minimal pairs are not always there

[Stanley Friesen]

At 10:35 PM 12/11/00 +0200, you wrote:

>On Tue, 07 Nov 2000 Stanley Friesen <sarima at friesen.net> wrote:

>> Seems reasonable, though perhaps a bit overstated.  There are
>> plenty of words with some sort of sound-symbolism involving
>> perfectly good phonemes to make this too strong a statement.

>Yes, I grant you the point about sound-symbolism.  I always try
>to allow for this, ...

>But what kind of sound symbolism are you proposing that accounts
>for the fact that pronouns and deictic words in English have [D]
>while other words have [T]?

*I* am not proposing such a thing.  I just felt your original
counter-argument was overstated.  I actually agree with you that there is
no such thing in this particular case.  I just maintain that you cannot
conclude what you do from the data.

>   You can't just make the original
>point go away by some vague reference to sound symbolism without
>showing some connection to the present discussion.  For, if, as
>you agree, when sound symbolism isn't involved, the presence of a
>particular phoneme in a particular word shouldn't tell you
>anything about the meaning of that word, then how is it
>possible that the phoneme /D/ in initial position belongs
>exclusively to pronouns and deictic words?

I would rather say that the presence of a particular phoneme does not
*normally* tell one anything about the meaning of a word.  In addition to
sound-symbolism, I would allow for historical accidents in the origin of
the vocabulary making for temporary statistical anomalies of this sort.  In
other words, a bias in the distribution of a pair of sounds does not *by*
itself* constitute evidence that they are *currently* not distinct
phonemes, but only that at some fairly recent time they were not such.

>   When you can provide
>a convincing answer for this, then you will have made your point.
>Until then, I will continue to maintain that the presence of a
>particular phoneme in a particular word should tell you nothing
>about the meaning of that word (leaving aside the possibility of
>sound symbolism).

I maintain this is only a *statistical* *average* situation, and thus its
violation is not evidence for lack of phonemicity per se.

>>> In the pair ether/either, 'ether' belongs to a class of words
>>> where the pronunciation of <th> as [th] is required (by rule
>>> based on a clearly established pattern [Greek loans originally
>>> containing theta]);

>> I disagree. I do not respond to any such rule in my own
>> listening.  No such rule governs any pattern in my speech
>> production.  As far as I am aware, I just memorized the word
>> 'ether' as such.

>Well I can't argue with your perceptions, because they are in
>your head, not mine.  But this means that you have memorized
>the pronunciation of all other English words with <th> as well
>and when you see a new word with <th> you don't have a clue how
>to pronounce it.

Yep.  Though my vocabulary is so large, and I know so many foreign words I
can often recognize a word and guess its pronunciation based on its
cognates. (Which makes no use of any rule other than that, other things
being equal, related words have similar pronunciations).

>>>    Since the respective pronunciations of these words are
>>> required by rule, this cannot be a phonemic distinction because
>>> the choice of these sounds is not arbitrary.

>> It is in MY speech.  And I doubt many other English speakers
>> could be shown to have even a subliminal awareness of any such
>> rules.

>You still seem to be operating on the assumption that it is
>necessary to know how a system works in order to be able to use
>it.  By and large, native speakers do not know what the rules are
>in any conscious way.

That isn't the point.  Not only do I see no evidence that any speaker is
conscious of such a rule, I see precious little, if any, evidence that they
*act* on any such *unconscious* rule.  I require *evidence* from *behavior*
before I am willing to postulate an unconscious rule.  The mere fact of a
statistical anomaly is insufficient evidence for such without evidence that
speakers are at least subliminally *aware* of it.

>   They just know what sounds right.  And it
>is fully automatic.  ...

Perform an experiment on ordinary English speakers using made up words to
show that they in fact behave as if they had such a rule, and I will
consider your hypothesis.  (Leave out people with any substantial
linguistic training, as they may know too much consciously).

>> Not at all - there is such a thing as a *relictual* pattern. one
>> that is left over from prior history, but which has no *current*
>> linguistic significance.

>The entire language is a relictual pattern left over from prior
>history.  Otherwise you have a creole.  There are only relictual
>patterns that are no longer fully productive and ones that are.

And there are ones that at not *at* *all* productive.  I generally only
accept synchronic rules for *currently* *productive* patterns, at least
without considerable additional evidence.

>The latter are used to create new forms in the language by its
>speakers; the former are not.  Here is a good example of a
>relictual pattern that is no longer productive:  the English
>personal pronoun system.  Now tell me that this pattern has no
>significance for the *current* language or that native speakers
>aren't aware of it because it is a "relictual pattern left over
>from prior history."

They are aware of no *rules* generating it, we just memorize it, and how to
use it.  The sort of rule you are proposing is more of the sort that would
be used in generating *new* pronouns - it is a rule of word formation word
use (or, in traditional  terminology, phonemics not syntax).

>> The only evidence I would accept for a synchronic rule is
>> evidence from the speech behavior of native speakers.

>Okay, so you won't accept the list of words and pronunciations
>that I provided based on a contemporary corpus and dictionary.

Not *by* *itself* - not as evidence for an internal rule for *generating*
words.  There are many sets of words in the dictionary that are not related
by any rule whatsoever.

>Fine.  Take the same list and ask a couple of hundred native
>speakers how they pronounce these words.

How does this prove anything?  Native speakers *already* know how to
pronounce all of the words in their vocabulary - indeed, it is by asking
native speakers that the dictionary writers arrive at the pronunciations
therein.  To demonstrate a rule you have to use words the speaker does
*not* already know, and show they determine the pronunciation based on the
particular factor that you are proposing as a rule.

>   If you find significant
>differences from what I have provided, then you will have made
>your point.  But I think that you will find that this is the way
>that these words are pronounced by native speakers today.

Of course it is.  Alll that proves is that the dictionary writers wrote
down the right pronunciation for the words.  Memorization is as good an
explanation of this pattern as any other.  The sort of behavior pattern I
am talking about is one that goes beyond this in that it shows deeper
patterning than mere historical accident.

>> The mere existence of a pattern is not, by itself, sufficient to
>> establish a rule.

>The existence of patterns is the only basis for establishing
>rules.

But you are making your claim from one *static* pattern of words in the
dictionary.  That is not the only sort of pattern that exists.  There is
also the way in which speakers derive new words, and they ways in which
they mis-hear words when they are pronounced in opposition to rules, and
how they sound out written words they do not have in their active
vocabulary (though one must be careful here to rule out prior exposure to
the word).

To establish *linguistic* *rules* it is the *latter* sorts of patterns that
are required, as there are too many ways that mere static patterns of words
could have been caused to make any valid conclusion from that sort of
pattern alone.

>find patterns.  Now when you have a pattern that you can't
>account for, you are justified in saying that you can't account
>for the pattern, but you aren't justified in saying that the
>pattern has no significance because you can't account for it.

Fine.  I am not saying that.  I am saying that I can account for it just
fine thank-you as a non-productive, relictual pattern. I find that a
sufficient account, and see no need for anything more, at least not without
evidence that the pattern goes beyond old words.

>But above a certain level of coincidence or randomness, patterns
>not created by rules are ruled out by the second law of
>thermodynamics.

Only when the system has had time to reach equilibrium - which English has
not yet done with regard to /D/ vs. /T/.  (If any language in fact ever
does reach equilibrium).

--------------
May the peace of God be with you.         sarima at ix.netcom.com