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<h1>Nothing new about Indonesia’s foreign worker language regulations</h1>
<time datetime="2018-07-18T22:00:38+10:00">18 July 2018</time>
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<p>Author: Tommy Koh, UBC</p>
<p>Just two days after Indonesia’s recently held <em>Pilkada </em>(<a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/22/are-indonesias-regional-elections-a-barometer-for-2019/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">local elections</a>),
Presidential Regulation 20/2018 on the use of foreign workers in
Indonesia came into effect on 29 June 2018. With election results
capturing the attention of Indonesians and observers, it is likely that
few noticed the implementation of the decree, signed by Jokowi almost
three months prior. Yet there remain lingering concerns, especially
among the business community, about the impact of the regulation on
foreign workers.<span id="gmail-more-136901"></span></p>
<p><img class="gmail-aligncenter gmail-wp-image-136904 gmail-size-medium" title="Workers prepare reinforcing steel at a tunnel under construction for the China-financed Jakarta-Bandung fast train, in Jakarta, Indonesia, 2 May 2018 (Photo: Antara Foto/Aprillio Akbar/ via Reuters)." src="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-05-02T083653Z_1214679205_RC1FD8F252C0_RTRMADP_3_INDONESIA-RAILWAY-400x267.jpg" alt="Workers prepare reinforcing steel at a tunnel under construction for the China-financed Jakarta-Bandung fast train, in Jakarta, Indonesia, 2 May 2018 (Photo: Antara Foto/Aprillio Akbar/ via Reuters)." width="400" height="267"></p>
<p>Much of the present fear stems from a recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/world/asia/indonesia-language-foreign-permits.html?rref=collectionper cent2Ftimestopicper cent2FIndonesia&action=click&contentCollection=world®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>New York Times </em>article</a>
analysing a provision in the regulation that allegedly orders foreign
workers to learn the Indonesian language. The clause of interest is a
single line in the regulation, buried in Article 26 of Chapter 3. <a href="https://www.ibai.or.id/images/publication/2018/Presidential-Regulation-The-Use-of-Foreign-Workers/Presidential_Regulation_No_20_of_2018_on_The_Use_of_Foreign_Workers.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Loosely translated</a>,
it states that employers of foreign workers are obliged to ‘facilitate
Indonesian language education and training to foreign workers’. But
reading this as a new development with substantial adverse effects is
unnecessarily alarmist and ignores the significant continuities in
Indonesia’s policy toward foreign workers.</p>
<p>Requiring foreign workers to learn Indonesian is not new. It has
roots in two regulations, neither of which have been actively enforced.
The first is a 2013 Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration regulation
that requires foreign workers to communicate in the Indonesian language.
The second is a government regulation from 2014 stipulating that
foreign workers who do not meet required language proficiency will be
sent for language training. Put simply, nothing has changed.</p>
<p>While it is possible that the new regulation represents a renewed
commitment by the Jokowi administration to impose a foreign worker
language requirement, this is unlikely for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, critical local economic stakeholders such as multi-national
corporations are disproportionately affected by the policy. These
stakeholders have the ability to impose significant economic
repercussions upon Indonesia if they feel they are being disadvantaged
by local language requirements.</p>
<p>Second, Indonesia is a labour exporting country (especially in the care sector) and <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/08/remittances-are-ripping-off-migrant-workers-in-asean/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remittances</a>
from overseas workers contribute meaningfully to the Indonesian
economy. The possibility of other countries retaliating by subjecting
Indonesian foreign workers to the same language requirements will be
both politically and economically untenable.</p>
<p>These represent compelling reasons for the Jokowi administration to
continue avoiding the enforcement of foreign worker language
requirements.</p>
<p>Identifying the new regulation as keeping with the status quo rather
than making a ground-breaking change allows us to discard several
suggested explanations for the inclusion of the language clause. The
argument that the language requirement is to crack down on the
increasing numbers of illegal Chinese labourers in Indonesia is not
compelling. Not only would these irregular and unregulated migrants not
be subject to the new provision if enforced, but subjecting legal
Chinese migrants to stringent language requirements is likely to push
such migrants to illegal channels. If illegal Chinese labourers are
indeed the primary concern, the availability of targeted policy tools
(such as site checks) that are not a blanket language requirement are
likely to be more effective and less politically costly.</p>
<p>So why was the provision included in the new presidential order?
After all, if a policy is not being enforced, why include the same
wording again?</p>
<p>The popularity among Indonesians of symbolically subjecting foreign
workers to a local language requirement is crucial to understanding the
language clause. Even if the policy is not actively enforced, the
clause’s existence enables the Jokowi administration to point to it as
evidence of the government’s commitment to nationalism and
prioritisation of Indonesian culture and language. Amid concerns
surrounding foreign investment, having policy clauses that affirm the
primacy of Indonesia provides the Jokowi administration with legitimacy.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most important takeaway here relates to the stickiness of
policy wording. The continuity of an unenforced policy is less a
response to <em>existing </em>political opposition and more an effort to avoid the <em>potential </em>political
backlash of changing the policy. The nuance here between inaction and
action is noteworthy. The new regulation is not a radical departure but
merely the quiet continuation of existing policy that seeks to balance
domestic political priorities and continued economic growth. If the
current language of the regulation is a holdover rather than an
intentional shift in policy intent, repercussions are unlikely to be
severe.</p>
<p>It is easy to misinterpret the presidential regulation because of the
gaps that exist between policy wording, policy enforcement and policy
intent. Understanding previous regulations is both instructive and
critical.</p>
<p>A comment obtained by the <em>New York Times </em>from the American
Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia highlighted a desire for ‘predictable
rules’. The Jokowi administration’s language clause in the new
regulation is nothing but predictable. There is little reason to read
the inclusion of the language clause as a radical change. Business as
usual can continue.</p>
<p><em>Tommy KS Koh is a Master of Public Policy and Global Affairs
candidate at the University of British Columbia (UBC) and a Graduate
Student Researcher at UBC’s Institute of Asian Research.</em></p></section></article></section></div>
<br clear="all"><br>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+<br><br> Harold F. Schiffman<br><br>Professor Emeritus of <br> Dravidian Linguistics and Culture <br>Dept. of South Asia Studies <br>University of Pennsylvania<br>Philadelphia, PA 19104-6305<br><br>Phone: (215) 898-7475<br>Fax: (215) 573-2138 <br><br>Email: <a href="mailto:haroldfs@gmail.com" target="_blank">haroldfs@gmail.com</a><br><a href="http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/" target="_blank">http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/</a> <br><br>-------------------------------------------------</div>
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