Dozing eyes and drunken faces: nominalized psycho-collocations in Daakaka (Vanuatu)

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Abstract

Like many languages of the world, the Oceanic language Daakaka (Vanuatu) uses idiomatic collocations of body-part terms and verbs to express emotions, medical conditions and related concepts. However, languages differ in how they express the same concepts nominally. I will contrast the nominalization strategy found in Daakaka with other languages and discuss possible reasons for the differences. I will argue that the nominalization strategy in Daakaka is less transparent than its alternatives but that it allows for the formation of a paradigm that also includes meteorological expressions. This phenomenon highlights the need to look beyond individual lexemes when comparing lexical classes and derivational processes crosslinguistically.

14 **1** Introduction

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15 2 Word classes in Daakaka

The Oceanic language Daakaka (spoken on Ambrym, Vanuatu) has fairly rigid boundaries between lex ical classes and a correspondingly rich inventory of derivational processes. There are four major, open
 word classes in Daakaka that can clearly be distinguished by their basic morpho-syntactic behavior.

They correspond roughly to the cross-linguistically established labels of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs which I will use henceforth to refer to them. Nouns are the only lexemes that can occur in argument positions – as objects of verbs or subjects of finite sentences – without interfering morphology. Adjectives are the only lexemes that can be attributes to nouns without further modification. Verbs are lexemes that can serve as predicates without a copula, and can not be attributes of noun phrases. Adverbs are the only open class that can modify predicate phrases without additional morpho-syntactic structure (compare von Prince, 2015b).

As one may expect, object-denoting lexemes such as *atuwo* 'basket' and *em* 'house' are primarily found in the noun class, while prototypical event-denoting lexemes such as *ane* 'eat sth.' and *oko* 'walk, travel' are verbs.

However, certain notions that do not fall squarely into one of the semantic domains prototypically associated with specific lexical classes cannot be expressed by a single lexeme at all. Emotional states are a case in point. They are neither prototypical objects nor prototypical events, and the only way to refer to them in Daakaka are **psycho-collocations** – formulaic phrases such that a body-part term serves as the subject to a certain predicate. This phenomenon is illustrated by the following example:

34 (1) *yu-on mwe yaa* feeling-3s REAL hurt

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'she/he is angry' (lit. 'his/ her feeling hurts') (ex. (561) in von Prince 2015b)

To form a corresponding nominal expression that denotes the notion of 'anger', an uninflected body-36

- part noun is taken as the head, with the predicate as its attribute: 37
- (2)vuo yaa~yaa 38 feeling REDUP~hurt 39
 - 'anger' (lit. 'the hurting feeling') (ex. (78) in von Prince 2015b)

This is different from languages such as Sino-Tibetan Japhug, where the predicate is nominalized and 40 the body-part is encoded as a possessor: 41

(3)u-sni u-tu-zduy 42 3sg.poss-thought/heart 3sg.poss-NMLZ:DEGREE-painful 'her sadness' (lit. 'her heart's pain') (this example is an excerpt from ex. (9) below.) 43

This difference highlights the importance of looking beyond individual lexemes when comparing lex-44 ical classes and derivational processes cross-linguistically. In the following section, I will describe the 45 phenomenon of psycho-collocations in general, and in Daakaka in particular. In section 4, I will describe the processes of deriving nominal expressions from those psycho-collocations in Daakaka as 47

compared to other languages. Section 5 concludes the article. 48

Daakaka examples come either from the published literature, from elicitations by the author, or 49 from corpus data collected by Kilu von Prince between 2009 and 2012. Each example is referenced 50 accordingly. In longer utterances, the relevant sequences are enclosed by square brackets. 51

3 **Expressing emotions** 52

Emotional states such as anger and fear do not correspond neatly to any of the prototypical concepts 53 usually associated with major lexical classes: They are certainly not visible, tangible objects, and they 54 also lack the dynamics associated with prototypical events. The person who experiences a certain 55 emotion is often neither an agent nor a typical patient of this process. Emotional states are usually 56 only temporary, which in turn differentiates them from prototypical properties of objects. Similar 57 considerations hold not only for emotional states in the narrow sense, but also for other physical and 58 medical states such as fatigue, headaches or ebriety. 59

It is therefore not surprising that, in many languages, expressions that refer to such concepts do not 60 fall squarely into one specific lexical class. They may not even correspond to one single lexeme: A very 61 widespread strategy for expressing emotions and related notions is to use formulaic combinations of 62 a body-part expression with a certain predicate. It appears that most of the world's languages have 63 at least a few expressions that follow this pattern (compare Wierzbicka, 1999; Enfield & Wierzbicka, 64 2002). One example from English is the phrase my heart is heavy to describe a feeling of sadness or 65 regret. In some languages, such structures are by far the most productive way to refer to emotions. As 66 Ameka (2002: 29) puts it, the 'bodily expressions' of emotions in these languages (including his subject 67 language, Ewe) are basic and unmarked, they do not contrast with less complex expressions. 68

Languages in which such formulaic phrases are the main way of expressing emotions can be found 60 in many different families all over the world. They include Dalabon from Australia (Ponsonnet, 2014), 70 Mandinka from Sub-Saharan Africa (Denis Creissels, p.c.), Mezquital Otomi from Central America (En-71 rique L. Palancar, p.c.), Adyghe from the North-West Caucasus (Peter Arkadiev, p.c.) and Walman, a 72 Torricelli language from Papua New Guinea (Matthew Dryer and Lea Brown, p.c.). The term psycho-73 collocations is commonly used in the context of Mainland South-East Asian languages to refer to the 74 exact same phenomenon (see Matisoff 1986, also compare Vittrant 2013 and references therein). For 75 the remainder of this article, I will continue to use this term in the context of other languages. 76

In many of the Oceanic languages of Melanesia, too, psycho-collocations are the main way to express 77

emotions and similar concepts (compare Francois, 2013). Daakaka is one of those languages. The subject 78 of the following example is ny- 'face of', a noun which is inflected for the person and number of its 79 obligatory possessor; the predicate is the verbal adjective *lili* 'drunk'. The combination of these two 80 expressions is the only canonical way in Daakaka to encode the information that someone is drunk. 81

(4)nv-un mwe lili 82 face.of-3s REAL drunk 'she/he is drunk' (ex. (570) in von Prince 2015b) 83

A particularly frequent subject in psycho-collocations is yu, which probably developed diachronically 84

from a noun with the meaning 'inside/ interior' but could today also be translated as 'feeling' (compare 85 von Prince, 2015b: 266). 86

yu-on (5)mwe yaa 87 feeling-3s REAL hurt 'she/he is angry' (lit. 'his/ her feeling hurts') (repeated from (1))

(6)*mwe kyes~kyes(=ane* vu-on nge) feeling-3s REAL REDUP~be.sweet=TRANS 3s

'she/he is in love (with her/him)' (lit. 'his/ her feeling is sweet for her/him') (ex. (563) in von Prince 2015b) 91

Other examples include terms referring to the skin, the body, the head and the eyes as subjects. The 92 last case is illustrated by (7) For a detailed discussion, see von Prince (2015b: chapter 6, section 2.2.3). 93

(7)met-an mwe nyup 94 eye-3s REAL doze.off 'she/he is dozing off' ((569) in von Prince 2015b) 95

Expressions that follow this pattern do not only denote emotions in the narrow sense, but also comprise 96 medical states such as blindness and pain, as well as human propensities such as stubbornness. For 97

convenience, I will use the term *psycho-collocation* to encompass all these expressions. 98

Nominalizing psycho-collocations 4

In the published literature, formulaic subject-predicate combinations expressing emotions have been 100 mainly discussed in terms of their implications for cross-cultural comparison of cognitive processes 10 (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1999; Enfield & Wierzbicka, 2002; Sharifian et al., 2008; Idström & Piirainen, 2012; 102 Ponsonnet, 2014). For this article, however, I want to focus on the challenge that these structures pose 103 for grammatical processes: How do you derive a nominal expression for a meaning that can only be 104 encoded by a subject-predicate combination? 105

There are a number of logical answers to this question. For some languages, the answer may be 106 simply that such structures are not nominalized at all. This appears to be the case for Walman, for 107 example, where many concepts relating to mental and emotional states cannot be expressed nominally 108 (Matthew Dryer, p. c.). 109

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Other languages do have a variety of strategies to nominalize psycho-collocations. Consider the Sino-Tibetan language Japhug. Japhug has a wide range of body-part-denoting subjects that collocate 111 with specific predicates to express a person's physical and emotional state. The body-part terms are 112

typically relational and must be prefixed by a morpheme that denotes the person and number of its 113

possessor:1 114

¹Many of these expressions correspond to incorporating verbs with their (unpossessed) objects – see Jacques (2012).

115	(8)	uı-sni	រាយ-zdយy
		3sg.poss-thought/he	art sens-painful
116		'He feels sad.' (Guilla	aume Jacques, p. c.)

To express the notion of 'sadness' nominally, the predicate is nominalized, the body-part term is encoded as the possessor of the nominalized verb, and the experiencer is encoded as the possessor of the body part (see Jacques to appear for more on this type of nominalization):

120	(9)	tchemspu	ı nuı rca,	[ɯ-sni		uı-tuı-zduıy]		
		little.girl	DEM FOC:UNEXE	9 3sg.poss-tho	ought/heart	3sg.poss-nmlz:degre	e-painful	
121		pjx-sxre		<i>Z</i> 0				
		ifr:ipfv-b	e.funny/be.extre	ете емрн				
122		'The little	girl was extrem	ely sad (lit. tł	ne pain of t	he little girl's heart w	as extreme).'	(from the
123		Cinderella	a story, in the Ja	phug Corpus)				

It is also possible to leave the experiencer unspecified: Among the possessor prefixes that attach to
 obligatorily possessed nouns is one morpheme that indicates a generic possessor. This is illustrated in
 (10):

127	(10)	тх-кш-ре	a-púı-wy-mtsh¥m t¢e	[tɯ-sni	uı-tuı-zduıy]
		NEG-NMLZ:S/A-be.good	IRR-PFV-INV-hear LNK	GENR.POSS-hear	really
128		saχaв			
		3sg.poss-nmlz:degree	z-be.painful be.extreme	FACTUAL	
129		'When one hears bad	news, one feels extrem	ely sad' (lit. 'the	e pain of one's heart is extreme')
130		(Guillaume Jacques, p.	c.)		

A similar strategy is used by the Niger-Congo language Mandinka. In (11), we see the basic sentential structure, where the subject is a body-part term ('liver'), combining with the predicate *láa* 'lie down'; the experiencer is expressed as the (inalienable) possessor of the body-part:

¹³⁴ (11) À jùsôo láatá lè.
¹³⁵ 3sG liver.D lie.down.CPL FOC
¹³⁵ 'He/ she is happy.' (lit. 'His/her liver lied down.') (Denis Creissels, p. c.)

In the corresponding nominal expression, the body-part term is incorporated by the verb. Predicates
 can be used as event-nominals without interfering morphology in Mandinka, so the resulting term
 jùsù-láa can be used as a nominal expression denoting 'happiness'. The experiencer of the emotion
 can optionally be expressed by an alienable possessor of this noun phrase. See Creissels & Sambou
 (2013) for incorporation in Mandinka, Creissels (2012a) for more on event nominals in Mandinka, and
 Creissels (2012b) for the entry on *jùsù-láa* and related lexemes.

(*à* lá) jùsù-lâa
 3SG GEN liver-lying.D
 '(his/ her) happiness' (Denis Creissels, p. c.)

In Daakaka, however, the canonical way to express an emotion nominally is very different. Whereas in Japhug and Mandinka, the head of the noun phrase is the nominalized predicate, Daakaka emotion nominals are headed by the relevant body-part term. The corresponding predicate is used as an attribute to the body-part expression. Thus, the notion of 'love/ infatuation' literally translates as 'sweet feeling, sweet inside', not as 'emotional/ interior sweetness'. In (13), we see how the verb *kyes* 'be sweet' is reduplicated to form an attribute to the noun *yuo* 'feeling/ inside'

150	(13)	bwe	e kolir usili [yuo kyes~kyes]
		REA	L.CONT sing follow feeling REDUP~sweet
151		'he	was singing about love' (lit. 'he was singing about the sweet feeling') (sto25:080)
152	The	nom	nal terms corresponding to the other phrases introduced in section 3 are as follows:
153	(14)	a.	nana lili
			face drunk
154			'drunkenness' (translation-based elicitation, OT)
155		b.	[yuo yaa~yaa]=ne yas=an sa mwe gene ba=an
			feeling redup-hurt=trans steal=nmlz cm real make fight=nmlz
156			'the anger about the theft caused the fight' (elicited, JM)
157		c.	na=m ongane [myar nyup~nyup]
			1SG=REAL feel eyes REDUP~drowsy
158			'I feel sleepy' (lit. 'I feel drowsy eyes') (elicited, JM)

These expressions are quite curious in a number of ways. First of all, they are arguably exocentric,
in the sense that the entire term is not a hyponym of its head element – which is the definition of
exocentricity in the context of compounds (Bauer, 2001): When I talk about 'drowsy eyes' in Daakaka,
I hardly talk about a particular kind of eyes. The attribute 'drowsy' does not serve to disambiguate the
head noun (the drowsy eyes, in contrast to the alert ones); nor does it further describe a given set of
eyes (the eyes, which are drowsy).

Exocentricity may not necessarily be a property of all these structures. Enfield (2002) rightly warns 165 against drawing inferences from the 'literal' body-part meanings about the conceptualization of corres-166 ponding emotion-related expressions. Especially nominals with the rather abstract noun yuo 'feeling' 167 as their head may in fact be understood quite literally – maybe the 'sweet feeling' is in fact a particular 168 kind of feeling, rather than a particular kind of sweetness. And in the less obvious cases (such as the 169 'drowsy eyes' and the 'drunken face'), it is possible, as suggested by Enfield (2002) that we are really 170 dealing with polysemous lexemes whose actual reference is simply not as concrete as the homophonous 171 body-part term. 172

However, there are certain expressions in the language that follow the exact same morpho-syntactic pattern, and which are quite clearly exocentric. Thus the term $kus \, lip \sim lip$ literally translates as 'dripping nose', but really denotes the bleeding of the nose, or the blood running from the nose. This is illustrated in (15):

(15) temeli en=te mu mur te [kus lip~lip] mu puo yen kus-un child DEM=MED REAL fall DISC nose REDUP~drip REAL be.plenty in nose.of-3sg.POSS
¹⁷⁸ 'this child fell and then he had a big nosebleed' (lit. 'the dripping nose was plentiful in his nose') (ex. (166) in von Prince 2015b)

Frequently, the property denoted by a body-part term and its attribute is taken metonymically to refer
 to the person characterized by this property. For example, *myar bwii* (eye blind) may refer to a blind
 person, *vyaa boo* (hand swollen) may denote a person whose arm is deformed by elephantiasis. This is
 also illustrated in (16):

(16) [myar sang~sanga] sa ma oko vyan tu-kuwu tebol
 eye REDUP~bad COM REAL walk go hit-RES.out table
 'someone with bad eyes has walked into the table, overturning it' (elicited, JM)

Therefore, even if not all nominal emotion-expressions are necessarily exocentric, they appear to be prone to being interpreted this way.

¹⁸⁸ The second interesting property of nominal psycho-collocations concerns the morphology of their

head nouns. Nouns denoting external human body-parts are generally inflected for the person and 189 number features of their possessor in Daakaka. In contrast to Japhug, there is no inflection in Daakaka 190 that would indicate an indefinite or generic possessor. There is therefore no form of an inflected noun 191 without a definite or specific possessor. The nouns that are used as heads for nominalized psycho-192 collocations are suppletive, uninflected lexemes. An inflected noun cannot be the head of a psycho-193 collocation. The following examples show that the relevant pattern is available only for uninflected 194 body-part nouns, not for inflected ones. Since finite sentences have a very similar distribution to noun 195 phrases, the corresponding meaning can usually be expressed by a clausal argument, as shown in (17-c). 196 The first of those examples was given by JM as a response to my request for a sentence containing the 197 expression kor pwengpwenges 'headache'. I then inquired about the acceptability of the two variations 198 of the sentence. 199

200	(17)	a.	gyes=an	en=te	mwe gene	[kor pweng~pv	venges]
			work=nmlz	DEM=MED	REAL make	e head REDUP~hu	ırt
201			'this work c	auses head	laches'		
202		b.	*gyes=an	en=te	mwe gene	[bet-uk	pweng~pwenges]
			work=nmlz	DEM=MED	REAL make	e head.of-1sg.pos	ss redup~hurt
203			intended 'th	is work ca	uses me a l	neadache'	
204		c.	gyes=an	en=te	mwe gene	[bet-uk	ma pwenges]
			work=NMLZ	DEM=MED	REAL make	e head.of-1sg.pos	ss real hurt
205			'this work n	nakes my ł	nead hurt'		

The ban against inflected head nouns in nominal psycho-collocations may in fact be conditioned by their exocentricity: it is well possible that the only interpretation available for (17-b) would be 'this kind of work makes my head that is hurting', or 'this kind of work makes my head, which is hurting'. Support for this hypothesis comes from the following observation: There is no general restriction against attributes to inflected nouns, as long as these attributes can be understood to either restrict the reference of the noun, or to further describe its referent. This is illustrated in (18):

212	(18)	a.	bwe	kolir usil	i [nat-en	[na m [.]	we seaa	vyan pwer	etes]]
			REAL.CC	ONT sing foll	ow child-3se	G.POSS COMP RE	AL get.los	t go stay	at.sea
213			ʻshe wa	s singing abo	out her child	l that/ which w	vas lost at a	sea' (sto23:0	015)
214		b.	ka	ra=p	tiye vyap	myató en=te	myane	e [meby-un	kekei]
			MOD.RE	l 1pl.in=pot	kill womar	n old DEM=M	IED with	grandson.	of-3sg small
215			'we wil	l kill this wo	man and he	r small grandso	on' (sto34:0	054)	

Moreover, it is not the case that nominalized psycho-collocations generally disallow the realization of the experiencer or subject. It is possible to talk about the anger or love felt by someone specific, not just as abstract concepts: An experiencer can be encoded as the possessor of the phrase by a possessive linker pronoun or a linker genitive – structures that are typically associated with alienable possession (compare von Prince, 2015a). For the following example, I asked JM if he could form a sentence starting with *san kor yasyas sa mwe gene...* 'his obstinacy resulted in...', which he did:

222	(19)	[s-an	[kor	yas~yas]]	sa	mwe	gene	vy-an	mwe	setyup
		CL3-3SG.POSS	head	REDUP~strong	СМ	REAL	make	hand.of-3sg.poss	REAL	break
223		'his obstinacy	y was	the reason he	bro	ke his	s hand	,		

Apparently, in cases such as (19), the scope of the possessive relation is not restricted to the body-part term, but extends over the entire psycho-collocation. In short, uninflected nouns allow for generic possessors and for possessors that scope over the entire phrase, rather than just the body-part term, thus allowing for an exocentric reading of the noun phrase. The same is not possible with inflected nouns, which is probably why they cannot serve as heads for a nominal psycho-collocation.

The question remains why the strategy of nominalization that is utilized by languages like Japhug and Mandinka is not available in Daakaka. After all, one may expect that an endocentric, more transparent expression such as 'my heart's pain' should be preferred over an exocentric, less transparent expression such as 'my painful heart'. The reason for this choice of nominalization strategy is not immediately apparent, as Daakaka has a very productive procedure of nominalizing predicates: The clitic *=an* nominalizes verbs and predicative adjectives. The resulting expression denotes an event or a kind of events:

236 (20) [s-am oko=an en=te] ka we vyan ka we sanga CL3-2SG travel=NM DEM=MED MOD.REL POT go MOD.REL POT bad 'this journey of yours will go badly' (exp02:127)

The nominalized predicate phrase can consist of more than one lexeme. The following example shows
 how a semitransitive verb and its generic object are nominalized to express a generic or habitual beha vior.

241 (21) [s-am yas barar=an] to vu CL3-2SG steal pig=NM NEG.REAL good

²⁴² 'your (habit of) stealing pigs is not good' (a response by my consultant JM to the question ²⁴³ whether he could use the phrase *yas barar=an* in a sentence)

It is however possible that this derivational process excludes the kinds of predicates that feature in psycho-collocations. My data suggest that this may in fact be one relevant factor. Some of the verbs we find in psycho-collocations can be nominalized by the morpheme *=an* described above, but not all of them. Thus, I have tried to elicit a nominalized version of *kyes* 'sweet', which we have seen in examples (6) and (13), but suggestions such as the following were firmly rejected by JM:

 249 (22) *kyes~kyes=an (ne mees) REDUP~=NMLZ TRANS food
 250 intended: 'sweetness (of the food)'

I can not explain the unacceptability of (22) in terms of *aktionsart* or reduplication, since otherwise all types and shapes of predicates find their way into nominalizations with *=an*. Whatever the reason, the nominalization strategy that takes the body-part term as a head is available to all expressions in the paradigm, while the strategy that takes the nominalized predicate as its head is not. Thus, it may be that in Daakaka, a consistent paradigm featuring exocentring nominalizations wins against an inconsistent paradigm featuring endocentric ones.

Before concluding this article, I would like to point out an interesting parallel between the psycho collocations and the following expressions for meteorological events:

259	(23)	a.	or	mwe myaek
			place	e REAL be.night
260			ʻit is	night'
261		b.	or	тже уиор
			place	e real be.dawn
262			ʻit is	dawn' (ex. (553-a/b) in von Prince 2015b)

The corresponding nominal expressions follow the same pattern as the psycho-collocations, and their
 exocentricity is illustrated by the following example:

265 (24) or bwe towane [or yuop~yuop] bush REAL;CONT throw place REDUP~dawn 'it was getting dawn' (lit. 'the place was throwing the dawning place') (ex. (95-c) in von Prince
 2015b)

Like emotions, meteorological events do not match any of the prototypical notions associated with one particular lexical class and show considerable variation in their assignment to lexical classes crosslinguistically. In Daakaka, they could be described as forming one class with psycho-collocations: In both cases, the relevant meaning can only be expressed by a specific subject-predicate collocation at the sentence-level; and in both cases, these collocations form noun phrases by taking the subject expression as a head noun and the predicate as its attribute.

²⁷⁴ 5 Conclusion

For this short paper, I have discussed the nominalization of psycho-collocations in Daakaka. I have 275 contrasted this process with different strategies from other languages and proposed that, given the 276 logical alternatives, the nominalization strategy used in Daakaka is slightly puzzling. I have presented 277 original data from fieldwork and corpus work to explore some of the possible reasons behind the devel-278 opment of this process. I have concluded that one relevant factor may be the consistency of a paradigm 279 that may not only include psycho-collocations, but also meteorological collocations. But only a more 280 systematic comparison between languages will allow us to get a thorough understanding of the factors 281 that determine the choice of nominalization strategy and the range of variation considering this phe-282 nomenon. 283

This research highlights the fact that cross-linguistic comparisons between derivational processes should not be restricted to the level of individual lexemes, but should also take more complex phrases into consideration.

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