Language and democracy; Luk'ianov; photographs from Ukraine

Fri Dec 3 11:39:05 UTC 2004

On Dec 3, 2004, at 3:43 AM, John Dunn wrote:
> Hm.  Perhaps this is the time to give our profession a boost by 
> promoting the idea that every media outlet in the anglophone world 
> should employ at least one Slavonic linguist.

Excellent point.  We might also use recent events to convince 
university administrators that Slavic Studies represent a complex and 
fascinating set of disciplines, a set that cannot be reduced by 
metonymy to Russian Studies alone.

I draw your attention to Fedor Luk'ianov's article (in Russian), 
*Evropeiskii renesans Ukrainy* (and attendant articles) which appeared 
in  the Russian internet publication Gazeta.ru 2.XII.04
http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2004/12/02_a_206242.shtml

  For those who specialize in languages other than Russian, a 
translation by Olha Bohatyrenko for UKL, is given below.

To view photographs of citizens In Kyiv and Maidan nezalezhnosty 
(Independence Square):
29 November - http://dere.com.ua/vybir/vybir_6.shtml
28 November - http://dere.com.ua/vybir/vybir_5.shtml
27 November - http://dere.com.ua/vybir/vybir_4.shtml
26 November - http://dere.com.ua/vybir/vybir_3.shtml
26 November - http://dere.com.ua/vybir/vybir_2.shtml
24 November - http://dere.com.ua/vybir/vybir.shtml

Cheers,
Natalia Pylypiuk (U of Alberta)

******
Fyodor Lukyanov, Ukraine's European Rebirth, gazeta.ru, 2 December 2004 
(Transl. by Olha Bohatyrenko)

  Whatever the outcome of the power crisis in Kyiv, one of its key 
consequences is obvious: Europe has discovered Ukraine. This fact may 
be very consequential for all involved - for Ukraine per se, for the 
European Union, and for Russia.

  During all the ten years of Leonid Kuchma's presidency, the EU has not 
paid Ukraine any special attention. The country remained in the 
background, shadowed, on the one hand, by Central and Eastern European 
states seeking to join the EU, and by Russia whom Brussels wanted to 
engage in a long-term strategic partnership, on the other hand. Kiev's 
reputation in Europe was worse than Moscow's: admittedly, according to 
its indicators of corruption, stagnation and state effectiveness, as 
well as its anti-democratic trends, Ukraine stood even farther from the 
ideal than Russia. All attempts to establish long-term promising 
relations with Kyiv would get stuck in a peculiar Ukrainian politics, 
where interests of various cliques and groups - financial-industrial, 
political, ethnic, religious - are tangled to form a very intricate and 
very solid web.

  A mere two years ago, virtually all European officials admitted 
off-the-record: Ukraine is hopeless. The concentrated intervention from 
without that took place during the presidential campaign detonated the 
complicated domestic political balance within Ukraine. And, despite the 
fact that the collision is far from being over, we can already talk 
about some of its consequences.

  First, for the first time in a long time, European rhetoric has 
geopolitical connotations. That is very surprising and unusual for the 
European Union, which has always denied its geopolitical interests. 
Brussels insists that it is not expanding in the traditional meaning of 
the word, but that it is conducting a peaceful and willing expansion in 
the areas of rights, law, democracy, and welfare that underlies 
integration. In fact, nobody denies this statement, yet one hears quite 
different arguments made in regards to Ukraine. It is especially 
obvious, for example, in the German mass media that openly warn against 
the re-establishment of Russian influence over Ukraine, talk about the 
pusillanimous inaction of Europe, which, unlike the US, has been 
ignoring such a strategically important country, and so on. 

  The impression of a geopolitical renaissance is reinforced by the fact 
that in German newspapers and broadcasts Lviv, for example, goes under 
its earlier name Lemberg (it would be fair to notice that it has 
nothing to do either with the revolution in Kyiv or with the awakening 
of expansionist ambitions in Berlin, it merely reflects German 
toponymic tradition). One of high-standing officials in the 
Eurocommission in Berlin noted to the author of these lines that 
Germans are, apparently, being again overpowered by the "Croatian 
syndrome". In 1991 Bonn recognized the independence of Croatia that had 
long been attracted to the German sphere of influence, which became one 
of the factors contributing to the beginning of the Balkan bloodshed. 
In any case, the situation in Ukraine allows the EU to act, this time, 
towards its "new neighborhood".

  Second, it was exactly the threat of serious destabilization in its 
large (even by European standards) neighbor that made the EU redouble 
its activity. And, again, it seems comparable to the politics in the 
Balkans in the 1990s: since the times of well-known "contact groups" in 
Yugoslavia and different "plans" (Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg, 
Bildt-Holbrooke, etc.) European diplomacy has not been as frantically 
active as it is now in Kyiv. Moreover, in regards to the number of 
high-level mediators Ukraine, it seems, surpasses Bosnia. This is all 
given, according to another Eurocommission official, that "until now we 
could not even imagine how complex and diverse Ukraine it, we were not 
ready for such a turn of events."

  Europe is trying to compensate for its unreadiness by active 
involvement in the crisis mediation process at this stage. The 
possibility of the Ukrainian split seriously worries Europeans. It is 
so worrisome that they, as it seems, may, despite all their sympathies 
towards Yushchenko, pressure him into a compromise with his opponents.

  Third, Russia is fast losing its bastions in Ukraine. Having placed a 
substantial and aggressive bet on Yanukovych, the Kremlin, as it turns 
out, is absolutely not ready for any other outcome than that of its 
favorite's victory. All of Moscow's attempts to regain the initiative 
either through forecasting a forthcoming disaster or through flirting 
with separatist regions in the East have so far had an opposite effect: 
Europe initiated its own mediation efforts, and a substantial number of 
Kuchma-Yanukovych's supporters, frightened by all that is going on, 
have condemned separatism. If the EU and the OSCE are successful in 
making the parties in the conflict reach a compromise, then Moscow can 
literally forget about having any political influence in Ukraine.

  And, since it was Russia's insistence on the idea that the Ukrainian 
elections are a crucial geopolitical battle, one must admit that Russia 
is on the verge of a total defeat.

Given all this, Kremlin's passivity is a striking contrast to its own 
hyperactivity just a few days ago. At the crucial moment Russia, 
seeking a dominant position, is represented in Kyiv by such a 
politician as Boris Gryzlov. The only name for it is capitulation.  
  The outcome of the battle for Ukraine can have substantial influence 
on European politics. A pro-Western candidate (and it does not have to 
be Viktor Yushchenko) will make European leaders pay more attention to 
the country that was taken quite lightly a mere month ago. Electoral 
fervor has unnaturally stimulated interest towards Kyiv, having 
increased its importance (without even exaggerating  it) for the Old 
World. This, without saying, does not mean that Ukraine will be offered 
some fast-track integration within the EU. Yet, nor does it mean that 
Ukraine's chances of joining this EU equal to those of New Zealand, as 
Romano Prodi once stated.

  In the meantime, the wave of protests regarding the forthcoming 
negotiations regarding the Turkish membership is growing. These 
negotiations will last at least ten years, and, furthermore the 
Eurocomimssion intends to introduce a special clause allowing it to 
terminate the negotiations at any time should Ankara's reforms, in 
Brussels' opinion, regress. If, in the meantime, the situation in 
Ukraine changes, then the rhetorical question "Why conditionally 
European Turkey, and not surely European Ukraine" may become a 
practical reality. Although this, as they say in fairy-tales, is a 
different story.

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