

“Am I blue?": Privileged Access Constraints in Kathmandu Newar¹

DAVID HARGREAVES

Western Oregon University

Abstract

Traditionally described as a system of verb morphology (Bendix 1974, 1992; Hale 1980; Hale and Shrestha 2006; Hargreaves 1990; 1991a, 1991b, 2005), “conjunct/disjunct” egophoric encoding in Kathmandu Newar (Tibeto-Burman) is not, in fact, limited to inflectional morphology. Instead, accounting for egophoric distributions synchronically and diachronically in Kathmandu Newar requires positing an interrelated set of semantic and pragmatic principles linked to patterns in verbal morphology, temperature predicates, and the simple/causative alternation of the auxiliary *dhun-* ‘finish.’ The principles include a semantic feature assigned to arguments of internal state predicates (both agents of intentional action and experiencers), epistemic constraints on the attribution of intentional and internal states, and a discourse function, termed ‘epistemic source,’ which is constructed from the indexical properties of speaker/addressee and the pragmatic preconditions for declarative/interrogative illocutionary types.

1. Introduction

The terms “conjunct/disjunct,” coined by Austin Hale for Kathmandu Newar (1980), have been widely used to describe distributions in which 1st person declarative and 2nd person interrogative clauses share some formal reflex, typically verbal morphology, in contrast with an “elsewhere” system for other person/illocutionary type combinations (cf. this volume).

My primary aim in this paper is to show that the “conjunct/disjunct” egophoric system in Kathmandu Newar² is not, in fact, limited to inflectional morphology, nor is it

¹ Thanks to the all the participants at the Summer 2011 LSA workshop for the insightful comments and suggestions on my presentation. Special thanks also to the organizers, Simeon Floyd, Elisabeth Norcliffe, Lila San Roque. I am especially grateful to Laura Nott, Lila San Roque, and three anonymous reviewers for comments and corrections on earlier drafts.

limited to verbs of intentional action. Instead, Newar egophoric distributions can best be accounted for synchronically by positing a set of interrelated principles, which will account for functionally parallel distributions in verbal morphology, temperature predicates, and the simple/causative alternation of the auxiliary *dhun-* ‘finish.’ Equally importantly, evidence from two late classical Newar texts reveals that the egophoric distribution of the auxiliary *dhun-* was sensitive not only to intentional action predicates, but a variety of other inner state predicates as well—a hitherto unreported fact about Newar diachrony and egophoricity. I conclude that accounting for these synchronic and diachronic distributions of egophoricity in Newar requires positing a set of semantic and pragmatic principles whose interaction is central to understanding not only Newar, but the typological parameters of egophoric systems in general. In essence, the Newar egophoric system can be shown to index the semantics of private inner-state predicates, e.g., intentional action and temperature predicates, relative to a principle of privileged access, reflected in a unitary discourse role of 1st person declarative/2nd person interrogative.

Because of the central place of the Newar system in the early literature on “conjunct/disjunct” marking, I begin with a review of the basic egophoric pattern in Newar inflectional morphology and a short overview of how it has been previously described.

² I use the term ‘Kathmandu Newar’ to refer to the language *Nepāl Bhāṣā* (Tibeto-Burman), as spoken primarily in the cities of Kathmandu and Patan, and surrounding villages in Nepal’s Kathmandu valley. Definitive evidence for locating *Nepāl Bhāṣā* within any Tibeto-Burman subgroup remains elusive although it can safely be considered a member of Himalayish, as described in Matisoff (2003:5). The 2001 Nepal census lists the number of mother-tongue speakers for Newar at 825,458. The term *Nepāl Bhāṣā* will also apply to the historical literary language found in texts dating from 1114 CE. up to the modern era. For brevity, I will also use the term ‘Newar.’

2. Finite Verbal Morphology

Summarized in Tables 1 and 2 are the paradigms for finite verb inflection.³ In Table 1, the verb *thyan-* ‘arrive’ belongs to the class of impersonal non-control verbs that does not participate in egophoric distribution. Finite marking with this class of verbs forms a three-way contrast: an imperfective stem, marked with vowel lengthening, a perfective suffix */-a/*, and a non-past suffix */-i/*.⁴ Unlike egophoric distributions, this paradigm does not distinguish person or illocutionary type (Hale & Shrestha 2006; Hargreaves 2005).

Table 1. Finite forms of *thyan-* ‘arrive.’⁵

	Illocutionary Type Declarative/Interrogative	
Person	<i>thyã:</i>	(IMPFV)
1/2/3	<i>thyan-a</i>	(PFV)
	<i>thyan-i</i>	(NPST)

In contrast, in Table 2, the verb *wan-* ‘go’ belongs to the class of verbs whose default lexical semantics assume an intentional action for animate actors. Whereas impersonal predicates like *thyan-* ‘arrive’ do not allow egophoric forms at all, with the *wan-* ‘go’ class of verbs, egophoric coding consists of a two term contrast: past tense *-ã* with non-past *-e*. The egophoric forms occur exclusively in finite contexts of 1st person

³ Transcriptions for *Nepāl Bhāṣā* examples follow the conventions of Devanagiri orthography and transliteration, with one small exception. The low central vowel phoneme (IPA) /a/ is represented as < *ã* >, rather than the expected < *ā* >, and the low back vowel phoneme (IPA) /a/ is represented as < *a* > rather than the expected < *ā* >.

⁴ Imperative forms are derived by shortening the long vowel form of the imperfective stem. For details on non-finite forms, as well as alternations in the stem final consonants and inflectional classes, see Malla 1985, Hargreaves 2003, Hale and Shrestha 2006.

⁵ Abbreviations: ABS absolutive; ADV adverb; CAUS causative; CL classifier; CM concatenation marker; COMP complementizer; DAT dative; DEM demonstrative; EGO egophoric; ERG ergative; EVD evidential; GEN genitive; HON honorific; INCL inclusive; INF infinitive; IMP imperative; IMPFV imperfective; LOC locative; NEG negative; NMLZ nominalizer; NPST non-past; PFV perfective; PLR plural; PRT particle; PST past; PTCP participle; PURP purpose; RDP reduplication; TOP topic; Q question.

declarative and 2nd person interrogative clauses, and in logophoric contexts marking coreference between the actor of a reported speech/thought verb, and the actor in the embedded clause, regardless of person. The “elsewhere” forms occur in all other finite contexts, again contrasting imperfective/perfective and non-past, as with impersonal verbs. The significance of two term egophoric (past vs. non-past) marking versus three-term non-egophoric (perfective vs. imperfective vs. non-past marking) will be taken up in §5 as a partial explanation for the grammaticalization of auxiliary *dhun-* ‘finish’ in egophoric contexts.

Also worth noting is the fact that the finite past and non-past egophoric forms (-*ā* vs. -*e*) are homophonous with a non-finite participle and infinitive form, respectively. The importance of this fact for reconstructing the Newar system cannot be overstated, but the details are beyond the scope of this study. Finite clauses marked with the nominalizer -*gu* also exhibit egophoric contrasts (Hale and Shrestha 2006; Hargreaves 1991a; 2005).

Table 2. Finite forms of /*wan-*/ ‘to go.’⁶

	Declarative	Interrogative
1 st	<i>wan-ā</i> (PST.EGO) <i>wan-e</i> (NPST.EGO)	<i>wā:</i> (IMPFV) <i>wan-a</i> (PFV) <i>wan-i</i> (NPST)
2 nd	<i>wā:</i> <i>wan-a</i> <i>wan-i</i>	<i>wan-ā</i> <i>wan-e</i>
3 rd	<i>wā:</i> <i>wan-a</i> <i>wan-i</i>	<i>wā:</i> <i>wan-a</i> <i>wan-i</i>

⁶ Central to the thesis in this paper is the necessity of distinguishing between the morphological form -*ā* (glossed as PST.EGO), which has egophoric distributions, and other lexical-grammatical domains of egophoric distribution. Thus, although temperature predicates and the auxiliary *dhun-* ‘finish’ will be shown to have egophoric distributions, they have no formal elements that can be glossed as such. Non-egophoric finite verb forms will be glossed for aspect only (i.e., PFV vs. IMPFV).

The key contrasts pointed out originally in Bendix (1974) and Hale (1980) for the verbal morphology are exemplified in (1-12) and elaborated further in §3. The first parameter for egophoric encoding is the requirement that the verb be construed as intentional. Verbs fall into three semantic classes according to the degree to which intentional action is construed as a default component of their lexical structure.

First, there is a large lexical class of control verbs, such as *wan-* ‘go’, whose semantics entail intentional action, with animate actors. With these verbs, 1st declarative clauses are marked with egophoric forms. Epistemic authority, the person assumed to have privileged access to the intentions for an action, is assumed for 1st person intentional actors and egophoric marking is the default. However, non-egophoric forms may occur whenever the epistemic assumptions about 1st person authority are cancelled. The appearance of a non-egophoric inflection with a control verb implicates that the intentional component of the action cannot felicitously be self-ascribed by the speaker; hence, it is inferable that the action may be non-intentional.

Markers that cancel default assumptions for 1st person actor epistemic authority include interrogative forms as in (2), an inferential evidential marker (3), and adverbial form encoding non-intention (4).⁷

(1) *jĩ:* *a:pwa twan-ā*
 1.ERG much drink-**PST.EGO**
 ‘I drank a lot.’ (self-ascription)

(2) *jĩ:* *a:pwa twan-a* *lā*
 1.ERG much drink-**PFV** Q
 ‘Did I drink a lot?’

⁷ Spoken language data in this paper come from field notes, elicitations, recorded conversations and oral narratives collected in Kathmandu 1984-85, 1988-89, Fall 2006, Winter 2008, and in Portland, Oregon, USA, Fall 2004, Summer 2011. Unmarked examples are from elicitations. Textual examples are indicated as follows: (AE) two party conversation, (EQ) three party conversation, (LW) oral narrative. Special thanks to Rajendra Shrestha, Gita Manandhar, and Daya Shakya. All errors are mine.

- (3) *jĩ:* *a:pwa* *twan-a* *khanisā*
 1.ERG much drink-PFV EVD
 ‘It appears I drank a lot.’
- (4) *jĩ:* *ma-cāe-ka* *kā* *cāphut-a* *kā*
 1.ERG NEG-feel-ADV thread snap-PFV PRT
 ‘I unwittingly snapped the thread.’

In direct contrast with the set of control verbs is the set of non-control verbs, impersonal verbs whose semantics disallow any interpretation of intentional action, and hence, will never appear with egophoric marking. The verb *thyan-* ‘arrive’ is one such verb. For example, in order to be eligible for inclusion in an action construed as intentional, *thyan-* ‘arrive’ requires an adverbial form, *thyan-ka* modifying a control motion verb functioning deictically, e.g. *thyanka wan-* ‘go arrive (there)’ or *thyanka wa(l)-* ‘come arrive (here).’ Like all non-control verbs, *thyan-* will never itself appear with egophoric inflectional morphology. Also belonging to this class are predicates of emotion, e.g., *gyā(t)-* ‘fear,’ and sensation, e.g., *ciku(l)-* ‘be.cold’, as well cognition verbs such as *thu(l)-* ‘understand’ and *si(l)-* ‘know.’ The diachronic significance of this sub-class of inner state predicates is discussed in §5.3.

The contrast between intentional and non-intentional interpretations is most clearly exemplified in 1st person clauses with a third class of verbs, termed fluid verbs (5-6). This class freely allows either inflectional form (egophoric/non-egophoric) in 1st person, without the need to overtly override the default assumption about 1st person authority via evidential operators (cf. Hargreaves 1991a; 2005).

- (5) *jĩ:* *mānaj* *nāpalān-ā*
 1.ERG Manoj.ABS meet-PST.EGO
 ‘I met Manoj (as planned).’
- (6) *jĩ:* *mānaj* *nāpalāt-a*
 1.ERG Manoj.ABS meet-PFV
 ‘I met Manoj (by coincidence).’

With the reportative evidential, and reported speech or thought, egophoric marking functions logophorically. Non-coreference between matrix clause and embedded clause actor is marked on the embedded verb with non-egophoric morphology as in (7-8).⁸

- (7) *wã:* *jĩ:* *a:pwa twan-a* *dhakã: dhãl-a*
 3.ERG 1.ERG much drink-PFV COMP say-PFV
 ‘He_i said I_j drank a lot.’
- (8) *syãm-ã* *wã:* *a:pwa twan-a* *dhakã: dhãl-a*
 Syam-ERG 3.ERG much drink-PFV COMP say-PFV
 ‘Syam_i said he_j drank a lot.’

The same distribution applies with the reportative evidential *hã:* as in (9-10).

- (9) *jĩ:* *a:pwa twan-a* *hã:*
 1.ERG much drink-PFV EVD
 ‘It’s said I drank a lot.’
- (10) *wã:* *a:pwa twan-a* *hã*
 3.ERG much drink-PFV EVD
 ‘It’s said he drank a lot.’

In contrast, egophoric forms will mark co-reference between the matrix clause (source of the report) and the embedded clause (intentional) actor.

- (11) *syãm-ã* *wã:* *a:pwa twan-ã* *dhakã: dhãl-a*
 Syam-ERG 3.ERG much drink-PST.EGO COMP say-PFV
 ‘Syam_i said he_i drank too much.’
- (12) *syãm-ã* *a:pwa twan-ã* *hã*
 Syam-ERG much drink-PST.EGO EVD
 ‘Syam_i said that he_i drank a lot.’

⁸ Elicited examples such as 7-8 and 11, with all nominal arguments overt, sound clumsy to my consultants. The overt presence of both matrix and embedded clause subjects is rare in texts. Still, the inflectional morphology on the embedded clause verb will always code logophoric or non-logophoric reference for these arguments.

3. Previous Accounts

As it turns out, Hale (1980) initially coined the term “conjunct” to characterize this logophoric function of the verbal morphology (see §2 ex. 7-12). Arguing that the reported speech (logophoric) analysis could “naturally be extended to account for unembedded clauses as well” (1980: 97), Hale suggested an abstract performative model along the lines of Saddock (1974). The performative model, isomorphic with the reported speech construction, posited in essence, a “higher” performative verb of speaking for simple (non-reported speech) clauses. Thus, the term “conjunct,” as Hale used it, suggested co-reference between the subject of the “higher” abstract performative verb and the actor of the main clause verb. Soon detached from the performative underpinnings of Hale’s original paper, the terms “conjunct/disjunct” entered the Tibeto-Burman literature, and beyond, although not without reservations and some strongly argued dissent (Bickell 2000; 2001; Dickenson 2000; Creissels 2008; Curnow 2000, 2002; DeLancey 1992; Loughnane 2009; Malla 1985; San Roque 2008; Slater 2003; Sun 1993; Tournadre 2008).

Interestingly, Edward Bendix’s earlier observations (1974), cited by Hale (1980), had taken a different approach, arguing that Newar tense/aspect morphology in simple finite clauses was evidential in function. In Bendix’s account, the *-ā* form (egophoric) marked that “evidence for the assertion is at least one experience of [the speaker] which is this intentional performance [of action by actor]” (1974: 49). Bendix described the co-indexing of speaker/addressee with intentional actor, suggesting that the *-ā* form be viewed as an “evidential and not a first person verb ending: it may occur with any person as such, for example, second person in interrogative and third person in quotative” (1974: 49).

As both Bendix and Hale had pointed out, one primary constraint on egophoric forms in Newar is that the verb be understood as selecting “a true instigator, one responsible for an intentional act” (Hale 1980: 96). Moreover, Hale (1980:100) showed that an interpretation of intentionality with actors in 1st declarative clauses was the default semantic interpretation, leading to implicatures of non-control, or non-awareness, whenever “disjunct” forms occurred, as in §2, ex. (1-4). Bendix’s (1992) pragmatic approach also demonstrated a wide range of contexts in which speakers use non-egophoric forms as marked forms with control verbs, in order to strategize the abdication of 1st person actor responsibility or epistemic authority. Similar “1st person effects” also appear in evidential systems (Aikhenvald 2004: 219).

Drawing from both Bendix and Hale, as well as DeLancey’s work on Tibetan and his cognitive model of events (DeLancey 1985, 1986, 1990), Hargreaves (1990; 1991a; 1991b) used neutral terms (SET1/SET2) for the inflectional morphology, but then noting reservations, returned to the labels “conjunct/disjunct” (2003, 2005). The terms by then were well established in the English language literature, even among Newar scholars (cf. Malla 1985), although Joši (1992) used Indic terms *ātma* ‘self’ and *para* ‘other.’

To account for the Newar distributions, Hargreaves (1991a; 1991b, 2005) argued for a semantic analysis of intentional action distinguishing two components: first, a force dynamic in which an actor is understood to self-initiate some behavior, without proximate causal antecedents (Talmy 1985), and, second, a representational, or propositional attitude component (Jackendoff 1985), in which the actor is understood to

act in accordance with an appropriate form of self-awareness, a self-ascription of an intention-in-action.⁹

Thus, the occurrence of egophoric forms in first person declarative clauses was said to co-index the two default lexical components for intentional action predicates: (a) a self-initiated force dynamic with (b) an appropriate self-representation. Marked uses of the non-egophoric form in 1st person declarative clauses resulted when the force dynamic was not co-indexed with the default self-representation. In other words, the speaker/agent performed an action *without* the assumed self-representation exemplified in English paraphrases such as “I *did* pull on the thread, and it *did* snap, but that’s *not* what I had in mind.” The behavior was performed with a lack of awareness, or internal representation, of the eventual outcome. In any case, it implies that the speaker is abdicating the privileged viewpoint on self’s own intentional action, deferring to an externalized viewpoint incompatible with self-ascription.

Finally, Hargreaves (1991a, 1991b, 2005) argued that the pragmatic preconditions for declarative and interrogative speech acts construct a unified functional role for the speaker in 1st declarative clauses and addressee in 2nd interrogative clauses in terms of the “epistemic source,” the privileged epistemic authority for the state of affairs being referred to.¹⁰ Thus, in clauses with 1st or 2nd persons, epistemic source was construed as a function of the intersection of the indexical properties of speaker-addressee self-ascription with the epistemic preconditions for declarative-interrogative illocutionary types.

⁹ Thanks to observations by Steve Wechsler (2010, pc.), it’s now clear that reference *de se* and *self-ascription* are exactly the right semantic concepts to describe this aspect of the Newar system. My work at the time did not employ these concepts, but should have.

¹⁰ The terms *locutor* (Aikhenvald 2004) and *informant* (Bickel 2008) have also been used to describe this role. It’s not clear to me what the most appropriate descriptive label should be.

In the case of intentional actions, the notion of epistemic source also presupposed a specific evidential principle of *privileged access*, an ontological constraint on direct evidence for the mental states of non-self, also a prerequisite for positing a theory of mind (Gunderson 1990: 302, Searle 1990: 277; 1995). Newar egophoric marking was thus seen as indexing privileged access to the intention-in-action representation of an actor, as a function of self-ascription for speaker/addressee in declarative/interrogative illocutionary types, respectively.

To conclude this section, then, the literature to date on the “conjunct/disjunct” system in Newar suggests the following: egophoric (conjunct) forms will appear whenever the following *two* conditions are met:

1. The action is construed as intentional. The construal is primarily lexically governed by verbs falling into three classes.
 - a. control verbs in which the construal of intentionality is the default lexical setting.
 - b. fluid verbs that freely allow either intentional or non-intentional construal.
 - c. non-control impersonal verbs incompatible with intentional action.
2. The illocutionary type is:
 - a. 1st person declarative, or
 - b. 2nd person interrogative, or
 - c. 3rd person in logophoric contexts of reported speech.

However, while the conditions above may adequately describe the distribution of the verbal morphology, it turns out that the egophoric distributions in Newar grammar have not yet been fully described, and that a more complete synchronic *and* diachronic description of Newar egophoricity has direct consequences for understanding egophoric systems in general. Specifically, I will show that egophoric distributions in Newar are not limited to verbs of intentional action, or limited to tense/aspect verbal morphology.

Instead, I will suggest that it is more useful to view the egophoric system in Newar as a set of interrelated semantic and pragmatic principles, realized formally in (at least) three distinct domains of Newar grammar: (a) tense/aspect verbal morphology; (b)

lexical contrast between two sets of temperature predicates; (c) causative vs. simple forms of the auxiliary verb *dhun-* ‘finish.’ Having reviewed the verbal morphology, we turn now to temperature predicates.

4. Temperature Predicates

Newar has a set of temperature predicates, hot/cold *tã:nwa(l)-/ ciku(l)-*, marking internal-sense temperature in localized space; this pair contrasts with another pair of temperature predicates, hot/cold *kwã- / khwãũ-*, which mark tactile sensation acquired from physical contact, typically finger or tongue on some surface (Hargreaves 2005). The pair *kwã- / khwãũ-* follows a non-egophoric distribution, whereas *tã:nwa(l)-/ ciku(l)-* are constrained by egophoric parameters.

The following examples illustrate that *tã:nwa(l)-/ ciku(l)-*, marking an internal sense of temperature, are limited to egophoric contexts.

- (13) *chã-ta tã:nwa: lã*
 2-DAT hot.IPFV Q
 ‘Are you hot?’

ã ji-ta tã:nwa:
 Yeah 1-DAT hot.IPFV
 ‘Yeah, I’m hot’

- (14) **ji-ta tã:nwa: lã*
 1-DAT hot.IPFV Q
 Am I hot?

**ã chã-ta tã:nwa:*
 Yeah, 2-DAT hot.IPFV
 Yeah, you’re hot.

These internal temperature predicates may occur with temporal and spatial adjuncts. Dative subjects do not normally occur in these contexts, but the experiencer is implied.

Along with a reduplicative form of the predicate, *ciku-ciku* in (15), the verb *dhā*: ‘say’ forms a construction marking graded assertions for a range of sensory predicates.

- (15) *thāũ-kanhae bahani: ciku-ciku dhā:*
 today-tomorrow evening.LOC cold-RDP say.IPFV
 ‘Nowdays, the evenings are somewhat chilly.’
- (16) *kwathā-e dune tasakã: tã:nwa:*
 room-LOC inside very hot
 ‘It’s really hot in that room.’

Direct attribution of the internal state, e.g. ‘be.cold,’ to 3rd persons is restricted, but can be overridden by evidential markers, a constraint also well-documented for Japanese (Tenny 2006).

- (17) **wa manu tã:nwa: /ciku:*
 DEM person hot/cold.IPFV
 ‘That person is hot’
- (18) *wa manu tã:nwa: /ciku: thẽ*
 DEM person hot / cold.IPFV EVD
 ‘That person appears hot/cold’

In contrast, the second set of hot/cold predicates, *kwā(t)- / khwāũ(l)*, indicate tactile properties, and may freely be used with 3rd persons and inanimates.

- (19) *la kwā:*
 water hot.IPFV
 ‘The water is hot.’
- (20) **la tã:nwa:*
 water hot.IPFV

1st person interrogatives and 2nd person declaratives with *kwā(t)- / khwāũ(l)* assume physical contact, for example, reaching out and touching with the hand.

- (21) *ji kwā: lā*
 1.ABS hot.IPFV Q
 ‘Am I (e.g., my forehead) hot?’
- (22) *(chã-gu chyã:) kwā:*
 (2-GEN forehead) hot.IPFV
 ‘(Your forehead is) hot’

The distribution, summarized in Table 3, demonstrates the parallel patterning of internal temperature predicates with the egophoric verbal morphology:

Table 3. Temperature predicates

	Declarative (internal sense)	Declarative (tactile sense)	Interrogative (internal sense)	Interrogative (tactile sense)
1 st	<i>tã:nwa(l)-</i> <i>ciku(l)-</i>	<i>kwā(t)-</i> <i>khwāũ(l)-</i>	***	<i>kwā(t)-</i> <i>khwāũ(l)-</i>
2 nd	***	<i>kwā(t)-</i> <i>khwāũ(l)-</i>	<i>tã:nwa(l)-</i> <i>ciku(l)-</i>	<i>kwā(t)-</i> <i>khwāũ(l)-</i>
3 rd	***	<i>kwā(t)-</i> <i>khwāũ(l)-</i>	***	<i>kwā(t)-</i> <i>khwāũ(l)-</i>

5. Aspectual auxiliary *dhun-* ‘finish’

Along with the inflectional morphology and temperature predicates, the aspectual auxiliary verb *dhun-* ‘finish’ also patterns egophorically, contrasting occurrences of simple stem *dhun-* in egophoric contexts, with the causative stem *dhun-k(al)-* elsewhere. In this section, I first outline the synchronic properties of the auxiliary *dhun-* followed by the relevant details of the causative morpheme *-k(al)-*, which marks the auxiliary *dhun-* in non-egophoric contexts. The section then concludes with a discussion of historical evidence from two late classical Newar texts which is suggestive of the diachronic development of this exceptional pattern.

5.1. The egophoric patterning of auxiliary *-dhun*

The simple stem of the aspectual auxiliary *dhun-* ‘finish’, appears only in egophoric contexts; the causative stem is used as the elsewhere form in all non-egophoric

environments (Hale and Shrestha 2006: 159-164; Hargreaves 1991a; Kiryu 2000).

Unlike with inflectional morphology, the auxiliary contrasts are also found in non-finite participles and imperatives, as well as in finite declarative/interrogative contexts.

The egophoric properties of the auxiliary are exemplified in (23-24). In the routine greeting, the appropriate second pair-part is to repeat the verb complex.

(23) *jā na-e dhun-a lā*
 rice eat-INF finish-PFV Q
 ‘Have you eaten?’ (greeting)

ā na-e dhun-a
 Yes eat-INF finish-PFV
 ‘Yes, I have.’

3rd person clauses will always take causative marking as in (24).

(24) *wā: jā na-e dhun-kal-a*
 3.ERG rice eat-INF finish-CAUS-PFV
 ‘S/he has already eaten’

In its simple (non-causative) form, the auxiliary verb *dhun-* ‘finish’ belongs to the class of non-control verbs, obligatorily inflects with non-egophoric /-a/, and subcategorizes for infinitive complements. The verb rarely appears as an independent verb, and does so only with an elided infinitive complement already understood (Hale and Shrestha 2006:163).

The aspectual semantics of the auxiliary follow from its lexical meaning “finish” but a more precise label is problematic. Hale and Shrestha (2006:159), for example, label it “perfective” glossing the senses of the verb as “finish” and “already.” On the other hand, Kiryu (2000) concludes that the auxiliary expresses a “perfect” aspect, specifically “the perfect of result and experiential perfect” (2000:49).

There is consensus that the auxiliary meaning focuses on the “completive” phase of the event or action, but note that this is also true of the inflectional form of the non-

egophoric perfective (PFV). The clearest contrast between the inflectional perfective form (PFV) and the auxiliary form is grounded in the anterior ‘already’ interpretation with the auxiliary as in (26). What is less clear is how anteriority is interpreted *vis a vis* the resultant state, current relevance or personal experience; nevertheless, the current relevance and experiential aspects of the perfect are appropriate interpretations in (26). Note also that non-intentional predicates with 1st persons take the causative form.

(25) *ji ni-kwa: birāmi jul-a*
 1.ABS two-CL ill become- PFV
 ‘I got sick twice.’ (perfective)

(26) *ji ni-kwa: birāmi ju-e dhun-kal-a*
 1.ABS two-CL ill become-INF finish-CAUS-PFV
 ‘I’ve already gotten sick twice.’
 (anterior, plus current relevance)

In the conversational example in (27) the pronoun *jhipĩ:* marks 1st plural inclusive, suggesting minimal social distance between the pronoun’s referents (niece and maternal aunt), even though the niece (speaker) was not even born when the events in the conversation took place. The appearance of the simple form *dhun-a* with the interrogative treats the addressee as the epistemic authority.¹¹

(27) *jhipĩ: thana chē: cwā wa-e*
 1.PLR.INCL here house stay.PURP come-INF

dhun-a lā le?
 finish-PFV Q PRT
 ‘Had we all already come here to stay at the house?’ (EQ:412)

2nd person non-interrogatives take the causative form; in (28), the verb is marked as imperative.

¹¹ The curious semantics-pragmatics of 1st plural inclusive relative to egophoric marking was pointed out in the workshop by Lila San-Roque.

- (28) *saphu:* *bwan-e* *yākana dhũ-k-i* *le*
 book.ABS read-INF quickly finish-CAUS-IMP PRT
 ‘Please finish reading the book quickly’
 (re-transcribed from Hale & Shrestha 2006: 163)

As noted above, 3rd persons always take the causative form as in (29) from a conversational text, and (30), from a short story.

- (29) ...*dun-ā:* *si-e* *dhun-kal-a* *kā*
 ...collapse-PTCP die-INF finish-CAUS-PFV PRT
 ‘(The wall) having collapsed, (they) were already dead’ (EQ:528)
- (30) *kwathā:* *pihã:* *wan-e* *dhun-kal-a*
 room outward go-INF finish-CAUS-PFV
 ‘(The moon) had already left the room’ (Hṛḍaya 1976:4)

The distribution of the auxiliary with intentional action predicates is summarized in Table 4.

Table 4. Distribution of simple vs. causative forms of *dhun-*

	Declarative	Interrogative
1 st	<i>Simple</i>	Causative
2 nd	Causative	<i>Simple</i>
3 rd	Causative	Causative

5.2. The causative morpheme *-k(al)-*

In this section, I show that the egophoric pattern of causative marking with auxiliary *dhun-* can partially be accounted for by observing the function of the causative morpheme, in particular, with a set of non-control verbs with unaccusative lexical structure (Perlmutter 1978). Canonically, the causative morpheme suffixes to verb stems adding an overt causer/agent argument as in examples (31-33). Note also that the suffix can be inflected with either egophoric or non-egophoric morphology, with the expected distribution.

- (31) *khāpā* *cāl-a*
 door.ABS open-PFV
 ‘The door opened’

- (32) *jĩ:* *khāpā* *cāe-k-ā*
 1.ERG door.ABS open-CAUS-PST.EGO
 ‘I opened the door’
- (33) *wā:* *khāpā* *cāe-kal-a*
 3.ERG door.ABS open-CAUS-PFV
 ‘She/he opened the door’

However, there is also a set of cognition verbs whose lexical structures require ergative marked subjects, but do not allow egophoric marking; with this class of verbs, the causative introduces no new overt arguments (cf. Hargreaves 1991a, 2005). In example (34) the verb takes the non-egophoric perfective *-a* since the semantics of “remember” do not include a potential for intentional action. In these cases, causative marking may be affixed in 1st, 2nd or 3rd person clauses, inflects with the normal egophoric/non-egophoric alternation, and indicates increased agency/control, but does not add an overt external argument. Examples of 1st person marking are given in (34-35).

- (34) *jĩ:* *luman-a*
 1.ERG remember-PFV
 ‘I (unintentionally) remembered (it).’
- (35) *jĩ:* *luman-k-ā*
 1.ERG remember-CAUS-PST.EGO
 ‘I (intentionally) remembered (it).’

With predicates licensing experiencer subjects, usually marked with the dative case, the causative will also not add any new arguments, constructing instead the interpretation of “externalized behavior.” This notion of externalized behavior will be reconsidered below as a partial account of the causative function with auxiliary *dhun-*. Consider again the egophoric temperature predicate *ciku(l)-*, and the evidential requirement for 3rd person attribution. Consultants report that (37) would be

unacceptable without the evidential to indicate the fact that it is behavioral evidence that is being judged.

(36) *ji-ta cikul-a*
 1-DAT cold-PFV
 ‘I got cold.’

(37) *wa-yā cikul-a thē:*
 3-GEN cold-PFV EVD
 ‘It looks like s/he’s cold’

Similarly, in (38), with a 3rd person experiencer, the causative form gives the interpretation that the person has externalized the evidence for the inner state, through a behavior such as shivering, or pretending to act cold.¹²

(38) *wa-yā cikui-kal-a*
 3-GEN cold-CAUS-PFV
 ‘S/he behaved as if cold, e.g., by shivering’

In the following segment of oral narrative, the wife is pretending to be sick in order to get out of going to the fields to work. The predicate, *jwara wa(l)-* ‘fever come,’ normally requires a dative (experiencer) subject; in this example, the verb appears in the causative form, with a non-finite participle inflection (-ā:). Most importantly, the causative marking indicates the fever is externalized as observable behavior. It also suggests she is faking the fever, and the husband is clueless.

(39) *ale nhyā-balē bhā:ta-yāta bũ-e chway-ā:*
 then any-time husband-DAT field-LOC send-PTCP
 ‘She would always send her husband out to the field,

ma-phut-a dhakā: jwara wae-k-ā:
 NEG-able-PFV COMP fever come-CAUS-PTCP
 saying she’s not well, **feigning fever,**

ũ ũ ũ hāl-ā cwan-i-gu
 oh oh oh cry-CM stay-NPST-NMLZ
 and moaning and groaning’ (LW: 4-7)

¹² As of yet, there is no clear account for why the genitive form -yā, which forms the base for the dative -yāta, will occur often in these constructions, although the full dative form is also possible. The egophoric verb form is judged strange or entirely unacceptable.

Returning now to auxiliary *dhun-*, recall that it too will not manifest an additional overt argument when marked with the causative suffix, suggesting a similar lexical structure with the cognition and inner state sensation verbs in Newar (cf. Hargreaves 1991a; 2005; Kansakar 1990; Kiryu 2001). As we have seen, with this class of verbs, instead of adding an overt agent/causer argument role, the semantics of the causative suffix will encode either increased agency/control *or* the appearance of an externalized behavior which is symptomatic of an internalized state. This externalized behavior is publically available knowledge, confirmable by visual evidence, a non-privileged epistemic status consistent only with non-egophoric distributions. The causative *dhun-k(al)-* follows exactly this pattern.

In contrast, the simple form of *dhun-* marks an aspectual value consistent with private experience. In particular, in modern Newar, it encodes the completive-experiential phase of an intentional act, a personal knowledge which is not directly accessible to others, and hence subject to egophoric constraints (cf. DeLancey on Lhasa Tibetan, 1985; 1986; 1990).

5.3. Auxiliary *-dhun* ‘finish’ in two late classical Newar texts

The egophoric distribution of auxiliary *dhun-* is a curious phenomenon. More evidence of its exceptional nature comes from an examination of the auxiliary in two late classical Newar texts.¹³ Interestingly, the egophoric distribution of the auxiliary relative to predicate types differs slightly from the modern use of the auxiliary. Specifically, the evidence shows that the egophoric distribution of the auxiliary *dhun-* included a wide

¹³ The term “late classical” is used here merely as a convenience; the periodization of the Classical Newar written tradition is controversial, and beyond the scope of this study (cf. Malla 2000; Tamot 2002).

range of intentional and inner state predicates as complements, in contrast with the modern restriction to only predicates of intentional action.

Consider first the *Batīsaputrikākathā*, a Newar recension of the traditional Indian legends of King Vikramāditya ‘Tales of the Thirty-Two Statuettes,’ (Jørgenson: 1939).¹⁴ The text is undated, but based on internal textual evidence, Jørgenson considers it “likely from the 18th century” (1939:5); moreover, as a literary artifact, it likely represents a more conservative register than the dating suggests (Tamot 2002). The distribution of *dhun-* in the text shows egophoric patterning for the simple form of the auxiliary.

Recall that *dhun-* belongs to the class of non-control verbs and does not allow egophoric *-ā* suffixation under any circumstance. Nevertheless, like modern Newar its distribution in the text manifests an egophoric asymmetry. Out of fifty-two total tokens of the auxiliary *dhun-*, all forty-six tokens of the simple, non-causative stem occur in egophoric distribution. None of the causative forms occur in egophoric contexts.

Table 5. Auxiliary *dhun-* in the *Batīsaputrikākathā*

	Declarative		Interrogative	
1 st	<i>dhun-a</i>	42		
2 nd	<i>dhuna-kal-a</i>	1	<i>dhun-a</i>	4
3 rd	<i>dhuna-kal-a</i>	1		
	<i>dhuna-kā-va</i>	4		

The 1st declarative tokens occur with intentional action predicates as illustrated in (40-42).¹⁵

¹⁴ The 140 pages of Jørgenson’s transliterated text contain approximately 67,200 words.

¹⁵ For clarity of exposition, I parse only the relevant morpho-syntactic properties. References are to the page and line numbers in the Jørgenson texts. Translations are my own. I have also regularized the spelling of the non-egophoric suffix *-a*, which can also appear as *-o* in the text.

- (40) *ji vaṇavaya dhun-a*
 1.ABS go.come.INF finish-PFV
 ‘I’ve already gone and come back.’ (B97.7)
- (41) *Bikramādityanaṃ dhālaṃ vaya dhun-ayo*
 Bikiramāditya.ERG say.PFV come.INF finish-PFV¹⁶
 ‘Bikiramāditya replied, “I have come.”’ (B28.27)
- (42) *jin svasyaṃ taya dhun-a*
 1.ERG see.NMLZ put.INF finish-PFV
 ‘I’ve already picked out (the one I want).’ (B127.24)

There are four apparent exceptions in which 1st declarative clauses occur with non-intentional predicates as in (43-44); three of the exceptions involve inner state predicates, a pattern so far not attested in modern Kathmandu Newar.¹⁷ We return to this issue below:

- (43) *bho Karṇ ji khusi juya dhun-a*
 Oh Karṇ 1.ABS happy become.INF finish-PFV
 ‘I am delighted.’ (B 75.13)
- (44) *bho babu-ju chalapolayā pratāpan*
 Oh father-HON 2.HON.GEN glory.ABL
 ‘Oh father, through your glory
- ji sukhanam cone dhun-a*
 1.ABS happiness.ABL stay.INF finish-PVF
 I now live in happiness.’ (B128.5)

The simple form appears four times with 2nd interrogative intentional predicates as in (45-46) below.

- (45) *Bho puruṣ bijyāya dhun-a rā*
 Oh husband come.HON.INF finish-PFV Q
 ‘Oh husband, have you already come?’ (B44.8)
- (46) *bho Karṇ waya dhun-a lā*
 Oh Karn come.INF finish-PVF Q
 ‘Oh Karn, have you already come?’ (B75.8)

¹⁶ The inflectional ending *-ayo* is unusual here, but the stem form is clearly not causative.

¹⁷ The one genuine exception appears with the predicate *jyāth ju(l)*- ‘get old,’ although it could be argued ‘getting old’ is also just a state of mind.

The one token of 2nd person declarative clearly exhibits the expected non-egophoric pattern:

(47) *āva chan ji hmas cikananam*
now 2.ERG 1.GEN body oil.ABL

buya dhun-kal-a
rub.INF finish-CAUSE-PFV
'You've now finished rubbing my body with oil;

āva chiva jiva kāmākṛīḍā yāya māl....
now 2.and 1.and love.play do.INF need.IMPFV
now you and I must make love.' (B70.29-30)

In sum, all tokens of the causative form occur in non-egophoric contexts. Two causative tokens take the finite form *dhuna-kal-a*. The remaining causative tokens occur as *dhuna-kā-wa*, a non-finite participle form characteristic of narrative sequencing.

As we have seen in the *Batīsaputrikākathā*, all but four of the complements with *dhun-a* are intentional action predicates. Moreover, three exceptions involve inner state predicates. Turning to another late classical text, *Vicitrakarṇikāvadānoddhṛta*, we find more robust evidence for the egophoric form with inner-state predicates.¹⁸

The *Vicitrakarṇikāvadānoddhṛta* is a collection of tales belonging to the Buddhist *Avadānas* tradition. The Newar text, dated 1873-4, is likely a copy of an earlier text translated from a Sanskrit source (Jørgenson 1931:2-4). Phonologically and morphologically, the text reflects more modern forms than the *Batīsaputrikākathā*. In the *Vicitrakarṇikāvadānoddhṛta*, the simple form *dhun-a* (often in a variant form *dhun-o*) follows egophoric distribution; forms with the causative suffix, *dhuna-kal-a* or *dhuna-kā-wa*, occur only in non-egophoric contexts.

1st person declarative and 2nd person interrogatives with intentional action predicates occur with *dhun-a*:

¹⁸ The 165 pages of Jørgenson's transliterated text contain roughly 34,650 words.

- (48) *jācak* *boṅāo* *haya* *dhun-a*
 beggar lead.PTCP bring-INF finish-PFV
 ‘(I) have brought the beggar (to you). (V68.16)
- (49) ...*śmaśānas* *tayāo* *taya* *dhun-a*
 graveyard.LOC put.PTCP put.INF finish-PVF
 ‘...and (I) have placed (it) in the graveyard’ (V46.20)
- (50) *guli* *sampatti sādhan* *yāya* *dhun-a*
 how.much wealth gain do-INF finish-PFV
 ‘How much wealth have (you) acquired?’ (V110.24)

The distributions are similar to those found in the *Batīsaputrikākathā*.

Table 6. Auxiliary *dhun-* in the *Vicitrakarṇikāvadānoddhṛta*

	Declarative		Interrogative	
1 st	<i>dhun-a</i>	53		
2 nd	<i>dhuna-kal-a</i>	2	<i>dhun-a</i>	1
3 rd	<i>dhuna-kal-a</i>	0		
	<i>dhuna-kā-va</i>	26		

However, whereas in the *Batīsaputrikākathā* complements with *dhun-a* are all intentional action predicates (with the three exceptions already noted above), the distribution in the *Vicitrakarṇikāvadānoddhṛta* includes a sizeable number of complements with predicates of inner emotional or cognitive states. The construction often consists of a Sanskrit nominal with infinitive forms of *cāya* ‘feel, sense’, or *juya* ‘become’ as complements to *dhun-*.

- (51) *cha* *khaṅāo* *ji* *ati karuṅā* *cāya* *dhun-a*
 2.ABS see.PTCP 1.ABS very empathy feel.INF finish-PFV
 ‘On seeing you (like this), I feel empathy.’ (V68.8)
- (52) *āo* *ji* *samdeh* *ma* *cāya* *dhun-a*
 now 1.ABS doubt NEG feel.INF finish-PFV
 ‘Now, I no longer feel doubt.’ (V100.13)

There are examples, however, where inner-state predicates come with strong Tibeto-Burman pedigrees, without Sanskrit nominals, e.g., *gyāya* ‘to fear’ < TB **k/gra*k

(Matisoff 2003: 597), suggesting that the construction is not just an artifact of translation or the Sanskrit source of the text.

- (53) *ji julam ati gyāya dhun-a*
 1.ABS TOP very fear.INF finish-PVF
 ‘...for I’ve become very afraid.’ (V148.16)

These inner-state predicates with the egophoric auxiliary form include thirty-four tokens of the following types: *karuṇā cāya* ‘feel compassion, pity’, *saṁdeh cāya* ‘feel doubt’, *adbhut cāya* ‘feel astonished, wonder’, *āścary cāya* ‘feel curious, surprised’, *bismay cāya* ‘feel wonder, surprise’, *bodh juya* ‘come to believe’, *pratyār juya* ‘come to believe’, *saṁtos juya* ‘become pleased’, *gyāya* ‘fear’, *siya* ‘know’ *darśan yāye* ‘have a vision, revelation,’ *khane* ‘see’, and *ñene* ‘hear’.

The list of intentional action predicates with the auxiliary included nineteen tokens of the following types: *lāya* ‘obtain’, *mune* ‘gather’, *hlāya* ‘hand over’, *yāya* ‘do’, *boṅāo haya* ‘lead-bring’, *tayāo oya* ‘put-come’, *dayakāo oya* ‘make-come’ *sidhayakāo oya* ‘complete-come’, *sar-tāo oya* ‘come to call on’ *kāyāo oya* ‘get-come’, *oya* ‘come’ *tol-te*, ‘abandon,’ *siyāke*, ‘learn,’ *swoya* ‘watch/look at’.

What emerges from these two lists of predicates is the fact the egophoric distribution of the simple forms of *dhun-* ‘finish’ was sensitive to both intentional action and non-intentional inner state predicates, suggesting a more generalized notion of privileged access not restricted to intentions.

5.4. Assessing the late classical evidence

Previous studies of Newar diachrony have already established that the verbal morphology in the classical texts from the Kathmandu Valley had egophoric distributions (Jørgensen 1941; Kansakar 1995; Kölver & Kölver 1978). Moreover, as

we have seen, the evidence from two late classical texts shows an egophoric distribution for the simple form of the auxiliary *dhun-* contrasted with the causative stem *dhuna-k-* (Table 7).

Table 7. Total: auxiliary *dhun-* in two late classical texts

Declarative		Interrogative	
1 st	<i>dhun-</i>	95	
2 nd	<i>dhuna-k-</i>	3	<i>dhun-</i> 5
3 rd	<i>dhuna-k-</i>	31	

By way of contrast, the verbal morphology of Dolakha Newar (from the village of Dolakha, 145 kilometers east of Kathmandu) encodes person/number subject agreement, showing no evidence of egophoric distribution (Genetti 2007). Interestingly, Dolakha has a cognate auxiliary *d(h)on* ‘finish’ and a cognate causative suffix *-ker-*. Dolakha auxiliary forms *d(h)on* and *d(h)on-ker-* are thus cognate with the Kathmandu Newar auxiliary forms *dhun-* and *dhun-k(al)-* (Genetti 2007: 190, 331).

Genetti notes that the Dolakha causative alternation with the auxiliary *d(h)on-* varies somewhat relative to the transitivity of the verb, but clear patterns are not discernible and she concludes that it is “unclear whether the causative form has any particular semantic effect; further investigation of this issue may (or may not) reveal motivated patterns” (2007:383). The presence of this non-categorical variation is significant, as we shall see.

No lexical source for the causative morpheme *k(al)- / ker-* has yet been identified, but it undoubtedly reflects a more recent development in causative marking than the Kathmandu and Dolakha Newar reflexes of the older Proto-Tibeto-Burman causative prefix **s-* (Genetti 2007:330; Hargreaves 2005; Matisoff 2003:100). In any event, the

verb *dhun-* /*d(h)on-* ‘finish’ and the causative suffix *k(al)-* / *ker-* can safely be posited for a Proto-Newar stage.

Proto-Newar had the verb *dhun-* /*d(h)on-* as an aspectual auxiliary, and independently manifested a simple/causative alternation with *k(al)-* / *ker-*. Thus, the lack of an egophoric distribution for the auxiliary in Dolakha Newar suggests that the egophoric distribution for the auxiliary *dhun-* was innovated in Kathmandu Newar. An early stage of the innovation with *dhun-*, as evidenced in the classical texts, appears to have involved a wider range predicates (both intentional action and inner state), while subsequently, modern Kathmandu Newar came to categorically contrast only intentional action with the elsewhere cases. Meanwhile, the modern Dolakha opposition continues to show variable semantics with respect to transitivity, but no evidence of any categorical opposition. Clearly, with the inflectional morphology in Dolakha marking person/number, there is no independent motivation toward egophoric distribution.

Recall also, in both classical and modern Newar, the egophoric inflectional paradigms do not exhibit an aspectual contrast, marking instead only (realis) past *-ā* and (irrealis) non-past *-e* (see §2). This absence of an aspectual opposition in the egophoric paradigm can be posited as a likely motivation for an increased frequency of the aspectual auxiliary *dhun-* “finish” in just these egophoric contexts.¹⁹ One plausible scenario, then, is that the non-causative stem *dhun-* was nudged towards egophoric contexts by these paradigmatic and semantic motivations.

Conversely, the non-egophoric inflectional paradigm is already contrasting perfective/imperfective aspect in realis (past) contexts. And since the causative form

¹⁹ See Creissels (2008) for a similar diachronic scenario in Akhvakh (Nakh-Daghestanian) egophoric marking.

dhun-k(al)- contrasts with the imperfective/perfective aspectual coding that already exists, it appears only as an elsewhere case.²⁰

In any event, the late classical texts show the distribution of the simple stem *dhun-* with both intentional and inner state predications, and then undergoing a semantic narrowing in modern Kathmandu Newar, where it appears only with intentional action predicates in egophoric contexts parallel to that of the inflectional morphology. The causative form, with its semantics of externalized behavior, is relegated to the elsewhere cases.

Equally importantly, in diachronic terms, it shows that egophoricity in Kathmandu Newar has not been simply an isolated feature assigned to the finite inflectional morphology on the verb. Instead, the core parameters for egophoric distributions appear to have conditioned the finite inflectional morphology *and* recruited the auxiliary into this distribution.

6. Conclusion

Am I blue?/am I blue?/ain't these tears, in these eyes telling you?/how can you ask me 'am I blue'?/why, wouldn't you be too/if each plan with your man done fell through? (lyrics by Grant Clark)

In the lyrics of the American popular song “Am I blue?,” sung by a long tradition of jazz and popular vocalists, listeners recognize instantly that the song’s emotional pivot is the “disjunct” between the interrogative form “*Am I blue?*,” which attributes epistemic authority to an addressee, and the presumption that first persons, e.g. the

²⁰ This, in part, may also account for the discrepancy between Hale and Shrestha’s (2008) and Kiryu’s (2000) interpretation of the semantics of the auxiliary. Independent of the simple/causative contrast, the aspectual value of the auxiliary stem *dhun-* contrasts differently relative to the two term egophoric inflectional paradigm (past/non-past) than it does in the three term non-egophoric paradigm (perfective/ imperfective/non-past). More detailed study will need to confirm this.

singer, have privileged access to their own emotional states.²¹ A pragmatic account is hinted at by Austin (1956: 249):

Suppose for example you say to me, 'I'm feeling pretty mouldy this morning'. Well, I say to you 'no you're not;' and you say 'what the devil do you mean, I'm not.' 'Oh nothing—I'm just stating you're not—is it true or false?' And you say, 'wait a bit, about whether it's true or false, the question is what did you mean by making statements about someone else's feelings? I told you I'm feeling pretty mouldy. You're just not in a position to say, to state that I'm not.'²²

The song lyrics, of course, exploit this presumption. The interrogative form signals ironic pretense as the singer appeals to the interlocutor to affirm a truth about the singer's own private internal state. She appeals to both visual evidence (her tears) and empathy (if this happened to you, you'd feel as I do), taking these to be publically shared notions of evidence (Currie 2006, Grice 1967, Sperber and Wilson 1981).

Similar pragmatic principles in Newar underlie egophoric marking. Actors are presumed to have privileged access to their own intentions-in-action, and non-egophoric marking leads to predictable implicatures when non-egophoric forms occur with 1st person actors in declarative utterances. As Bendix noted, using a non-egophoric form when the egophoric form is expected suggests "in Gricean terms, I am not being as fully informative as I am believed capable of being. Not selecting the [egophoric form *DH*] is a marked usage and demands an interpretation (1992:240)."

More specifically, it demands an interpretation derived from several interdependent assumptions. It assumes, for example, that certain lexical and morpho-syntactic constructions assign features such as "intentional actor" or "inner-state experiencer" to argument positions in clauses. It assumes that certain types of self-ascribed intentional and internal states are accessible only to self. In addition, it assumes a set of Gricean-

²¹ The classic version is Ethel Waters 1929, "On with the show."
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xELXrF9efaQ>

²² Thanks to Larry Horn for drawing my attention to this passage in Austin.

like pragmatic principles evaluating Quantity for self-reports (being fully informative), and Quality for other-attributions (asserting only what you have evidence for).

What I suggest, then, is that most economical way to account for egophoric distributions in Kathmandu Newar is to suggest a single set of semantic and pragmatic principles, indexed to the formal domains of inflectional morphology, temperature predicates, and the simple/causative form of the auxiliary (Hargreaves 2012).²³

Expanding on the framework outlined in Bickell 2008, I suggest the following inter-related components (Hargreaves 2012):

1. *internal state*: In modern Kathmandu Newar, predicates of intentional action and inner-sense temperature can be said to include a feature, let's call it "internal state," associated with certain agent and experiencer argument roles. The evidence from late classical Newar shows a wider range of inner state predicates associated with this feature. This association is part of the conceptual structure of an event/action, and is independent of person/speech event participant roles. Informally speaking, in the construal of certain states-of-affair, predicates such as *twan-* 'drink' or *ciku(l)-* 'be.cold' are understood to attribute private intentional or inner states to participants in the action or event.

2. *privileged access*. One property of an inner state is that of being subject to privileged access, which follows from the "ontological subjectivity" of inner states (Searle 1995). This principle underlies the fundamental epistemic asymmetry in ascribing internal states for self and non-self, and is also a prerequisite for any theory of mind. In other words, the conditions for verifying the truth of the statement "I met Manoj (as I had planned)" are fundamentally distinct from the

²³ It's not clear to me whether this "template" can be understood as in any way similar to the "semplates" of Levinson & Burenhult (2009).

conditions for verifying “You met Manoj (as you had planned)” (cf. §2 examples 5-6). Truth claims in the latter case are constrained by the notion that only self has access to self’s own intention-in-action.

3. *epistemic evaluation*. Whereas “privileged access” refers to the ontological status of cognitive states, and “inner state” refers to a semantic feature associated with argument roles, the notion of *epistemic evaluation* refers to conventionalized language specific constraints in specific lexical or morpho-syntactic domains. In other words, this principle takes the notions of “inner state” and “privileged access” as appropriateness conditions for intentional and inner state attributions, conventionally encoded in the language specific morpho-syntactic and lexical domains of Kathmandu Newar (cf. Kamio 1979; Robbins & Rumsey 2008; Rosen 1995; Tenny 2006).

As we have seen in section §5, the boundaries of these lexical and morpho-syntactic domains from Proto-Newar to modern Kathmandu Newar have been subject to lexical variation and discourse pressures toward grammaticalization. For example, the parameters for egophoric distribution with the auxiliary *dhun-* in modern Kathmandu Newar are mostly dictated by lexical class (control, non-control, fluid) with respect to intentional action. Evidence from the late classical texts suggest a wider range of predicates occurring with the simple form of the auxiliary *dhun-*.

Other languages (cf. this volume) may evaluate other parameters as privileged internal states—not only intentional action, inner state sensation or emotion, but also “direct witness” or “direct involvement” (cf. Slater 2003 for Mangghuer). These latter cases, encompassing various degrees of involvement, involve an epistemic

evaluation that widens the scope of “inner state” outside the usual parameters for assigning semantic features to core arguments. Still, these expanded domains of involvement constitute an epistemic status construed as privileged knowledge about the event, subject to inner state access constraints. In turn, they also generate implicatures derived from default assumptions about access.

4. *epistemic source*: this term refers to the discourse role emergent from the intersection of two distinct domains: (a) the “essential” indexical properties of speech participants (speaker & addressee), and (b) the pragmatic preconditions for declarative & interrogative speech acts. Thus, while the epistemic evaluation of intentional and inner states, coupled with the principle of privileged access, accounts for the self/non-self asymmetries in specific lexical and morpho-syntactic domains, the principle of epistemic source underlies the knowledge asymmetries relative to speech event participants and speech acts in conversational adjacency pairs. In this domain, interactants co-occupy the reciprocal roles of speaker/addressee across turns at talk, as 1st/2nd person indices co-vary with declarative/interrogative illocutionary acts. In this sense, the egophoric distribution emerges as face-to-face interactants manage reference to self and other, *along with* the epistemic status of self and other, as a function of declarative or interrogative speech acts—in reference to states-of-affairs entailing intentional or inner states (Gordon and Lakoff 1971; Grice [1967] 1989; Perry 1979; Schegloff 2006; Wechsler 2010). Under appropriate coreference conditions, 3rd persons function as epistemic source, specifically logophoric contexts, the original motivation for the terms “conjunct/disjunct” (cf. §2).

In sum, to the extent that these related semantic and pragmatic principles can also be said to underlie commonplace interpretations in a popular song such as “Am I blue?,” and other 1st person effects generally, I would also suggest that when viewed independent of its formal realizations, the egophoric template will turn out to have a wide range of explanatory applications, and potentially draw under one roof a wider range of semantic and pragmatic phenomena.

References

- Aikhenvald, Alexandra. 2004. *Evidentiality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, C. Anthony and Owens, Joseph. (eds). 1990. *Propositional attitudes: The role of content in logic, language, and mind*. Stanford University: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- Austin, J.L. 1956. Performative utterances, in *Philosophical Papers* 233-52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bendix, Edward. 1974. Indo-Aryan and Tibeto-Burman contact as seen through Nepali and Newari verb tenses. *International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics* 3(1): 42-59.
- Bendix, Edward. 1992. The grammaticalization of responsibility and evidence: interactional potential of evidential categories in Newari, in J. Hill and J. Irvine (eds), *Responsibility and Evidence in Oral Discourse*, 226-247. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bickel, Balthasar (ed.). 2000. Person and evidence in Himalayan languages. *Special Issue of Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area*, Vol. I: 23(2).
- Bickel, Balthasar (ed.). 2001. Person and evidence in Himalayan languages. *Special Issue of Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area*, Vol. 2: 24(1).
- Bickel, Balthasar. 2008. Verb agreement and epistemic marking: a typological journey from the Himalayas to the Caucasus. *Chomolangma, Demawend und Kasbek, Festschrift für Roland Bielmeier*, 1-14.
- Curnow, Timothy. 2000. Why ‘first/non-first’ is not grammaticalized mirativity. *Proceedings of the ALS2k, the 2000 conference of the Australian Linguistics Society*.
- Curnow, Timothy. 2002. Conjunct/Disjunct marking in Awa Pit. *Linguistics* 40(3): 611-627.
- Currie, Gregory. 2006. Why irony is pretense, in S. Nichols (ed.), *The architecture of the imagination: new essays on pretense, possibility and fiction*, 111-133. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Creissels, Denis. 2008. Person variations in Akhvakh verb morphology: functional motivation and the origin of an uncommon pattern. *Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung* 61(4): 309-325.

- DeLancey, Scott. 1985. Lhasa Tibetan evidentials and the semantics of causation. *Proceedings of the eleventh annual Berkeley Linguistics Society* 11: 65-72.
- DeLancey, Scott. 1986. Evidentiality and volitionality in Tibetan. In *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, in Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds). Norwood: Ablex.
- DeLancey, Scott. 1990. Ergativity and the cognitive model of event structure in Lhasa Tibetan. *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 289-321.
- DeLancey, Scott. 1992. The historical status of the conjunct/ disjunct pattern. *Acta Linguistica Hafniensa*, 25: 289-321.
- Dickinson, Connie. 2000. Mirativity in Tsafiki. *Studies in Language* 24(2): 379-421.
- Genetti, Carol. 2007. *A grammar of Dolakha Newar*. Mouton Grammar Library 40. Berlin. Mouton de Gruyter.
- Gordon, David and Lakoff, George. 1971. Conversational Postulates. *Chicago Linguistics Society* 7, 63-84.
- Grice, Paul H. 1989 [1967] *Logic and conversation in Studies in the way of words*: Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Gunderson, Keith. 1990. Consciousness and intentionality: robots with and without the right stuff. In Anderson, C.A. and Owens, J. (eds), 285-324.
- Hale, Austin. 1980. Person markers: finite conjunct and disjunct forms in Newari. In Ronald Trail (ed.), *Papers in Southeast Asian Linguistics* 7:53, 95-106.
- Hale, Austin. & Shrestha, Kedār. 2006. *Newār (Nepāl Bhāsā)*. München: Lincom Europa.
- Hargreaves, David. 1990. Indexical functions and grammatical sub-systems in Kathmandu Newari. *Chicago Linguistics Society* 26. 179-93.
- Hargreaves, David. 1991a. The concept of intentional action in the grammar of Kathmandu Newari. PhD dissertation, University of Oregon.
- Hargreaves, David. 1991b. The conceptual structure of intentional action: data from Kathmandu Newari. *Proceedings of the seventeenth annual Berkeley Linguistics Society* 17: 379-389.
- Hargreaves, David. 2003. Kathmandu Newar (Nepāl Bhāsā). In *The Sino-Tibetan Languages*, Graham Thurgood and Randy LaPolla (eds). Routledge Language Family Series. London: Routledge.
- Hargreaves, David. 2005. Agency and intentional action in Kathmandu Newar. *Himalayan Linguistics* 5, 1-48.
- Hargreaves, David. 2012. "Constraints on inner state attribution in Kathmandu Newar." Paper presented to 86th Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America. Portland, Oregon. January 5-8.
- Hṛdaya, Chittadhar. 1976. *Andhakār* 'Darkness'. From *khuphu bākhā:cā* 'Six short stories'. Kathmandu: Nepal Press.
- Jackendoff, Ray. 1985. Believing and intending: two sides of the same coin. *Linguistic Inquiry* 16(3): 445-460.
- Jørgensen, Hans. (trans.) 1931. *Vicitrakarṇikāvadānoddhṛta*. A collection of Buddhist legends. (Nevāri Text edited and translated by H. Jørgensen). Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, Vol. XXXI. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
- Jørgensen, Hans. (trans.) 1939. *Batīsaputrikākathā*. *Tales of the Thirty-Two Statuettes*. (Edited and translated with explanatory notes by H. Jørgensen). Det. Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser 24(2). København: Ejnar Munksgaard.

- Jørgensen, Hans. 1941. *A grammar of the Classical Newari*. Det. Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser 27(3).
- Joši, Sundar Kriṣṇā. 1992 (= NS 1112). *Nepāl Bhāṣāyā bhāṣāvaijñānika vyakarana*. [A linguistic grammar of Nepāl Bhāṣā (Newar)]. Mahābauddha, Yê [Kathmandu]: Lacoul Publications.
- Kamio, Akio. 1979. On the notion of speaker's territory of information: A functional analysis of certain sentence-final forms in Japanese. In *Explorations in Linguistics: Papers in Honor of Kazuko Inoue*, George D. Bedell, Eiichi Kobayashi & Masatake Muraki, (eds), 213-233. Tokyo: Kenkyuusya.
- Kansakar, Tej. R. 1990. Newari causatives. Paper presented to the *Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of Nepal*, Kathmandu, Nepal.
- Kansakar, Tej. R. 1995. Classical Newari verbal morphology: a preliminary report. *Contributions to Nepalese Studies*, 22.1, 21-30.
- Kiryu, Kazayuki. 2000. A note on perfect aspect in Newari. *Mimasaka Joshidaigaku Mimasaka Tankidaigakubu Kiyoo* (Bulletin of Mimasaka Women's College and Mimasaka Women's Junior College)/ 45: 45-50.
- Kiryu, Kazayuki. 2001. Types of verbs and functions of the causative suffix *-k* in Newar. *Kobe Papers in Linguistics*. Vol. 3. 1-9.
- Kölver, Ulrike & Kölver, Bernhard. 1978. Classical Newari verbal morphology. *Zentralasiatische Studien* 12: 273-316.
- Levinson, Stephen C. and Burenhult, Niclas. 2009. Semplates: A new concept in lexical semantics? *Language* 85(1): 153-174.
- Loughnane, Robyn. 2009. A grammar of Oksapmin. PhD. dissertation, University of Melbourne.
- Malla, Kamal P. 1985. *The Newari language: A working outline*. Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies [Monumenta Serindica 14]
- Malla, Kamal P. (ed.). 2000. *A dictionary of the Classical Newari*. Nepal Bhasa Dictionary Committee. Cwasā Pāsā. Kathmandu.
- Matisoff, James. 2003. *Handbook of Tibeto-Burman: system of philosophy of Sino-Tibetan reconstruction*. University of California Publications in Linguistics: 135. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Perry, John. 1979. The problem of the essential indexical. *Noûs* 13(1): 3-21.
- Perlmutter, David. 1978. Impersonal passives and the unaccusative hypothesis, *Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Berkeley Linguistics Society* 4: 157-189.
- Robbins, Joel and Rumsey, Alan. 2008. Introduction: cultural and linguistic anthropology and the opacity of other minds. *Anthropological Quarterly* 81(2): 407-420.
- Rosen, Lawrence (ed.). 1995. *Other intentions: Cultural contexts and the attribution of inner states*. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
- San Roque, Lila. 2008. An introduction to Duna grammar. PhD dissertation, Australian National University.
- Sadock, Jerrold. (1974). *Toward a linguistic theory of speech acts*. New York: Academic Press.
- Schegloff, Emanuel. 2006. Interaction: The infrastructure of social institutions, the natural ecological niche for language, and the arena in which culture is enacted.

- In *Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction*, N. J. Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson (eds), 70-96. Oxford: Berg.
- Searle, John R. 1990. Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality. In Anderson, C. A. and Owens, J. (eds.), 269-284.
- Searle, John R. 1995. *The construction of social reality*. New York: The Free Press.
- Slater, Keith W. 2003. *A grammar of Mangghuer*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Sperber, Dan & Deirdre Wilson. 1981. Irony and the use-mention distinction, in *Radical Pragmatics*, P. Cole (ed.). New York: Academic Press.
- Sun, Jackson T. 1993. Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan. *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology* 63(4): 945-1001.
- Talmy, Leonard. 1985. Force dynamics in language and thought. *Papers from the Parasession on Causatives and Agentivity, Chicago Linguistic Society* 21: 293-337.
- Tamot, Kashinath. 2002. Some characteristics of the Tibeto-Burman stock of Early Classical Newari, C. Beckwith (ed.) *Medieval Tibeto-Burman Languages*: 13-26. Leiden: Brill.
- Tenny, Carol. 2006. Evidentiality, experiencers, and the syntax of sentience in Japanese. *Journal of East Asian Linguistics* 15: 245-288.
- Tournadre, Nicolas. 2008. Arguments against the concept of ‘conjunct’/‘disjunct’ in Tibetan. *Chomolangma, Demawend und Kasbek, Festschrift für Roland Bielmeier, zu seinem 65 Geburtstag*. International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies. Vol. I: 281-308.
- Wechsler, Stephen. 2010. What ‘you’ and ‘I’ mean to each other: person indexicals, self-ascription, and theory of mind. *Language* 86.2. 232-365.