Some thoughts on the Richardson reading

[Linnea Micciulla]

Hi everyone,

It seems that the primary questions being asked in this chapter are related
but with different foci:  first, is ‘Islamophobia’ a good term to describe
anti-Muslim prejudice, and second, how do we distinguish between bigotry and
valid criticism?  For the first question, I disagree with Halliday’s
assessment that “The attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against
Muslims as a people.”  I think the attack is also against Islam; from
well-known extremists such as Ann Coulter to anonymous hate-postings on the
Web, there is the suggestion that if Muslims converted to Christianity this
would remove or diminish their threat.  And, as John mentions, people
routinely use quotes from Islamic texts or rumors they’ve heard about Islam
to support their claims.  In the field of social action, again, as John
suggests, there is evidence that hate crimes against Muslims (or people who
look Muslim) are driven by perceived “Muslim-ness.”  So it's difficult to
claim that there is not a backlash against (perceptions of) Islam.

Perhaps a “phobia” is not a good way to describe this phenomenon, since,
although fear is certainly a factor, and the social arena is at least as
important as (if not more important than) the emotional arena.  Of course,
whether we like the term or not, it’s already come into common usage, and
its meaning will eventually be shaped by those who have the power and
interest to shape it.  I wonder if a ‘phobia’ is better than an ‘ism’ in
that regard, seeing how the meaning of anti-Semitism has been twisted to
mean anti-Israeli, so that it can be used to stifle legitimate criticism of
the Israeli government as well as non-legitimate criticism of the Jewish
faith or of Jewish people as a whole.  ‘Phobia’ is probably more difficult
to co-opt in defense of governments, since it has a narrower meaning than
‘ism’.

The second question is posed, “This clearly entails an interpretative
problem: in short, how do we establish that such hostility is unfounded, as
opposed to justified?” Although the rules for rational argumentation are
helpful, it may be difficult to avoid getting caught in a circular trap,
where the application of the rules yields different results according to
each point of view.  John states, “Critical views should be accurate and
relate to the actual beliefs, standpoints and practices of Islam rather than
distorted or perverse interpretations” – but who decides which
interpretations are perverse?  The conclusion reached after the discussion
of the BNP’s background, “In summary therefore, we need to consider the
character and conduct of the arguer” seems to violate the argumentum ad
hominum, since starting from the standpoint that they are biased or have
made contradictory claims is a way of taking away their right to argue.

I wonder if doing an inter-group comparison would be a good supplemental
technique for identifying prejudice towards Muslims (or other groups).  For
example, how does the media’s treatment of Iraq’s Muslim insurgents compare
with its treatment of Ireland’s Catholic IRA (or more recently, the Real
IRA)?   In both cases, the US has classified the group as ‘terrorist,’ they
use violence as a means to achieve their ends, and they are referenced by
their associated religions.  Are both groups essentialized / stratified?
Identification of essentialization & stratification would be made clearer by
juxtaposition with an absense of these strategies.  Comparing Muslim &
Catholic conflicts, does Western media position of the first as “other” –
Muslim, Middle Eastern, and the second as “us” – Christian, Western?  Are
they both provided with equal historical context?  In John’s analysis of
Curtis’ conclusions about representation of Afghan lives, the bias is made
clear through comparison of media treatment of American and Iraqi lives.
This is an example of useful application of group comparison.

Looking forward to hearing your thoughts,
Linnea