<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Le projet <a href="http://www.sfl.cnrs.fr/-La-causalite-dans-le-langage-et-la-.html">« La causalité dans le langage et la cognition »</a> de la Fédération <a href="http://www.typologie.cnrs.fr/?lang=fr">« Typologie et Universaux Linguistiques »</a> a le plaisir d'annoncer deux exposés qui auront lieu mardi le 11 décembre 2012, 14:30 - 17:00, au Centre Pouchet du CNRS, salle 108 :<div><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#222222"><div><br></div></font></div><div><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#222222"><br></font></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); "><b>Syntax and Intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind</b></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); ">Brent Strickland (Yale University)</span></div><div><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#222222"><br></font></div><div><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#222222"><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; "><b>How to cause a passive state: The role of by-phrases in adjectival passives </b></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; ">Berit Gehrke (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)</div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; "><br></div></font></div><div><br></div><div><br><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#222222"><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; ">résumés : </div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; "><br></div></font><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); "><b>Syntax and Intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind</b></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); ">Brent Strickland (Yale University)</span><span style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); "> </span></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in; "><span style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); ">Certain aspects of theory-of-mind appear to be automatic, arising in ways that people cannot control and that may even conflict with the judgments they make after careful reflection </span>(e.g. Heider & Simmel, 1947)<span style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); ">. </span>Here I show that linguistic cues trigger automatic attributions of mental states via a link between the grammatical subject position and a core notion of agency.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in; ">An initial series of experiments shows that automatic syntactic biases contrast sharply with more reflective judgments concerning intentionality. Consider a logically reversible sentence like “John exchanged books with Steven”. Under time pressure people have an overwhelming tendency to perceive John as having acted more intentionally than Steven. However this bias disappears when people are given the opportunity to think deeply about the action in question. A second study shows that biases for grammatical subjects result from an association with a central concept of agency that is capable of influencing not only intentionality but also moral judgments regarding punishment and blame. A third and final study exploits the automatic attribution of intentionality to grammatical subjects to provide experimental support for the “unaccusativity hypothesis” (Perlmutter, 1978). Thus in speeded relative to unspeeded conditions, there exists an intentionality bias for unergative but not unaccusative verbs. This is exactly the pattern of results that one would expect if unaccusative (but not unergative) verbs involved the covert movement of a grammatical object to the grammatical subject position.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in; ">As a whole, the results presented here suggest a privileged relationship between language and central theory-of-mind representations (like that of an intentional agent). More specifically, they indicate that there are at least two distinct modes of generating intentionality judgments: (1) an automatic verbal bias heavily influenced by linguistic structure (2) a deeper, more careful consideration of a given event.</p><div><br></div></div><div><br></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); "><b>How to cause a passive state: The role of by-phrases in adjectival passives </b></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); ">Berit Gehrke (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)</div></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); "><br></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); ">résumé ci-joint</div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: Palatino; "><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; "><br></span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; font: normal normal normal 12px/normal Helvetica; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: Palatino; "><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; "></span></div></body></html>