From andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE Tue Jan 11 20:56:51 2005 From: andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE (Andreas Nolda) Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 21:56:51 +0100 Subject: Intermediate syntactic meaning Message-ID: Dear IL-List subscribers, I would like to draw your attention to some shortcomings of the conception of intermediate syntactic meanings and to propose a partially different conception for them. According to Lieb (1983, chap. 19 and 20), intermediate syntactic meanings typically are of the same formal type as basic syntactic meanings: they are pairs , with b being an n-place potential concept and Z being an m-place 'contextualization set'. Let us consider two examples, taken from (Lieb 1983). First example. The intermediate meaning for _american student_ is (1) ("e" and "i" denote the element relation and the intersection operation, respectively; "V" typically stands for an utterance from the point of view of the linguist and "V1" for a speaker from this point of view; as a rule, numerical indices are to be read as subscripts): (1) where (2) Z1 = { | x e reference-basis(_american_, V, V1, .american.) i x e reference-basis(_student_, V, V1, .student.)} The intension of .american student. is defined as the union of the intensions of .american. and .student.. Second example. The intermediate meaning for _in London_ is (3) ("A" denotes the universal quantifier): (3) where (4) Z2 = { | A x1 (V1 refers by _London_ in V to x1 -> e reference-basis(_in_, V, V1, .in.))} The intension of .in London. contains the intensional relation (5) as its only element ("L" denotes the lambda-operator): (5) L x V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _London_ in V to x1 -> e extension(.in.)) Now, (5) is a 'hybrid' relation as far as the ontologies the arguments are taken from are concerned: it relates one entity of type x from the speaker's ontology to two entities of type V from the linguist's ontology. When we assume that such a relation (of type d) is contained in the intension of a concept, we have a problem. Recall that according to the definition of "(potential) concept" (e.g. Lieb 1983, 208 f.), the elements in the intension of a concept are part of the content of a perception or conception. According to Lieb (1983, 210), "we may then require that every speaker of idiolect system S _has_ the non-empty concepts that are lexical meanings in S". Thus, the elements of the intension of a potential concept should involve entities from the speaker's ontology only. This problem was already pointed out in the IL colloques (e.g. Lieb 1999/2000, SS 2000, 36). As a remedy, Lieb proposed to replace intermediate syntactic meanings like (3) by single intensional relations like d1 in (3'): (3') d1 = L x V V1: (V1 refers by _London__ in V to x1 -> e reference-basis(_in_, V, V1, .in.) i extension(.in.)) In other words, the pair is collapsed into d1. This change also solves an empirical problem with Lieb's (1983, 318) semantic analysis of example (6), where _in London_ occurs as a prepositional object: (6) _The student has arrived in London._ According to him, the proposition for (6) is the following intensional relation ("E" denotes the existential quantifier): (7) L V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _the student_ in V to x1 -> E x (a. e reference-basis(_has arrived_, V, V1, .arrive.) b. e extension(.arrive.) ...)) Formulae of the form "M(-, V, V1)" abbreviate "{x | e M}". The problem with (7) concerns condition (7 a). The set Z2(-, V, V1) contains, according to (4), all first components of pairs consisting of x and the referent of _London_ such that the pair is an element of the reference basis for .in.. A pair is in the reference basis for .in. if the speaker V1 is willing to assume that '.in. applies to it' or to assume that '.in. does *not* apply to it'. Thus, in a given utterance situtation, Z2(-, V, V1) will typically contain a large number of spaces in London as well as of spaces which are *not* in London. Now, it is quite probably that the triple is not at all an element of the reference basis for .arrive.: the 'monster set' Z2(-, V, V1) may be simply too large for V1 to consider it. This effect, however, is not intended. Therefore, the contextual restriction by condition (5 a) is too strong. (As far as I know, that problem has not yet been noted anywhere.) Note that this problem does not arise when (3) is replaced by d1: (7') L V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _the student_ in V to x1 -> E x (a. e reference-basis(_has arrived_, V, V1, .arrive'.) i extension(.arrive'.) ...)) Here, "d1(-, V, V1)" denotes not a set, but the corresponding property "L x: has d1". (As we are now relating a property -- instead of a set -- to the verbal concept, we also have to replace .arrive. by its intensional variant .arrive'.) There is no problem with (7') because the set of entities to which d1(-, V, V1) applies is much smaller than Z2(-, V, V1): d1 is a property of spaces in London only. Alas, d1 cannot generally be substituted for . Consider the following example, where _in London_ functions as a non-complement modifier of a referential expression's nucleus: (8) _The hotel in London was splendid._ Presupposing d1 as the intermediate meaning for _in London_, the existential-doxastic referential meaning for _the hotel in London_ in (8) would run as follows: (9) L V V1: a. E! x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x) b. A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e reference-basis(_the hotel_, V, V1, .hotel.) & x has d1(-, V, V1))) c. ... d. V presupposes that: A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e extension(.hotel.) & x has d1(-, V, V1))) As can be seen from (9), "d1(-, V, V1)" occurs twice. In addition to the presupposition in (9 d), it reappears in (9 b) outside of any presuppositional context. (9 b) should involve only reference bases or contextualizations, though. d1, however, also involves the extension of .in.. As a consequence, (9 d)'s presupposition that x has d1(-, V, V1) is invalidated. In view of these problems with the conceptions of Lieb (1983) and Lieb (1999/2000), I'd like to propose the following solution. _In London_ has an intermediate meaning of the following sort: (10) where (11) d2 = (5) If _in London_ is used as a modifier, the components of its intermediate meaning can be processed separately. Consider, for example, the revised existential-doxastic referential meaning for _the hotel in London_ in (8) is (9'): (9') L V V1: a. E! x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x) b. A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e reference-basis(_the hotel_, V, V1, .hotel.) & x e Z2(-, V, V1))) c. ... d. V presupposes that: A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e extension(.hotel.) & x has d2(-, V, V1))) If _in London_ is used as a complement, the components of (10) are 'fused' into a set (or a property), as, for instance, in the the proposition of (6): (7'') L V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _the student_ in V to x1 -> E x (a. e reference-basis(_has arrived_, V, V1, .arrive.) i extension(.arrive.) ...)) where (12) M = {x2 | x2 e Z2(-, V, V1) & x2 has d2(-, V, V1)} Andreas Nolda References Lieb, Hans-Heinrich (1983). _Integrational Linguistics_. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 17. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Vol. 1: _General Outline_. Lieb, Hans-Heinrich (1999/2000). Integrative Sprachwissenschaft: Der Sprechaktaspekt in der Integrativen Sprachtheorie. Authorized minutes of a colloquium at the Freie Universität Berlin in the summer semester 1999, the winter semester 1999/2000, and the summer semester 2000. -- Andreas Nolda http://www2.hu-berlin.de/linguistik/institut/nolda/ Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Philosophische Fakultät II Institut für deutsche Sprache und Linguistik From lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE Wed Jan 12 15:35:47 2005 From: lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE (Hans-Heinrich Lieb) Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 16:35:47 +0100 Subject: Intermediate syntactic meaning In-Reply-To: <200501111933.06838.andreas.nolda@staff.hu-berlin.de> Message-ID: Dear IL-List subscribers, Andreas Nolda's small paper (whose essentials he discussed with me beforehand) is important, and I accept its result: In addition to intermediate syntactic meanings (ISM) as assumed in Lieb 1983 for constituents of the type of *american student*, there should be a second type of ISM, of the general form , exemplified by Nolda's (10), which would be (n is the number of variables of type x that appear in a d-type lambda expression: Lambda xVV1). Creating concepts whose intension contains attributes d superscript n was a mistake of which I was conscious in writing Lieb 1983 but whose correction I left for later. I subsequently proposed a correction by which the relations d superscript n themselves were taken as ISMs of a new type. While this corrected the original mistake, it introduced a new one which Nolda now discovered and has corrected. It is not yet clear to me if relations d superscript n must still be retained as ISMs in different contexts, and the consequences for the relevant semantic relations building up the proposition - already hinted at by Nolda - remain to be established in a more precise way. I do not understand Nolda's .arrive'. in (7') but this is inessential. Hans-Heinrich Lieb ------------------------------------------------ Prof. Dr. Hans-Heinrich Lieb FB Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN ------------------------------------------- lieb at zedat.fu-berlin.de Telefon (030) 838-52973 Sekretariat (030) 838-52168 Privat (030) 852 92 80 www.germanistik.fu-berlin.de/il/lieb.html ------------------------------------------------ From andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE Thu Jan 13 11:12:42 2005 From: andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE (Andreas Nolda) Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 12:12:42 +0100 Subject: Intermediate syntactic meaning In-Reply-To: <41E551E3.13595.267E20@localhost> Message-ID: On Wednesday 12 January 2005 16:35, Hans-Heinrich Lieb wrote: > I do not understand Nolda's .arrive'. in (7') but this is > inessential. The third place of the 'extensional' .arrive. applies to *sets* of spaces, while the third place of its 'intensional' variant .arrive'. applies to *properties* of spaces. In (7), .arrive. is related to triples of the form , with M being a set. In (7'), however, the triple is substituted for the 's. As d1(-, V, V1) is a property, we now must relate .arrive'. to this triple. Andreas Nolda -- Andreas Nolda http://www2.hu-berlin.de/linguistik/institut/nolda/ Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Philosophische Fakultät II Institut für deutsche Sprache und Linguistik From andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE Fri Jan 21 19:58:58 2005 From: andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE (Andreas Nolda) Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2005 20:58:58 +0100 Subject: Intensions Message-ID: Dear subscribers, Integrational Semantics makes abundant use of intensions: properties and intensional relations are assumed in the intension of potential concepts (word meanings), sentence meanings are conceived as intensional relations between potential utterances and potential speakers, etc. The nature of these intensions, however, has been left unspecified: We shall leave it undecided how exactly relations-in-intension and properties are to be construed, whether in the way proposed by Richard Montague or in some other way. (Lieb 1980: 126) Montague conceives intensions as functions from possible worlds to extensional entities. Thus, two intensions are identical if their values are identical for every possible world. According to another explication of "intension", which is due to Carnap, intensions are identical if they are logically equivalent. According to common assumptions, logically true statements hold in every possible world (and logically false statements hold in no possible world). Thus, the conceptions of Montague and Carnap amount to the same identity conditions for intensions. Now, as far as I can see, constructing intensions along these lines leads to problems in Integrational Semantics. Consider the following two properties: (1) the property of not being identical with oneself (2) the property of being circular as well as non-circular Let us assume that in no possible world there is anything which has (1) or (2). Thus, (1) and (2) have the same value for every possible world: that is, the empty set. Equivalently, we may assume, that "for every x, x has (1) if and only if x has (2)" is a logically true statement. In other words, according to Montague's and Carnap's conceptions, (1) and (2) are identical: they are the 'contradictory property' or 'null property'. As a consequence, given that (1) and (2) make up the intension of two possible concepts (say, .non-identical with oneself. and .circular and non-circular.), both concepts are identical, too. Despite the somewhat artifical nature of the examples, this consequence is quite unwelcome. Similar problems arise when assuming intensions of some kind (intensional relations or states-of-affairs) as the content of propositional attitudes like 'believe' or 'communicate'. The reason for these problems is obvious: they result -- as far as natural language is concerned -- from a counter-intuitive conception of intensions. For, according to the ordinary-language use of "property", (1) and (2) clearly are different properties. Therefore I'd claim that Montague's (or Carnap's) conception of intensions is too weak for Integrational Semantics. What we need are 'hyper-intensions' or something of the kind. Andreas Nolda Reference Lieb, Hans-Heinrich (1980). Syntactic meanings. In _Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics_, ed. by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch, Synthese Language Library 10, Dordrecht: Reidel, 121-153. -- Andreas Nolda http://www2.hu-berlin.de/linguistik/institut/nolda/ Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Philosophische Fakultät II Institut für deutsche Sprache und Linguistik From lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE Sat Jan 22 00:44:00 2005 From: lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE (Hans-Heinrich Lieb) Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 01:44:00 +0100 Subject: Intensions In-Reply-To: <200501212054.09911.andreas.nolda@staff.hu-berlin.de> Message-ID: Dear IL people, the (general) problems with intensions (intensional entities) mentioned by Nolda appear to be innocuous in Integrational Semantics: All intension- denoting expressions ultimately appear in characterizations of the content of speaker attitudes. In IL, a de re approach is taken to such attitudes and different intension-denoting expressions that are logically equivalent are not freely replaceable in attitudinal contexts. Hans-Heinrich Lieb ------------------------------------------------ Prof. Dr. Hans-Heinrich Lieb FB Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN ------------------------------------------- lieb at zedat.fu-berlin.de Telefon (030) 838-52973 Sekretariat (030) 838-52168 Privat (030) 852 92 80 www.germanistik.fu-berlin.de/il/lieb.html ------------------------------------------------ From andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE Tue Jan 11 20:56:51 2005 From: andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE (Andreas Nolda) Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 21:56:51 +0100 Subject: Intermediate syntactic meaning Message-ID: Dear IL-List subscribers, I would like to draw your attention to some shortcomings of the conception of intermediate syntactic meanings and to propose a partially different conception for them. According to Lieb (1983, chap. 19 and 20), intermediate syntactic meanings typically are of the same formal type as basic syntactic meanings: they are pairs , with b being an n-place potential concept and Z being an m-place 'contextualization set'. Let us consider two examples, taken from (Lieb 1983). First example. The intermediate meaning for _american student_ is (1) ("e" and "i" denote the element relation and the intersection operation, respectively; "V" typically stands for an utterance from the point of view of the linguist and "V1" for a speaker from this point of view; as a rule, numerical indices are to be read as subscripts): (1) where (2) Z1 = { | x e reference-basis(_american_, V, V1, .american.) i x e reference-basis(_student_, V, V1, .student.)} The intension of .american student. is defined as the union of the intensions of .american. and .student.. Second example. The intermediate meaning for _in London_ is (3) ("A" denotes the universal quantifier): (3) where (4) Z2 = { | A x1 (V1 refers by _London_ in V to x1 -> e reference-basis(_in_, V, V1, .in.))} The intension of .in London. contains the intensional relation (5) as its only element ("L" denotes the lambda-operator): (5) L x V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _London_ in V to x1 -> e extension(.in.)) Now, (5) is a 'hybrid' relation as far as the ontologies the arguments are taken from are concerned: it relates one entity of type x from the speaker's ontology to two entities of type V from the linguist's ontology. When we assume that such a relation (of type d) is contained in the intension of a concept, we have a problem. Recall that according to the definition of "(potential) concept" (e.g. Lieb 1983, 208 f.), the elements in the intension of a concept are part of the content of a perception or conception. According to Lieb (1983, 210), "we may then require that every speaker of idiolect system S _has_ the non-empty concepts that are lexical meanings in S". Thus, the elements of the intension of a potential concept should involve entities from the speaker's ontology only. This problem was already pointed out in the IL colloques (e.g. Lieb 1999/2000, SS 2000, 36). As a remedy, Lieb proposed to replace intermediate syntactic meanings like (3) by single intensional relations like d1 in (3'): (3') d1 = L x V V1: (V1 refers by _London__ in V to x1 -> e reference-basis(_in_, V, V1, .in.) i extension(.in.)) In other words, the pair is collapsed into d1. This change also solves an empirical problem with Lieb's (1983, 318) semantic analysis of example (6), where _in London_ occurs as a prepositional object: (6) _The student has arrived in London._ According to him, the proposition for (6) is the following intensional relation ("E" denotes the existential quantifier): (7) L V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _the student_ in V to x1 -> E x (a. e reference-basis(_has arrived_, V, V1, .arrive.) b. e extension(.arrive.) ...)) Formulae of the form "M(-, V, V1)" abbreviate "{x | e M}". The problem with (7) concerns condition (7 a). The set Z2(-, V, V1) contains, according to (4), all first components of pairs consisting of x and the referent of _London_ such that the pair is an element of the reference basis for .in.. A pair is in the reference basis for .in. if the speaker V1 is willing to assume that '.in. applies to it' or to assume that '.in. does *not* apply to it'. Thus, in a given utterance situtation, Z2(-, V, V1) will typically contain a large number of spaces in London as well as of spaces which are *not* in London. Now, it is quite probably that the triple is not at all an element of the reference basis for .arrive.: the 'monster set' Z2(-, V, V1) may be simply too large for V1 to consider it. This effect, however, is not intended. Therefore, the contextual restriction by condition (5 a) is too strong. (As far as I know, that problem has not yet been noted anywhere.) Note that this problem does not arise when (3) is replaced by d1: (7') L V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _the student_ in V to x1 -> E x (a. e reference-basis(_has arrived_, V, V1, .arrive'.) i extension(.arrive'.) ...)) Here, "d1(-, V, V1)" denotes not a set, but the corresponding property "L x: has d1". (As we are now relating a property -- instead of a set -- to the verbal concept, we also have to replace .arrive. by its intensional variant .arrive'.) There is no problem with (7') because the set of entities to which d1(-, V, V1) applies is much smaller than Z2(-, V, V1): d1 is a property of spaces in London only. Alas, d1 cannot generally be substituted for . Consider the following example, where _in London_ functions as a non-complement modifier of a referential expression's nucleus: (8) _The hotel in London was splendid._ Presupposing d1 as the intermediate meaning for _in London_, the existential-doxastic referential meaning for _the hotel in London_ in (8) would run as follows: (9) L V V1: a. E! x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x) b. A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e reference-basis(_the hotel_, V, V1, .hotel.) & x has d1(-, V, V1))) c. ... d. V presupposes that: A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e extension(.hotel.) & x has d1(-, V, V1))) As can be seen from (9), "d1(-, V, V1)" occurs twice. In addition to the presupposition in (9 d), it reappears in (9 b) outside of any presuppositional context. (9 b) should involve only reference bases or contextualizations, though. d1, however, also involves the extension of .in.. As a consequence, (9 d)'s presupposition that x has d1(-, V, V1) is invalidated. In view of these problems with the conceptions of Lieb (1983) and Lieb (1999/2000), I'd like to propose the following solution. _In London_ has an intermediate meaning of the following sort: (10) where (11) d2 = (5) If _in London_ is used as a modifier, the components of its intermediate meaning can be processed separately. Consider, for example, the revised existential-doxastic referential meaning for _the hotel in London_ in (8) is (9'): (9') L V V1: a. E! x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x) b. A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e reference-basis(_the hotel_, V, V1, .hotel.) & x e Z2(-, V, V1))) c. ... d. V presupposes that: A x (V1 refers by _the hotel in London_ in V to x -> (x e extension(.hotel.) & x has d2(-, V, V1))) If _in London_ is used as a complement, the components of (10) are 'fused' into a set (or a property), as, for instance, in the the proposition of (6): (7'') L V V1: A x1 (V1 refers by _the student_ in V to x1 -> E x (a. e reference-basis(_has arrived_, V, V1, .arrive.) i extension(.arrive.) ...)) where (12) M = {x2 | x2 e Z2(-, V, V1) & x2 has d2(-, V, V1)} Andreas Nolda References Lieb, Hans-Heinrich (1983). _Integrational Linguistics_. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 17. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Vol. 1: _General Outline_. Lieb, Hans-Heinrich (1999/2000). Integrative Sprachwissenschaft: Der Sprechaktaspekt in der Integrativen Sprachtheorie. Authorized minutes of a colloquium at the Freie Universit?t Berlin in the summer semester 1999, the winter semester 1999/2000, and the summer semester 2000. -- Andreas Nolda http://www2.hu-berlin.de/linguistik/institut/nolda/ Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin Philosophische Fakult?t II Institut f?r deutsche Sprache und Linguistik From lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE Wed Jan 12 15:35:47 2005 From: lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE (Hans-Heinrich Lieb) Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 16:35:47 +0100 Subject: Intermediate syntactic meaning In-Reply-To: <200501111933.06838.andreas.nolda@staff.hu-berlin.de> Message-ID: Dear IL-List subscribers, Andreas Nolda's small paper (whose essentials he discussed with me beforehand) is important, and I accept its result: In addition to intermediate syntactic meanings (ISM) as assumed in Lieb 1983 for constituents of the type of *american student*, there should be a second type of ISM, of the general form , exemplified by Nolda's (10), which would be (n is the number of variables of type x that appear in a d-type lambda expression: Lambda xVV1). Creating concepts whose intension contains attributes d superscript n was a mistake of which I was conscious in writing Lieb 1983 but whose correction I left for later. I subsequently proposed a correction by which the relations d superscript n themselves were taken as ISMs of a new type. While this corrected the original mistake, it introduced a new one which Nolda now discovered and has corrected. It is not yet clear to me if relations d superscript n must still be retained as ISMs in different contexts, and the consequences for the relevant semantic relations building up the proposition - already hinted at by Nolda - remain to be established in a more precise way. I do not understand Nolda's .arrive'. in (7') but this is inessential. Hans-Heinrich Lieb ------------------------------------------------ Prof. Dr. Hans-Heinrich Lieb FB Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften FREIE UNIVERSIT?T BERLIN ------------------------------------------- lieb at zedat.fu-berlin.de Telefon (030) 838-52973 Sekretariat (030) 838-52168 Privat (030) 852 92 80 www.germanistik.fu-berlin.de/il/lieb.html ------------------------------------------------ From andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE Thu Jan 13 11:12:42 2005 From: andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE (Andreas Nolda) Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 12:12:42 +0100 Subject: Intermediate syntactic meaning In-Reply-To: <41E551E3.13595.267E20@localhost> Message-ID: On Wednesday 12 January 2005 16:35, Hans-Heinrich Lieb wrote: > I do not understand Nolda's .arrive'. in (7') but this is > inessential. The third place of the 'extensional' .arrive. applies to *sets* of spaces, while the third place of its 'intensional' variant .arrive'. applies to *properties* of spaces. In (7), .arrive. is related to triples of the form , with M being a set. In (7'), however, the triple is substituted for the 's. As d1(-, V, V1) is a property, we now must relate .arrive'. to this triple. Andreas Nolda -- Andreas Nolda http://www2.hu-berlin.de/linguistik/institut/nolda/ Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin Philosophische Fakult?t II Institut f?r deutsche Sprache und Linguistik From andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE Fri Jan 21 19:58:58 2005 From: andreas.nolda at CMS.HU-BERLIN.DE (Andreas Nolda) Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2005 20:58:58 +0100 Subject: Intensions Message-ID: Dear subscribers, Integrational Semantics makes abundant use of intensions: properties and intensional relations are assumed in the intension of potential concepts (word meanings), sentence meanings are conceived as intensional relations between potential utterances and potential speakers, etc. The nature of these intensions, however, has been left unspecified: We shall leave it undecided how exactly relations-in-intension and properties are to be construed, whether in the way proposed by Richard Montague or in some other way. (Lieb 1980: 126) Montague conceives intensions as functions from possible worlds to extensional entities. Thus, two intensions are identical if their values are identical for every possible world. According to another explication of "intension", which is due to Carnap, intensions are identical if they are logically equivalent. According to common assumptions, logically true statements hold in every possible world (and logically false statements hold in no possible world). Thus, the conceptions of Montague and Carnap amount to the same identity conditions for intensions. Now, as far as I can see, constructing intensions along these lines leads to problems in Integrational Semantics. Consider the following two properties: (1) the property of not being identical with oneself (2) the property of being circular as well as non-circular Let us assume that in no possible world there is anything which has (1) or (2). Thus, (1) and (2) have the same value for every possible world: that is, the empty set. Equivalently, we may assume, that "for every x, x has (1) if and only if x has (2)" is a logically true statement. In other words, according to Montague's and Carnap's conceptions, (1) and (2) are identical: they are the 'contradictory property' or 'null property'. As a consequence, given that (1) and (2) make up the intension of two possible concepts (say, .non-identical with oneself. and .circular and non-circular.), both concepts are identical, too. Despite the somewhat artifical nature of the examples, this consequence is quite unwelcome. Similar problems arise when assuming intensions of some kind (intensional relations or states-of-affairs) as the content of propositional attitudes like 'believe' or 'communicate'. The reason for these problems is obvious: they result -- as far as natural language is concerned -- from a counter-intuitive conception of intensions. For, according to the ordinary-language use of "property", (1) and (2) clearly are different properties. Therefore I'd claim that Montague's (or Carnap's) conception of intensions is too weak for Integrational Semantics. What we need are 'hyper-intensions' or something of the kind. Andreas Nolda Reference Lieb, Hans-Heinrich (1980). Syntactic meanings. In _Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics_, ed. by John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch, Synthese Language Library 10, Dordrecht: Reidel, 121-153. -- Andreas Nolda http://www2.hu-berlin.de/linguistik/institut/nolda/ Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin Philosophische Fakult?t II Institut f?r deutsche Sprache und Linguistik From lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE Sat Jan 22 00:44:00 2005 From: lieb at ZEDAT.FU-BERLIN.DE (Hans-Heinrich Lieb) Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 01:44:00 +0100 Subject: Intensions In-Reply-To: <200501212054.09911.andreas.nolda@staff.hu-berlin.de> Message-ID: Dear IL people, the (general) problems with intensions (intensional entities) mentioned by Nolda appear to be innocuous in Integrational Semantics: All intension- denoting expressions ultimately appear in characterizations of the content of speaker attitudes. In IL, a de re approach is taken to such attitudes and different intension-denoting expressions that are logically equivalent are not freely replaceable in attitudinal contexts. Hans-Heinrich Lieb ------------------------------------------------ Prof. Dr. Hans-Heinrich Lieb FB Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften FREIE UNIVERSIT?T BERLIN ------------------------------------------- lieb at zedat.fu-berlin.de Telefon (030) 838-52973 Sekretariat (030) 838-52168 Privat (030) 852 92 80 www.germanistik.fu-berlin.de/il/lieb.html ------------------------------------------------