FUNKNET Digest, Vol 78, Issue 12

[s.t. bischoff]

In regards to the claims below tangentially, I wonder how many would agree
that (1) linguistics is a "proto-science" rather than a "mature science"
and (2) language is a "meso-object" thus linguistics is a "meso-science".

Shannon

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 12:30 PM, <funknet-request at mailman.rice.edu> wrote:

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>   1. cross-linguistic categorization (Esa Itkonen)
>   2. Re: cross-linguistic categorization (A. Katz)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 15:52:33 +0200
> From: Esa Itkonen <eitkonen at utu.fi>
> Subject: [FUNKNET] cross-linguistic categorization
> To: funknet at mailman.rice.edu
> Message-ID: <fbb0d5df9cae2.4ba79241 at utu.fi>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Dear Funknetters: Many if not most people would subscribe to the following
> claims:
>
> 1) Meaning and form are two different things, and neither should be
> ignored.
> 2) Most if not all of the time we are dealing with cluster concepts, i.e.
> concepts based on several types of criteria
> 3) Most if not all of the psychological/social concepts are of non-discrete
> nature, and the description should reflect this fact, however imperfectly.
> 4) Any given entity may be viewed from several (non-arbitrary) points of
> view, which entails that, depending on the point of view (or level of
> abstraction) two entities A and B may be different, partly similar, or
> identical.
> 5) It is just as wrong to claim all categories to me psychologically real
> and to claim them to be psychologically non-real. This is something that
> cannot be non a priori.
> 6) It is better to know many languages than few languages.
> 7) Science is an on-going process, with a ('dialectical') feedback relation
> between data and theory, which makes it impossible for theory to become
> totally detached from data.
> 8) When forwarding several claims, one should make sure that they are
> mutually consistent.
>
> If one accepts these claims and tries to consistently apply them to
> cross-linguistic data, it would be difficult (though perhaps not impossible)
> to arrive at a result very different from what was given in my 'Concerning
> the Role of Induction in Typological Linguistics' (cf. my homepage).
>
> Still, things should be seen in perspective. The differences at issue
> cannot go very deep, since everybody seems to agree - grosso modo - on
> following the lead of such trail-blazers as H. Paul, N.S, Trubetzkoy, J.
> Greenberg, and T. Giv?n.
>
> Esa
>
>
> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 07:46:55 -0700 (PDT)
> From: "A. Katz" <amnfn at well.com>
> Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] cross-linguistic categorization
> To: Esa Itkonen <eitkonen at utu.fi>
> Cc: funknet at mailman.rice.edu
> Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.4.64.1003220729210.11021 at well.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"
>
> Esa,
>
> I agree with most of the things on your list. One claim that I would want
> to modify, though, is (3) about the concepts being non-discrete. I think
> that while the system that supports language in humans is analog rather
> than digital, the concepts lend themselves to a digital (discrete) model.
>
> Yes and No are discrete concepts. When we listen for a /b/ phoneme in our
> native language, we either hear it or we don't. Never mind that it is
> produced in many different ways by many different individuals and no two
> instances are exactly the same. That's just the hardware. The concept is
> discrete. It's either a /b/ or it's not.
>
>   --Aya
>
> http://hubpages.com/profile/Aya+Katz
>
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2010, Esa Itkonen wrote:
>
> > Dear Funknetters: Many if not most people would subscribe to the
> following claims:
> >
> > 1) Meaning and form are two different things, and neither should be
> ignored.
> > 2) Most if not all of the time we are dealing with cluster concepts, i.e.
> concepts based on several types of criteria
> > 3) Most if not all of the psychological/social concepts are of
> non-discrete nature, and the description should reflect this fact, however
> imperfectly.
> > 4) Any given entity may be viewed from several (non-arbitrary) points of
> view, which entails that, depending on the point of view (or level of
> abstraction) two entities A and B may be different, partly similar, or
> identical.
> > 5) It is just as wrong to claim all categories to me psychologically real
> and to claim them to be psychologically non-real. This is something that
> cannot be non a priori.
> > 6) It is better to know many languages than few languages.
> > 7) Science is an on-going process, with a ('dialectical') feedback
> relation between data and theory, which makes it impossible for theory to
> become totally detached from data.
> > 8) When forwarding several claims, one should make sure that they are
> mutually consistent.
> >
> > If one accepts these claims and tries to consistently apply them to
> cross-linguistic data, it would be difficult (though perhaps not impossible)
> to arrive at a result very different from what was given in my 'Concerning
> the Role of Induction in Typological Linguistics' (cf. my homepage).
> >
> > Still, things should be seen in perspective. The differences at issue
> cannot go very deep, since everybody seems to agree - grosso modo - on
> following the lead of such trail-blazers as H. Paul, N.S, Trubetzkoy, J.
> Greenberg, and T. Giv?n.
> >
> > Esa
> >
> >
> > Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen
> >
> >
>
> End of FUNKNET Digest, Vol 78, Issue 12
> ***************************************
>