minimal pairs (was: PIE e/o Ablaut)

[Ross Clark (FOA LING)]

I've tried to keep this short by eliminating some inessential paragraphs. RC

-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Whiting [mailto:whiting at cc.helsinki.fi]
Sent: Monday, 6 November 2000 7:52 a.m.
To: 'Indo-European at xkl.com'
Subject: RE: minimal pairs (was: PIE e/o Ablaut)


On Sat, 21 Oct 2000 "Ross Clark (FOA LING)"
<r.clark at auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

[snip]

>RW> Historical grammar, when we have a written record, is based
>RW> on empirically verifiable facts.  Synchronic grammar is based on
>RW> a hypothesis about how native speakers produce their language.  A
>RW> hypothesis is not a fact.  It is an explanation put forward to
>RW> account for observable facts.  People tend to forget this and
>RW> consider synchronic grammar a fact.  But whatever reality may
>RW> exist in the speaker's head just can't be gotten at at the
>RW> present time with our present knowledge.  In general, I agree
>RW> that what we are trying to get at is the reality in speakers'
>RW> heads, but it is a roundabout road that we have to take and we
>RW> have to have a realistic picture of language before we are likely
>RW> to get there.

RC>I'm not sure what you mean by "historical grammar" here.

RW>By "historical grammar" I mean the changes in grammar through
RW>time, studied systematically.  By grammar I mean those features
RW>of language that one will usually find in a standard grammar
RW>book:  phonology, morphology, and syntax, but generally not
RW>including pragmatics and lexicon.

RC>If it is an account of changes in the language, then it is
RC>surely an account of transitions from one synchronic grammar to
RC>another, and hence subject to the same epistemological
RC>vulnerability you attribute to the latter.

RW>Hardly.  At any given period the speakers of a language will
RW>produce a corpus of language.  For this to be useful for
RW>historical purposes it must be recorded somehow -- either as
RW>texts or by being recorded as a spoken corpus by a competent
RW>field linguist.  The recorded corpus of language becomes a body
RW>of data.  This data can be minutely compared with similar data
RW>from other periods and the differences noted in detail.  Consider
RW>the following diagram:

  speakers     +     rules      -->      Old English
                                               |
  speakers     +     rules      -->      Middle English
                                               |
  speakers     +     rules      -->      Modern English

RW>Synchronic (generative) grammar is concerned with the horizontal
RW>rows.  Historical grammar is concerned only with the final
RW>column.  Since we don't know what goes on in speaker's minds,
RW>everything to the left of the arrows is an assumption.  We assume
RW>that speakers start from a certain point and apply a certain set
RW>of rules to arrive at the corpus on the right of the arrows.  But
RW>everything to the right of the arrows is data.  When we move from
RW>one set of data to another we also formulate rules to account for
RW>the changes.  The difference is that that the historical rules
RW>are not based on assumptions about how speakers produce language,
RW>but on observed differences in the language that speakers have
RW>produced.  Synchronic grammar is simply cut out of the loop in
RW>historical grammar.

I doubt that this description fits anything that we are familiar with under
the name of historical grammar. A corpus is not a language, and I find it
hard to imagine, say, historical syntax couched in terms of differences
between a sentence found in an OE corpus and another one found in a ME
corpus. (I don't mean examples, I mean the statements of historical
grammar.) As soon as you even begin to talk about, say, cases, constituents
or constructions, you are already moving left of the arrows.

[snip]

RC>So, in your view, we have, on the one hand, "the language that
RC>speakers produce" -- texts, I guess. Presumably the "empirically
RC>verifiable facts" on which you see historical grammar as being
RC>based are of the same sort.

RW>Precisely.  This is what I have said.  The language that speakers
RW>produce synchronically is exactly the same language that we
RW>arrive at by tracing its historical development.  The outcomes of
RW>both methods are the same.  But the historical rules and the
RW>synchronic rules that produce it will not necessarily be the same.

RC>On the other hand we have "the cognitive processes that produce
RC>language", "whatever reality may exist in a speaker's head",
RC>which is at present unknowable. Yet apparently we are able to
RC>describe "how language works linguistically", "a realistic
RC>picture of language". And what criteria do we have as to what is
RC>"realistic" in this description? Is this what was once called the
RC>Hocus Pocus view -- that a linguistic description is simply an
RC>efficient and elegant description of a body of data, without
RC>reference to any possible mental reality?

RW>Realistic means based on realia -- things that actually exist as
RW>opposed to mental constructs.

This is not sufficient to make any discrimination among linguistic
descriptions. Any linguist of any theoretical persuasion will claim that
their description is "based on" "things that actually exist". However, I
guess it might distinguish you from a radical Hocuspocusian.

RW>When you start talking about
RW>"mental reality" you are getting into a murky area of philosophy.
RW>Is there such a thing as "mental reality"?  This is something
RW>that can be discussed endlessly and inevitably inconclusively.

Well, that's what philosophers are paid to do. As linguists, I think we
should simply admit that insofar as our synchronic descriptions are any more
than mere transcription, they are attempts to capture some aspect of mental
reality.

[snip]

>RC>> The rest of your post is entirely dependent on the further
>RC>> assumption that native speakers of modern English (in general,
>RC>> not just linguists) distinguish "foreign" from "native" words,
>RC>> and that the words I listed with /th/ in voiced environments are
>RC>> marked as "foreign". Since I don't share this assumption, I would
>RC>> like to know what evidence leads you to it. Do you have any such
>RC>> evidence, other than the fact that by excluding these hundreds of
>RC>> words you can arrive at a nice phonological generalization?

>RW> Let me answer this from back to front.

>RW> You ask what evidence I have that native speakers
>RW> distinguish by rule the [th] of loan words from the [dh] of
>RW> native words other than hundreds of examples and the fact that it
>RW> produces a nice phonological generalization.

RC>This is not quite what I said. I said that in order to arrive at
RC>your nice generalization you need to *exclude* hundreds of
RC>English words, and I asked what independent evidence you had that
RC>these words are somehow marginal to the structure of English?

RW>I don't remember saying that these words were marginal to the
RW>structure of English and I don't remember your saying it
RW>previously.  I didn't say these words were marginal to the
RW>structure of English.  I said that these words follow a different
RW>rule from native English words and that foreign words don't
RW>necessarily follow the same rules as native words.  So these
RW>words aren't marginal to English -- there are too many of them --
RW>they just follow different rules.

RW>But I can see that I shouldn't expect connections to be made when
RW>these connections have not been expressly stated.  So let's start
RW>again.  Grimm's Law says that certain PIE consonants shift in a
RW>certain way in Germanic.  But there are a large number of
RW>exceptions.  One exception is that unvoiced stops don't shift
RW>when the stop is the second part of a voiceless cluster (thus
RW>/sp/, /st/, and /sk/ remain unshifted).  However, even with this,
RW>there are still a large number of exceptions to Grimm's Law.
RW>Verner's Law says that when the PIE stress fell after the
RW>consonant then the consonant shifted in a different way.  So
RW>Verner's Law in effect *excludes* hundreds of Germanic words from
RW>the effects of Grimm's Law thereby producing a nice phonological
RW>generalization.

This is the most peculiar interpretation of Verner's Law I have ever seen.
The fact is that Verner made it possible to *include* many words which had
previously simply been sidelined as "exceptions".

RW>What independent evidence is there that Verner's
RW>Law correctly excludes these words?  Only the fact that when it
RW>can be checked, the PIE stress does fall after the consonant in
RW>those cases where the consonant does not shift according to
RW>Grimm's Law.  Of course this might just be coincidence, and some
RW>people might not accept Verner's Law and ask what independent
RW>evidence there is for it other than that when you exclude these
RW>words using this rule you get the nice phonological generalization
RW>known as Grimm's Law.

If someone asked this I would have to conclude that they had not understood
either.

>RW> This seems rather like asking what evidence I have for
>RW> Grimm's Law or Verner's Law other than hundreds of examples and
>RW> the fact that they provide a nice phonological generalization.

RC>No, because you are not presenting this as a historical law. As
RC>a historical explanation of why /th/ occurs in certain places and
RC>/dh/ in others, it is not in dispute.

RW>Historical law - historical explanation -- What's the difference
RW>in your mind?

You misunderstood me. I was not proposing an antithesis.

RW>What happened happened.  If the explanation can be
RW>stated as a rule and is not in dispute, what is the problem?

What I said was that the *historical* explanation of the distribution of
[th] and [dh] in native English words was not in dispute. What we are
arguing about is a *synchronic* account of [th] and [dh] in Modern English.
This is why the comparison with Grimm/Verner was not appropriate.

[snip]

>RW> But ultimately, it is unimportant whether speakers can still
>RW> recognize foreign words after several centuries or not. The
>RW> pronunciation rules are marked in the lexicon.  The native
>RW> speaker learns these rules and follows them.  It is these rules
>RW> that produce the pattern, not the speaker's perception of the
>RW> words as native or non-native.

>RW> For other evidence that native speakers distinguish by rule
>RW> the [th] of loan words from the [dh] of native words I offer the
>RW> pattern created by the presence of intervocalic [th] and [dh] in
>RW> English words.

RC>This is not "other evidence". This *is* your evidence.

RW>Then my position is unassailable.

I think you should be worried about this. "Self-validating" might be another
way of putting it.

RW>As with Verner's Law, the fact
RW>that the rule by which the exclusions are made is valid and leads
RW>to a valid generalization is sufficient.

Not in the slightest like Verner's Law, as I've pointed out. Consider: For
any pair of English phonemes (say /p/ and /b/) it is possible to extract a
subset of the words in which they occur where the two are in "complementary
distribution". (Say [p] initially and [b] medially, so we include pig,
nibble and rubber, but exclude big, nipple and supper.) We then state that
there is only one phoneme, but that the excluded words "follow a different
rule". What principle would exclude such a ridiculous analysis?

[snip]

RC>As I understand your position, you are claiming that there is a
RC>single phoneme, say /th/, with a realization rule that says
RC>(among other things) that /th/ is realized as [dh]
RC>intervocalically, except in certain exceptional words.

RW>Close.  I claim that there was once a single phoneme /th/ in
RW>English.  Then that this phoneme became voiced to [dh]
RW>intervocalically without creating any new contrasts (/th/ now
RW>has allophones [th, dh]).  Then that any words that came into the
RW>language with intervocalic [th] after this sound change operated
RW>retain [th] intervocalically (this is not necessarily restricted
RW>to loanwords; it could also include new coinings -- there just
RW>don't seem to be any with intervocalic [th]).  There is nothing
RW>particularly exceptional about words with intervocalic [th]
RW>except that the vast majority of them came into the language
RW>after the sound change.  There are a few native words with
RW>intervocalic [th] (for reasons that can be accounted for), but
RW>there are no loanwords that originally had intervocalic [th] that
RW>now have [dh].  This is exceptional, at least to the extent that
RW>there are no exceptions.

[snip]

RC>Meanwhile, how do we know that children and the less educated
RC>actually formulate the rule this way? If they did, one would
RC>expect that errors consisting of pronouncing [dh]
RC>intervocalically in words which should have [th] would be common.
RC>I don't recall any such tendency from my experience as a native
RC>speaker of English, but surely it's you that should be looking
RC>for such evidence.

RW>My point is that we don't know how any speaker actually
RW>formulates the rule.  What goes on on the left side of the arrows
RW>is a mystery.  All we know is that there is a pattern, the
RW>historical reason for the pattern, and that, synchronically,
RW>patterns must be accounted for by rules.  My further point is
RW>that it doesn't matter that we can't formulate the synchronic
RW>rule.  There must be one, or the pattern wouldn't be there.

Since you are sure there is a rule, and are even willing to state it, I
don't see why you claim it is such a mystery.

RW>And I must confess that I did not consider the effect of
RW>mispronunciation in the same way that you do.  You said that
RW>native speakers don't recognize these words with intervocalic
RW>[th] as loans.  My assumption was that if they don't recognize
RW>them as loans, then they would mispronounce them by treating them
RW>as native words and pronouncing intervocalic <th> as [dh].  This
RW>would support your contention.  But your assumption seems to be
RW>that if they do recognize them as loans then they would see them
RW>as words in need of nativization and would mispronounce them in
RW>an attempt to nativize them.  This would support what you see as
RW>my contention.

RW>But it is not my contention that native speakers recognize these
RW>words as loans.  That is, as you so readily agree, merely the
RW>historical explanation for why these words have intervocalic
RW>[th], and what you have assumed is my contention.  I will quite
RW>as readily agree that I don't really know how native speakers
RW>recognize the words as exceptional.  The more educated may
RW>recognize them as loans, the less educated may simply memorize
RW>the correct pronunciation as exceptions (as they memorize the
RW>exceptions in plural forms such as 'foot' / 'feet'.  Since
RW>neither of us have noticed any tendency to mispronounce these
RW>words the point about what such mispronunciation would prove is
RW>moot.  But I do maintain that there is some synchronic rule that
RW>maintains this pronunciation or else *all* loans with
RW>intervocalic [th] wouldn't still have this pronunciation.

We may be working from fundamentally different conceptions of how languages
are organized here. I repeat your schema from the discussion of historical
grammar:

 speakers     +     rules      -->      Old English

>From this it would appear that, for you, "rules" includes all the
information commonly thought of as being part of the lexicon. Just above,
you stated that "The pronunciation rules are marked in the lexicon", which
makes me wonder whether you share an assumption that I had been taking as
given, namely that there are two different types of information/knowledge
relevant here:

	(i) information about the phonological shape of particular lexical
items -- for example, the fact that the English word for "fish" has an /f/
in initial position.
	(ii) general information about the realization of particular
segments and configurations (such as allophonic and morphophonemic rules).

In my experience, most people would use the term "rules" of the latter type
of information, but not the former.

[snip]

>RW> The best evidence that the pattern is created by rule by the
>RW> speakers of the language is the fact that the pattern exists.
>RW> For if there is a pattern in a language, synchronically it must
>RW> be created by its speakers because that is the only place that
>RW> language comes from.  If the pattern is not created by rule, then
>RW> it is simple coincidence.

RC>No, this is where you go wrong.

RW>I presume that "this is where you go wrong" is your way of saying
RW>that your opinion is different from mine. :)

Isn't that what "wrong" usually means? :)

RC>The pattern has been created by historical changes in the
RC>language. That is what creates the distribution of [dh] and [th]
RC>that is the input to each speaker's language-learning task. There
RC>is no general principle that speakers must recognize (consciously
RC>or unconsciously) any such pattern, or make use of it in their
RC>rule-governed language behaviour.

RW>No, the modern language is not created by the historical events
RW>that brought it about.

?There is obviously a distinction in your mind between "create" and "bring
about" which I am not picking up. Otherwise you have contradicted yourself.
Or is it the tense distinction between "is created" (by speakers,now) and
"brought it about" (in the past). In either case, I am happy to re-state my
claim above as:

The historical changes *brought about* the present distribution of [dh] and
[th].

RW>The modern language is created by what
RW>goes on on the left side of the arrows in the diagram above.
RW>This is the assumption of generative grammar.  And it is a basic
RW>premise of generative grammar that patterns must be accounted for
RW>by rules.  If you have evidence, rather than just an intuition,
RW>that linguistic patterns are not created by rules, then please
RW>share it.  It will revolutionize synchronic grammar.

No, I don't think it will. My view is one you have probably heard before:
That there are two distinct phonemes /th/ and /dh/, which occur in various
words in various positions. A subset of the English vocabulary shows a
pattern of complementary distribution between these phonemes. The pattern is
there in the vocabularies of English speakers because it is there in the
corpus of presently spoken English on which they have based their
internalized knowledge of English. And it is in the corpus as a consequence
of changes which took place long ago in the history of the language.

Your analysis (again, correct me if I'm wrong) postulates a single phoneme
/th/ with two different "pronunciation rules". Some words follow a rule that
says intervocalic /th/ is pronounced [th], and others a rule that says it is
pronounced [dh]. Which words follow which rule presumably has to be marked
on individual lexical items.

In the broad sense implicit in your schema, both analyses produce the
[th]/[dh] pattern by "rules". (In the narrower sense, however, your analysis
has "rules" that mine doesn't.)

Now that we have two analyses to compare, perhaps you can explain why you
think yours is superior.

Ross Clark

[snip]

The following is something of an excursus, but too interesting to snip:

RC>Actually, I am arguing that English speakers do not consider
RC>words like "author", "Ethel", or "method" to be unusual in any
RC>way.

RW>First, let us dispense with the idea that there is nothing in any
RW>way unusual about 'Ethel'.  You can't say that 'Ethel' is not
RW>unusual in any way because it is unusual from the moment it stops
RW>being a word in the language and becomes a personal name.  It is
RW>no longer a lemma of the language, it becomes part of a special
RW>corpus, the corpus of personal names.  Generally, you won't find
RW>personal names listed in the lexicon (dictionary), although they
RW>may be collected in a separate section.  If personal names are
RW>listed in the lexicon, they do not have a meaning, only a
RW>functional label: "masc. PN", "fem. PN", or the like.

Personal names are semantically distinctive, it is true. I don't agree that
they don't have a meaning. (Their meaning is roughly "person named X", where
X is the phonological shape. Thus defining them in dictionaries would be a
rather tedious waste of space.) Still less do I agree that they are not
words of the language.

RW>In addition to being lexically exceptional, personal names, are
RW>also phonologically exceptional.  Personal names are, well,
RW>personal.  People identify with their names in more ways than
RW>one.  When someone has been called something all his life (his
RW>name), he will resist changing it; even if the sounds in his name
RW>change in the language he will resist introducing these changes
RW>into his name.  If others mispronounce his name, he will correct
RW>them.  Personal names, then, have the potential to withstand
RW>phonetic changes that take place elsewhere in the language with
RW>the result that such changes often bypass personal names.

How we feel about our names has nothing to do with their phonological
exceptionality or otherwise. If you have actual evidence of the
resistance-to-sound-change phenomenon, let's hear it. My ancestors appear to
have offered no resistance to the relatively recent sound change by which
"Clerk" became "Clark".

RW>So linguistically, practically everything is unusual about
RW>'Ethel'.  Historical linguists know that personal names are a
RW>fruitful hunting ground for archaisms -- forms that have long
RW>disappeared from the rest of the language.

A personal name is a distinct lexical item from any word that may have gone
into its formation. As such, it may survive when the original word is lost.
Just as OE guma "man" survives only in "bridegroom". This is not indicative
of a special status for personal names.

RW>Even small children
RW>know that names are different.  When my daughter was about 3, she
RW>got a new doll.  She soon began saying "sisibamakin".  When I
RW>asked her what "sisibamakin" was she said it was her doll.  "But
RW>what does it mean?", I asked.  "It doesn't mean anything, it's
RW>her name," was her reply.  So speakers don't really treat
RW>personal names as a normal part of language.

Names are distinctive in that they are attached to people (and dolls) in a
particular way. This does not mean that they are phonologically
extra-systemic.

RW>They are simply
RW>labels without linguistic connotations.

Surely you can't mean this.

RW>  They stand outside both
RW>the normal lexicon and normal phonological rules.

So far I've seen no evidence for this.

RC>So if someone tells you that his or her name is Abraham or Avram
RC>or Ethel or Stanley or Ahmed or Rumpelstiltskin, you don't
RC>question how it fits into the phonology of your language.  You
RC>just accept it because that's his or her name.

Do you really mean that English speakers never drop the /h/ from "Ahmed" to
make it fit English phonotactics? I'm astonished.

[end of excursus]

[snip some rather repetitive material]