FUNKNET Digest, Vol 78, Issue 12
Daniel Everett
dlevere at ilstu.edu
Mon Mar 22 23:53:07 UTC 2010
What's the cop-out, Tom? Sounds like you didn't read all that carefully. There are places where mathematical rigor is possible and places where it is less likely. There are areas of linguistic study that are akin to physics and areas of linguistics that are closer to the study of literature.
We do our best to bring all the rigor we can to all we do.
But thinking that 'science' is somehow a higher calling than the humanities seems to have little support. I think it is just silly to say that without striving to be scientific we cannot be taken seriously. Speech Acts is something to take very seriously and the notion has been ever since Austin proposed it. But I don't see anything that I would call 'science' in any but the loosest sense in 'How to do things with words'.
On the other hand, let me repeat, quantitative methods in linguistics is vital. I'd be happy to discuss some recent work in Piraha intonation that uses such methods in calculating the relationship between VOT and intonational breaks. There are papers of this type on my website, especially under phonology and phonetics.
I don't worry about the label I put on what I do. If others find it useful and it can be tested (which is another form of usefulness), I am happy. Anyway, no point arguing about this. It gets to 'essentialism' which is never useful.
Peace,
Dan
On 22 Mar 2010, at 18:57, Tom Givon wrote:
>
>
>
> If I have ever heard a cop-out, this one surely takes the cake. Unless we feel bound by some of the basic assumptions and methods of science, however diluted those may be by our yet-incomplete understanding, we are doomed to continue like the rest of the humanities and so-called social sciences, where anything goes, where "this is your opinion but I've got mine" is a winning argument (or a show-stopper), where disagreements are settled not by facts and rational methodology but by rhetorics--and may the best screamer prevail. This is not to say that we understand language well enough yet to see our way clearly through the tangle of facts, theory and method. After all these years, many of us still struggle. But if some sense of science is not what we strive for, we forfeit the right to be taken seriously. TG
>
> ==========
>
>
> Daniel Everett wrote:
>> It isn't clear to me why anyone would want linguistics to be a science in the first place. Some aspects of the study of language, e.g. phonetics, seem eminently scientific or open to mathematical study, but many of the most important components, such as the study of discourse and diachrony, seem to fall squarely in the humanities (even though they too can benefit from rigorous quantitative methods at times). I don't understand why that would be anything to be embarrassed about, as though the maturity of a specific discipline meant that it would move from the humanities to science (even though I know that many sciences have indeed emerged from philosophy in a broad definition of that term).
>> This just sounds like 'microscope envy'.
>> Dan
>>
>>
>> On 22 Mar 2010, at 16:45, s.t. bischoff wrote:
>>
>>
>>> In regards to the claims below tangentially, I wonder how many would agree
>>> that (1) linguistics is a "proto-science" rather than a "mature science"
>>> and (2) language is a "meso-object" thus linguistics is a "meso-science".
>>>
>>> Shannon
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 12:30 PM, <funknet-request at mailman.rice.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>
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>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>
>>>> 1. cross-linguistic categorization (Esa Itkonen)
>>>> 2. Re: cross-linguistic categorization (A. Katz)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 1
>>>> Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 15:52:33 +0200
>>>> From: Esa Itkonen <eitkonen at utu.fi>
>>>> Subject: [FUNKNET] cross-linguistic categorization
>>>> To: funknet at mailman.rice.edu
>>>> Message-ID: <fbb0d5df9cae2.4ba79241 at utu.fi>
>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>>>>
>>>> Dear Funknetters: Many if not most people would subscribe to the following
>>>> claims:
>>>>
>>>> 1) Meaning and form are two different things, and neither should be
>>>> ignored.
>>>> 2) Most if not all of the time we are dealing with cluster concepts, i.e.
>>>> concepts based on several types of criteria
>>>> 3) Most if not all of the psychological/social concepts are of non-discrete
>>>> nature, and the description should reflect this fact, however imperfectly.
>>>> 4) Any given entity may be viewed from several (non-arbitrary) points of
>>>> view, which entails that, depending on the point of view (or level of
>>>> abstraction) two entities A and B may be different, partly similar, or
>>>> identical.
>>>> 5) It is just as wrong to claim all categories to me psychologically real
>>>> and to claim them to be psychologically non-real. This is something that
>>>> cannot be non a priori.
>>>> 6) It is better to know many languages than few languages.
>>>> 7) Science is an on-going process, with a ('dialectical') feedback relation
>>>> between data and theory, which makes it impossible for theory to become
>>>> totally detached from data.
>>>> 8) When forwarding several claims, one should make sure that they are
>>>> mutually consistent.
>>>>
>>>> If one accepts these claims and tries to consistently apply them to
>>>> cross-linguistic data, it would be difficult (though perhaps not impossible)
>>>> to arrive at a result very different from what was given in my 'Concerning
>>>> the Role of Induction in Typological Linguistics' (cf. my homepage).
>>>>
>>>> Still, things should be seen in perspective. The differences at issue
>>>> cannot go very deep, since everybody seems to agree - grosso modo - on
>>>> following the lead of such trail-blazers as H. Paul, N.S, Trubetzkoy, J.
>>>> Greenberg, and T. Giv?n.
>>>>
>>>> Esa
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 2
>>>> Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 07:46:55 -0700 (PDT)
>>>> From: "A. Katz" <amnfn at well.com>
>>>> Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] cross-linguistic categorization
>>>> To: Esa Itkonen <eitkonen at utu.fi>
>>>> Cc: funknet at mailman.rice.edu
>>>> Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.4.64.1003220729210.11021 at well.com>
>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"
>>>>
>>>> Esa,
>>>>
>>>> I agree with most of the things on your list. One claim that I would want
>>>> to modify, though, is (3) about the concepts being non-discrete. I think
>>>> that while the system that supports language in humans is analog rather
>>>> than digital, the concepts lend themselves to a digital (discrete) model.
>>>>
>>>> Yes and No are discrete concepts. When we listen for a /b/ phoneme in our
>>>> native language, we either hear it or we don't. Never mind that it is
>>>> produced in many different ways by many different individuals and no two
>>>> instances are exactly the same. That's just the hardware. The concept is
>>>> discrete. It's either a /b/ or it's not.
>>>>
>>>> --Aya
>>>>
>>>> http://hubpages.com/profile/Aya+Katz
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2010, Esa Itkonen wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Dear Funknetters: Many if not most people would subscribe to the
>>>>>
>>>> following claims:
>>>>
>>>>> 1) Meaning and form are two different things, and neither should be
>>>>>
>>>> ignored.
>>>>
>>>>> 2) Most if not all of the time we are dealing with cluster concepts, i.e.
>>>>>
>>>> concepts based on several types of criteria
>>>>
>>>>> 3) Most if not all of the psychological/social concepts are of
>>>>>
>>>> non-discrete nature, and the description should reflect this fact, however
>>>> imperfectly.
>>>>
>>>>> 4) Any given entity may be viewed from several (non-arbitrary) points of
>>>>>
>>>> view, which entails that, depending on the point of view (or level of
>>>> abstraction) two entities A and B may be different, partly similar, or
>>>> identical.
>>>>
>>>>> 5) It is just as wrong to claim all categories to me psychologically real
>>>>>
>>>> and to claim them to be psychologically non-real. This is something that
>>>> cannot be non a priori.
>>>>
>>>>> 6) It is better to know many languages than few languages.
>>>>> 7) Science is an on-going process, with a ('dialectical') feedback
>>>>>
>>>> relation between data and theory, which makes it impossible for theory to
>>>> become totally detached from data.
>>>>
>>>>> 8) When forwarding several claims, one should make sure that they are
>>>>>
>>>> mutually consistent.
>>>>
>>>>> If one accepts these claims and tries to consistently apply them to
>>>>>
>>>> cross-linguistic data, it would be difficult (though perhaps not impossible)
>>>> to arrive at a result very different from what was given in my 'Concerning
>>>> the Role of Induction in Typological Linguistics' (cf. my homepage).
>>>>
>>>>> Still, things should be seen in perspective. The differences at issue
>>>>>
>>>> cannot go very deep, since everybody seems to agree - grosso modo - on
>>>> following the lead of such trail-blazers as H. Paul, N.S, Trubetzkoy, J.
>>>> Greenberg, and T. Giv?n.
>>>>
>>>>> Esa
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Homepage: http://users.utu.fi/eitkonen
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> End of FUNKNET Digest, Vol 78, Issue 12
>>>> ***************************************
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>
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