Misrepresenting others' views

[ECOLING at aol.com]

Larry Trask continues to avoid the basic statement of the paradox,
to muddy the waters with red herrings.

And he continues to knowingly misrepresent others' views.

>And the assertion that linguists do not normally think at all of any factors
>beyond mutual intelligibility is beyond belief.  This is not remotely true.
>I'm a linguist, and I've just given our first-years a lecture on the numerous
>factors involved in deciding where language boundaries should be placed.
>Nor am I in any way unusual here.

No one has said that linguists do not normally think at all of any factors
beyond mutual intelligibility.  So attributing it to one's opponents in a
discussion is a serious misrepresentation.  (Nor has anyone said they
do not normally think of other factors when creating a serious definition.
They may choose a definition which does not incorporate every detail
of which they are fully aware.)
This misrepresentation is however consistent with
what Larry Trask repeatedly does.  (See further below.)

Saying that many linguists commonly use a definition of distinct
languages referring in some way to "mutual intelligibility"
in no way implies that they are in any sense unaware of other factors
which would enter into a refined definition.

Nor do they or we need to be lectured about mutual intelligibility
being a gradient phenomenon (70% or etc.) as Larry Trask does.
We are all quite aware of that, thank you very much.

NOR does it imply that such a simple definition is used only for children
nor that it is "not a serious definition", as Trask has attempted to argue.
Lyle Campbell (whom Larry Trask professes to admire) uses exactly
that definition in his book *American Indian Languages*
which many consider a definitive reference work on the current
status of knowledge of genetic relations in this field.

These are all red herrings.  Trask simply refuses to deal with
the paradox raised.  He clearly does not like the obvious conclusion.
As pointed out previously, the conclusion almost certainly stands
EVEN IF one changes the definition to suit him, AS LONG AS
the definition of "same" vs. "different" language does not preclude
that some dialects of a language can change substantially so that
(under one's favorite definition) they count as a distinct language,
while other dialects can in the same time span change so little that
one is more comfortable treating them as still the same language.
The only way to avoid this appears (so far) to be a definition which
circularly prevents the paradox by  defining ANY CHANGE HOWEVER
SMALL as meaning we no longer have the "same language".
This certainly does violence to any normal definition of
same vs. different language (see also the next paragraph).

(Of course, saying there is no such thing as same vs. different
language also evades it.  But that is a perversion of the English
language, and a denial of normal usage among both linguists
and lay people.  In a most recent message, Trask affirms this is his
position, but then fails to admit that he should not have pretended
to be answering the paradox with his many other red herrings,
which appear relevant to the statement of the paradox only if one DOES
admit that the notions of same vs. different language mean something.
Because without that, the statement of the paradox means nothing
and so should not be under discussion at all.)

On Trask's continued attmempts to discredit others:

>> Unless of course the writer literally means as he writes
>> that mutual intelligibility is "one of many factors which may help to
>> determine whether varieties are best regarded as two languages
>> or as a single language".  Note the "one of", in which case the
>> response should have been not "NO, WRONG", but
>> "YES, WITH ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS".

>Eh?  I say it's one of many factors, and you complain that I am overlooking
>other factors?  What does this mean?

Mr. Trask should have asked first, if he did not know what it means.
As I have pointed out to him elsewhere, it means that he should not always
try to find fault with the expressions of others' views, by saying they are
wrong, then giving his own version which includes their views as part.
That is both rude and not entirely honest (at least I would consider myself
dishonest if I did that).  Rather he should agree with his interlocutors as
far as he can, and say he accepts their views as a PART of his own when
he in fact does (as in this case he clearly did), and say that he needs to add
some refinements or modifications before he can agree fully.
It's an attitude and politeness problem, and also one of misrepresentation.

As to other misrepresentations, Trask in the list paraphrased here
implies he disagrees with others of us on a long list of items.

Trask says he does *not* believe that mutual intelligibility is *the*
criterion
     for setting up language boundaries.
He says he does *not* believe that it is the primary or sole criterion
     used by linguists in general.
He says he does *not* believe that it constitutes a "serious technical
definition".

He says he does *not* believe that it can be applied in a principled way.

He says he does *not* believe that the man in the street has a better
     conception of language boundaries than professional linguists do.
He says he does  *not* believe that individual languages just exist
     as discrete entities "out there".
He says he does *not* believe that the question "Are A and B the
     same language or different languages?" is generally meaningful
     or capable of being answered in a principled way.
He says he does *not* believe that a language can remain unchanged over time.

And Trask says he is afraid that this cumulation of disagreements
     doesn't seem to leave him many points of contact with me.

As has been apparent from his many communications, Mr. Trask
     repeatedly tries to paint others as having the views listed above,
     and similar ones.

Every one of these is a misrepresentation, and Mr. Trask has been
repeatedly informed of this fact.  So it is a deliberate misrepresentation.

Other than one item dealt with in more detail shortly below,
I agree with Mr. Trask on every single item in the list above.
Trask has been told that, on most of them repeatedly,
in one way or another.
Yet he insists on repeating various of these claims,
or versions of them, in a context in which he is attempting
to denigrate his conversation partners,
and adds to that the appearance (only) of great erudition.
Those are features which make these assertions libelous or slanderous.

(On one item, Mr. Trask regards
Lyle Campbell as a serious linguist, and his book as a serious book,
therefore it necessarily follows, though I suspect Trask will try to
evade this, that Campbell's use of "mutual intelligibility" as his
working definition for that book is a serious definition.
Doris Bartholomew, reviewing it in the prestigious journal Language,
quoted that definition without critical remarks.  Politeness to one's
fellow professional linguists should then require that it be treated
seriously, and that one should be able to explore the consequences
of using that definition.  Mr. Trask is clearly very intelligent,
and quite capable of doing so.  However he refuses to do so.)

>*What alternative criteria do you propose?*  *And how will they give
>better results?*

>Are you ever going to answer these questions?

Larry has repeatedly made the statement above.
It is a red herring, avoiding dealing with the poins which WERE raised.

I have repeatedly answered these questions.
I have done so here yet again.
Partly the answer is fewer exclusions, this will give better results
because of earlier awareness of the full range of native and
ancient vocabulary.
Anything more specific has to refer to specifics which
have been given elsewhere, some of them here yet again.

Lloyd Anderson
Ecological Linguistics