<div dir="ltr"><h1 class="" id="page-title">Soft Belarusization: A New Shift in Lukashenka's Domestic Policy?</h1>
<div class=""><span class=""></span> <span class="">21 April 2015</span></div>
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<p>Russian pro-government media outlet Lifenews has recently criticised
Lukashenka's decision to not participate in the 9 May Victory Day Parade
in Moscow. <span style="line-height:1.6em">Many in Russia think that Minsk's integration rhetoric has been replaced with a form of soft </span>Belarusianisation<span style="line-height:1.6em">
. Following the events in Crimea, Lukashenka has begun to demonstrate
more support and concern for the Belarusian language and national
history.</span></p>
<p>Still, he is trying to maintain some balance and good relations with
Russia for the sake of its economic support. The last time the political
scale shifted in this direction, increased rhetoric about independence
and more engagement with Europe followed.</p>
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<p>In addition to the state's renewed interest in Belarusisation and
cultural initiatives, support for these changes in society is also on
the rise. The 'soft' Belarusisation policy and the activity of the
organisations such as Art Siadziba are in growing demand in Belarus.</p>
<p><strong>Soft Belarusization as a Response to Russian Aggression</strong></p>
<p>The term 'soft Belarusisation' was employed by Lukashenka publicly
for the first time during his open dialogue with the media in January
2015. Judging by his words, it appears that Lukashenka regards
Belarusisation as means of countering Russian influence. "Some in Russia
are bothered by some soft Belarusisation … while in Russia they are
accustomed to using terms like 'the Russian World', 'soft power'. We
have promoted 'soft Belarusisation' [at home]," said Lukashenka.</p>
<p>However, the reality after Crimea's annexation has discounted popular
opinion (especially among opponents of the regime) that Lukashenka is
an ideological supporter of Russia and is willing to sacrifice
Belarusian independence, if need be.</p>
<p>On the contrary, after following the events in Crimea, Lukashenka has
solidified his role as a mediator and peacekeeper on the Ukrainian
issue and has started moving slowly towards promoting a Belarusian
national revival. Lukashenka explained his new position by stating, “I
support the Belarusian language, because it distinguishes us from the
Russians. This is a feature of our nation”.</p>
<p><strong>Language, History and Political Balance </strong></p>
<p>The Belarusian head of state explained his new policy in simple and <a href="http://belarusdigest.com/story/lukashenka-trying-emancipate-belarus-russian-culture-19510">straightforward manner</a>
in April 2014 when he declared, "we are not Russians, we are
Belarusians", a mere month after the occupation of Crimea began. In the
past, he has freely spouted off slogans like "Belarus and Russia are one
nation" and other similar phrases indicating their oneness.</p>
<p>As of late, he has turned towards employing the Belarusian language
in his speeches. The Ministry of Education's own policies also appear to
be following Lukashenka's lead. For example, according to Minister of
Education Mikhail Zhuravkov, “we will soon come to understand that we
need to have more than half of all academic subjects in the Belarusian
language”.</p>
<p>Official attitudes towards history have also changed. Previously, the
authorities mainly focused their energies on the Great Patriotic War
(World War II), but now their opinions have shifted towards early
periods of time in Belarus's history. The installation of a monument in
honour of Algerd, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, is just one such example,
erected in Vitebsk, near the border with Russia, on 27 June 2014
(Vitebsk's City Day).</p>
<p>The Grand Duke Algerd doubled the domain he reigned over through wars
with Moscow at a time when Belarusian lands were an essential region in
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It is plain for anyone to see how this
historical figure does not suit Lukashenka's prior rhetoric about the
"historical friendship and unity" of Belarus and Russia.</p>
<p>The Vitebsk Cossacks and the Communists have made an appeal to Minsk,
asking Lukashenka not to erect the Algerd monument. Historical memory,
as it turns out, is much more important to the authorities than local
pro-Russian social movements' support – and the monument was solemnly
unveiled as officials from Vitebsk looked on.</p>
<p>Lukashenka justified this move, saying, “At one point in Vitebsk ...
some people started saying that because of the [process] 'soft
Belarusisation', Belarus will lose out on its Russian interests, and so I
asked the question: where are our interests? Everything that is on
Belarusian territory is our vital interest”.</p>
<p>Altogether this form of Belarusisation, i.e. the gradual, largely
voluntary extension of the use of the Belarusian language, support for
the development and dissemination of Belarusian culture, historical and
cultural heritage via the creation of cultural policy, is slowly
beginning to take hold.</p>
<p><strong>Not Only State: Public Belarusization </strong></p>
<p>Of course, this policy of Belarusisation is not simply the domain of
the Belarusian authorities. In society, demand is growing for the
promotion of the Belarusian language and the nation's history and
culture. The events in Ukraine have increased these types of
initiatives’ popularity and stimulated manifestations of patriotism and
national identity.</p>
<p>Consider the recent Festival of Belarusian Culture “Sniezhan” (31
January 2015) or a Belarusian language pub-quiz game “Varta” about
Belarusian history (held three times from February-April 2015) that
recently sprung up. <span style="line-height:1.6em">There is also the independent cultural initiative Art </span>Siadziba<span style="line-height:1.6em"> (</span><span style="line-height:1.6em">Art Headquarters) that organises a </span><a href="http://belarusdigest.com/story/vyshyvanka-day-golden-age-university-forum-entrepreneurs-civil-society-digest-20843" style="line-height:1.6em">variety of popular events</a><span style="line-height:1.6em"> to promote </span>Belarusian<span style="line-height:1.6em"> culture and the arts and manufactures clothes with traditional </span>Belarusian<span style="line-height:1.6em"> ornamentation. </span></p>
<p><span style="line-height:1.6em">Last, but not least, is the “Mother Language Festival”, organised by Art </span>Siadziba<span style="line-height:1.6em"> 22 February 2015 (International Mother Language Day by UNESCO). Thousands of </span>Belarusians<span style="line-height:1.6em"> attended free open courses in the </span>Belarusian<span style="line-height:1.6em"> language called </span>Mova<span style="line-height:1.6em"> </span>Ci<span style="line-height:1.6em"> </span>Kava<span style="line-height:1.6em"> & </span>Mova<span style="line-height:1.6em"> </span>Nanova<span style="line-height:1.6em"> in Minsk and many regional towns thanks to growing popular demand</span><span style="line-height:1.6em">.</span></p>
<p><strong>What Will Belarusisation Lead To? </strong></p>
<p>Lukashenka, however, has to seek a balance between both sides. On the
one hand, he has to use his traditional fraternal rhetoric and
alliances with Russia to get it to provide Belarus with loans and
discounted energy. On the other hand, Lukashenka needs to guide Belarus
away from Russia, be it through a policy of 'soft Belarusisation' or
improving ties with the West in order to minimise potential threats to
Belarusian sovereignty and to his own power.</p>
<p>All of these initiatives aimed at promoting Belarusisation –
sponsored by the state and civil society – are extremely popular and
relevant. To some extent, it reflects a new national-oriented period in
Lukashenka’s policy. New possibilities are slowly emerging for
Belarusian political and civil actors. Leading up to the presidential
election in November this year, one can only view from afar how they use
this window of opportunity.</p>
<p><em>Vadim Mojeiko</em></p>
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