Language Situation in the post-Soviet Ukraine (longish)

[Michael Flier]

Dear Mr. Ushakov:

Thank you for forwarding the Kuzio article. It is difficult to interpret
the true significance of Kuzio's interpretation, however, without
information about the nature and size of the polls he cites. Does he
provide that information as well?

Sincerely,

Michael Flier


************************************************************************

PROF. MICHAEL S. FLIER
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures
Harvard University
Barker Center, 12 Quincy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
. . . . . . . . . . .

TEL (617) 495-4065 [Slavic],
    (617) 495-4054 [Linguistics]
    (617) 495-7833 [HURI]
FAX (617) 864-2167 [home]

************************************************************************

On Fri, 7 Jul 2000, Alexander Ushakov wrote:

> The following is from today's
> RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 129, Part II, 7 July 2000
> (RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC)
>
> THE MYTH OF RUSSOPHONE UNITY IN UKRAINE
>
> By Taras Kuzio
>
> In the second round of Ukraine's July 1994 presidential
> elections, the incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, won the majority
> of votes west of the River Dnipro and his main challenger,
> Leonid Kuchma, the majority east of that river. The larger
> urban and industrial centers of eastern Ukraine gave Kuchma a
> modest lead over Kravchuk. Since those elections, the
> prevailing view among many scholars and policymakers in the
> West has been that Ukraine is clearly divided into two
> linguistic halves: "nationalist, pro-European, and
> Ukrainophone" western Ukraine and "Russophile, pro-Eurasian
> and Russophone" eastern Ukraine.
> Unfortunately, this framework for understanding post-
> Soviet Ukraine has failed when it has been applied to the
> Kuchma. When elected in 1994, Kuchma was an eastern Ukrainian
> Russophone, and it was predicted that he would return Ukraine
> to Eurasia. Instead, Ukrainian foreign policy has remained
> consistent throughout the 1990s, regardless of the language
> spoken by the president or his support base. The Ukrainian
> Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined this policy in 1996 as
> "Integration into Europe, Cooperation with the CIS," which
> continues to rule out Ukraine's participation in the military
> and political structures of the CIS.
> Under Kuchma, Ukrainian foreign policy has shifted
> westward more decisively, especially with regard to NATO.
> Ukraine has also been instrumental in preventing Russian
> regional hegemony through its membership in the pro-Western
> GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova)
> regional group, which in effect split the CIS into two groups
> of an equal number of states.
> Using language as the sole or main criterion by which to
> analyze post-soviet Ukrainian developments has proved to be
> flawed for two reasons. First, it assumed that Ukrainians
> belonged to either one or the other linguistic camp--
> Ukrainophones or Russophones. Most observers argued that
> language data in the 1989 Soviet census were flawed and that
> the actual number of Ukrainophones was far smaller than the
> number of Russophones in Ukraine. Moreover, a large
> proportion of Ukrainians, perhaps even the majority, are
> bilingual and therefore cannot be characterized as either
> purely Ukrainophone or Russophone. Kuchma himself, for
> example, uses Ukrainian in public but has a Russian wife and
> almost certainly speaks Russian in the private sphere. Which
> of the two linguistic groups does he belong to?
> Data from an Intermedia National Survey in late 1999
> conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
> asked "In which language is it easier for you to talk?" Of
> the respondents, 44.2 percent said in Ukrainian and only 38.7
> percent said in Russian. In response to the question "which
> language do you speak at home?" 47.8 percent said Ukrainian,
> 36.3 percent Russian, and 14.4 percent both.
> Second, there has been no evidence of the mobilization
> of Russophones as a group or lobby. Indeed, there is strong
> evidence that Russophones in Crimea, Odesa, the Donbas, Kyiv
> and western Ukraine have very distinct separate identities
> and have developed different attitudes toward the Ukrainian
> language, nation-building, and foreign policy. A recent study
> found that Russophones in Odesa and the Donbas exhibit
> "language retention," while in Kyiv and Lviv they favor
> assimilation or "language integration." A large number of
> Kyivites, for example, continue to use Russian as their main
> language but have not opposed sending their children to
> Ukrainian language schools, which now account for 80 percent
> of all schools in the city.
> A recent poll conducted in Kyiv by the National
> Democratic Initiatives Center among a representative sample
> of Kyivites was aimed at gauging the attitudes of Russian
> speakers and demonstrated this lack of uniformity among
> Russophones. Five main results emerged from the poll.
> First, 53 percent of Kyivites speak Russian always or
> most of the time. Of these respondents, 70 percent were
> brought up in a Russian-language environment.
> Second, half of these Russophones believe that the
> "Ukrainian language is an attribute of Ukrainian statehood."
> They feel that its usage in all spheres in the capital city
> does not reflect its state status and that there is still a
> need to raise its prestige. Moreover, according to these
> Russophones, state officials should take exams in the
> Ukrainian language to prove their proficiency. Only 30
> percent of Russophones in Kyiv disagreed with these views.
> Three, two-thirds of Russophones in Kyiv feel that their
> rights as Russian speakers are not infringed on within a
> Ukrainian language information space.
> Four, 70 percent of Russophones in Kyiv believe that
> Ukrainian citizens should know the Ukrainian language well
> and 44 percent believe that they personally should improve
> their Ukrainian because it is important for them to do so.
> And five, only 43 percent of Russophones in Kyiv agreed
> raising the status of Russian to second state language.
> The organizers of the poll concluded that only up to
> one-third of Russophones in Kyiv are opponents of
> Ukrainianization. Meanwhile, 50-55 percent use Russian but
> remain positively disposed toward increased use of the
> Ukrainian language and do not see such a development as in
> any way harming their national dignity.
> Contemporary Ukrainian studies await further research
> into the myth of Russophone unity in Ukraine. Clearly the
> situation in Ukraine is far more complicated than a
> simplistic division of the country into two linguistic groups,
> one oriented toward Europe (Ukrainophones) and the other
> toward Eurasia (Russophones). If Ukraine's elites wish to
> maintain an independent state, they have no alternative but
> to continue with a policy of "Integration into Europe,
> Cooperation with the CIS."
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>  Use your web browser to search the archives, control your subscription
>   options, and more.  Visit and bookmark the SEELANGS Web Interface at:
>                 http://members.home.net/lists/seelangs/
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Use your web browser to search the archives, control your subscription
  options, and more.  Visit and bookmark the SEELANGS Web Interface at:
                http://members.home.net/lists/seelangs/
-------------------------------------------------------------------------