a.heuboeck at pgr.reading.ac.uk
Tue Mar 6 22:29:35 UTC 2012
I'm interested in discursive (or: 'rhetorical', in a wider sense)
functions of relative clauses. Here are three examples:
(1) The branch of the metaphysics of modality with <b>which</b> I will
be concerned with is the question of the ontological basis of
(2) To a large extent these objections will be dealt with by denying the
authority of intuition in these domains , but I will also sketch an
account of counterlegal statements <b>which</b> allows some of them to
come out as not trivially true .
(3) That it took until 1836 to enact specific legislation against '
thuggee ' is a further measure of the extent to <b>which</b> Sleeman and
Smith were able to organise and expand relatively freewheeling
operations against ' thuggee ' in the early 1830s , evading the
restraining influence of the Judicial Department .
I read all three as restrictive relative clauses. In pre-theoretical
terms I'd point out the functional differences I'm interested in in the
(1) acts as a 'filter' in that one out of many (possible or actually
existing) branches is selected;
(2) is descriptive in the sense that there's only one account sketched,
which is further qualified (a reading as 'filter' like (1) is
syntactically possible, but seems rather implausible here);
in (3), 'extent to which' forms a functional unit with the effect of
providing a particular focus on S & S's ability to organize..., rather
than focusing on qualification of 'extent', as the syntactic surface
I'd be grateful for pointers to theoretical frameworks that would allow
me to analyze that sort of functional difference, or, indeed, any
comments on your analysis of these functions.
With thanks in advance,
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