[Lingtyp] comparative concepts

Sun Jan 24 22:56:05 UTC 2016

In our forthcoming book The role of functions in syntax: a unified
approach to language theory,
description, and typology (Zygmunt Frajzyngier
with Erin Shay, to appear; Amsterdam: Benjamins), we demonstrate that if
one takes a language as a system (see Gilbert Lazard¹s last email) one can
explain similarities and differences across languages without recourse to
comparative concepts. The only elements used in such a comparison are the
functions actually encoded in individual languages. The approach does not
require aprioristic definitions of any kind. (See also Frajzyngier 2013:
Non-aprioristic typology as a discovery tool. In Functional-Historical
Approaches to Explanation: In honor of Scott
DeLancey, ed. by Tim Thornes, Erik Andvik, Gwen Hyslop and Joana Jansen.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 3-25.)

Best,
Zygmunt

-- Zygmunt Frajzyngier
Professor
Dept. of Linguistics, Box 295
University of Colorado,
Boulder, CO 80309
USA
Phone: 303-492-6959
Fax: 303-492-4416
http://spot.colorado.edu/~frajzyng/

On 1/24/16, 3:44 PM, "Lingtyp on behalf of Siva Kalyan"
<lingtyp-bounces at listserv.linguistlist.org on behalf of
sivakalyan.princeton at gmail.com> wrote:

>I wonder if ³utterance², as defined below, is really being defined in
>³distributional² terms. The definition given seems to be phonological;
>and I would suggest that it should also be defined interactionally (e.g.
>as a stretch of speech within which no change of speaker can occur; cf.
>the notion of "Turn Construction Unit² in Conversation Analysis). Thus,
>for this particular case (I haven¹t yet read David¹s 2000 paper), I¹m not
>sure that this *isn¹t* a comparative concept (provided that comparative
>concepts can make reference to phonology and discourse pragmatics).
>
>More generally, I wonder if what seem like distributionally-defined
>universal categories might actually be defined with respect to
>³constructions" that are *themselves* comparative concepts. E.g. if we
>had a comparative concept of ³clause², then we could define a category
>³verb² as ³the head of a clause²; this would be a category defined
>distributionally with respect to a comparative concept, and thus would
>arguably also be a kind of comparative concept.
>
>I do agree that distributional classes of some sort need to be definable
>cross-linguistically; to elaborate on David¹s two reasons, let me mention
>the existence (and indeed, near-ubiquity) of code-mixing. It would be
>impossible for a bilingual to borrow a ³Language A Noun² into Language B
>without somehow knowing that (some) Language A Nouns can go in the same
>slots as (some) Language B Nouns.
>
>Siva
>
>> On 24 Jan 2016, at 11:25 PM, David Gil <gil at shh.mpg.de> wrote:
>> 
>> On 24/01/2016 13:46, William Croft wrote:
>>> 1. David Gil argues that syntactic categories "based exclusively on
>>>distributional criteria, and...blind to the semantics" can be defined
>>>as comparative concepts. But distributional criteria are criteria
>>>defined by a construction or constructions in a specific language, and
>>>so by definition are not comparative: the constructions are
>>>constructions of particular languages. This is what makes grammatical
>>>categories language-specific, and in fact construction-specific.
>> Under Martin's definition of comparative concept, Bill is right in
>>saying that "distributional criteria are criteria defined by a
>>construction or constructions in a specific language, and so by
>>definition are not comparative: the constructions are constructions of
>>particular languages."  But I would like to suggest that the kinds of
>>categories that we typologists deal with (and which I somewhat loosely
>>referred to as comparative concepts) in fact do not provide a perfect
>>fit to Martin's definition of comparative concept.
>> 
>> Martin raised the hypothetical case of two languages with identical
>>grammars differing only with respect to their lexicons.  Now let's
>>imagine a hypothetical world in which these were the only two languages
>>in existence.  In such a hypothetical world, language-specific
>>categories would be identical to cross-linguistic categories.  Now
>>obviously our real world is very different from such a hypothetical
>>world, but how different exactly?  At the opposite extreme one can
>>imagine another world with several thousand languages each of which is
>>endowed with its own individual constructions incommensurate with those
>>of each and every other language.  Many linguists would say that this is
>>the actual world that we inhabit.  I would like to suggest (a) that the
>>positioning of our real world of languages in relation to these two
>>extremes should be considered an empirical question, not a matter of
>>belief or philosophical persuasion; and (b) that the factually correct
>>answer is that our real world of languages actually lies in-between
>>these two extremes, albeit probably closer to the
>>several-thousand-incommensurate-languages extreme than is commonly
>>assumed not just by generativists but also by many other linguists
>>belonging to various other camps.
>> 
>> In other words, I argue that there do exist categories that are,
>>simultaneously, manifest in the grammars of individual languages and
>>also relevant to cross-linguistic comparisons.  My (2000) paper referred
>>to in my previous posting was an attempt to define some syntactic
>>categories which fit this bill.  Since these categories yield useful
>>typological insights, I somewhat sloppily referred to them in the
>>preceding discussion as comparative concepts, which is what Bill
>>correctly took issue with above.  But my response is to suggest that the
>>current definition of comparative concept may not be the most useful
>>one.  Of course, the specifics of that proposal could easily be wrong,
>>but it's the principle that is at issue here.
>> 
>> But for a simpler example of a category / construction type that is
>>both language-specific and universal, how about "utterance", defined
>>roughly as what occurs in-between two periods of silence.
>> 
>> Following are two related reasons why we should expect to find
>>language-specific categories which are shared by more than one language,
>>and hence which might be useful also for cross-linguistic categories.
>> 
>> The first (as pointed out by Eitan earlier) is the phenomenon of
>>bilingualism.  Bilinguals are clearly capable of providing (necessarily
>>imperfect) translations from one language to another; it is hard to see
>>how such an ability can be accounted for without positing certain
>>correspondences between languages ‹ not just at a "deep" level of
>>conceptual representations, but also with respect to more readily
>>observable formal properties.
>> 
>> The second reason is the phenomenon of language-internal variation, be
>>it geographical, social, idiolectal, or whatever.  We linguists are good
>>at telling our laymen friends that there's no difference between
>>languages and dialects, but we sometimes fail to internalize this
>>message ourselves.  In fact, many if not all of us are competent in a
>>multiplicity of registers or varieties of our native languages ‹ how
>>many such varieties exactly is a moot question since it depends on
>>arbitrary decisions concerning the level of resolution that we wish to
>>adopt.  So if I speak a Home-English and an Office-English, do these
>>have two separate grammars which just happen to be virtually identical,
>>or do they share a single common grammar with (Labovian) specifications
>>for those areas which exhibit variation?  If the former, then it would
>>be absurd not to admit that the two separate grammars share lots of
>>categories.  If the latter, then well, if there's no difference between
>>dialects and languages, then just as my Home-English and my
>>Office-English will share categories and constructions, so, as a
>>bilingual, will my English and my Hebrew (albeit presumably fewer).
>> 
>> To summarize:  While I agree with many of my typologist colleagues that
>>languages are massively more different from each other than is commonly
>>supposed by many, perhaps most, other linguists, I do not believe ‹ as I
>>suspect some do ‹ that languages may differ without bounds.  Moreover,
>>while I agree that many of the most influential proposals that have been
>>made in the past (e.g. by generativists) for categories that are,
>>simultaneously, language-specific and universally valid are
>>fundamentally misguided, I do not believe that we should throw the baby
>>out with the bathwater and reject the possibility that such
>>language-specific-cum-universal categories may nevertheless exist.
>> 
>> -- 
>> David Gil
>> 
>> Department of Linguistic and Cultural Evolution
>> Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History
>> Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745 Jena, Germany
>> 
>> Email:gil at shh.mpg.de
>> Mobile Phone (Indonesia): +62-812-73567992
>> 
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