

enter into material processes where the metaphenomena by themselves cannot. For example, although we cannot say *it destroyed his life that the experiment had failed*, we can say *the knowledge that the experiment had failed destroyed his life* — not the idea as such, but his knowledge of it, was the destroyer.

We might also say *the fact that the experiment had failed destroyed his life*; here *fact* stands for a state of affairs, rather than for a projected metaphenomenon as in its prototypical sense (cf. Section 7.5.7 below). In other words, although projections cannot participate in processes other than those of consciousness, the names of projections can, because they can be used to label events or states of affairs. Here we have reached the borderline between expansion and projection; the two come together under conditions of nominalization, where there is metaphor in the grammar and many of the semantic distinctions expressed in the clause tend to be neutralized (cf. Chapter 10 below).

7.5 Reports, ideas and facts: three kinds of projection

In Section 7.2 we introduced the notion of projection, the logical-semantic relationship whereby a clause comes to function not as a direct representation of (non-linguistic) experience but as a representation of a (linguistic) representation. It was pointed out that projection combines with the same set of interdependencies that have been shown to occur with expansion: parataxis, hypotaxis and embedding. Thus in the following examples *(that) Caesar was ambitious* is a 'projected' clause:

'Caesar was ambitious,' says Brutus	(paratactic)
Brutus says that Caesar was ambitious	(hypotactic)
Brutus' assertion that Caesar was ambitious	(embedded)

In this section we will explore more systematically the different types of projection that occur in English.

7.5.1 Quoting ('direct speech'): verbal process, parataxis

The simplest form of projection is 'direct' (quoted) speech, as in

She keeps saying to us 'I stay up till twelve o'clock every night'.

The projecting clause is a verbal process, one of saying, and the projected clause represents that which is said.

Here the 'tactic' relationship, the type of dependency, is parataxis; the two parts have equal status. In written English, the projection is signalled by quotation marks ('inverted commas'; for the significance of double and single quotation marks see below). In spoken English, the projecting clause is phonologically less prominent than the projected: if it comes first, it is often proclitic (non-salient and pre-rhythmic: see Chapter 1, Section 1.2 above), while if it follows all or part of the projected, instead of occupying a separate tone group, it appears as a 'tail', a post-tonic appendage that continues the pitch movement of the preceding projected material; for example

- (a) 1 ^ 2 Brutus said: 'Caesar was ambitious'.
 (b) '1 ^ 2 'Caesar was ambitious,' said Brutus.
 (c) '1 « 2 » 'Caesar,' said Brutus, 'was ambitious'.
 (d) '1 ^ 2 'Was Caesar ambitious?' asked Mark Anthony.

Typically, in (a) *Brutus said* will be proclitic; in (b), *said Brutus* will fall, continuing the falling tone (tone 1) on *ambitious*; in (c) it will rise, continuing the falling-rising tone (tone 4) on *Caesar*; in (d) *asked Mark Anthony* will rise, continuing the rise (tone 2) or fall-rise (tone 2) on *ambitious*.

The reason for this is that the main function of the projecting clause is simply to show that the other one is projected: someone said it. There is nothing in the wording of a paratactic projected clause to show that it is projected; it could occur alone, as a direct observation. In written English it is signalled prosodically, by punctuation; and if the quoted matter extends to a new paragraph the quotation marks are usually repeated, as a reminder. The parallel to this, in spoken English, is the repetition of the projecting clause, as in the following example:

My brother, he used to show dogs, and he said to me, he said, 'Look,' he said, 'I really think you've got something here,' he said. 'Why don't you take it to a show?' And I said 'Oh, yea. Right-oh.'

Without this kind of repetition, the fact that a passage of discourse is projected may easily be lost sight of.* In written English typically only the first clause complex will be explicitly accompanied by a projecting clause. Note that the analysis accurately reflects the paratactic pattern, showing projection where it occurs in the structure but not where it is simply presumed by cohesion; cf. the following example:

|| Thomas could just see out of the hole, || but he couldn't move. ||
 1 ×2

|| 'Oh dear,' « he said, » 'I am a silly engine.' ||
 "1 « 2 »

|| 'And a very naughty one too,' || said a voice behind him. || 'I saw you.' ||
 "1 2 1

|| 'Please get me out; || I won't be naughty again.' ||
 1 + 2

|| 'I'm not so sure,' || replied the Fat Controller. || 'We can't lift you out with a
 "1 2 1
 crane, || the ground's not firm enough.' ||
 ×2

Since the amount and type of explicit projection is a significant discourse variable it is important to show exactly where and in what form it occurs.

* Some speakers introduce a special voice quality into their quoted speech, which could in principle serve as an ongoing prosodic marker and obviate the need for repeating the 'saying' clause — although the acoustic effect probably depends mainly on the initial change of tambre, and if so it will tend to diminish as the quoted speech continues.

What is the nature of the projected clause? The projected clause here stands for a 'wording': that is, the phenomenon it represents is a lexicogrammatical one. Take for example *'I'm not so sure,' replied the Fat Controller*. While the projecting clause *replied the Fat Controller* represents an ordinary phenomenon of experience, the projected clause *I'm not so sure* represents a second-order phenomenon, something that is itself a representation. We will refer to this as a 'metaphenomenon'. If we want to argue, the issue is not 'is he, or is he not, so sure?' — that is a separate question;* it is 'did he, or did he not, say these words?' The total structure, therefore, is that of a paratactic clause complex in which the logical-semantic relationship is one of projection; the projecting clause is a verbal process, and the projected clause has the status of a wording.

Verbs used in quoting clauses include

- (1) *say*, the general member of this class;
- (2) verbs specific to (a) statements and (b) questions, e.g. (a) *tell* (+ Receiver), *remark*, *observe*, *point out*, *report*, *announce*; (b) *ask*, *demand*, *inquire*, *query*;
- (3) verbs combining 'say' with some circumstantial element, e.g. *reply* ('say in response'), *explain* ('say in explanation'), *protest* ('say with reservation'), *continue* ('go on saying'), *interrupt* ('say out of turn'), *warn* ('say: undesirable consequences');
- (4) verbs having connotations of various kinds, e.g. *insist* ('say emphatically'), *complain* ('say irritably'), *cry*, *shout* ('say loudly'), *boast* ('say proudly'), *murmur* ('say sotto voce'), *stammer* ('say with embarrassment').

A very wide range of different verbs can be pressed into service under this last heading, verbs which are not verbs of saying at all but serve, especially in fictional narrative, to suggest attitudes, emotions or expressive gestures that accompanied the act of speaking, for example *sob*, *snort*, *twinkle*, *beam*, *venture*, *breathe*; e.g.

'It is a great thing, discretion,' mused Poirot.

Here the implication is that Poirot is trying to give the impression of thinking aloud, while making sure the listener 'overhears'.

7.5.2 Reporting ('indirect speech'): mental process, hypotaxis

Talking is not the only way of using language; we also use language to think. Hence a process of thinking also serves to project; for example,

Dr Singleman always believed that his patient would recover.

Here again there is a phenomenon, *Dr Singleman always believed*, and a metaphenomenon *his patient would recover*. The difference between this and the examples given above is that here (i) the projecting clause is a mental process, more specifically one of cognition; and (ii) the projected clause is not a wording but a meaning.

Something that is projected as a meaning is still a phenomenon of language — it is what was referred to above as a 'metaphenomenon'; but it is presented at a different level — semantic, not lexicogrammatical. When something is projected as

* In order to argue this we should have to turn it into a first-order phenomenon: *and is he?*

a meaning it has already been 'processed' by the linguistic system; but processed only once, not twice as in the case of a wording. So for example the phenomenon of water falling out of the sky may be coded as a meaning, by a mental process of cognition, in *(she thought) it was raining*; but when the same phenomenon is represented by a verbal process, as in *(she said:) 'it's raining'*, it is the meaning 'it is raining' that has been recoded to become a wording. A wording is, as it were, twice cooked. This is symbolized in an interesting way by the punctuation system of English, which uses both single and double quotation marks; in principle, single quotation marks stand for a meaning and double quotation marks stand for a wording.* We are unconsciously aware that when something has the status of a wording it lies not at one but at two removes from experience; it has undergone two steps in the realization process. This symbolism has been adopted in our present notation, in which ' stands for a projected meaning and " for a projected wording:

|| Dr Singleman believed || his patient would recover ||
 α β

When something is projected as a meaning, we are not representing 'the very words', because there are no words. If we want to argue about whether or not the doctor held this opinion, we have no observed event as a point of reference. Hence in combination with the tactic system the basic pattern for projecting meanings is not parataxis, which treats the projection as a free-standing event, but hypotaxis, which makes it dependent on the mental process. In other words, the typical pattern for representing a 'thinking' is the hypotactic one.

As pointed out earlier, the hypotactic relationship implies a different perspective. If we contrast the following pair of examples:

- (a) Mary said: 'I will come back here to-morrow'.
- (b) Mary thought she would go back there the next day.

then in (a) the standpoint in the projected clause is that of the Sayer, Mary; she is the point of reference for the deixis, which thus preserves the form of the lexico-grammatical event, using *I, here, come, tomorrow*. In (b) on the other hand the standpoint in the projected clause is simply that of the speaker of the projecting one; so Mary is 'she', Mary's present location is 'there', a move towards that location is 'going', and the day referred to as that immediately following the saying is not the speaker's tomorrow but simply 'the next day'. Furthermore, since the saying clause has past time the projected clause carries over the feature of temporal remoteness: hence *would*, not *will*. Hypotactic projection preserves the deictic orientation of the projecting clause, which is that of the speaker; whereas in paratactic projection the deixis shifts and takes on the orientation of the Sayer.

So far, therefore, we have the pattern in Table 7(9):

* Regrettably, publishers do not allow authors to follow this principle in their works.

Table 7(9) Basic types of projection nexus

type of projecting process:	taxis:	paratactic 1 2	hypotactic $\alpha \beta$
		projection of wording 1 "2	projection of meaning $\alpha' \beta'$
verbal	"		
mental	'		

This is the basic pattern of projection. But, by the familiar semogenic process of recombination of associated variables (more simply known as filling up the holes), other forms have come to exist alongside.

7.5.3 Reporting speech, quoting thought

It is possible to 'report' a saying by representing it as a meaning. This is the 'reported speech', or 'indirect speech', of traditional western grammars; for example, *the noble Brutus hath told you Caesar was ambitious* (Figure 7-12).




Fig. 7-12 Reported speech

In this instance, Brutus had indeed said those very words:

Brutus: As Caesar loved me, I weep for him; as he was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honour him: but, as he was ambitious, I slew him.

[. . .]

Mark Antony: The noble Brutus
Hath told you Caesar was ambitious.
If it were so, it was a grievous fault.

But the principle behind this hypotactic representation of a verbal event is that it is not, in fact, being presented as true to the wording; the speaker is reporting the gist of what was said, and the wording may be quite different from the original, as in the following (where A is a shopkeeper, B an elderly, hard-of-hearing customer and C is her grandson):

- A. It doesn't work; it's broken. You'll have to get it repaired.
- B. What does he say?
- C. He says it needs mending.

This is not to suggest, of course, that when a speaker uses the paratactic, 'direct' form he is always repeating the exact words; far from it. But the idealized function of the paratactic structure is to represent the wording; whereas with hypotaxis the idealized function is to represent the sense, or gist.

Verbs used in reporting statements and questions are often the same as those used in quoting; but there is one significant difference. In quoting, the independent status of the proposition, including its mood, is preserved; hence the speech function is as explicit as in the 'original'. In reporting, on the other hand, the speech function is, or may be, obscured, and is therefore made explicit in the reporting verb. Three things follow. (1) In quoting, the word *say* can project sayings of every mood, whereas in reporting we find *say*, *ask* and *tell*:

Henry said, 'Mary's here'.	Henry said that Mary was there.
Henry said, 'Is Mary here?'	Henry asked whether Mary was there.
Henry said, 'Who's here?'	Henry asked who was there.
Henry said, 'Stay here!'	Henry told [Fred] to say there.

Note also the reporting form *Henry told Janet who was there* 'answered Janet's question "who's here?"', to which there is no quoting equivalent. (2) Many semantically complex verbs for elaborated speech functions are used only in reporting, e.g. *insinuate*, *imply*, *remind*, *hypothesize*, *deny*, *make out*, *claim*, *maintain*. These verbs are seldom used to quote; there is too much experiential distance between them and the actual speech event. (3) On the other hand, many verbs that assign interpersonal and/or behavioural features to the speech event, and are used to quote especially in narrative contexts, are never used to report because they do not contain the feature 'say'. Thus we are unlikely to find, corresponding to the example at the end of the previous subsection, *Poirot mused that discretion was a great thing*.

This combination of a verbal process with 'reporting', although we are treating it as logically subsequent to quoting, being arrived at by analogy with the reporting of a mental process, is the normal way of representing what people say, in most registers of English today. The opposite combination, that of a mental process with 'quoting', is also found, although considerably more restricted. Here a thought is represented as if it was a wording, for example

I saw an ad in the paper for dachshunds, and I thought 'I'll just inquire' — not intending to buy one, of course.

|| I thought || 'I'll just inquire' ||
 1 '2

The implication is 'I said to myself . . .'; and this expression is often used, recognizing the fact that one can think in words. Only certain mental process verbs are regularly used to quote in this way, such as *think*, *wonder*, *reflect*, *surmise*.

We can now revise Table 7(9) as Table 7(10). First, however, in order to do so, let us establish the following terms:

paratactic projection:	quote
hypotactic projection:	report
what is projected verbally:	locution
what is projected mentally:	idea

Table 7(10) Four types of projection nexus

Type of projecting process:	Taxis:	Quote paratactic 1 2	Report hypotactic α β
Locution " verbal		Wording 1 "2 She said, 'I can'	Wording represented as meaning α " β She said she could
Idea ' mental		Meaning represented as wording 1 '2 She thought, 'I can'	Meaning α ' β She thought she could

Quoting and reporting are not simply formal variants; they differ in meaning. The difference between them derives from the general semantic distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis, as it applies in the particular context of projecting. In quoting, the projected element has independent status; it is thus more immediate and lifelike, and this effect is enhanced by the orientation of the deixis, which is that of drama not that of narrative. Quoting is particularly associated with certain narrative registers, fictional and personal; it is used not only for sayings but also for thoughts, including third-person thoughts projected by an omniscient narrator, as in

'And that's the jury-box,' thought Alice.

Reporting, on the other hand, presents the projected element as dependent. It still gives some indication of mood, but in a form which precludes it from functioning as a move in an exchange. And the speaker makes no claim to be abiding by the wording.

Traditional school exercises of the kind 'turn into direct/indirect speech' suggest that the two always fully match. This is true lexicogrammatically, in that it is always possible to find an equivalent — although not always a unique one: given *Mary said she had seen it*, the quoted equivalent might be *I have seen it*, *I had seen it* or *I saw it*, or *she* (someone else) *has seen it*, etc. (cf. Chapter 6, Section 6.3 above). But it is not true as a general statement about usage. Semantically the two do not exactly match, and there are many instances where it does not make sense to replace one by the other. Note for example *Alice thought that that was the jury-box*, where we should have to change *Alice thought* to something like *Alice said to herself* in order to avoid the sense of 'held the opinion' which is the natural interpretation of a verb of thinking when it is projecting by hypotaxis.

There are different ways of referring back to what is quoted and what is reported. Typically a reference item, usually *that*, is used to pick up a quoted passage, while a substitute, *so/not*, is used with a report. For example,

She said, 'I can't do it.' — Did she really say that?
She said she couldn't do it. — Did she really say so?

(For the difference between reference and substitution see Chapter 9 below.) This is because the act of quoting implies a prior referent, some actual occasion that can

then be referred back to, whereas in reporting there is nothing but the reported text. This explains the difference in meaning between *I don't believe that* 'I do not accept that assertion as valid' and *I don't believe so* 'in my opinion such is not the case'. Compare:

- The sky is about to fall. (i) — Who said that?
 (ii) — Who said so?

It is clear that both *that* and *so* stand for something that is projected, as shown by the verb *said*. In (i) this projected element is being treated as a quote: 'who produced that verbal act?' — hence we can ask *who said that?* if we want to identify a speaker from among a crowd, like a teacher finding out who was talking in class. In (ii), on the other hand, the expression *the sky is about to fall* is being treated not as anybody's verbal act but as a text; the meaning is 'who affirmed that that was the case?', with the implication that the contrary is conceivable.

In verbal processes, therefore, *he said that* simply attests his production of the wording, whereas *he said so* raises the issue of whether what he said is in fact the case. With mental processes the picture is more complex, since the reference form *that* tends to be associated with certainty and the substitute *so* with uncertainty; the principle is actually the same, but it is operating in a different environment (cf. the different senses of *thought* in quoting and reporting, referred to above). The principle is that a substitute does not refer; it simply harks back. It thus has the general semantic property of implying, and so excluding, possible alternatives; cf. the nominal substitute *one* as in *a big one*, meaning 'there are also small ones, and I don't mean those'. This is why *so*, which is a clause substitute, has the general sense of 'non-real', by contrast with what is 'real'; besides (i) projection, where it signifies what is asserted or postulated, it is used in two other contexts: (ii) hypothetical, as opposed to actual, and (iii) possible, as opposed to certain. Hence:

- | | | | | | |
|-------|-------------------|-----|------------------------|-----|---------------------|
| (i) | <i>I think so</i> | but | <i>I know [that]</i> | not | <i>I know so</i> |
| (ii) | <i>if so</i> | " | <i>because of that</i> | " | <i>because so</i> |
| (iii) | <i>perhaps so</i> | " | <i>certainly</i> | " | <i>certainly so</i> |

See Chapter 9 for further discussion.

7.5.4 Projecting offers and commands

So far we have considered just the projection of propositions: that is, statements and questions. We must now turn to the projection of clauses of the 'goods-&-services' kind, offers and commands, to which we gave the general name 'proposals'.

Offers and commands, and also suggestions which are simply the combination of the two (offer 'I'll do it,' command 'you do it', suggestion 'let's do it'), can be projected paratactically (quoted) in the same way as propositions, by means of a verbal process clause having a quoting function. For example (using an exclamation mark as an optional notational variant),

If we're talking when she's writing up on the board, all of a sudden she'll turn round and go 'will you be quiet!'

|| she'll go || will you be quiet ||
 1 "2!

Here the verb *go* is the quoting verb.