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<a href="https://www.fpri.org/publications/baltic-bulletin">Baltic Bulletin</a></p>
<h1 class="event-det-title">Integration Policy & Perceptions in Estonia</h1>
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<a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/mridvika-sahajpal/">Mridvika Sahajpal</a>, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/silviu-kondan/">Silviu Kondan</a>, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/david-j-trimbach/">David J Trimbach</a></div>
<p class="eventlist-date gmail-pf-date">May 7, 2018</p>
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<div class="gmail-printfriendly"><a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/05/integration-policy-perceptions-in-estonia/#" rel="nofollow" class="gmail-noslimstat" title="Printer Friendly, PDF & Email"><img style="border: medium none; box-shadow: none;" src="https://cdn.printfriendly.com/buttons/printfriendly-button.png" alt="Print Friendly, PDF & Email"></a></div>
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<div class="gmail-desc">Mridvika Sahajpal is pursuing a Master's Degree in
European and Russian Affairs at the University of Toronto, Centre for
European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES).<a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/mridvika-sahajpal/">Read More</a></div>
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<div class="gmail-desc">Silviu Kondan is pursuing a master’s degree in
European and Russian Affairs at the University of Toronto, Centre for
European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES).<a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/silviu-kondan/">Read More</a></div>
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<div class="gmail-desc">Dr. David J. Trimbach is a Postdoctoral Research
Associate in the Department of Fisheries and Wildlife
at Oregon State University. <a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/david-j-trimbach/">Read More</a></div>
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<p><a href="https://www.fpri.org/research/eurasia/">Eurasia Program</a></p>
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<p>Broken international agreements, historical cleavages, and Russia’s
use of both hard and soft power in the Baltic states have caused some
analysts to worry that another conflict in Eastern Europe awaits.
Fearing that the Kremlin will launch a Crimea-style military
intervention, the media has fixated on rising Baltic military <a href="https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/01/22/the-baltic-region-is-the-world-leader-in-military-spending-expert" rel="noopener">spending</a>—expected to reach <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-military/baltics-fearing-russia-to-triple-military-spending-by-2018-report-idUSKCN12J2S4" rel="noopener">$2.1 billion</a>
by 2020. Yet, the most pressing threat to the Baltics is not the
possibility of conventional warfare in the upcoming months. Rather, it
is Russia’s ability to use soft or <a href="https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf" rel="noopener">sharp</a> power to achieve its aims.</p>
<p>Central to Russia’s soft power capabilities is the issue of Estonia’s
Russian-speaking minority population, largely a legacy of the illegal
Soviet occupation (1940-1991). Estonia’s multiethnic Russian-speaking
population comprises roughly <a href="https://www.stat.ee/64629" rel="noopener">30% </a>of Estonia’s total population of 1.3 million people, of which, an estimated <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/roads/2017/03/many_ethnic_russians_in_estonia_have_gray_passports_live_in_legal_limbo.html" rel="noopener">80,000 to 90,000</a>
individuals are stateless and carry the grey passport that denotes
undetermined citizenship. While stateless residents make up a small
percentage of Estonia’s total population, Estonia does contain the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/07/human-rights-watch-upr-submission-ohchr-estonia" rel="noopener">10th largest</a>
stateless population by state in the world. Statelessness and
Russian-speaker integration more broadly continues to be a major issue
of contention both internally between majority Estonians and
Russian-speakers and externally between Estonia and the Russian
Federation.</p>
<p>This ongoing contention continues to be reflected in the everyday
experiences of many Russian-speakers, who perceive group-based <a href="http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/59104/danylyuk_arsen_ma_2018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y" rel="noopener">discrimination</a>
in Estonian society and noted incidents of instability or volatility.
Such incidents include, but are not limited to, the failed 1990s
regional autonomy <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21645845-how-nervousness-over-russia-affects-daily-life-and-politics-border" rel="noopener">referendum</a> in Estonia’s predominantly Russian-speaking northeast; the 2007 <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-estonia-russia/estonian-capital-suffers-second-night-of-violence-idUKL2754678920070427" rel="noopener">Bronze soldier riot</a>,
which was sparked by the removal of a Soviet-era statue in Tallinn and
led to the death of one individual, the arrest of over 1,000 people, and
the first Russian<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/39655415" rel="noopener"> cyberwar</a>; and an attempted<a href="https://rus.err.ee/636518/foto-i-video-v-narve-muzhchina-pytalsja-sovershit-samosozhzhenie" rel="noopener"> self-immolation</a>
of a Russian pensioner in protest of the Estonian government. The
status and wellbeing of Estonian Russian-speakers have provoked the
Russian state in the past to voice official <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-estonia/moscow-signals-concern-for-russians-in-estonia-idUSBREA2I1J620140319?irpc=932" rel="noopener">concern</a>.
Such everyday experiences and noted incidences illustrate an underlying
fracture that the Russian state could potentially influence through
soft power.</p>
<p>While historically the security concerns of Central and Eastern
European states have been at odds with the rights of their minorities,
regional institutions now view minority integration as a means for
de-escalating interstate conflict. Specifically, in the Baltics, NATO,
the OSCE, and the EU have identified grey passports, socioeconomic
disparities between Russian-speakers and titular populations, and the
naturalization process as key policy <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a338b5c4.pdf" rel="noopener">challenges</a>.
For these organizations, the adoption of stable integration policies is
imperative to mitigate the risks associated with targeted hybrid
warfare.</p>
<p>Estonia has followed the recommendations of its regional partners and
gradually introduced more favorable integration policies for its
Russian-speakers. While simultaneously promoting national security as
the top policy objective, the government has <a target="_blank" rel="noopener">increased</a>
its efforts toward facilitating Estonian language-learning and
naturalization. While comparative data suggests that Estonia has
progressed well in social, political, and economic integration, debate
still surrounds the appropriate path forward.</p>
<h3><strong>Current Policy Developments</strong></h3>
<p>In its <a href="http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/integrating_estonia_2020.pdf" rel="noopener"><em>2020 Vision</em></a>,
the Estonian government identified three objectives to aid the
integration of minorities: (1) increasing the openness of Estonian
society towards multiculturalism, (2) supporting minority cultures and
languages, and (3) adapting integration policies for new and incoming
minorities. The current focus with regards to Russian-speakers is to
increase naturalization rates of youth and those with undetermined
citizenship through reformed naturalization laws and language
acquisition planning.</p>
<p>The continued use of language exams as a prerequisite for
naturalization poses the greatest challenge to the integration of
Russian-speakers, particularly stateless Russian-speakers. While
naturalization reform has made it much simpler for youth to become
citizens, older generations are still required to meet at least a B1
level of Estonian proficiency. For some Russian-speakers, the time and
money required to complete Estonian language classes presents too
significant a burden. For others, the requirement of
naturalization—despite being born on Estonian territory—provokes a
stigma of being classified as “secondary citizens.”</p>
<p>Incentives to preserve the grey passport have arguably also hindered
the success of the naturalization process. There are some practical
benefits to having undetermined status, such as travelling cost free
across both the EU and Russia, where Estonian citizens must get visas to
visit Russia. This dissuades some individuals from acquiring
citizenship. Regardless of these benefits, having access to political
participation at the national level remains a civic right that
Russian-speakers should enjoy. The reduction in undetermined citizenship
has been an ongoing goal for both policymakers and representatives of
the Russian-speaking community.</p>
<p>The language of instruction in schools is central to integration
debates. In Estonia, the minority group is allowed, albeit with some
restrictions, to choose the primary language of instruction. However,
tensions have emerged over allowing Russians to regulate their own
language acquisition, creating an immersion program for both Estonian
and Russian students, and/or assimilating Russian pupils into the
Estonian language.</p>
<p>In accordance with Estonia’s integration goals, the government has
settled on the following: as long as schools teach 60 percent of
subjects in Estonian during grades 10-12, Russian-language schools may
operate. However, these schools lag in educational standards due to a
lack of institutional support, understaffing, and insufficient bilingual
teaching capabilities. Furthermore, the introduction of the 60/40
bilingual split in tenth grade exacerbates the difficulties of weaker
Russian-language students. As a result, the families of Russian students
strongly oppose the government’s proposed benefits of the 60/40 policy.</p>
<p>Lastly, recognizing that an ethnic divide in media only fuels polarization, the government aims to <a href="https://wwwkul.rik.ee/sites/kulminn/files/6_meedia_eng.pdf" rel="noopener">integrate</a>
the information spaces between Estonian- and Russian-speakers. With the
implementation of the 2007 Estonian Public Broadcasting Act, Estonia
Public Broadcasting (ERR) became responsible for meeting the information
needs of all populations in Estonia. It established ETV+ as an
alternative Russian-language channel to combat targeted disinformation
campaigns from external Russian broadcasting. Interestingly, despite
significant funding and access gaps between Russian-speaking and ethnic
Estonian journalists, Russian-speaking journalists see themselves as
potential <a href="https://en.ejo.ch/media-politics/estonia-can-russian-speaking-journalists-help-two-communities-integrate" rel="noopener">mediators</a> between the two communities.</p>
<p>Thus, while the Estonian government has made strides toward achieving its objectives, <a href="http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=urceu" rel="noopener">public opinion</a> remains
divided. Some regard the government’s efforts as too invasive and
assimilatory, while others believe they are insufficient to counter the
alienation of Estonia’s Russian-speakers.</p>
<h3><strong>Integration Outcomes: Local Perceptions</strong></h3>
<p>What does integration policy look like to Estonia’s Russian-speakers?
Examining the impact of these policies as perceived by their target
community is critical to gauging policy effectiveness.</p>
<p>Our research shows that Russian-speakers vary in how they understand
citizenship and integration. When asked to assess the value of
citizenship in Estonia, around half deemed it important. Research shows
that Russians tend to value the acts associated with being a
citizen—i.e., voting, civic engagement, volunteering, protesting,
etc.—more than its legal status. This mixed perception of citizenship’s
value is illustrated by <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/estonian-citizenship-policy-restoration-country-leads-statelessness-some" rel="noopener">naturalization statistics</a>,
which reveal a steady decline since 2005. When asked about the
naturalization process, the majority of Russian-speakers stated that
learning the Estonian language should be a requirement. However, many
noted that naturalization is difficult, particularly due to current
language requirements and process length.</p>
<p>In our interviews, Russian-speakers demonstrated ambivalence toward
citizenship in their perceptions of integration. While a select few
voiced positive impressions of integration, most expressed more negative
attitudes. Some Russian-speakers saw no distinction between integration
and complete assimilation, thus illustrating the divisive and
politicized nature of integration policy. For example, one individual
asserted that the Estonian government was “forcing people to learn
Estonian and to become citizens.” Others suggested that integration is
ineffective because it neglects integral aspects of everyday life, like
basic interactions between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers. One
disillusioned Russian-speaker went as far as to say,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Integration in Estonia. . . . It’s dead. . . . I can actually tell
exactly the date when the integration was over . . . April 26, 2007
[date of <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-estonia-russia/estonian-capital-suffers-second-night-of-violence-idUKL2754678920070427">Bronze Soldier riots</a>].
So, as of April 26, it became apparent to me in 2007 about my role in
this society and about my possibilities – what I can achieve and cannot
achieve in this society.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This same individual, among others, shared a sense of Estonia’s “two
inequitable societies.” Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities lack
daily interactions and shared information spaces, particularly in the
predominantly Russian-speaking northeast. We heard stories of
Russian-speakers changing their surnames to better integrate. One
individual explained, “I know that some people have a negative attitude
towards me because I changed my surname from a Russian one to an
Estonian one. . . . But it just gives you some kind of benefit.”
Overall, the prevalence of such negative attitudes toward integration
illustrates a critical need for policy “resuscitation.”</p>
<h3><strong>Policy Recommendations</strong></h3>
<p>While it is easy to ignore Estonian integration policy within the
current geopolitical context, security and integration in Estonia deeply
intersect. Both are bellwethers of stability, especially as the
government derives political legitimacy from notions of democracy,
equality, and justice.</p>
<p>To implement effective and well-received policies, officials must
rectify the views of national security experts with the experiences of
Estonia’s Russian-speakers. We propose the following recommendations in
geopolitics and security and in minority integration and perceptions.</p>
<h4><em>Geopolitics & Security</em></h4>
<p>Hybrid threats continue to pose a security risk to the Baltic states.
Cyberwarfare and disinformation counter-campaigns must be present on
the government’s agenda. Studies on <a href="https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Jill_Dougherty__Riina_Kaljurand_-_Estonia_s__Virtual_Russian_World_.pdf" rel="noopener">information consumption</a>
reveal that Russian-speakers a) prioritize entertainment over news and
b) are skeptical of both Russian and Estonian news broadcasting.
Estonian broadcasting companies must therefore deliver programming that
matches the entertainment interests of Russian-speakers. They should
also market ETV+ as a tool for cultural exchanges and
language-learning—both for Russian-speakers and ethnic Estonians.</p>
<p>Social and digital media play an increasing role in information consumption. For example, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/02/fake-news-botnets-how-russia-weaponised-the-web-cyber-attack-estonia" rel="noopener">fake news</a>
targeted toward Russian- and Estonian-speakers in Estonia, shared or
perpetuated via social and digital media, may influence
Russian-speakers’ perceptions of the Estonian government. Recent
research shows that Estonians are the <a href="http://estonianworld.com/security/estonians-are-the-least-critical-of-the-dangers-of-fake-news-in-the-eu/)" rel="noopener">least critical</a>
of fake news and its potential dangers among EU residents. Measures are
needed to ensure active participation among both ethnic Estonians- and
Russian-speakers in information integration.</p>
<p>Our interviews further <a href="http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=urceu" rel="noopener">revealed</a>
the vulnerability of Russian-speakers in national discussions
surrounding security and defense. Fixating on the threat from Russia,
officials often wind up alienating Estonia’s Russian-speakers. To
prevent ethnic stereotyping in mainstream society, officials must take
caution to separate the Russian government and the Russian people as two
distinct entities. Similarly, in discussions of Estonia’s posture
toward Russia, policymakers should include a diverse array of
Russian-speaking perspectives, which have often been absent in such
conversations.</p>
<h4><em>Minority Integration & Perceptions</em></h4>
<p>Recognizing that naturalization has become easier for youth, we
recommend greater accommodation for Russian-speaking adults with
undetermined citizenship. Through long-term, fully or partially funded
language classes, the government can increase levels of Estonian
proficiency and ease the naturalization process. The government should
also prioritize consultation with Russian-speakers who feel
disenfranchised by the requirement of naturalization. Not only will this
help mitigate tensions, but it will allow the government to develop
more inclusive and equitable processes to better reflect the
community-wide challenges faced by Russian-speakers.</p>
<p>As acquisition planning continues to fuel grievances between
Russian-speakers and Estonian policymakers, proponents of the 60/40
education policy must address the concerns of Russian families. To
allocate teaching resources, the Estonian government should a) direct
more funding to Russian schools and b) ensure that Estonian and Russian
teachers are adequately trained so that neither language group is
systematically disadvantaged. To promote the holistic integration of
Russian-speaking youth, the government should consider full-immersion
programs, informal language learning classes, and exchange programs that
encourage active collaboration between ethnic Estonians and
Russian-speakers.</p>
<h3><strong>The Integration Work Continues</strong></h3>
<p>Estonia has introduced key multidimensional integration policies to
bridge more effectively Russian-speakers with mainstream Estonian
society; however, much work remains. Estonia’s naturalization process,
in particular, has undergone various amendments that have allowed for
easier access to citizenship. However, it continues to be measured as <a href="http://www.mipex.eu/estonia" rel="noopener">more restrictive</a> than its fellow EU member states, with the exception of Latvia, which shares somewhat similar <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/10/non-citizen-non-question-latvia-struggles-leave-soviet-legacy-behind/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">policies</a> and national <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-latvia-russia-next-20150502-story.html" rel="noopener">concerns</a>.</p>
<p>The geographic concentration and separation of Russian-speakers,
particularly in the northeast, reflect a need to better integrate
Russian-speaking areas. For example, President Kersti Kaljulaid has
unexpectedly committed to <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/0223/As-Estonia-turns-100-a-new-embrace-of-its-Russian-speakers" rel="noopener">relocating </a>her office to Russian-majority Narva for one month in 2018, building upon past efforts to <a href="https://news.err.ee/120675/preliminary-plans-to-relocate-state-agencies-out-of-tallinn-made-public" rel="noopener">relocate</a>
state institutions to the region. These efforts highlight a path
forward. However, the challenge remains to balance responsibly the local
perceptions and input of the Russian-speaking community with the
overall security of the state.</p>
<p><em>This work combines findings from complementary studies carried out by the authors including </em><a href="http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=urceu"><em>Integration Policy and Outcomes for the Russian-Speaking Minority in Estonia</em></a><em> and research on </em><a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/estonian-citizenship-policy-restoration-country-leads-statelessness-some"><em>citizenship</em></a><em>, </em><a href="http://balticworlds.com/understanding-narva-identity/"><em>identity</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2015.1110040?journalCode=rege20"><em>Estonian Russian-speakers</em></a><em>. Mridvika Sahajpal and Silviu Kondan </em><em>conducted research from a policy perspective at the national level through interviews with officials and policy-makers, while</em><em> David J. Trimbach engaged in mixed-method research at the local level with Russian-speakers.</em></p>
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<br clear="all"><br>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+<br><br> Harold F. Schiffman<br><br>Professor Emeritus of <br> Dravidian Linguistics and Culture <br>Dept. of South Asia Studies <br>University of Pennsylvania<br>Philadelphia, PA 19104-6305<br><br>Phone: (215) 898-7475<br>Fax: (215) 573-2138 <br><br>Email: <a href="mailto:haroldfs@gmail.com" target="_blank">haroldfs@gmail.com</a><br><a href="http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/" target="_blank">http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/</a> <br><br>-------------------------------------------------</div>
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