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Thinking for Speaking and the Construction of Evidentiality in Language Contact

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Abstract

Long-term habitual use of two languages can have consequences for mappings between form and content in one or the other of the languages. In processes of thinking for speaking, speakers attend to dimensions of experience that are available for morphosyntactic and lexical coding. In situations of long-term language contact there are tendencies, in some conceptual domains, for common patterning across languages. Merging of conceptual frameworks may be especially salient in communicating *point of view*. An example is the marking of *evidentiality*, where some Balkan languages fashioned evidential marking in contact with Turkish, and Andean Spanish did the same in contact with Quechua and Aymara. The case study shows that either the dominant or subservient language can change, depending on the need to fill a felt communicative gap in the other language. This process is tempered by sociolinguistic factors of language attitudes.

1. Contact-induced change

In situations of long-term contact between two languages, both of them change, approaching each other in form and content. Such contact scenarios provide valuable case studies for language, culture, and mind, requiring attention to dimensions of linguistics, psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics. Researchers have made strong proposals about what can happen in contact-induced change. For example: “There are no discernible linguistic limits to the possibilities of transferring any linguistic feature from one language to another. (Thomason 2001: 11). “Essentially any part of language structure can be transferred from one language to another” (Heine & Kuteva 2003: 1). “Under appropriate social circumstances—particularly in long-lasting contact situations—almost any feature from one code can ultimately be copied into another.” (Johanson 2002: 309)

The current literature provides impressive documentation of what can be borrowed or transferred from one language to another, including *features* (Gumperz & Wilson, Johanson), *morphological categories* (Thomason), *structural patterns* (Aikhenvald), *stylistic tendencies*, (Mithun), *patterns of semantic and pragmatic organization* (Muysken), and *functions, meanings, habits* (Heine & Kuteva).¹ However, there is less specificity with regard to the processes that are proposed. Linguists simply speak in terms of linguistic form, using terms such as “diffusion” or “transfer” of linguistic features. Or, if psycholinguistic factors are invoked, these are limited to economy of processing by individual

¹ See References for writings by the scholars mentioned here.

language-users, such as reduction of cognitive load, simplification of processing, or strivings to unify disparate systems. As a cognitive linguist, I ask: Where are the speakers, with their mental states, and communicative intentions, and values, and world view, and their interactions with each other? After all, people are not trying to be linguists. Rather, they're trying to communicate using the perspectives that they're used to—perspectives that seem to be the obvious and necessary way of framing events and taking stances in interaction. To be sure, they have “habits”—and these habits are formed throughout a lifetime of framing utterances in a particular language, that is, habits of “thinking for speaking” (Slobin 1987, 1996).

In this paper I suggest that a relevant process facilitating contact-induced change is the online attempt to frame communicative intentions in two or more contrasting languages. What is in contact are not linguistic forms but the uses of those forms by speakers. Contact can induce change when speakers try to accommodate thinking for speaking in one language while communicating in the other—and this sort of contact requires long-term bilingualism or multilingualism such as is found in the many border areas of language communities around the globe and in empires in which local populations speak a different language than the administrative language. Here I will focus on two colonial contact situations: interactions between Turkish and indigenous languages in the Ottoman empire and interactions between Spanish and indigenous languages in the Andes of South America.

It is useful to compare these two areas in terms of types of contact events as schematized by Donohue (2013), in a paper titled “Who inherits, what, when?” Donohue lays out three broad binary variables: *population mobility*: intruder or local; *societal hierarchy*: dominant or subordinate; *population size*: intruder populous or intruder minority. Ottoman Turks and Spanish colonials were both relatively small intruder populations occupying dominant social positions. In contrast to some historically similar situations, neither the intruder language nor the local languages were lost. However, the Balkans and the Andes fall into different cells of Donohue's larger scheme. In the Ottoman scenario, local languages, in Donohue's terms, “acquired morphosyntax overlay” from the intruder language—in our case, evidential marking. In the South American scenario, by contrast, the intruder language acquired morphosyntax overlay from local languages. This paper is an attempt to account for these two outcomes in terms of thinking for speaking.

2. Thinking for speaking

Let me begin with a few personal anecdotes, and I'm sure readers will recognize similar experiences of their own if they use more than one language regularly. These anecdotes, of course, are short-term, in the life of a single individual, but they suggest processes that become entrenched over generations, leading to the search for comparable means of expression in the two or more languages used regularly in a speech community. Consider, first, terms of address. I've spent a lot of time in Spain over the years, regularly conversing with several friends who are women. To each of them, individually, I use the familiar 2nd-person singular *tu*. In Latin America, when speaking to two or more women friends, this dimension disappears and they become *Ustedes* 2.PL, like the French *vous* 2.PL. But in Spain the familiar 2nd-person is maintained in the plural, and with the addition of gender. Two or more women friends are addressed as *vosotras* 2.PL.FEM, men friends as *vosotros* 2.PL.MASC. If a conversation with women friends switches from Spanish to English, I feel vaguely uncomfortable saying *you* to them. This discomfort lingers when I return to the States. Somehow it seems a bit crude, even indecent to say *you* to a group of women friends, as if I were insulting them or distancing myself by ignoring their gender and our friendship. I feel the lack of grammatical gender even more strongly when moving from Hebrew to English, because in the Semitic verb system there are distinct gender inflections on all verbs in all persons, along with distinct 2nd-person pronouns. That is, gender agreement is pervasive and can't be ignored in thinking for speaking. After a while, these feelings of grammatical lacunae in English fade, since I am not about to try to reform English

(though reformers have been able to influence the public use of 3rd-person gender forms in English and other European languages).²

However, the topic for the present paper is not gender but evidentiality, which is obligatorily marked in Turkish and Andean languages, as discussed in more detail below. My Turkish friends and colleagues speak fluent and beautiful English, but when I listen carefully I note an abundant use of expressions like “apparently” and “it seems.” These are perfectly grammatical and contextually appropriate, yet their abundance can sometimes be pragmatically unsettling. I wonder why the speaker is hedging so frequently. When I return to English from a period of talking Turkish, I find myself doing the same thing. My thinking for speaking in Turkish has sensitized me to a dimension that is not foregrounded in ordinary English discourse but in Turkish is part of the habitual background of language processing.

In psycholinguistic terms, a speaker has to “conceptualize” a forthcoming speech act and send a “preverbal message” to a “Formulator” for lexical, grammatical, and phonological encoding, eventuating in motor commands to the relevant articulators (Levelt 1989). In the course of learning and using a particular language, the “Conceptualizer” becomes attuned to the kinds of information that the Formulator needs for programming utterances in that language. That is, the Conceptualizer becomes selectively attentive to dimensions that are regularly marked in the language. Thinking for speaking “involves picking those characteristics that (a) fit some conceptualization of the event, and (b) are readily encodable in the language” (Slobin 1987: 435). The Dutch psycholinguist Willem Levelt has noted this principle in his canonical model of the speaker:

A final issue to be raised is whether messages must, to some degree, be *tuned* to the target language. Will a message for an English Formulator have to differ from one that is fed into a Dutch Formulator, merely because of language-specific requirements? The answer ... is positive: Using a particular language requires the speaker to think of particular conceptual features” (Levelt 1989: 71).

It follows that a bilingual speaker has two slightly different Formulators, selectively tuned to the two target languages. For example, when tuned to Turkish the Formulator has to attend to the source of evidence for claims. When a bilingual speaker switches to English, the Formulator searches for means to express the same information and finds that hedging expressions can sometimes fill the gap. But what happens in long-term bilingualism, extended across generations and varying discourse settings? This is the problem area of the linguistics of contact-induced change. Evidential marking in Turkish and Andean contact areas provides an instructive case study. The languages that lacked evidential marking created grammatical means for doing so—but using the forms available in their own languages. This raises a puzzle: How can languages influence one another without borrowing any linguistic substance—that is, without borrowing any explicit forms? The answer, I will argue, is that there is no “borrowing” involved, but rather the emergence of parallel Conceptualizers for the languages in contact.

² Arabic, like Hebrew, has pervasive gender agreement, contrasting with Turkish, which has none. I have heard Turks, fluent in English, ignore 3rd-person gender pronouns, saying things like “my father ... she.” Anyone advocating a strong form of linguistic determinism would be hard-pressed to explain why the position of women in various provinces of the Ottoman Empire did not differ notably between Turkish- and Arabic-speaking areas. Strong Whorfianism would expect gender equality in Turkey but not in Syria, Iraq, Arabia, Egypt, North Africa. Yet all of these Muslim areas were similar in this regard, regardless of language. Clearly other factors are more important than linguistic gender marking.

3. Evidentiality

First off—some terminology and a quick overview of evidentiality. We need a way to distinguish the two languages in contact. The terms used by Heine and Kuteva (2005) are helpful: the *Model Language* provides the concept, and the *Replica Language* creates means for expressing the concept. This paper is concerned with situations in which a Replica Language *assigns new functions* to existing forms in order to match a Model Language on dimensions of evidentiality. That is, one language (the Replica) re-uses some of its forms in order to carry on thinking for speaking habits established by use of another language (the Model). It is striking that in the Ottoman case, the Model Language is also the administrative language, whereas in the Andean case it is the indigenous languages that serve as Models.

For our purposes, *linguistic evidentiality* is characterized by two criteria: (1) The speaker marks a statement to indicate source of information, and (2) obligatory grammatical choices are required. Note that evidential marking is neutral with regard to the truth of the information. As de Haan has put it (2005: 319): “Evidentiality *asserts* the evidence, while epistemic modality *evaluates* the evidence.” Acts of assertion are the stuff of everyday interaction, making them especially susceptible to thinking for speaking effects.

Turkish provides a clear example, as described by Slobin and Aksu(-Koç) (1982), Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986), and many others. There is an obligatory, binary choice between past-tense suffixes *-dı* and *-miş*. For example, with the verb root *gel-* ‘come’, there are two possibilities:

- (1a) *Kemal gel-dı*
 come-PAST.WITNESSED
 ‘Kemal came.’
- (1b) *Kemal gel-miş*
 come-PAST.NONWITNESSED
 ‘Kemal came (apparently, reportedly).’

In uttering (1a) the speaker indicates that he has direct experience that Kemal came. By contrast, utterances of (1b) indicate indirect experience of some sort: the speaker has inferred or heard that Kemal came. The Turkish evidential *-miş* is neutral with regard to inference or hearsay. For example, the speaker may have noticed Kemal’s car parked out front, but has not yet seen Kemal; or the speaker has been told that Kemal has arrived.

Slobin and Aksu(-Koç) reported an additional use of *-miş*, which has come to be called “mirativity” (DeLancey 1997). An utterance of (1b) can also communicate surprise, as when the speaker hears someone approach, opens the door, and sees Kemal, who was totally unexpected. Direct experience is reported as, metaphorically, nonwitnessed. DeLancey proposes a useful distinction: “Evidentiality refers to the grammatical marking of the source of evidence for a proposition; mirativity refers to the marking of a proposition as representing information that is new to the speaker” (DeLancey 2001: 369). The Turkish *-miş* can function both as an evidential and a mirative (also termed admirative).

All three uses of *-miş*—inference, hearsay, mirative—in one way or another distance the speaker from the information being reported. Aksu-Koç and Slobin note a pragmatic extension to compliments or scorn. Even if an event has been directly experienced, the speaker can convey a sense that the event was far from what was expected. This is not the place to recapitulate all of the argumentation presented by Aksu-Koç and Slobin. For them, the essential factor distinguishing uses of *-dı* and *-miş* is cognitive: to what extent was the speaker’s mind prepared for the experience being reported? In their summary: “The essence of all uses of *-miş* is to encode situations for which the speaker is not somehow prepared—

situations on the fringe of consciousness learned of indirectly, or not immediately assimilable to the mental sets of the moment” (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986: 163). Thinking for speaking in Turkish—when reporting past events—requires constant background attention to one’s earlier level of mental preparedness for those events.

Aikhenvald (2004), in her comprehensive overview of evidentiality across languages, underlines the communicative functions of evidentiality marking:

The function of evidentials is to signal where information comes from. Having obligatory evidentials implies the necessity of being precise about the information source. ... Accuracy in getting one’s information source right is crucial for successful communication and for the speaker’s reputation.

This sort of precision is essential for every speaker in every situation, and it must be made automatic because it is obligatorily marked. Clearly, such a habit could easily carry over to planning utterances in another language. But where can speakers find linguistic means for expressing evidentiality in the other language? The literature on both of our colonial contact situations points to one highly probable source.

4. Language contact in the Balkans and Anatolia

Consider, first, the many long-term contact settings between Turkish and indigenous languages. In these settings Turkish is the Model Language and also the administrative language. The Replica Languages represent a range of language types, spread across a wide territory. In the Balkans and Anatolia, evidentiality has been documented in Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Serbian (Slavic); Romanian, Aromanian, and Judeo-Spanish, or Judezmo (Romance); Albanian; Greek; and Romani (Indo-Iranian). And to the East there are studies of contact-induced evidential marking in more Indo-Iranian languages: Farsi (Iran), Kurmanji Kurdish (Eastern Anatolia, Iran), Tat (Caucasus), and Tajik (Central Asia) (Aikhenvald 2004; Friedman 1986, 2003; Johanson 2003). In all of these Replica Languages, the typical source of evidential marking is to be found in past participles and forms of the Perfect. Note that these forms are retrospective with some anchoring in the current speech situation, and they tend to be focused on end-state or completion. Comrie has pointed out that “the semantic similarity ... between perfect and inferential lies in the fact that both categories present an event not in itself, but via its results” (Comrie 1976: 110). Historically, the Turkish evidential *-miş* developed from forms expressing the Perfect (Grunina 1976, and others). It is therefore understandable that speakers of Replica languages find overlapping meanings between their own past participial and Perfect forms and the Turkish *-miş* that they have become accustomed to using.

There are many discussions of evidential marking in Balkan Slavic (see, especially, Friedman 1978, 1986, 2003). The Bulgarian system is especially well developed. Fitneva (2001) provides a clear example of contrasting uses of the simple past and the participial past. If someone is reporting that a ship sailed away, there are two options:

(2a) *zamina*
left.SIMPLE.PAST

(2b) *zaminala*
left.PAST.PARTICIPLE

The form in (2a) is used if the speaker has seen the departure of the ship; it is thus a *direct experience* marker. Fitneva glosses (2a) as ‘I bear witness; it sailed’. By contrast, the use of (2b) indicates that the speaker has heard that the ship sailed away; the past participle marks indirect experience. In Fitneva’s

gloss: ‘It is claimed to have sailed’. Bulgarian examples (2a) and (2b) nicely match Turkish examples (1a) and (1b). Friedman, in a chapter on Macedonian and Albanian, notes the same sort of thinking for speaking transfer that I commented on anecdotally:

A point worth considering is the fact that speakers of Turkic and Balkan Slavic languages have reported feeling the absence of a nonconfirmative [nonwitnessed, indirect evidence] verb form when speaking English. Although adverbs such as *apparently* carry the same type of distancing semantics lexically, their use is felt to be gross and intrusive compared to selecting a verb form. I have felt this same lack myself when I have returned to the US after spending several months in Macedonia (Friedman 2003: 210).

Throughout the Ottoman Empire there were descendants of Jews exiled from Spain in 1492. They continued to speak a form of Spanish known as Judezmo or Ladino or Judeo-Spanish. And these speakers faced the same dilemma as Slavic and Albanian speakers: how to find an equivalent of *-miş* in their home language. Again, the solution was found in the Perfect—in this instance, the Spanish Pluperfect, which lost its meaning of past-before-past and became an evidential past-tense marker. For example, Varol (2001; cited by Friedman 2003: 191) reports the following form:

- (3a) Kuando estaban en l’Amérika, les **aviya entrado** lavrón.
 when they.were in America to.them had entered thief
 ‘When they were in America, a thief [apparently] broke in.’

This corresponds to the standard Spanish example in (3b), which lacks the Judezmo implication that the speaker was not a witness to the event. In the standard version, the Pluperfect performs its normal function of retrospection in a past-tense narrative.

- (3b) Cuando estaban en América, les **había entrado** lavrón.
 when they.were in America to.them had entered thief
 ‘When they were in America, a thief had broken in’

Examples (3a) and (3b) have the identical sequence of morphemes, but with differing implications with regard to the speaker’s source of information. Note that the typology of the Replicant Language does not play a role in these various Balkan examples.

5. Language Contact in the Andes

Here the Model Languages are indigenous, chiefly Quechua and Aymara, and the Replicant Language is Spanish. Our focus is a variety of Spanish known as *el español andino*, or Andean Spanish, spoken in the Central Andes from southwestern Venezuela through Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, to parts of northern Chile and Argentina. Bilingualism between Spanish and the dominant local languages has been widespread since the sixteenth century (e.g., Escobar, 2012; Rataj 2005; Rivarola 1986), comparable to the period of Balkan bilingualism between Turkish and various indigenous languages. Andean Spanish has a number of distinct linguistic features in addition to the marking of evidentiality (e.g., Hardman-de-Bautista 1982; Granda 2001; Pfänder 2009; Stratford 1989).

Quechua and Aymara have a system of evidential marking that bears an uncanny similarity to Turkish. For example, Babel and Pfänder (2012) give the following examples for Bolivian Quechua:

- (4a) EXPERIENCED PAST: *-rqa-* [cf Turkish *-dI*]

Khumpa-y hamu-rqa-Ø
 friend-my come-**experienced.past**-3SG
 ‘My friend came (I vouch for this information).’

- (4b) NON-EXPERIENCED PAST: *-sqa-* [cf Turkish *-mIş*]

Khumpa-y hamu-sqa-Ø
 friend-my come-**nonexperienced.past**-3SG
 ‘Apparently my friend came.’

They also note a mirative extension of the *-sqa-* form to express surprise—again parallel to uses of Turkish *-mIş*:

- (4c) *Hamu-sqa-yki-ña!*
 come-**nonexperienced.past**-2SG-already
 ‘You’re here already!’ (surprise)

Babel (2009: 496), who has worked extensively on Bolivian Quechua and Andean Spanish, notes a deep-grained attention to evidentiality that echoes the anecdotal observations of Friedman and myself with regard to Balkan and Turkish evidential marking:

Although no systematic investigation has been carried out, anecdotal accounts universally confirm that Quechua speakers consider evidentials to be essential to polite interaction; in fact, speech without evidentials is frequently characterized as animalistic (Hardman 1986 for Aymara; Nuckolls 1993 and Puma p.c. for Quechua).

Andean Spanish is not only spoken by Quechua and Aymara speakers, but has become a monolingual Spanish variety spoken throughout the highlands of the Andes. In this variety, the Spanish Pluperfect has been reconstituted as an evidentiality marker, parallel to the indigenous forms of (4b) and (4c) and performing parallel functions. In standard Spanish, the Preterite is used to report a completed past event and the Pluperfect is used for relative anterior times, as in (5a) and (5b):

- (5a) *Su amigo llegó.*
 3.POSS friend **arrive.PRET**
 ‘His friend arrived.’
- (5b) *Su amigo había llegado antes de X.*
 3.POSS friend **arrive.PLUPERF** before X.
 ‘His friend had arrived before X.’

In Andean Spanish this aspectal/temporal contrast has been replaced by an evidential contrast. For example, Herminia Martin (1981: 205) notes the following opposition in the Spanish of La Paz, Bolivia, paralleling local Aymara usage. Note that the Andean Spanish form, in contrast to standard Spanish, is used in non-sequential temporal clauses.

- (6a) *Hoy día llegó su mamá de él.*
 today **arrive.PRET** 3.POSS mama of him
 ‘Today his mother arrived (and I saw her arrive).’

- (6b) *Hoy día había llegado su mamá de él.*
 today arrive.PLUPERF 3.POSS mama of him
 ‘Today his mother arrived (but I didn’t see her arrive).’

The recruitment of the Pluperfect to mark indirect or nonwitnessed experience is identical to the evidential Pluperfect of Judeo-Spanish in (3a) on the other side of the world. And in both cases Spanish has been reorganized in the minds of bilingual speakers—regardless of whether their habituation with evidentiality was formed by a dominant administrative language, as in the Balkans and Turkey, or by subordinate indigenous languages, as in the Andes.

The Andean Spanish evidential Pluperfect is also used in mirative extensions to express surprise. For example, Laprade (1981: 224), in the same La Paz variety of Spanish, reports examples of commenting on “nonpersonal knowledge at the time of the occurrence of the event and subsequent surprise,” as in (7) and (8):

- (7a) *Me he cortado mi dedo.*
 ‘I cut (PERF) my finger.’
- (7b) *Me **había** cortado mi dedo.*
 ‘I cut (PLUPERF) my finger!’ (I hadn’t realized.)
- (8a) *Me he dormido.*
 ‘I slept (PERF) (took a siesta).’
- (8b) *Me **había** dormido.*
 ‘I slept (PLUPERF) (accidentally fell asleep).’

The Pluperfect is also used to convey surprise, as in (9) (Laprade 1981: 225).

- (9) *¡Había sabido hablar Aymara muy bien!*
 He had known (PLUPERF) how to speak Aymara very well
 (= It turned out that he *did* know how to speak Aymara very well!)

All of these mirative uses indicate a situation that was counter to the speaker’s expectations—in the terms of Aksu-Koç and Slobin, the information did not enter a “prepared mind.” All of these are pragmatic extensions that have become grammaticized in Andean Spanish. Numerous reports from field linguists suggest that these revisions of Spanish are the result of thinking for speaking in Quechua and Aymara. Hardman, Vasquez, and Yapita (1971) observe: “Virtually all [Aymara-Spanish] bilinguals believe that the Spanish pluperfect tense form reflects nonpersonal knowledge.” In fact, various observers report that speakers of Andean Spanish sometimes reject material written in standard Spanish, due to its lack of attention to evidentiality, and they often demand to know the source of evidence for historical assertions and news reports. Hardman (1986: 133), working with speakers of Jaqi Aymaran, noted that they found it difficult to imagine a language that doesn’t specify source of information.

It always takes a good deal of persuasion and illustration to lead to the belief that we really are not lying when we use an unmarked sentence to relate the material we have not personally experienced. (As when I might say, ‘Whorf was the student of Sapir’—‘No, I did not know them,—but no, I am not lying,—and no, I don’t have to say that I read it.)

She echoes Friedman’s observation about influences of Balkan Slavic on his own English, along with my anecdotes about Turkish influence: “To some degree we find ourselves having to adjust our English.”

6. Recruitment of Perfect tenses to mark nonwitnessed evidentiality

Thinking for speaking about source of information is only part of the story, of course. Some lexical item or construction of the Replicant Language has to be grammaticized to perform the function made habitual by regular use of the Model Language. In the cases considered here, there is no “borrowing,” because existing means are used. The Replicant language does not simply add evidential morphemes taken from the Model Language. (There may be typological factors involved: the Model Languages—Turkish, Quechua, Aymara—are all agglutinative, whereas the Replica Languages are not.) In any case, we need to account for the recruitment of forms of the Perfect as evidential constructions. Perfect tenses combine a perspective on results or endstates along with the processes that lead to those states. The state is typically currently experienced and its antecedents are readily inferred. This combination of ANTERIOR and RESULT is also characteristic of nonwitnessed pasts. In the Turkish example of *-miş* in (1b) and its Quechua equivalent in (4b), the speaker has some current evidence that someone has arrived, but did not experience the arrival itself. In fact, *-miş*, historically, is a grammaticization of a Perfect Participle, and the suffix can also perform this function in adjectival constructions. Aikhenvald (2004) notes widespread Perfect origins of evidential marking across typological categories and areas. And according to Friedman (2003: 210): “The connection between a perfect’s focus on result and the preceding act being treated as unwitnessed (*sensu largo*) goes back to the Sanskrit grammarians...”

In a paper on “discourse origins of the Present Perfect,” I offered a Shakespearean example of early uses of the Present Perfect to comment on nonwitnessed events with present consequences (Slobin 1994: 128). In *King Henry IV* (part 2, act 4, scene 5), the king wakes up to find that his crown is no longer on his pillow. He suspects that it has been taken. Note his use of the verb *take* in both Preterite and Present Perfect.

King: Where is the crown? who **took** it from my pillow?
 Warwick: When we withdrew, my liege, we left it here.
 King: The prince **hath ta'en** it hence: go, seek him out.
 ...
 (After the prince is discovered with the crown.)
 King: But wherefore **did he take** away the crown?

The king’s use of the Perfect, “The prince *hath ta'en* [*has taken*],” infers the past event on the basis of present evidence (‘The prince must have taken it.’). Later, when it is confirmed that the prince was the culprit, the king asserts the act in the Preterite, “wherefore [=why] *did he take* away the crown?” Of course, this contrast did not evolve into a grammaticized evidential contrast in English, but it may help to illuminate a possible grammaticization path followed by other languages.

The Pluperfect, or Past Perfect, may be the most suitable goal of such a path, because the form presents a situation as distanced from topic time, yet relevant to an established past referent point. Two versions of Spanish—Judezmo and Andean Spanish—have grammaticized the Pluperfect as marker of nonwitnessed past. Consider the discourse functions of the Pluperfect: If I’m telling you about a mutual friend, it would be odd for me to say: “His mother had arrived.” You would miss the attendant circumstance provided by a second reference point: “He received a call that his mother had arrived.” The evidential uses in (3a) and (6b) may suggest, to a speaker of standard Spanish, that the anchoring reference time is not available. His mother arrived, but the speaker lacks preparatory knowledge of the event: it entered an unprepared mind. In Andean and Judeo-Spanish, the Pluperfect presents a past situation which the speaker had not witnessed, and therefore cannot vouch for. The discourse bridge from standard uses of the Pluperfect has some plausibility.

7. Sociolinguistic factors in language contact

It is clear from the Balkan and Andean contact situations that the language of authority can be either the Model or the Replicant Language. Sociolinguistically, contact-induced shift occurs under conditions where long-term use of two or more languages is the norm for relatively large populations. However, in order for new forms to emerge in a language it is not sufficient that two languages live in the minds of individual speakers over generations. Language is always part of identity; language use is always a social act permeated with additional messages of power and solidarity. As Thomason (2011: 77) has pointed out, “the linguistic factors can be overridden by social factors pushing in an opposite direction.” And there are some interesting gaps in the overall pattern of contact and change quickly summarized above.

Greek presents an instructive exception to the pattern of replicating evidential marking on the Turkish model. In the Balkans and in most of Anatolia, Greek speakers did not restructure their language to express evidentials, even though they were in constant contact with Turkish. Friedman (2003) and Joseph (2003) suggest Greek language attitudes as a determining factor. Joseph (2003: 315) plausibly suggests that “some insight can be gained by looking to socio-historical reasons for the lack of diffusion of evidentials—in the case of Balkan Greek, it probably has to do with the attitude Greek speakers have about their language, the literary tradition of Greek, the identification of Greek with religion, the importance of religion in identity formation among Greeks, and the like...” An important sociolinguistic factor for maintaining this attitude appears to be a large and vigorous speech community. In isolated pockets of Greek communities in Anatolia, where Turkish was the dominant language of everyday life, Greek took on not only evidentials, but even Turkish agglutinative morphology. An investigator in Ottoman times (Dawkins, 1916), described Cappadocian Greek (central Anatolia) dramatically: “The body has remained Greek but the soul has become Turkish.” By contrast, where a small Turkic community is surrounded by a large non-Turkic monolingual community, the Turkic language can even lose its evidentiality system. Johanson (2003: 288) reports that Turkish dialects in the Trabzon area on the eastern Black Sea have lost evidentiality marking “under the impact of Greek (Brendemoen 1997),” and the Karai Turkic language spoken in Lithuania also lacks evidentials “under Slavic and Lithuanian impact (Csató 2000).”

8. Conclusion

In sum, what remains stable and what changes in language contact situations are language attitudes and language practice, grounded in cognitive processes. What the linguist sees are the results of processes of thinking for speaking, tempered by constraints of psycholinguistic processing on one hand, and linguistic attitudes and values on the other.

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