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<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial;">===========================================<br>
L O W L A N D S - L - 18 January 2009 - Volume 03<span style="color: rgb(102, 102, 102);"><br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial;"><br>
From: <span class="ep8xu"><span><span style="color: rgb(121, 6, 25);">Andrys Onsman</span></span></span><span class="hccdpe"> </span><span class="ldacoc"><<a href="mailto:Andrys.Onsman@calt.monash.edu.au">Andrys.Onsman@calt.monash.edu.au</a>></span><br>
Subject: <span class="hccdpe">LL-L "Language programming" 2009.01.16
(01) [E]</span><br>
<br>
To: Mark Dreyer<br>
Subject: LL-L "Language programming"<br>
From: Andrys Onsman<br>
<br>
Hi Mark<br>
<br>
> I *insist* that this is so. That is why we make them, to do what we don't<br>
> have the time or leisure to do ourselves. Conceding all your objections<br>
> in<br>
> the following passage, I don't disagree, you are only telling me the<br>
> brain<br>
> is a less perfect instrument than the computer: In certain limited<br>
> respects<br>
> (at present), true.<br>
<br>
My tentative assertion that the brain is not like a computer is based on its
idiosyncracy; its holistic inclusivity; its neurological inconsistency and its
ability to generate abstracted principles from multiple sources. It makes a
computer a very much less than perfect brain, rather than the other way around.
Regardless of what we may read in the popular media, no part of the brain works
in isolation, nor is it likely that any part of the brain is irrevocable
assigned to a specific task. As you can tell, the analogy is a bugbear!<br>
<br>
When I did my first PhD in non-literal language processing in 1988
(unbelievable - 20 years ago!!) I, like everyone who worked in our lab (and
elsewhere) was convinced that Collins and Quillian were correct in their idea
that language is stored and accessed logically in discernible parts of the
brain. Developments over the next twenty years (and especially in the last
three) in monitoring and measuring neurological activity have shown
conclusively that my entire thesis was completely wrong.<br>
<br>
> Andrys, you asked,<br>
><br>
> "Wouldn't recognition be an aspect of a sense of number? And vice
versa?"<br>
><br>
> I don't think so. Bearing in mind your point about the holistic<br>
> properties<br>
> of the brain, recognition is an Aboelian operation involving sets of<br>
> 'like'<br>
> in a set of 'one' among many, whereas counting is a collation of 'unlike'<br>
> sets of 'one' from 'one' to 'enth' among many. In the former, number is<br>
> not<br>
> important. Sort through a box of documents for a certain letter from your<br>
> Great-aunt Jemima. You can go through the whole box & find the letter
or<br>
> not, & I hope you do, without noting the number of documents.<br>
> Alternatively<br>
> you can count the number of documents without looking for, or even<br>
> noticing,<br>
> any specific one. Poor Great-aunt Jemima.<br>
<br>
Isn't that more related to task rather than concept? Finding something specific
is not essentially the same as counting instances. I'd imagine that motivation
has some kind of filtering (or focusing) agency in the task at hand. The brain
has the capacity to record and process information at the same time, which
would suggest some kind of filtering capacity. Go the puddle-ducks, I say!<br>
<br>
> And aren't these things always related to the observer?<br>
><br>
> Mark:<br>
><br>
> Yes, but how?<br>
><br>
I'd start by looking at motivation and purpose, but perhaps I assign them too
great an agency. Immediacy and incentives are also observer-specific - along
with all the usual suspects we have in nature and nurture.<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<span style="color: rgb(136, 136, 136);">Andrys</span><br style="">
<br style="">
</span></p>