cross-linguistic categorization

[A. Katz]

Brian,

It makes a lot of sense to think of "universals of phonetics", and I think 
that none of us doubt that there are such universals and that they are 
worth talking about. However, it would seem that phonetics itself is not a 
"language universal", as long as articulatory or acoustic issues are 
dominant in that field and are used as a way of defining contrasts.

On the other hand, it would be unfortunate to have a theory of language 
that did not recognize the correspondences between something like written 
English and spoken English. Written English is hardly phonetic - it is not 
a transcription phone by phone (or even phoneme by phoneme) of spoken 
English -- and yet most of us would agree it's essentially the same 
language, modalities aside.

While most Anglophones learn spoken English first and written English 
later, it can be done the other way around. Helen Keller learned to spell 
English and to communicate via finger spelling long before she learned to 
pronounce it. She was already fluent in written English before she 
learned how to articulate it. Is there any question that her 
finger-spelling English and her spoken English were the same language? If 
they were, then there must be some non-physical way to describe the basic 
units of English.

Contrast this with native speakers of ASL, who actually have to learn a 
completely different language when they learn English.

Best,

    --Aya


On Tue, 16 Mar 2010, Brian MacWhinney wrote:

> Folks,
>
> It seems to me that idea that universals must transcend modality is problematic.  Geoff notes that he is referring to universals affecting the oral-aural modality.  Within this modality, numerous (often statistical) universals are generated from the properties of the vocal and auditory apparatuses.  There are, of course, many other (also often statistical) universals that emerge from "deeper" levels of language processing to which Aya is referring.  However,  both sets of universals are important and interesting to linguists and psycholinguists.
>
> One could push this analysis a bit further to note that universals always hold modulo some equivalent background.  In case that Aya raises, we are looking at universals that hold modulo fixing of the oral-aural modality.  To take another example, there are universals that hold modulo a particular cut on the contrast between planned and unplanned discourse.  Of course, this contrast is more permeable than the split between modalities, but it is still enough to generate important statistical correlations, modulo a certain level of planfulness.  There are also dimensions that relate to genre (headlines, poetry, stop signs, war chants, baby talk, etc.)  Does this vitiate the notion of universals?  I think not.  Rather, it simply introduces another dimension into an already highly multidimensional space.  Stated generally, universals don't have to be universal across forms of language, but should be universal modulo a particular form of language.
>
> -- Brian MacWhinney
>
>
> On Mar 16, 2010, at 9:13 AM, A. Katz wrote:
>
>> Geoff,
>>
>> If there are real language universals, don't you think that they transcend modality? If the meaning is in the constrasts, and not in the physical ways the contrasts are encoded, shouldn't language universals address only that level of abstraction that is the same across sensual modalities?
>>
>>   --Aya
>>
>> http://hubpages.com/profile/Aya+Katz
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, 15 Mar 2010, Geoff Nathan wrote:
>>
>>> My comments about phonological universals apply only to spoken phonologies, whose nature is shaped by the fact that they produced by vocal tracts and perceived (primarily but not exclusively) by auditory systems.  Sign languages have phonologies too, and appear to have their own corresponding universals, but of course will be different because they are based in different modalities (hands and arms and facial expressions), and I know much less about how they work.  But I would still expect a similar set of prototype-category shaped universals (bilateral symmetry, for example, seems to be one of the driving forces driving sound change).
>>>
>>> Geoff
>>>
>>> Geoffrey S. Nathan
>>> Faculty Liaison, C&IT
>>> and Associate Professor, Linguistics Program
>>> +1 (313) 577-1259 (C&IT)
>>> +1 (313) 577-8621 (English/Linguistics)
>>>
>>> ----- "Engin Arik" <earik at purdue.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> From: "Engin Arik" <earik at purdue.edu>
>>>> To: "Geoff Nathan" <geoffnathan at wayne.edu>
>>>> Cc: "Funknet Funknet" <funknet at mailman.rice.edu>
>>>> Sent: Monday, March 15, 2010 9:57:18 AM GMT -10:00 Hawaii
>>>> Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] cross-linguistic categorization
>>>>
>>>> I think we shouldn't forget about sign languages which are natural
>>>> human
>>>> languages before making cross-linguistic generalizations.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> Engin Arik
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Engin Arik, Ph.D.
>>>>
>>>> http://sites.google.com/site/enginarikweb/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Quoting Geoff Nathan <geoffnathan at wayne.edu>:
>>>>
>>>>> If one doesn’t assume Aristotelian-flavoring for cross-linguistic
>>>>> substantive categories one can be much happier and retain the idea
>>>> that
>>>>> languages actually have universals of some kind. As a
>>>> (natural/cognitive)
>>>>> phonologist I am happy to say that pretty much all languages have
>>>> consonants
>>>>> and vowels, syllables, probably feet and perhaps somewhat larger
>>>> units
>>>>> (words, breath groups, some such...)
>>>>> In any case we don’t have to say that all languages MUST have
>>>> some
>>>>> particular structure, but we can note that, say, all languages that
>>>> have
>>>>> syllables have CV syllables (Larry Hyman argued that one of
>>>> ‘his’
>>>>> languages actually didn’t have syllables, but there are few
>>>> competitors),
>>>>> some subset have CVC syllables, and a smaller subset have more
>>>> complex
>>>>> offerings.
>>>>> Similarly, all languages have a vowel height contrast, and if they
>>>> have a
>>>>> color contrast (labial/round vs. palatal/front) those vowels will
>>>> tend to be
>>>>> high rather than mid.  But, although nothing is absolute, there are
>>>> strong
>>>>> tendencies that have perceptual and/or motoric explanations (color
>>>> contrasts
>>>>> are easy to perceive, stop contrasts that cluster in the three
>>>> primary
>>>>> articulatory regions are easiest to make). This would lead us to
>>>> expect that
>>>>> the distribution of categories will follow the typical radial
>>>> prototype
>>>>> category structure, with central members that just about everybody
>>>> has, with
>>>>> more peripheral members (say front rounded vowels, or CCVCCC
>>>> syllables) being
>>>>> correspondingly more scarce and presupposing the existence of the
>>>> expected
>>>>> more prototypical /i/ or /u/ and CV syllables.
>>>>>
>>>>> Geoffrey S. Nathan
>>>>> Faculty Liaison, C&IT
>>>>> and Associate Professor, Linguistics Program
>>>>> +1 (313) 577-1259 (C&IT)
>>>>> +1 (313) 577-8621 (English/Linguistics)
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- "Daniel L. Everett" <dlevere at ilstu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> From: "Daniel L. Everett" <dlevere at ilstu.edu>
>>>>>> To: "Martin Haspelmath" <haspelmath at eva.mpg.de>
>>>>>> Cc: "Funknet" <funknet at mailman.rice.edu>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, March 15, 2010 3:38:18 AM GMT -10:00 Hawaii
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] cross-linguistic categorization
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As I read this discussion, including Tom G's and Martin H's, I
>>>> think
>>>>>> everyone is right. I am not seeing a conflict here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Balthasar's use of multivariate analysis seems like exactly the
>>>> right
>>>>>> direction to me. Something the young whippersnappers get that
>>>> would
>>>>>> not have occurred to most field researchers 30 years ago.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dan
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mar 14, 2010, at 3:25 PM, Martin Haspelmath wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks, Edith Moravcsik, for the systematization of the issues,
>>>> and
>>>>>> Tom Givón, for a historical perspective. Here are some reactions
>>>> from
>>>>>> me:
>>>>>>>> (a)	THE LEGITIMACY OF CATEGORIZATION
>>>>>>>> Following Bill C., Martin H. and Matthew Dryer, one might
>>>> question
>>>>>> the legitimacy of crosslinguistic grammatical categories on
>>>> grounds
>>>>>> that the members of any one of these categories differ from each
>>>>>> other. I cannot see why this is a problem. ... The key to the idea
>>>> is
>>>>>> that things can be different in some respects but the same in
>>>> other
>>>>>> respect. Thus, as long as there is some likeness among entities,
>>>> we
>>>>>> are justified in assigning them to the same category without
>>>> incurring
>>>>>> a contradiction.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, of course -- such categories are what I call "comparative
>>>>>> concepts". The crucial point is that they are not identical to
>>>> the
>>>>>> descriptive categories that we use to analyze languages. As Dan
>>>>>> Everett points out, the IPA is very useful as a set of
>>>> comparative
>>>>>> concepts in phonetics/phonology, even though "no two phonemes and
>>>> no
>>>>>> two phonetic segments are exactly the same
>>>> cross-linguistically").
>>>>>>>   Many linguists (not just generativists) assume (often
>>>> implicitly)
>>>>>> that the notions that typologists work with are also the notions
>>>> that
>>>>>> descriptive linguists working on a single language should use,
>>>> and
>>>>>> that categories in different languages are not just similar, but
>>>> can
>>>>>> be equated. This is what I object to. (For phonology, Bob Ladd
>>>> has
>>>>>> pointed out that many phonologists have worked with the asumption
>>>> that
>>>>>> something like the IPA is a universal alphabet of segmental
>>>>>> phonology.)
>>>>>>>> (b)	CRITERIA FOR CATEGORIZATION
>>>>>>>> In an absolute sense, criteria of classification are
>>>> arbitrarily
>>>>>> (or, in Bill C.’s terminology, opportunistically) chosen.
>>>> However,
>>>>>> there are two ways to justify them. First, if we choose criteria
>>>> for
>>>>>> categorization so that they serve a particular research goal, the
>>>>>> choice becomes principled instead of being arbitrary.
>>>>>>> I think the choice of criteria for descriptive categories (for
>>>>>> language-particular analyses) is much less arbitrary than the
>>>> choice
>>>>>> of criteria for comparative concepts, because the goal is simple:
>>>> To
>>>>>> describe the language in a consistent and complete way. There are
>>>>>> different ways of doing this, but the possibilities are fairly
>>>>>> limited, compared to the possibilities of comparing languages
>>>> with
>>>>>> different structures.
>>>>>>>> (c)	LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC VERSUS COMPARATIVE CONCEPTS
>>>>>>>> It seems to me that Martin H. is right in saying that there
>>>> are
>>>>>> categories that are useful in crosslinguistic comparison but that
>>>> do
>>>>>> not play a role in individual language descriptions; but I don’t
>>>> think
>>>>>> this is necessarily so. For example, in a crosslinguistic study,
>>>> the
>>>>>> concept of argument alignment varying over accusative, ergative,
>>>> and
>>>>>> other types is important but in the grammar of a language that
>>>> is,
>>>>>> say, purely ergatively structured, the concept will not play any
>>>> role.
>>>>>> However, another concept, such as of subject-verb agreement, may
>>>> be a
>>>>>> useful category both in single-language grammars and also in a
>>>>>> crosslinguistic typology – even if the details of the
>>>> construction
>>>>>> differ across languages.
>>>>>>> "Agreement" is indeed a highly general concept that at first
>>>> glance
>>>>>> seems to be suited both for language-particular description and
>>>>>> cross-linguistic comparison (but of course not "subject-verb
>>>>>> agreement", because the meaning "subject" varies strongly across
>>>>>> languages). But as Corbett (2006) has shown, the kinds of
>>>> phenomena
>>>>>> that linguists subsume under "agreement" are fairly diverse, and
>>>>>> whatever precise definition one chooses, one will only capture
>>>> part of
>>>>>> what usually goes by the term.
>>>>>>>   In any event, the main point is that a large number of
>>>>>> comparative concepts are irrelevant in language description (such
>>>> as
>>>>>> alignment), and a large number of descriptive categories are
>>>>>> irrelevant in language comparison, so the two kinds of entities
>>>> need
>>>>>> to be kept separate in principle.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> T. Givón writes:
>>>>>>>> So now a new coalition of alpha males are splitting off and, in
>>>> a
>>>>>> reprise of Bloomfield's maneuver [of splitting off from Hermann
>>>> Paul],
>>>>>> are narrowing the domain once again. This history is, leastwise to
>>>> me,
>>>>>> profoundly depressing.
>>>>>>> I don't see any narrowing of the domain anywhere. Hermann Paul
>>>> and
>>>>>> the neogrammarians were narrow in that they disregarded the true
>>>> range
>>>>>> of cross-linguistic variation, largely limiting themselves to the
>>>>>> languages of the European nation states. Franz Boas's name is
>>>> missing
>>>>>> in Givón's historical narrative -- his lesson on the radical
>>>>>> differences between languages needs to be re-taught again and
>>>> again,
>>>>>> because most linguists work on English or some other major
>>>> language
>>>>>> and forget the lesson too easily (not to mention the seductive
>>>>>> simplicity of innate universal grammar).      The categorial
>>>>>> particularist position advocated by Matthew Dryer, Bill Croft,
>>>> Gilbert
>>>>>> Lazard, Sonia Cristofaro and myself is fully consonant with
>>>> Hermann
>>>>>> Paul, Franz Boas, and Joseph Greenberg, and we were all strongly
>>>>>> influenced by T. Givón as well, so I don't see any "coalition
>>>>>> warfare". Just normal scientific debate, without any
>>>> revolutionary
>>>>>> rhetoric.
>>>>>>>> So far, I have found "universal" categories such as noun/verb
>>>> or
>>>>>> subject/object, and  the complex theory behind them, to be
>>>>>> indispensable in my own descriptive field work.
>>>>>>> What is clear is that the Greenbergian typological approach has
>>>> led
>>>>>> to much more interesting (and transparent) descriptive grammars --
>>>> if
>>>>>> one doesn't know at all what to expect, one cannot easily
>>>> distinguish
>>>>>> what is banal from what is special (cf. Dryer 2006). But as in
>>>> Boas's
>>>>>> time, a good grammar describes the language in its own terms,
>>>> with
>>>>>> precisely defined language-particular categories, not in terms of
>>>>>> intuitive pretheoretical concepts of "noun/verb" or
>>>> "subject/object",
>>>>>> or in terms of vague prototypes (crucial as these often are for
>>>>>> comparison and explanatory theory).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Greetings,
>>>>>>> Martin Haspelmath
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>