6.73 Kant and Innateness

[The Linguist List]

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LINGUIST List:  Vol-6-73. Thu 19 Jan 1995. ISSN: 1068-4875. Lines: 69
 
Subject: 6.73 Kant and Innateness
 
Moderators: Anthony Rodrigues Aristar: Texas A&M U. <aristar at tam2000.tamu.edu>
            Helen Dry: Eastern Michigan U. <hdry at emunix.emich.edu>
 
Asst. Editors: Ron Reck <rreck at emunix.emich.edu>
               Ann Dizdar <dizdar at tam2000.tamu.edu>
               Ljuba Veselinova <lveselin at emunix.emich.edu>
               Liz Bodenmiller <eboden at emunix.emich.edu>
 
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1)
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 1995 09:13:45 -0500 (EST)
From: STEVENBAYNE at delphi.com
Subject: Kant and Innateness
 
-------------------------Messages--------------------------------------
1)
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 1995 09:13:45 -0500 (EST)
From: STEVENBAYNE at delphi.com
Subject: Kant and Innateness
 
References to innateness in Kant are not easy to find, but here is one
that is relevant to the current controversy regarding linguistic "realism"
vs. "conceptualism."
 
        A middle course may be proposed bewtween the two above
        mentioned, namely, that the categories are neither
        self-thought first principles apriori of our knowledege
        nor derived from experience, but sujective dispositions
        of thought, implanted in us from the first momement, so
        ordered by our creator that their employment is in complete
        harmony with the laws of nature in accordance with which
        experience proceeds -- a kind of preformation-system
        of pure reason...there is this DECISIVE ojection ... that
        the necessity of the categories...then would have to be
        sacrificed. (B167-168._Critique of Pure Reason_trans. Kemp Smith.)
 
Noam Chomsky observes that "rationalist" as well as "empiricist" theories
of language incorporate "innate dispositions." (_Reflections on Language_.
Pantheon. 1975. p.215)  Whether the logical modalities enter the linguistic
picture is uncertain, but one can imagine that on some formulation of
minimality the connection with economy of derivation may be necessary in
some sense, to choose a possible example just for the purpose of
illustration. If so, then such modalities may NOT exclude "psychologism"
in linguistics and with it conceptualism ala Chomsky. One consequence would
be that arguments against extending linguistic "psychologism" to logic
would not be barred for the Fregean reasons sometimes cited by linguists
(e.g. Katz and Postal in _Linguistics and Philosophy_. 14, 1991. p.520.
 
The importance of Kant for the history of the philosophy of linguistics
is not innateness, rather it is in recognizing that concepts are RULES.
(ibid. A106).These rules allow the identification of the forms of
"judgments." Within a framework of rules ("principles") and parameters,
Kant's view of concepts takes on special significance, eventually pointing
toward a possible resolution of the question of the place of linguistics within
science.
 
 
Steven Bayne
(grad student)
UCONN, Linguistics
Stevenbayne at delphi.com
 
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