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Speaking of oneself in multi-term evidential systems: From the Himalayas to Amazonia

Abstract: Languages with multi-term evidential systems vary in how people speak about themselves and their own actions. The aim of this paper is to understand the differences between evidentials used with the first person (oneself) and with other persons. We focus on two groups of languages with large evidential systems – Tariana and Tukano from the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area in Amazonia, and Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi, two Tibetic languages of the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas. We analyse similarities and contrasts in the expression of information source and access to information through grammatical evidentials and egophoric systems in these two groups of languages. Our analysis reveals their intricacies and the special status of speech act participants.

Keywords: Evidentiality, egophoricity, first person, Tariana, Tukano, Ladakhi, Tibetan

1 Speaking of oneself: setting the scene

Speaking of oneself and one's intimate experiences is central to our everyday life at home or among close relatives, and yet the linguistic practices adopted in familiar places and situations are still under-investigated. The ways of speaking about oneself, about one's own actions (intentional or non-intentional), feelings, and experiences, vary from language to language. Languages use "a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories" (Jaszczolt 2018: 2). Evidentiality – the grammatical expression of information source, or how one knows what one is

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talking about – shows special features when used in a first person context. The issue is truly intriguing for languages with multi-term evidential systems. In line with the central questions of this edited volume, we will also examine how evidentials encode liminal experiences, such as altered states of consciousness, dreams, and extrasensory perceptions. These highly subjective experiences, which are in essence hard to render in words, are presented with different grammatical means in complex evidential systems.

The focus of our paper is a comparison of the evidential systems of the languages of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area (especially Tariana and Tukano) with those spoken on the Tibetan Plateau and in the Himalayas (especially Common Tibetan and Ladakhi). We will focus on these four languages for two reasons. First, our analysis of these languages is grounded in first-hand data based on original fieldwork. Secondly, our fieldwork has revealed facts on these focal languages that offer fertile ground for an in-depth study of a number of both area-specific and more general phenomena. Our typological micro-comparison is expected to shed some light on systemic principles at work in presenting one's own experience.

Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi belong to the Tibetic branch of the Sino-Tibetan macrofamily. The Tibetic languages and some other languages in contact with them are well known for their elaborate systems of evidentials (see Gawne and Hill 2017; DeLancey 2023; Sun 2023; Tournadre and Suzuki 2023: 389–440). Tournadre and Suzuki (2023: 469–636) list 76 languages (or groups of dialects) spoken in six Asian countries. Common Tibetan is spoken in Central Tibet in the Tibet Autonomous Region (China) and among the Tibetan diaspora outside Tibet (with an estimated number of speakers of c. 2 million). Central Ladakhi is spoken in the central region of Ladakh in the Union Territory of Ladakh (India) (c. 100,000 speakers). All Tibetic languages present multi-term evidential systems.[1]

The languages of Lowland Amazonia are also known for their elaborate systems of evidentials (see a summary in Aikhenvald 2015: 248–278). These features are particularly notable in the languages of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area in northwest Amazonia (see Aikhenvald 2022, 2023a, 2023c, 2024; Stenzel and Gomez-Imbert 2023; Barnes 1984, 1999). This well-established linguistic area spans adjacent regions

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1 Materials on Common Tibetan and Ladakhi are based on first-hand immersion fieldwork by the first two co-authors in Ladakh (India) and Tibet (China) over three decades. Corpora of spontaneous conversations, elicited sentences and semi-guided narratives were collected, notably the TSC, the CTC, and the CLC, with various methodologies to document a large spectrum of genres, such as childhood memories, dreams, historical narratives and spontaneous reactions to different tasks and sensations.

of Brazil and Colombia. Languages traditionally spoken in the region belong to two unrelated genetic groups – East Tukanoan and Arawak. East Tukanoan languages on the Brazilian side of the area are Tukano, Wanano (or Kotiria), Desano, Pirata-puya (or Waikhana), Tuyuca, and Barasano. All the languages are closely related and in constant contact with each other. The Arawak family – the largest in South America in terms of its expanse – is represented by Tariana, from the North Arawak subgroup, spoken entirely on the Brazilian side of the area (see Aikhenvald 2021a for an up-to-date classification of Arawak languages). The major feature of the area is obligatory societal multilingualism which follows the principles of linguistic exog-amy: one can only marry someone whose father belongs to and speaks a different language. The exogamous marriage network encompasses just the East Tukanoans and the Tariana. This principle has resulted in rampant areal diffusion, especially tangible when the languages spoken within the area are compared with related lan-guages outside it. Tariana has developed a complex system of evidentials (absent from the related languages) under the influence of its East Tukanoan neighbours and marriage partners, especially Tukano. At present, Tukano is rapidly gaining ground as a major language in the Brazilian Vaupés, at the expense of other lan-guages, including Tariana (see Aikhenvald 2022, 2023a, 2024). The focus of our dis-cussion here is Tariana (currently spoken by about 100 people) and the neighbour-ing Tukano (estimated number of speakers c. 5,000).[2]

First person and the expression of one's own experience have a special status within evidential systems (this is reflected in additional meanings of evidentials

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[2] A number of languages belonging to the Makú cultural complex spoken within the area form at least two families (see Aikhenvald 2022, 2015: 75–83, and references therein). Two national lan-guages spoken in the region – Portuguese in Brazil and Spanish in Colombia – bear the impact of the indigenous languages in the expression of information source (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2020). These lie beyond the scope of our study. Materials on Tariana are based on three decades of intensive immersion fieldwork by Alexandra Aikhenvald, and consist of 40 hours of recordings of stories of different genres (with the corpus growing based on on-going interactions with the speakers via computer-mediated communication) and fieldnotes. There is a comprehensive grammar of the lan-guage (Aikhenvald 2003), a dictionary, and several collections of stories, in addition to pedagogical materials currently in use at a local school (see www.aikhenvaldlinguistics.com). Tariana examples, all from Alexandra Aikhenvald's fieldwork, are given in practical orthography adopted in the Tari-ana school in Iauaretê, Brazil. Examples from Tukano (obtained from Alexandra Aikhenvald's own fieldwork and published sources) are given in the orthography introduced by Ramirez (1997). No examples are based on elicitation (a technique carefully avoided). A proviso is in order. Recent years have seen a few ill-informed attempts to reinterpret some of the Tariana evidential markers (especially -*ka* 'recent past visual evidential' as a 'topic marker'), done by scholars with little knowl-edge of the Tariana language (including paradigmatic relations within the Tariana evidential sys-tem, and their semantics, addressed in relevant publications). These attempts do not deserve any mention here.

with the first person, with overtones of control or lack thereof: see Aikhenvald 2021a: 22–23; Sun 2023). Some evidentials are also rarely used with first person. These include the reported evidentials in most languages of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area, including Tariana and Tukano (see further discussion in §4.4.2). The Tibetic languages have special means for statements involving the speaker, notably egophoric markers, which appear in the same paradigms as evidential markers. Across both linguistic areas, the evidentials used when speaking about oneself reveal the privileged status of the speaker, his/her attitudes to other speech act participants, and the special status of altered states of consciousness and the supernatural. In §2 we start with a snapshot of a number of general concepts, with a focus on evidentiality and 'egophoricity' (the latter being particularly relevant for Tibetic languages). A brief overview of some common features of multi-term evidential systems in the focal regions is in §3. In §4, we turn to the salient semantic features of evidential use in the context of first person. The last section (§5) concludes our investigation.

2 General concepts: Evidentiality and 'egophoricity'

Evidentiality is a grammatical category that has source of information as its primary meaning (Aikhenvald 2004: 1, further fine-tuned in Aikhenvald 2023c, 2024). The connections and interactions of evidentiality with other grammatical means of expressing knowledge-related categories have been addressed in Aikhenvald (2021b: 19 and *passim*). Evidential categories may have different labels depending on the grammatical tradition of a given language, making cross-linguistic comparisons a difficult task. We have chosen to use a taxonomy that is mainly based on Aikhenvald (2023c: 12–15) for the sake of clarity and, at the same time, we have kept some of the terms that prevail in the tradition of Tibetic linguistics for the sake of precision. One should keep in mind that the definition we propose for each evidential category is inevitably simplified in order to offer a clear comparison of the four languages. Although every evidential typically belongs to a single broad category, they often have specific uses which differ from language to language. These differing uses are particularly noticeable in contexts where the speaker is directly involved, as we will see throughout the paper. For further information on evidential categories from a typological perspective, one can refer to Aikhenvald (2023b). For further details on evidentials of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area, see Aikhenvald (2022) and references therein, and for a more comprehensive presentation of Tibetic evidentiality, see Gawne and Hill (2017) and Tournadre and Suzuki (2023: 389–440).

Evidentials are usually divided into three broad categories: I. direct, II. inferred, and III. hearsay.

I.   Direct evidentials

Direct evidentials encode that the speaker is or has been a direct witness of the state of affairs he/she is referring to. Some evidentials cover this whole category, such as the existential-copular verb *'dug*, as well as the suffixes *-gi.'dug* and *-song*, in Common Tibetan. These morphemes will be labelled 'direct sensory', as they are used for all sensory channels (sight, hearing, smell, inner sensations, etc.). This category can be divided in two subcategories, namely visual and non-visual, which are rendered by distinct morphemes in Ladakhi, Tariana, and Tukano. The following are the three terms that will be used for the direct evidential category and their definitions.

–   DIRECT SENSORY, used for states of affairs directly perceived by the speaker.
–   DIRECT VISUAL, used for states of affairs that the speaker saw directly.
–   DIRECT NON-VISUAL, used for states of affairs directly perceived through other senses than sight.

II.   Inferred evidentials

Inferred evidentials express that the speaker has not witnessed the state of affairs, but that indirect cues have enabled him/her to deduce its existence. One cue may be the resultant state of the state of affairs. This is, for example, the case of the inferential perfects of Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi. However, because the 'inferred evidentials' of the focal languages do not display the same nuances, and the terms for these markers are now well-established in their respective grammatical traditions, we have kept the different traditional labels despite partial semantic overlaps. We will use the following terms for the 'inferred' subcategories:

–   SENSORY INFERENTIAL (Tibetic languages) or INFERRED (Vaupés Basin linguistic area), used for states of affairs inferred by the speaker on the basis of sensory cues.
–   VISUAL INFERENTIAL, used for states of affairs inferred by the speaker on the basis of visual cues.
–   NON-VISUAL INFERENTIAL, used for states of affairs inferred by the speaker on the basis of senses other than sight.
–   ASSUMED, used for states of affairs that have been accessed with reasonable assumptions and general knowledge.

III.   Hearsay evidentials

Hearsay evidentials indicate that the speaker has learned about the state of affairs verbally, that is, by hearing or reading about it. Markers that cover this whole se-

mantic category (such as Standard Tibetan *-ze* or *-za*) will simply be called "hearsay evidentials". Other markers in the focal languages belong to a subcategory of hearsay evidentials, since they may only be used when the speaker does not mention explicitly the person or the text he/she has learned the information from. Central Ladakhi, Tariana, and Tukano possess such markers, which are called "reported" evidentials. We will thus use the following terms:

– HEARSAY, used for states of affairs accessed verbally.
– REPORTED, used for states of affairs obtained verbally, without an explicit mention of the author or source of the speech report.[3]

Another notion that is essential to understand the evidential system of Tibetic languages is 'egophoricity'. In the typological literature, egophoricity is sometimes referred to as 'privileged access to information'. Egophoric markers encode the fact that the speaker can access through his/her own experiential knowledge a state of affairs which involves the speaker him/herself or an entity close to him/her. The sentences in (1) and (2) are marked with egophoric markers in Central Ladakhi and Common Tibetan respectively.[4]

(1) *mdzar.ba zos-**pin***
     lunch   eat$_2$-EGOint
     'I ate lunch.' (CLadakhi)

(2) *nga-la'i   bsam.blo gcig.pa **yin***
     1SG-DAT:ADD thought   same   COP.EGO
     'My thoughts are the same.' (CTib; TSC)

The egophoric suffix in (1) specifies that the action was performed intentionally by the speaker, and also that the speaker knows about it through his/her own experiential memory. If the speaker was referring to an action that they had performed without being aware of it or without remembering it, an egophoric form would not be appropriate, because they would know about this state of affairs only indirectly. In (2), the subject is not the first person, but the state of affairs still concerns entities inside the speaker's sphere (i.e., his thoughts). This type of

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3 Note that some languages, including Mamaindê (a Nambiquara language from Brazil; Aikhenvald 2023c), distinguish special evidentials for secondhand and firsthand speech reports.
4 In the examples, we follow the Wylie transliteration for both Central Ladakhi and Common Tibetan for the sake of comparison and etymological transparency. For Central Ladakhi, we generally follow Bakula Rinpoche's spelling (as in Bakula Rinpoche 2010, 2014) and Rebecca Norman's *rang.skat Ladakhi-English dictionary* (Norman 2019).

context may also trigger egophorics. Because the type of access to information determines the use of egophorics, and because these morphemes appear in the same paradigm as other evidential markers, most Tibetanists consider egophorics to be evidentials that are typical of the Tibetic language family. However, other scholars argue that egophoricity is a concept which can be applied to a wide variety of languages and is distinct from evidentiality. Although most languages do not have egophoric markers *per se*, meanings that are typically associated with egophorics may be embedded within evidential systems outside the Tibetic linguistic area, like in Tariana, as we will see throughout the paper (such 'egophorically' oriented evidential systems are addressed in some detail in Aikhenvald 2024). Further discussions of the status of egophoric distinctions inside, or outside, evidential systems lie outside our present purview.

3 Evidential systems in the focal regions

We start with a summary of the Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi systems, and then turn to Tariana and Tukano.

3.1 Evidentials in Tibetic with a focus on Central Ladakhi

The Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi systems differ in their morphology and functional domains, but have much in common. In both languages, evidentials are expressed with verbal inflections and enclitics. Their main evidential categories are all compatible with various TAM, as shown in Table 1. There is a set of correlations between evidentiality and tense-aspect, since there are, for example, fewer evidential distinctions in the future in the Tibetic languages (Tournadre 2004, 2016; Mélac 2014: 276; see also Aikhenvald 2004; Skribnik and Aikhenvald 2024; Mélac 2014: 484–488). In addition, no evidential distinctions have been found in the imperative for these languages. Evidentials are used in main clauses but not in subordinate clauses, except for reported speech clauses. There are the same number of evidential distinctions in declarative, negative, and interrogative clauses.

For Central Ladakhi, the forms of evidentials are listed in Table 1.[5]

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5 There are several languages and dialects spoken in Ladakh, located in northern India, which may be divided into two large groups: the Kenhat dialects (*gyen skat*) and the Shamskat dialects (*sham skat*) (Zeisler 2011). One could add that the dialects of Changthang (the upper Indus valley in Ladakh) are more closely related to the dialects of Spiti and Ngari (Tournadre and Suzuki

Table 1: Evidentials and tense-aspect in declarative clauses in Central Ladakhi[6].

Labels	uncompleted	perfect	completed past	future
Egophoric	*-ad*	*-te.yod*	*-pin*	*-yin*
Default direct sensory			*-Ø*	
Direct visual	*-'dug/ -rug*			
Direct non-visual	*-a.rag*			
Sensory inferential		*-tog*		
Visual inferential		*-te.'dug*		*-ces.'dug*
Non-visual inferential		*-te.rag*		*-ces.rag*
Factual(-inferential)	*-a.kyag*	*-te.yod.kyag*	*-kyag*	*-cen*
Definitory-gnomic	*-a.nog*	*-te.(yin.)nog*		
Mirative	*-ad.tshug*	*-te.yod.tshug*		
Reported	QUOTATION-*lo*			

We have introduced the notions of egophoric, direct, visual, non-visual, inferential, and reported in §2. The following are the definitions of the other, non-evidential categories of the morphemes appearing in the same verbal paradigm. We will not elaborate on these notions further, because they are not central to our topic.

– Factual(-inferential), used for states of affairs presented as objective facts (typically accessed through general knowledge or logical inference) (Tournadre 2008).
– Gnomic-definitory, used for well-established knowledge and general truth.
– Mirative, used for unexpected states of affairs (DeLancey 1997).

The following examples from Central Ladakhi illustrate each of these categories. In order to illustrate the full paradigm, all these examples refer to a past event, but with different aspects (uncompleted, perfect, and completed).

2023: 617–625). Two languages of wider communication have gained a dominant position: Central Ladakhi (spoken in the Leh area) and Purik (spoken in the Kargil area).

6 This chart only includes the main evidentials. It does not include marginal evidentials or epistemic markers. However, we did include the future forms *ces.'dug* and *ces.rag,* which may be considered evidential and epistemic, since they usually convey some uncertainty in addition to their evidential meanings. Also note that, for the completed past, Central Ladakhi can use the bare stem (traditionally called "past inflection", marked with ₂), which encodes the direct sensory by default. In most contexts, this form indicates that the state of affairs was directly perceived by the speaker, but it also has some marginal "non-direct sensory" uses, hence the label "default direct sensory".

(3)   *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**te.yod***
      field-DAT   water   give₂-PFCT.EGOint
      'The field has been watered.' [I know it because I did it, or I know it because
      my brother has watered our mutual fields]

(4)   *zhing-nga chu   **btangs***
      field-DAT   water   give₂.CPL.DFLT.SENS
      'The field was watered.' [I saw or heard someone do it]

(5)   *zhing-nga chu   btang-**'dug***
      field-DAT   water   give₁-UNCPL.DIR.VIS
      'The field is being watered.' [I saw someone doing it]

(6)   *zhing-nga chu   btang-**nga.rag***
      field-DAT   water   give₁-UNCPL.DIR.NONVIS
      'The field being watered.' [I heard someone doing it]

(7)   *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**tog***
      field-DAT   water   give₂-PFCT.SENS.INF
      'The field has been watered.' [I have seen or touched the wet soil]

(8)   *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**te.'dug***
      field-DAT   water   give₂-PFCT.VIS.INF
      'The field has been watered.' [I can see that the soil is wet]

(9)   *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**te.rag***
      field-DAT   water   give₂-PFCT.NONVIS.INF
      'The field has been watered.' [I can feel with my hand that the soil is wet]

(10) *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**te.yod.kyag***
      field-DAT   water   give₂-PFCT.FACT
      'The field has been watered.' [It is a simple fact. Someone was to water it
      and I believe they did]

(11) *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**te.yin.nog***
      field-DAT   water   give₂-PFCT.DEF
      'The field has been watered.' [It is well-known that fields in Ladakh are irri-
      gated]

(12) *zhing-nga chu   btangs-**te.yod.tshug***
     field-DAT   water give₂-PFCT.MIR
     'Oh! The field has been watered.' [I did not expect it would]

(13) *zhing-nga chu   btangs-te.yod.kyag-**lo***
     field-DAT   water give₂-PFCT.FACT-REP
     'The field has been watered.' [I've heard that someone did it]

One of the striking characteristics of the Tibetic languages is that hearsay markers (or reported evidentials) do not belong to the same paradigm as other evidentials, but follow them (as shown in ex. (13)). The main markers used for hearsay are *za* (central Tibet), *lo* (Ladakh, Spiti, Dzongkha, etc.) and *grag* (some Kham dialects) (Tournadre and Suzuki 2023: 422–430).[7] These markers are all derived from verbs of speech, similar to numerous instances documented elsewhere in the family (see, e.g., Zhang 2014 for Ersu, a Tibeto-Burman language from Sichuan Province in China), and across Eurasia (see Skribnik and Aikhenvald 2024). They can co-occur with all the other evidentials. For example, in Central Ladakhi: V-(x.)*yod-lo* (egophoric + hearsay); V-(x.)*yin.nog.-lo* (factual + hearsay); V-(x.)'*dug-lo* (direct visual + hearsay); V-(x.)*rag-lo* (direct non-visual + hearsay); V-*tog-lo* (sensory inferential + hearsay), etc. Example (14) illustrates a combination of a sensory and a hearsay marker in Common Tibetan.

(14) *dbyin.ji sbyang na yag.po '**dug-ze***
     English learn   if good   COP. DIR.SENS-HSAY
     '(They say) It's good to learn English.' [I have heard from someone who can testify directly] (CTibetan, TSC)

Because hearsay markers are grammatically and semantically quite distinct from the other evidentials in Tibetic languages, Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) proposed an alternative definition of evidentiality, that is, "the representation of source and access to information according to the speaker's perspective and strategy". In this definition, "source" refers specifically to the actual speaker's speech or to the reported

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7 Common Tibetan possesses two hearsay enclitics derived from the verb *zer*: *-za* and *-ze* (pronounced /s/). They can both have a reported function (without mentioning the author of the reported information) and a quotative function (specifying the reported speaker). They differ in their degree of backgroundedness (Mélac 2014: 131–134, 392). Central Ladakhi only possesses a reported enclitic *-lo* (derived from the verb of speaking *lab*). In order to specify the identity of the reported speaker, one can only use a reported speech construction involving a lexical verb of speech, such as *zer* or *mol*.

speaker's speech (when available), whereas "access" refers specifically to the ways in which the actual speaker or a reported speaker obtains the given information (sensory perceptions, sensory inferences, logical inferences, gnomic information, etc.). The reason for introducing the above distinction between "source" and "access" is related to the fact that in the Tibetic languages, the two types are grammatically encoded in two distinct paradigms (Tournadre and LaPolla 2014; Mélac 2023). It is necessary to specify whether the word "source of information" is used in the broad sense or in the more specific meaning of "speech source of information", at least for some languages, since the distinction plays a significant role in their grammar. For other languages, maybe most languages, this distinction might not be relevant, and the notion of "source of information", in its broad sense, as proposed by Aikhenvald (2004), is sufficient.

The Common Tibetan evidential system possesses fewer markers than the Central Ladakhi system, so fewer semantic distinctions exist in the former system overall. The following characteristics distinguish Central Ladakhi's evidential system from that of Common Tibetan:

(a) the existence of a formal distinction in Central Ladakhi between visual sensory (*'dug, -'dug/-rug, -te.'dug, -ces.'dug*) and non-visual sensory (*rag, -a.rag, -te.rag, -ces.rag*), whereas Common Tibetan only possesses "general sensory" markers (*'dug, -gi.'dug, -bzhag, -'dug, -pa.'dug, -song*);[8]

(b) the existence of two types of "factual" markers: factual(-inferential) (*yod. kyag, yin.kyag, -ad.kyag, -te.yod.kyag, -kyag, -cen*) and gnomic-definitory (*yin. nog, -a.nog, -te.(yin.)nog*) in Central Ladakhi,[9] whereas Common Tibetan only possesses one main factual category (*red, yod.red, -yod.red -gi.yod.red, -pa. red*);

(c) the existence of mirative markers (several forms containing the sub-morpheme *tshuk*) in Central Ladakhi, while no morpheme is dedicated to this meaning in the Common Tibetan verbal paradigm;

(d) the absence of a direct sensory suffix (visual or non-visual) in the completed past in Central Ladakhi. The bare stem of the verb (in what is traditionally called its "past inflection") usually conveys a default direct sensory meaning.

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8 Endopathic markers refer to the speaker's inner sensations, emotions, and cognitive processes. In both languages, the endopathic is only used with the first person whereas the other sensory functions generally occur with the second and third persons.

9 There are two entirely distinct functions of *nog* when combined with the auxiliary *yin. Yin-nog* 1 is a gnomic-definitory *'i rgyal.po-'i mkhar **yin.nog** 'It is the King's palace [everybody knows that]'. The function of *yin-nog* 2 is a visual sensory inferential: *wa a.rag **yin.nog**-pa* 'Oh, this is alcohol!' (looking at the liquid) and is opposed to the non-visual sensory inferential *yin-grag*: *wa a.rag **yin.grag**-pa* 'Oh, this is alcohol!' (smelling or tasting the liquid).

However, in some cases, this form indicates the speaker's experiential knowledge about him/herself and his/her sphere (egophoric overtone), while in the completed past, common Tibetan possesses the direct sensory -*song* and the receptive egophoric -*byung*;

(e) the existence of the marker -*pin* optionally added to an evidential to refer to the past.[10]

3.2 Evidentials in the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area: focus on Tariana

Within the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area, both Tariana and Tukano have five-term systems of grammatical evidentials. In both Tariana and Tukano, and across the area, evidentials are used in main clauses only (in agreement with our cross-linguistic expectations: see, for instance, Aikhenvald 2021b, 2023c). A larger set of evidentials occurs in declarative clauses, and a reduced set is used in questions (we return to this at the end of the current section). This is in contrast to Tibetic languages, which have the same set of distinctions in declarative and interrogative clauses. The reported term is the only one used in imperative clauses (meaning 'do something on someone else's order'). Tariana and Tukano also contrast with Tibetic languages in having evidentials in commands, whereas Tibetic languages do not.[11] These correlations between sentence types, clause types, and moods are consistent with many other languages of the world (see Aikhenvald 2021a: 85–99 on dependencies between tense, aspect and evidentiality, and Hyslop 2023 for the dependencies in Bodic languages). No evidential distinctions are expressed in the future, in contrast to numerous languages of Northern Eurasia (see Skribnik and Aikhenvald 2024), and to the Tibetic languages (see Tournadre 2016). Lastly, in contrast to other Amazonian languages, Tariana and Tukano (and other languages of the Vaupés River Basin) do not allow the co-occurrence of more than one evidential within a clause (unlike Matses; see Fleck 2007; Aikhenvald 2021b: 51, 55).

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10 Central Ladakhi -*pin* in the first slot after the verb is comparable to Common Tibetan -*pa.yin*, i.e., a completed past intentional egophoric. It should not be confused with the above-mentioned -*pin*, which only indicates past tense.

11 In Tibetic languages, morphemes used for commands appear in the same slot as evidentials and do not contain evidential features. However, because a hearsay clitic can follow this slot, it is indeed possible to use "imperative + hearsay" to refer to what somebody else has ordered, as in *sgo phyes-dang-ze* '(He said,) "open the door"'.

Evidential markers in Tariana are fused with tense: present (zero-marked), recent past (marked with the suffix *-ka*) or remote past (suffix *-na*) (see Table 2). Unlike Tibetic languages, evidentials in Tariana and Tukano do not have any obvious interactions with aspect. The inferred and assumed evidentials have no present tense forms. The inferred evidential encodes information inferred from sensory (mostly visual) perception. The assumed evidential covers information obtained via reasoning, assumptions based on general knowledge, and often general knowledge. The Tukano system is very similar to Tariana in both meanings and usage (see Aikhenvald 2010: 117–128).

The semantics of tenses correlates with the time of the event and the time when the information was first acquired (Aikhenvald 2003: 289–290; 2021b; the forms and their meanings in Tukano are discussed in Ramirez 1997: 120–2). Consequently, the remote past visual evidential refers to something the speaker saw a long time ago and can see right now as well. Further discussion of the semantics of tenses in Tariana and in Tukano lies outside our purview here.

In Tariana, the markers are "floating clitics": they tend to have the predicate as their host, but can attach to any focused constituent (which does not make them into focus markers; see Aikhenvald 2003: 293–310). In Tukano, they are suffixes to the verb (see Figure 1 in §4.2.2).[12]

The forms of evidentials in three tenses in Tariana declarative clauses are listed in Table 2. Evidentials are partly segmentable (more on this, and on the option of analysing the recent past visual evidential *-ka* as *-ø-ka* (VISUAL.EVIDENTIAL-RECENT.PAST) and the remote past visual evidential *-na* as *-ø-na* (VISUAL.EVIDENTIAL-RECENT.PAST), can be found in Aikhenvald 2021b: 10–12).

Table 2: Evidentials and tense in declarative clauses in Tariana.

Labels	present	recent past	remote past
Visual	*-naka*	*-ka*	*-na*
Non-visual	*-mha*	*-mahka*	*-mhana*
Inferred	–	*-nihka*	*-nhina*
Assumed	–	*-sika*	*-sina*
Reported	*-pida*	*-pidaka*	*-pidana*

The following examples from Tariana illustrate five real-life situations. Evidentials were straightforwardly used to express different information sources for the

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12 Those speakers who speak on a daily basis tend to predominantly use evidentials on verbs. This innovation goes beyond the present study.

speaker (from Alexandra Aikhenvald's original fieldwork, examples obtained in 2020–23).

(15) *nu-pheru*   *du-dia-**naka***
     1SG-older_sister 3SGF-return-PRES.VIS
     'My older sister is coming back.' [I can see her]

(16) *nu-pheru*   *du-dia-**mha***
     1SG-older_sister 3SGF-return-PRES.NONVIS
     'My older sister is returning.' [I can hear the noise]

(17) *nu-pheru*   *du-dia-**nihka***
     1SG-older_sister 3SGF-return-REC.P.INFR
     'My older sister has returned.' [I see her bag hanging in the doorway]

(18) *nu-pheru*   *du-dia-**sika***
     1SG-older_sister 3SGF-return-REC.P.ASSUM
     'My older sister has returned.' [I know she always comes home at this time]

(19) *nu-pheru*   *du-dia-**pidaka***
     1SG-older_sister 3SGF-return-REC.P.REP
     'My older sister has returned.' [I was told recently]

Evidentials in Tariana and Tukano branch out into other knowledge-related meanings. They can have overtones of privileged access to information and of epistemic meanings of uncertainty about something one cannot quite see (more on this in §4). The speaker may have access to more than one information source. Generally, visually obtained information, if available, will tend to be preferred over any other information source (Barnes 1984: 262 reported the same principle for Tuyuca, an East Tukanoan language spoken in the Colombian part of the Vaupés River Basin Linguistic Area; see also Aikhenvald 2004: 307–308). The next preferred choice is expected to be the non-visual evidential, then inferred based on visible results, then reported, and only then the assumed. However, the choice of evidentials will be further constrained by a number of factors, including the following (see Aikhenvald 2021a: 195–208):
(a) whether the action was intentional or not;
(b) what kind of access to information the speaker has: for instance, one's own mental processes and feelings are accessible to the person themselves, and not to others;
(c) the type of information: for instance, prophetic dreams will be treated differently from other types of information;

(d) the status of the speaker: some people can "see" what others cannot, and sha-
mans may have special access not available to ordinary mortals.

These choices are particularly relevant in the context of the first-person subject.
They are the topics of §4.1.2, §4.2.2, §4.3.2, §4.4.2, and §4.5.2.

In contrast to Tibetic languages, the reported term in Tariana and other lan-
guages of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area appears in the same morphologi-
cal slot within the predicate as all the evidentials (the predicate structure in Tari-
ana is in Aikhenvald 2003: 253–254). A reported evidential cannot combine with
other evidentials. This is in contrast to a few other Amazonian languages (includ-
ing Bora and Panoan; see Aikhenvald 2015: 259–262 and references therein). In
both Tariana and Tukano, the reported evidentials are unlike other terms in the
system in that they may have their own time reference, different from that of the
clause or the sentence (see Aikhenvald 2021b: 53). In both languages, the reported
evidential marks the time of the speech report (rather than that of the event it-
self). The timing of the event – subsequent to the timing of the report – can be
marked separately. In this way, tense is expressed twice.

In (20), the speaker has just been told that the event will happen in the future.
The purposive marker -*karu* refers to the timing of the person returning. The re-
cent past reported evidential reflects the timing of the speech report.

(20) *du-nu-karu-**pidaka***
      3SGF-come-PURP-REC.P.REP
      'She will return, reportedly.' [I have been told recently] (Tariana)

If the speaker had been told about a future event a long time ago, they would
have used the remote past reported evidential:

(21) *du-nu-karu-**pidana***
      3SGF-come-PURP-REM.P.REP
      'She will return, reportedly.' [I was told a long time ago] (Tariana)

The reported evidential is the only one used with imperative forms in commands
(to second person only) across the Vaupés, e.g., Tariana *pi-hña-pida* (2SG-eat-
REPORTED.COMMAND) 'eat (on someone else's order)' (see Aikhenvald 2023c: 19–20 for
a cross-linguistic appraisal of evidentials in commands; see Aikhenvald 2008 for a
survey of evidentials in imperative forms across the Vaupés River Basin Linguistic
Area and for an analysis of this and other imperatives, all of which are formally
different from declaratives). In interrogative clauses, inferred, assumed, and re-

ported evidentials have one form (Aikhenvald 2003: 311–18). That is, only three evidentials are distinguished in questions – visual, non-visual and a further form covering all other distinctions.[13] Historically, the reported evidential in Tariana is the most archaic of all. It is the only one shared with Baniwa of Içana, a closely related language (see Aikhenvald 2023d: 155–157). All evidentials in Tukano appear to go back to the proto-language (Stenzel and Gomez-Imbert 2023: 856–857). There is no evidence of any etymological connection with a verb of speech in either language. This is in contrast to Tibetic languages, where the hearsay evidentials are relatively recent innovations, grammaticalized from speech verbs (Mélac and Bialek 2024).

Shared information source by speech act participants is a feature of the inferred evidential (more on this in Aikhenvald 2021a, 2023a). The assumed evidential may express the information shared by everyone (see examples and discussion in Aikhenvald 2021b: 74–75; 2023a). First person experience plays a fundamental role in the choice between visual and non-visual evidentials in the expression of intentionality, feelings and inner states, and supernatural experience, as we will see in §§4.1–5.

4 Speaking of oneself: the grammar of evidentials

We now turn to the salient semantic properties of evidentials in the context of the first person, across the languages in the focal regions. These cover the distinction between intentional and unintentional actions (§4.1), personal sphere and intimate knowledge (§4.2), one's sensations, feelings and thoughts (§4.3), altered states of consciousness (§4.4), and dreams (§4.5).

4.1 Intentional and unintentional actions

4.1.1 Tibetic languages

In most Tibetic languages, intentional actions performed by the speaker are typically expressed by intentional egophorics (Tournadre 2017). For example, the in-

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13 The same form -*pida* is used in the expression of negative consequence ('lest something should happen') – a feature developed in Tariana as a result of diffusion from Tukano (more on this in Aikhenvald 2010: 164–165).

tentional egophorics *-pa.yin* and *-gi.yin* (completed past and future) of Common Tibetan are strictly associated with a first person volitional agent in declarative sentences (Garrett 2001: 178–205; Tournadre 2008, 2017).[14] However, the intentional egophoric *-gi.yod* (uncompleted past and present) can be used with a non-first person volitional agent in a declarative sentence, as long as the latter is in the speaker's personal sphere (Mélac 2014: 119–121; see §4.2.1, ex. (29)). The behaviour of Central Ladakhi egophorics is on the whole similar to those in Common Tibetan. The intentional egophoric *-pin* (> *-pa.yin*), used for completed past, is only felicitous with a first person volitional agent, while the intentional egophoric *-ad* (> *yod*), used for uncompleted past and present, can be used with non-first person agents. Examples (22a) and (23a) illustrate this point in Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi. These declarative sentences would be ungrammatical with a second or third person agent (22b and 23b).

(22) a. *nga der   mchod.mjal-la phyin-**pa.yin***
        1SG   there worship.H-DAT go$_2$-CPL.EGOint
        'I went there to do worship.' (CTibetan; TSC)
     b. **kho der   mchod.mjal-la phyin-**pa.yin***
        3SG   there worship.H-DAT go$_2$-CPL.EGOint

(23) a. *ngas   ga.ri mang.po sruls-**pin***
        1SG:ERG car   a_lot   drive$_2$-CPL.EGOint
        'I drove a lot.' (CLadakhi)
     b. **khos   ga.ri mang.po sruls-**pin***
        3SG:ERG car   a_lot   drive$_2$-CPL.EGOint

It is typically infelicitous to use other evidential markers in the preceding situations unless under the following specific conditions:

(a) the speaker observes him/herself in a mirror, movie, dream, etc. (see examples (33) and (35) in Oisel (2017); see also §4.5);
(b) the speaker emphasizes that the act was unintentional (see examples (47) and (49) in Oisel 2017);
(c) the speaker wants the addressee to act as a witness of what he/she did, as in (24) and (25).

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14 This distinction between egophorics, limited to first person volitional agents and less restricted egophorics, is referred to as 'strong' vs. 'weak' evidential restrictions (Garrett 2001: 178–205), or 'narrow' vs. 'wide-scope' egophorics (Tournadre 2017).

(24) *ga.ri ngas*   ***sruls***
      car   1SG:ERG drive$_2$.CPL.PAST.DFLT.DIR.SENS
      '*I* drove the car!' (CLadakhi)[15]

(25) *mo.ta ngas*   *btang-**song**-nga*
      car   1SG:ERG drive$_2$-CPL.DIR.SENS-PHAT
      '*I* drove the car, didn't I!' (CTibetan)

In (24) and (25), the speaker refers to an action that he did willingly and in the presence of the addressee. The use of the direct sensory form aims to appeal to the addressee for confirmation, since the latter can testify about what happened. These sentences can be used when two people are travelling over a long distance and the speaker wants the addressee to take his turn at driving, insisting that he has already done his part of the job, as the addressee can confirm.

4.1.2 Tariana and Tukano

The choice of visual versus non-visual evidentials with the first person in Tariana and in Tukano correlates with intentionality of action. A non-visual evidential will refer to something the speaker did accidentally and unintentionally, while in Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi, the same meaning will be rendered by avoiding egophoric marking (see also Aikhenvald 2018: 29–30; 2021a: 197–198; similar examples from Tukano are in Ramirez 1997: 134–135). In (26), the speaker broke a branch on purpose. The branch was in his way when he was walking through the jungle, as stated in the dependent clause.

(26) *heku-kena-nuku*   *nu-thuka-**ka***
      tree-CL:BRANCH.LIKE-TOP.OBJ   1SG-break-REC.P.VIS
      nu-na   *di-adeta-hyume*
      1SG-OBJ   3MASC.SG-be.in.the.way/prevent-
                                     AFTER/SINCE
      'I have broken the branch (intentionally), since it was in my way.' (Tariana)

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15 In Central Ladakhi, the use of the plain form of the verb is a factual completed past which usually implies sensory access to information.

In (27), the speaker is talking about breaking the tree branch – without meaning to, as an accident.

(27) *heku-kena-nuku*   *nu-thuka-**mahka***
      tree-CL:BRANCH.LIKE-TOP.OBJ 1SG-break-REC.P.NONVIS
      'I have broken the branch (unintentionally).' (Tariana)

The non-visual evidential with a first person subject can refer to an aimless action, if the speaker has no control over what is happening. In (28), from a hunting story, the speaker got lost in the jungle at night and was walking around without knowing what he was doing.

(28) *de:pi-se*   *nu-pipina-**mhana***
      night-LOC   1SG-get_lost-REM.P.NONVIS
      nu-emhani   *awakada-se*
      1SG-walk   jungle-LOC
      'I walked (aimlessly) lost in the jungle at night.' (Tariana)

The differentiation between intentional and unintentional action through evidentials reflects what Sun (2023: 56–58) calls "reduced information access".

4.2 Personal sphere and intimate knowledge

4.2.1 Tibetic languages

Tibetic languages do not possess verbal inflections indexing person *per se*, but person reference interacts with evidential marking. Some languages, such as Balti and Purik, do not have any markers encoding an egophoric meaning (Zemp 2018), whereas other languages possess several types of egophorics: intentional (§4.1.1, ex. (22–23)), habitual (§4.3.1, ex. (43–44)), receptive (§4.3.1, ex. (47)) and experiential (Tournadre 2017). As mentioned in §4.1.1, a speaker can use the intentional egophoric *-gi.yod* with a non-first person agent in Common Tibetan if the latter belongs to his/her personal sphere, such as a family member or a close friend. In (29), the speaker talks about her relationship with her grandmother, and uses an egophoric with a third person agent in Common Tibetan. The same phenomenon is attested in Central Ladakhi, as in (30):

(29) *byams.po zhe.po.cig gnang-**gi.yod***
     affection a_lot   give.H-UNCPL.EGO
     'She was giving me a lot of affection.' (CTibetan; TSC)

(30) *tshe.ring nga'i   pha.spun **yin***
     Tshering 1SG:GEN phaspun COP.EGO
     'Tshering is my *phaspun* (a relative from a group of families with strong social and spiritual ties).' (CLadakhi)

However, egophorics are inappropriate when the speaker does not have any personal experience of the situation in which they were involved, but can only rely on hearsay or inference to know about it. For example, if the speaker refers to his/her own birth in Common Tibetan, the factual *-pa.red* will typically be used, as in (31), while the egophoric *-byung* or sensory *-song* are unacceptable. For obvious reasons, the speaker cannot tap into his/her direct experience of his/her own birth in order to recount it, but can only have heard about it.

(31) *nga lha.sar   skyes-**pa.red***
     1SG Lhasa:DAT be_born$_2$-CPL.PAST.FACT
     'I was born in Lhasa.' (CTibetan)

For situations that the speaker has consciously experienced and in which he/she is directly involved, egophorics are typically used in Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi. However, egophorics also convey an idea of intimate knowledge, and are avoided when the speaker appeals to shared knowledge. For example, if a person does not want to pay and says he/she has no money, he/she may emphasize that it is common knowledge by using a factual instead of an egophoric to contradict the addressee's claim:

(32) A: *nga-'a   pe.ne   **med***
        1SG-DAT money NEG.EXIST.EGO
     B: *zun ma-btang khyed.rang-nga pe.ne   **yod.kyag***
        lie NEG-LV.IMP you-DAT   money EXIST.FACT
     A: *tshang.ma rgyus   yin.nok nga-'a pe.ne*
        everybody knowledge COP.FACT 1SG-DAT money
        med.kyag
        NEG.EXIST.FACT

A: 'I have no money.'
B: 'Don't lie, you do have money!'
A: 'I don't! Everybody knows that!' (CLadakhi)

In the same situation, a speaker of Common Tibetan will also use a factual form (*yod.red*) instead of an egophoric to appeal to common knowledge and contradict the other person's claim.

Similarly, when referring to one's official status, it is very common to use a factual instead of an egophoric in Common Tibetan. For example, if a teacher has to remind his students of his position, as in (33), the egophoric form will be infelicitous.

(33) *dge.rgan   nga   red*
      teacher   1SG   COP.FACT
      '*I* am the teacher!' (CTibetan)[16]

4.2.2 Tariana and Tukano

While Tibetic languages do not have person indexing verb inflections, Tariana and Tukano do possess a person paradigm, although the two languages show considerable differences in the way person is marked on verbs.

Tariana has obligatory person marking prefixes on transitive and intransitive active verbs (inherited from Proto-Arawak). Stative verbs take no personal prefixes (see also Aikhenvald 2003: 234–243 on verb classes in Tariana). The presence of a non-visual evidential on a verb expressing a physical or an emotional state will indicate that the experiencer is the speaker. In contrast to Tariana, person markers on the verb in Tukano and other languages of the family have a typologically unusual system where (a) one form covers speech act participants (first and second persons) and third person singular inanimate referents, and (b) three different forms are used for animate nonfeminine singular, animate feminine singular, and plural. This can be schematically represented as in Figure 1.

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16 In the same situation, a factual marker (gnomic-definitory) would also be used in Central Ladakhi: *dge.rgan nga **yin.nog** '*I am the teacher*'.

non-third person (SAP) *or* third person inanimate   third person animate

one form   3FEM.SG   3NONFEM.SG   3PL

Figure 1: Person marking in Tukano verbs.

That is, in Tukano *apê-a-pi* (play-REC.P.VIS-NONTHIRD.PERSON) may mean 'I played', 'you (singular or plural) played', 'we (exclusive or inclusive) played' or 'it (inanimate) played'. Overt personal pronouns – or, more frequently, the context – are crucial for determining who did what.

If we are dealing with third person singular or plural animate participants, three forms will be distinguished:

– *apê-a-mi* (play-REC.P.VIS-3SGNF) means 'he played';
– *apê-a-mo* (play-REC.P.VIS-3SGF) means 'she played';
– *apê-a-ma* (play-REC.P.VIS-3PL) means 'they played'.

In free pronouns, Tukano and other languages of the family distinguish three persons and two numbers (singular and plural), in addition to inclusive-exclusive forms for the first person plural (see a summary in Aikhenvald 2010: 62). The context and the free pronouns are crucial for distinguishing first and second person.

The choice of an evidential marker with verbs of state will also help specify whether we are talking about the first person or someone else, creating a distinction between first and non-first person. Similar to Tariana, one will talk about one's own feelings using different information source markers than if one is talking about what someone else feels or thinks. This is one way in which East Tukanoan languages with multiple evidentials make up for having ambiguous person marking with bound pronouns on the verb (see Aikhenvald 2015: 149–150; Barnes 1999).

Tukano is gradually becoming the major language spoken by the Tariana. As a consequence of extensive areal diffusion, Innovative Tariana, spoken by younger people, is developing an inclusive-exclusive distinction in its bound and free pronouns. The original impersonal pronoun and the impersonal prefix are being reinterpreted as having the meaning of 'inclusive we', and the original first person plural form is used in the meaning of the 'exclusive' form (Aikhenvald 2010; 2018: 24–25). Another feature of Innovative Tariana is the extensive use of personal pronouns to mark subjects. This is absent from older people's Traditional Tariana, and must have developed under Tukanoan influence.

The choice of a visual versus a non-visual evidential in Tariana and in Tukano has a strong correlation with the person of the speaker, and can be considered a person marking strategy (see ex. (48–49), §4.3.2., and similar examples

from Tukano in Ramirez 1997: 134–135; see also Aikhenvald 2021a: 197–198; 2023d: 29–30). Talking about oneself in Tariana and Tukano will involve visual evidentials unless the action is accidental or one is talking about one's feelings, emotions, desires, and inner states. We turn to this in §4.3.2.

Contrary to what happens in Tibetic languages with egophorics, the same evidential tends to be used when general information is provided about oneself or about any other person outside of the community. In (34), the speaker is introducing himself with his traditional blessing name, Kuda, using the present visual evidential (Brito 2021: 271). The information about the speaker's name is a fact available to everyone.

(34) *nhua-naka hĩ   Kuda*
      I-PRES.VIS   DEM.ANIM Kuda
      'I am this Kuda.' (Tariana)

Throughout the narrative, the speaker talks about the respect everyone in the Tariana community has for the researcher who has undertaken the documentation of the language (referring to her with her Tariana name, Kumatharo). An example is in (35).

(35) *hanipa wha whepa   wa-de   wa-ni-**naka***
      much   we   1PL+respond 1PL-have 1PL-do-PRES.VIS

      du-na   duha Kumatharo-nuku
      3FEM.SG-OBJ she   Kumatharo-TOP.OBJ

      *wa-na   wa-pheru   kayu-**naka***
      1PL-OBJ 1PL-older_sister be_like-PRES.VIS
      'We respect (lit. respond-say) her, this Kumatharo, a lot. She is like an older sister to us.' (Tariana)

Most examples throughout this paper involve the first person singular – 'I'. The same statements will generally apply to the non-singular first person, with one proviso. We saw that Tibetic languages tend to favour an egophoric inflection for knowledge related to the speaker's personal sphere, and a factual inflection for knowledge involving the larger community. Similarly, the assumed evidential in Tariana and Tukano (the nearest equivalent to the Tibetic factual) is hardly employed with the first person singular. This evidential category can be used to describe common knowledge shared by the community in both languages (see Aikhenvald 2023a: 9–12; Ramirez 1997: 138–140 for Tukano), and is thus rarely an option to describe the speaker's personal sphere. The first person non-singular –

'we' (especially exclusive) – can reflect the experience of the whole community (what everyone knows), and is thus easily associated with the assumed evidential in Tariana and Tukano. We return to a special overtone of the inferred evidential with the first person in Tariana in §4.4.2.

4.3 One's inner sensations, thoughts and feelings

4.3.1 Tibetic languages

Referring to one's inner sensations, thoughts, and feelings typically corresponds to the category of endopathic (Tournadre 1996, 2017; Tournadre and Dorje 2003; Tournadre and LaPolla 2014; Caplow 2017). In most Tibetic languages, this category is marked by the same markers as the direct sensory. Some previous work has not clearly distinguished endopathic markers and egophorics (San Roque et al. 2018: 22–23; DeLancey 2023). However, the two types of markers clearly need to be distinguished since they contrast in the same paradigm and with the same predicates.[17] In Central Ladakhi, the endopathic sensory has the same form as the direct non-visual (-*rag*), as in (36). Common Tibetan does not distinguish between visual and non-visual, and its endopathic sensory marker has the same form as its direct sensory marker (-*gi.'dug*), as in (37).

(36) *nga-'a   mgo.tshag btang-**nga.rag***
      1SG-DAT headache   LV₁-UNCPL.DIR.NONVISendo
      'I have a headache.' (CLadakhi)

(37) *nga mgo   na-**gi.'dug***
      1SG head be_sick-UNCPL.DIR.SENSendo
      'I have a headache.' (CTibetan)

It is possible to use *-rag* in Central Ladakhi even when one has visual access to the state of affairs, if one wants to insist on one's inner feelings. Compare (38) and (39):

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17 Tournadre (1996) classifies endopathics as a subcategory of egophorics. The latter term should be taken as a general concept of 'talking about oneself'. In later works, Tournadre clarifies this view, which could indeed be misleading, by restricting the term 'egophorics' to a category of markers related to the speaker's personal sphere and distinct from endopathics, which denote the speaker's access to his/her inner sensations and feelings (Tournadre and Sangda Dorje 1998, 2003; Tournadre 2008, 2017; Tournadre and LaPolla 2014).

(38) *i   yul-po   bde.mo   'dug*
DEM village-DEF beautiful COP.DIR.VIS
'This village is beautiful.' [unmarked statement based on visual sensations]
(CLadakhi)

(39) *i   yul-po   bde.mo   rag*
DEM village-DEF beautiful COP.DIR.NONVIS
'This village is beautiful.' [based on inner feelings; the speaker knows the
village and has a personal opinion about it] (CLadakhi)

Knowing about one's inner sensations and those of others involves very distinct
perceptual and cognitive processes, which is reflected in the grammar of multi-
term evidential languages. In Common Tibetan (notably the Lhasa variety), one
cannot use an endopathic sensory marker when talking about other people's
inner sensations and feelings. For example, if a speaker wants to say that some-
one else has a headache (as in ex. (40)), he/she will typically use a sensory inferen-
tial marker (*-bzhag*) because he/she cannot access that person's inner perceptions
directly.

(40) *kho mgo   na-bzhag*
3SG head be_sick-PFCT.SENS.INF
'He has a headache.' (CTibetan)

In Central Ladakhi, *'dug* will be used to describe another person's inner state if
the speaker perceives cues through the visual channel, as in (41). The endopathic
-rag followed by the reported enclitic *-lo* will typically be used if the speaker re-
ports another person's inner sensations, as in (42).

(41) *kho-'a   mgo.tshag btang-'dug*
3SG-DAT headache LV₁-UNCPL.DIR.VIS
'He has a headache.' [inferring the person's state from his visual appear-
ance] (CLadakhi)

(42) *kho-'a   mgo.tshag btang-nga.rag-lo*
3SG-DAT headache LV₁-UNCPL.DIR.NONVISendo-REP
'He has a headache.' [the speaker was told by the person suffering from the
headache] (CLadakhi)

Egophorics with the uncompleted aspect are typically used for recurring inner sensations, as in (43) and (44):

(43) *nga-'a rkyang mgo.tshag btang-**ngad***
      1SG-DAT always headache LV₁-UNCPL.EGO
      'I always have headaches.' (CLadakhi)

(44) *nga rtag.par mgo   na-**gi.yod***
      1SG always   headache be_sick-UNCPL.EGO
      'I always have headaches.' (CTibetan)

In Central Ladakhi, the speaker can also use *-rag* when talking about what he/she feels like doing, since the intention is based on one's feelings, as in (45):

(45) *dbang.mo-'a pug gcig   btang-snying-**rag***
      Angmo-DAT   kiss a_little LV₁-feel_like-UNCPL.DIR.NONVISendo
      'I feel like kissing Angmo.' (CLadakhi)

In the completed past, there is also a contrast between the sensory marker *-song* and the receptive egophoric *-byung* in Common Tibetan. Example (46) may be used in a context where the speaker has just met the dog and immediately expresses his/her fear, whereas (47) would be used when the speaker is telling what has happened to him/her after having integrated the experience.

(46) *nga khyi-la   zhed-**song***
      1SG dog-DAT   be_afraid-CPL.DIR.SENSendo
      'The dog scared me.' [immediate reaction] (CTibetan)

(47) *nga khyi-la   zhed-**byung***
      1SG dog-DAT   be_afraid-CPL.EGOrec
      'The dog scared me.' [recounting one's experience] (CTibetan)

In Central Ladakhi, the bare stem of the verb ("past" inflection) will be used as an equivalent of both forms in (46) and (47); see (54) in §4.4.1.

4.3.2 Tariana and Tukano

In talking about one's own feelings, thoughts, and physical or emotional states, Tariana and Tukano consistently employ the non-visual evidential, similar to Cen-

tral Ladakhi, as described in the previous section. The non-visual evidential will be used for what the speaker feels or thinks but cannot see – illness, suffering, fever, and also thought, sadness, or happiness.[18] In (48), the late Batista is talking about his work for a white man on rubber extraction, where he caught a fever (or rather, a fever got him); he had almost died and was feeling weak. This stretch of the story is cast in the remote past non-visual evidential.

(48) *Madali-da   i-pumina   nu-na   adaki*
      three-CL:ROUND INDEF-after 1SG-OBJ fever

      *dhipa-**mhana***   *kai-peri.*
      3SGNF+get-REM.P. NONVIS pain-COLL

      *Tuki   nu-yami-maya-**mhana***   *nu-yena.*
      little 1SG-die-ALMOST-REM.P.NONVIS   1SG-exceed

      *Nhua   meyakude-**mhana***.
      I   lacking_strength-REM.P.NONVIS
      'Three (days) later fever got me, painful (fever). I well and truly almost died. I was lacking strength.' (Tariana)

The internal physical and mental states of someone else have to be described using a different evidential. Like in Central Ladakhi, this can be visual (while Common Tibetan tends to use the inferential) if the speaker can see what happened. In example (49), from the same story in Tariana as (48), the speaker talks about his companions, whom he had seen being taken with fever. He uses visual evidentials, as they were visibly unwell. The Tariana speakers pointed out on numerous occasions that one cannot use the non-visual evidential to talk about other people's feelings because one cannot feel what other people feel (further discussion and examples are in Aikhenvald 2021a and references therein).

(49) *Na-na-pita   adaki   dhipa-**na**-pita*
      3PL-OBJ-RPD   fever   3SGNF+get-REM.P.VIS-RPD
      *Paita   di-yami-maya-**na***   *di-yena*
      one+CL:ANIM 3SGNF-die-ALMOST-REM.P.VIS 3SGNF-exceed
      'Fever got them again. One well and truly almost died.' (Tariana)

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18 This is similar to endophoric meanings in Tibetic languages (see Sun 2023); it is also described as the first person effect in Aikhenvald (2004: 224–225), the term erroneously attributed to Timothy Curnow (Aikhenvald 2021b: 22).

In Tariana and Tukano, evidentials help distinguish person for the verbs denoting states and feelings. In active intransitive verbs in Tariana – which take personal prefixes – this differentiation can be considered redundant. In Tukano, first and second person are expressed in the same way on the verb (Figure 1, §4.2.3). The use of evidentials helps understand who the experiencer is, somewhat similar to Tibetic languages, as described in §4.3.1.

Depending on the information source available, one can use the inferred evidential, if all one is privy to are the visual traces of the event. A further option would be to use the assumed evidential, if the statement is based on reasoning and assumption (more on this in Aikhenvald 2021a: 197; 2003: 294–96. Similar examples from Tukano are in Ramirez (1997: 134–135).

The evidentials used to talk about one's own feelings and physical and emotional states, and also thought and internal speech, occur in statements about other people only if the speaker has a close kinship relationship with the addressee or a third person. In (50), a speaker comments on her own state of being nauseous (after a day of heavy drinking), using the non-visual evidential.

(50) *khenolena-**mha**-niki* *nu-na*
      be_dizzy-PRES.NONVIS-COMPL 1SG-OBJ
      'I am nauseous.' (lit. nauseous to me) (Tariana)

The subject of the stative verb 'be nauseous' and of numerous other verbs denoting physical and mental states takes the object case form (see Aikhenvald 2003: 239–240 on the properties of these verbs). In (51), she comments on what her younger brother felt, on that same day. She uses the non-visual evidential to refer to his internal state of being dizzy, as if she could feel for him.

(51) *khenolena-**mha*** *di-na* *kherunikanite*
      be_nauseous-PRES.NONVIS 3SGNF-OBJ poor+NCL:ANIM
      'He is nauseous, poor thing.' (lit. nauseous to him) (Tariana)

In some cases, the use of a visual or a non-visual evidential may lead to a different interpretation of the lexical verb in Tariana or Tukano (as is also the case in Ladakhi; see ex. (38–39), §4.3.1). A non-visual evidential with the verb *kherunikana* 'be poor, miserable' will imply that the speaker is feeling miserable, as in (52).

(52) *kherunikana-**mha*** *nhua* *ma:tsi-pu-**mha*** *nu-rena*
      poor-PRES.NONVIS I bad-AUG-PRES.NONVIS 1SG-feel
      'I feel poor (miserable), I feel very bad.' (Tariana)

By using the visual evidential with the same verb, the speaker will describe him/herself as poor and destitute, as in (53).

(53) *kherunikana-**naka** nhua dineiru sede-**naka***
poor-PRES.VIS   I   money   NEG.EXIST-PRES.VIS
'I am poor (destitute), there is no money.' (Tariana)

Speakers are aware of the difference between (52) and (53). Example (52) was accompanied by a metalinguistic explanation, 'I cannot see myself'. Example (53) was commented on by saying 'This is how I live'.

4.4 Oneself in altered states of consciousness

4.4.1 Tibetic languages

The degree of speaker's control and awareness often correlates with the use of evidentials (see Aikhenvald and Dixon 2014 and Aikhenvald 2021b on how altered states such as being drunk can be expressed with non-visual or reported evidentials in various systems). Examples (54–57) show different ways of saying 'I was drunk' in Central Ladakhi, depending on one's degree of awareness:

(54) *nga **ra.ros***
1SG   be_drunk.CPL.PAST.DFLT.DIR.SENSendo
'I was drunk.' [I experienced it] (CLadakhi)

(55) *nga ra.ros-**te.rag**-pin*
1SG   be_drunk-DIR.NONVISendo-PAST
'I was drunk.' [I remember and insist on the sensation I had] (CLadakhi)

(56) *nga ra.ros-**tog***
1SG   be_drunk-PFCT.SENS.INF
'I was drunk.' [I infer from some cues, such as the mess I made] (CLadakhi)

(57) *nga ra.ros-**kyag***
1SG   be_drunk-CPL.PAST.FACT
'I was drunk.' [I do not remember and have learned about it indirectly] (CLadakhi)

Common Tibetan makes fewer distinctions, but different forms are still available: *ra.bzi-song* (CPL.PAST.DIR.SENSendo), when the speaker is accessing and reporting the moment he/she got drunk, and *ra.bzi-bzhag* (PFCT.INFsens), when he/she realizes his/her state once he/she is already drunk. The sequence *ra.bzi-pa.red* (CPL.PAST.FACT) is also possible if the speaker presents the information as an objective fact.

For hallucinations, egophorics are also typically avoided when talking about oneself in Central Ladakhi, as in (58).

(58) *yog.ga gcig   bltas-pa rkang.pa **mi.ruk***
    down   a_little look-CO   foot   NEG:EXIST.DIR.VIS

    *rta-'i   ra.go **'dug***
    horse-GEN hoof   EXIST.DIR.VIS
    'When I looked down, I didn't have feet but horses' hooves.' (CLadakhi)

In the same situation, speakers of Common Tibetan will use the direct sensory existential *'dug* and its negative form *mi.'dug* instead of egophoric forms.

Ladakhi people believe there are beings that only some people with extrasensory powers can see, such as *lha.klu* 'spirits', *sba.lu* 'leprechaun', etc. Average speakers will not use sensory markers to refer to them, but can report their presence. In (59), the factual *yod.kyag* is used by a speaker who simply knows about the existence of such a supernatural being but is unable to see it. In (60), the direct visual *'dug* is used because the great lama (*Rinpoche*), who is the reported speaker here, is capable of seeing it.

(59) *nga'i   tshas-si   nang-nga sba.lu   **yod.kyag***
    1SG:GEN garden-GEN in-DAT   leprechaun EXIST.FACT
    'There is a leprechaun (*sbalu*) in my garden.' (CLadakhi)

(60) *rin.po.ches   nga'i   tshas-si   nang-nga sba.lu*
    Rinpoche:ERG 1SG:GEN garden-GEN in-DAT   leprechaun

    ***'dug**   mol-la.rag*
    EXIST.DIR.VIS say₁.H-UNCPL.DIR.NONVIS
    'The great lama (*Rinpoche*) said there is a leprechaun (*sbalu*) in my garden.' (CLadakhi)

4.4.2 Tariana and Tukano

In Tariana, a typical description of an altered state may involve an inferred evidential with the first person. In (61), the speaker wakes up, realizes how late it is (the basis of the inference) and describes what has happened.

(61) *nu-kama-huyme*   *numa*   *nu-yena*   *nu-a-**nihka***
       1SG-be_drunk-AFTER/SINCE 1SG+sleep 1SG-exceed 1SG-go-REC.P.INFR
       'Having got drunk, I have overslept (lit. I exceeded I slept).' (Tariana)

Example (61) involves deferred realization of what happened to the speaker. The speaker remembers that he had got drunk, and talks about oversleeping as an "inference" from the fact that he had got drunk (see de Reuse 2003 and Aikhenvald 2021b: 33–34, 109 on the notion of "deferred realization" and its expression in evidential systems). A speaker can use the non-visual evidential if they have no memory of what has occurred, as in (62). Here, the verb 'remember, think of' takes the non-visual evidential, as "the person cannot see themselves thinking or remembering" (using the actual words of Tariana speakers).

(62) *nu-kama-**mahka***   *nhua* *heku-se*
       1SG-be_drunk-REC.P.NONVIS I   yesterday-LOC

       ma-awakade-mahka   *nhua*
       NEG-remember/think-REC.P.NONVIS I
       'I got drunk yesterday, I don't remember.' (Tariana)

In contrast, a Tukano speaker may use the reported evidential to talk about altered states (Ramirez 1997: 142, Aikhenvald's own work).

(63) *yi'î* *utiá-**a**-pa'do*
       I   cry-REC.P.REP-NONTHIRD.P
       'I have been said to have cried.' [the speaker doesn't recall because he was drunk] (Tukano)

The non-visual evidential in Tariana and in Tukano refers to what cannot be seen with the human eye. This involves spirit attacks and their consequences (see also Aikhenvald 2003: 299; 2021a: 199–202; and numerous examples in Aikhenvald 2019). In (64), Jovino Brito tells a story about how he and his elder brother went hunting and were attacked by a spirit *ñamu*. The hunters managed to thwart the attack by lighting a fire and throwing hot tar on the ground. The visual evidential is used

when the speaker recounts what they did, in agreement with what we saw in §4.1.2. Their feelings are described using the non-visual evidential, as described in §4.3.2. The actions of the spirit are also cast in the non-visual evidential.

(64) *hĩ*   *nu-weri-nuku*   *nu-kalite-**na***
      DEM.ANIM 1SG-younger_brother-TOP.OBJ 1SG-tell-REM.P.VIS

      paita   *yaphini-**mha***   *diha wa-na*
      one+CL:ANIM thing-PRES.NONVIS   he   1PL-OBJ
      'I told my younger brother [visual], "Something different (contrary) it is for us [non-visual]".' (Tariana)

To reiterate: the remote past visual evidential is used in the story itself, as shown by the first line of (64), because the story is autobiographical. As discussed in Aikhenvald (2003, 2004, and other publications based on firsthand analysis of the language), all autobiographical stories are told using visual evidentials. The content of the speech report is cast in the non-visual evidential, because it refers to the actions of an evil spirit. In order to describe typical actions and attitudes of an evil spirit, the present non-visual is generally used. Example (65) comes from a narrative about the evil spirit *ñamu*.

(65) *hape-peri depiha pa-hña-ka*   *ina*
      cold-COLL   early   IMPERS-eat-SEQ women
      tapulisa-ka diha ñamu   *ke:ru-**mha***
      dream-SEQ   he   evil.spirit angry-PRES.NONVIS
      *iya-**mha***   *di-sueta*
      rain-PRES.NONVIS   3SGNF-put
      'If one eats cold (things) early, if one dreams of women, the evil spirit *ñamu* is angry, he sends (lit. puts) the rain.' (Tariana)

In talking about the actions and practices of shamans and healers, a non-visual evidential is also the preferred choice. In (66), Jorge Muniz describes a shamanic practice of inflicting illness with the help of a centipede and its poison (further examples are in Aikhenvald 2019).

(66) *diha amarusapare di-de-**mha***
      he   centipede   3SGNF-have-PRES.NONVIS
      'He (the shaman) has a centipede.' (Tariana)

When he was asked why the non-visual evidential was used here, Jovino Brito (who was helping with the translation) explained this with (67):

(67) *dihmeta-nipe-ne*   *di-ni-**mha***   *mẽda*
      3SGNF+think-NOM-INST   3SGNF-do-PRES.NONVIS   CEXP
      'He does (it) with his thinking, don't you know?' (Tariana)

This explanation reflects the metalinguistic awareness of the speakers, who are prepared to discuss and explain why an evidential has been used (further examples from Tariana and other languages, including Jarawara from southern Amazonia, are in Aikhenvald 2021b: 58–59).

The non-visual evidential reflects access to information by those whose powers and thus actions lie beyond the realm of the human eye.[19] In contrast, shamans and powerful spirits "see" everything, and thus are entitled to use visual evidentials (see further examples in Aikhenvald 2021a: 203–204), just like high lamas or mediums in Tibet or Ladakh (see ex. (60), §4.4.1).[20]

4.5 Oneself in dream narratives

4.5.1 Tibetic languages

In most Tibetic languages, speakers use different evidentials when describing what happened to them in dreams than in their 'waking life'. Egophorics and endopathics are typically absent from dream narratives. The main reason seems to

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19 We find many analogies across the world. In traditional Wintu, the non-visual evidential is used to talk about the supernatural (Lee 1938). The Trio and the Wayana, speakers of Cariban languages with just two evidentials, 'witnessed' and 'unwitnessed', describe shamanic attacks using the unwitnessed form (Carlin 2023). The non-visual evidential marker *ŋa-* in Dyirbal is used when talking about spirits (Dixon 2014: 186–187). The "auditive" evidential in Nenets (a Samoyedic language) and in Yukaghir (a Palosiberian isolate) typically refers to something one has heard or felt (but not seen), and to shamanic activities (Skribnik and Kehayov 2023: 548–550; Ilyina 2017: 167–169).
20 In a few Amazonian languages, a shaman will use a visual or a witnessed evidential when talking about his/her own shamanic revelations – as Carlin (2023) puts it, they represent an "alternative reality". Among the Shipibo-Konibo, a shaman recounts his/her experiences obtained under the influence of the powerful hallucinogenic *ayahuasca* using a visual evidential. Those who use a visual evidential to talk about something others think they have not seen may be accused of being unreliable "braggarts", or simply crazy (such an instance in Huallaga Quechua was described by Weber 1986: 142).

be that the speaker is in a position of a witness to what his/her alter ego is doing in the dream and does not perceive his/her intentions or feelings from the inside. Examples (68) and (69) illustrate this difference:

(68) *nga'i*   *gnyid.lam nang-la nga dang nga'i*
     1SG:GEN dream   in-DAT 1SG and   1SG:GEN
     a.zhang 'dug
     uncle   EXIST.DIR.SENS
     'In my dream, there were my uncle and me.' (CTibetan, CTC)

(69) *nga.tsho da   tshar-song   bsam-byas mgyogs.po*
     1PL   now   finish-CPL.PAST.DIR.SENS think-CO   fast
     *'gro-ga byed-**kyi.'dug**-ga*
     go-NMZ   do₁-UNCPL.DIR.SENS-PHAT
     'Once we thought it was finished, we pretended to go away fast.' (CTibetan, TSC)

In (69), if the speaker had been describing his/her experience in 'real life', they would have used the egophoric instead.

     Interestingly, Central Ladakhi speakers avoid the direct non-visual *-rag* when reporting what they have heard, felt, smelt or tasted in their dreams. They use the direct visual *'dug* instead, as in (70).

(70) *nga ri-'a   'dzegs-**'dug**   de.nas ri-nas*
     1SG mountain-DAT climb₁-UNCPL.DIR.VIS then   mountain-ABL
     *yog.ga bud-**'dug**-pin   rkang.pa chag-**'dug**   de.nas*
     down   fall-UNCPL.DIR.VIS-PAST leg   break-UNCPL.DIR.VIS then
     *'grul nyan-**na.mi.rug** de.nas zhag pha.lan gcig.po*
     move can-NEG.UNCPL.VIS then   days   many   alone
     *lus-**'dug**   nga skoms-**'dug**   khyi mug-ga*
     stay-UNCPL.DIR.VIS 1SG be_thirsty-UNCPL.DIR.VIS dog   bark-NMZ
     *tshor-**'dug**   nga'i   rma.kha rul-te dri.ma rtsog.po*
     hear-UNCPL.DIR.VIS 1SG:GEN wound   rot-CO   smell   bad
     *yong-**'dug***
     come₁-UNCPL.DIR.VIS
     'I was climbing a mountain, and then I fell. I broke my leg. I couldn't move and I stayed alone for many days. I was thirsty, and I could hear the dogs barking. My wound got rotten and there was a bad smell.' (CLadakhi)

Just as in Common Tibetan, egophorics are replaced by sensory markers in Central Ladakhi, as in *'dzegs-'dug* 'I was climbing'. Contrary to any narrative of one's "waking life", the direct non-visual marker is avoided and the direct visual marker is used, instead for other senses such as sounds (*tshor-'dug* 'I heard'), smells (*dri.ma rtsog.po yong-'dug* 'there was a bad smell') and inner sensations (*skoms-'dug* 'I was thirsty').

The reluctance to use egophorics is linked to the fact that speakers do not have direct access to their own intentions, but are simple witnesses. The situation is comparable to watching oneself in a film. The avoidance of the non-visual sensory in Central Ladakhi may be explained by the fact that speakers do not feel sensations in their dreams as acutely as in real life. Moreover, the visual sensory *'dug* encodes an experience that is primarily visual, but does not exclude the other senses, following the sense hierarchy presented in Viberg (1983: 136) (see also Faller 2002; Tournadre 2023). It seems that dreams are considered a predominantly visual experience in these languages.

4.5.2 Tariana and Tukano

In stark contrast to Tibetic languages, dreams by common mortals are treated as non-visual experience in the languages of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area (see also Aikhenvald 2023c: 29–30 on non-visual evidentials in dreams across the world's languages). Treating dreams and mental processes as non-visual rather than "seen" is reminiscent of the predominance of auditory perception (hearing) in the expression of mental processes in Australian languages and numerous languages of Amazonia and New Guinea (see the discussion in Aikhenvald and Storch 2013 and references therein).

The Tariana and the Tukano rely on dreams for predicting the reality of the day. And yet the dreams of a common mortal without any special supernatural powers are treated as if they are not quite what one sees in reality. In (71), Olívia Brito describes the dream she had the night before her father, the late Cândido Brito, passed away. She uses the remote past non-visual evidential throughout the narrative, as the dream had taken place three or four years before (see also example (14.37) in Aikhenvald 2003: 298; 2018: 32–33).

(71) *nu-haniri* *di-ñami-karu* *i-peya* *nuhua-misini*
      1SG-father 3SGNF-die-PURP INDEF-before I-TOO

> *hi-nuku*   *tapulisa-**mhana***
> DEM.ANIM-TOP.OBJ dream-REM.P.NONVIS
> 'Before my father died, I too dreamt of this [non-visual].' (Tariana)

When another speaker, Jovino, was asked why he used the non-visual evidential in talking about a bad dream he had just had, his answer was:

(72) *ma-ka-kade-**mha***   *nhua tapuli-se*   *mẽda*
      NEG-see-NEG-PRES.NONVIS I   dream-LOC CEXP
      'I didn't really see it, (it was) in the dream, don't you know?' (Tariana)

Conversely, a prophetic dream by a shaman will be cast in the visual evidential (see Aikhenvald 2018: 33). The explanation for this was given in (73).

(73) *thuya* *di-ka-naka*   *mẽda*
      all   3SGNF-see-PRES.VIS CEXP

      maliẽri-pu-naka   *diha*
      shaman-AUG-PRES.VIS he
      'He sees everything, he is a (real) shaman, don't you know?' (Tariana)

The way in which the non-visual evidential is used to describe a dream – as an alternative reality – is similar to what we find in a number of other Amazonian languages (see Aikhenvald 2015: 269) and is contrary to what is found in the Tibetic languages. Within the Vaupés River Basin Linguistic Area, vision plays a special role as a powerful – and dangerous – resource. Heeding and listening are at the heart of human socialization, along the lines of Aikhenvald and Storch (2013: 32–33). This offers an exception to Viberg's (1983) mostly European-oriented discussion.

5 To conclude

Tariana and Tukano, two neighbouring languages of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area in Amazonia, and two Tibetic languages – Central Ladakhi and Common Tibetan – share some significant typological similarities. Each of these languages has a large evidential system, with relatively similar categories. Tariana and Tukano distinguish between visual and non-visual, and so does Central Ladakhi. These two categories are, however, conflated in Common Tibetan. Each of the four focal languages has the same number of evidential categories in positive and negative de-

clarative sentences. There are few, if any, evidential distinctions in the future. In both linguistic areas, evidentials in questions essentially reflect the addressee's source of information and thus correspond to an anticipation strategy. Because of regular correlations between evidentiality and person, evidential markers often suggest who the participants in the sentence are. This is particularly so in the specialized uses of evidentials when associated with the first person.

There are, however, differences in the evidential systems of the two linguistic areas, notably regarding the hearsay or reported evidentials. In Tariana and Tukano, reported evidentials allow a distinction to be made between the time of the state of affairs and the time of acquisition of the information. In the Tibetic languages, hearsay evidentials belong to another syntactic slot and can combine with other evidentials, indicating several information sources or accesses.

In the four languages under study, evidentials show distinct behaviours when the speaker refers to him/herself or his/her close circle, as well as when the speaker's access to information is filtered by an altered state of consciousness. The fieldwork data we have collected show the following major contrasts:

– The first person intentional agent is marked by egophoric markers in Common Tibetan and Central Ladakhi, whereas in Tariana and Tukano overtones of intentionality are conveyed by visual evidentials (as we saw in the examples in §4.1.2; see also Aikhenvald 2021a). Conversely, the speaker's lack of intention is marked with non-egophorics in the Tibetic languages (typically direct sensory or direct visual evidentials), while the languages of the Vaupés Basin resort to non-visual evidentials to convey that meaning.

– In the Tibetic languages, the speaker's personal sphere (people and other entities close to the speaker) also tends to be marked by egophorics (§§4.1–3). In Tariana and Tukano, visual evidentials are typically used in these contexts, and one can talk about a close relative as if one can feel the same as they feel (§4.3.2; see more on this in Aikhenvald 2021a) – a phenomenon only marginally reported in the Tibetic languages.

– In both linguistic areas, supernatural phenomena (spirits or similar entities) which are not directly perceptible by common people cannot logically be marked with direct sensory or visual evidentials unless the speaker possesses extrasensory powers (high lamas, shamans, etc.). Factual, hearsay or inferential markers are commonly used in Tibetic languages in these contexts, because the speaker can only know about these types of supernatural phenomena indirectly. Conversely, this type of access is typically expressed by non-visual evidentials in Tariana and Tukano, because the non-visual markers of these languages may refer to the speaker's intuitions, and thus to the perception of generally invisible phenomena.

–   The expression of one's altered states and dreams differs in the two regions. In Tibetic languages, one's own dreams are consistently expressed using sensory evidentials (only visual in Central Ladakhi). Even with a first person agent, the egophoric is infelicitous in dreams, as if the speaker was simply watching him/herself in a film. Conversely, in the languages of the Vaupés Basin, the dreams of common mortals are cast in non-visual evidentials, as part of an alternative, "out-of-this-world" reality. However, the prophetic dreams of shamans are cast in visual evidentials, thus reflecting the correlation between the use of evidentials, the power of vision and the privileged status of the speaker, typical of the magical ethos across Amazonia.

The special status of evidentials is corroborated by speakers' metalinguistic awareness. Speakers are prepared to discuss, explain, and even query evidentials. At first sight, the languages under study seem to possess quite similar evidential categories, but they happen to have very distinct uses of these categories in specific situations, particularly when talking about one's own inner and outer life. The grammar of evidentials when referring to oneself allows speakers to make very fine distinctions, in accordance with their access to information. Depending on what one is talking about, the visual evidential may not be the preferred option. Evidential conventions at work for the first person – e.g., using the non-visual evidential for one's internal states – override the tendency towards vision as a preferred information source. This casts doubt on the universal validity of an evidential hierarchy based on the dominant status of visual information.

This study has thus offered a detailed analysis of the intricacies of multi-term evidential systems in a variety of contexts, revealing the pervasiveness of cognitive processes in the choice of evidentials. It has shown the necessity of taking into account the speech act participants, as well as the speaker's perspective on the situation, in order to account for the distribution of evidentials in the two focal regions. We hope that future in-depth studies on the behaviour of evidentials in such special contexts will provide detailed descriptions of the interaction of evidentiality with person in other linguistic areas. Acquiring more cross-linguistic data on the influence of the speaker's involvement, perspective, and altered cognition on the linguistic expression of information sources is still needed. It will allow us to cast light on some challenging aspects that remain to be unravelled to provide a comprehensive analysis of the most complex evidential systems.

Glossing abbreviations

1, 2, 3	first, second, third person
1, 2	first, second stem (traditionally called the "present" and the "past" stem for the Tibetic languages)
ABL	ablative
ALMOST	action nearly averted
ANIM	animate
ASSUM	assumed
AUG	augmentative
CEXP	counterexpectation
CL	classifier
CO	connector
COLL	collective
COMPL	completive
COP	copula
CPL	completed
DAT	dative
DECL	declarative
DEF	definitory-gnomic
DEM	demonstrative
DFLT.SENS	default sensory
DIR	direct
EGO	egophoric
EGOint	intentional egophoric
EGOrec	receptive egophoric
ERG	ergative
EXIST	existential verb
f	feminine
FACT	factual
FOC	focalizer
GEN	genitive
H	honorific
HSAY	hearsay
IMP	imperative
IMPERS	impersonal
INDEF	indefinite
INST	instrumental
INF	inferential
INFR	inferred
INTER	interrogative
LOC	locative
LV	light verb
MIR	mirative
NCL	noun class
NEG	negative

NMZ	nominalizer
NOM	nominalization
NONTHIRD.P	nonthird person
NONVIS	non-visual
NONVISendo	endopathic non-visual sensory
OBJ	object
PAST	past
PFCT	perfect
PHAT	phatic
PL	plural
PRES	present
PURP	purposive
REC.P	recent past
REM.P	remote past
REP	reported
RPD	repeated action
SENSendo	endopathic sensory
SG	singular
SGNF	singular nonfeminine
SEQ	sequential
TOO	additive
TOP.OBJ	topical object
UNCPL	uncompleted
VIS	visual
VOC	vocative

Other abbreviations

CTibetan	Common Tibetan
CLadakhi	Central Ladakhi
CTC	Choglamsar Tibetan Corpus (collected by Nicolas Tournadre in Choglamsar, Ladakh, India 2018)
CLC	Central Ladakhi Corpus
SAP	speech act participants
TAM	time-aspect-modality
TSC	Tibet Student Corpus (collected by Eric Mélac in Lhasa 2010–2011)

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