rhotacism from Ray Hickey

[Ross Clark]

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
> Date:          Wed, 11 Nov 1998 12:22:12 -0500
> From:          "H.M.Hubey" <hubeyh at montclair.edu>
> Reply-to:      hubeyh at montclair.edu
> Organization:  Montclair State University
> To:            Ross Clark <drc at antnov1.auckland.ac.nz>
> Cc:            HISTLING at VM.SC.EDU
> Subject:       Re: rhotacism from Ray Hickey
 
> Ross Clark wrote:
> >
> > > Aren't morphological paradigms also part of 'regular sound change"?
> >
> > No, they're not.
> >
> > But more to the point, contrary to what Mr Hubey seems to be
> > suggesting, the little couplet above is not an instance of circular
> > reasoning. It's merely the same statement phrased two different ways.
> > Or rather,  2. is a statement of a general principle, of which 1. is a
 specific application.
> >
> > What Mr Hubey may be trying to articulate is the superficially
> > circular-looking:
> >
> > 1. A,B,C are a language family ===> A,B,C have regular sound
> > correspondences.
> >
> > 2. A,B,C have regular sound correspondences ===> A,B,C are a language
> > family.
> >
>
> Perhaps only some people use it circularly, or many linguists use it
> circularly, but it is in use.
 
Could you cite an example or two? I don't mean of 1. or 2. in use
separately, but of the two used together as a fallacious syllogism.
 
>
> > But the attribution of circularity rests on a misreading of the
> > relations between the propositions in 1. and 2. as the same. 1. is a
> > causal relation -- regular sound correspondences result from the
> > definition of a language family, plus the fact that sound change is
> > regular.
>
> But borrowings also create regular sound correspondences.
 
Yes, just as things other than measles can produce spots on the face.
We need to take such things into consideration if we want to raise
our competence in historical linguistics (or medical diagnosis) from
this very rudimentary level.
 
>
> 2. is a progression from evidence to inference -- we observe
> > regular sound correspondences, from which we conclude these languages
> > are a family. (Whether this is an accurate account of what we
> > actually do is not the question here.) It's no more circular than:
> >
> > 1. Patient has measles ===> patient has spots on face.
> > 2. Patient has spots on face ===> patient has measles.
>
> This rests on something different.
>
> 1. Patient has measles (definition comes from some other place, but may
> include spots on the face). These days the defn would come from being
> able
> to culture the bacteria. Then the spots on the face and measles
> correlate.
> The time depth is short and one can see a non-measles person get it, get
> sick, etc.
>
> Because of the correlation of measles and spots, 2 then becomes an
> implication.
>
>
> But that does not work so in historical linguistics because we never had
> a record of any language family (knowing its relatives, etc) but all of
> it
> rests on a larger theory of which regular sound correspondence must be a
> part.
 
Well, we do in fact have records of various language families. What
are you trying to say here?
 
> So it is a whole mess of correlations which lead towards that
> conclusion.
>
> More to the point it is based on this reasoning.
>
> 1. These languages have too many things in common. IOW, there are many
> words in
> these languages which can be made to look like each other with similar
> meanings
> and which could not be due to chance.
>
> 2. If that is not due to chance then either they got these words from
> each other
> or the words are all descended from a common language.
>
> 3. We have plenty of evidence (what?) that these languages did not get
> these
> words from each other.
>
> 4. Therefore these words in these languages must all come from an
> earlier common
> source.
>
> This is how it is supposed to work, but you can see rather easily how
> and where
> problems crop up, and where arguments occur.
>
> Isn't this basically right?
 
Yes, problems crop up and arguments occur, to be sure.
 
I recognize 1-4 as a rough outline of the reasoning by which one
arrives at a hypothesis of genetic relatedness among languages.
Rather than argue about details, I'd like to know where you're going
with it. Are we finished with the idea that it's logically circular?
 
Ross Clark