypotheses over the past 35 > years than you have. But let's not confuse these differences in taste > with differences in belief. > > But I do object to your trying to use the term "theory" exclusively > for questions of explanation. I think you do Greenberg a disservice > when you say "Greenberg's work in typology has been theoretical from > the very start, in at least three senses I am aware of: (a) the work > on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the diachronic > foundations of typology; (c) His later forays into diachrony and > evolution." You miss a very important fourth sense: his work on what > languages are like. Greenberg loved reading grammars. His unique > contribution to the field resulted from the fact that he was > interested in what languages were like in a way that none of his > contemporaries were. > > Of course, you're free to use the word "theory" as you wish and you're > free to object to how I use the word. But that's not a substantive > issue either. > > Matthew > > --On Thursday, November 6, 2008 10:06 AM -0700 Tom Givon > wrote: > >> >> >> I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that some >> of us have felt about the WALS project from its very inception--it's >> relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this project has chosen to >> follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) >> that facts are, somehow, theory- independent, and that one can do a >> theory-free typology. This is done by two implicit moves: First, by >> defining grammatical phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping >> them by the* grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them And >> second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. To my mind, the >> geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is neigh meaningless >> without considering the diachrony of the particular languages (or >> families) in the region. It is of course true that a project could >> choose >> to be less ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in >> anticipation that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts >> to build their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that >> matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never >> theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", >> even >> as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height >> of self delusion. >> >> Cheers, TG >> >> ========= >> >> >> >> Martin Haspelmath wrote: >>> Dear Esa, >>> >>> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >>> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >>> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >>> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >>> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >>> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >>> http://wals.info.) >>> >>> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >>> >>> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >>> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >>> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >>> of different authors." >>> >>> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >>> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >>> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >>> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking >>> (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural >>> marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if >>> the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might >>> still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation >>> between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not >>> between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". >>> >>> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >>> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >>> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >>> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care >>> has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this >>> is not a flaw in the design of the project. >>> >>> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >>> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >>> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is >>> that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its >>> own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >>> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >>> >>> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive >>> categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers >>> and handouts".) >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures >>>> (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish >>>> linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a >>>> 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >>>> >>>> Esa Itkonen >>>> >>>> >>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>>> >>> >> >> > > > > > -- Prof. Bernd Heine Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa 3-11-1, Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo, 183-8534 JAPAN Phone: 042-330-5664 Fax: 042-330-5610 From Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Sat Nov 8 09:01:39 2008 From: Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2008 10:01:39 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <2147483647.1226062212@dryer-osx.caset.buffalo.edu> Message-ID: Dear friends, I want to briefly come back to a point made by Matthew: > But the theoretical questions that I'm most interested in are > questions of the form "What are languages like?" I'm interested in > theories about the range of typological variation and the limits on > this variation. I'm also interested in theories about why languages > are the way they are, but for me those questions are more like a hobby > than the core of what I do as a linguist. Possible answers to the question "What are languages like?" necessarily entail a number of (hidden) assumptions about the question "Why languages are the way they are". First, you set up a class of (say) 'objects' delimiting from other possible 'objects' ("language"). This classification thus includes a definition of the class at issue. For instance, you may say that 'language' is the structural coupling of patterns of motoric activities related to 'breath obstruction' (articulation) and conceptual patterns. Or, you may say that this coupling may likewise involve motoric patterns related to mimics, gesture etc. (thus including e.g. sign languages). The overall quality of the definiendum thus depends from which position you take (or: which definiens you select). Accordingly, the choice of the definiens automatically addresses questions about the ontology of the definiendum. Which position so ever you take: The choice would (in science) reflect a theoretical segment that is, however, less often spoken out in fuller details. In other words: Matthew's 'hobby' is fundamental for answering his original question. The same holds for 'variation': In order to 'observe' variations within a class set up by definition (!), you have to select deviating features. Yet, the act of observing differences depends from the point of view of the observer: For instance, if you start from the class of 'cars' (defined how so ever), you have multiple choices concerning the selection of features: The cars themselves do not tell the observer, which features are different, but it is the observer who decides (types of wheels, number of wheels, color, shape of the autobody, carriage, functions etc.). Moreover, it is the observer who sets up 'theories' about which features are comparable even though they may have different shapes. Who tells the observer that for instance (in linguistics) the Turkish inferential -mIS can be included into a class of variation that is also present with the (say) German modal pattern 'er soll + Perfect' (Turkic gitmiS ~ German 'er soll gegangen sein')? The choice of the tertium comparationis presupposes that we first decide (!) on the comparability of the items in question. And again, this decision is grounded in theory (be it pronounced or not). Note that in my sense, 'theory' does not necessarily mean a full fledged construction. Here, 'theory' refers to any schematic pattern that because active in a (scientific) cognition when perceiving/observing linguistic 'worlds'. I'm left with the impression that the present debate brings us back to discussions that went on 30-40 years ago: The (Phoney) Linguistic War between East Coast and West Coast Linguistics conditioned that quite a number of linguists turned away and practiced what has been called 'business-as-usual linguistics'. This scientific behavior seems to be a general tendency in case theory-driven debates exclude people not willing to enter one of the camps (a teacher of mine once had polemically termed this pattern 'Scientific Biedermeier'). Still, I am not sure whether this 'drawback' (to business-as-usual linguistics) can be more than just a 'pause' in the debate on what Matthew has addressed in the question "Why languages are the way they are?". I think that, today, it is crucial to openly articulate one's own position with respect to this question that underlies - as I have said above - the question "What are languages like?". Even a 'hunter and gatherer' of linguistic data must have an idea about what is the 'use' of collecting these data and according to which 'recipe' (s)he collects them. Here, the three standard paradigms ('something is the way it has become' (causa efficiens; 'mythology'), 'something is the way it is' (causa formalis; 'descriptivism'), and 'something is for what is has been designed' (causa finalis; 'utopy')) cannot be separated except for short-living heuristic purposes. The global scientific paradigm usually focuses upon one of these positions (today, the causa efficiens being the main target of ontology, contrary to say 30 years ago, when the causa finalis played the major role). However, we cannot (or: must not) escape from the others..... Best wishes, Wolfgang -- --------------------------------------------------------- *Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze * ---------------------------------------------------------- /Primary contact: / Institut für Allgemeine & Typologische Sprachwissenschaft Dept. II / F 13 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München *Neue Adresse / New address* Ludwigstraße 25 D-80539 München Tel.: 0049-(0)89-2180-2486 (Secretary) [1.OG, R 102] 0049-(0)89-2180-5343 (Office) [1. OG, R 105] Fax: 0049-(0)89-2180-5345 Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de /// Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Web: New page (change bookmarks!): http://www.ats.lmu.de/index.html Personal homepage: http://www.wolfgangschulze.in-devir.com ---------------------------------------------------------- /Second contact: / Katedra Germanistiký Fakulta humanitných vied Univerzita Mateja Béla / Banská Bystrica Tajovského 40 SK-97401 Banská Bystrica Tel: (00421)-(0)48-4465108 Fax: (00421)-(0)48-4465512 Email: Schulze at fhv.umb.sk Web: http://www.fhv.umb.sk/app/user.php?user=schulze ---------------------------------------------------------- From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Nov 10 03:48:47 2008 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2008 22:48:47 EST Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies Message-ID: In a message dated 11/7/08 12:50:44 PM, dryer at buffalo.edu writes: > < be fairly confident of, hypotheses about why languages are the way they are > ultimately just that, hypotheses.  All too often, they are untestable and > unfalsifiable and always will be.>>  > A Quick Comment. Early natural histories organized groups of animals according to categories that we find odd these days. Birds and bats and butterflies were all things that fly, so they were grouped together. Now this was not so much a theory, or even a hypothesis, as it was a way of giving some kind of organization to that part of the natural world. A random organization makes a presentation of data difficult for any audience. Modern biology textbooks often poo-poo the categories of the old natural historians because modern biology views them from the point of view of modern theories of temporal evolution and relateness. That birds, bats and butterflies all fly is a coincidence from that perspective. But, of course, in terms of physics, birds and bats and butterflies do indeed have something in common -- in the sense of their main method of motion. These three not-closely-related animal forms do share a common solution to the problem of motion, even if each particular solution arose independently. What appears to be an erroneous grouping actually does inform us about how external contingencies can lead to a common solution, DESPITE a lack of direct relatedness. An important aspect of evolution. And possibly of language. So, is WALS the equivalent of the old naive natural histories, slapping together linguistic forms on some superficial sense of typology? I don't think so. The real question is how the groupings end up working with everything else. How does one explain all these "typologies?" The worse possible reaction is to belittle the process as a mere "hypothesis." Hypotheses are the meat of any REAL science. Any theory that does not yield testable hypotheses, by long and hallowed tradition, sucks. It seems to me that the organization of WALS constitutes some sort of hypothesis. It is just a matter of someone somewhere actually stating it, and making some testable predictions based on it. If A, B, C, are here, then where would we expect to find D? Stating that all the observable language structures are in reality one structure does not help, because it doesn't explain why there is more than one human language. We need a sensible description of the process, the mechanism -- given the data. Which means we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. We need a way to say all this makes sense, if we just put the sun in the center. (At this point, I'm afraid a Darwin or Einstein are down the road a bit, for linguistics.) In the mean time, WALS is a collection of data organized from some general point of view. If there is a Copernican solution to the data, then please have at it. In the meantime, we need to be satisfied with bats and bees and butterfies living together, all under the same chapter heading. Regards, Steve Long ************** AOL Search: Your one stop for directions, recipes and all other Holiday needs. Search Now. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1212792382x1200798498/aol?redir=http://searchblog.aol.com/2008/11/04/happy-holidays-from -aol-search/?ncid=emlcntussear00000001) From dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au Mon Nov 10 07:09:22 2008 From: dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au (dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:09:22 +1100 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: snip.. > we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. -- David Harvey 60 Gipps Street Drummoyne NSW 2047 Australia Tel: 61-2-9719-9170 From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Mon Nov 10 09:36:06 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 10:36:06 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: Message-ID: If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with authority, rather fatal ones). Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval biology. Martin > At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > snip.. > >> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > > A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a > comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing > body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both > also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. > Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is > not to be sniffed at. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From ritva.laury at helsinki.fi Mon Nov 10 13:58:40 2008 From: ritva.laury at helsinki.fi (Ritva Laury) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 15:58:40 +0200 Subject: New book on clause combining Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I am delighted to announce the publication of a new book, Crosslinguistic Studies of Clause Combining. Details available at http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=TSL%2080 and below. Ritva Laury Crosslinguistic Studies of Clause Combining The multifunctionality of conjunctions Edited by Ritva Laury University of Helsinki  [Typological Studies in Language, 80] 2008. xiv, 253 pp. Hb 978 90 272 2993 9 EUR 105.00 Table of contents Introduction Ritva Laury and Sandra A. Thompson From subordinate clause to noun-phrase: Yang constructions in colloquial Indonesian Robert Englebretson On quotative constructions in Iberian Spanish Ricardo Etxepare Bulgarian adversative connectives: Conjunctions or discourse markers? Grace E. Fielder Projectability and clause combining in interaction Paul J. Hopper and Sandra A. Thompson Conjunction and sequenced actions: The Estonian complementizer and evidential particle et Leelo Keevallik Clause combining, interaction, evidentiality, participation structure, and the conjunction-particle continuum: the Finnish että Ritva Laury and Eeva-Leena Seppänen The grammaticization of but as a final particle in English conversation Jean Mulder and Sandra A. Thompson Quotative tte in Japanese: Its multifaceted functions and degrees of “subordination” Shigeko Okamoto and Tsuyoshi Ono Quoting and topic-marking: Some observations on the quotative tte construction in Japanese Ryoko Suzuk From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Nov 10 14:04:38 2008 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 09:04:38 EST Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies Message-ID: In a message dated 11/10/08 2:09:41 AM, dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au writes: > < comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing body of > work>> > To be exact, there was a large body of data before Copernicus (and Kepler). Astronomers and mariners were able to predict the movement of objects in the sky reasonably well. However, all this data was INTERPRETED with a theory that demanded all sorts of epi-cycles, whistles and bells in order to be consistent with the data. It was not that Ptolemy and pre-Copernican astronomy was inconsistent with the data. It was that it jumped through all sorts of hoops to keep the earth at the center of the solar system. What Copernicus did was change the CENTER of the theory, and all that complexity evaporated. One might suggest that what Chomsky did was put the wrong object at the center of linguistics and sent it jumping through comparable hoops. Kepler, having better data, added the ellipse to the equation. But the "laws" of plantery motion awaited Newton. You needed a Copernicus before you could get to a Newton. Gallileo was, and got in trouble for being, a Copernican. He had the center right. Chomsky is a Chomskyan. His work is as admirable as the Alexandrians, but it still unfortunately has the earth as the center of the universe. What we need is someone to do a Copernicus on it. Regards, Steve Long ************** AOL Search: Your one stop for directions, recipes and all other Holiday needs. Search Now. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1212792382x1200798498/aol?redir=http://searchblog.aol.com/2008/11/04/happy-holidays-from -aol-search/?ncid=emlcntussear00000001) From dryer at buffalo.edu Mon Nov 10 14:22:07 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 09:22:07 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: Bernd, Let me emphasize that (1) what I am talking about is a matter of personal taste; and (2) I'm not questioning the value of explanatory work. I have done work both in constructing theories about what languages are like and in explaining why they are that way, and while each are a source of satisfaction in their own way, ultimately I find the former more satisfying. I understand perfectly well why there are others who find the latter more satisfying. The field benefits from having both sorts of linguists. My email was in response to Tom's original email that seemed to interpret the difference, not as a matter of personal taste, but as a matter of difference in belief. (I say "Tom's original email", since in a response he sent just to me, he did recognize that a difference in temperament was at least part of the picture.) And his email seemed not to recognize that there is a large body of theoretical work in typology that essentially involves theories of what languages are like rather than explanations for why they are that way. So to answer your question, Bernd, while I get more personal satisfaction from theories about what languages are like, I don't stop there. I am interested in functional explanations for why they are that way, I engage in such work myself to some extent, and I certainly hope that others do as well. Now I recognize that there is another very different body of work that could also be characterized as being about what languages are like, namely work in generative grammar, that does not aim at going beyond that (apart from attributing things to innateness). But functionalists should not let such work give the idea of theories about what languages are like a "bad name". Nor should we accept the generative linguists' view of work in typology that characterizes what languages are like as atheoretical. Too many typologists and functionalists seem to accept that view. Matthew On Fri 11/07/08 9:01 PM , Bernd Heine bernd.heine at uni-koeln.de sent: > Matthew, > I am a little bit confused. In your understanding: What is 'functional > linguistics'? Does it have any meaning? Is it just a label? And how > would you relate your own work to this term? > Bernd > > > > Tom, > > > > I think you're imagining a difference in belief > where there isn't one. > There is no belief behind WALS that typology can > be theory-neutral (in > any sense of "theory") and no sense in > which WALS is based on > Bloomfieldian empiricism. If there's a > difference in anything, it's > simply a difference in taste and > interest.> > > But let me address one, ultimately > terminological, issue. You seem to > think that theory means explanation. But the > theoretical questions > that I'm most interested in are questions of the > form "What are > languages like?" I'm interested in theories > about the range of > typological variation and the limits on this > variation. I'm also > interested in theories about why languages are > the way they are, but > for me those questions are more like a hobby > than the core of what I > do as a linguist. There are a number of reasons > for this. For one > thing, theories about why languages are the way > they are "neigh > meaningless" if what they are explaining > isn't true or even if what > they purport to explain is something that we > don't know yet if it's > true or not. There is a huge body of literature > from the past 40 > years that falls into this category. > Unfortunately, Tom, that > includes some of your work. For another, even > if the explanandum is > something that we can be fairly confident of, > hypotheses about why > languages are the way they are ultimately just > that, hypotheses. All > too often, they are untestable and unfalsifiable > and always will be. > Now I don't want to sound like a Martin Joos and > say that we shouldn't > be asking such questions or trying to answer > them. I'm just > explaining why I personally am more interested > in theoretical > questions about what languages are like. But > that's ultimately just a > matter of taste, not really any different from > why I chose to be a > linguist rather than something else. I'm glad > that there are others > whose tastes have led them to devote their > energy to questions of > explanation, especially you, I might add, since > in my opinion no > linguist has come up with more interesting > hypotheses over the past 35 > years than you have. But let's not confuse > these differences in taste > with differences in belief. > > > > But I do object to your trying to use the term > "theory" exclusively > for questions of explanation. I think you do > Greenberg a disservice > when you say "Greenberg's work in typology > has been theoretical from > the very start, in at least three senses I am > aware of: (a) the work > on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the > diachronic > foundations of typology; (c) His later forays > into diachrony and > evolution." You miss a very important > fourth sense: his work on what > languages are like. Greenberg loved reading > grammars. His unique > contribution to the field resulted from the fact > that he was > interested in what languages were like in a way > that none of his > contemporaries were. > > > > Of course, you're free to use the word > "theory" as you wish and you're > free to object to how I use the word. But > that's not a substantive > issue either. > > > > Matthew > > > > --On Thursday, November 6, 2008 10:06 AM -0700 > Tom Givon > egon.edu> wrote:> > >> > >> > >> I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, > articulated the concern that some>> of us have felt about the WALS project from > its very inception--it's>> relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, > this project has chosen to>> follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis > Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.)>> that facts are, somehow, theory- > independent, and that one can do a>> theory-free typology. This is done by two > implicit moves: First, by>> defining grammatical phenomena purely > structurally, rather than grouping>> them by the* grammaticalized functional > domains* that underlie them And>> second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the > equation. To my mind, the>> geographical distribution of grammatical > phenomena is neigh meaningless>> without considering the diachrony of the > particular languages (or>> families) in the region. It is of course > true that a project could >> choose > >> to be less ambitious, and simply give us > "pure facts", perhaps in>> anticipation that theory-oriented people > would later on use those facts>> to build their theories. But I have to agree > with Hanson (and, for that>> matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that > in science facts are never>> theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a > science of "pure facts", >> even > >> as a preliminary exercise to subsequent > theory-building, is the height>> of self delusion. > >> > >> Cheers, TG > >> > >> ========= > >> > >> > >> > >> Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >>> Dear Esa, > >>> > >>> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed > commentary on the World Atlas>>> of Language Structures (WALS). This is > the most detailed review that>>> has been written, and we are very > grateful for it. Many of the>>> individual points of criticism are > well-taken, and the WALS authors>>> should take them into account in future > editions. (We're planning>>> future online editions of WALS, see the > free online version at>>> http://wals.info.)>>> > >>> Just one comment, concerning one of your > major points:>>> > >>> You write (p. 1): "The reader of > WALS is encouraged ... to seek>>> *correlations* between the results of > different chapters, and this>>> clearly presupposes a high degree of > compatibility between the views>>> of different authors." > >>> > >>> Well, I would say: To find true > correlations, the chapters must be>>> sufficiently correct, but they don't > necessarily have to be very>>> compatible, certainly not in > terminology. Suppose you want to link>>> case-marking and plural marking, and ask > whether affixal case-marking>>> (as opposed to adpositional marking) > correlates with affixal plural>>> marking (as opposed to pluralization by > number words). Then even if>>> the two chapters use different > definitions of "affixal", you might>>> still get a true correlation. But it > will of course be a correlation>>> between affixal(1) case-marking and > affixal(2) pluralization, not>>> between "affixal (tout court) > case-marking and pluralization".>>> > >>> My view is that typological definitions > are inherently>>> linguist-specific, and as such the > typological concepts of different>>> linguists are bound to be different > (unless a Chomsky-like figure>>> comes along and imposes widespread > "agreement by authority"). So care>>> has to be taken in interpreting WALS > correlations, of course. But this>>> is not a flaw in the design of the > project.>>> > >>> Typology cannot be based on some kind of > "definitive" set of>>> grammatical concepts, because there is > no such list (or if there is,>>> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so > far away from knowing what it is>>> that it's irrelevant for practical > purposes). Each language has its>>> own categories, so typologists > necessarily have to make up their>>> comparative concepts that give them the > most interesting results.>>> > >>> (For more on this, see my paper > "Comparative concepts and descriptive>>> categories in cross-linguistic > studies", on my website under "Papers>>> and handouts".) > >>> > >>> Martin Haspelmath > >>> > >>> Esa Itkonen wrote: > >>>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, > World Atlas of Language Structures>>>> (= WALS) is a monumental > achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish>>>> linguists (= myself & Anneli > Pajunen) have ventured to write a>>>> 30-page commentary on it, available > on the homepage below. Enjoy!>>>> > >>>> Esa Itkonen > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen>>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Prof. Bernd Heine > Tokyo University of Foreign Studies > Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa > 3-11-1, Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, > Tokyo, 183-8534 JAPAN > Phone: 042-330-5664 > Fax: 042-330-5610 > > > > > From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Nov 10 15:45:18 2008 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 10:45:18 EST Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: In a message dated 11/10/08 9:22:26 AM, dryer at buffalo.edu writes: > Nor should we accept the generative linguists' view of work in typology > that > characterizes what languages are like as atheoretical.  Too many typologists > and > functionalists seem to accept that view. > Typology classically is a matter of categorizing. There are many different ways to categorize any complex set of raw data. Implicit in most choices is theory. For the moment, let's hypothesize that the main "function" of language is common reference. From there, we would theorize that all structure -- from phonology to lexicon to syntax -- serves to seek common reference -- to disambiguate between what the speaker is referring to and what the listener understands. Then, the World Atlas of Language Structures becomes a catalog of approaches to that objective, disambiguation in communication -- attempts towards a more accurate common reference between speakers and listeners. The research would be valuable in assessing why those attempts differed. This is quite a different view than generativist theory would have of that Atlas. It's also a different view than say a traditional Indo_europeanist would have -- something that Greenberg was certainly conscious of. Admitting that describing "what languages are like" involves theory from the start helps and does not hurt the process. Otherwise we have hidden assumptions in the descriptions that must be pryed out rather than given up front. Steve Long ************** AOL Search: Your one stop for directions, recipes and all other Holiday needs. Search Now. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1212792382x1200798498/aol?redir=http://searchblog.aol.com/2008/11/04/happy-holidays-from -aol-search/?ncid=emlcntussear00000001) From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Mon Nov 10 16:18:39 2008 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:18:39 +0200 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: <49180086.6020008@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Thank you for initiating a very interesting discussion. The complexity of the study of language as a socio-cultural and cognitive phenomenon by far exceeds, for instance, the complexity of the basic principles of physics and astronomy. In general, it seems clear that linguistic categories cannot be claimed to have any objective ontological status. They are social constructions and there are multiple ways to construct the theories in a meaningful way. A formalization of the subjectivity/intersubjectivity of language use is presented in our recent article "Simulating processes of concept formation and communication" (J of Econ Methodology, vol. 15, no. 3, Sept 2008, pp. 245-259): 1 Introduction 1.1 Multi-agent systems 1.2 Language learning and game theory 1.3 Grounding 1.4 Learning paradigms 2 Basic theoretical framework 3 Communication between agents 3.1 Language games 3.2 Single-agent model 3.3 Two-agent model 4 Learning of conceptual models 4.1 Unsupervised learning of conceptual systems 5 Practical implications 5.1 Meaning negotiations 5.2 Costs associated with harmonization of conceptual systems 6 Discussion The article aims to provide a principled alternative to the formal approaches in which language is viewed as an autonomous system without careful consideration of the subjective element. Constructive comments on the paper (available on request) are welcome! Best regards, Timo P.S. I will be in UC Berkeley from 17th to 19th, in Stanford from 20th to 21st and in UC San Diego from 25th to 27th of November. If you are working there and would be interested in discussing these issues, please contact. On Mon, 10 Nov 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy is > Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious way, without > providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with authority, rather fatal > ones). > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before Darwin, > but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation until a new way > of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case with comparative > linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far from the Keplerian, > Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it was > often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval biology. > > Martin > > At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > > snip.. > > > > > we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > > > > A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a > > comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing > > body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both > > also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. > > Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is > > not to be sniffed at. > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Nov 10 22:01:37 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 14:01:37 -0800 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I think, Timo, that one can perhaps go a bit too far in claiming that linguistic categories have no reality (Comsky has arrived cat this conclusion about moroho-syntactic constructions, by the way...) It is true that linguistic methodology often makes it appear this way, not only on the Chomskian side but also on the more empiricist side.But there are quite a few of us who strive to connect our work with, and indeed be guided by, experimental work on the cognition & neurology of language. It requires a lot of patience to do this, but it is both rewarding & promising (while being still very far from where we want to go...). I think both extremes of the field will need to change their approach to universals before a true fusion with cognitive-neuro-linguistics will come about. Chomskian universals are too abstract & are achieved by formal fiat, facts of cross-language diversity be damned. But simple surface-fact-universals are not all that useful either, if you don't go beyond them. They are the same old "inductive generalizations" in Booomfield's sense, and counter to M. Dryer, they are not a theory, but rathe the important empirical buildup toward an eventual theory. They are summaries of facts ("all languages have a surface feature x"), what Carnap calls "empirical genewralizations". What we need is to discover the universal principles and mechanisms (diachronic, evolutionary, acquisitional) that makes the seemingly-universal facts what they are. And for this, we have to get away from BOTH extremes in linguistics. So no, Noam, constructions DO exist. And yes, Noam, general facts, however general, are NOT themselves the universals. Principles & the mechanisms (of development, of "emergence", of cognition & communication; rather than abstract "principles & parameters") that they control are what we are after. But in order to discover what the principles, we DO have to study constructions, their communicqative use, their acquisition & their diachronic emergence, and their neuro-cognitive processing. Cheers, TG ================= On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:18:39 +0200 (EET), timo.honkela at tkk.fi wrote: > Thank you for initiating a very interesting discussion. The complexity > of the study of language as a socio-cultural and cognitive phenomenon > by far exceeds, for instance, the complexity of the basic principles > of physics and astronomy. > > In general, it seems clear that linguistic categories cannot be > claimed to have any objective ontological status. They are social > constructions and there are multiple ways to construct the theories in > a meaningful way. > > A formalization of the subjectivity/intersubjectivity of language use > is presented in our recent article "Simulating processes of concept > formation and communication" (J of Econ Methodology, vol. 15, no. 3, > Sept 2008, pp. 245-259): > > 1 Introduction > 1.1 Multi-agent systems > 1.2 Language learning and game theory > 1.3 Grounding > 1.4 Learning paradigms > 2 Basic theoretical framework > 3 Communication between agents > 3.1 Language games > 3.2 Single-agent model > 3.3 Two-agent model > 4 Learning of conceptual models > 4.1 Unsupervised learning of conceptual systems > 5 Practical implications > 5.1 Meaning negotiations > 5.2 Costs associated with harmonization of conceptual systems > 6 Discussion > > The article aims to provide a principled alternative to the formal > approaches in which language is viewed as an autonomous system without > careful consideration of the subjective element. Constructive comments > on the paper (available on request) are welcome! > > Best regards, > Timo > > P.S. I will be in UC Berkeley from 17th to 19th, in Stanford from 20th > to 21st and in UC San Diego from 25th to 27th of November. If you are > working there and would be interested in discussing these issues, > please contact. > > > > > On Mon, 10 Nov 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy is > > Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious way, without > > providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with authority, rather fatal > > ones). > > > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before Darwin, > > but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation until a new way > > of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case with comparative > > linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far from the Keplerian, > > Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it was > > often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval biology. > > > > Martin > > > At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > > > snip.. > > > > > > > we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > > > > > > A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a > > > comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing > > > body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both > > > also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. > > > Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is > > > not to be sniffed at. > > -- > > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > -- > Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent > Adaptive Informatics Research Center > Helsinki University of Technology > P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK > > timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Fri Nov 14 03:26:22 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 20:26:22 -0700 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: <49180086.6020008@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Well, Martin, I wonder why you are impelled to make such sweeping statements, one's that are bound to shoot way beyond the mark. Do you really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? Now, since you invoke Aristotle, I had better go an record saying that he is the acknowledged founder of biology--not only empirical biology with his pioneering classification (according to an ascending degree of complexity--practically begging an evolutionary interpretation...), but also adaptive-functional--thus THEORETICAL--biology. It took Linaues and many before him another 2,000 years to complete Aristotle's classification; and it took Darwin another 200 years to find the theoretical explanation for the form-function isomorphisms identified by Aristotle. But to lump Aristotle (in Biology) as "speculative", like Plato, suggests a pretty careless reading of (at least) three of his books: De Partibus Animalium, De Generationem Animalium, and Historiae Animalium. If you want to delve into the history of scientific (observation-based AND theoretical) biology, these books are the place to start. As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems to me that you are implying something that for me translates as follows: Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to that: "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't need all those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of evolution by natural (adaptive) selection". If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, types that are so surprising and earthshaking that they manifestly falsify our current theoretical understanding (I hate to call what we do "theory", but it is definitely "theoretical"). All I can say is, from my remote corner, is that most of what I see of the endless compilation of more and more descriptions, is a lot of familiar types and sub-types. In other words, more and more species and subspecies of butterflies described in more and more minute detail. And like Darwin (or, like Watson and Crick), I'm inlined to say that the finches we already have in hand are enough to at least start building a theoretical, explanatory account of language. So all y'all have to do is falsify our predictions. Best, TG ========== Martin Haspelmath wrote: > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy > is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious > way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with > authority, rather fatal ones). > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before > Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation > until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case > with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far > from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it > was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval > biology. > > Martin >> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >> snip.. >> >>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. >> >> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and >> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a >> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory >> of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although of a >> rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or >> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. From dcyr at yorku.ca Fri Nov 14 04:08:12 2008 From: dcyr at yorku.ca (Danielle E. Cyr) Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 23:08:12 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS - Butterflies and broken harmony In-Reply-To: <491CEFDE.9020308@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Marginally speaking, I recently watched a science program on TV, most probably NOVA (I don't quite remember), talking about a notion in physics, which was new to me, i.e. «broken harmony». This notion explains why there is less antimatter than matter in our universe. As much as I can remember, it seems that immediately after the initial Big Bang the quantity of matter and antimatter were even but, for some mysterious reason, that balance was as soon disrupted, therefrom the notion of broken/disrupted harmony. And, the narrator went on to say, this very fact of broken harmony is precisely what allowed/triggered the entire process of evolution leading to us among other things. It really struck me as a principle that applies to language as well. Isn't the tendency to break/disrupt the established grammatical harmony in order to produce eloquence at the basis of grammaticalisation? That was my reflection to my graduate students in a seminar on the evolution of French grammar. From which I went on to quote Gustave Guillaume who claimed that language itself is the first theory of the Universe since language is the first and most fundamental way mankind gave to itself while aiming at finding a way to see/put some order in an apparently fuzzy/unordered universe. And, subsequently, it made me realize that the notion of broken harmony could be the golden thread, sought by so many of us trough time and continents, that could reunite physics, chemistry and social sciences: everything is the way it is because of broken harmony. The only tremendously awsome question remaining would then be: «What causes (local) harmony to break apart? Something to think about? Danielle Cyr Quoting Tom Givon : > > > > Well, Martin, I wonder why you are impelled to make such sweeping > statements, one's that are bound to shoot way beyond the mark. Do you > really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical > foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my > associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our > finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? > > Now, since you invoke Aristotle, I had better go an record saying that > he is the acknowledged founder of biology--not only empirical biology > with his pioneering classification (according to an ascending degree of > complexity--practically begging an evolutionary interpretation...), but > also adaptive-functional--thus THEORETICAL--biology. It took Linaues and > many before him another 2,000 years to complete Aristotle's > classification; and it took Darwin another 200 years to find the > theoretical explanation for the form-function isomorphisms identified by > Aristotle. But to lump Aristotle (in Biology) as "speculative", like > Plato, suggests a pretty careless reading of (at least) three of his > books: De Partibus Animalium, De Generationem Animalium, and Historiae > Animalium. If you want to delve into the history of scientific > (observation-based AND theoretical) biology, these books are the place > to start. > > As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems > to me that you are implying something that for me translates as follows: > Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical > explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species > and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone > discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to that: > "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't need all > those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of evolution by > natural (adaptive) selection". > > If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is > premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to > justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, > all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about > cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such > diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, types > that are so surprising and earthshaking that they manifestly falsify our > current theoretical understanding (I hate to call what we do "theory", > but it is definitely "theoretical"). All I can say is, from my remote > corner, is that most of what I see of the endless compilation of more > and more descriptions, is a lot of familiar types and sub-types. In > other words, more and more species and subspecies of butterflies > described in more and more minute detail. And like Darwin (or, like > Watson and Crick), I'm inlined to say that the finches we already have > in hand are enough to at least start building a theoretical, explanatory > account of language. So all y'all have to do is falsify our predictions. > > Best, TG > > ========== > > > > Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy > > is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious > > way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with > > authority, rather fatal ones). > > > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before > > Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation > > until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case > > with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far > > from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it > > was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval > > biology. > > > > Martin > >> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > >> snip.. > >> > >>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > >> > >> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and > >> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a > >> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory > >> of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although of a > >> rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or > >> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. > > "The only hope we have as human beings is to learn each other's languages. Only then can we truly hope to understand one another." Professor Danielle E. Cyr Department of French Studies York University Toronto, ON, Canada, M3J 1P3 Tel. 1.416.736.2100 #310180 FAX. 1.416.736.5924 dcyr at yorku.ca From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Fri Nov 14 11:20:53 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 12:20:53 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS, Darwin and butterflies In-Reply-To: <491CEFDE.9020308@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Hi Tom, Tom Givon wrote: > Do you really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical > foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my > associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our > finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? I see WALS as a salient manifestation of Greenbergian and Givonian efforts of the last few decades. While Greenberg and Givón are not strictly speaking authors of WALS, their spirit permeates the entire work. > As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems > to me that you are implying something that for me translates as > follows: Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical > explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species > and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone > discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to > that: "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't > need all those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of > evolution by natural (adaptive) selection". I think WALS is something like Darwin's finches, plus the other things he knew about comparative zoology and botany. But note that Darwin's thinking was not only derived from a few finches -- he had a huge previous literature to test his ideas on, including many descriptive volumes he wrote himself. The finches were more like textbook examples. So Darwin was NOT premature, precisely because an empirical foundation already existed when he came along. > If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is > premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to > justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, > all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about > cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such > diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, That's pretty easy -- the linguistics literature is full of premature generalizations (such as "Kayne's generalization", which holds for Spanish, Italian, and French, but breaks down with Modern Greek). Of course, linguists with a Greenbergian or Givonian background are not so likely to fall into this trap, but WALS is addressed to the entire field of theoretical linguistics. In addition, many typologists of the younger generation (who increasingly are trained in statistics) find it important to adopt a quantitative perspective, where a single counterexample does not destroy a correlation. For a quatitative perspective, one needs many languages. This is also an approach adopted by some comparative biologists. (In biology, this work is not very prominent, because genetics is currently occupying center stage, but in linguistics we have nothing corresponding to genetics.) Best, Martin > Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy >> is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious >> way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with >> authority, rather fatal ones). >> >> Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before >> Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation >> until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case >> with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very >> far from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. >> >> The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put >> comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, >> it was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like >> medieval biology. >> >> Martin >>> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >>> snip.. >>> >>>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. >>> >>> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and >>> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a >>> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a >>> theory of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although >>> of a rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or >>> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From amnfn at well.com Fri Nov 14 13:51:40 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 05:51:40 -0800 Subject: Concerning WALS, Darwin and butterflies In-Reply-To: <491D5F15.104@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: On the one hand, it's true that newly discovered correlations, say in areas such as historical linguistics and genetic classifications, are poo-poohed unless one presents massive statistical data backing them up, greater than what Bopp and Grimm presented to make their claims. But on the other hand, the current claim that (in grammaticalization theory) a single counterexample does not disprove a rule if you have lots of "statistical data" backing up your hypothesis is truly dangerous. It sets up situations where hypotheses are not falsifiable under plain logic. There's nothing wrong with statistics if you know how to use it. However, many linguists don't understand statistics and don't know what it's for. Best, --Aya On Fri, 14 Nov 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Hi Tom, > > Tom Givon wrote: > > Do you really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical > > foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my > > associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our > > finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? > I see WALS as a salient manifestation of Greenbergian and Givonian > efforts of the last few decades. While Greenberg and Givón are not > strictly speaking authors of WALS, their spirit permeates the entire work. > > As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems > > to me that you are implying something that for me translates as > > follows: Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical > > explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species > > and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone > > discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to > > that: "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't > > need all those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of > > evolution by natural (adaptive) selection". > I think WALS is something like Darwin's finches, plus the other things > he knew about comparative zoology and botany. But note that Darwin's > thinking was not only derived from a few finches -- he had a huge > previous literature to test his ideas on, including many descriptive > volumes he wrote himself. The finches were more like textbook examples. > > So Darwin was NOT premature, precisely because an empirical foundation > already existed when he came along. > > If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is > > premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to > > justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, > > all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about > > cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such > > diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, > That's pretty easy -- the linguistics literature is full of premature > generalizations (such as "Kayne's generalization", which holds for > Spanish, Italian, and French, but breaks down with Modern Greek). Of > course, linguists with a Greenbergian or Givonian background are not so > likely to fall into this trap, but WALS is addressed to the entire field > of theoretical linguistics. > > In addition, many typologists of the younger generation (who > increasingly are trained in statistics) find it important to adopt a > quantitative perspective, where a single counterexample does not destroy > a correlation. For a quatitative perspective, one needs many languages. > This is also an approach adopted by some comparative biologists. (In > biology, this work is not very prominent, because genetics is currently > occupying center stage, but in linguistics we have nothing corresponding > to genetics.) > > Best, > Martin > > > Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy > >> is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious > >> way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with > >> authority, rather fatal ones). > >> > >> Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before > >> Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation > >> until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case > >> with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very > >> far from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. > >> > >> The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > >> comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, > >> it was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like > >> medieval biology. > >> > >> Martin > >>> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > >>> snip.. > >>> > >>>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > >>> > >>> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and > >>> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a > >>> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a > >>> theory of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although > >>> of a rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or > >>> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig > Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Fri Nov 14 15:05:32 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:05:32 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies Message-ID: I forget- was the Givonian before or after the Comrian? I can never seem to keep them *strata*. ;-) Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From vanvalin at buffalo.edu Mon Nov 17 12:40:24 2008 From: vanvalin at buffalo.edu (Robert Van Valin) Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2008 13:40:24 +0100 Subject: Post-doc position at MPI Nijmegen Message-ID: A research position for a Postdoctoral Researcher is available in the research group ‘Information structure, syntax and typology’, headed by Dr. Robert Van Valin, at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (Nijmegen, NL). The position is now open. The appointment is initially for 2 years, with possible extension for up to 3 additional years. Research Focus: The research group ‘Information structure, syntax and typology’ represents a collaboration between the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics and the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, supported by a Max Plank Fellowship to Van Valin. The group will investigate the interaction of information structure and syntax across languages of varying structural types. Special emphasis will be placed on the role information structure plays in the organization of grammatical constructions and in core grammatical processes, and how it varies across languages. In addition, the implications of this interaction for language acquisition, in conjunction with the Information Structure project in the Language Acquisition Group, and for sentence-processing will be explored. Requirements: Applicants should have a PhD in Linguistics, and in- depth research experience on a language or language family is highly desirable. Review of applications will begin January 15, 2009, and the position will remain open until filled. The Max Planck Society is an equal opportunity employer. Applicants should send their CV, a sample of their work, and the names and e-mail addresses of at least two potential referees to vanvalin at phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de and to (both hard copy and electronic) Mrs. Nanjo Bogdanowicz Language Acquisition Group Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics Wundtlaan 1, 6525 XD NIJMEGEN The Netherlands Nanjo.Bogdanowicz at mpi.nl From v.evans at bangor.ac.uk Wed Nov 19 15:56:00 2008 From: v.evans at bangor.ac.uk (Vyv Evans) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2008 15:56:00 +0000 Subject: MAs in Language & Cognition at Bangor University Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Applications are invited for Master of Arts (M.A.) programmes in: -Cognitive Linguistics -Language, Communication & Cognition -Anthropological Linguistics in the School of Linguistics, Bangor University. Bangor University boasts the senior Linguistics department in the UK, and is located on the Menai Strait, in North Wales in the ancient cathedral city of Bangor. Bangor is situated adjacent to the Snowdon Mountains, one of the most picturesque regions in Europe. The MA programmes, detailed below, run for 12 months, full time, providing a set of core modules and option modules, with a 20,000 individual research dissertation. The MA programmes are highly distinctive, and are taught by leading experts. Web details are available from the School of Linguistics: http://www.bangor.ac.uk/linguistics/, or from here: www.vyvevans.net/CLBangor.htm Contact the MA programme director, Prof. Vyv Evans with specific enquiries (v.evans at bangor.ac.uk). MA COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS The MA in Cognitive Linguistics is primarily aimed at those students who wish to undertake a taught programme of graduate-level study in order to pursue research in some aspect of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Linguistics is a modern and innovative approach to the study of language and mind, and their relationship with embodied experience and culture. The MA provides a focused and comprehensive programme of graduate-level training in the core subject matter of Cognitive Linguistics, including the most important theoretical frameworks. The subject matter covered includes conceptual structure and organisation, figurative language, grammar and mind, the relationship between language, thought and culture, lexical and cognitive compositional semantics, the issue of embodiment, and contemporary methodology in Cognitive Linguistics. The MA also provides a platform for those interested in pursuing an advanced research degree such as a PhD. The MA in Cognitive Linguistics involves 4 compulsory modules and 2 options plus a research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. _Compulsory modules (20 credits each):_ * *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics * * *Metaphor and Thought * * *Grammar and Mind * * *Language of Space and Time* _Optional modules (20 credits each) 2 modules from the following:_ * *Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology * * *Language, Thought and Reality * * *Linguistic Ethnography * * *Language, Mind and Brain * * *Language, Culture and Society* MA LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION & COGNITION The relationship between language, communication and cognition is central to many of the disciplines in the humanities as well as the social and cognitive sciences, including studies relating to language, culture, media and mind. The MA in Language, Communication and Cognition is aimed at those students who wish to undertake a taught programme of graduate-level study in the interdisciplinary area of language and mind which is not limited to a specific theoretical perspective. The MA provides a comprehensive programme of graduate-level training in various topics associated with the study of language, culture, communication and cognition, approached from the perspective of theories in cognitive linguistics, as well as cultural and communication studies. The purpose of the MA is to provide students with the necessary tools and skills to undertake advanced research in some area of language, culture, communication and mind. Topics covered will include linguistic meaning and structure, cognitive linguistics, embodied cognition, linguistic relativity, the nature of spatial and temporal representation, the socio-cultural nature and basis of language and communication, cross-cultural and cross-linguistic diversity especially in communication practices, data collection techniques including the collection of qualitative data and experimental design, how the mind and brain process language, and linguistic anthropology. Students will have ample opportunity to conduct their own research, both in course projects and in the final dissertation. The MA also provides a platform for those interested in pursuing an advanced research degree. The MA in Language, Communication and Cognition involves 4 compulsory modules plus 2 options plus a research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. _Compulsory modules (20 credits each):_ * *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics * * *Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology * * *Language, Thought and Reality * * *Language, Mind and Brain* _Optional modules (20 credits each) 2 from the following:_ * *Metaphor and Thought * * *Grammar and Mind * * *Language of Space and Time * * *Linguistic Ethnography * * *Language, Culture and Society* MA ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS The MA in Anthropological Linguistics provides a taught programme of graduate-level study in the interdisciplinary area of language and culture, which is not limited to a specific theoretical perspective. The course provides a comprehensive, varied and flexible programme of training in multi-disciplinary topics associated with the study of language, culture, communication, behaviour, society, and cognition. The purpose of the course is to provide students with the necessary theoretical, analytical and methodological tools and skills to undertake advanced research in an area of language, culture and communication. The taught component of the MA takes place over semesters 1 and 2. In semester 1, students take two foundational modules: Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology and Language, Thought and Reality. The Linguistic Anthropology module introduces them to key subjects areas, theoretical approaches and methodologies in the discipline, ranging from evolutionary questions to culture theories, and social models of understanding. Language, Thought and Reality is a theoretical and experimental module addressing the triangular relationship between language, culture and thought. This module incorporates a methodological element. In semester 2, students take two modules covering additional core subject areas, including Linguistic Ethnography (a specifically methodological module), and Language, Culture and Society. This latter module addresses key concerns and facts in linguistic anthropology, including diversity, development, multilingualism, and sociolinguistics. The MA in Anthropological Linguistics consists of a taught component of 4 required modules, two option modules and a research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. _Compulsory modules (20 credits each):_ * *Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology * * *Linguistic Ethnography * * *Language, Thought and Reality * * *Language, Culture and Society* _Optional modules (20 credits each) 2 of the following:_ * *Metaphor and Thought * * *Grammar and Mind * * *Language of Space and Time * * *Language, Mind and Brain * * *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics* -- Gall y neges e-bost hon, ac unrhyw atodiadau a anfonwyd gyda hi, gynnwys deunydd cyfrinachol ac wedi eu bwriadu i'w defnyddio'n unig gan y sawl y cawsant eu cyfeirio ato (atynt). Os ydych wedi derbyn y neges e-bost hon trwy gamgymeriad, rhowch wybod i'r anfonwr ar unwaith a dilëwch y neges. Os na fwriadwyd anfon y neges atoch chi, rhaid i chi beidio â defnyddio, cadw neu ddatgelu unrhyw wybodaeth a gynhwysir ynddi. Mae unrhyw farn neu safbwynt yn eiddo i'r sawl a'i hanfonodd yn unig ac nid yw o anghenraid yn cynrychioli barn Prifysgol Bangor. Nid yw Prifysgol Bangor yn gwarantu bod y neges e-bost hon neu unrhyw atodiadau yn rhydd rhag firysau neu 100% yn ddiogel. Oni bai fod hyn wedi ei ddatgan yn uniongyrchol yn nhestun yr e-bost, nid bwriad y neges e-bost hon yw ffurfio contract rhwymol - mae rhestr o lofnodwyr awdurdodedig ar gael o Swyddfa Cyllid Prifysgol Bangor. www.bangor.ac.uk This email and any attachments may contain confidential material and is solely for the use of the intended recipient(s). If you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete this email. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you must not use, retain or disclose any information contained in this email. Any views or opinions are solely those of the sender and do not necessarily represent those of the Bangor University. Bangor University does not guarantee that this email or any attachments are free from viruses or 100% secure. Unless expressly stated in the body of the text of the email, this email is not intended to form a binding contract - a list of authorised signatories is available from the Bangor University Finance Office. www.bangor.ac.uk From gdesagulier at univ-paris8.fr Thu Nov 27 11:52:56 2008 From: gdesagulier at univ-paris8.fr (Guillaume Desagulier) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2008 12:52:56 +0100 Subject: 2nd CFP: AFLiCo 3, 'Grammars in construction(s)', May 27-29, 2009, Paris 10-Nanterre (France) Message-ID: (apologies for multiple postings) SECOND CALL FOR PAPERS (version en francais plus bas) Third International Conference of the French Cognitive Linguistics Association (AFLiCo 3) “Grammars in construction(s)”. Organized by MoDyCo (http://www.modyco.fr) University of Paris 10, Nanterre, France 27-29 May 2009 http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 PLENARY SPEAKERS Hans C. BOAS (University of Texas at Austin, USA) Gilles FAUCONNIER (University of California, San Diego, USA) Jacques FRANCOIS (University of Caen, France) Adele GOLDBERG (Princeton University, USA) Stephane ROBERT (LLACAN, CNRS, France) Bernard VICTORRI (Lattice, ENS, France) Richard WATTS (University of Bern, Switzerland) OBJECTIVES The conference aims at bringing together cognitive linguists working in France and abroad, and strengthening the network of discussion and collaboration set in motion by the first two AFLiCo conferences held in Bordeaux (2005) and Lille (2007). The concept of grammar is of crucial importance to the cognitive linguistics framework and forms the basis for numerous research topics. As a constructed cognitive entity (by linguists or speakers), and/or an emergent one, grammar lies at the heart of considerable theoretical issues. The core position currently held by grammar is thus one to be questioned. Drawing on the themes from the last two AFLiCo conferences, we will examine the concept of grammar in regard to its place in cognitive linguistics, as well as in regard to its place in variants of the model, which range from Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar to so-called construction grammars. This year, the focus will be on the latter. In the wake of Charles Fillmore and Paul Kay’s work, construction grammars endeavor to describe grammar not in terms of “words and lists” (as in generative grammar) but in terms of grammatical constructions whose overall meanings are not predictable from their respective component structures. This enterprise was initially limited to idiomatic constructions (e.g., throw in the towel, kick the bucket, etc.) but swiftly developed to deal with more general constructions (cf. Adele Goldberg’s work on meaningful argument structure). The idea that grammar is composed of constructions – previously identifiable in the works of George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker – currently fuels a vast paradigm and applies to a large variety of linguistic phenomena in morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. GENERAL SESSIONS The 3rd AFLiCo conference will also provide the occasion to address more general points of discussion in relation to the question of grammar (non-exhaustive list): - The notion of linguistic units as linked to other concepts such as entrenchment or frequency of occurrence - Comparisons between different traditions (American and European) regarding the establishment of a linguistic unit as a cognitive routine, lexicalization, the symbolic thesis, etc. - The acquisition of grammar (L1, L2) - Constructions and diachrony - The grammaticalization of constructions - Methodological concerns (constitution and use of corpora) - Grammars of gesture and kinesic systems - The role of conceptual integration and grammatical blending in grammar - The extension of cognitive linguistics into socio-pragmatics In line with one of the main goals of AFLiCo, we welcome papers elaborating the affinities between cognitive linguistics and related theories (Gustave Guillaume, Antoine Culioli, Henri Adamczewski). The organizers further encourage young researchers to submit an abstract. It is to be noted that papers can bear on any language (not just English or French) THEMATIC SESSIONS Organizers of theme sessions are kindly asked to provide the following information: - a short description of their session topic (300-500 words); - an indication of the structure proposed for the whole session: order of presentations, discussant contributions, breaks, and general discussion by the audience; - the abstracts from all of their speakers, accompanied by all the information requested in the abstract specifications above. Proponents can choose the internal structuring of their Theme Session provided that the overall timetable of the conference (notably coffee and lunch breaks) is kept intact. Ideally, a theme session should take no longer than a whole morning or afternoon. For any further detail you may need in the organization of your theme session, please do not hesitate to contact the organizers (aflico3 at u-paris10.fr). SUBMISSION PROCEDURE Abstracts will be submitted to a double, blind review. They should be fully anonymous and not exceed 500 words (references excluded). To be sent via email as attachment (MS-WORD doc or rtf, OpenOffice, PDF) to: aflico3 at u-paris10.fr Please put in the subject line: ‘abstract AFLICO 3’ In the body of the mail, please specify: - author(s) - title - affiliation of author(s) - presentation or poster - thematic sessions or general session - 3 - 5 keywords IMPORTANT DATES Submission deadline General sessions: December 15th 2008 Theme sessions: December 8th 2008 (extended) Notification of acceptance : Early February 2009 REGISTRATION Details about the registration procedure and registration deadlines will be posted on the conference website as soon as they become available. REGISTRATION FEES Regular fee (participants/audience) : 80 euros AFLiCo members : 60 euros Students : 40 euros Students (including AFliCo membership) : 30 euros If you wish to join the AFLiCo, please contact Stephanie Bonnefille (stephanie.bonnefille at univ-tours.fr) OFFICIAL LANGUAGES French, English CONFERENCE WEBSITE http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 NEW AFLiCo WEBSITE http://www.aflico.fr/ ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Guillaume Desagulier (Associate Professor, MoDyCo-CNRS-Paris 10, & University of Paris 8) Philippe Grea (Associate Professor, MoDyCo, Paris 10), assisted by Simon Harrison (PhD student, ENS-Lyon), Dylan Glynn (Research Fellow, University of Leuven) SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE President: Dominique Legallois (Associate Professor, University of Caen) Michel Achard (Professor, Rice University) Cristiano Broccias (University of Genoa) Jose Deulofeu (Professor, Universite de Provence, Aix-Marseille 1) Pierre Encreve (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Gilles Fauconnier (Professor, University of California, San Diego) Michel de Fornel (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Jean-Michel Fortis (CNRS, Paris 7) Jacques François (Professor, Universite de Caen) Dylan Glynn (Research fellow, University of Leuven) Craig Hamilton (Assoc. Prof., Universite de Haute Alsace, Mulhouse-Colmar) Martin Haspelmath (Prof. Dr., Max-Planck-Institut, Leipzig) Hans-Petter Helland (Professor, University of Oslo) Willem Hollmann (Lecturer, University of Lancaster) Sylvain Kahane (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Anne Lacheret (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Bernard Laks (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Jean-Remi Lapaire (Professor, Universite de Bordeaux 3) Peter Lauwers (Lecturer, Universities of Ghent & Leuven) Danielle Leeman (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Maarten Lemmens (Professor, Universite de Lille 3) Sarah Leroy (CR, MoDyCo-CNRS, Universite de Paris 10) Wilfrid Rotge (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Dominique Willems (Prof, Dr., University of Ghent) ======== (toutes nos excuses pour les envois multiples) SECOND APPEL A COMMUNICATIONS 3e Colloque International de l’Association Française de Linguistique Cognitive (AFLiCo) « Grammaires en construction(s) » Organise par le laboratoire MoDyCo (http://www.modyco.fr) Universite Paris 10, Nanterre, La Defense, France 27-29 mai 2009 http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 INTERVENANTS INVITES Hans C. BOAS (Univ. du Texas, Austin, USA) Gilles FAUCONNIER (Univ. de Californie, San Diego, USA) Jacques FRANÇOIS (Univ. de Caen, France) Adele GOLDBERG (Univ. de Princeton, USA) Stephane ROBERT (LLACAN, ENS, France) Bernard VICTORRI (Lattice, ENS, France) Richard WATTS (Univ. de Berne, Suisse) OBJECTIFS DU COLLOQUE Cette conference a pour but de reunir les acteurs de la linguistique cognitive en France et au dela, et de renforcer la collaboration entre chercheurs entamee lors des deux precedentes editions a Bordeaux (2005) et Lille (2007) Le concept de grammaire a une importance cruciale dans le cadre theorique de la linguistique cognitive et de nombreuses problematiques se construisent à partir de lui. Entite cognitive construite (par les linguistes, mais aussi par les locuteurs) et / ou emergente (soumise à la variation et au changement, car regulee par des forces tout à la fois conservatrices et innovantes) la grammaire est au centre d’enjeux theoriques considerables. Elle occupe des lors une position-cle qu’il faut interroger. Dans le prolongement des deux precedents colloques de l’AFLiCo, il s’agit donc de focaliser notre attention sur une nouvelle dimension de la linguistique cognitive, un concept qui se decline de differentes façons, depuis la grammaire cognitive de Langacker jusqu’aux grammaires dites de constructions. Ces dernieres, en particulier, constituent aujourd’hui la branche la plus dynamique de ce cadre general de par le nombre de publications et l’impact de ces recherches sur differents niveaux de la linguistique (syntaxe, semantique, morphologie et pragmatique). SESSIONS GENERALES Le colloque AFLiCo 3 sera aussi l’occasion d’aborder des problematiques reliees à la question de la grammaire (liste non-exhaustive) : -La notion d’unite linguistique en rapport avec d’autres concepts comme l’enracinement (entrenchment) ou la frequence d’occurrence. -Une comparaison entre les differentes traditions (americaines et europeennes) liees au figement, à la lexicalisation, etc. -La question de l’apprentissage de la grammaire (L1, L2) -Un point de vue diachronique sur les constructions et la grammaticalisation des constructions -La question des methodes (constitution et utilisation de corpus) -Les prolongements de la linguistique cognitive dans la socio-pragmatique Dans le sillage des deux precedents colloques, nous encourageons les propositions de communication portant sur les passerelles entre la linguistique cognitive (au sens large) et la Theorie des Operations Enonciatives de Culioli, l’approche adamczewskienne ou la Psychomecanique du Langage. Le comite d’organisation encourage les jeunes chercheurs a envoyer une proposition de communication. Il est a noter que les communications peuvent porter sur toutes les langues, pas seulement le francais ou l’anglais. SESSIONS THEMATIQUES Les responsables de panels pour les sessions thematiques doivent fournir les renseignements suivants : -un resume du theme choisi ; -des precisions concernant la structure globale de la session : ordre des presentations, contributions des intervenants, pauses, debats ; -les resumes des communications de chacun des intervenants, ainsi que les renseignements demandes dans la procedure de soumission ci-dessous. Les intervenants sont libres de choisir la structure interne de leur session thematique des lors qu’elle n’affecte pas la structure generale du colloque (pauses cafe, et dejeuner). Nous recommandons que chaque session thematique ne depasse pas une matinee ou une apres-midi. Pour tout renseignement sur l’organisation d’une session thematique, n’hesitez pas a nous contacter (aflico3 at u-paris10.fr). PROCEDURE DE SOUMISSION Chaque proposition sera evaluee par deux relecteurs. Les textes doivent etre anonymes et ne pas depasser 500 mots (hors bibliographie). Ils sont a envoyer par email en fichier attache (MS-WORD -- doc ou rtf -- OpenOffice, PDF) à l’adresse suivante : aflico3 at u-paris10.fr Dans l’objet de votre message, specifiez : ‘abstract AFLICO’ Dans le corps du message, precisez : - le nom de l’auteur / des auteurs - titre - affiliation et adresse de l’auteur / des auteurs - presentation ou poster - session thematique ou session generale - 3 à 5 mots-cles DATES IMPORTANTES Date limite de soumission : Sessions generales : 15 decembre 2008 Sessions thematiques : 8 decembre 2008 (date repoussée) Notification d’acceptation : debut fevrier 2009 INSCRIPTION Des renseignements specifiques concernant la procedure d’inscription et les dates limites seront affiches tres prochainement sur le site. FRAIS D'INSCRIPTION tarif normal (participants/public) : 80 euros membres d'AFLiCo : 60 euros etudiants : 40 euros etudiants membres de l'AFLiCo : 30 euros Pour rejoindre l'AFLiCo, merci de contacter Stephanie Bonnefille (stephanie.bonnefille at univ-tours.fr) LANGUES DU COLLOQUE Anglais, Français SITE DU COLLOQUE http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 NOUVEAU SITE DE L'AFLICO http://www.aflico.fr/ COMITE D’ORGANISATION Guillaume Desagulier, (MCF, MoDyCo-CNRS & Universite Paris 10, Universite Paris 8) Philippe Grea (MCF, MoDyCo - CNRS & Universite Paris 10) Assistes de Simon Harrison (ENS-Lyon), Dylan Glynn (Universite Catholique de Louvain) COMITE SCIENTIFIQUE President : Dominique Legallois, MCF, Universite de Caen Michel Achard (Professeur, Rice University) Cristiano Broccias (MCF, Universite de Genes) Jose Deulofeu (Professeur, Universite de Provence, Aix-Marseille 1) Pierre Encreve (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Gilles Fauconnier (Professeur, Universite de Californie, San Diego) Michel de Fornel (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Jean-Michel Fortis (CR, CNRS, Paris 7) Jacques François (Professeur, Universite de Caen) Dylan Glynn (Charge de recherche, Universite Catholique de Louvain) Craig Hamilton (Assoc. Prof., Universite de Haute Alsace, Mulhouse-Colmar) Martin Haspelmath (Professeur, Max-Planck-Institut, Leipzig) Hans-Petter Helland (Professeur, Universite d’Oslo) Willem Hollmann (MCF, University of Lancaster) Sylvain Kahane (Professeur, Universite Paris 10) Anne Lacheret (Professeur, Universite Paris 10) Bernard Laks (Professeur, Universite de Paris 10) Jean-Remi Lapaire (Professeur, Universite de Bordeaux 3) Peter Lauwers (Charge de recherche, Universite Catholique de Louvain) Maarten Lemmens (Professeur, Universite de Lille 3) Danielle Leeman (Professeur, Universite de Paris 10) Sarah Leroy (CR, MoDyCo-CNRS, Universite Paris 10) Wilfrid Rotge (Professeur, Universite de Paris 10) Dominique Willems (Professeur, Universite de Gand) From Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl Sat Nov 29 10:35:32 2008 From: Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl (Amiridze, Nino) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2008 11:35:32 +0100 Subject: Language Contact and Change: Multiple and Bimodal Bilingual Minorities, Tartu 2009 Message-ID: [Apologies for multiple posting] Language Contact and Change: Multiple and Bimodal Bilingual Minorities Date: May 28, 2009 Location: Tartu, Estonia Workshop at the International Conference on Minority Languages XII (ICML 2009) Website: http://www.dipfilmod-suf.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-236.html Contact: tartulcc at gmail.com The workshop aims at exploring the language contact and language change phenomena that characterize multiple linguistic minorities. It focuses on but is not confined to signed, Uralic and Caucasian languages. On the one hand, we intend to explore the situation of bimodal bilingualism. Data from changes in multi-modal bilingual contexts can lead to new insights into bilingualism, the typology and structure of languages, and language change and contact in general. Research into bimodal bilingualism can draw upon several methods and approaches developed for studying the bilingualism of other minority languages, and vice versa. On the other hand, we know that it is difficult to reach the bilingual individuals and communities that are deaf and belong to several linguistic minorities. Therefore, we approach the bimodal target via individual studies on minority languages. More specifically, we concentrate on the issue of language change in contact in the context of a typologically wide range of minority languages. We are looking for answers to questions such as the following: - How do deaf children of (hearing) parents belonging to linguistic minorities (e.g., Nganasan) communicate with the Deaf communities in their country and with their own parents? - How does their language change? - How can we test the change in the structure of the languages in contact in a uniform way? - What are the factors that influence the developments? - Can we work towards a typology? Invited keynote speakers: Csilla Bartha (hearing) (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest): The situation of the Deaf and national minorities in Hungary; Östen Dahl (hearing) (Stockholm University): Contact induced changes in tense and aspect systems; Tatiana Davidenko (Deaf) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education): Sign Language Diversity in Post-Soviet Countries; Anna Komarova (hearing) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education): Development of Bilingual Education of the Deaf in Post-Soviet Countries; Gaurav Mathur (Deaf) (Gallaudet University): The relationship between agreement and finiteness in sign languages; Johanna Mesch (Deaf) (Stockholm University): Variations in tactile signing - the case of one-handed conversation; Helle Metslang (hearing) (University of Tartu): Changes in Finnish and Estonian tense and aspect; Christian Rathmann (Deaf) (Hamburg University): Minority Communities within German Deaf Community; Don Stilo (hearing) (Max Planck Institute, Leipzig): Introduction to an Atlas of the Araxes-Iran Linguistic Area. Check for updates, our interdisciplinary areas, and more research questions at http://www.dipfilmod-suf.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-236.html Submission (deadline January 15, 2009, notification January 31, 2009). Abstracts (in English, maximum 2 pages, including data and references) have to be submitted electronically as portable document format (.pdf) or Microsoft Word (.doc) files via the EasyChair conference management system (https://www.easychair.org/login.cgi?conf=lcc09). If you do not have an EasyChair account, click on the button "I have no EasyChair Account" on that page and follow the instructions. When you receive a password, you can enter the site and upload your abstract. Organizers: Nino Amiridze, Utrecht University (The Netherlands) Östen Dahl, University of Stockholm (Sweden) Anne Tamm, University of Florence (Italy) and Institute for the Estonian Language (Estonia) Manana Topadze, University of Pavia (Italy) Inge Zwitserlood, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands) From eitkonen at utu.fi Mon Nov 3 14:51:51 2008 From: eitkonen at utu.fi (Esa Itkonen) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2008 16:51:51 +0200 Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! Esa Itkonen Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Nov 6 14:37:02 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 15:37:02 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Esa, Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at http://wals.info.) Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views of different authors." Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". My view is that typological definitions are inherently linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this is not a flaw in the design of the project. Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers and handouts".) Martin Haspelmath Esa Itkonen wrote: > Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a 30-page commentary on it, available > on the homepage below. Enjoy! > > Esa Itkonen > > > Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen > -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) http://email.eva.mpg.de/~haspelmt/index.html Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Nov 6 17:06:55 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 10:06:55 -0700 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <4913010E.1030105@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that some of us have felt about the WALS project from its very inception--it's relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this project has chosen to follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) that facts are, somehow, theory- independent, and that one can do a theory-free typology. This is done by two implicit moves: First, by defining grammatical phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping them by the* grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them And second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. To my mind, the geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is neigh meaningless without considering the diachrony of the particular languages (or families) in the region. It is of course true that a project could choose to be less ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in anticipation that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts to build their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", even as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height of self delusion. Cheers, TG ========= Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Dear Esa, > > Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas > of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that > has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the > individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors > should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning > future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at > http://wals.info.) > > Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: > > You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek > *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this > clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views > of different authors." > > Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be > sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very > compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link > case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking > (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural > marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if > the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might > still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation > between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not > between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". > > My view is that typological definitions are inherently > linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different > linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure > comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care > has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this > is not a flaw in the design of the project. > > Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of > grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, > i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is > that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its > own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their > comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. > > (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive > categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers > and handouts".) > > Martin Haspelmath > > Esa Itkonen wrote: >> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures >> (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish >> linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a >> 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >> >> Esa Itkonen >> >> >> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >> > From collfitz at gmail.com Thu Nov 6 18:06:10 2008 From: collfitz at gmail.com (Colleen Fitzgerald) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 12:06:10 -0600 Subject: Job openings Message-ID: Dear All,We have an unexpected vacancy for the spring 2009 semester and are offering a one-semester position in applied linguistics/TESOL/SLA. This will be in the Department of Linguistics and TESOL at the University of Texas at Arlington. (Note: I have moved.) We expect to move quickly on this. I hope you will circulate the below job ad (plus two links to our tenure-track positions, which begin in Fall 2009), and encourage any qualified applicants to come our way. (Please direct questions to me at my work account, cmfitz at uta.edu) Links to the two tenure-track positions: Syntax: http://ling.uta.edu/documents/Syntax-TT-UTArlington.pdf Applied linguistics/TESOL: http://ling.uta.edu/documents/TESOL-TT-UTArlington.pdf Job ad for the Visiting Assistant Professor Position: The Department of Linguistics and TESOL at The University of Texas at Arlington invites applications for a one semester, non-tenure track position as a Visiting Assistant Professor in TESOL, for the Spring 2009, starting January 12, 2009. Candidates will have a doctorate or be ABD in Applied Linguistics or a closely related field by the time of the appointment. We have a specific need for the candidate to teach two courses (Pedagogical Grammar of English, Second Language Acquisition) and to condict the TESOL practicum. Although these courses are cross-listed undergraduate/graduate, the main audience will consist of graduate students working towards the M.A. in TESOL. Candidates are encouraged to provide supporting documentation for their teaching experience in these courses and graduate student teaching. Please note that this job is separate from the tenure-track position that we are advertising in the same area, which has a start date of Fall 2009. Candidates may apply to both positions (with separate cover letters and supporting materials as requested for the two different positions), but should be advised that the positions are not linked. The Department has a thriving PhD program, strong MA programs in linguistics and in TESOL, and a Graduate Certificate in TESOL. Our graduate student organization hosts an annual student conference. The Department is also in the process of building its undergraduate offerings, which currently includes a linguistics minor. The Department also includes the English Language Institute, which offers intensive English instruction at various levels. Successful candidates must demonstrate the ability to teach undergraduate and graduate courses, particularly in areas of TESOL and second language pedagogy. Applications from members of underrepresented groups are especially encouraged. The University of Texas at Arlington is a doctoral, research-intensive public institution of over 25,000 students located in the heart of the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, a region with excellent cultural, recreational and entertainment facilities. A letter of application describing teaching and research interests, current curriculum vitae, one writing samples, evidence of teaching excellence, and three letters of reference from those most familiar with the applicant's research and teaching should be sent to: TESOL VAP Search Department of Linguistics and TESOL UT Arlington, Box 19559--Hammond Hall 403 Arlington, TX 76019-0559 For more information about the department, visit http://ling.uta.edu, or contact by phone (817) 272-3133. Review of the applicants will begin Dec. 1, 2008 but will continue until successful candidates are identified. This is a security sensitive position, and a criminal background check will be conducted on finalists. UT Arlington is an Equal Opportunity & Affirmative Action Employer. ************************************ Dr. Colleen Fitzgerald Chair Dept. of Linguistics & TESOL The University of Texas at Arlington Box 19559 Arlington, TX 76019-0559 Webpage: http://ling.uta.edu/~colleen Email: cmfitz at uta.edu (O)817-272-3133 (F)817-272-2731 From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Thu Nov 6 19:47:48 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 20:47:48 +0100 Subject: WALS and empiricism In-Reply-To: <4913242F.4010805@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Thanks, Tom, for these interesting comments! But they demand a response: > I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that > some of us have felt about the WALS project from its very > inception--it's relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this > project has chosen to follow the old empiricist misonception (vis > Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) that facts are, somehow, > theory-independent, and that one can do a theory-free typology. That data and theory are interdependent is a truism. But the problem with the term "theory" in linguistics is that it has been virtually monopolized by the generative view of the world. The Greenbergian functionalist theory underlying WALS is of a very different sort. What matters to me (and to empirical typology in general) is that it makes no sense to postpone typology till we somehow find "the right theory", which provides all the categories that languages might have. This is basically the generative approach, and for this reason generative linguistics has not led to any major insights into cross-linguistic regularities. Boas, Sapir and Bloomfield were right that all languages have their own categories (a position that was more recently articulated by people such as Lazard, Dryer, LaPolla, Croft, Bickel), so the typological concepts have to be different from linguistic categories. > This is done by two implicit moves: First, by defining grammatical > phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping them by the > *grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them. And second, > by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. I find these remarks puzzling. Many of the WALS chapters have been conceived of in terms of functional domains, and of course many of the generalizations are ultimately due to diachronic factors. I think most WALS authors are fully aware of this. Still, to make systematic cross-linguistic databases, we need consistently applicable definitions of the types (which one might call "purely structural definitions"). The main difference between WALS and Givonian work is the scale: In WALS, each chapter looks at 200 languages or more (the average number of languages per map is 400). We feel that this is necessary, because the earlier practice of taking a few languages and jumping to generalizations, while suggestive and interesting, does not provide a firm basis about what is truly general. > To my mind, the geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is > neigh meaningless without considering the diachrony of the particular > languages (or families) in the region. I don't know anyone who would disagree with this statement. The problem is that while grammaticalization gives us the beginning of a theory of morphosyntactic patterns, we don't even have the beginning of a diachronic theory of the large-scale areal patterns. That these are so common for all areas of language structure is a fascinating, though currently quite enigmatic observation. > It is of course true that a project could choose to be less ambitious, > and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in anticipation that > theory-oriented people would later on use those facts to build their > theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that matter, > Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never > theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", > even as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the > height of self delusion. > > Cheers, TG I don't think that the Greenbergian work from the 1960s is rightly characterized as "the height of self-delusion", and WALS represents a continuation of that tradition. While practically all of the famous Chomskyan parameters of the 1980s have dissipated and disappeared from the scene (see my 2008 paper in the Biberauer volume), the great majority of Greenberg's universals from 1963 have survived. We are still struggling to understand these patterns, but nobody is deluding themselves. World-wide linguistics is much like geology: You first need to do a lot of on-site fieldwork to get a good sense of what the mountain range is like, before you can begin to construct your ambitious (catastrophist, gradualist, etc.) explanatory stories. Best, Martin > Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> Dear Esa, >> >> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >> http://wals.info.) >> >> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >> >> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >> of different authors." >> >> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking >> (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural >> marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if >> the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might >> still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation >> between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not >> between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". >> >> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care >> has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But >> this is not a flaw in the design of the project. >> >> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it >> is that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has >> its own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >> >> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive >> categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers >> and handouts".) >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language >>> Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid >>> Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write >>> a 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >>> >>> Esa Itkonen >>> >>> >>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>> >> > > From Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Thu Nov 6 20:24:09 2008 From: Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 21:24:09 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: Dear Tom and others, > (...) But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that matter, Chomsky, > perish the thought...) that in science facts are never theory-neutral, > and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", even as a > preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height of > self delusion. Yes! It is good to see someone making this point! All the more, linguistic data are in fact /phenomena/ (in the Kantian sense) not 'true objects'. They take shape in terms of their (scientific) perception (> description, classification etc.). In fact, linguistics is by large a phenomenology (see http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~wschulze/redling.pdf on more about this problem, if you want [alas, in German ]). This shouldn't prevent us from doing empirical work even in the sense of Martin's 'comparative concepts', but just as Basic Linguistic Theory (BLT) ? la Bob Dixon cannot be theory-neutral, 'comparative concepts' cannot be either.... The main point is that we should always integrate (and pronounce!) our (scientific) perceptual background when giving a gestalt to linguistic phenomena.... Best wishes, Wolfgang -- --------------------------------------------------------- *Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze * ---------------------------------------------------------- /Primary contact: / Institut f?r Allgemeine & Typologische Sprachwissenschaft Dept. II / F 13 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit?t M?nchen *Neue Adresse / New address* Ludwigstra?e 25 D-80539 M?nchen Tel.: 0049-(0)89-2180-2486 (Secretary) [1.OG, R 102] 0049-(0)89-2180-5343 (Office) [1. OG, R 105] Fax: 0049-(0)89-2180-5345 Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de /// Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Web: New page (change bookmarks!): http://www.ats.lmu.de/index.html Personal homepage: http://www.wolfgangschulze.in-devir.com ---------------------------------------------------------- /Second contact: / Katedra Germanistik? Fakulta humanitn?ch vied Univerzita Mateja B?la / Bansk? Bystrica Tajovsk?ho 40 SK-97401 Bansk? Bystrica Tel: (00421)-(0)48-4465108 Fax: (00421)-(0)48-4465512 Email: Schulze at fhv.umb.sk Web: http://www.fhv.umb.sk/app/user.php?user=schulze ---------------------------------------------------------- From tgivon at uoregon.edu Thu Nov 6 22:12:59 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 15:12:59 -0700 Subject: WALS and empiricism In-Reply-To: <491349E4.9070702@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Fair enough, Martin. But with some caveats: Some of us have NEVER conceded "theory" to the Chomskians. So I would suggest that the work of many of us has been theoretical from the word go, in the best sense of the word--seeking explanations from wider and wider domains. This is articulated as clear as a bell in my "On Understanding Grammar" (1979), and was an implicit practice since the very start of the anti-Chomskian rebellion (dating in my life to Haj Ross & George Lakoff's 1967 paper "Is deep structure necessary?"). So it is high time we stop conceding to Chomsky more than his necessary dues (which are extensive but not absolute). Second: Greenberg's work in typology has been theoretical from the very start, in at least three senses I am aware of: (a) the work on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the diachronic foundations of typology; (c) His later forays into diachrony and evolution. It is of course true that he didn't explicitly try to explain his famous "Greenbergian correlations". But it is also true that he encouraged those of us who did try to explain them, and at least in person accepted our theoretical explanations as a matter of course. Alas, he was not as explicit as Hermann Paul on these issue (indeed, he never cited him, to my knowledge). Lastly: bigvs. small sample. How big is big enough? The advantage of a large sample could only be demonstrated if you can show that you have discovered a body of important facts that were ignored by those of us who "impressionistically" started their theoretical work on smaller samples without waiting for a 100% world-wide data-base (and didn;'t apologizing for it). In other words, as in all good empirical science, you can falsify our hypotheses by collecting data from a larger sample and showing facts in them that are incompatible with those hypotheses. So go ahead, we're not perfect. But, quoting from memory from a 1980 interview with George Watson: "...we didn't just want to find the right solution. We wanted to find it with the minimum amount of data...". Cheers, TG ======== Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Thanks, Tom, for these interesting comments! But they demand a response: >> I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that >> some of us have felt about the WALS project from its very >> inception--it's relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this >> project has chosen to follow the old empiricist misonception (vis >> Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) that facts are, somehow, >> theory-independent, and that one can do a theory-free typology. > That data and theory are interdependent is a truism. But the problem > with the term "theory" in linguistics is that it has been virtually > monopolized by the generative view of the world. The Greenbergian > functionalist theory underlying WALS is of a very different sort. > > What matters to me (and to empirical typology in general) is that it > makes no sense to postpone typology till we somehow find "the right > theory", which provides all the categories that languages might have. > This is basically the generative approach, and for this reason > generative linguistics has not led to any major insights into > cross-linguistic regularities. Boas, Sapir and Bloomfield were right > that all languages have their own categories (a position that was more > recently articulated by people such as Lazard, Dryer, LaPolla, Croft, > Bickel), so the typological concepts have to be different from > linguistic categories. >> This is done by two implicit moves: First, by defining grammatical >> phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping them by the >> *grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them. And second, >> by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. > I find these remarks puzzling. Many of the WALS chapters have been > conceived of in terms of functional domains, and of course many of the > generalizations are ultimately due to diachronic factors. I think most > WALS authors are fully aware of this. Still, to make systematic > cross-linguistic databases, we need consistently applicable > definitions of the types (which one might call "purely structural > definitions"). > > The main difference between WALS and Givonian work is the scale: In > WALS, each chapter looks at 200 languages or more (the average number > of languages per map is 400). We feel that this is necessary, because > the earlier practice of taking a few languages and jumping to > generalizations, while suggestive and interesting, does not provide a > firm basis about what is truly general. >> To my mind, the geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is >> neigh meaningless without considering the diachrony of the particular >> languages (or families) in the region. > I don't know anyone who would disagree with this statement. The > problem is that while grammaticalization gives us the beginning of a > theory of morphosyntactic patterns, we don't even have the beginning > of a diachronic theory of the large-scale areal patterns. That these > are so common for all areas of language structure is a fascinating, > though currently quite enigmatic observation. >> It is of course true that a project could choose to be less >> ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in anticipation >> that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts to build >> their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that >> matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are >> never theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure >> facts", even as a preliminary exercise to subsequent >> theory-building, is the height of self delusion. >> >> Cheers, TG > I don't think that the Greenbergian work from the 1960s is rightly > characterized as "the height of self-delusion", and WALS represents a > continuation of that tradition. While practically all of the famous > Chomskyan parameters of the 1980s have dissipated and disappeared from > the scene (see my 2008 paper in the Biberauer volume), the great > majority of Greenberg's universals from 1963 have survived. > > We are still struggling to understand these patterns, but nobody is > deluding themselves. World-wide linguistics is much like geology: You > first need to do a lot of on-site fieldwork to get a good sense of > what the mountain range is like, before you can begin to construct > your ambitious (catastrophist, gradualist, etc.) explanatory stories. > > Best, > Martin > > > > >> Martin Haspelmath wrote: >>> Dear Esa, >>> >>> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >>> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >>> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >>> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >>> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >>> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >>> http://wals.info.) >>> >>> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >>> >>> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >>> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >>> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >>> of different authors." >>> >>> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >>> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >>> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >>> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal >>> case-marking (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with >>> affixal plural marking (as opposed to pluralization by number >>> words). Then even if the two chapters use different definitions of >>> "affixal", you might still get a true correlation. But it will of >>> course be a correlation between affixal(1) case-marking and >>> affixal(2) pluralization, not between "affixal (tout court) >>> case-marking and pluralization". >>> >>> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >>> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >>> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >>> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So >>> care has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. >>> But this is not a flaw in the design of the project. >>> >>> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >>> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >>> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it >>> is that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has >>> its own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >>> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >>> >>> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and >>> descriptive categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website >>> under "Papers and handouts".) >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language >>>> Structures (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two >>>> intrepid Finnish linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have >>>> ventured to write a 30-page commentary on it, available on the >>>> homepage below. Enjoy! >>>> >>>> Esa Itkonen >>>> >>>> >>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>>> >>> >> >> > From dryer at buffalo.edu Fri Nov 7 17:50:12 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 12:50:12 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <4913242F.4010805@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Tom, I think you're imagining a difference in belief where there isn't one. There is no belief behind WALS that typology can be theory-neutral (in any sense of "theory") and no sense in which WALS is based on Bloomfieldian empiricism. If there's a difference in anything, it's simply a difference in taste and interest. But let me address one, ultimately terminological, issue. You seem to think that theory means explanation. But the theoretical questions that I'm most interested in are questions of the form "What are languages like?" I'm interested in theories about the range of typological variation and the limits on this variation. I'm also interested in theories about why languages are the way they are, but for me those questions are more like a hobby than the core of what I do as a linguist. There are a number of reasons for this. For one thing, theories about why languages are the way they are "neigh meaningless" if what they are explaining isn't true or even if what they purport to explain is something that we don't know yet if it's true or not. There is a huge body of literature from the past 40 years that falls into this category. Unfortunately, Tom, that includes some of your work. For another, even if the explanandum is something that we can be fairly confident of, hypotheses about why languages are the way they are ultimately just that, hypotheses. All too often, they are untestable and unfalsifiable and always will be. Now I don't want to sound like a Martin Joos and say that we shouldn't be asking such questions or trying to answer them. I'm just explaining why I personally am more interested in theoretical questions about what languages are like. But that's ultimately just a matter of taste, not really any different from why I chose to be a linguist rather than something else. I'm glad that there are others whose tastes have led them to devote their energy to questions of explanation, especially you, I might add, since in my opinion no linguist has come up with more interesting hypotheses over the past 35 years than you have. But let's not confuse these differences in taste with differences in belief. But I do object to your trying to use the term "theory" exclusively for questions of explanation. I think you do Greenberg a disservice when you say "Greenberg's work in typology has been theoretical from the very start, in at least three senses I am aware of: (a) the work on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the diachronic foundations of typology; (c) His later forays into diachrony and evolution." You miss a very important fourth sense: his work on what languages are like. Greenberg loved reading grammars. His unique contribution to the field resulted from the fact that he was interested in what languages were like in a way that none of his contemporaries were. Of course, you're free to use the word "theory" as you wish and you're free to object to how I use the word. But that's not a substantive issue either. Matthew --On Thursday, November 6, 2008 10:06 AM -0700 Tom Givon wrote: > > > I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that some > of us have felt about the WALS project from its very inception--it's > relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this project has chosen to > follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) > that facts are, somehow, theory- independent, and that one can do a > theory-free typology. This is done by two implicit moves: First, by > defining grammatical phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping > them by the* grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them And > second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. To my mind, the > geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is neigh meaningless > without considering the diachrony of the particular languages (or > families) in the region. It is of course true that a project could choose > to be less ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in > anticipation that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts > to build their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that > matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never > theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", even > as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height > of self delusion. > > Cheers, TG > > ========= > > > > Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> Dear Esa, >> >> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >> http://wals.info.) >> >> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >> >> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >> of different authors." >> >> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking >> (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural >> marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if >> the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might >> still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation >> between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not >> between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". >> >> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care >> has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this >> is not a flaw in the design of the project. >> >> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is >> that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its >> own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >> >> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive >> categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers >> and handouts".) >> >> Martin Haspelmath >> >> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures >>> (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish >>> linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a >>> 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >>> >>> Esa Itkonen >>> >>> >>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>> >> > > From bernd.heine at uni-koeln.de Sat Nov 8 02:01:00 2008 From: bernd.heine at uni-koeln.de (Bernd Heine) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2008 03:01:00 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <2147483647.1226062212@dryer-osx.caset.buffalo.edu> Message-ID: Matthew, I am a little bit confused. In your understanding: What is 'functional linguistics'? Does it have any meaning? Is it just a label? And how would you relate your own work to this term? Bernd > > Tom, > > I think you're imagining a difference in belief where there isn't one. > There is no belief behind WALS that typology can be theory-neutral (in > any sense of "theory") and no sense in which WALS is based on > Bloomfieldian empiricism. If there's a difference in anything, it's > simply a difference in taste and interest. > > But let me address one, ultimately terminological, issue. You seem to > think that theory means explanation. But the theoretical questions > that I'm most interested in are questions of the form "What are > languages like?" I'm interested in theories about the range of > typological variation and the limits on this variation. I'm also > interested in theories about why languages are the way they are, but > for me those questions are more like a hobby than the core of what I > do as a linguist. There are a number of reasons for this. For one > thing, theories about why languages are the way they are "neigh > meaningless" if what they are explaining isn't true or even if what > they purport to explain is something that we don't know yet if it's > true or not. There is a huge body of literature from the past 40 > years that falls into this category. Unfortunately, Tom, that > includes some of your work. For another, even if the explanandum is > something that we can be fairly confident of, hypotheses about why > languages are the way they are ultimately just that, hypotheses. All > too often, they are untestable and unfalsifiable and always will be. > Now I don't want to sound like a Martin Joos and say that we shouldn't > be asking such questions or trying to answer them. I'm just > explaining why I personally am more interested in theoretical > questions about what languages are like. But that's ultimately just a > matter of taste, not really any different from why I chose to be a > linguist rather than something else. I'm glad that there are others > whose tastes have led them to devote their energy to questions of > explanation, especially you, I might add, since in my opinion no > linguist has come up with more interesting hypotheses over the past 35 > years than you have. But let's not confuse these differences in taste > with differences in belief. > > But I do object to your trying to use the term "theory" exclusively > for questions of explanation. I think you do Greenberg a disservice > when you say "Greenberg's work in typology has been theoretical from > the very start, in at least three senses I am aware of: (a) the work > on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the diachronic > foundations of typology; (c) His later forays into diachrony and > evolution." You miss a very important fourth sense: his work on what > languages are like. Greenberg loved reading grammars. His unique > contribution to the field resulted from the fact that he was > interested in what languages were like in a way that none of his > contemporaries were. > > Of course, you're free to use the word "theory" as you wish and you're > free to object to how I use the word. But that's not a substantive > issue either. > > Matthew > > --On Thursday, November 6, 2008 10:06 AM -0700 Tom Givon > wrote: > >> >> >> I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, articulated the concern that some >> of us have felt about the WALS project from its very inception--it's >> relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, this project has chosen to >> follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.) >> that facts are, somehow, theory- independent, and that one can do a >> theory-free typology. This is done by two implicit moves: First, by >> defining grammatical phenomena purely structurally, rather than grouping >> them by the* grammaticalized functional domains* that underlie them And >> second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the equation. To my mind, the >> geographical distribution of grammatical phenomena is neigh meaningless >> without considering the diachrony of the particular languages (or >> families) in the region. It is of course true that a project could >> choose >> to be less ambitious, and simply give us "pure facts", perhaps in >> anticipation that theory-oriented people would later on use those facts >> to build their theories. But I have to agree with Hanson (and, for that >> matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that in science facts are never >> theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a science of "pure facts", >> even >> as a preliminary exercise to subsequent theory-building, is the height >> of self delusion. >> >> Cheers, TG >> >> ========= >> >> >> >> Martin Haspelmath wrote: >>> Dear Esa, >>> >>> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed commentary on the World Atlas >>> of Language Structures (WALS). This is the most detailed review that >>> has been written, and we are very grateful for it. Many of the >>> individual points of criticism are well-taken, and the WALS authors >>> should take them into account in future editions. (We're planning >>> future online editions of WALS, see the free online version at >>> http://wals.info.) >>> >>> Just one comment, concerning one of your major points: >>> >>> You write (p. 1): "The reader of WALS is encouraged ... to seek >>> *correlations* between the results of different chapters, and this >>> clearly presupposes a high degree of compatibility between the views >>> of different authors." >>> >>> Well, I would say: To find true correlations, the chapters must be >>> sufficiently correct, but they don't necessarily have to be very >>> compatible, certainly not in terminology. Suppose you want to link >>> case-marking and plural marking, and ask whether affixal case-marking >>> (as opposed to adpositional marking) correlates with affixal plural >>> marking (as opposed to pluralization by number words). Then even if >>> the two chapters use different definitions of "affixal", you might >>> still get a true correlation. But it will of course be a correlation >>> between affixal(1) case-marking and affixal(2) pluralization, not >>> between "affixal (tout court) case-marking and pluralization". >>> >>> My view is that typological definitions are inherently >>> linguist-specific, and as such the typological concepts of different >>> linguists are bound to be different (unless a Chomsky-like figure >>> comes along and imposes widespread "agreement by authority"). So care >>> has to be taken in interpreting WALS correlations, of course. But this >>> is not a flaw in the design of the project. >>> >>> Typology cannot be based on some kind of "definitive" set of >>> grammatical concepts, because there is no such list (or if there is, >>> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so far away from knowing what it is >>> that it's irrelevant for practical purposes). Each language has its >>> own categories, so typologists necessarily have to make up their >>> comparative concepts that give them the most interesting results. >>> >>> (For more on this, see my paper "Comparative concepts and descriptive >>> categories in cross-linguistic studies", on my website under "Papers >>> and handouts".) >>> >>> Martin Haspelmath >>> >>> Esa Itkonen wrote: >>>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, World Atlas of Language Structures >>>> (= WALS) is a monumental achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish >>>> linguists (= myself & Anneli Pajunen) have ventured to write a >>>> 30-page commentary on it, available on the homepage below. Enjoy! >>>> >>>> Esa Itkonen >>>> >>>> >>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen >>>> >>> >> >> > > > > > -- Prof. Bernd Heine Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa 3-11-1, Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo, 183-8534 JAPAN Phone: 042-330-5664 Fax: 042-330-5610 From Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Sat Nov 8 09:01:39 2008 From: Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de (Wolfgang Schulze) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2008 10:01:39 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS In-Reply-To: <2147483647.1226062212@dryer-osx.caset.buffalo.edu> Message-ID: Dear friends, I want to briefly come back to a point made by Matthew: > But the theoretical questions that I'm most interested in are > questions of the form "What are languages like?" I'm interested in > theories about the range of typological variation and the limits on > this variation. I'm also interested in theories about why languages > are the way they are, but for me those questions are more like a hobby > than the core of what I do as a linguist. Possible answers to the question "What are languages like?" necessarily entail a number of (hidden) assumptions about the question "Why languages are the way they are". First, you set up a class of (say) 'objects' delimiting from other possible 'objects' ("language"). This classification thus includes a definition of the class at issue. For instance, you may say that 'language' is the structural coupling of patterns of motoric activities related to 'breath obstruction' (articulation) and conceptual patterns. Or, you may say that this coupling may likewise involve motoric patterns related to mimics, gesture etc. (thus including e.g. sign languages). The overall quality of the definiendum thus depends from which position you take (or: which definiens you select). Accordingly, the choice of the definiens automatically addresses questions about the ontology of the definiendum. Which position so ever you take: The choice would (in science) reflect a theoretical segment that is, however, less often spoken out in fuller details. In other words: Matthew's 'hobby' is fundamental for answering his original question. The same holds for 'variation': In order to 'observe' variations within a class set up by definition (!), you have to select deviating features. Yet, the act of observing differences depends from the point of view of the observer: For instance, if you start from the class of 'cars' (defined how so ever), you have multiple choices concerning the selection of features: The cars themselves do not tell the observer, which features are different, but it is the observer who decides (types of wheels, number of wheels, color, shape of the autobody, carriage, functions etc.). Moreover, it is the observer who sets up 'theories' about which features are comparable even though they may have different shapes. Who tells the observer that for instance (in linguistics) the Turkish inferential -mIS can be included into a class of variation that is also present with the (say) German modal pattern 'er soll + Perfect' (Turkic gitmiS ~ German 'er soll gegangen sein')? The choice of the tertium comparationis presupposes that we first decide (!) on the comparability of the items in question. And again, this decision is grounded in theory (be it pronounced or not). Note that in my sense, 'theory' does not necessarily mean a full fledged construction. Here, 'theory' refers to any schematic pattern that because active in a (scientific) cognition when perceiving/observing linguistic 'worlds'. I'm left with the impression that the present debate brings us back to discussions that went on 30-40 years ago: The (Phoney) Linguistic War between East Coast and West Coast Linguistics conditioned that quite a number of linguists turned away and practiced what has been called 'business-as-usual linguistics'. This scientific behavior seems to be a general tendency in case theory-driven debates exclude people not willing to enter one of the camps (a teacher of mine once had polemically termed this pattern 'Scientific Biedermeier'). Still, I am not sure whether this 'drawback' (to business-as-usual linguistics) can be more than just a 'pause' in the debate on what Matthew has addressed in the question "Why languages are the way they are?". I think that, today, it is crucial to openly articulate one's own position with respect to this question that underlies - as I have said above - the question "What are languages like?". Even a 'hunter and gatherer' of linguistic data must have an idea about what is the 'use' of collecting these data and according to which 'recipe' (s)he collects them. Here, the three standard paradigms ('something is the way it has become' (causa efficiens; 'mythology'), 'something is the way it is' (causa formalis; 'descriptivism'), and 'something is for what is has been designed' (causa finalis; 'utopy')) cannot be separated except for short-living heuristic purposes. The global scientific paradigm usually focuses upon one of these positions (today, the causa efficiens being the main target of ontology, contrary to say 30 years ago, when the causa finalis played the major role). However, we cannot (or: must not) escape from the others..... Best wishes, Wolfgang -- --------------------------------------------------------- *Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schulze * ---------------------------------------------------------- /Primary contact: / Institut f?r Allgemeine & Typologische Sprachwissenschaft Dept. II / F 13 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit?t M?nchen *Neue Adresse / New address* Ludwigstra?e 25 D-80539 M?nchen Tel.: 0049-(0)89-2180-2486 (Secretary) [1.OG, R 102] 0049-(0)89-2180-5343 (Office) [1. OG, R 105] Fax: 0049-(0)89-2180-5345 Email: W.Schulze at lrz.uni-muenchen.de /// Wolfgang.Schulze at lmu.de Web: New page (change bookmarks!): http://www.ats.lmu.de/index.html Personal homepage: http://www.wolfgangschulze.in-devir.com ---------------------------------------------------------- /Second contact: / Katedra Germanistik? Fakulta humanitn?ch vied Univerzita Mateja B?la / Bansk? Bystrica Tajovsk?ho 40 SK-97401 Bansk? Bystrica Tel: (00421)-(0)48-4465108 Fax: (00421)-(0)48-4465512 Email: Schulze at fhv.umb.sk Web: http://www.fhv.umb.sk/app/user.php?user=schulze ---------------------------------------------------------- From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Nov 10 03:48:47 2008 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2008 22:48:47 EST Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies Message-ID: In a message dated 11/7/08 12:50:44 PM, dryer at buffalo.edu writes: > < be fairly confident of, hypotheses about why languages are the way they are > ultimately just that, hypotheses.? All too often, they are untestable and > unfalsifiable and always will be.>>? > A Quick Comment. Early natural histories organized groups of animals according to categories that we find odd these days. Birds and bats and butterflies were all things that fly, so they were grouped together. Now this was not so much a theory, or even a hypothesis, as it was a way of giving some kind of organization to that part of the natural world. A random organization makes a presentation of data difficult for any audience. Modern biology textbooks often poo-poo the categories of the old natural historians because modern biology views them from the point of view of modern theories of temporal evolution and relateness. That birds, bats and butterflies all fly is a coincidence from that perspective. But, of course, in terms of physics, birds and bats and butterflies do indeed have something in common -- in the sense of their main method of motion. These three not-closely-related animal forms do share a common solution to the problem of motion, even if each particular solution arose independently. What appears to be an erroneous grouping actually does inform us about how external contingencies can lead to a common solution, DESPITE a lack of direct relatedness. An important aspect of evolution. And possibly of language. So, is WALS the equivalent of the old naive natural histories, slapping together linguistic forms on some superficial sense of typology? I don't think so. The real question is how the groupings end up working with everything else. How does one explain all these "typologies?" The worse possible reaction is to belittle the process as a mere "hypothesis." Hypotheses are the meat of any REAL science. Any theory that does not yield testable hypotheses, by long and hallowed tradition, sucks. It seems to me that the organization of WALS constitutes some sort of hypothesis. It is just a matter of someone somewhere actually stating it, and making some testable predictions based on it. If A, B, C, are here, then where would we expect to find D? Stating that all the observable language structures are in reality one structure does not help, because it doesn't explain why there is more than one human language. We need a sensible description of the process, the mechanism -- given the data. Which means we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. We need a way to say all this makes sense, if we just put the sun in the center. (At this point, I'm afraid a Darwin or Einstein are down the road a bit, for linguistics.) In the mean time, WALS is a collection of data organized from some general point of view. If there is a Copernican solution to the data, then please have at it. In the meantime, we need to be satisfied with bats and bees and butterfies living together, all under the same chapter heading. Regards, Steve Long ************** AOL Search: Your one stop for directions, recipes and all other Holiday needs. Search Now. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1212792382x1200798498/aol?redir=http://searchblog.aol.com/2008/11/04/happy-holidays-from -aol-search/?ncid=emlcntussear00000001) From dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au Mon Nov 10 07:09:22 2008 From: dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au (dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:09:22 +1100 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: snip.. > we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. -- David Harvey 60 Gipps Street Drummoyne NSW 2047 Australia Tel: 61-2-9719-9170 From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Mon Nov 10 09:36:06 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 10:36:06 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: Message-ID: If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with authority, rather fatal ones). Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval biology. Martin > At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > snip.. > >> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > > A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a > comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing > body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both > also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. > Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is > not to be sniffed at. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From ritva.laury at helsinki.fi Mon Nov 10 13:58:40 2008 From: ritva.laury at helsinki.fi (Ritva Laury) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 15:58:40 +0200 Subject: New book on clause combining Message-ID: Dear Funknetters, I am delighted to announce the publication of a new book, Crosslinguistic Studies of Clause Combining. Details available at http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=TSL%2080 and below. Ritva Laury Crosslinguistic Studies of Clause Combining The multifunctionality of conjunctions Edited by Ritva Laury University of Helsinki  [Typological Studies in Language, 80] 2008. xiv, 253 pp. Hb 978 90 272 2993 9 EUR 105.00 Table of contents Introduction Ritva Laury and Sandra A. Thompson From subordinate clause to noun-phrase: Yang constructions in colloquial Indonesian Robert Englebretson On quotative constructions in Iberian Spanish Ricardo Etxepare Bulgarian adversative connectives: Conjunctions or discourse markers? Grace E. Fielder Projectability and clause combining in interaction Paul J. Hopper and Sandra A. Thompson Conjunction and sequenced actions: The Estonian complementizer and evidential particle et Leelo Keevallik Clause combining, interaction, evidentiality, participation structure, and the conjunction-particle continuum: the Finnish ett? Ritva Laury and Eeva-Leena Sepp?nen The grammaticization of but as a final particle in English conversation Jean Mulder and Sandra A. Thompson Quotative tte in Japanese: Its multifaceted functions and degrees of ?subordination? Shigeko Okamoto and Tsuyoshi Ono Quoting and topic-marking: Some observations on the quotative tte construction in Japanese Ryoko Suzuk From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Nov 10 14:04:38 2008 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 09:04:38 EST Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies Message-ID: In a message dated 11/10/08 2:09:41 AM, dharv at mail.optusnet.com.au writes: > < comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing body of > work>> > To be exact, there was a large body of data before Copernicus (and Kepler). Astronomers and mariners were able to predict the movement of objects in the sky reasonably well. However, all this data was INTERPRETED with a theory that demanded all sorts of epi-cycles, whistles and bells in order to be consistent with the data. It was not that Ptolemy and pre-Copernican astronomy was inconsistent with the data. It was that it jumped through all sorts of hoops to keep the earth at the center of the solar system. What Copernicus did was change the CENTER of the theory, and all that complexity evaporated. One might suggest that what Chomsky did was put the wrong object at the center of linguistics and sent it jumping through comparable hoops. Kepler, having better data, added the ellipse to the equation. But the "laws" of plantery motion awaited Newton. You needed a Copernicus before you could get to a Newton. Gallileo was, and got in trouble for being, a Copernican. He had the center right. Chomsky is a Chomskyan. His work is as admirable as the Alexandrians, but it still unfortunately has the earth as the center of the universe. What we need is someone to do a Copernicus on it. Regards, Steve Long ************** AOL Search: Your one stop for directions, recipes and all other Holiday needs. Search Now. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1212792382x1200798498/aol?redir=http://searchblog.aol.com/2008/11/04/happy-holidays-from -aol-search/?ncid=emlcntussear00000001) From dryer at buffalo.edu Mon Nov 10 14:22:07 2008 From: dryer at buffalo.edu (Matthew Dryer) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 09:22:07 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: Bernd, Let me emphasize that (1) what I am talking about is a matter of personal taste; and (2) I'm not questioning the value of explanatory work. I have done work both in constructing theories about what languages are like and in explaining why they are that way, and while each are a source of satisfaction in their own way, ultimately I find the former more satisfying. I understand perfectly well why there are others who find the latter more satisfying. The field benefits from having both sorts of linguists. My email was in response to Tom's original email that seemed to interpret the difference, not as a matter of personal taste, but as a matter of difference in belief. (I say "Tom's original email", since in a response he sent just to me, he did recognize that a difference in temperament was at least part of the picture.) And his email seemed not to recognize that there is a large body of theoretical work in typology that essentially involves theories of what languages are like rather than explanations for why they are that way. So to answer your question, Bernd, while I get more personal satisfaction from theories about what languages are like, I don't stop there. I am interested in functional explanations for why they are that way, I engage in such work myself to some extent, and I certainly hope that others do as well. Now I recognize that there is another very different body of work that could also be characterized as being about what languages are like, namely work in generative grammar, that does not aim at going beyond that (apart from attributing things to innateness). But functionalists should not let such work give the idea of theories about what languages are like a "bad name". Nor should we accept the generative linguists' view of work in typology that characterizes what languages are like as atheoretical. Too many typologists and functionalists seem to accept that view. Matthew On Fri 11/07/08 9:01 PM , Bernd Heine bernd.heine at uni-koeln.de sent: > Matthew, > I am a little bit confused. In your understanding: What is 'functional > linguistics'? Does it have any meaning? Is it just a label? And how > would you relate your own work to this term? > Bernd > > > > Tom, > > > > I think you're imagining a difference in belief > where there isn't one. > There is no belief behind WALS that typology can > be theory-neutral (in > any sense of "theory") and no sense in > which WALS is based on > Bloomfieldian empiricism. If there's a > difference in anything, it's > simply a difference in taste and > interest.> > > But let me address one, ultimately > terminological, issue. You seem to > think that theory means explanation. But the > theoretical questions > that I'm most interested in are questions of the > form "What are > languages like?" I'm interested in theories > about the range of > typological variation and the limits on this > variation. I'm also > interested in theories about why languages are > the way they are, but > for me those questions are more like a hobby > than the core of what I > do as a linguist. There are a number of reasons > for this. For one > thing, theories about why languages are the way > they are "neigh > meaningless" if what they are explaining > isn't true or even if what > they purport to explain is something that we > don't know yet if it's > true or not. There is a huge body of literature > from the past 40 > years that falls into this category. > Unfortunately, Tom, that > includes some of your work. For another, even > if the explanandum is > something that we can be fairly confident of, > hypotheses about why > languages are the way they are ultimately just > that, hypotheses. All > too often, they are untestable and unfalsifiable > and always will be. > Now I don't want to sound like a Martin Joos and > say that we shouldn't > be asking such questions or trying to answer > them. I'm just > explaining why I personally am more interested > in theoretical > questions about what languages are like. But > that's ultimately just a > matter of taste, not really any different from > why I chose to be a > linguist rather than something else. I'm glad > that there are others > whose tastes have led them to devote their > energy to questions of > explanation, especially you, I might add, since > in my opinion no > linguist has come up with more interesting > hypotheses over the past 35 > years than you have. But let's not confuse > these differences in taste > with differences in belief. > > > > But I do object to your trying to use the term > "theory" exclusively > for questions of explanation. I think you do > Greenberg a disservice > when you say "Greenberg's work in typology > has been theoretical from > the very start, in at least three senses I am > aware of: (a) the work > on markedness of categories; (b) The work on the > diachronic > foundations of typology; (c) His later forays > into diachrony and > evolution." You miss a very important > fourth sense: his work on what > languages are like. Greenberg loved reading > grammars. His unique > contribution to the field resulted from the fact > that he was > interested in what languages were like in a way > that none of his > contemporaries were. > > > > Of course, you're free to use the word > "theory" as you wish and you're > free to object to how I use the word. But > that's not a substantive > issue either. > > > > Matthew > > > > --On Thursday, November 6, 2008 10:06 AM -0700 > Tom Givon > egon.edu> wrote:> > >> > >> > >> I think Martin, perhaps inadvertently, > articulated the concern that some>> of us have felt about the WALS project from > its very inception--it's>> relentless a-theoretical perspective. To me, > this project has chosen to>> follow the old empiricist lisonception (vis > Bloomfield, Carnap, etc.)>> that facts are, somehow, theory- > independent, and that one can do a>> theory-free typology. This is done by two > implicit moves: First, by>> defining grammatical phenomena purely > structurally, rather than grouping>> them by the* grammaticalized functional > domains* that underlie them And>> second, by leaving *diachrony* out of the > equation. To my mind, the>> geographical distribution of grammatical > phenomena is neigh meaningless>> without considering the diachrony of the > particular languages (or>> families) in the region. It is of course > true that a project could >> choose > >> to be less ambitious, and simply give us > "pure facts", perhaps in>> anticipation that theory-oriented people > would later on use those facts>> to build their theories. But I have to agree > with Hanson (and, for that>> matter, Chomsky, perish the thought...) that > in science facts are never>> theory-neutral, and that to propose to do a > science of "pure facts", >> even > >> as a preliminary exercise to subsequent > theory-building, is the height>> of self delusion. > >> > >> Cheers, TG > >> > >> ========= > >> > >> > >> > >> Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >>> Dear Esa, > >>> > >>> Thanks a lot for writing this detailed > commentary on the World Atlas>>> of Language Structures (WALS). This is > the most detailed review that>>> has been written, and we are very > grateful for it. Many of the>>> individual points of criticism are > well-taken, and the WALS authors>>> should take them into account in future > editions. (We're planning>>> future online editions of WALS, see the > free online version at>>> http://wals.info.)>>> > >>> Just one comment, concerning one of your > major points:>>> > >>> You write (p. 1): "The reader of > WALS is encouraged ... to seek>>> *correlations* between the results of > different chapters, and this>>> clearly presupposes a high degree of > compatibility between the views>>> of different authors." > >>> > >>> Well, I would say: To find true > correlations, the chapters must be>>> sufficiently correct, but they don't > necessarily have to be very>>> compatible, certainly not in > terminology. Suppose you want to link>>> case-marking and plural marking, and ask > whether affixal case-marking>>> (as opposed to adpositional marking) > correlates with affixal plural>>> marking (as opposed to pluralization by > number words). Then even if>>> the two chapters use different > definitions of "affixal", you might>>> still get a true correlation. But it > will of course be a correlation>>> between affixal(1) case-marking and > affixal(2) pluralization, not>>> between "affixal (tout court) > case-marking and pluralization".>>> > >>> My view is that typological definitions > are inherently>>> linguist-specific, and as such the > typological concepts of different>>> linguists are bound to be different > (unless a Chomsky-like figure>>> comes along and imposes widespread > "agreement by authority"). So care>>> has to be taken in interpreting WALS > correlations, of course. But this>>> is not a flaw in the design of the > project.>>> > >>> Typology cannot be based on some kind of > "definitive" set of>>> grammatical concepts, because there is > no such list (or if there is,>>> i.e. if UG exists after all, we're so > far away from knowing what it is>>> that it's irrelevant for practical > purposes). Each language has its>>> own categories, so typologists > necessarily have to make up their>>> comparative concepts that give them the > most interesting results.>>> > >>> (For more on this, see my paper > "Comparative concepts and descriptive>>> categories in cross-linguistic > studies", on my website under "Papers>>> and handouts".) > >>> > >>> Martin Haspelmath > >>> > >>> Esa Itkonen wrote: > >>>> Dear Funknetters: By all accounts, > World Atlas of Language Structures>>>> (= WALS) is a monumental > achievement. Still, two intrepid Finnish>>>> linguists (= myself & Anneli > Pajunen) have ventured to write a>>>> 30-page commentary on it, available > on the homepage below. Enjoy!>>>> > >>>> Esa Itkonen > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen>>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Prof. Bernd Heine > Tokyo University of Foreign Studies > Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa > 3-11-1, Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, > Tokyo, 183-8534 JAPAN > Phone: 042-330-5664 > Fax: 042-330-5610 > > > > > From Salinas17 at aol.com Mon Nov 10 15:45:18 2008 From: Salinas17 at aol.com (Salinas17 at aol.com) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 10:45:18 EST Subject: Concerning WALS Message-ID: In a message dated 11/10/08 9:22:26 AM, dryer at buffalo.edu writes: > Nor should we accept the generative linguists' view of work in typology > that > characterizes what languages are like as atheoretical.? Too many typologists > and > functionalists seem to accept that view. > Typology classically is a matter of categorizing. There are many different ways to categorize any complex set of raw data. Implicit in most choices is theory. For the moment, let's hypothesize that the main "function" of language is common reference. From there, we would theorize that all structure -- from phonology to lexicon to syntax -- serves to seek common reference -- to disambiguate between what the speaker is referring to and what the listener understands. Then, the World Atlas of Language Structures becomes a catalog of approaches to that objective, disambiguation in communication -- attempts towards a more accurate common reference between speakers and listeners. The research would be valuable in assessing why those attempts differed. This is quite a different view than generativist theory would have of that Atlas. It's also a different view than say a traditional Indo_europeanist would have -- something that Greenberg was certainly conscious of. Admitting that describing "what languages are like" involves theory from the start helps and does not hurt the process. Otherwise we have hidden assumptions in the descriptions that must be pryed out rather than given up front. Steve Long ************** AOL Search: Your one stop for directions, recipes and all other Holiday needs. Search Now. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1212792382x1200798498/aol?redir=http://searchblog.aol.com/2008/11/04/happy-holidays-from -aol-search/?ncid=emlcntussear00000001) From timo.honkela at tkk.fi Mon Nov 10 16:18:39 2008 From: timo.honkela at tkk.fi (timo.honkela at tkk.fi) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:18:39 +0200 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: <49180086.6020008@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Thank you for initiating a very interesting discussion. The complexity of the study of language as a socio-cultural and cognitive phenomenon by far exceeds, for instance, the complexity of the basic principles of physics and astronomy. In general, it seems clear that linguistic categories cannot be claimed to have any objective ontological status. They are social constructions and there are multiple ways to construct the theories in a meaningful way. A formalization of the subjectivity/intersubjectivity of language use is presented in our recent article "Simulating processes of concept formation and communication" (J of Econ Methodology, vol. 15, no. 3, Sept 2008, pp. 245-259): 1 Introduction 1.1 Multi-agent systems 1.2 Language learning and game theory 1.3 Grounding 1.4 Learning paradigms 2 Basic theoretical framework 3 Communication between agents 3.1 Language games 3.2 Single-agent model 3.3 Two-agent model 4 Learning of conceptual models 4.1 Unsupervised learning of conceptual systems 5 Practical implications 5.1 Meaning negotiations 5.2 Costs associated with harmonization of conceptual systems 6 Discussion The article aims to provide a principled alternative to the formal approaches in which language is viewed as an autonomous system without careful consideration of the subjective element. Constructive comments on the paper (available on request) are welcome! Best regards, Timo P.S. I will be in UC Berkeley from 17th to 19th, in Stanford from 20th to 21st and in UC San Diego from 25th to 27th of November. If you are working there and would be interested in discussing these issues, please contact. On Mon, 10 Nov 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy is > Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious way, without > providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with authority, rather fatal > ones). > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before Darwin, > but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation until a new way > of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case with comparative > linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far from the Keplerian, > Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it was > often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval biology. > > Martin > > At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > > snip.. > > > > > we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > > > > A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a > > comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing > > body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both > > also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. > > Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is > > not to be sniffed at. > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) -- Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent Adaptive Informatics Research Center Helsinki University of Technology P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ From tgivon at uoregon.edu Mon Nov 10 22:01:37 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 14:01:37 -0800 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I think, Timo, that one can perhaps go a bit too far in claiming that linguistic categories have no reality (Comsky has arrived cat this conclusion about moroho-syntactic constructions, by the way...) It is true that linguistic methodology often makes it appear this way, not only on the Chomskian side but also on the more empiricist side.But there are quite a few of us who strive to connect our work with, and indeed be guided by, experimental work on the cognition & neurology of language. It requires a lot of patience to do this, but it is both rewarding & promising (while being still very far from where we want to go...). I think both extremes of the field will need to change their approach to universals before a true fusion with cognitive-neuro-linguistics will come about. Chomskian universals are too abstract & are achieved by formal fiat, facts of cross-language diversity be damned. But simple surface-fact-universals are not all that useful either, if you don't go beyond them. They are the same old "inductive generalizations" in Booomfield's sense, and counter to M. Dryer, they are not a theory, but rathe the important empirical buildup toward an eventual theory. They are summaries of facts ("all languages have a surface feature x"), what Carnap calls "empirical genewralizations". What we need is to discover the universal principles and mechanisms (diachronic, evolutionary, acquisitional) that makes the seemingly-universal facts what they are. And for this, we have to get away from BOTH extremes in linguistics. So no, Noam, constructions DO exist. And yes, Noam, general facts, however general, are NOT themselves the universals. Principles & the mechanisms (of development, of "emergence", of cognition & communication; rather than abstract "principles & parameters") that they control are what we are after. But in order to discover what the principles, we DO have to study constructions, their communicqative use, their acquisition & their diachronic emergence, and their neuro-cognitive processing. Cheers, TG ================= On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:18:39 +0200 (EET), timo.honkela at tkk.fi wrote: > Thank you for initiating a very interesting discussion. The complexity > of the study of language as a socio-cultural and cognitive phenomenon > by far exceeds, for instance, the complexity of the basic principles > of physics and astronomy. > > In general, it seems clear that linguistic categories cannot be > claimed to have any objective ontological status. They are social > constructions and there are multiple ways to construct the theories in > a meaningful way. > > A formalization of the subjectivity/intersubjectivity of language use > is presented in our recent article "Simulating processes of concept > formation and communication" (J of Econ Methodology, vol. 15, no. 3, > Sept 2008, pp. 245-259): > > 1 Introduction > 1.1 Multi-agent systems > 1.2 Language learning and game theory > 1.3 Grounding > 1.4 Learning paradigms > 2 Basic theoretical framework > 3 Communication between agents > 3.1 Language games > 3.2 Single-agent model > 3.3 Two-agent model > 4 Learning of conceptual models > 4.1 Unsupervised learning of conceptual systems > 5 Practical implications > 5.1 Meaning negotiations > 5.2 Costs associated with harmonization of conceptual systems > 6 Discussion > > The article aims to provide a principled alternative to the formal > approaches in which language is viewed as an autonomous system without > careful consideration of the subjective element. Constructive comments > on the paper (available on request) are welcome! > > Best regards, > Timo > > P.S. I will be in UC Berkeley from 17th to 19th, in Stanford from 20th > to 21st and in UC San Diego from 25th to 27th of November. If you are > working there and would be interested in discussing these issues, > please contact. > > > > > On Mon, 10 Nov 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy is > > Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious way, without > > providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with authority, rather fatal > > ones). > > > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before Darwin, > > but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation until a new way > > of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case with comparative > > linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far from the Keplerian, > > Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it was > > often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval biology. > > > > Martin > > > At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > > > snip.. > > > > > > > we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > > > > > > A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and a > > > comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a discipline-changing > > > body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory of everything). Both > > > also had clashes with authority although of a rather different kind. > > > Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or Einstein but to be a Galileo is > > > not to be sniffed at. > > -- > > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > > D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > -- > Timo Honkela, Chief Research Scientist, PhD, Docent > Adaptive Informatics Research Center > Helsinki University of Technology > P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015 TKK > > timo.honkela at tkk.fi, http://www.cis.hut.fi/tho/ > From tgivon at uoregon.edu Fri Nov 14 03:26:22 2008 From: tgivon at uoregon.edu (Tom Givon) Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 20:26:22 -0700 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies In-Reply-To: <49180086.6020008@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: Well, Martin, I wonder why you are impelled to make such sweeping statements, one's that are bound to shoot way beyond the mark. Do you really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? Now, since you invoke Aristotle, I had better go an record saying that he is the acknowledged founder of biology--not only empirical biology with his pioneering classification (according to an ascending degree of complexity--practically begging an evolutionary interpretation...), but also adaptive-functional--thus THEORETICAL--biology. It took Linaues and many before him another 2,000 years to complete Aristotle's classification; and it took Darwin another 200 years to find the theoretical explanation for the form-function isomorphisms identified by Aristotle. But to lump Aristotle (in Biology) as "speculative", like Plato, suggests a pretty careless reading of (at least) three of his books: De Partibus Animalium, De Generationem Animalium, and Historiae Animalium. If you want to delve into the history of scientific (observation-based AND theoretical) biology, these books are the place to start. As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems to me that you are implying something that for me translates as follows: Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to that: "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't need all those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of evolution by natural (adaptive) selection". If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, types that are so surprising and earthshaking that they manifestly falsify our current theoretical understanding (I hate to call what we do "theory", but it is definitely "theoretical"). All I can say is, from my remote corner, is that most of what I see of the endless compilation of more and more descriptions, is a lot of familiar types and sub-types. In other words, more and more species and subspecies of butterflies described in more and more minute detail. And like Darwin (or, like Watson and Crick), I'm inlined to say that the finches we already have in hand are enough to at least start building a theoretical, explanatory account of language. So all y'all have to do is falsify our predictions. Best, TG ========== Martin Haspelmath wrote: > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy > is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious > way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with > authority, rather fatal ones). > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before > Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation > until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case > with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far > from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it > was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval > biology. > > Martin >> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >> snip.. >> >>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. >> >> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and >> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a >> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory >> of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although of a >> rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or >> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. From dcyr at yorku.ca Fri Nov 14 04:08:12 2008 From: dcyr at yorku.ca (Danielle E. Cyr) Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 23:08:12 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS - Butterflies and broken harmony In-Reply-To: <491CEFDE.9020308@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Marginally speaking, I recently watched a science program on TV, most probably NOVA (I don't quite remember), talking about a notion in physics, which was new to me, i.e. ?broken harmony?. This notion explains why there is less antimatter than matter in our universe. As much as I can remember, it seems that immediately after the initial Big Bang the quantity of matter and antimatter were even but, for some mysterious reason, that balance was as soon disrupted, therefrom the notion of broken/disrupted harmony. And, the narrator went on to say, this very fact of broken harmony is precisely what allowed/triggered the entire process of evolution leading to us among other things. It really struck me as a principle that applies to language as well. Isn't the tendency to break/disrupt the established grammatical harmony in order to produce eloquence at the basis of grammaticalisation? That was my reflection to my graduate students in a seminar on the evolution of French grammar. From which I went on to quote Gustave Guillaume who claimed that language itself is the first theory of the Universe since language is the first and most fundamental way mankind gave to itself while aiming at finding a way to see/put some order in an apparently fuzzy/unordered universe. And, subsequently, it made me realize that the notion of broken harmony could be the golden thread, sought by so many of us trough time and continents, that could reunite physics, chemistry and social sciences: everything is the way it is because of broken harmony. The only tremendously awsome question remaining would then be: ?What causes (local) harmony to break apart? Something to think about? Danielle Cyr Quoting Tom Givon : > > > > Well, Martin, I wonder why you are impelled to make such sweeping > statements, one's that are bound to shoot way beyond the mark. Do you > really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical > foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my > associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our > finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? > > Now, since you invoke Aristotle, I had better go an record saying that > he is the acknowledged founder of biology--not only empirical biology > with his pioneering classification (according to an ascending degree of > complexity--practically begging an evolutionary interpretation...), but > also adaptive-functional--thus THEORETICAL--biology. It took Linaues and > many before him another 2,000 years to complete Aristotle's > classification; and it took Darwin another 200 years to find the > theoretical explanation for the form-function isomorphisms identified by > Aristotle. But to lump Aristotle (in Biology) as "speculative", like > Plato, suggests a pretty careless reading of (at least) three of his > books: De Partibus Animalium, De Generationem Animalium, and Historiae > Animalium. If you want to delve into the history of scientific > (observation-based AND theoretical) biology, these books are the place > to start. > > As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems > to me that you are implying something that for me translates as follows: > Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical > explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species > and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone > discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to that: > "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't need all > those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of evolution by > natural (adaptive) selection". > > If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is > premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to > justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, > all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about > cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such > diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, types > that are so surprising and earthshaking that they manifestly falsify our > current theoretical understanding (I hate to call what we do "theory", > but it is definitely "theoretical"). All I can say is, from my remote > corner, is that most of what I see of the endless compilation of more > and more descriptions, is a lot of familiar types and sub-types. In > other words, more and more species and subspecies of butterflies > described in more and more minute detail. And like Darwin (or, like > Watson and Crick), I'm inlined to say that the finches we already have > in hand are enough to at least start building a theoretical, explanatory > account of language. So all y'all have to do is falsify our predictions. > > Best, TG > > ========== > > > > Martin Haspelmath wrote: > > If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy > > is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious > > way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with > > authority, rather fatal ones). > > > > Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before > > Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation > > until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case > > with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very far > > from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. > > > > The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > > comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, it > > was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like medieval > > biology. > > > > Martin > >> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > >> snip.. > >> > >>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > >> > >> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and > >> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a > >> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a theory > >> of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although of a > >> rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or > >> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. > > "The only hope we have as human beings is to learn each other's languages. Only then can we truly hope to understand one another." Professor Danielle E. Cyr Department of French Studies York University Toronto, ON, Canada, M3J 1P3 Tel. 1.416.736.2100 #310180 FAX. 1.416.736.5924 dcyr at yorku.ca From haspelmath at eva.mpg.de Fri Nov 14 11:20:53 2008 From: haspelmath at eva.mpg.de (Martin Haspelmath) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 12:20:53 +0100 Subject: Concerning WALS, Darwin and butterflies In-Reply-To: <491CEFDE.9020308@uoregon.edu> Message-ID: Hi Tom, Tom Givon wrote: > Do you really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical > foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my > associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our > finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? I see WALS as a salient manifestation of Greenbergian and Givonian efforts of the last few decades. While Greenberg and Giv?n are not strictly speaking authors of WALS, their spirit permeates the entire work. > As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems > to me that you are implying something that for me translates as > follows: Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical > explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species > and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone > discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to > that: "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't > need all those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of > evolution by natural (adaptive) selection". I think WALS is something like Darwin's finches, plus the other things he knew about comparative zoology and botany. But note that Darwin's thinking was not only derived from a few finches -- he had a huge previous literature to test his ideas on, including many descriptive volumes he wrote himself. The finches were more like textbook examples. So Darwin was NOT premature, precisely because an empirical foundation already existed when he came along. > If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is > premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to > justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, > all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about > cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such > diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, That's pretty easy -- the linguistics literature is full of premature generalizations (such as "Kayne's generalization", which holds for Spanish, Italian, and French, but breaks down with Modern Greek). Of course, linguists with a Greenbergian or Givonian background are not so likely to fall into this trap, but WALS is addressed to the entire field of theoretical linguistics. In addition, many typologists of the younger generation (who increasingly are trained in statistics) find it important to adopt a quantitative perspective, where a single counterexample does not destroy a correlation. For a quatitative perspective, one needs many languages. This is also an approach adopted by some comparative biologists. (In biology, this work is not very prominent, because genetics is currently occupying center stage, but in linguistics we have nothing corresponding to genetics.) Best, Martin > Martin Haspelmath wrote: >> If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy >> is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious >> way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with >> authority, rather fatal ones). >> >> Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before >> Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation >> until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case >> with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very >> far from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. >> >> The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put >> comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, >> it was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like >> medieval biology. >> >> Martin >>> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: >>> snip.. >>> >>>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. >>> >>> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and >>> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a >>> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a >>> theory of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although >>> of a rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or >>> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. -- Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 D-04103 Leipzig Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics (http://www.glottopedia.org) From amnfn at well.com Fri Nov 14 13:51:40 2008 From: amnfn at well.com (A. Katz) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 05:51:40 -0800 Subject: Concerning WALS, Darwin and butterflies In-Reply-To: <491D5F15.104@eva.mpg.de> Message-ID: On the one hand, it's true that newly discovered correlations, say in areas such as historical linguistics and genetic classifications, are poo-poohed unless one presents massive statistical data backing them up, greater than what Bopp and Grimm presented to make their claims. But on the other hand, the current claim that (in grammaticalization theory) a single counterexample does not disprove a rule if you have lots of "statistical data" backing up your hypothesis is truly dangerous. It sets up situations where hypotheses are not falsifiable under plain logic. There's nothing wrong with statistics if you know how to use it. However, many linguists don't understand statistics and don't know what it's for. Best, --Aya On Fri, 14 Nov 2008, Martin Haspelmath wrote: > Hi Tom, > > Tom Givon wrote: > > Do you really mean that WALS is what will put us on sound empirical > > foundations? At long last? Gets one to wonder what myself and my > > associates (let alone your guru Greenberg) have been doing with our > > finite earthly time all those pre-WALS years; now don't it? > I see WALS as a salient manifestation of Greenbergian and Givonian > efforts of the last few decades. While Greenberg and Giv?n are not > strictly speaking authors of WALS, their spirit permeates the entire work. > > As to how far we are in linguistics from the Darwinian stage: It seems > > to me that you are implying something that for me translates as > > follows: Darwin was hopelessly premature in delving into a theoretical > > explanation of variation in Biology, because in his time many species > > and sub-species of butterflies had not yet been described, let alone > > discovered. Well, here is what I bet you Darwin would have said to > > that: "I had my finches, and apparently they were enough, I didn't > > need all those the extra butterflies to come up with the theory of > > evolution by natural (adaptive) selection". > I think WALS is something like Darwin's finches, plus the other things > he knew about comparative zoology and botany. But note that Darwin's > thinking was not only derived from a few finches -- he had a huge > previous literature to test his ideas on, including many descriptive > volumes he wrote himself. The finches were more like textbook examples. > > So Darwin was NOT premature, precisely because an empirical foundation > already existed when he came along. > > If the good folks of WALS want to make a serious claim that it is > > premature to do theoretical (explanatory) linguistics, and thus to > > justify the time & money poured into their admirable enterprise, well, > > all they have to do is convince those of us who know just a bit about > > cross-language diversity (and also about the major source of such > > diversity--diachrony) that they are finding new types of variants, > That's pretty easy -- the linguistics literature is full of premature > generalizations (such as "Kayne's generalization", which holds for > Spanish, Italian, and French, but breaks down with Modern Greek). Of > course, linguists with a Greenbergian or Givonian background are not so > likely to fall into this trap, but WALS is addressed to the entire field > of theoretical linguistics. > > In addition, many typologists of the younger generation (who > increasingly are trained in statistics) find it important to adopt a > quantitative perspective, where a single counterexample does not destroy > a correlation. For a quatitative perspective, one needs many languages. > This is also an approach adopted by some comparative biologists. (In > biology, this work is not very prominent, because genetics is currently > occupying center stage, but in linguistics we have nothing corresponding > to genetics.) > > Best, > Martin > > > Martin Haspelmath wrote: > >> If you want to compare Chomsky with someone, I think the best analogy > >> is Socrates -- he asked a number of new questions in a very serious > >> way, without providing answers (Socrates also had clashes with > >> authority, rather fatal ones). > >> > >> Comparative biology became an empirically-based science long before > >> Darwin, but it was extremely difficult to make sense of the variation > >> until a new way of thinking became possible. Maybe that is the case > >> with comparative linguistics, too. It seems that we are still very > >> far from the Keplerian, Galilean or Darwinian stage. > >> > >> The World Atlas of Language Structures is primarily an attempt to put > >> comparative linguistics on an empirical foundation. Until recently, > >> it was often based on Platonic or Aristotelian speculation, like > >> medieval biology. > >> > >> Martin > >>> At 10:48 PM -0500 9/11/08, Salinas17 at aol.com wrote: > >>> snip.. > >>> > >>>> we need a Copernicus, not a Chomsky or a Greenberg. > >>> > >>> A reminder that it was Kepler who formulated the planetary laws, and > >>> a comment that Chomsky has in common with Galileo a > >>> discipline-changing body of work (subsequently elevated into a > >>> theory of everything). Both also had clashes with authority although > >>> of a rather different kind. Maybe we haven't yet had our Darwin or > >>> Einstein but to be a Galileo is not to be sniffed at. > > -- > Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath at eva.mpg.de) > Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Deutscher Platz 6 > D-04103 Leipzig > Tel. (MPI) +49-341-3550 307, (priv.) +49-341-980 1616 > > Glottopedia - the free encyclopedia of linguistics > (http://www.glottopedia.org) > > > > > > From phonosemantics at earthlink.net Fri Nov 14 15:05:32 2008 From: phonosemantics at earthlink.net (jess tauber) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:05:32 -0500 Subject: Concerning WALS - Bees, Bats, Butterflies Message-ID: I forget- was the Givonian before or after the Comrian? I can never seem to keep them *strata*. ;-) Jess Tauber phonosemantics at earthlink.net From vanvalin at buffalo.edu Mon Nov 17 12:40:24 2008 From: vanvalin at buffalo.edu (Robert Van Valin) Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2008 13:40:24 +0100 Subject: Post-doc position at MPI Nijmegen Message-ID: A research position for a Postdoctoral Researcher is available in the research group ?Information structure, syntax and typology?, headed by Dr. Robert Van Valin, at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (Nijmegen, NL). The position is now open. The appointment is initially for 2 years, with possible extension for up to 3 additional years. Research Focus: The research group ?Information structure, syntax and typology? represents a collaboration between the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics and the Heinrich Heine University D?sseldorf, supported by a Max Plank Fellowship to Van Valin. The group will investigate the interaction of information structure and syntax across languages of varying structural types. Special emphasis will be placed on the role information structure plays in the organization of grammatical constructions and in core grammatical processes, and how it varies across languages. In addition, the implications of this interaction for language acquisition, in conjunction with the Information Structure project in the Language Acquisition Group, and for sentence-processing will be explored. Requirements: Applicants should have a PhD in Linguistics, and in- depth research experience on a language or language family is highly desirable. Review of applications will begin January 15, 2009, and the position will remain open until filled. The Max Planck Society is an equal opportunity employer. Applicants should send their CV, a sample of their work, and the names and e-mail addresses of at least two potential referees to vanvalin at phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de and to (both hard copy and electronic) Mrs. Nanjo Bogdanowicz Language Acquisition Group Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics Wundtlaan 1, 6525 XD NIJMEGEN The Netherlands Nanjo.Bogdanowicz at mpi.nl From v.evans at bangor.ac.uk Wed Nov 19 15:56:00 2008 From: v.evans at bangor.ac.uk (Vyv Evans) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2008 15:56:00 +0000 Subject: MAs in Language & Cognition at Bangor University Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Applications are invited for Master of Arts (M.A.) programmes in: -Cognitive Linguistics -Language, Communication & Cognition -Anthropological Linguistics in the School of Linguistics, Bangor University. Bangor University boasts the senior Linguistics department in the UK, and is located on the Menai Strait, in North Wales in the ancient cathedral city of Bangor. Bangor is situated adjacent to the Snowdon Mountains, one of the most picturesque regions in Europe. The MA programmes, detailed below, run for 12 months, full time, providing a set of core modules and option modules, with a 20,000 individual research dissertation. The MA programmes are highly distinctive, and are taught by leading experts. Web details are available from the School of Linguistics: http://www.bangor.ac.uk/linguistics/, or from here: www.vyvevans.net/CLBangor.htm Contact the MA programme director, Prof. Vyv Evans with specific enquiries (v.evans at bangor.ac.uk). MA COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS The MA in Cognitive Linguistics is primarily aimed at those students who wish to undertake a taught programme of graduate-level study in order to pursue research in some aspect of Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Linguistics is a modern and innovative approach to the study of language and mind, and their relationship with embodied experience and culture. The MA provides a focused and comprehensive programme of graduate-level training in the core subject matter of Cognitive Linguistics, including the most important theoretical frameworks. The subject matter covered includes conceptual structure and organisation, figurative language, grammar and mind, the relationship between language, thought and culture, lexical and cognitive compositional semantics, the issue of embodiment, and contemporary methodology in Cognitive Linguistics. The MA also provides a platform for those interested in pursuing an advanced research degree such as a PhD. The MA in Cognitive Linguistics involves 4 compulsory modules and 2 options plus a research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. _Compulsory modules (20 credits each):_ * *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics * * *Metaphor and Thought * * *Grammar and Mind * * *Language of Space and Time* _Optional modules (20 credits each) 2 modules from the following:_ * *Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology * * *Language, Thought and Reality * * *Linguistic Ethnography * * *Language, Mind and Brain * * *Language, Culture and Society* MA LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION & COGNITION The relationship between language, communication and cognition is central to many of the disciplines in the humanities as well as the social and cognitive sciences, including studies relating to language, culture, media and mind. The MA in Language, Communication and Cognition is aimed at those students who wish to undertake a taught programme of graduate-level study in the interdisciplinary area of language and mind which is not limited to a specific theoretical perspective. The MA provides a comprehensive programme of graduate-level training in various topics associated with the study of language, culture, communication and cognition, approached from the perspective of theories in cognitive linguistics, as well as cultural and communication studies. The purpose of the MA is to provide students with the necessary tools and skills to undertake advanced research in some area of language, culture, communication and mind. Topics covered will include linguistic meaning and structure, cognitive linguistics, embodied cognition, linguistic relativity, the nature of spatial and temporal representation, the socio-cultural nature and basis of language and communication, cross-cultural and cross-linguistic diversity especially in communication practices, data collection techniques including the collection of qualitative data and experimental design, how the mind and brain process language, and linguistic anthropology. Students will have ample opportunity to conduct their own research, both in course projects and in the final dissertation. The MA also provides a platform for those interested in pursuing an advanced research degree. The MA in Language, Communication and Cognition involves 4 compulsory modules plus 2 options plus a research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. _Compulsory modules (20 credits each):_ * *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics * * *Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology * * *Language, Thought and Reality * * *Language, Mind and Brain* _Optional modules (20 credits each) 2 from the following:_ * *Metaphor and Thought * * *Grammar and Mind * * *Language of Space and Time * * *Linguistic Ethnography * * *Language, Culture and Society* MA ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS The MA in Anthropological Linguistics provides a taught programme of graduate-level study in the interdisciplinary area of language and culture, which is not limited to a specific theoretical perspective. The course provides a comprehensive, varied and flexible programme of training in multi-disciplinary topics associated with the study of language, culture, communication, behaviour, society, and cognition. The purpose of the course is to provide students with the necessary theoretical, analytical and methodological tools and skills to undertake advanced research in an area of language, culture and communication. The taught component of the MA takes place over semesters 1 and 2. In semester 1, students take two foundational modules: Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology and Language, Thought and Reality. The Linguistic Anthropology module introduces them to key subjects areas, theoretical approaches and methodologies in the discipline, ranging from evolutionary questions to culture theories, and social models of understanding. Language, Thought and Reality is a theoretical and experimental module addressing the triangular relationship between language, culture and thought. This module incorporates a methodological element. In semester 2, students take two modules covering additional core subject areas, including Linguistic Ethnography (a specifically methodological module), and Language, Culture and Society. This latter module addresses key concerns and facts in linguistic anthropology, including diversity, development, multilingualism, and sociolinguistics. The MA in Anthropological Linguistics consists of a taught component of 4 required modules, two option modules and a research dissertation of 20,000 words maximum. _Compulsory modules (20 credits each):_ * *Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology * * *Linguistic Ethnography * * *Language, Thought and Reality * * *Language, Culture and Society* _Optional modules (20 credits each) 2 of the following:_ * *Metaphor and Thought * * *Grammar and Mind * * *Language of Space and Time * * *Language, Mind and Brain * * *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics* -- Gall y neges e-bost hon, ac unrhyw atodiadau a anfonwyd gyda hi, gynnwys deunydd cyfrinachol ac wedi eu bwriadu i'w defnyddio'n unig gan y sawl y cawsant eu cyfeirio ato (atynt). Os ydych wedi derbyn y neges e-bost hon trwy gamgymeriad, rhowch wybod i'r anfonwr ar unwaith a dil?wch y neges. Os na fwriadwyd anfon y neges atoch chi, rhaid i chi beidio ? defnyddio, cadw neu ddatgelu unrhyw wybodaeth a gynhwysir ynddi. Mae unrhyw farn neu safbwynt yn eiddo i'r sawl a'i hanfonodd yn unig ac nid yw o anghenraid yn cynrychioli barn Prifysgol Bangor. Nid yw Prifysgol Bangor yn gwarantu bod y neges e-bost hon neu unrhyw atodiadau yn rhydd rhag firysau neu 100% yn ddiogel. Oni bai fod hyn wedi ei ddatgan yn uniongyrchol yn nhestun yr e-bost, nid bwriad y neges e-bost hon yw ffurfio contract rhwymol - mae rhestr o lofnodwyr awdurdodedig ar gael o Swyddfa Cyllid Prifysgol Bangor. www.bangor.ac.uk This email and any attachments may contain confidential material and is solely for the use of the intended recipient(s). If you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete this email. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you must not use, retain or disclose any information contained in this email. Any views or opinions are solely those of the sender and do not necessarily represent those of the Bangor University. Bangor University does not guarantee that this email or any attachments are free from viruses or 100% secure. Unless expressly stated in the body of the text of the email, this email is not intended to form a binding contract - a list of authorised signatories is available from the Bangor University Finance Office. www.bangor.ac.uk From gdesagulier at univ-paris8.fr Thu Nov 27 11:52:56 2008 From: gdesagulier at univ-paris8.fr (Guillaume Desagulier) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2008 12:52:56 +0100 Subject: 2nd CFP: AFLiCo 3, 'Grammars in construction(s)', May 27-29, 2009, Paris 10-Nanterre (France) Message-ID: (apologies for multiple postings) SECOND CALL FOR PAPERS (version en francais plus bas) Third International Conference of the French Cognitive Linguistics Association (AFLiCo 3) ?Grammars in construction(s)?. Organized by MoDyCo (http://www.modyco.fr) University of Paris 10, Nanterre, France 27-29 May 2009 http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 PLENARY SPEAKERS Hans C. BOAS (University of Texas at Austin, USA) Gilles FAUCONNIER (University of California, San Diego, USA) Jacques FRANCOIS (University of Caen, France) Adele GOLDBERG (Princeton University, USA) Stephane ROBERT (LLACAN, CNRS, France) Bernard VICTORRI (Lattice, ENS, France) Richard WATTS (University of Bern, Switzerland) OBJECTIVES The conference aims at bringing together cognitive linguists working in France and abroad, and strengthening the network of discussion and collaboration set in motion by the first two AFLiCo conferences held in Bordeaux (2005) and Lille (2007). The concept of grammar is of crucial importance to the cognitive linguistics framework and forms the basis for numerous research topics. As a constructed cognitive entity (by linguists or speakers), and/or an emergent one, grammar lies at the heart of considerable theoretical issues. The core position currently held by grammar is thus one to be questioned. Drawing on the themes from the last two AFLiCo conferences, we will examine the concept of grammar in regard to its place in cognitive linguistics, as well as in regard to its place in variants of the model, which range from Langacker?s Cognitive Grammar to so-called construction grammars. This year, the focus will be on the latter. In the wake of Charles Fillmore and Paul Kay?s work, construction grammars endeavor to describe grammar not in terms of ?words and lists? (as in generative grammar) but in terms of grammatical constructions whose overall meanings are not predictable from their respective component structures. This enterprise was initially limited to idiomatic constructions (e.g., throw in the towel, kick the bucket, etc.) but swiftly developed to deal with more general constructions (cf. Adele Goldberg?s work on meaningful argument structure). The idea that grammar is composed of constructions ? previously identifiable in the works of George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker ? currently fuels a vast paradigm and applies to a large variety of linguistic phenomena in morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. GENERAL SESSIONS The 3rd AFLiCo conference will also provide the occasion to address more general points of discussion in relation to the question of grammar (non-exhaustive list): - The notion of linguistic units as linked to other concepts such as entrenchment or frequency of occurrence - Comparisons between different traditions (American and European) regarding the establishment of a linguistic unit as a cognitive routine, lexicalization, the symbolic thesis, etc. - The acquisition of grammar (L1, L2) - Constructions and diachrony - The grammaticalization of constructions - Methodological concerns (constitution and use of corpora) - Grammars of gesture and kinesic systems - The role of conceptual integration and grammatical blending in grammar - The extension of cognitive linguistics into socio-pragmatics In line with one of the main goals of AFLiCo, we welcome papers elaborating the affinities between cognitive linguistics and related theories (Gustave Guillaume, Antoine Culioli, Henri Adamczewski). The organizers further encourage young researchers to submit an abstract. It is to be noted that papers can bear on any language (not just English or French) THEMATIC SESSIONS Organizers of theme sessions are kindly asked to provide the following information: - a short description of their session topic (300-500 words); - an indication of the structure proposed for the whole session: order of presentations, discussant contributions, breaks, and general discussion by the audience; - the abstracts from all of their speakers, accompanied by all the information requested in the abstract specifications above. Proponents can choose the internal structuring of their Theme Session provided that the overall timetable of the conference (notably coffee and lunch breaks) is kept intact. Ideally, a theme session should take no longer than a whole morning or afternoon. For any further detail you may need in the organization of your theme session, please do not hesitate to contact the organizers (aflico3 at u-paris10.fr). SUBMISSION PROCEDURE Abstracts will be submitted to a double, blind review. They should be fully anonymous and not exceed 500 words (references excluded). To be sent via email as attachment (MS-WORD doc or rtf, OpenOffice, PDF) to: aflico3 at u-paris10.fr Please put in the subject line: ?abstract AFLICO 3? In the body of the mail, please specify: - author(s) - title - affiliation of author(s) - presentation or poster - thematic sessions or general session - 3 - 5 keywords IMPORTANT DATES Submission deadline General sessions: December 15th 2008 Theme sessions: December 8th 2008 (extended) Notification of acceptance : Early February 2009 REGISTRATION Details about the registration procedure and registration deadlines will be posted on the conference website as soon as they become available. REGISTRATION FEES Regular fee (participants/audience) : 80 euros AFLiCo members : 60 euros Students : 40 euros Students (including AFliCo membership) : 30 euros If you wish to join the AFLiCo, please contact Stephanie Bonnefille (stephanie.bonnefille at univ-tours.fr) OFFICIAL LANGUAGES French, English CONFERENCE WEBSITE http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 NEW AFLiCo WEBSITE http://www.aflico.fr/ ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Guillaume Desagulier (Associate Professor, MoDyCo-CNRS-Paris 10, & University of Paris 8) Philippe Grea (Associate Professor, MoDyCo, Paris 10), assisted by Simon Harrison (PhD student, ENS-Lyon), Dylan Glynn (Research Fellow, University of Leuven) SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE President: Dominique Legallois (Associate Professor, University of Caen) Michel Achard (Professor, Rice University) Cristiano Broccias (University of Genoa) Jose Deulofeu (Professor, Universite de Provence, Aix-Marseille 1) Pierre Encreve (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Gilles Fauconnier (Professor, University of California, San Diego) Michel de Fornel (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Jean-Michel Fortis (CNRS, Paris 7) Jacques Fran?ois (Professor, Universite de Caen) Dylan Glynn (Research fellow, University of Leuven) Craig Hamilton (Assoc. Prof., Universite de Haute Alsace, Mulhouse-Colmar) Martin Haspelmath (Prof. Dr., Max-Planck-Institut, Leipzig) Hans-Petter Helland (Professor, University of Oslo) Willem Hollmann (Lecturer, University of Lancaster) Sylvain Kahane (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Anne Lacheret (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Bernard Laks (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Jean-Remi Lapaire (Professor, Universite de Bordeaux 3) Peter Lauwers (Lecturer, Universities of Ghent & Leuven) Danielle Leeman (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Maarten Lemmens (Professor, Universite de Lille 3) Sarah Leroy (CR, MoDyCo-CNRS, Universite de Paris 10) Wilfrid Rotge (Professor, Universite de Paris 10) Dominique Willems (Prof, Dr., University of Ghent) ======== (toutes nos excuses pour les envois multiples) SECOND APPEL A COMMUNICATIONS 3e Colloque International de l?Association Fran?aise de Linguistique Cognitive (AFLiCo) ? Grammaires en construction(s) ? Organise par le laboratoire MoDyCo (http://www.modyco.fr) Universite Paris 10, Nanterre, La Defense, France 27-29 mai 2009 http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 INTERVENANTS INVITES Hans C. BOAS (Univ. du Texas, Austin, USA) Gilles FAUCONNIER (Univ. de Californie, San Diego, USA) Jacques FRAN?OIS (Univ. de Caen, France) Adele GOLDBERG (Univ. de Princeton, USA) Stephane ROBERT (LLACAN, ENS, France) Bernard VICTORRI (Lattice, ENS, France) Richard WATTS (Univ. de Berne, Suisse) OBJECTIFS DU COLLOQUE Cette conference a pour but de reunir les acteurs de la linguistique cognitive en France et au dela, et de renforcer la collaboration entre chercheurs entamee lors des deux precedentes editions a Bordeaux (2005) et Lille (2007) Le concept de grammaire a une importance cruciale dans le cadre theorique de la linguistique cognitive et de nombreuses problematiques se construisent ? partir de lui. Entite cognitive construite (par les linguistes, mais aussi par les locuteurs) et / ou emergente (soumise ? la variation et au changement, car regulee par des forces tout ? la fois conservatrices et innovantes) la grammaire est au centre d?enjeux theoriques considerables. Elle occupe des lors une position-cle qu?il faut interroger. Dans le prolongement des deux precedents colloques de l?AFLiCo, il s?agit donc de focaliser notre attention sur une nouvelle dimension de la linguistique cognitive, un concept qui se decline de differentes fa?ons, depuis la grammaire cognitive de Langacker jusqu?aux grammaires dites de constructions. Ces dernieres, en particulier, constituent aujourd?hui la branche la plus dynamique de ce cadre general de par le nombre de publications et l?impact de ces recherches sur differents niveaux de la linguistique (syntaxe, semantique, morphologie et pragmatique). SESSIONS GENERALES Le colloque AFLiCo 3 sera aussi l?occasion d?aborder des problematiques reliees ? la question de la grammaire (liste non-exhaustive) : -La notion d?unite linguistique en rapport avec d?autres concepts comme l?enracinement (entrenchment) ou la frequence d?occurrence. -Une comparaison entre les differentes traditions (americaines et europeennes) liees au figement, ? la lexicalisation, etc. -La question de l?apprentissage de la grammaire (L1, L2) -Un point de vue diachronique sur les constructions et la grammaticalisation des constructions -La question des methodes (constitution et utilisation de corpus) -Les prolongements de la linguistique cognitive dans la socio-pragmatique Dans le sillage des deux precedents colloques, nous encourageons les propositions de communication portant sur les passerelles entre la linguistique cognitive (au sens large) et la Theorie des Operations Enonciatives de Culioli, l?approche adamczewskienne ou la Psychomecanique du Langage. Le comite d?organisation encourage les jeunes chercheurs a envoyer une proposition de communication. Il est a noter que les communications peuvent porter sur toutes les langues, pas seulement le francais ou l?anglais. SESSIONS THEMATIQUES Les responsables de panels pour les sessions thematiques doivent fournir les renseignements suivants : -un resume du theme choisi ; -des precisions concernant la structure globale de la session : ordre des presentations, contributions des intervenants, pauses, debats ; -les resumes des communications de chacun des intervenants, ainsi que les renseignements demandes dans la procedure de soumission ci-dessous. Les intervenants sont libres de choisir la structure interne de leur session thematique des lors qu?elle n?affecte pas la structure generale du colloque (pauses cafe, et dejeuner). Nous recommandons que chaque session thematique ne depasse pas une matinee ou une apres-midi. Pour tout renseignement sur l?organisation d?une session thematique, n?hesitez pas a nous contacter (aflico3 at u-paris10.fr). PROCEDURE DE SOUMISSION Chaque proposition sera evaluee par deux relecteurs. Les textes doivent etre anonymes et ne pas depasser 500 mots (hors bibliographie). Ils sont a envoyer par email en fichier attache (MS-WORD -- doc ou rtf -- OpenOffice, PDF) ? l?adresse suivante : aflico3 at u-paris10.fr Dans l?objet de votre message, specifiez : ?abstract AFLICO? Dans le corps du message, precisez : - le nom de l?auteur / des auteurs - titre - affiliation et adresse de l?auteur / des auteurs - presentation ou poster - session thematique ou session generale - 3 ? 5 mots-cles DATES IMPORTANTES Date limite de soumission : Sessions generales : 15 decembre 2008 Sessions thematiques : 8 decembre 2008 (date repouss?e) Notification d?acceptation : debut fevrier 2009 INSCRIPTION Des renseignements specifiques concernant la procedure d?inscription et les dates limites seront affiches tres prochainement sur le site. FRAIS D'INSCRIPTION tarif normal (participants/public) : 80 euros membres d'AFLiCo : 60 euros etudiants : 40 euros etudiants membres de l'AFLiCo : 30 euros Pour rejoindre l'AFLiCo, merci de contacter Stephanie Bonnefille (stephanie.bonnefille at univ-tours.fr) LANGUES DU COLLOQUE Anglais, Fran?ais SITE DU COLLOQUE http://www.modyco.fr/aflico3 NOUVEAU SITE DE L'AFLICO http://www.aflico.fr/ COMITE D?ORGANISATION Guillaume Desagulier, (MCF, MoDyCo-CNRS & Universite Paris 10, Universite Paris 8) Philippe Grea (MCF, MoDyCo - CNRS & Universite Paris 10) Assistes de Simon Harrison (ENS-Lyon), Dylan Glynn (Universite Catholique de Louvain) COMITE SCIENTIFIQUE President : Dominique Legallois, MCF, Universite de Caen Michel Achard (Professeur, Rice University) Cristiano Broccias (MCF, Universite de Genes) Jose Deulofeu (Professeur, Universite de Provence, Aix-Marseille 1) Pierre Encreve (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Gilles Fauconnier (Professeur, Universite de Californie, San Diego) Michel de Fornel (Directeur d'etudes, EHESS) Jean-Michel Fortis (CR, CNRS, Paris 7) Jacques Fran?ois (Professeur, Universite de Caen) Dylan Glynn (Charge de recherche, Universite Catholique de Louvain) Craig Hamilton (Assoc. Prof., Universite de Haute Alsace, Mulhouse-Colmar) Martin Haspelmath (Professeur, Max-Planck-Institut, Leipzig) Hans-Petter Helland (Professeur, Universite d?Oslo) Willem Hollmann (MCF, University of Lancaster) Sylvain Kahane (Professeur, Universite Paris 10) Anne Lacheret (Professeur, Universite Paris 10) Bernard Laks (Professeur, Universite de Paris 10) Jean-Remi Lapaire (Professeur, Universite de Bordeaux 3) Peter Lauwers (Charge de recherche, Universite Catholique de Louvain) Maarten Lemmens (Professeur, Universite de Lille 3) Danielle Leeman (Professeur, Universite de Paris 10) Sarah Leroy (CR, MoDyCo-CNRS, Universite Paris 10) Wilfrid Rotge (Professeur, Universite de Paris 10) Dominique Willems (Professeur, Universite de Gand) From Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl Sat Nov 29 10:35:32 2008 From: Nino.Amiridze at let.uu.nl (Amiridze, Nino) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2008 11:35:32 +0100 Subject: Language Contact and Change: Multiple and Bimodal Bilingual Minorities, Tartu 2009 Message-ID: [Apologies for multiple posting] Language Contact and Change: Multiple and Bimodal Bilingual Minorities Date: May 28, 2009 Location: Tartu, Estonia Workshop at the International Conference on Minority Languages XII (ICML 2009) Website: http://www.dipfilmod-suf.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-236.html Contact: tartulcc at gmail.com The workshop aims at exploring the language contact and language change phenomena that characterize multiple linguistic minorities. It focuses on but is not confined to signed, Uralic and Caucasian languages. On the one hand, we intend to explore the situation of bimodal bilingualism. Data from changes in multi-modal bilingual contexts can lead to new insights into bilingualism, the typology and structure of languages, and language change and contact in general. Research into bimodal bilingualism can draw upon several methods and approaches developed for studying the bilingualism of other minority languages, and vice versa. On the other hand, we know that it is difficult to reach the bilingual individuals and communities that are deaf and belong to several linguistic minorities. Therefore, we approach the bimodal target via individual studies on minority languages. More specifically, we concentrate on the issue of language change in contact in the context of a typologically wide range of minority languages. We are looking for answers to questions such as the following: - How do deaf children of (hearing) parents belonging to linguistic minorities (e.g., Nganasan) communicate with the Deaf communities in their country and with their own parents? - How does their language change? - How can we test the change in the structure of the languages in contact in a uniform way? - What are the factors that influence the developments? - Can we work towards a typology? Invited keynote speakers: Csilla Bartha (hearing) (E?tv?s Lor?nd University, Budapest): The situation of the Deaf and national minorities in Hungary; ?sten Dahl (hearing) (Stockholm University): Contact induced changes in tense and aspect systems; Tatiana Davidenko (Deaf) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education): Sign Language Diversity in Post-Soviet Countries; Anna Komarova (hearing) (Moscow Centre for Deaf Studies and Bilingual Education): Development of Bilingual Education of the Deaf in Post-Soviet Countries; Gaurav Mathur (Deaf) (Gallaudet University): The relationship between agreement and finiteness in sign languages; Johanna Mesch (Deaf) (Stockholm University): Variations in tactile signing - the case of one-handed conversation; Helle Metslang (hearing) (University of Tartu): Changes in Finnish and Estonian tense and aspect; Christian Rathmann (Deaf) (Hamburg University): Minority Communities within German Deaf Community; Don Stilo (hearing) (Max Planck Institute, Leipzig): Introduction to an Atlas of the Araxes-Iran Linguistic Area. Check for updates, our interdisciplinary areas, and more research questions at http://www.dipfilmod-suf.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-236.html Submission (deadline January 15, 2009, notification January 31, 2009). Abstracts (in English, maximum 2 pages, including data and references) have to be submitted electronically as portable document format (.pdf) or Microsoft Word (.doc) files via the EasyChair conference management system (https://www.easychair.org/login.cgi?conf=lcc09). If you do not have an EasyChair account, click on the button "I have no EasyChair Account" on that page and follow the instructions. When you receive a password, you can enter the site and upload your abstract. Organizers: Nino Amiridze, Utrecht University (The Netherlands) ?sten Dahl, University of Stockholm (Sweden) Anne Tamm, University of Florence (Italy) and Institute for the Estonian Language (Estonia) Manana Topadze, University of Pavia (Italy) Inge Zwitserlood, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands)