Deixis, Buhler and the Problem of Ambiguity

[Tahir Wood]

>>> <Salinas17 at aol.com> 05/18/09 3:40 PM >>>
The problem I cited with deixis applying to abstracts is that we
really
have no way of stopping the ball at just concretes.   For example:
John knew that.
That was exactly what I was thinking.
Do you believe this?
Here is where we part thinking.
That is diectic and this is not.
Here, on the other hand, a squared times b squared equals d.


Steve, when I mentioned this I had in mind something that is concretely
known in terms of either episodic memory, or working memory or
perception. In each of your examples there is a concrete
interpretation:

John knew that. This means that John knew something which is in focus
for both interlocutors, e.g. John knew that what you just said is true.
It is not abstract, because it is precisely in episodic memory for you
and for me and is activated, other wise we couldn't have referred to it.
it is therefore both concrete and specific. Something we refer to can be
a specific mental state or a stimulus. These are not abstract in
themselves. The contents of epiosdic memory are in a sense factual
knowledge and just as concrete as the contents of perception. All of
your examples are the same in this regard. Your mistake IMHO lies in
thinking that for reference to occur it must involve a concrete, unitary
object. Not so. One can refer to an utterance, a memory, a thought, a
text, a dream.
Tahir