The missing link between truth and intensification

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Truth markers commonly evolve into intensifiers (Heine & Kuteva 2002), but we here argue that this shift is only indirect, and a counter-loosening phase necessarily mediates between truth marking and intensification. Counter-looseners instruct the addressee to avoid (or rather, constrain) the very natural interpretative process of broadening, whereby the speaker-intended concept would have been taken as a loosened, "more or less" interpretation of the meaning of the modified expression (Carston 2002). We provide a diachronic analysis for Hebrew *mamash* 'really', which supports our point, and we reinterpret diachronic analyses of other truth markers in order to show that they too underwent a counter-loosening phase before turning intensifiers. Finally, we briefly distinguish between a counter-loosening mediated intensifier evolution (for truth markers, particularizers and maximizers) and a direct evolutionary path into intensification for originally upscaling expressions (extreme scalar modifiers and augmenters).

1. Introduction

Truth-attesting markers constitute a well-known source for boosting intensifiers (Heine & Kuteva 2002).[1] Notable examples are English *very* and *really*. While the evolution of many such expressions has been thoroughly studied (Breban & Davidse 2016; Montserrat 2015; Mustanoja 1960; Paradis 2003, *inter alia*) we here add the story of Hebrew *mamash* 'tangible', 'real(ly)'. We aim at a unified account for truth-based intensifiers, which prompts us to problematize and reanalyze the semantic path proposed in the literature for the evolution of truth markers into

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1. We will henceforth use 'intensifier' specifically as a boosting degree expression.

intensifiers. Specifically, we argue that a truth marker X does not and cannot evolve into an intensifier *directly* for two reasons. First, we challenge a mostly implicit assumption in the literature that a natural pragmatic process leads from **predicating** 'reality' or 'truth' on some property to an inference that that property is **upscaled**. We contend that there is a missing link in the historical accounts – Phase II below, which mediates between truth marking and intensification. 'Counter-loosening', we argue, serves as the missing link and provides a **motivated** explanation for how a 'truth' function (Phase I) can evolve into an 'intensification' function (Phase III):[2]

Phase I (Truth marker):	X explicitly (conceptually) predicates 'truth'/'genuineness' on the component it modifies.
Phase II ('Counter-loosener'):	X carries an implicit (procedural) instruction to the addressee to avoid an otherwise predictable 'loosening' of the meaning of the relevant component p as 'more or less p'.
Phase III ('Intensifier'):	X explicitly (conceptually) upscales the component it modifies.[3]

Second, truth markers have a precise and bounded denotation (a proposition is either true or not true), and as such, should modify specifically bounded components, e.g., *identical* (Paradis 1997), which are inherently nongraded. Indeed, they do (in the so-called emphasizer use – Quirk et al. 1985: 429/430) – see Méndez Naya (2008a). But intensifiers, such as *very*, are unbounded, and operate on unbounded predicates, which come with built-in gradedness (e.g., *nice*). We thus need to account for this shift from boundedness to nonboundedness. Here too, we argue, the Phase II counter-loosening function is crucial.

If we are correct, we need to motivate the shift from truth marking to 'counter-loosening', as well as the shift from 'counter-loosening' to 'intensification'. In addition, we need to demonstrate that truth markers must first shift into counter-looseners before turning into intensifiers. We propose a motivated, but **indirect** path from truth marking to intensification in Section 2, and follow our theoretical proposal with actual historical paths for several relevant expressions supporting this diachronic pattern. Section 3 presents our original analysis of Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)'. In Section 4 we mostly re-interpret claims made for various 'real' markers in different languages, arguing that a 'counter-loosening' phase indeed preceded 'intensification'. We then briefly contrast intensifiers which

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2. The three phases above do not, however, exhaust the relevant steps involved (see Section 2.3 below).

3. But note that layering means that the phases above may co-exist for the same marker (Hopper 1991).

evolved out of truth markers (as well as other bounded markers), with two other intensifier sources (extreme scalar modifiers and augmenters) in order to show that it is only bounded sources that must go through an intermediate 'counter-loosening' phase. We conclude with Section 5.

A caveat is here called for. Since our goal is to problematize the 'truth' to 'intensification' conceptual development, we will not be concerned with the very many, and obviously important grammatical, as well as collocational changes, that naturally facilitated the relevant evolutionary changes.[4] Even the grammatical distinction between noun intensification (by adjectives mostly) and intensification of other syntactic categories (by adverbs) is not pertinent to our discussion, since in both cases gradable properties are boosted (Ghesquière 2017). In fact, as we will see, truth-based adverbial intensifiers often evolved out of adjectives, the so-called noun emphasizers/reinforcers/ intensifiers. In our account, this is only to be expected, since it is bounded meanings (well-defined and rather precise, e.g., 'identical'), rather than unbounded (naturally graded) meanings, that tend to trigger a counter-loosening instruction.

2.   'Truth' will 'narrow' before it 'intensifies'

2.1   Problematizing the truth marker to intensifier evolution

We claim that it is not self-evident that a truth marker should intensify the content of the component under its scope. Testifying to the truth of a certain predicate does not imply logically, nor even discursively, an intensified interpretation for that component. So, our first question is how does intensification arise from truth marking? Second, while by definition, intensifiers modify scalar predicates (Kennedy & McNally 2005), truth markers do not typically modify scalar components. So, how do truth markers evolve scalarity? The key to answering both questions, we propose, is a 'counter-loosening' Phase II, which provides the missing link between 'true' and 'very' and between 'boundedness' and 'scalarity'. We elaborate on each question in turn.

To see the separation between 'truth' predicating and upscaling, consider the different uses of Hebrew *beemet* 'truly' (literally 'in truth') in (1) (note the different free glosses):

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4. See for example the careful analyses of really by Paradis (2003) and very by Breban & Davidse (2016).

(1) a. *Ha-meshorer menase le-haavir teur   shel ha-matmid*
         The-poet   tries   to-convey description of   the-dilligent.student
         *ke-mi   she-mishtadel   la-kum   mukdam **beemet***
         as-someone who-makes.an.effort to-get.up early   truly
         le-limudo.
         for-studies-his.
         'The poet is trying to portray the diligent student as someone who makes
         an effort to get up **really** early for his studies'.
                                   (https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki, last access 19.12.2020)
     b. *Aval ze   **beemet** mukdam*
         But this truly   early.
         'But this is **indeed** early'.   (Cosih, Y111_sp1_020)[5]
     c. *At **beemet** recinit im   ha-keta   haze?*
         You truly   serious about the-thing this?
         'Are you **really**/**actually** serious about this thing?'   (Cosih, C842_sp1_055)

Example (1a) illustrates the meaning of Hebrew 'dawn' by reference a student who
wakes up 'very early' in order to study. *Beemet* 'truly' functions here as an inten-
sifier similar to *very*. The context in (1b), however, makes it clear that here *beemet*
'truly' marks **agreement** with a previous speaker's message. Finally, *beemet* is a
truth attester in (1c), where the speaker is asking whether the addressee's serious-
ness is factual, and not if it is an 'upscaled seriousness'.

    Note that *early* and *serious* denote their conventional 'earliness' and 'serious-
ness' in 1(b) and (c). *Beemet* 'truly' is relatively close to its literal 'truth' predication
here (although it in addition operates at the discourse level – see Table 1 below).
In 1(a), however, *beemet* contributes to the very proposition made by the speaker.
Intensifier *beemet* makes a direct, compositional and truth-conditional contribu-
tion, in that the 'earliness' intended is not of a conventional, but rather, of a high
degree. It's one thing to indicate or to agree that a predicate is true (of something).
It's quite another to assert that the relevant predicate holds to a greater degree.

    Interestingly, Maschler & Estlein's (2008) careful study of Contemporary
Hebrew *beemet* 'truly' does not even mention its (rare) use as an intensifier. Thus,
while modification by a truth marker can in principle create an intensified read-
ing, and eventually even a semanticized intensifier, intensification is by no means
guaranteed, since it assumes an unjustified strengthening step. The evolution
into full-fledged intensifiers, we claim, requires truth markers to first evolve into
'counter-looseners', which bridge the gap between truth marking and strengthen-
ing.

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5. Cosih is the Corpus of Spoken Israeli Hebrew, available at http://cosih.com (last access 14
March 2021).

Still, a proponent of a direct 'truth' to 'intensification' path could make the following, quite reasonable argument. Literal truth markers are often enough used when the speaker indicates a very strong subjective involvement (Paradis 2003). Indeed, that is definitely so. Arguably, then, a truth marker consistently used to mark heightened subjectivity can evolve into a boosting intensifier, should the original subjective stance strengthening be reanalyzed as objective referential strengthening. Such a path predicts that subjective, mostly gradable properties should lead the way of truth markers to intensification. But the fact is that it is relatively objective, bounded properties that lead the way (Méndez Naya 2008b). This is clearly so for Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)' (Section 3), where one typical early example is *shxiva mamash* 'real lying down (Example 10 below, where a bounded concept is modified, and no strong subjectivity is present (see Section 4.1 for other truth markers).[6]

Moving on to the second question, about scalarity, Paradis (1997: 66, 2001) has convincingly argued for a Principle of Harmony between intensifiers and the adjectives they modify. According to this principle, scalar intensifiers (e.g., *very*) can only modify scalar adjectives (e.g., *nice*). Such adjectives refer to an unbounded range on a scale (e.g., of 'niceness'), where there are no definable points for where 'niceness' begins or ends. Similarly, *very* in *very nice* also points to an unbounded, albeit narrower, range on the 'niceness' scale (there is no definable point where 'nice' ends and 'very nice' begins). Maximizing intensifiers (e.g., *absolutely, completely*), on the other hand, indicate a definite and precise endpoint value, and hence modify extreme (e.g., *brilliant*) or limit (e.g., *identical*) adjectives, which do not denote scalar ranges. Like maximizers, truth markers narrowed into 'genuine' predicates too modify bounded predicates. Hence, both expression types need to change their schematic domain (Paradis 2001) from boundedness to gradability. We propose that it is the counter-loosening phase that paves the way for intensification in that it imposes a scale of alternative denotations, so that the marker can then indicate upscaling on that scale.

We discuss the function of counter-loosening in 2.2, and explain the shift into scalarity via counter-loosening in 2.3. Section 2.4 outlines the diachronic stages undergone by truth markers turned intensifiers.

2.2 Motivating explicit counter-loosening

Following Carston (2002), we assume that natural language is not rich enough to offer a one-to-one unique coding for all, or even most of the concepts relevant

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6. Moreover, we will later argue that the subjective uses of *really* actually double up as counter-looseners (4.1).

to communicators (This is the now well-established Linguistic Underdeterminacy thesis). Hence, according to Carston, addressees routinely need to adapt the linguistic meaning encoded by the lexeme, so as to construct the speaker-intended *ad hoc* concept. Carston defines two such processes of contextual adaptation: 'narrowing' and 'loosening'. The latter is crucial to our argument:

(2)   **MILES:** *You must have **good** stereo.*   (SBC: 002)

The concept of *good* Miles is aiming for here must be loosened into something like 'high quality'.

Loosening is quite relevant for bounded linguistic expressions, especially ones with precise meanings. Note that loosening triggers an interpretation that actually violates the definition of term's linguistic meaning. Thus, *straight*, as in *a straight road* commonly gives rise to a 'more or less straight' *ad hoc* concept, which is only loosely related to the (strict) linguistic meaning of 'straight' (180°). Similarly, the city of *Denver* has clear city line limits. But speakers may loosen those boundaries, in order to also include under the denotation of 'Denver' close-by places *outside* the city, as in:

(3)   **LISA:** *She's from **Denver**.*
      MARIE: (H) .. *But s- it's by Denver.*
      LISA: *Yeah.* ((2 LINES OMITTED))
      MARIE: *The outskirts.*   (SBC: 036)

Note that Lisa is well-aware that the relevant place is actually not *in* Denver (see her later "yeah"), but she nonetheless uses *Denver* (loosely). The reason is that for argumentative purposes close-enough nonmembers may contribute the same contextual implications as category members.

It is the spontaneous and wide-spread process of loosening as in (3) that motivates the evolution of explicit **counter**-looseners such as Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)'. When the speaker-intended concept must **not** be loosened, she may have to explicitly block (or mitigate) the contextual process of loosening. Indeed, consider Kevin's *Denver proper* following the exchange in (3):

(4)   **KEVIN:** *I is she is she from **Denver proper**?*   (SBC: 036)

A speaker interested in a **non**loosened interpretation, when one would seem to be the contextually natural concept, may draw the addressee's attention to the marked (non-loosened) interpretation intended by using an explicit counter-loosener, such as *strictly speaking*, postpositive *proper*, etc. The addressee then blocks, or, more often, restricts the loosening he would have otherwise opted for.

Truth markers constitute natural sources for counter-loosening expressions, because the 'narrowed' interpretation sought is supposed to adhere to the "real" or "genuine" concept, a category member. We hypothesize that originally, 'genuine' markers were added on in order to block loosening altogether, thus restricting the concept of the modified component to category-internal member(s).[7] But since loosening is such a common interpretative process, the genuine marker itself underwent loosening into 'counter-loosening' (rather than 'cancelled loosening').[8] Still, where does the boosting interpretation come from? Upscaled predicates are not necessarily more central, "real" or "genuine" category members. The resulting concept of 'niceness' in *a very nice woman* is not a more central or prototypical exemplar of 'nice woman' than the one in *a nice woman*. In fact, it may be less so. On our account, what drives the shift from 'counter-loosening' to 'intensifying' is a similar referential strengthening of the speaker's utterance, which is true of both 'counter-loosening' and 'intensifying'. We explain this step in 2.3.

2.3   Counter-loosening and scalarity

In addition to the too big a leap from 'X is true/genuine' to 'a boosted X', we noted the lack of gradability of truth markers, when intensifiers are scalar by definition. But before we address the evolution of gradability for truth markers we need to address a more basic question, in fact. The observed harmony between modifiers and their heads (Paradis 2001) is actually puzzling when bounded pairs are concerned. If the modified component has a precise and/or a bounded meaning there seems to be no need to modify it by a modifier whose sole function is to guarantee a nonscalar, bounded meaning. Why do speakers ever use combinations such as *absolute nonsense, absolutely not* (SBC: 053), *absolutely identical* (LSAC) and *absolute evidence* (LSAC), when *nonsense, not, identical* and *evidence* by themselves denote 'all or none' bounded concepts?[9] In other words, we need an explanation for why e.g., *truly* or *absolutely* are not simply redundant when modifying a bounded property. Paradis (2000) argues that all adjectives are predisposed to a gradable construal (see also Ghesquière & Davidse 2011). Paradis (2001) adds that the potential for gradability is even greater when evaluatives are involved, and points to a central role for a strong subjective stance in the change. While often

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7. Such counter-looseners may be narrowed in addition, and thus force the selection of central category members to the exclusion of more peripheral members.

8. Similarly, *exactly* narrows the loosened interpretation of 'here' in *exactly here*, but does not eliminate it completely (Lasersohn 1999).

9. As Biber et al. (1999: 526) note, such redundancies (their term!) are nonetheless "not at all unusual in conversation".

enough true, we propose a more general explanation that applies to nonsubjective predicates and to nouns as well (e.g., *dead, identical, table*). It is the prototype category structure of **all** lexical items (not only extreme and limit ones) that enables an initially *ad hocly* accessed "gradedeness".

Assuming that linguistic meanings have prototype category structure (Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987) means (among other things) that the boundaries surrounding these meaning categories are often nonrigid. 'Loosening' builds precisely on that. A spontaneous process of loosening selects a **non**category member as the contextually appropriate interpretation of the expression. For example, although *straight, empty, identical, eight o'clock* etc., have precise bounded meanings, natural use quite often involves loosened up interpretations of these expressions, where **non**category members, such as 'almost empty', 'more or less straight', 'sort of identical', 'around eight o'clock', are the *ad hoc* concepts actually intended by the speaker, despite the use of the bounded term. The reason is that noncategory members, which are close enough to being members may support the same argumentative point as the category member.

But now, the boundary cancellation effect of loosening does not license just any interpretation, of course. A gradation of noncategory denotations, ordered according to their relative distance from category members, is necessary once loosening takes place. Addressees are expected to loosen the linguistic meaning just enough: neither too little nor too much. It is precisely against this **category nonmembership** scale that 'truth/genuine' markers and maximizers (as well as particularizing focus markers – see 4.2 below) have a nonredundant role to play. They all counter the spontaneous choice of denotations which are increasingly distant from the category. *Really identical, just right* and *absolutely empty* counter an otherwise default process of loosening 'identical', 'right' and 'empty' too much. This is how counter-looseners become scale operators, which is what the Phase II here proposed is all about. Asserting *mamash P* 'real(ly) P', the speaker restricts the predicted loosening, and asserts that the 'P' at hand, although likely not a category member of 'P', **counts as** a category member, at least argumentatively.

Initially, counter-looseners operate on (*i*) a scale arranged according to degree of category (non)membership, where (*ii*) the maximal value meets only a minimal threshold, namely, the one imposed by category membership. How, then, does it become an intensifier, which (*i*) operates on a scale of 'p's arranged according to their intensity, and (*ii*) imposes upscaling of the value well above the minimum? This switch, we propose, is mediated by the similar discourse functions served by the two operations. Both counter-looseners and intensifiers **strengthen** the speaker's claim (as compared with the claim without them).

Once the pragmatically induced intensification conventionalizes, the expression becomes polysemous between counter-loosening and intensification. Note

that in both cases strengthening of 'p' is involved, but the first concerns degrees of category membership and the second concerns degrees of intensity. When loosening is contextually expected 'counter-loosening' will apply and upscale 'p's value, at most up to the standard meaning of the modified property. But when loosening is not expected the marker will upscale the value above the standard meaning. As we show elsewhere (Bardenstein & Ariel in preparation), the same *mamash* 'real(ly)' modifier may counter a loosened interpretation of e.g., 'crying' ('full-fledged crying') on one occasion, but it may upscale the value of standard crying ('cried hard, long') on another occasion. We thus see that a counter-loosening intermediate phase solves all our puzzles. First, counter-loosening motivates the seemingly redundant modification of a bounded concept by a bounding modifier. Second, positing it as an intermediate phase helps bridge over the conceptual gap between 'true/genuine' and 'intensification', and third, it explains the shift of the modifier from bounded to gradable.

2.4   From 'truth' to 'counter-loosening' to 'intensifying'

Table 1 is a schematic representation of the semantic path we propose for truth markers evolving into intensifiers. Note that we make a clear distinction between **pragmatic effects** optionally but consistently associated with the use of the marker (on the right) and the different **referential contents** encoded by the marker at different stages (the middle columns). While the literature on intensifier evolution focuses on the pragmatic effects associated with intensifiers both synchronically and diachronically (especially in connection with so-called noun intensification), we need to distinguish between the referential and the pragmatic aspects involved in the evolution of truth markers into intensifiers. As the table shows, the two developments are not at all perfectly aligned (arrows mark continuity across stages):

Phase I (stages 1,2 on the left column) includes truth markers such as Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)' and the original English *very*, which encode 'true/genuine' or 'truth'. Naturally, given Grice's (1989) Maxim of Quality, speakers do not predicate 'truth' "in vain". There is an interactional motivation behind their use of a truth emphasizer.[10] The right-hand columns specify some (but not all) optional concomitant pragmatic conditions associated with 'truth' marking. Speakers use the truth marker to signal agreement with another speaker (see Example 1b again), or they may indicate that the speaker's message is unpleasant, etc. Stage 2 leaves the encoded meaning intact, but shows a specialization of the relevant markers for a subset of the discourse effects available in principle for the would-be intensifier.

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10.   As can be seen in the history of e.g., *in fact, actually* (Traugott & Dasher 2002).

Table 1. A schematic history of truth markers evolved into intensifiers

	Referential contribution			Optional pragmatic effects			
Stage	Function	Gloss		Agreement	Un-pleasant	Un-expected	Strongly subjective
1	Predicating truth (conceptual)	'True(ly)/ Genuine(ly)'		+	+	+	+
2				NA	NA		
3	Counter-loosening Interpretation (procedural)	NA					
4	Boosting (conceptual)	'Very'					
5						NA	NA

Phase II (stage 3) shows a shift in the encoded meaning, from a conceptual 'true'/genuine' meaning to a procedural, **nonrepresentational** negative instruction to counter an expected process of loosening the meaning of the property modified by the marker (as explained in 2.2 above).[11] There's no change in the pragmatic profile of the expression. Phase III (stages 4 and 5) marks another shift in the encoded meaning and the referential content of the original truth marker, into a boosting intensifier. The marker now explicitly encodes a **representational** concept of boosting ('very'). No change is observed for the marker's pragmatic profile in stage 4. Indeed, many intensifiers are consistently associated with non-referential effects, especially pertaining to strong subjectivity and/or social identity (e.g., Ito & Tagliamonte 2003; Paradis & Bergmark 2003; Tagliamonte 2008). Finally, stage 5 markers are no longer particularly associated with specific subjective characteristics.

If we are correct about these three main phases, since change is not guaranteed, we should be able to identify truth markers at different stages of this path. Indeed, we do. Some such expressions are only literal truth markers (Phase I), some have evolved into counter-looseners (Phase II), and some have become full-fledged intensifiers (Phase III). The following examples show that different 'truth' markers are not automatically substitutable by others, depending on where they are on the evolutionary cline.

Consider the use of Hebrew *axen* 'truly/indeed':

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11. Note that although 'counter-loosening' is a procedural, implicit function, we list it under the "referential contribution" column because it effects the 'what is said'/explicated representation of the speaker's utterance. *Truly straight* denotes a narrower set of denotations than *straight*, and is judged as true under different (stricter) circumstances.

(5) *Ha-olam* **axen** *yafe*
    The-world indeed beautiful
    'The world is **indeed** beautiful'
                    (https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1801099540145277, last access
                                                                        18.12.2016)

Axen 'truly, indeed' is a Phase I truth marker, often used for marking agreement
in addition.

    Hebrew *ashkara* 'real(ly)' is a Phase II marker. This is why in addition to its
prevalent use as predicating truth over an unexpected message (6a), (6b) exem-
plifies the next evolutionary phase, where the speaker indicates that 'loosening'
the interpretation of 'excellent' must be avoided or at least limited (in other words,
that it shouldn't be weakened):

(6) a. *Hi* **ashkara** *natna li   neshika ve-xibuk.*
          She really   gave me kiss   and-hug.
          'She **actually** gave me a kiss and a hug.'
                        (www.fxp.co.il/showthread.php?t=7278518, last access 19.12.2010)
      b. *Gam le-brait lait   xazarti ve-hu* **ashkara** *mecuyan*
          Also to-Bright Light returned and-it real(ly)   excellent
          '… it is **no less than** excellent.'
                       (https://www.fxp.co.il/showthread.php?t=19273209, last access
                                             8.11.2018)

The next example introduces an instance of *mamash* ''real(ly)', a Phase III marker,
used as intensifier:

(7) *Yesh   li   xavera she-niret ke-ilu hi anorexit ki   hi* **mamash**
    There.is to.me friend who-looks as-if   she anorexic because she 'real(ly)'
    raza.
    thin.
    'I have a friend who looks like she is anorexic because she is really/very thin.'
                        (https://www.wattpad.com/254014450 last access 21.1.2020)

It is no accident that each of the examples in (5), (6) and (7) contains a different
truth-based marker. If truth does not necessarily give rise to a 'counter-loosening'
function we expect there to be truth-attesters which cannot be used for 'counter-
loosening'. This is the case of Hebrew *axen* (in 5). Similarly, if the evolution from
'counter-loosener' to intensifier is not necessary, there may be expressions which
are used for both truth marking and 'counter-loosening', but not for intensifying.
This is true for Hebrew *ashkara* (in 6). Indeed, should we replace *ashkara* (in 6)
or *mamash* (in 7) with Phase I *axen* the resulting utterances will be either infe-
licitous or else convey a different interpretation. Phase II *ashkara* too is not quite

appropriate as a substitute for *mamash* in (7), because it is not (yet) a full-fledged intensifier.

The importance of the separation between referential meanings and pragmatic effects in Table 1 will be crucial in our reanalysis of the history of truth markers such as *very, real(ly), right*. We maintain that in general, linguists did not pay much attention to what we're calling Phase II ('counter-loosening'). More precisely, they ignored its referential impact. Mostly, what corresponds to our Phase II analysis in the literature are subjective effects (often correctly) attributed to the truth markers at that phase. Markers so used mostly go under the name of noun emphasizers/reinforcers/ intensifiers (Quirk et al. 1985: 1414–1415). We propose that many of these 'emphasizing' functions also show a referential 'counter-loosening'.

3. The evolution of Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)'

Our main point in this article is that truth markers must evolve into counter-looseners before they can become intensifiers. To support this claim, we briefly outline the evolutionary path of Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)', now polysemous between counter-loosening and intensification (Bardenstein & Ariel in preparation). As we see below, *mamash* initially evolved into a truth marker (2.1). It then evolved into a counter-loosener (2.2). We actually find no clear cases of a purely 'intensifying' *mamash* prior to contemporary Hebrew (2.3). It is only in Present-day Hebrew that 'intensification' accounts for about half of the *mamash* tokens (Bardenstein & Ariel in preparation). Interestingly, the history of *mamash* clearly shows that the prior counter-loosening stage is not necessarily accompanied by a heightened subjective stance.

3.1 Phase I: *Mamash* turns into a truth marker

Mamash 'real(ly)' is derived from the biblical Hebrew root *m.sh.sh* 'touch, feel, grope' (Even Shushan 1981), but is first attested only in Early Rabbinical Hebrew, in the *Mishnah* (~3rd century), where it occurs 9 times. *Mamash* starts out as a noun meaning 'tangibility/concrete entity', as in the following example:

(8) *Paxot mi-ke-beitza   oxlim   ve-kaxay   she-yesh   ba-h*
     Less   than-about-egg eat.IMPERSONAL and-plant.essence that-there.is in-it
     mamash
     tangibility.
     'One eats less than about an egg and the stalk's essence which is tangible.'
                                                                    [Oholot 13:6]

The example refers to the essence of the plant's stalk, which is thick, and hence constitutes a tangible entity. Note that *mamash* here is part of a dedicated (Goldbergian) existential construction, where the adjunct ('it') is topical and *mamash* is nonreferential and predicative.[12]

   The first change undergone by *mamash* shifts its meaning from 'tangibility' to 'truth'. Indeed, this common change among would-be truth markers (see Bybee & Pagliuca 1985; Herrero-Ruiz 2002) is naturally motivated by an inference that 'whatever can be touched must be real'. Interestingly, all these 'true' tokens occur within some variant of the existential construction in (9):

(9) *Exad devarim she-yesh   ba-hem **mamash** ve-exad devarim she-ein*
     One   words   that-there.is in-them truth   and-one words   that-there.isn't
     *ba-hem **mamash***
     in-them truth.
     'On the one hand true words, on the other hand words that are not true.'
                                                                    [Shavu'ot 3:6]

3.2   Phase II: From truth marking to 'counter-loosening'

Later Rabbinical Hebrew, the *Talmud* (we focused on the Babylonian Talmud ~5th century), contains 51 *mamash* tokens.[13] These are used as flexible modifiers meaning 'real'/'true'.[14] A total of 48 (94.1%) of these occur outside the existential construction. Although most instances of *mamash* modify nouns (41/48, 85.4%), they cannot be analyzed as adjectives, because they do not manifest the Hebrew

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12. See Ziv (1982) for the predicational function of English existential constructions.

13. Our analysis here relies on both Mishnaic Hebrew and Babylonian Aramaic examples, since the two languages are extremely close, and their grammars converged to a great extent (Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh 2015).

14. We do not have data that bear on the syntactic change from nominal to modifier *mamash*. We tentatively suggest that the predicative nature of the specific (existential) construction motivates its modification function. And we note that *mamash* is not the only noun in Rabbinical Hebrew that evolved into a flexible modifier. So did *stam* 'something unclear, indefinite, unknown' (Ben Yehuda 1940: 4235). Interestingly, both expressions came to be used as (different) category operators (Ziv 2013).

obligatory number and gender agreement.[15] *Mamash* is then a flexible modifier, also modifying adjectives (4/48 tokens, 8.3%) and verbs (3/48 tokens, 6.25%). Here's a typical example:

(10) *Bi-sh ʕat   shxiva   **mamash***
      At-time.of lying.down 'real(ly)'.
      'While really lying down'.   [Babylonian Talmud, Berachot tractate 1:11]

Later Rabbinical Hebrew *mamash* is then predominantly a Phase II procedural counter-loosener.

3.3   Towards Phase III: Between 'counter-loosening' and intensification

Hebrew modifiers generally follow the phrase they modify, but Hebrew intensifiers can either precede or follow it. Interestingly, Kadari 1990 finds cases where Medieval Hebrew (~15th century) *mamash* may also precede its head. We confirmed this observation based on the Ma'agarim corpus, but note that this ordering is quite rare.

Now, this new position may point to a potential shift into an intensifying modifier (Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot 1995, and see Kadari 1990 for what he calls *mamash*'s intensification function at that period). Consider (11), where *mamash* precedes the noun it scopes over (as does *beemet* 'really'):

(11) *Ve-zehu   'inyan ha-cdaka   she-hu beemet **mamash** po'al   ha-nefesh*
      And-this.is issue   the-charity that-is truly   real(ly)   act (of) the-soul
      'And that is the issue of charity, which truly is a real act of the soul'.
                        [Menaxem Gitzani, a letter to the Cairo community, 1400–1450]

Mamash clearly functions as a 'counter-loosener' here. It counters a reasonable contextually weakened interpretation of the very strong expression 'act of the soul'. But unlike the previous Example (10), where *mamash* counter-loosened an objective concept, we here see an additional subjective layer. Although 'an act of the soul' is a bounded concept, *mamash* portrays it in a 'qualitative way' (Méndez-Naya 2019). Such *mamash* tokens are not too different from various so-called 'noun intensifiers' (Ghesquière 2014, Méndez-Naya 2019) or 'emphasizers' (Quirk et al. 1985), in that the speaker conveys a strong subjective stance regarding the nature of charity. But while these referential and subjective aspects often go together we show elsewhere that they don't have to (Bardenstein & Ariel in preparation).

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15. Indeed, Hebrew has a separate adjectival form, *mamashi*, which inflects for gender and number.

Moving on to 18th century and to Revival (19th-early 20th century) Hebrew, we examined 100 random tokens (out of 660 tokens) from The Maʾagarim corpus, which spans up to 1933). Of these, 14 *mamash* tokens (14%) are part of the Phase I truth-predicating existential construction described in 3.1. Next, as a flexible modifier, *mamash* patterns just as expected from a counter-loosener. It only scopes over bounded concepts. The most frequent modified category is nouns (e.g., 'death', 'widow') – 39 (39%), followed by adverbials (27, 27%), the majority of which are comparative complements ('like'). Verbal phrases constitute a minority 5% (In addition, we found one modified possessive pronoun).

Nonetheless, we do see some potential precursors for a future shift into intensification when we examine the nature of the modified components more carefully. First, we found 14 *mamash* tokens which scoped over adjectives (14%). This seems a higher rate when compared with the three adjective cases ('single', 'new', 'old') in the Talmud (5.9%). We do note that all of these adjectives refer to bounded concepts: 7 were comparative predicates (mostly 'similar'), and the others are: 'toxic', 'crazy', 'private', 'new', 'mechanical' and 'different' (2 tokens). But, as limit adjectives, they **can** be loosened if associated with a scale which admits non-category members relatively close to category members ('more or less new/crazy' – see again Section 2.3). When this loosening is **not** speaker-intended counter-loosening is often explicitly marked by *mamash*. This is true for all the adjective cases.

Next, 5/39 (12.8%) of the *mamash*-modified nouns are 'gradable nouns', i.e. realizable at different degrees (e.g., *caʾar* 'sadness' and *peʾer* 'magnificence'). Once again, we do interpret these *mamash* tokens as counter-looseners. But the association of counter-loosening *mamash* with such gradable discourse entities (introduced by these nouns), on top of the potentially scalar predicates introduced by the limit adjectives, may have paved the way for the initiation of a boosting function for *mamash* (upscaling on an intensity scale instead of a category membership scale – see again 2.3).

Although not included in our sample, we did find one limit adjective which is possibly intensified by *mamash*:

(12) *ʾim era   keʾev piotoʾm be-eize evar le-ʾish* **bari   mamash**   *bli*
      If   occurred pain sudden in-some organ to-man healthy real(ly)/very without
      shum siba   ve-taʾam...
      any   reason and-cause
      'If a sudden pain occurs in some organ of a man who is real(ly)/very healthy without any reason and cause...'
                              [Mendel Lapin, Refuʾat Haʾam, chapters 5–31, page 227, 1794]

We view this example possibly as a bridging context between counter-loosening and intensification. While most likely *mamash* here is a 'counter-loosener', which rejects a potential weakening of 'healthy', we cannot absolutely rule out an intensifying interpretation, whereby specifically a high degree of health is intended. But we should emphasize that the Ma'agarim corpus showed no examples of unequivocally intensifying *mamash*. These only shows up in contemporary Hebrew (see Example 7 again). Interestingly, however, while current intensifying *mamash* is only slightly more frequent than counter-loosening *mamash* it seems that the latter is losing ground. Almost half of the counter-loosening tokens are restricted to a single collocation, *mamash lo* 'real(ly) no' (Bardenstein & Ariel in preparation).

Summing up, Section 3 has shown that, as predicted, 'counter-loosening' precedes 'intensification' for Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)'. Specifically, Early Rabbinical Hebrew *mamash* is at Phase I, namely a conceptual truth marker. Late Rabbinical Hebrew, as well as Medieval and even Revival Hebrew *mamash* shows a Phase II procedural counter-loosener. Only Revival Hebrew contains a noticeable minority of examples where the *mamash* contexts meet the precondition (inherent gradability) for the evolution of an intensifier. It is not until Present-day Hebrew that intensification becomes a significant meaning of *mamash*. We also wish to draw the reader's attention to the fact that while counter-loosening may be accompanied by a strong speaker's stance (as in 'noun intensification'), this is not necessarily so (see again Examples 10 and 12), which is why we insist that counter-loosening is the missing link between truth marking and intensification, rather than noun intensification/reinforcement. In Section 4 we argue that a counter-loosening intermediate phase is not unique to the history of *mamash*. Rather, it is a missing link in the description of the evolution of other, possibly all, truth markers into intensifiers.

4.   Finding the missing link for other truth-based intensifiers

The goal of Section 4 is to show that *mamash*'s 'real(ly)' evolution is not at all unique in that truth markers routinely undergo a counter-loosening phase II before they become full-fledged intensifiers (4.1). In fact, all originally bounded markers *en route* to intensification need to first function as counter-looseners. But this is not true for originally scalar expressions (4.2). Section 4.3 contrasts the evolutionary paths of bounded and of upscaling would-be intensifiers.

4.1   A necessary counter-loosening phase for truth markers

While to our knowledge, we are the first to propose that truth markers **must** undergo a counter-loosening intermediate phase *en route* to assuming an intensification function, we are not the first to observe such a historical process for specific truth markers. Discussing nonintensifying *very* (e.g., *the very pinnacle*, Example 1), Brugman (1984) proposes that English *very* actually started out as a narrowing metalinguistic designator, what we're here calling a counter-loosener, and Traugott (2007) similarly claims that early *very* is a slack regulator.

Breban & Davidse (2016), a detailed analysis of the history of nonpredicative *very*, note that initially, *very* 'true' only modified bounded components (see also Mustanoja 1960). They analyze such tokens of *very* as meta-designators used to indicate that the head is to be interpreted 'in the full sense of the word', clearly corresponding to our Phase II counter-loosening function. Indeed, towards the end of the 14th century *very* seems to have turned into a flexible modifier (this is our term). It then modifies adjectives (initially bounded ones, such as 'repentant', Example 37 in the cited paper), as well as nouns denoting gradable properties (e.g., 'fool', Example 15), in the 15th century. Once it also modified gradable adjectives (e.g., 'painful', Example 38 in the cited paper)-the way to scalar intensification was paved.[16] Such cases, they argue, form a bridging context between a counter-loosening function (on our terminology) and intensification. It is only in Early and Late Modern English that *very* has become an intensifier predominantly.

Intensifier *right* (as in *right fat*; Traugott 1988) most likely also evolved out of a truth/genuineness marker (Brugman 1984; Méndez Naya 2006, 2007, 2019; Traugott 1988). As noted by Méndez Naya (2007), noun intensifier/meta-designator *right* (a counter-loosener in our analysis)[17] mostly modified bounded nouns in Middle English.[18] Brugman notes the special connection between *right* (and *just*) and temporal expressions. Indeed, temporal expressions are prone to loosening, and therefore to counter-loosening.

Brugman (1984) proposes that *really* evolved in a similar way to *very*. We here propose that Paradis' synchronic analysis of *really* may likely reflect a Phase I to Phase III evolution for *real(ly)*. Paradis (2003; Paradis & Bergmark 2003) pro-

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16. Breban & Davidse propose that it is the redundancy between the bounded modified component and the bounding *very* which introduced the intensifying interpretation, but as argued above, counter-loosening a bounded concept is not actually redundant in view of the prevalence of loosening in discourse.

17. Bélen Méndez Naya (p.c) agrees with our counter-loosening analysis for *right*.

18. But Méndez Naya (2019) also considers the possibility that a totalizing function (see 4.2) was the source for the intensification.

poses three readings for *really*: (*i*) Truth attesting, (*ii*) Subjective emphasis, and (*iii*) Degree reinforcement. Clearly, the first and the third readings/stages parallel our Phase I truth-marker and Phase III intensifier functions respectively. And we propose that Paradis' subjective emphasis function (ii) can be reinterpreted as mostly a counter-loosening phase/reading. If so, what we see here may be a synchronic layering of the three phases laid out in Table 1 above.

We are challenging Paradis' claim regarding a strong subjective function for *really* (*ii*). But, first, strong subjectivity is not restricted to this function. Degree modifying/intensifying *really* (*iii*) too is often accompanied by a relatively strong subjective stance. In fact, the newer the intensifier the more highly subjective it is, which is why *really* is more subjective than *very*. Second, we propose that *really* (*ii*) does not only operate as a strong stance marker. It also effects the *ad hoc* constructed concept, which the speaker wishes the addressee to counter-loosen. Seen in this light, it's not surprising that attitudinal verbs, and bounded and/or strong and extreme adjectives are targeted by *really* (*ii*). It is precisely such affective and strong predicates that are prone to loosening, the addressee figuring that the speaker was overstating her case. Strong and/or subjective concepts are subject to the Red Queen effect in Lewis Carroll's *Through the looking glass*, where one needs to move forward just to avoid moving backward. Speakers need to explicitly counter-loosen strong predicates, just because otherwise, they will be weakened by default.

We suggest that Paradis relies too much on distributional criteria for classifying the various *really* tokens, sometimes overlooking their interpretative function. For example, the *really* in *I really must learn how…* (Paradis 2003: Example 45), is classified as *really* (*ii*) just because *really* here modifies a verb. But Paradis herself notes that *must* is not actually an attitudinal verb. Indeed, while not attitudinal, 'must' can be loosened, in which case, counter-loosening may be called for. Next, while we think that most of her *really* (*ii*) cases are counter-loosening examples, some are probably *really* (*iii*) intensifiers. We suspect that just because *very* cannot substitute for *really* in e.g., *I really love her* (Paradis 2003: Section 3.3) such examples were analyzed by Paradis as *really* (*ii*). But again, she herself notes that this really is close to a booster.[19] In our account, a strong subjective stance for counter-loosening cases is only optional (as shown by the *must* example), we expect and observe it for intensifying uses quite often (see the findings for current Hebrew *mamash* in Bardenstein & Ariel in preparation), and we expect to find cases which

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19.   The fact that *I really love her very much* is acceptable does not entail that *really* cannot be an intensifier when *very much* is absent. Rather, just because two different intensifying forms cannot cooccur, *really* can be interpreted as truth-attesting in order to avoid double intensification.

are ambiguous between counter-loosening and intensifying (e.g. *really love*). In other words, whereas we think that there is a very high correlation between predicate type and *really* (and *mamash*) function, this correlation is not perfect.

Thus, we propose that the three current discourse functions of real(ly) may very well reflect a diachronic shift into intensification, where the intermediate phase involves counter-loosening.

Our final example for a truth marker evolving into an intensifier via an intermediate counter-loosening phase comes from a study we initiated for Italian *davvero* 'of truth, really'.[20] Table 2 shows the breakdown of the three functions of *davvero*, truth marking, counter-loosening and intensifying, starting with the 14th century (see Appendix 1 for the table and the sources). As can be seen, *davvero* is used exclusively as a Phase I truth marker throughout the 14–16th century. The 17–18th century manifest a Phase II development: a substantial minority of *davvero* tokens (close to 40%) function as counter-looseners. Crucially, there are no intensifying instances at this stage. Finally, the 19th–21st centuries constitute a single (early) Phase III, where a small minority of intensifying uses is observed.

Summing up Section 4.1, we have seen that just like Hebrew *mamash*, very, *davvero* 'really', and possibly *real(ly)* too, all currently used (also) as intensifiers, were/are used not only for truth marking, but also for counter-loosening. Moreover, we have direct evidence that counter-loosening preceded intensification at least for *mamash, very* and *davvero*. In fact, based on the ratio of their intensifying uses we can rate all four expressions as to how advanced they are on the evolutionary cline here proposed:[21]

(13)   Very (88.6%) > *mamash* (48.4%) > *really* (44%) > *davvero* (6–8%)

While the ratio of intensifying uses of *mamash* and *really* is quite similar, we consider *mamash* as more advanced, since it barely has any truth marking uses currently, whereas *really* is so used in 23% of the cases. Not surprisingly, the scale in (13) also represents the degree of the current transparency of 'truth'/'reality' for the expressions. While *really* and *davvero* are quite transparent, very is quite opaque, and *mamash* too is relatively opaque.

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20. We thank Carlo Meloni, the second author's research assistant, for meticulously conducting the Italian diachronic corpus searches for *davvero* (as well as *assolutamente* 'absolutely' and *terribilmente* 'terribly' – see below), and coding the data under our guidance. When we were not sure of the intended reading we tried to at least narrow it to one of two readings (Columns 3,5 in Table 2 in Appendix 1). We remained undecided regarding only 2 examples in Phase III.

21. The numbers for *very* are based on every 5th token in SBC (70/350), and the *really* numbers are cited from Paradis (2003: Table 1).

4.2   A general mechanism of counter-loosening to intensification

If truth-markers turned counter-looseners potentially evolve into intensifiers, we predict that so can counter-looseners which did not start out as truth-markers. Indeed, this is true for both totalizing maximizers (e.g., *totally*) and particularizers (e.g., *just*).[22]

Totalizing maximizers, such as *completely, totally, absolutely* evolve out of adverbs which assert that the manner in which some action was carried out affected every relevant aspect. According to Bolinger (1972), maximizers position the property they modify at the end of the relevant scale. But Traugott (2007: 527) notes that maximizers actually function as 'slack regulators' (Lasersohn 1999), which is why she in fact treats *truly* and the original *very* as maximizers. We agree with Traugott, and hence expect that totality manner adverbials which evolved into intensifiers must have undergone a counter-loosening phase first.

Paradis (2001) proposes that there is a tendency to shift bounded construals of concepts (e.g., *sober, true, empty*) into scalar ones. In our account, this tendency is due to the prevalent process of contextual loosening (Section 2.3), where addressees routinely loosen up core meanings to include meanings which do not fall within the category. Then, just like 'true/genuine' markers, 'totalizing' adverbials may be recruited into counter-loosening when loosening is to be rejected/ constrained. Once these adverbs function as counter-looseners, the way is paved for their evolution into intensifiers as well, in the same manner that originally truth markers evolved into intensifiers.

Here are just a few examples. Bucholtz et al. (2007) list *totally* as a Southern California intensifier. Beltrama (2018) distinguishes between a lexical use of *totally*, which corresponds to our counter-loosening function and a nonpropositional strong stance marker. We think *totally* is evolving an intensifying use out of counter-loosening. Example 14(a) shows a Phase I literal 'totally', (b) is a Phase II counter-loosening case, and (c) is possibly a Phase III intensification example. We find that a strong stance accompanies all of these examples (Cf. 14a with *You just rip the car apart **totally***):

(14)   a.   *You just **totally** rip the car apart*   (LSAC)
           b.   *You can **totally** get away with those*   (LSAC)
           c.   *He was **totally** nice*   (LSAC)

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22.   Of course, the shift from counter-loosening to intensification is not guaranteed. *In the full sense of the word, full-fledged* have not shifted to intensification. *Completely* is now on the same path as *totally* (Beltrama 2018), and see Ghesquière & Davidse (2011) on noun intensifying *complete*, which is subjectively emphatic and a counter-loosener in our analysis.

Shaviv (2018/19) analyzes the evolution of Hebrew *legamrey* 'totally' into an intensifier. She notes that *legamrey* can modify nouns, verbs, adverbs as well as adjectives – a flexible modifier, in other words, and she too emphasizes the subjectification undergone by the manner adverb as it evolved. But although she treats *legamrey* as an intensifier, in fact, in all of her examples *legamrey* modifies bounded concepts (e.g., 'different', 'disappeared', 'alone'). In other words, she does not identify a full-fledged intensification function of inherently scalar adjectives. We interpret Shaviv's "intensification" cases as Phase II counter-loosened cases. *Legamrey* in *legamrey na'ar yeshivot* 'totally a yeshiva youth' (p. 167), for example, is best paraphrased by counter-loosening *mamash* 'real(ly)'. But our web searches (August 2020) do show a nonnegligible number of cases where *legamrey* modifies inherently gradable adjectives like *yafa/e* 'pretty' (see below).

Our last totalizer case is Italian *assolutamente* 'absolutely', which is already at Phase II in the earliest period checked. Table 3 in Appendix 1 presents the data. Note that the three historical phases we examined are less distinct for *assolutamente* 'absolutely' as compared with *davvero* 'really'. A (potentially) Phase II counter-loosening use is the dominant pattern in all 4 periods. But there is a noticeable reduction in phase I (literal) uses in periods 2–4 (24% to 0–4%), which is moreover accompanied by a marked rise in Phase III 'intensifier' uses in these periods (0% to 12–28%).

Next, particularizers (e.g., *just, pure(ly)*) indicate that their head is the one intended by the speaker, rather than some other, competing referent(s). The competing alternatives might have been expected in the given context, which is why the speaker indicates that they are ruled out (by inference):

(15)   **LYNNE:** *But we're talking **just** the regular,*
           .. light horses you know.   (SBC: 001)

Lynne's *just the regular, light horses* rules out any other horses, irregular, heavy ones, for example.

Now, particularizers too have given rise to intensifiers, mostly to noun emphasizers, where researchers have focused on their strong stance more than on what we see as their counter-loosening contribution (Ghesquière 2017; Vandewinkel & Davidse 2008). Consider Lynne's *just* in (16):

(16)   **LYNNE:** *… Her brother was like,*
           *… (H) **just** right out of high school?*   (SBC: 001)

Here, *just* counter-loosens *right* (ruling out 'more or less right'). The difference between particularizers and counter-looseners is that the former rule out **any** competing referents, while counter-looseners are category operators. As such, they rule out marginal category members, as well as close-by noncategory members.

Had Lynne's *just* in (15) been a procedural counter-loosener, the interpretation would have been something like 'strictly speaking regular', where loosened interpretations of 'regular' are ruled out. 'Irregular horses' would not have been on the table. Of course, by implication they would have been ruled out, but this is not a speaker-intended inference when a counter-loosener is used. Example 17(a) seems a plausible bridging context from counter-loosening to intensification. The *just* in (b) is definitely a booster, paraphrasable by the augmenter (*very*) *much* (see Aijmer 2002):

(17) a. **SHERI:** *It's so pretty.*
          … And if they were, ((1 LINE OMITTED))
          in a … pot with good soil and water,
          *they'd be **just** beautiful.*   (SBC: 058)
      b. **LYNNE:** *I **just** hope !Orville and !Genetta get that little girl.*   (SBC: 001)

English *proper* is now used as an intensifier by young Londoners, as in *proper strict/dumb/good* (Núñez-Pertejo & Palacios-Martínez 2018). Quite likely the intensifying source is a counter-loosening use of postpositive *proper* (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 560) (see Example 4 above). Here's a potentially bridging context case, where the counter-loosening *proper* precedes a bounded verb:

(18) *He was proper looking at us*   (Stratton 2020, BNC)

Recall that a marker need not necessarily evolve all the way into an intensifier. We suspect this is true for *pure(ly)* and Hebrew *pashut* 'simply'. *Pure(ly)* is first used as a patricularizer in the 16th century, and then as a noun intensifier (counter-loosener + strong stance), starting in the 19th century (Ghesquière 2017; Vandewinkel 2010; Vandewinkel & Davidse 2008).

Next, the following *pashut kirkas* 'simply a circus' is quite parallel to a *mamash kirkas* 'a real circus' example discussed in Bardenstein & Ariel (in preparation). In both cases the speakers scorn the way some trial is conducted:

(19) *Ze   kirkas, **pashut** kirkas!*
      This circus, simply circus
      'This is a circus, **simply** a circus!'   (Reshet Bet, Jul. 27, 2020)

Indeed, *pashut* 'simply' functions as a counter-loosener in (19). Once again, the way to intensification involves a counter-loosening phase, here, at the argumentative level, rather than at the referential level. Ziv analyzes *pashut* as a focalizer, but she also identifies an intensification function for it, which we think is still more counter-loosening. The following example may well be a bridging context for an intensification function:

(20) *Sh'ot   ha-avoda   sheli ba-avoda be-eilat hayu ayumot aval ma-ze   ayumot*
Hours of.the-work my   in.the-job in-Eilat were terrible but what-this terrible
pashut *noraiyot*
simply horrible
'My work hours at my job in Eilat were terrible, but really terrible, simply hor-
rible.'   (Cosih)

Summing up, Section 4.2 discussed a few totalizing maximizers and particulariz-
ers. Both expression types are regularly mobilized to indicate counter-loosening,
and may then evolve into intensifiers. Indeed, we saw at least initial intensifying
uses for *totally, legamrey* 'totally', *assolutamente* 'absolutely', *just, proper*, and
pashut 'simply'.

4.3   Direct versus indirect paths to intensification

So far we have seen truth markers, maximizers and particularizers, which, we
claim, had to undergo a counter-loosening Phase II before evolving into inten-
sifiers. But this does not mean that counter-loosening is the only direct path to
intensification. Would-be intensifiers which are inherently upscaling do not need
a counter-loosening phase in order to evolve scalarity. Once such expressions are
mobilized as flexible modifiers their scale-boosting function is naturally moti-
vated. This is so for extreme scalar adverbs (e.g. *terribly*) and augmenters (e.g.,
much, mighty). We here predict a direct shift to intensification (through an *ad hoc*
metonymy at first).

Figure 1 provides an overview of the paths of change undergone by truth
markers, particularizers and maximizers (on the left) as opposed to extreme scalar
modifiers and augmenters (on the right):

Figure 1. Paths to intensification

The evolutionary shift of extreme scalar modifiers and augmenters can be accounted for by Paradis' (2001) insightful analysis of a reversal in the fore-ground/background relations between the content and the schematic domains of the relevant expressions. The assumption is that lexical items are associated with multiple domains. The content domain of e.g., *terribly* specifies its unique, idiosyncratic and explicit (lexical) denotation, something like 'awfulness'. The schematic domain, on the other hand, provides an implicit configurative frame, and need not be unique to the specific expression. The schematic domain of *terrible*(*ly*) specifies 'gradability', a feature it shares with many different lexical expressions (e.g., *amazing*(*ly*)). For *terrible*(*ly*) (as well as other expressions which implicitly invoke gradability) to shift to an intensifier ('very') function their schematic 'gradability' and 'extremity' must be foregrounded at the expense of a demoted (and ultimately eliminated) content ('awfulness' here). *Much* and *mighty* expression types are inherently gradable, as well as boosting, so the shift only involves extending the domains of application from graded quantities to graded properties (Ghesquière & Davidse 2011).[23] This is why the right-hand sources can evolve into intensifiers much more directly than the sources on the left.

Our data for Italian *terribilmente* 'terribly' confirms this proposal. Table 4 in Appendix 1 presents the diachronic evolution of *terribilmente* from a manner adverb to intensifier. As can be seen, potentially intensifying uses appear in the 18th century, and clear intensifying cases are attested in the 20th century. As expected, there is no counter-loosening or other mediating function between the original literal meaning and intensification.

Now, analyzing the change in English maximizing adjectives, such as *absolute* and *complete*, and extreme adjectives, such as *awful* and *terrible*, into reinforcing adjectives (e.g., *absolute bliss, a terrible bore*), Paradis (2000) argues that both types of modifiers are inherently associated with schematic gradability. So, in both cases what needs to happen is for the schematic gradability to get fore-grounded at the expense of the propositional content. Bridging contexts for such shifts should involve "double-faced" interpretations (as in the middle column in Table 4), where the modifier contributes both its lexical content and upscaling. Here are such bridging cases from English: *Insanely generous/silly* (BNC); *painfully aware* (LSAC). The following cases, however, are more likely intensification cases: *an insanely great product* (BNC), *highly unlikely* (LSAC), *super expensive* (LSAC), *ecstatically simple* (BNC).

While Paradis does distinguish between maximizing and extreme adjectives she nonetheless assumes that both types are originally associated with a **bounded**

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23. Núñez-Pertejo (2018) notes young Londoners' intensifier use of *bare* (e.g., *bare mean*), which evolved out of a 'loads of' meaning.

conceptualization mode of **gradability**, because they denote either 'completeness' or extreme points on a scale (Both expression types must in addition lose their 'superlativity'). In this respect, as Paradis herself notes, there should be no difference between these adjectives and their adverbial counterparts, which we focus on.

But according to our proposal, extreme modifiers and maximizers are not equally available for evolving into full-fledged intensifiers, because on our account the two modifiers show different associations with gradability. While we too consider extreme modifiers (be they adjectival or adverbial) as inherently (linguistically) gradable, we consider maximizing modifiers (be they adjectival or adverbial) as inherently (linguistically) **nongradable**. When modifying bounded properties maximizers simply counter a contextually induced loosening. Just like truth markers, then, maximizers need to evolve gradability, a gradability whose source is external to their linguistic meaning – contextual, we claim. We propose that one and the same counter-loosening function is responsible for turning truth markers and maximizers into (upscaling) gradable expressions. Since extreme modifiers are inherently upscaling they do not require this mediating function.

In order to verify our prediction for a differential pattering for the two types of expressions we examined three Hebrew extreme modifiers, *shigaon* 'insanely', *beteruf* 'insanely', *lehaxrid* 'frightfully' and one maximizer, *legamrey* 'totally', all of them currently en route to becoming conventionalized intensifiers (we note that *legamrey* 'totally' is not used literally in such contexts). To see the discourse patterning of these modifiers we picked three unbounded adjectives (*yafe/a* 'pretty', *nexmad* 'nice', *mafxid* 'scary') and three bounded adjectives (*zehe/a* 'identical', *idiot* 'idiot', *rek* 'empty').[24] The ratio between unbounded and bounded adjectives modified by one of the modifiers here considered is quite large: There are 289,733 such unbounded adjectives, as compared to 51,376 such bounded adjectives. In other words, for every bounded adjective modified by the maximizer or the extreme modifiers here considered there were 5.6 modified unbounded adjectives.

This baseline difference between the frequency of modified bounded and unbounded adjectives, however, cannot account for the very large gap we found in the distribution of the maximizer *legamrey* 'totally' versus the extreme modifiers (e.g., *be-teruf* 'insanely'). While both types of expressions modified more unbounded (e.g., *nexmad* 'nice') than bounded adjectives (e.g., *zehe* 'identical'), the maximizer only showed 3 unbounded adjectives per 1 bounded adjective (154,070 versus 51,171 tokens) (cf. with the 5.6 baseline ratio). The maximizer is then significantly under-represented in modifying unbounded adjectives. This is what we would expect from a counter-loosener. Quite the opposite picture was revealed for the extreme modifiers. There were 135,663 such modified unbounded

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24. All Google searches were performed on July 6, 2020.

adjectives, but only 205 modified bounded adjectives – 661.8 times more, as compared with the 5.6 baseline gap. The extreme modifiers are then extremely overrepresented in modifying unbounded adjectives (118.2 times more). This is what we would expect from markers which can directly turn into intensifiers

Differently put, of the evolving intensifiers here examined, there were 1.5 times more maximizer tokens (205,241) than extreme modifiers (135,868). Nonetheless, the two types modify an almost equal number of unbounded adjectives (154,070 maximizing modifiers versus 135,663 extreme modifiers). The difference between them is quite dramatic, however, when bounded adjective are examined. The maximizer tokens (51,171) are here overwhelmingly more frequent than the extreme modifiers (205), 249.6 times more.

If we're correct, as a first phase, maximizers only counter a predictable loosening procedure. They do not boost the degree of the relevant property they modify. But extreme adjectives do boost their modified adjective. Indeed, a comparison between the effect of these two modifiers on unbounded adjectives shows that only the extreme scalar modifiers clearly boost their predicates. The maximizers most likely only counter-loosen (e.g., *yashan legamrey* lit. 'totally old' is interpreted as 'full-fledged old'). This is why sentences containing *shigaon* or *beteruf* 'insanely' (21a) construe the entity as older than the maximizer *legamrey* 'totally' (21b) (the same applies to other properties, e.g., *yafa* 'pretty', *meushar* 'happy' and *maaliv* 'insulting'):

(21) a. *Ze   yashan beteruf*
           This old   insanely
           'This is insanely old.'
                         (https://twitter.com/Rutshapira/status/1306716576671051777, last
                                                                access 12.9.2020)

      b. *Ze   yashan legamrey*
           This old   totally
           'This is totally old.'
                         (https://www.askpavel.co.il/blog/surviving-site-migration, last
                                                                access 24.6.2010)

The conclusion from this quick and dirty study is that there is a marked difference between the paths of maximizers and of extreme modifiers into intensification. Maximizers are proportionately significantly less associated with unbounded adjectives than with bounded adjectives, while extreme modifiers are much more strongly associated with unbounded than with bounded adjectives. Now, recall that the four modifiers here examined are not (yet) conventionalized intensifiers. The differential results then testify that a scalar schema is much more available for extreme modifiers, where it's part of the linguistic meaning than it is for maximiz-

ers, which we claim evolve it pragmatically.[25] This is why we maintain that max-imizer *legamrey* 'totally' starts out as a **counter-loosening** modifier of bounded adjectives, and only later it may turn into a full-fledged intensifier, whereas the extreme modifiers *shigaon* 'insanely', *beteruf* 'insanely' and *le-haxrid* 'frightfully' are directly recruited for intensifying unbounded adjectives. Only later do they come to modify bounded adjectives.

In fact, a comparison between the Hebrew conventional intensifier *meod* 'very', *mamash* 'real(ly)', the three extreme modifiers, and *legamrey* 'totally', all when modifying the same three bounded and three unbounded adjectives, shows that the proportion of unbounded versus bounded modified adjectives is even larger for the extreme modifiers than it is for the conventional *meod* 'very'.[26] Thus, *legamrey* 'totally' only modifies 3 unbounded adjectives per each bounded adjective, but the extreme modifiers modify 662 unbounded adjectives per each bounded one. The gaps for *mamash* 'real(ly)' and *meod* 'very' are intermediate:[27]

◀ - ▶

Legamrey	Mamash	Meod	Extreme modifiers
3:1	32:1	295.5:1	661.8:1

Note that the two expression types on the left evolved into intensifiers via a mediating counter-loosening phase, whereas the two expression types on the right evolved into intensifiers directly, we claim. As each of the four expression types becomes more of an established intensifier it expands its domain of appli-cation, and comes to modify more of its originally **non**prototypical adjective types. Naturally, these expansions are gradual. Since *mamash* 'real(ly)' evolved into an intensifier much earlier than *legamrey* 'totally', it is relatively more strongly associated with unbounded adjectives than *legamrey* 'totally' is (a 32 to 1 ratio). Similarly, since *meod* 'very' evolved into an intensifier much earlier than the extreme modifiers here examined, the latter are (still) more strongly associated with unbounded adjectives. Hence, our division into direct versus indirect inten-sification evolutionary paths gains support from the different synchronic dis-course profiles associated with originally maximizers and originally extreme modifiers en route to becoming full-fledged intensifiers.

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25. See Table 5 in Appendix 2 for a detailed breakdown of the results, as well as a comparison to *meod* 'very', the Hebrew conventional intensifier. As can be expected, on the whole, *meod* is more frequent than both the maximizer and the extreme modifiers.

26. See Table 6 in Appendix 2 for the data on *mamash*.

27. The numbers indicate the ratio of unbounded to bounded adjectives per each modifier type.

5.   Conclusions

The goal of this paper was to draw attention to a missing link in the description of the evolution of intensifiers out of bounded sources, primarily truth markers. We argued that truth markers cannot directly evolve into boosting intensifiers for two reasons. First, emphatically (and supposedly redundantly) asserting the truth of some component does not necessarily nor routinely trigger a conceptual **upscaling** of its content via pragmatic inference. Second, intensifiers are scalar, but truth markers, just like particularizers and maximizers, are not. All need to evolve scalarity, as well as upscaling, before they can function as intensifiers. We proposed that assuming a counter-loosening intermediate phase resolves both issues, because it can naturally motivate the evolution of truth markers (and other bounded expressions) into scalar boosting expressions. We accounted for the existence of counter-looseners by reference to the prevalence of contextually loosened interpretations in discourse. Such loosenings build on the fact that lexical meanings have a prototype category structure, which allows for the inclusion of a non-category member ("more or less a category member") as if it were a full-fledged category member. But then, contextual loosening is not a free license to choose just any noncategory member as the speaker-intended concept. Rather, loosening operates on a set of candidate concepts, ordered on a scale reflecting how close they are to meeting the linguistic meaning.

Given such a routine interpretative process, we argued, it is only to be expected that natural language would evolve specialized **counter**-loosening expressions. And truth markers, particularizers and maximizers fit the bill. The function of counter-looseners is to indicate to the addressee to avoid or at least constrain the loosening he would have opted for in the given context. Counter-looseners direct the addressee to select a member that's high on the *ad hoc* category-membership scale. Once some bounded marker has become a counter-loosener, it can extend its domain of application from upscaling on a pragmatically derived scale of bounded concepts to upscaling on an inherently scalar concept. Now, other scholars have emphasized the strong stance commonly associated with would-be intensifiers, but we argued that not only is this not sufficient to account for upscaling, it is not even a necessary step (Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)' was not accompanied by a strong subjective stance prior to its intensification stage).

Our thesis does not rest on theoretical arguments alone. We analyzed the history of Hebrew *mamash* 'real(ly)', which indeed showed that a counter-loosening phase preceded its evolution into an intensifier. Corpus analyses for Italian *davvero* 'truly' and *assolutamente* 'absolutely' pointed to the same mediated path. And we proposed that the diachronic and synchronic descriptions of English

very and '*real(ly)*' are quite compatible with the assumption that their 'inten-sification' was mediated by counter-loosening. Finally, we argued that it is the bounded nature of truth markers, particularizers and maximizers that required the intermediate counter-loosening phase in order for them to turn into upscaling expressions. Inherently upscaling source expressions, such as augmenters and extreme scalar adverbials, can be directly mobilized for scalar intensification. The diachronic evolution of Italian *terribilmente* 'terribly' supported this claim, as well as the differential distributional patterns of newly evolving Hebrew inten-sifiers, where the originally bounded Hebrew *legamrey* 'totally' does not modify scalar components nearly as much as inherently scalar source expressions do (e.g., Hebrew *shigaon* 'insanely').

Although our conclusions may seem different from those of Paradis (1997, 2003 *inter alia*), we rather think of our claims as a modification and elaboration of Paradis' proposals. Paradis makes two claims that are relevant to our account: (*i*) there is a boundedness/scalarity harmony between modifiers and modified com-ponents; (*ii*) people naturally tend to construe bounded concepts as gradable.

In our account, the observed harmony (i) does not serve some concord requirement between the modifier and its modified component.[28] Rather, it derives from the different function of the modifier vis a vis scalar versus bounded concepts. A scalar intensifier such as *very* operates on an **inherently** given, category-**internal** scale of values, selecting relatively high values among category members. But a bounded modifier such as *mamash* 'real(ly)' or *absolutely* coun-ters a prevalent process of pragmatic loosening. Counter-looseners operate on a **contextually derived**, category-**external** scale of denotations ordered according to closeness to category membership. Typically, different concepts (bounded ver-sus unbounded) are in need of different modifications (counter-loosening versus upscaling), which then call for different markers (counter-looseners versus inten-sifiers). This is the motivation behind the Principle of Harmony, we suggest.[29] Next, speakers' propensity to impose "gradability" on bounded terms (*ii*) is a consequence of the under-determinacy of the linguistic code on the one hand, but perhaps more importantly it supports the way we argue in natural discourse. Speakers do not necessarily abolish the boundaries around a bounded concept such as 'empty', but they may very well count a 'nonempty' state that's 'close to empty' as if it were 'empty' for their **argumentative** purposes. Loosened, as well as counter-loosened concepts routinely participate in such argumentation. All in all, we subscribe to Paradis' Principle of Harmony, and account for it by reference to

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28. Moreover, for bounded pairs such harmonic modification seems redundant in fact.

29. But we note that scalar concepts too may be counter-loosened, rather than intensified.

the need for different modifications of different concepts (with different category structures).

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Appendix 1. Sources of the Italian intensifiers

Davvero 'in truth' (An exhaustive search)

1307	Convivio (Dante Alighieri)	1
1336	Filocolo (Giovanni Boccaccio)	1
1421	Ricordi (Giovanni Morelli)	1
1459	Canzoniere (Vecchi Galli)	1
1476	Il novellino (Masuccio Salernitano)	1
1483	Morgante (Luigi Pulci)	1
1491	I reali di Francia (Andrea da Barberino)	1
1494	Rime (Filenio Gallo)	1
1521	Lettere (Baldassarre Castiglione)	1
1524	Sonetti lussuriosi (Pietro Aretino)	1
1525	L'asino d'oro (Agnolo Firenzuola)	7
1531	La puttana errante (Lorenzo Venier)	1
1544	Strambotti a la villanesca (Pietro Aretino)	1
1566	Catechismo del concilio di Trento	12
1608	Relazione di Francia di Pietro Priuli ambasciatore ad Enrico IV dall'anno 1605 al 1608 (Pietro Priuli)	1
1610–1628	Lettere (Galileo Galilei)	6
1632	Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi (Galileo Galilei)	1
1634	Pentamerone (Giambattista Basile)	1
1752	La locandiera (Carlo Goldoni)	7
1790	Vita (Vittorio Alfieri)	16
1802	Le ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis (Ugo Foscolo)	15
1817	Zibaldone di pensieri (Giacomo Leopardi)	10

1827	I promessi sposi (Alessandro Manzoni)	50
1881	I Malavoglia (Giuseppe Verga)	29
1904	Il fu Mattia Pascal (Luigi Pirandello)	30
1923	La coscienza di Zeno (Italo Svevo)	14
1929	Gli indifferenti (Alberto Moravia)	16
1954	L'isola di Arturo (Elsa Morante)	42
1979	Se una notte d'inverno un viaggiatore (Italo Calvino)	21
1994	Sostiene Pereira (Antonio Tabucchi)	8
2002	Romanzo criminale (De Cataldo)	40
2006	Gomorra (Roberto Saviano)	28
2010	La pancia degli italiani. Berlusconi spiegato ai posteri (Beppe Severgnini)	5
2015	Numero zero (Umberto Eco)	25
2019	La vita bugiarda degli adulti (Elena Ferrante)	39

Table 2. *Davvero* throughout time

Period	Truth	Truth/counter-loosener	Counter-loosener	Counter-loosener/ Intensifier	Intensifier	Truth/counter-loosener/ intensifier	Total N
I	30	0	0	0	0	0	30
14th–16th	100%						
II	18	1	11	0	0	0	30
17th–18th	60%	3.3%	36.7%				
III	55	6	29	6	3	1	100
19th	55%	6%	29%	6%	3%	1%	
	78	3	37	5	5	0	128
20th	60.9%	2.3%	28.9%	3.9%	3.9%		
	88	5	42	3	9	1	148
21st	59.5%	3.3%	28.4%	2%	6.1%	0.7%	

Assolutamente 'absolutely' (An exhaustive search)

1307	Convivio (Dante Alighieri)	1
1550	Navigazioni e Viaggi (Giovanni Battista Ramusio)	5
1632	Dialogo sopra i due massimi (Galileo Galilei)	19
1753	La locandiera (Carlo Goldoni)	2
1790	Vita (Vittorio Alfieri)	22
1798	Ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis (Ugo Foscolo)	1

1832	Le mie prigioni (Silvio Pellico)	3
1842	I promessi sposi (Alessandro Manzoni)	8
1877	Novelle (Cesare Balbo)	2
1889	Il piacere (Gabriele D'Annunzio)	1
1892	L'innocente (Gabriele D'Annunzio)	3
1894	Il trionfo della morte (Gabriele D'Annunzio)	2
1898	Senilità (Italo Svevo)	6
1929	Gli indifferenti (Alerto Moravia)	7
1957	L'isola di Arturo (Elsa Morante)	14
1979	Se una notte d'inverno un viaggiatore (Italo Calvino)	3
2006	Gomorra (Roberto Saviano)	1

Table 3. *Assolutamente* 'absolutely' throughout time

Period	Literal (in an unrestricted manner)	Literal/Counter-loosener	Counter-loosener	Counter-loosener/intensifier	Intensifier	?	Total
14th–17th	6 24%	2 8%	12 48%	3 12%	0	2 8%	25
17th–18th	0	5 20%	8 32%	5 20%	7 28%	0	25
18th–19th	1 4%	3 12%	11 44%	4 16%	6* 24%	0	25
20th–21th	0	0	13 52%	9 36%	3 12%	0	25

* One token indicates an intensified consent.

Terribilmente (a random search for 15 tokens for each of the earlier periods, 20 for the most recent period)

1321	Divina Commedia (Dante Alighieri)	1
1357	Cronica dell'Anonimo romano (autore anonimo)	1
1449	Sonetti (Domenico di Giovanni)	1
1483	Morgante (Luigi Pulci)	1
1494	Orlando innamorato (Matteo Maria Boiardo)	1
1510	Storie Fiorentine (Francesco Guicciardini)	1
1534	Ragionamento della Nanna e della Antonia (Pietro Aretino)	2
1562	Vita di Benvenuto di Maestro Giovanni Cellini fiorentino (Benvenuto Cellini)	1
1606	Navigazioni e viaggi (Giovan Battista Ramusio)	3

1607	Le sette giornate del mondo creato (Torquato Tasso)	1
1628	Carteggio (Galileo Galilei)	2
1749	Annali d'Italia dal principio dell'era volgare sino al 1749 (Lodovico Antonio Muratori)	1
1750	La Pamela (Carlo Goldoni)	1
1753	La locandiera (Carlo Goldoni)	1
1756	L'amante di sé medesimo (Carlo Goldoni)	1
1768	Il genio buono e il genio cattivo (Carlo Goldoni)	1
1772	Poesie di Ossian (Melchiorre Cesarotti)	1
1782	Lettere (Pietro Metastasio)	1
1791	Odi dell'abate Giuseppe Parini già divolgate (Giuseppe Parini)	1
1810	Iliade (Vincenzo Monti)	1
1842	I promessi sposi (Alessandro Manzoni)	2
1860	Pasquale Paoli ossia La rotta di Pontenuovo (Domenico Guerrazzi)	1
1868	Una casa fiorentina da vendere (Pietro Fanfani)	1
1872	Racconti e bozzetti (Enrico Castelnuovo)	1
1890	Stella d'oriente (Grazia Deledda)	1
1900	Le tigri di Mompracem (Emilio Salgari)	1
1901	Le stragi della China (Emilio Salgari)	1
1910	Colei che non si deve amare (Guido Da Verona)	1
1940	L'impronta del gatto (Augusto De Angelis)	1
1952	Fausto e Anna (Carlo Cassola)	1
1962	Le piccole virtù (Natalia Ginzburg)	1
1971	Il previtocciolo (Don Luca Asprea)	1
1980	Il mondo di Camilla (Camilla Cederna)	1
1991	Tina (Pino Cacucci)	1
1999	La donna di scorta (Diego De Silva)	1
2000	Baudolino (Umberto Eco)	1
2002	Il pericolo di una guerra contro l'Islam (Eugenio Scalfari)	1
2005	Mentre dorme il pescecane (Milena Agus)	1
2007	La grammatica di Dio (Stefano Benni)	1
2009	Orizzonte mobile (Daniele Del Giudice)	1
2012	La biblioteca perduta dell'alchimista (Marcello Simoni)	1
2015	La banda degli amanti (Massimo Carlotto)	1
2017	Terre promesse (Milena Agus)	1
2019	Genesi (Guido Tonelli)	1
2020	Dormi stanotte sul mio cuore (Enrico Galiano)	1

Table 4. *Terribilmente* throughout time

Period	Manner Adv.	Manner Adv./Intensifier	Intensifier	Total
14th–17th	15 100%	0	0	15
18th–19th	11 73.3%	4 26.7%	0	15
20th–21th	3 15%	4 20%	13 65%	20

Table 5. The distribution of *meod* 'very', *legamrey* 'completely and 3 extreme modifiers for bounded and unbounded adjectives

Bounded adj.	Unbounded adj.	Bounded adj.	Unbounded adj.
Meod Vs. legamrey	*Meod Vs. legamrey*	*Meod Vs.* 'insanely'	*Meod Vs.* 'insanely'
Zehe 'identical'	*Yafe/a* 'pretty'	*Zehe* 'identical'	*Yafe/a* 'pretty'
Legamrey > meod	**Meod > legamrey**	**Meod > insanely**	**Meod > insanely**
21,520 > 4991	1,416,000 > 83,950	4991 > 107	1,416,000 > 27,228
4.3	**16.9**	**46.6**	**52**
Idiot 'idiot'	*Nexmad* 'nice'	*Idiot* 'idiot'	*Nexmad* 'nice'
Legamrey > meod	**Meod > legamrey**	**Meod > insanely**	**Meod > insanely**
2371 > 1324	590,000 > 63,200	1324 > 7	590,000 > 1912
1.8	**9.3**	**189.1**	**308.6**
Rek 'empty'	*Mafxid* 'scary'	*Rek* 'empty'	*Mafxid* 'scary'
Legamrey > meod	**Meod > legamrey**	**Meod > insanely**	**Insanely > meod**
27,280 > 589	33,800 > 6920	589 > 91	106,523 > 33,800
46.3	**4.9**	**6.5**	**3.1**
Total	**Total**	6904 > 205	**Total**
51,171 > 6904	2,039,000 > 154,070	33.7	2,039,800 > 135,663
7.4	**13.2**		**15**

Table 6. The distribution for mamash 'real(ly)' for bounded and unbounded adjectives

Mamash + unbounded adj.		*Mamash* + bounded adj.	
Yafe/a 'pretty'	695,000	*Zehe/a* 'identical'	8380
Nexmad 'nice'	345,000	*Idiot* 'idiot'	22,390
Mafxid 'scary'	132,760	*Rek* 'empty'	5930
Total 1,172,760		**Total 36,700**	

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