FUNKNET] analysis: unhappiness

[Mark P. Line]

A. Katz wrote:
> Mark,
>
> Okay, I'm glad that you agree that a language user might be a machine or a
> non-human. That brings us much closer together. Nevertheless, there is
> also the fact that language can be preserved, but not used, for
> thousands of years, and then people start using it again.

Again, I would say that artifacts of language can be preserved separately
from language users, but not language itself. To my way of thinking,
language is the processes by which such artifacts are created and used
(when artifacts are involved at all). Those processes are synonymous with
language use and they cannot be divorced from their embodiment, the
language user.


> If it were an biological process, or even something like a live virus
> passed down from parent to child, then reviving it once it was dead would
> be
> impossible. But it's not. It's a tool. A tool that a group of people can
> stop using and making, but keep the blue prints for, and then make it
> again when they choose to.
>
> I wonder how many linguists realize that Hebrew was revived from a dead
> language.

I would assume most of us do. But I would also assume that most of us
realize that Modern Hebrew was engineered to capture the available data in
and about the dead language, not the language itself. There's no way to
revive a dead language because all of its embodiments are, like, dead.

To my mind, Modern Hebrew was created by tracing over a palimpsest.


> How many think it is just a slavic language with Hebrew lexemes?

I can't imagine any linguist who would think that. I might be wrong, I guess.


> How many realize that the grammar, the triliteral roots, the derivational
> system, are all working, and that any changes in pronunciation are of
> little importance when the basic contrasts are preserved?

This is all Ling 101 stuff, where I'm from, since Hebrew is the most
culturally salient Semitic language in these parts, and Semitic is an
important part of typological space with its triliteral and quadriliteral
roots. Some people's mileage might vary, I guess.


> Mark, if you can see that a language can be used by a non-human, then why
> not also acknowledge that it's a system for transferring information, and
> that the code can be preserved while in disuse?

First, I accept that language is a tool in a far-from-prototypical sense
(it's not a wrench, but it's not eating, either). As I said, a tool is as
a tool does, and since language can be used as a tool, it's a tool,
trivially, when it's being used as a tool. My point has been that not
everything worth knowing about language profits from the insight that
language can be a tool, and that that insight is not enough to justify the
study of language separately from any of its observed or potential
embodiments (and that, in fact, I know of nothing that might justify a
reductionist approach of that order).

Second, though, and more importantly, I most emphatically do not believe
that ***THE*** code of ***A*** language is preserved by any finite volume
of preserved text, for at least two related reasons:

1. There's no such thing as THE code of A language, so the whole endeavor
suffers from presupposition failure. Every embodiment (like you, and me)
has its own code. Communication ensues more or less effectively when a
speaker and hearer are using codes that overlap to a sufficient degree,
all the way up and down the chain from phonology to ontological
commitment.

2. Even if we stipulated some "common code" that was shared (perfectly, or
within some variationist framework) by some community of speakers, no
amount of preserved text and/or grammatical description would suffice to
preserve that common code.


I would also note that, the farther you go from the artifacts of language
to  the code we postulate as existing in the minds of speaker/hearers, the
less likely you're going to understand anything about it without taking
the exigencies of the embodiment into account.

My favorite example of this is the ease with which a language can be
constructed (constructed as in Esperanto and Klingon) in which center
embedding is rampant, the ease with which software parsers and generators
can be built for such languages, and the abject difficulties any human
being will have speaking or understanding any such language.


-- Mark


> On Mon, 13 Sep 2010, Mark P. Line wrote:
>
>> Aya --
>>
>> A. Katz wrote:
>>> Mark,
>>>
>>> Sorry, but "eating" is not a tool. It's a biological process.
>>>
>>> Eating cannot occur outside the biological context. A human being can
>>> avoid eating, but if so he starves. Feral children do not speak, but
>>> they eat, like everyone else, or they die. Eating does not have to be
>>> taught, there is no critical age of acquisition and it is not uniquely
>>> an
>>> artefact of human culture. If you are an animal, you eat. Eating cannot
>>> survive the death of the eater.
>>>
>>> Language can.
>>
>> I would say that not language, but the artifacts of language (texts,
>> audio
>> recordings) can survive the people who created them, because I try very
>> hard not to reify the artifacts of language as "language".
>>
>> The (usually communicative) process I refer to as language cannot exist
>> independently of its embodiment. That said, I don't care if the
>> embodiment
>> is human, computer, cetacean or non-human primate.
>>
>>
>> -- Mark
>>
>> Mark P. Line
>>
>>
>>> On Sun, 12 Sep 2010, Mark P. Line wrote:
>>>
>>>> Aya --
>>>>
>>>> You said: "Other tools can be studied separately from the people who
>>>> use
>>>> them or created them. Why not language?"
>>>>
>>>> Although language can certainly be considered a tool, I think it's
>>>> unlike
>>>> other tools in several very significant respects.
>>>>
>>>> 1. Although we're not born with language, we can't avoid (pathologies
>>>> excluded) acquiring it unless we're not exposed to it. To that extent,
>>>> language is a biological phenomenon. A prototypical tool is not a
>>>> biological phenomenon, so I'm not sure how valid any conclusions might
>>>> be
>>>> that are drawn from a premise of language-as-tool.
>>>>
>>>> 2. A tool is as a tool does: Anything is a tool that is being used as
>>>> a
>>>> tool, including dead wombats, broken screwdrivers or decks of playing
>>>> cards. (Completing the imagined scenarios is left as an exercise for
>>>> the
>>>> reader...) So saying that language is a tool is only saying that
>>>> language
>>>> is used as a tool. Quite a few conclusions can be and have been drawn
>>>> from
>>>> the fact that language is used as a tool, but I would have to be
>>>> convinced
>>>> in detail that almost everything worth knowing about language is
>>>> dependent
>>>> on the premise of language-as-tool.
>>>>
>>>> 3. If language is a "tool" for (say) communicating ideas, then eating
>>>> is
>>>> a
>>>> "tool" for reducing hunger. In both cases, I worry about the tool
>>>> metaphor
>>>> being stretched so far from the prototype that we're left with an
>>>> out-and-out category fallacy.
>>>>
>>>> 4. More prototypical tools can be studied separately from those who
>>>> use
>>>> or
>>>> create them because those tools are easily observed separately from
>>>> those
>>>> who use or create them. I don't think the same thing can be said of
>>>> language -- very little about language can be observed apart from its
>>>> use,
>>>> so very little about language can be observed apart from its user(s).
>>>>
>>>> 5. Any proposal to study something as complex as language separately
>>>> from
>>>> its embodiment is suspicious to me, smacking of reductionism --
>>>> something
>>>> up with which linguistics has had to put a tad much. Anything that
>>>> puts
>>>> language back into its human context would be a step forward.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -- Mark
>>>>
>>>> Mark P. Line
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A. Katz wrote:
>>>>> Tom,
>>>>>
>>>>> I understand the uncomfortable association with Chomsky that speaking
>>>>> of
>>>>> language apart from people can have. Competence versus performance,
>>>>> the
>>>>> way Chomsky used those terms, never made sense. But that's precisely
>>>>> because
>>>>> he associated "competence" with the brain and suggested that it was
>>>>> hard
>>>>> wired there -- when there was never any evidence of that.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, if we don't distinguish language from humans, and language
>>>>> processing from language data, then how are we going to judge
>>>>> artificial
>>>>> language-using devices as to their efficacy at producing and
>>>>> interpreting
>>>>> language? How are we going to determine whether and to what extent a
>>>>> non-human has acquired language?
>>>>>
>>>>> We aren't born with it. We don't embody it. It's a tool that we use
>>>>> to
>>>>> communicate. Other tools can be studied separately from the people
>>>>> who
>>>>> use
>>>>> them or created them. Why not language?
>>>>>
>>>>> --Aya
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, 12 Sep 2010, Tom Givon wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I wonder whether asking "how does language work?" is really a
>>>>>> meaningful
>>>>>> question without  asking "how does the language user work?"  One of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> worst
>>>>>> legacies good ol' Noam stuck us with is his (really, Saussure's)
>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>> of competence ("language", "knowledge") vs. performance ("language
>>>>>> user",
>>>>>> "processing"). It purported to limit linguists to the armchair
>>>>>> methods
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> study competence, and relegated to psychology the quantified,
>>>>>> distributional/variationist methods that study behavior, processing
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> on-line communication. The first breach in this artificial
>>>>>> methodological
>>>>>> wall occurred, leastwise for some of us, when we discovered the
>>>>>> intermediate
>>>>>> method of quantified studies of text, interaction, and conversation.
>>>>>> As
>>>>>> an
>>>>>> ex-biologist, I am forever puzzled by the methodological purism we
>>>>>> sill
>>>>>> seem
>>>>>> to embrace in linguistics, in the face of the manifest complexity
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> connectivity of language (mind, brain, culture, sociality,
>>>>>> evolution,
>>>>>> etc.).
>>>>>> In biology, another extremely complex science with multiple
>>>>>> connections
>>>>>> (chemistry, geology, paleontology, behavior, sociality, economics,
>>>>>> evolution,
>>>>>> etc.), ANY method is welcome so long as it does the job of
>>>>>> furthering
>>>>>> our
>>>>>> understanding. And by understanding we mean ever-wider circles of
>>>>>> connectivity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,  TG
>>>>>> ================
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A. Katz wrote:
>>>>>>> Chris,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks for addressing this question. I understand that many, many
>>>>>>> linguists
>>>>>>> are quite properly and approriately interested in this ultimate
>>>>>>> question:
>>>>>>> "How does the language user work?" (I am also intetested in this
>>>>>>> question
>>>>>>> some of the time.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My point is that "how does language work?" is also a valid
>>>>>>> question,
>>>>>>> and a
>>>>>>> central one to the field of linguistics. These two questions are
>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>> the same.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let me be very explicit: My aim is to separate out the "human" from
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> "language". There are many good reasons to do so. For anyone
>>>>>>> working
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> computerized language processing or in non-human language studies,
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> a significant point.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It does not matter if a computerized language processing system
>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>> remotely simulates what humans do with language in their brains. It
>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>> matter whether it comes up with comparable or indistinguishable
>>>>>>> results.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It does not matter whether a parrot, a dolphin or a chimpanzee is
>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same things inside the same modules in his brain as a human does.
>>>>>>> It
>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>> matter if the results are functionally equivalent.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We need to make that distinction, between humans and their
>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>> will be caught inside a circular definition with no way to break
>>>>>>> out
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> prove anything, not about others and not about ourselves!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    --Aya
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://hubpages.com/hub/What-Constitutes-Proof-in-Ape-Language-Studies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, 12 Sep 2010, Chris Butler wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Aya, I think two different things are getting a bit mixed up here.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't for a moment dispute that expressions are often
>>>>>>>> susceptible
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> multiple interpretations, that these interpretations are guided by
>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>> kinds of contextual information, or that different people, or even
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> same person at different times, may end up selecting differently
>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> various interpretations. Your example 'Open happiness' in another
>>>>>>>> contribution to this thread illustrates these points very well.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My point, though, is that each of these different interpretations,
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> well
>>>>>>>> as the selection of one (or more) as more likely in a particular
>>>>>>>> context,
>>>>>>>> is achieved through mechanisms in the interpreter's brain which
>>>>>>>> evolved in
>>>>>>>> the course of the phylogenetic development of language in the
>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>> species, and developed ontogenetically in that particular
>>>>>>>> interpreter's
>>>>>>>> brain. It is surely likely that those mechanisms are highly
>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> different human beings, even though there may be differences in
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> detailed wiring in different brains. What I'm saying is that in
>>>>>>>> order
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> answer the question 'How do we communicate using language?' or, if
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> prefer, 'How does the language user work?', we need to investigate
>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> those mechanisms are, and this is what psycholinguists can help us
>>>>>>>> with.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In particular, as linguists, we are interested (well, some of us
>>>>>>>> are,
>>>>>>>> though clearly not all) in whether the constructs we posit in our
>>>>>>>> theories
>>>>>>>> of language have psychological validity in the sense that they
>>>>>>>> correspond
>>>>>>>> to ways in which aspects of language are represented in the brain.
>>>>>>>> [As
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> aside, I do realise that there are linguists who strenuously
>>>>>>>> resist
>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> they see as a misguided emphasis on mental representation in the
>>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> cognitive scientists, but it seems clear that language must be
>>>>>>>> represented
>>>>>>>> in some way in the brain in order that we can engage in the
>>>>>>>> sociosemiotic
>>>>>>>> acts of meaning making which are the primary focus for many of
>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>> critics.] Taking your 'Open happiness' examples again, I think we
>>>>>>>> need
>>>>>>>> answers to questions such as: What kind of representation does the
>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>> language processing system have for 'open' and for 'happiness'?
>>>>>>>> Are
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic (for those who
>>>>>>>> distinguish
>>>>>>>> the semantic from the pragmatic) properties of these items (and we
>>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>>> want to add 'for this particular interpreter', though there must
>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> similarities across interpreters for communication to be possible)
>>>>>>>> represented in the same or different ways, in the same or
>>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>>> locations (or sets of distributed locations)? Indeed, are we right
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> thinking that these familiar levels of linguistic description must
>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> differentiated, as such, in the human language processing system?
>>>>>>>> Does
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> representation for 'open' distinguish between what we call verbal
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> adjectival uses of this item, and if so how? Or are syntactic
>>>>>>>> analyses
>>>>>>>> computed on the fly, using semantic and contextual clues, rather
>>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> neural equivalent of pigeon holes corresponding to verbs and
>>>>>>>> adjectives?
>>>>>>>> Is 'happiness' represented as 'happy + ness', or in its entirety,
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> both?
>>>>>>>> All these questions, and many many more, are relevant to the
>>>>>>>> construction
>>>>>>>> of a model of language which reflects how language users
>>>>>>>> communicate
>>>>>>>> (as,
>>>>>>>> of course, are a whole set of other questions about the
>>>>>>>> sociocultural
>>>>>>>> aspects of communication).  I am not a psycholinguist, but my all
>>>>>>>> too
>>>>>>>> superficial reading in the area suggests that psycholinguists have
>>>>>>>> gone
>>>>>>>> some of the way towards answering some of the questions we might
>>>>>>>> want
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> ask, but that there is still a long way to go.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> From: "A. Katz" <amnfn at well.com>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2010 3:18 PM
>>>>>>>> To: "Chris Butler" <cbutler at ntlworld.com>
>>>>>>>> Cc: "FUNKNET" <funknet at mailman.rice.edu>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [FUNKNET] FUNKNET] analysis: unhappiness
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The problem is that once we achieve the psycholinguistic goal and
>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> is happening in each person's head, and we see that conflicting
>>>>>>>>> analyses
>>>>>>>>> are the norm, rather than the exception, among normal language
>>>>>>>>> speakers,
>>>>>>>>> then we will realize that the way language works to transmit
>>>>>>>>> information
>>>>>>>>> is despite individual differences and not because of uniform
>>>>>>>>> processing
>>>>>>>>> strategies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Even when all are agreed as to the meaning of an utterance, they
>>>>>>>>> do
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> process it the same way. Which means that processing is seocndary
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> information transmission.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>   --Aya
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sat, 11 Sep 2010, Chris Butler wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Dick's comment that "this discussion raises the really
>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>> question of what kind of thing we think language is: social or
>>>>>>>>>> individual" is, it seems to me, an important one, particularly
>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>> those
>>>>>>>>>> of us who are committed functionalists. My own view is that a
>>>>>>>>>> truly
>>>>>>>>>> functional model of language would be one which aims to account
>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>> human beings communicate using language, or in other words tries
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> answer the question which was posed by Simon Dik a long time ago
>>>>>>>>>> now,
>>>>>>>>>> but which was not tackled head-on in his own work: "How does the
>>>>>>>>>> natural
>>>>>>>>>> language user work?' In trying to answer this question we need
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> accept
>>>>>>>>>> that language is BOTH social AND individual, and we need to
>>>>>>>>>> explore
>>>>>>>>>> both
>>>>>>>>>> aspects to get as complete a picture as possible of how we
>>>>>>>>>> communicate
>>>>>>>>>> using language. We need to know BOTH how people create and
>>>>>>>>>> respond
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> meanings and express those meanings in forms during social
>>>>>>>>>> interaction
>>>>>>>>>> AND the mechanisms which operate in the brains of individuals in
>>>>>>>>>> order
>>>>>>>>>> to make such interaction possible. Both are important parts of
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> answer to the question 'How do we communicate using language?',
>>>>>>>>>> though
>>>>>>>>>> this particular thread of the Funknet discussion has
>>>>>>>>>> concentrated
>>>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>>> on the second aspect, and so will I.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This doesn't mean that all the work linguists have done on
>>>>>>>>>> "exploring
>>>>>>>>>> the structure of a language so that I can understand how all the
>>>>>>>>>> bits
>>>>>>>>>> fit together" and "exploring the connections between items", as
>>>>>>>>>> Dick
>>>>>>>>>> puts it, is useless - far from it. After all, the hypotheses
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> psycholinguists test are based on ideas about what languages are
>>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>>> But it does mean, in my view, that ultimately we need to get
>>>>>>>>>> evidence
>>>>>>>>>> that the constructs and analyses we propose are ones that are at
>>>>>>>>>> least
>>>>>>>>>> consistent with what we know of the  processes which go on when
>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>> use
>>>>>>>>>> language. So I am with Matthew when he says that for him, "the
>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>> sense in which an analysis can be "the correct analysis" is in
>>>>>>>>>> terms
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> what is inside of people's heads". Of course, this doesn't imply
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> linguists should just give up their jobs until such time as we
>>>>>>>>>> know
>>>>>>>>>> everything there is to know about language processing. But it
>>>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>>> mean
>>>>>>>>>> that we need to collaborate with psycholinguists, psychologists
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> neurologists, as has also been pointed out by linguists such as
>>>>>>>>>> Ray
>>>>>>>>>> Jackendoff, Asif Agha, Ewa Dabrowska and Jan Nuyts. [We also
>>>>>>>>>> need
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> collaborate much more with sociolinguists and sociologists, so
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>> can get a better handle on the sociocultural aspects of how we
>>>>>>>>>> communicate.]  And it also means that psycholinguists, for their
>>>>>>>>>> part,
>>>>>>>>>> need whenever possible to follow up tightly controlled lab
>>>>>>>>>> experiments
>>>>>>>>>> with studies under more naturalistic conditions, to avoid the
>>>>>>>>>> criticism
>>>>>>>>>> that what happens in artifical lab situations may not happen in
>>>>>>>>>> natural
>>>>>>>>>> communicative conditions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I also agree with Dick when he says that "the differences
>>>>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>>> individuals really matter", and with Lise when she points out
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> "we
>>>>>>>>>> must also be careful not to idealize "what's in people's heads"
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> if it
>>>>>>>>>> were a single coherent construct that we are trying to
>>>>>>>>>> discover".
>>>>>>>>>> However, there are surely processing mechanisms which are common
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>> language users by virtue of the evolution of the language
>>>>>>>>>> faculty
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> which constitute the "general processes" which Dick says
>>>>>>>>>> psycholinguists
>>>>>>>>>> are interested in.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On the issue of quantitative methodology, I'm sympathetic in
>>>>>>>>>> general
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> Ted and Ev's views, though it does seem sensible to prioritise
>>>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> terms of a hierarchy such as Brian suggests. One thing this
>>>>>>>>>> means
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> that we should be giving our university students of linguistics
>>>>>>>>>> (and
>>>>>>>>>> some of our linguistics lecturers!) courses in quantitative
>>>>>>>>>> aspects
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> linguistics that introduce them to the use of at least some of
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> basic
>>>>>>>>>> statistical methods in language study, and I'm sure this is
>>>>>>>>>> indeed
>>>>>>>>>> going
>>>>>>>>>> on in some enlightened places. To those who suspect this can't
>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>> done
>>>>>>>>>> with maths-shy students who don't initially see the need for it,
>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>> offer
>>>>>>>>>> my own experience, over quite a long period, of teaching such
>>>>>>>>>> courses to
>>>>>>>>>> people with little or no prior experience in quantitative
>>>>>>>>>> techniques.
>>>>>>>>>> For some years in the 1990s, I taught such courses to all
>>>>>>>>>> linguistics
>>>>>>>>>> students in an institution where we had many mature students who
>>>>>>>>>> had
>>>>>>>>>> come into university level studies with non-standard
>>>>>>>>>> qualifications,
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> were not well equipped for courses of this kind by their
>>>>>>>>>> previous
>>>>>>>>>> experience. I'm glad to say that teaching the subject from their
>>>>>>>>>> own
>>>>>>>>>> perspective as language students rather than that of the
>>>>>>>>>> statistician,
>>>>>>>>>> and explaining the reasons for doing things in particular ways
>>>>>>>>>> rather
>>>>>>>>>> than just presenting formulae, paid off in the end, so that most
>>>>>>>>>> students were able to appreciate the relevance of these courses
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> turn in very creditable projects showing an understanding of
>>>>>>>>>> research
>>>>>>>>>> design and competence in the use of a range of basic statistical
>>>>>>>>>> techniques. And I still find that bright graduate students
>>>>>>>>>> respond
>>>>>>>>>> well
>>>>>>>>>> to similar courses which incorporate some of the rather more
>>>>>>>>>> advanced
>>>>>>>>>> techniques needed for many real research projects in various
>>>>>>>>>> areas
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> linguistics. But I may well be out of date with what is now
>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>> happening in our fine institutions of higher education!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chris Butler
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -- Mark
>>>>
>>>> Mark P. Line
>>>> Bartlesville, OK
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> -- Mark
>>
>> Mark P. Line
>> Bartlesville, OK
>>
>>
>
>


-- Mark

Mark P. Line
Bartlesville, OK